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
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THE VALUE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING CONTEMPORARY MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

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The most recent work on which these observations are based was a study of "Personnel Concepts and Practices" for the Municipal Manpower Commission. We were concerned with the ways in which these concepts and practices help or hinder the governmental and administrative processes of the modern urban government; and the ways in which they must be changed to accommodate themselves more exactly to the needs of those governments.

At the point in time when this paper is being written, the report to the Municipal Manpower Commission has not yet been completed; and by the time this paper is presented, the Commission's report will not yet have been made public.

All this is said as prelude to a disclaimer of any necessary relationship between what is about to be said and what may issue from the Municipal Manpower Commission. As they say in the fine print on the movie screen, "any resemblance is purely coincidental."

Both this paper and the report for the Municipal Manpower Commission are based on thirty years of close association with public personnel administration as technician, administrator, board member, consultant, teacher, writer and active participant in professional organization activities. This paper summarizes personal conclusions and convictions, based on participation ranging from passive observer to active battler in the arena in behalf of better personnel standards and practices.

The experience begins in 1931, when the spectre of the political spoilsman still haunted every public office; when widespread unemployment glutted the labor market with every needed talent; when urban governments of the size which is commonplace today were few and far between; and urban governments of the complexity we know today were scarcely dreamed of.

It spans all the time since, until this day of numerous urban governments; of complicated urban governments; of urban governments administered by the professionally trained and governed by politicians whose sophistication has carried many of them beyond old spoils practices; and of urban governments which now compete with prosperous private enterprise for managerial and professional talents.

The change in the problems of urban governments has been extreme; with extreme change necessarily comes the need to reexamine the concepts and the nature and practices of the institutions that serve those governments.

Unfortunately, the change in concepts of government and administration has not been nearly as dramatic as the change in the nature of the urban areas and their problems. We have had no real innovation in municipal government since the city manager form of government was first tried, many years ago. There has been little done with the internal organization of municipal governments to meet the change in service and in emphasis required by modern conditions. There has been a notable lack of success in fashioning any truly novel machinery of government to serve the whole metropolitan area. We have proceeded by compromise and patchwork in the face of problems deserving daring, new approaches.

True, we have accepted technical advances. We have progressed from the quill pen, to the fountain pen, to the ballpoint as technology has offered these new wonders; but we use the new tools to continue doing the old things in essentially the same way.

As we awaken to this lack of progress it is fitting that attention should be focused on personnel concepts and practices. The dynamics, the animation of local governments depends on the people who staff them. Ordinances are not self-executing, appropriations are not self-spending, public works are not self-constructed and no other service of local government has meaning except as it is planned, directed and delivered by people. Their motivations, their skills, their understanding determine the character of the government. In turn, the concepts and measures which guide their selection and treatment predetermine the extent and nature of their motivation, their skills and their understanding.

We are here concerned with "The Value Assumptions Underlying Contemporary Municipal Personnel Systems". I wish I could report with full confidence what they really are. Thirty years ago I was sure I knew. It was a certainty based in part on the eternal assurance of youth that what it knows and believes is the whole truth and compass of any subject; and in part on the simplicity of the value assumptions of that day. To the extent that we had formal personnel systems at all thirty years ago -- and they were then the exception rather than the rule -- they were the product of a civil service reform movement which declared political patronage to be an evil and which set up deliberate machinery to thwart the spoilsmen.

Three decades of change challenge that simple rationale for a personnel system. The system born of reform is no longer equal to the task. It no longer has the vigor of the original reform, nor is it suited to today's needs.

The simplest, most effective reform is that which takes place in one location; under one change of leadership. That which is more general in its application in both time and place, and which entails change of system, or concept or mores, is by all odds the most difficult reform to sustain because it goes contrary to the traditional way of doing things and it upsets vested interests. In the initial burst of enthusiasm, this type of reform may be quite successful; but the combination of the inertia which supports tradition and the re-action the attempted change causes in vested interests, will in time tend to outweigh the reformer's zeal. Moreover, the reformer's zeal is transient. Once he makes his point, he scores the victory and then goes on to seek new fields of reform. In time the underbrush of the old established ways of doing things may creep back to obliterate the marks of his early victories.

These characteristics of reform have left their mark on public personnel administration. The zealots of the early day of civil service reform are long gone. The reform having been deemed a success, the reformers turned to other problems. The personnel administrator was left the task of trying to hold the gains once made. He was handicapped by not having a constantly renewed popular mandate of the people. He was a mere administrative agent, attempting to enforce a law based on a concept contrary to old habits, old practices and what some regarded as their vested interests.

In the minds of many of these administrators, preserving the sanctity of the system against political assault remained the basic purpose of his work.

Few have dared to question the validity of this attitude lest they be branded as friends of patronage hungry politicians. Yet in many places the style in politicians has changed (very much for the better, I should add); the pressure for job patronage has diminished; the need for qualified, dedicated administrative and professional staff has become pronounced; and we have later concepts in both the form of municipal government and in labor relations, which render obsolete much of the practice and concept based on the "thwart the spoilsmen" school of reform.

The merging of these new forces with the remnants of old attitudes and practices has created a state of confusion about the true values underlying our municipal personnel systems.

We have convincing evidence that there is virtually no agreement among either the personnel practitioners or the administrators they serve concerning the underlying principles and practices of public personnel administration. With notably few exceptions, their disagreement is complete and general. There is no clear difference of attitudes on any considerable number of points between the personnelists and those they serve; or between the laity and the professionals; or between different parts of the country; or between different sizes and kinds of local government; or between different legal bases for the system. All disagree with each other and among themselves to about the same extent.

If there is any tendency to agree at all, it is not on those points which are the essentials of personnel administration. They tend to agree a little more, instead, on the need to serve the creature comforts of employees by providing pleasant, airy, well-lighted and well appointed places of work. When one poses 412 statements of concept and practice to a cross-section of personnel practitioners and general administrators and finds that there are only 24% of these items on which 50% or more of the respondents agree concerning present concepts and practice, and only 27% on which the same number of respondents can agree on desirable concepts and practices, one wonders what, indeed, are the values by which we judge either what we have or what we need.

If I cannot report with confidence any consensus of value judgments among the practitioners, I can speak with conviction about the values that I think ought to underlie our municipal personnel systems.

First, it is time to dismiss the thwarting of the spoilsmen as a factor of consequence. Most of them have already been thwarted. The rest can better be disposed of as a by-product of better conceived personnel systems, depending on other value and seeking other goals.

Second, I would assert the need to recognize that the civil service at all levels of government must be responsive to the policy and administrative direction of those our political system places in charge of governmental matters. This does not require political enslavement of the bureaucracy, nor does it even mean that the civil servant should be denied the right to think and act in the political arena as he sees fit. But it does mean that once the people decide who is to act for them, the entire civil service must give unqualified support to the program, regardless of personal viewpoint about its merits.

Third, just as it is important to recognize that the public employee has a right to maintain his identity as a political person, so is it important to recognize his right to organize and to use the force of organized effort to seek improvement in his conditions of employment. The details of how far he can use this force, and in what manner, need still to be worked out; but we can no longer afford to deny public employees the right to organization and representation so freely enjoyed by those who labor for private enterprise.

Fourth, much needs to be done in other ways to dignify public employment. It will be said that if public employment is to enjoy higher regard, the public employee will have to earn it. He must do his share; but if the public wants better service and a higher quality of civil servant it will have to change some of its own deep-seated attitudes.

If we were as quick to forgive honest errors of judgment by the public servant as we are to condone the deliberate flaunting of the moral code by prominent figures in other walks of life, we would remove an obstacle to dedicated public service. We cannot expect innovation and quick progress in administration until we are willing to concede that those who try and dare will make honest mistakes. Along with this, the citizenry must learn that an isolated act of dishonesty, or incompetence, or arrogance by a public servant, does not support the generalization

that all public servants are dishonest, incompetent or arrogant. The record will show that more bank tellers than government clerks steal money. Yet banks are respected institutions, while one example of a government employee's peculation attaches a stigma to all government in the community.

Fifth, the modern personnel system must be based firmly on the principle that the public interest is paramount. Personnel systems protect the employee only because a degree of security is essential to a stable and able work force. We do not provide security for the sake of the employee alone. Certainly every degree of security consistent with the public interest should be provided; but when it becomes a matter of deciding whether to do what is best for the public or best for the employee, there should be no doubt about which must control.

Here is a point on which current thinking among the practitioners is confused. There is a reasonable amount of agreement with the general thesis that the public interest is paramount. There is just as much agreement in thought and practice with a host of other ideas directly contrary to that thesis. Whether by design or circumstance, public personnel systems operate to the protection of the employee first, and to the ends of better government only incidentally or secondarily.

On the question of what is in the public interest, the views of top management or of operating departments must generally govern -- not those of the personnel agency. The police are responsible for law enforcement, the building inspectors for safety, the health officer for sanitation and wholesome environment, the engineer for public works. The personnel agency provides a very vital resource to each -- the human materials out of which they shape their organization and through which they do their work. But the administrators have the responsibility for delivering the service. Theirs must be the louder voice in declaring what is in the public interest.

Sixth, our public personnel systems must aggressively seek and hold the best available talent. The practices of the past and present have been too passive. We have announced employment opportunities, have invited applicants and have been content to accept the best of those who apply. In the personnel systems of the future, let the job seek out the man. Let active talent searches, with inducements and persuasions, take the place of mere advertisement.

Let high standards of performance be defined and let employees be evaluated in comparison to those standards. Let there be flexibility in assigning the employee according to his interests and highest ability, rather than in accordance with the narrow job classification for which he happened first to pass a test. Let incentives be established and let those who respond be rewarded. Above all, let those who fail to measure up to the high standards be displaced by those more willing and more able. Let those who have not the capacity to enlarge their vision and their understanding to match the steady enlargement of the problems of urban government, relinquish their authority and responsibility to those of greater vision, ability and will.

Seventh, the traditional assumptions underlying the personnel systems of the past must yield to the assumptions underlying a later development in municipal government. Civil service reform had its origins in national and state governments administered by politically elected chief executives. A modern, progressive city utilizes professional managers. If there ever was any justification for extending the principle of check and balances by creating independent personnel agencies in the national and state governments -- or even in local governments administered in the same political way -- that justification fails to extend to a form of government designed to retain political control in a governing body, but assigning administrative responsibilities to a professional manager. It is a complete contradiction to hold a manager responsible for results while denying him the authority to manage the people on whom he must rely for those results. The concept of the manager and the early concept of the independent, sheltered civil service system are diametrically opposed. The only way to resolve the conflict is to concede that personnel management is an essential part of the total central management, and to strike down all concepts and practices inconsistent with that concession.

The political scientist has an important role to play in creating sound values as the foundation of effective public personnel administration. From the elementary course in civics to the graduate course in political science, every student will be, at least, an individual who will exercise the rights of citizenship throughout his life. He must be made to appreciate these values so that he can better judge the issues affecting public service on which he will express himself by direct vote or through his elected representatives.

Others will become active participants in the political arena. They need to see clearly the distinction between the making of policy by the elected representatives of the people, and its execution by a trained, efficient bureaucracy. Further, their support must be enlisted for the values that will create that bureaucracy and hold it to high standards of performance.

There are those who will become the administrators. They, too, must understand the distinction between the policy making responsibility of others and their own obligation to fashion and direct the organization and systems by which policy is implemented.

Finally, there are those who by scholarly endeavor will broaden our scope of understanding and perpetuate the discovered values by becoming the teachers of new generations. It is particularly important that these should regard the values underlying personnel administration as something far above and beyond the mere mechanics of government.

Having been caught in the crossfire, I am well aware of the differences often found between the professor of political theory and the professor of public administration. Except as debate serves to sharpen the wits, I see little purpose in their differences. We are all -- scholars and practitioners alike -- concerned with the totality of governmental institutions. The concepts on which their constitutional and statutory forms are based, their internal organization, the apparatus for political control and day-to-day systems of operation are completely bound together. Theory, form and method form an indivisible trinity.

Men and women at work make all of this reality. Whether this reality is directed to the selfish ends of the employees or to the higher ends of the public interest, whether government serves enlightened ends or leans to obstruction and control, whether the best shall serve the people or only the mediocre and the poor, depends entirely on how well we can establish and maintain the true values that must underlie municipal personnel administration.

THE DIFFUSION OF POLITICAL IDEAS AND STRUCTURES IN THE COMMONWEALTH

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At the turn of the century when Joseph Chamberlain reminded the colonial prime ministers that--"The weary Titan struggles under the too, too great weight of its Orb" he indicated no intent to abdicate responsibility. Rather, it was a plea for the emerging dominions to assume larger defense responsibilities in what was later to become a commonwealth of nations. Imperialist that he was, he little visioned an association of free nations that in fifty to sixty years would include peoples of what was then termed "darkest Africa." Yet inherent in the ideas of the institutions that were transplanted from British soil were forces that might make full and free self-government inevitable. The timing might be controlled in part by the Imperial authorities but even this at times out-ran the wishes of colonial administrators. World events, particularly the maturing effects of two major world wars, gave to the young colonies a sense of nationhood that had to be translated into governmental expression both at the local level and in their inter se relationships.

Briefly this is the history of the British Empire qua Commonwealth in the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century the struggle in Canada over responsible government had illustrated that when the vision is narrow the colonial administrator is impeded by his traditional prejudices and pre-conceptions from taking the forward-looking steps that men such as Durham and Elgin realized were so necessary. In the twentieth century it is to the credit of the Attlee government that India was retained in the Commonwealth. The significance of India today is that in Asia regardless of the imperfections of her governmental structure she stands as an outpost of democracy in a continent where its survival is of so great importance to the future of the world. Although Nehru may assert that he draws his inspiration from both democracy and communism and though his policy of non-

alignment and neutralism may be often interpreted as unrealistic, the fact is that India remains within the Commonwealth. This is of great significance for it deeply influences the rising nationalist leaders of the new Commonwealth nations who see in Nehru a spiritual force as well as a leader in the Afro-Asian bloc. This in itself illustrates that the British character of the new Commonwealth is of diminishing significance although the inheritance of British institutions and forms are everywhere present in governmental structures and practices.

The old Empire, geographically spanning the wide world, was in many senses a narrow world of the civil servant known, with something less than affection, as "Mr. Mother Country." To the rising nationalist leaders in the colonies it was government by exploitation and if their own feelings of frustration had not already taught them this, then the lessons of Socialist teaching in Britain spelled it out for them. Yet this is hardly fair to the generations of dedicated civil servants who often-times with a sense of mission undertook assignments that resulted in the bridging of centuries in the development of backward areas. Whatever success these emerging nations have had in their democratic institutions some credit must be given to the degree to which British ideas of an impartial judiciary and an experienced and incorruptible civil service was fostered.[1] With these foundations there was the hope that when a class

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[1]The extent of this debt has not gone altogether unrecognized even among the new leaders. The opposition leader Busia, at Independence Day ceremonies in Ghana on March 6, 1957 recalls Ghana's debt to Great Britain in these words- "We have also benefited from British administration and law to which we owe our concepts of nationhood, democracy and individual freedom..... We would say again simply but with heartfelt sincerity, thank you; we are glad that our ties are to continue in the domain where human ties are most enduring--in the devotion and good-will of the human heart freely given and reciprocated." (Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. xxxviii (April 1957) p. 284) However, contrast this with the statement of President Nkrumah, who in Budapest on July 28, 1961 is reported to have referred to Britain as a colonialist oppressor.

of able and honest politicians could arise and when there could be developed in the electorate an understanding and faith in the democratic process some essential pre-requisites of nationhood would have been provided. The nature of this contribution was well expressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Iain Macleod, in addressing the West Indies Constitutional Conference in London last May 31, 1961. He remarks that the new federation is fitted to assume full independence because they possess--"the rule of law, the parliamentary system of government, the habit of respect for the rights and dignity of the individual and the sense that it is the personal value of the individual that counts, and not his class, race or religion."[2]

But certain assumptions call for further examination. One is that all nationalists are democrats and that people when given the suffrage will return democratic leaders. The unpredictability of a seasoned electorate should be a warning to all that a more or less illiterate electorate cannot be expected to perform at a higher level than those more experienced. Failure to appreciate this fact of life in the emerging nations may give to the Communists the opportunity they seek. The situation in British Guiana illustrates how democracy can be undermined from within. We have recovered somewhat from the false hopes of the First World War settlement when with overconfidence we thought we could make the world safe for democracy. But in the United Nations, however, we thought we could checkmate any attempts at predatory imperialism. Then came the Korean War and other expansionist moves in Asia. The invasion of Hungary following upon other conquests of communism in Europe reveals the true nature of the struggle the Western world faces.[3] In this contest the Commonwealth answer has been to encourage the development of self-government in her colonial areas. But the cold war between the two great political creeds resolves itself not alone on the philosophic plane but increasingly on the economic front. The struggle for survival by the underprivileged, underfed and undereducated has little meaning when expressed in ideological terms but has real significance if it can offer

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[2]Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 7, No. 12, (6 June 1961) p. 583.

[3]The Hungarian take-over, however, is not to be considered apart from the Suez crisis (see below).

high standards of living and greater efficiency in the use of resources whether they be human or industrial. Yet progress must be slow, since inertia and ingrained prejudices oftentimes must be overcome. This is the appeal in such schemes as the Colombo plan but it is not to be confused with the objectives of SEATO in which India and Ceylon have no part. Indeed Nehru feels outright hostility towards any such organization that runs counter to his notions of neutralism and co-existence. But in the eyes of Britain, Austrialia and New Zealand, as well as for the non-Commonwealth members, it represents a check on a communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Such rifts highlight the diffusion of ideas, objectives and approaches that have sprung up in the expanding Commonwealth. The Bandung conference in a positive way illustrates that the emerging Afro-Asian powers who have so recently risen from colonial status are determined to speak for themselves and to shape their own destinies. They do not ask guidance from those whose wealth and position has hitherto commanded respect, but in so far as the democratic ideal is represented in their thinking it may be regarded by the Western allies as a favorable international grouping. However, there is always the fear that anti-colonial hate can be stimulated by communist agents, for among former subject-peoples the embers of discord can easily be fanned by those who are unscrupulous enough to turn in their account when heedless of the danger in their course of action. Self-determinism, in brief, is not synonomous with democracy.

This leads to a consideration of a second assumption which is found in the aphorism that--"self-government is preferable to good government." Advanced liberal thinking on colonial affairs in Britain had long contended that this was so and perhaps it was because of their insistence upon this that so much progress in Commonwealth development should be credited. Yet there is always the fear that newly-elected leaders in these inexperienced nations might turn towards autocracy or maybe dictatorship. This might be out of desire or perversion by these leaders trained in Western thought, or maybe it might be forced by circumstances beyond their control. Tribal chiefs, long the wielders of power, might through appeals to superstition and tribalism undermine democratic government before it is safely launched. Even Ghana has not proved that she has successfully weathered the critical period--and can any more be said of elsewhere on the African continent.

Another assumption is that even if new nations make mistakes there is time enough for correction of their errors without too much resultant damage. No longer is this true, for in these competitive days the challenge of the communistic threat to the democratic ideal leaves little margin for error.

An assumption of very long standing in native and colonial policy was to regard the native as a Briton-in-the-making and as Thornton remarks--"one who, when made, (would) turn out to be a second class British citizen anyway."[4] While the American revolutionists might claim their rights as Englishmen, and the Canadian fifty years later make the same assertions in resolutions of protest, such a contention was hardly the ground upon which the Indian colonial would base his plea. To the native of India, Britain was never a mother country, for Mother India boasts civilization of great antiquity. True, modern Britain has given her institutions of courts and legislature, taught her an infinite series of relationships that makes possible living in the world of the twentieth century, but the heart and soul of India is an Eastern culture quite alien to the Western world.

From this example we should be cautioned to anticipate that not only ideas of democratic government may be modified and re-interpreted, but institutions and structures will undergo change as they are transplanted to new soil. The freshness and vigor of native territories in Africa may well express itself in modifications of British institutions when established in such foreign soil. In another place,[5] I have set forth some observations on the mutations resulting from the establishment of parliamentary institutions in the senior nations of the Commonwealth.

Britain has long prided herself on her "unwritten constitution" and however much has been reduced to words, whether it be by statute or court decision, the strength of her system has without doubt been in "the spirit of the communion," as Burke so aptly phrased it in another connection. This too is the

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[4]Thornton, A.P.--"The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies" (London-McMillan--1959) p. 276. Much helpful material was gleaned from this study and also from the historical presentation found in Don Taylor--"The Years of Challenge" (New York--Praeger--1960)

[5]Laing, Lionel H.--"The Transplantation of Parliament" in Parliamentary Affairs, (London) Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn 1958) pp. 405-424.

heritage of all her off-shoots. Yet each of these may in one way or another point to one specific document as the written constitution of the state. Elaborate provision is made in some cases for its alteration. Canada alone stands baffled to find an acceptable formula for change. Australia has built in a popular amending process which operates to make change infrequent. New Zealand, like the mother country, may, since the Statute of Westminster, amend by simple statute. India and Ghana have some protected clauses; for instance, Ghana requires that for an amendment to her constitution there must be a two-thirds majority of the whole national assembly, while amendments to certain basic clauses require the prior approval of two-thirds of the regional assemblies. There are clauses concerning the public services, the regions, the Houses of Chiefs, elections, suffrage, racial discrimination, and freedom of conscience. Such detail in the more recent of the Commonwealth constitutions illustrates how far modern constitutions differ from the idea of government characterized by the historic British concept of simple understandings based upon so much "obedience to the unenforceable."

But constitutions at best are but frameworks. It is in the operation of legislatures that one notes adaptations. Superficially much of the structure is a close copy whether it be in its bi-cameralism or the physical arrangement of the Houses with the wide aisle that divides Government from Opposition. While three readings in both Houses is everywhere the practice, much remains to be done to modify the legislative process to bring it up-to-date with the demands of the twentieth century. In the standing committees of the House, Great Britain long ago made a small attempt to meet the problem of the burden of lawmaking. Surprisingly a senior country such as Canada still labors with outmoded procedures. Indeed, nowhere in the Commonwealth do they seem to fully appreciate that the role of Parliament has changed through the years. While legislation by administrative order is a development frowned upon by the legal profession, it would seem inevitable that it will increase rather than lessen. Today the function of Parliament as a whole, in any case, should be not to initiate legislation but to safeguard the rights of the individual from the effects of power in the hands of an otherwise unchecked executive. Administrative law thus grows apace, but a remedy must lie close at hand whether it be by the regular courts or special agencies. The African states in modeling their legislatures after their British counterpart may well consider new forms and new procedures, although at first simple patterns may seem adequate.

Diffusion Political Ideas & Structures (Commonwealth)

The Wedgewood Benn controversy in Great Britain and the conflict with the Senate in Canada over the tariff bill and the Coyne issue raises anew the question of second chambers.[6] In the United States the Senate is historically and substantively justified on the grounds of the federal principle but in Canada the Senators, assured of life tenure, have no constituents to whom they must answer and so they follow an independent role akin to a peer in Britain, albeit in Canada with more conscientiousness to duty than that of a peer. It is at the cabinet level that real federal representation is to be found in Canada and to some extent in Australia too. This in itself is a practical adaptation that illustrates further the shift of power from legislature to executive that was commented upon above. Nor is the federal principle limited to institutional devices, for in countless relationships many actions and decisions are based upon the realization that regional diversity in Canada and Australia demands a federal outlook. Canada, and India to an even greater degree, is not a nation of a single cultural or linguistic group. For the new African nations of the Commonwealth the experience of these older members would suggest that the federal rather than the unitary structure may more effectively meet the problems of regional diversity and make possible larger areas to support an economy that can be viable. In following such a pattern of development further illustration is given that the diffusion of ideas and structures in the Commonwealth spreads not from a single source--Great Britain--but there is a cross-fertilization in which the contributions of the off-shoots can be significant.

Nowhere is greater diversity apparent throughout the Commonwealth than in political parties, their labels, their policies and practices. At first British names were adopted, but it is in name only that the terms Conservative and Liberal have any real identity between British and Canadian counterparts,

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[6]The government in Canada attempted to make the disagreement over the tariff issue appear to involve a dispute between the two Houses over the powers of taxation. But the Senate was not challenging the historic rights of the lower House over money bills, but rather was attempting to safeguard the right of appeal of those aggrieved by possible over-use of administrative power. In that respect they were in the best traditions of the responsibility of a second chamber. To many, therefore, the controversy seemed to illustrate that perhaps an upper house still has a role to perform. In that respect there is more substance to the debate in Canada than in Great Britain over reform of the second chamber.

while in Australia it is the Liberal and Country party that is the guardian of the conservative tradition, as is the Nationalist party in New Zealand. Certainly that Nationalist party feels little kinship with like-named parties taking form in the new Commonwealth nations. Probably in Labor circles there is more interchange of ideas, but when Gaitskell accepted the invitation of the Canadian "New Party" (subsequently the "New Democratic Party") to speak at its founding convention, some criticism was voiced that it was quite improper for the British Labor Leader to so identify himself with Canadian politics, although there was no mistaking the fact that the "New Party" was to be the spokesman for labor in Canada. Whatever the labels, the unique character of the problems of the respective parts of the Commonwealth make the platform and policies of the parties distinctive to each of the parts, oftentimes more than in being distinct from one another internally. It is true that where social welfare schemes have common features, working arrangements can be made by the respective governments irrespective of party labels for interchange of benefit payments to those who may move from one part to another, but such a British-Australian scheme has limited application. In brief, party principles and ideas must be by their very nature indigenous to each nation.

In the electoral process, however, great similarities may be observed. The single member district, the nominating process, sometimes even the conduct of the campaign, and the balloting often follow the British practice, although it may be observed that the very term "the Australian secret ballot" points up the fact that not all the contributions had a British origin. Furthermore, the Tasmanian variant of the transferable vote, known as the Hare-Clarke system, is unique but has hardly commended itself for emulation. In some of the new African nations the necessity of using common everyday symbols for party identification of the candidates is a practical application that new democracies must frequently undertake until such time as the electorate has had its educational standards raised. However, it may be noted that the elephant and the donkey as well as other symbols still adorn some American ballots.

Institutions and practices can exhibit great diversity without disturbing the unity of the Commonwealth for their effect is for the most part internal. Even the Royal Styles and Titles can be modified to suit the more sensitive parts. Monarchy can give way to a republic and the crown that once was worn by an Empress becomes no longer a symbol of Empire.

The royal personage is now designated "Head of the Commonwealth" --for some it still means allegiance, for others merely a symbol of unity. To the imperialist of old this is indeed the liquidation of the Empire yet in the new formulas and the new relationships there continues to exist a family of nations that on some issues move in concert. Yet as the years pass it becomes increasingly apparent that the issues that divide grow in number and significance. At the United Nations embarrassment has been avoided but whatever semblance of unity or accommodation the senior Commonwealth nations have hitherto observed, the same can not be expected from the new and self-conscious nations of Asia and Africa where different concepts and different loyalties arise. The keynote of the new Commonwealth, even more than that of the old, must be flexibility but there comes a point where accommodation is no longer possible.

The Suez crisis coming at the time of the invasion of Hungary left the Commonwealth somewhat shaken. Nehru considered the British action little better than the "gunboat diplomacy" of old. Pakistan and Ceylon remained neutral for as members of the Bandung conference they had conflicting sympathies. Canada shared some of the anti-imperial feelings of her neighbor the U.S.A., but even more Canada was irked that Eden should undermine the structure of the United Nations and so eventually succeeded in having the dispute referred to that forum. The reaction in Britain was one of anger and bitterness that her position had been so little understood. The split in the Commonwealth was wide, but it brought home to all, that responsibility for the survival of their association is shared, and unilateral action by one of the partners, even though a senior partner, is the concern of all in a multi-regional, multi-cultural organization such as the Commonwealth.

Such incidents revive hope in some that the Commonwealth can devise a structure for closer consultation, if not action. In 1951 Menzies of Australia called for a Commonwealth Committee on Foreign Affairs and subsequently his minister in London spelled this out in proposing a Commonwealth Charter and a Council of Commonwealth Affairs to co-ordinate defense, foreign affairs, economic development and trade policies. Curtin in 1943 similarly had expressed hope for an executive body or at least a strong consultative body. But the traditional Canadian view has been that while she has no objection

to consultation, cooperation and a degree of co-ordination in matters of common concern for the Commonwealth, there was a strong aversion in Canada to any formal organization. If organization should be undertaken in foreign affairs it should be international and not imperial. But whatever the formal structure of organization, whether it be international or Commonwealth, the fact remains that the very existence of the Commonwealth, however incoherent its policies or loose its links, it nevertheless possesses in the breadth of its membership and diversity of interests as well as variety of viewpoints, a stabilizing influence as a democratic answer to the challenge of the Cominform.

The real testing time is now upon the Commonwealth. For years Britain's prosperity and influence has rested upon her leadership of the sterling bloc. Her money and her enterprise through an intricate system of world trade and development has been responsible for a large share of the total external trade of the world. But the post-war world has seen the shift of economic gravity and no amount of urging to earn more dollars and consume less of the products of hard currency can be much more than a temporary pallative. A strong and successful economic unit has taken form on the continent and reluctantly Britain is now making overtures to join the European Common Market. Far-seeing observers for some time have been pointing out the inevitability of such a move but they were scoffed at. As early as November 1943, General Smuts speaking before the Empire Parliamentary Association in London suggested that Britain might be wise to strengthen her position in Europe by working more closely with the smaller democracies. Subsequently she did become one of the outer seven but it has become increasingly clear that membership in the European Common Market offers her the greatest hope to meet her economic adversity. Yet before she could undertake even the initial steps, she felt it necessary to send emissaries around the Commonwealth to explain and to justify her position. As might be expected the reception of the idea was met with coolness. From the selfish point of view the preferential position of the Commonwealth nations in a protected market is an advantage they are reluctant to surrender. But if the children have grown up, as in other respects they assert they have, then in economic affairs they must no longer expect to look to the "Mother Country" as a protected market. They need

to be reminded that it is not enough to remove the word "British" in front of "Commonwealth" to demonstrate equality. It requires all the members of the Commonwealth to make their contribution in the future as Britain has in the past. In simple terms, the deterioration of Britain's economy will require fresh approaches even if it should be motivated by self-interest on her part. There are those who see in such overtures an indication of the disintegration of the Commonwealth, especially when accompanied by other realignments by other members of this family of nations in distant parts where natural geographic and economic interests dictate.[7] Can the Commonwealth survive such polarization?

The answer to such questions brings us back to our starting point on the idea of the Commonwealth. Balfour in his declaration of 1926 declared that "the principles of equality and similarity appropriate to status did not universally extend to function."[8] But there is a close relation between status and function. India illustrates in her neutralism and non-commitment that she has a very important function in the Commonwealth, if not indeed in a world divided between power blocs. Her tremendous prestige among the Afro-Asian nations gives her a status supporting her position as the most powerful of the new states. Great Britain as the senior Dominion and the progenitor of the old British Commonwealth possesses an unique status which must always remain, although her function today may diminish in importance. As a merely European power, if admitted to the European Common Market, she will be coming into an existing association of European states where she cannot immediately aspire to such a status, though through her function she will command a leadership which will be a constant challenge to her new and strong allies there. Her effort to reconcile the strong pull of sentimental and traditional ties of Commonwealth may of necessity dictate that function as the very purpose of being will direct the course of Great Britain in the choices she must make tomorrow. However, for the newer nations of the Commonwealth they may find that the European Common Market as it becomes more embracing will become such a powerful economic bloc as to provide the future source of surplus capital for overseas development traditionally found in London. The weary Titan will then have laid down the weight of his Orb and the burden will have become a world responsibility.

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[7] e.g.--Bandung association.

[8] See:- Thornton,--op. cit. p. 354.

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Political and Administrative Implications of the Post-Stalin Changes in Soviet Agriculture

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Political and Administrative Implications of
the Post-Stalin Changes in Soviet Agriculture

Whether viewed through optimistic Soviet eyes or those of a hypercritical Western observer, important changes have occurred in Soviet agriculture since the death of Stalin. Moreover, the most skeptical Westerner must agree that the evidence indicates important advances have been achieved.

Although Khrushchev's 1958 claim that peasant real incomes advanced some sixty per cent from 1952 to 1958 may need to be pared, substantial increases have been made. After a careful examination of the many claims in this regard, Alec Nove concludes that the Khrushchev sixty per cent figure "cannot be accepted...without more information about its make-up."[1] Output has been increased and the level of the competence of the rural leadership has been improved. The number of skilled technicians on the farms has been advanced. Although serious question needs to be raised as to the achievement of the much needed decentralization of management in agriculture, in contrast with Stalin's time surely many more of the strictly technical decisions are made on the spot, without referral to Moscow.

The above, along with other political and economic changes over the past decade, has led a U. S. Department of Agriculture group to conclude that, "Agriculture today cannot be considered the 'Achilles heel' of the Soviet economy."[2] In light of the positive impact of the Khrushchev

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[1]"The Incomes of Soviet Peasants," The Slavic Review, June 1960, pp. 314-333.

[2]Economic Aspects of Soviet Agriculture: Report of a Technical Study Group. Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, May 1959, p. 52.

reforms, such a conclusion is defensable. However, the contention of the present paper is that the advances on the Soviet rural scene have not been as substantial as might be implied by such a conclusion. Agriculture is still the fontanel in the Soviet economy and its problems are many and serious.

To be sure, there was a period of years under Stalin, after forced collectivization, when the leadership had good reason to believe that a serious counter-revolutionary force lay with the peasantry. There is no reason to believe such a force exists today. Nevertheless, the changes that ended the old situation were surely more a matter of advanced controls, with an accompanying demoralization of any revolutionary sentiment, rather than a significant development of a positive attitude among the peasantry towards the collectives. This change was far advanced prior to the rise of Khrushchev as the leader in agriculture. However, nearly the whole of Khrushchev's domestic policies, and virtually all of his attention, has been devoted to correcting agriculture's serious weaknesses. As important as the advances that he has achieved may be, the 1953 situation was so bad that much more than has been done needs to be accomplished.

An appraisal of the present rural scene requires as its base some understanding of past achievements and past and present goals.

Goals and Achievements

As expected in any society, both Stalin and Khrushchev have exhibited a desire to achieve maximum levels of output at a minimum of cost. However, political imperatives dictated that normal economic considerations take the back seat under Stalin. In the order listed, the guiding principles

of his rule over the peasantry were as follows: (1) Maximization of controls over the peasantry, (2) Extraction of the peasants' product to provide the capital for industrialization and, (3) Socialization of the peasantry. In spite of a resounding failure to advance output, Stalin's success in achieving his first two goals was so great that his agricultural policy cannot be judged to have failed. Indeed, because his policy was so successful, Khrushchev has been able to relax somewhat on the industrial front and thus make some modest increases in agricultural investment. However, the legacy was so great that there is serious doubt that the professed goal of establishing equal priority for both industry and consumers' welfare (substantially a peasant problem) can be realized in any foreseeable future.

Although Stalin was highly successful in advancing controls, the desire for controls in a totalitarian system is insatiable and Khrushchev's direction of agriculture has very largely reflected the dictatorship's need to continually maximize conformity to the central will. This has been inseparable from the search for means to advance the level of socialism in rural Russia.

Although, both by design and necessity, the political and economic are even less separable in the Soviet Union than in Western democracies, the key to understanding Khrushchev's political goals in agriculture probably lies in his desire for Russia to enter the phase of the construction of Communism. On the economic side, although severely restricted by the Stalinist legacy, Khrushchev has attempted to do something about lagging output.

Rubles and Yields

In his startlingly candid review of the Soviet rural scene, delivered in the fall of 1953, Khrushchev openly acknowledged the sorry state of output. When compared with 1916 figures the cattle census was actually down, and pigs, sheep, and goats had shown only slight advances.[3] Although the picture regarding crop production was somewhat brighter, Soviet agricultural output was most dismal.

Although some Western sovietologists seemed to indicate that adequate increases in economic incentives could solve all of the major agricultural problems, some argued that the problems went much deeper than that of peasant incomes. Certainly the eminent group of economists, Alec Nove, Naum Jasny, and Lazar Volin, were quite correct in emphasizing that the prices paid to collective farms for peasant produce, largely extracted by the state at very low compulsory prices, was such that nothing could be accomplished under the existing incentive system. Even by 1952, the average cash earning of the kolkhoz peasant per trudoden was only 1.4 rubles.[4] At best, the average peasant's cash income from his collective must have been far less than 100 rubles (old currency) a month.

Under Khrushchev compulsory deliveries have been abandoned in name, and prices paid for state purchases have been substantially increased

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[3]N. S. Khrushchev, Measures for Further Development of Agriculture in the U.S.S.R. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 21.

[4]M. Opodko, "Strengthening the Principle of Material Incentive in Collective Farm Production." Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 2, February 1959, pp. 80-88.

in fact. Moreover, whereas the peasantry previously had been forced to wait until the end of the agricultural year before receiving any of the cash portion of their income (the kolkhozniki receive their piece work payment in the form of both cash and kind), a system of monthly advances has been adopted. As a result of these efforts to increase incentives, by 1956 average cash earnings assertedly had risen from the 1952 figure of 1.4 rubles to 3.8 rubles per trudoden.[5]

According to Khrushchev, in 1957 the total value of the average trudoden, in both cash and kind, was some 7.5 rubles. Alec Nove has commented: "This would mean about 10 or 11 rubles per actual day's work. This is only just equal to the lowest rural wage permitted by law."[6] The rate of increase enjoyed between 1952-57 has not been continued and there is strong evidence to conclude that the major benefits of the pump priming in agriculture already have been realized.

As a result, in part, of the additional ruble burden of the sale of the MTS equipment to the farms, beginning in 1958, there is substantial reason to conclude that peasant incomes may even have been reduced below the 1957 high.[7] Significantly, the Soviet economist Lazutkin revealed in April of this year that the incomes of the kolkhoz

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[5] Ibid.

[6] "Soviet Agricultural Policies and Prospects," St. Anthony's Papers on Soviet Affairs, April, 1959, p. 14.

[7] I have attempted to discuss this possibility in the paper, "Soviet Goals for 1965 and the Problems of Agriculture," The American Slavic and East European Review, (forthcoming fall, 1961).

peasantry have not advanced in the last two years. "Because of this, the collective farmers' incentive to develop communal production had dropped noticeably."[8] In spite of this, however, Khrushchev felt compelled to remark that, "It must be realized, Comrades, that the state cannot raise prices of farm products further. We must take another course -- that of stepping up the yields of the fields and the productivity of animal husbandry, increasing the output of products, lowering production costs and increasing labor productivity."[9]

Quite correctly, the Soviet leadership has shown an increased awareness of the key importance of raising the level of labor output on the farms. But, after all of his economic reforms had had time to show results, Khrushchev admitted at the end of 1958 that the level of labor output was still deplorably low. In his comparison of the labor productivity of the Russian kolkhozniki and the American farmer, he indicated that almost three times the man-hours were required to produce a liter of milk and more than seven times the labor was necessary to grow a centner of grain.[10] Perhaps some small improvement in

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[8]Ye. Lazutkin "Increase the Material Stake of Collective Farmers in Communal Production," Partinaya zhizn, No. 7, April, 1961, pp. 17-24. As in the present instance, whenever possible translations of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press have been utilized.

[9]Pravda, February 1, 1961, pp. 1-3.

[10]Pravda, December 16, 1958, pp. 1-7

agricultural labor output had been achieved since the passing of Stalin, but these 1958 figures are of the same magnitude as those revealed in a 1953 comparative study.[11] No wonder the working population in agriculture has been relatively stable over the past two decades. (See Table I)

Table I*
Agricultural Population (Millions)

Year	Total** Population	Including***		Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz Workers and Employees Excluding Administrative and Technical Personnel*	All Agricultural Workers	
		Urban	Rural		Kolkhozy	Sovkhozy
1939	170.6	56.1	114.5	34.763	N.A.	2.5(1938)+
1959	208.8	100.0	108.8	33.893	31.723++	6.611++

*The material for the tables in this paper was gathered and translated by my research assistant, Mr. George M. Bennett.

**Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 1, 1961, pp. 58-71.

***Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu, p. 9. According to Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 1, 1961, pp. 58-71, there are 65.5 million people on the kolkhozy.

+This is an estimate by Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR, p. 265

++Vestnik statistiki, No. 12, 1960, pp. 3-21. Sovkhozy indicates all state agricultural enterprises.

Whether or not the long standing principle of "all priority to industry" is to remain, further advances in Soviet agriculture (and industry as well) are very closely linked to a marked reduction in

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[11]See A. Nove and Roy D. Laird, "A Note on Labour Utilization in the Kolkhoz," Soviet Studies, 1953, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 434-42.

labor requirements in agriculture. Not only have further concessions on the economic front been halted, but a contention of the present writer is that the major reason for this shortcoming is political, arising out of organizational and administrative faults in the system that remain in spite of Khrushchev's reorganizational schemes. Before turning to the political problems, however, further comment on the economic situation is in order.

Although much ado has been made about the need to increase yields, and the value of agricultural output assertedly has advanced some 50 per cent since 1953,[12] according to Naum Jasny, "about half the increase in farm output in 1953-56 was attained by the new lands program."[13] Indeed, by 1959-60, some twenty per cent of the nation's grain was produced in this area while nearly sixty per cent of the total state grain purchases depended on the virgin lands. Yields on these no longer virgin soils have been declining. The danger of a complete collapse of agriculture in this semiarid region is very real. And yet, Soviet Russia has become increasingly dependent upon this tenuous base for its food.[14]

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[12] Sel'skoe khozyaistvo SSSR: statistichesky sbornik gosstatizdat TSSU SSSR, Moscow, 1960, p. 21.

[13] "Soviet Agriculture" Current History, January, 1958, P. 26.

[14] See Roy D. Laird and John E. Chappell. "Kazakhstan, Russia's Agricultural Crutch," The Russian Review (forthcoming, October, 1961).

As Jasny has observed, "An increase of, say 15 per cent in the older territories may be all right for a three-year period, but it cannot make up for 36 years of mismanagement."[15] Increasing emphasis upon extensive, rather than intensive, agricultural practices may prove to be one of the most crucial errors of that management.

The Khrushchev Reforms

Catalogued according to a totidem verbis reading of the major political and administrative changes imposed upon Soviet agriculture since 1953, a pattern of far-reaching consequence has been effected. Whereas agriculture in 1953 was a highly centralized operation with Moscow literally determining what crops a given kolkhoz or sovkhoz must plant, the impact of a whole series of decrees might imply that today, by comparison, each farm administration enjoys the high degree of autonomous decision making necessary to respond efficiently to the highly particular demands of a farming operation.

Clearly Khrushchev has recognized that the major stumbling block to increased efficiency in the Soviet agricultural operation lies in the need for a greatly increased latitude for decision-making at the level of production. Thus the decision to decentralize industrial administration was paralleled by a series of reorganizational moves designed to achieve decentralization in agriculture.

In 1955 a decree ending the old system of centralized planning was adopted, paralleled by the decision to end the old multiple price compulsory delivery system. In 1958, the MTS, which had been the bastion of Soviet power in the countryside, were eliminated and the machinery was sold to the collectives. Although the whole picture is still not

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[15] Op Cit.

complete, as a result of the February 1961 Plenum on agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture is to cease being a directing arm and is to become a focal point for research and the dissemination of new experience among the farms.

If these decrees had not been accompanied by countervailing moves, the Khrushchev decentralization drive may well have effected a devolution of power. The Soviet system of rule over the peasantry does seem to be undergoing a momentous transformation; however, not in the direction most western social scientists perceive when they speak of decentralization. Following each of the amputations that have removed the government bureaucracy from nearly all participation in the direction and control over agricultural production, have been moves increasing the hold of the hierarchy over the peasantry.

Khrushchev made his first bid as a leader in agricultural policy, and his first bid for the mantle of Stalin, in his 1950 proposal that the smaller collectives be amalgamated into larger agricultural units. Whether or not he clearly foresaw, at that time, the eventual outcome made possible by the amalgamations is not clear. Nevertheless, by the fall of 1953 the new pattern seems to have been cut. Although many important changes were to come out of the merger of the smaller kolkhozy, the major effect of the scheme was to allow a party restricted in membership to capture the key local posts of agricultural direction. In 1949 the party could hardly afford to staff each of the kolkhoz chairmanships with trusted party leaders, much less establish effective party units in each of the more than 235,000 collectives. By 1960,

however, the amalgamations had reduced the collectives to some 54,000,[16] virtually all with party chairmen and party units. 1954 was the crucial date in the revolution of local agricultural administration. This was the year Khrushchev called for 30,000 party and non-party actives to go voluntarily out into the countryside and offer themselves as chairmen. Some 20,000 responded, and within a space of a few months the collectives, already reduced below 100,000 in number, were captured at long last by the party directorate -- a feat never accomplished by Stalin. By the end of 1958, above and beyond a cadre of 3,000,000 Y.C.L. members, the collectives could boast a party membership of 1,350,000. Over ninety per cent of the farms had party members as chairmen and the average farms party unit comprised some twenty members.[17]

The importance of the intrenchment of the Party in agriculture has been stressed by several scholars,[18] but a further change of great moment was to grow out of this and Khrushchev's decision to eliminate the MTS. Recognizing that the MTS was the key to agricultural control, Khrushchev's first reaction (in 1953) was to strengthen further these one time auxiliary agencies as the instrument of rule over the peasantry. Although the MTS were state agencies, in his call for ending a situation wherein responsibility could not be located in local agricultural administration, Khrushchev gave the power, not to the state MTS director, but to the MTS party secretary. Under each party secretary was placed a

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[16] Sel'skoe khozyaistvo SSSR...1960, p. 41.

[17] Pravda, February 28, 1958, p. 1 and December 16, 1958, pp. 1-7.

[18] See, for example, Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Random House, New York, 1960, pp. 577ff.

staff of party inspectors, individually responsible for two or three of the collectives in the particular MTS zone.

By 1958, resulting from his successful drive to strengthen the party in the countryside, Khrushchev apparently perceived that the capture of the key posts of direction had rendered the MTS superfluous as a center of control. Moreover, the stations long had been a serious drain upon the economy. Thus, although the MTS were abandoned in 1958, the staffs of party inspectors were only transferred over to the rayon headquarters, where they could continue to exercise control as efficiently as before.

Although Gosplan has been given the responsibility for directing agriculture,[19] a most plausible rationale for the 1961 demise of the Ministry of Agriculture is that as a result of the Khrushchev reforms not only were the MTS eliminated in 1958, but the whole state directing apparatus has come to be increasingly regarded as an unnecessary burden upon the economy, and inconsistent with good managerial practice. Such an interpretation of this latest move is completely in line with Khrushchev's increasing insistance that the U.S.S.R. has entered the beginning phase of the period of transition to communism. Stalin's declaration that socialism had arrived in 1936 was underlined by the pretense that all important private enterprise had been liquidated -- apparently the peasant private plots did not count. Similarly, it is inconceivable that the Soviet leadership would claim any substantial achievement of communism without being able to point to the withering away of the state. Very

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[19] Sel'skaya zhizn, February 26, 1961, pp. 1-2.

probably the argument increasingly will be made that the state hierarchy is vanishing, with the accompanying failure to recognize that an expanding party apparatus is really the state by another name. Significantly, Khrushchev seems to be abandoning the Stalinist maxim that the state apparatus must have a party to guard its actions, both checked in turn by a powerful secret police. Undoubtedly serious efforts are still maintained -- through press investigations and other means -- to check upon lagging officials, but following the focus of local responsibility upon the party the evidence has mounted indicating that the role of both the police and particularly the state hierarchies has become less and less important in a scheme of check and double check on the control and direction of agriculture.

Decentralization, Without Devolution of Power

If a valid distinction between decentralization of administration and a devolution of power can exist, appreciable decentralization of decision-making has been achieved while centralized power has been enhanced. With managerial efficiency improved and trusted party officials securely in the saddle, responsiveness to the central will is undoubtedly superior to the system of control that existed a decade ago. Although the reports at the 1961 Party Plenum on agriculture disclosed that distortions of production figures have been widespread under party management, the opportunities for concealment and cheating must have been much greater under the old Stalinist system.

Compulsory deliveries have been replaced by contracts between the state and the kolkhozy. Under a new scheme, recently outlined by

Khrushchev, the state procurement officer will be forced to participate directly in planning a collective's output. With the amputation of the state directing arm, the procurement officer's power to assure the fulfillment of Moscow directed quotas will depend upon the power wielded by an expanded and more powerful party officialdom. Not only will the sense of responsibility be higher among the new farm directorate, but powerful rayon officials will direct all. In asserting that the procurement system "be radically reorganized," Premier Khrushchev re-emphasized the responsibilities of the district officers.

> After concluding an agreement, the procurement agent must not forget about the collectives or state farm. He must visit the farm periodically and see how the livestock that have been contracted for are being maintained.
>
> If he sees that the necessary number of livestock are not being fattened, that matters fare poorly on the collective or state farm and that the managers cannot ensure the necessary level of production, he must report this fact to the district Party committee and the district executive committee. The district organizations must decide the question of measures of assistance to the collective or state farms...[20]

The lack of clear cut responsibility under the pre-1953 system allowed the peasantry opportunity to appropriate for their own use untold amounts of grain. Many if not most peasants failed to fulfill the required work-day minimums. Today with a party chairman, a kolkhoz party committee, and outside rayon party inspectors, all guarding the state's interest, the opportunities for selfish actions on the part of either chairmen or individual peasants are greatly reduced. Although only recently brought to public eye, false reporting of production figures may well be less than previously. Perhaps we shall never know how much of the claimed recent increases in production in the old established

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[20] Pravda, February 1, 1961, pp. 1-3.

areas are actually paper increases stemming from a more efficient administration, but the past record could allow for such increases to be almost entirely accounted for in this fashion.

A Managerial Revolution?

Great emphasis has been placed upon the increased training of specialists in agronomical and zoological sciences. Impressive statistics indicate that an important increase has been achieved in the introduction of thousands of technicians into the production phase of the work. According to the 1960 statistical handbook, Sel'skoe khozyaistvo, whereas in 1953 there were 96,000 agricultural technicians on the farms and in the MTS, by 1959 there were over 267,000 in production work. (See Table II).[21]

Moreover, increasing emphasis has been given to placing these technically qualified persons into managerial posts where their skills will be most valuable. All might suggest the possibility of a counter trend, away from expanding party rule, in the evolution of agricultural administration. This does not appear to be the case, however, as there seems to be concerted effort to achieve a situation wherein the best party type, who also is a specialist, is given the key post. While the party members have expanded their hold over the critical managerial posts, an increasing number of these same individuals have had advanced training as agricultural specialists. Thus, according to Razzakov, the

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[21] Op. Cit., p. 467.

Table II

The number of Specialists with higher and secondary education, working directly on the kolkhozy, MTS, RTS, sovkhozy and state subsidiary agricultural enterprises.* (thsd. of men)*

	On Jan. 1	On July 1		On December 1		
	1941	1953	1955	1956	1957	1959
On Kolkhoz, MTS, RTS						
Specialists with higher and secondary education in all specialties	29	83	263	291	278	240
Including agricultural specialists+	19	69	204	220	211	175
On sovkhozy and state subsidiaries of agricultural enterprises						
Specialists with higher and secondary education in all specialties	21	31	45	69	93	126
Including agricultural specialists+	16	27	35	54	70	92
On Kolkhozy, MTS, RTS, and sovkhozy, and state subsidiaries of agricultural enterprises total	50	114	308	360	371	366
Including agricultural specialists+	35	96	239	274	281	267

*Sel'skoe khozyaistvo: ..., p. 467.
+Agricultural specialists include agronomists, zootechnicians, veterinarians, and foresters.

The number of specialists with higher and secondary education on Kolkhozy on December 1, 1959 in comparison with*the number on December 1, 1957 increased by 53,000 men, on the sovkhozy and state subsidiaries of agricultural enterprises -- by 33 thousand men. In connection with the reorganization in 1958 of the MTS a considerable portion of those working in their specialties went to the kolkhozy, sovkhozy and RTS, and the other portion of specialists went to work in the apparatus of regional inspection in agriculture and in the organizational service of agriculture. Therefore, the general number of specialists with higher and secondary education, who worked on December 1, 1959 directly on Kolkhozy, sovkhozy, RTS, and MTS were somewhat reduced in comparison with the number on December 1, 1957.

The general number of specialists with higher and secondary education who worked in agriculture and forestry, including employment in organizational service of agriculture and forestry and also in agricultural research institutions, at the end of 1959 constituted 530,000 men.

First Secretary of the Kirgiz Communist Party Central Committee, all state farm directors in his republic have specialized training, while seventy-five per cent of the kolkhoz chairmen have such a background. Assertedly eighty per cent of the agricultural specialists in the republic now hold production positions.[22] A similar report on Latvia records that seventy-seven per cent of the state farm directors and sixty per cent of the kolkhoz chairmen are classified as specialists, all at a time when party units of from ten to thirty members have been established in every collective and some 553 party groups have been created at the level of the collective farm brigades, livestock sections, and state farm divisions.[23]

Just as under Stalin, there is a continual revolution in agricultural management, but one that is imposed from above. An unwritten precept of Soviet administrative practice would seem to be that rapid promotion, demotion, or transfer of local officials must be continually practiced in order to keep the possibility of local arrangements from developing that would be disadvantageous to the state's interests. Certainly the disclosure at the February Plenum of the widespread falsification of reports would justify the need for such a continual shakeup. The 1959 statistical handbook, published before this recent

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[22] Pravda, January 14, 1961, pp. 5-6.

[23] A. J. Pelse, First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Committee, Pravda, January 14, 1961, pp. 3-5.

scandal came to light, revealed that by 1960 only 56.6 of the chairmen had been on the job for more than three years, some improvement over the 1952 figure of 40.4 (See Table III).[24] To be sure, the continued call for a greater stability in local officialdom extends back to the pre-World War II period, but these warnings must be interpreted as a caution against the over practice of the precept, rather than an end to a high degree of turnover. Certainly the Soviet policy of finding lower officials for scapegoats when failures have occurred is also conducive to a high turnover of directing personnel.

The removal of V. V. Matskevitch from the post of Minister of Agriculture in December of 1960 (he was replaced by M. A. Ol'shanskiy, former Vice President of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences) was probably linked with the unfolding of the scandal in reporting and the decision to reorganize the Ministry. However, the increasingly tenuous situation in the new lands and an opportunity to set him up for the local fall guy may well have been the prime factor behind his ouster. Obviously, Matskevitch has not always been as enthusiastic as Khrushchev about the new lands venture, otherwise he would not have taken the opportunity of implying in 1957 that the near bumper yields of 1956 in the area were due to the best rainfall in the region in a half century. Matskevitch's new assignment is that of heading up the new, new lands territory. Should the scheme suffer total collapse, Khrushchev will be able to transfer at least part of the blame on to a well known former Minister of Agriculture.

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[24] Narodnoe kozyaistvo SSSR v. 1959 godu, p. 452.

Table III

Membership of kolkhoz chairmen in the Party, their education, and length of service.* (in per cent)

	On July 1		On April 1				
	1952	1953	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
From the general composition of chairmen of kolkhozy:							
Members and candidates to CPSU	79.4	79.6	90.5	91.2	92.6	93.5	95.3
Those finished with higher and secondary education	15.1	18.0	37.1	36.0	37.2	50.4	55.6
Higher education+		2.6	7.8	7.4	7.8	11.8	
Secondary education+		15.4	29.3	28.6	29.4	38.6	
Term as chairman of kolkhoz							
To 1 year	23.5	23.8	29.7	16.9	17.3	4.6	4.3
From 1 to 3 years	36.1	35.6	33.9	41.0	33.7	38.9	39.1
More than 3 years	40.4	40.6	36.4	42.1	49.0	56.5	56.6

*Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v. 1959 godu, p. 452.
+Sel'skoe kohozyaistvo: ... p. 474.

The Sovkhozy

Before turning to a final evaluation of the changes that have been recorded here, one trend, somewhat outside of the general pattern of the Khrushchev reforms, deserves examination. This is the increasing import of the sovkhozy in recent years.

Although both efficiency of administration and Soviet doctrine support a prediction that the two forms of property and two major ways of organizing agricultural production eventually will be joined into one, more than one competent scholar has broken a lance with a prediction that the kolkhozy would be transformed into the higher sovkhoz form in the near future.

Since the break in the hierarchical chain of command was finally joined by Khrushchev's introduction of the party in the kolkhozy, the long standing observation is even more valid, that the only significant difference between the sovkhozy and the kolkhozy is that the sovkhoz worker has a guaranteed wage, whereas the kolkhoz worker's income is dependent upon the whims of nature and the level of efficiency of his co-workers.

In spite of statistical claims that labor output on the sovkhoz is significantly greater,[25] with the commitment to a guaranteed wage the cost of their operation is much higher. Thus the leadership has been unwilling to add the burden to the national budget of nationalizing

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[25] In his comparison of American and Russian labor efficiency, Khrushchev's figures revealed that the sovkhozy are much closer to American levels than are the kolkhozy. Thus, in the production of both grain and milk the sovkhozy expended only a little less than twice the labor of an American farmer. See Pravda, December 16, 1958, pp. 1-7.

all of the remaining kolkhozy. Although less efficient in their operations, the kolkhoz peasantry must still provide an important subsidy for the balance of the economy.

Be the economics of the situation as they may, the past decade not only has seen an important reduction in the numbers of kolkhozy, but also a substantial increase in both the number and size of the sovkhozy and thus their relative importance to the economy. However, although some collectives have been transformed into sovkhozy during this period, the great bulk of the relative increase in the importance of the state farms has been as a result of their being established in the new lands area.

In terms of the total sown area, whereas in 1953 the sovkhozy encompassed 18,236,000 hectares and the kolkhozy 132,000,000 hectares, by 1959 the relative figures were 58,813,000 and 130,268,000. In 1953 there were 4,857 sovkhozy, but by 1959 there were 6,496 state farms. (See Table IV).[26] Reflecting the bulk of this growth in the new lands areas, 535 of these new sovkhozy were created in Kazakhstan alone. As noted previously, the state has become dependent upon these farms for more than half of its grain purchases. Alec Nove has recorded that above and beyond the new lands sovkhozy the state has taken over some 2.6 million hectares of former kolkhoz land and state farms have

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[26] Sel'skoe khozyaistvo...1960, pp. 42, 43, and 128.

Table IV

	Number				Kolkhozy and Sovkhozy* Total Sown Area (Thsd. Hect.)			
	1940	1950	1957	1959	1940	1950	1957	1959
Kolkhozy	236,945	123,747	78,168	54,596	117,724	121,006	132,410	130,268
Sovkhozy	4,159	4,988	5,905	6,496	13,260	15,921	53,971	58,813

Sel'skoe khozyaistvo SSSR: Statisticheski sbornik, 1960, pp. 42-43, 50-51, and 128. All categories of collective and state rural enterprises are listed.

been established near the large cities to provide vegetables and potatoes for the urban centers.[27] Argument has been made, in the course of the Khrushchev reforms, that the differences between the two agricultural forms have been reduced. Although Matskevitch, in a speech in December of 1959, indicated a continuation of the past policy of consolidating the weaker kolkhozy with stronger neighboring collective or state farms, he gave greater emphasis to the expanding move to create interkolkhoz institutions, also involving neighboring sovkhozy, for such common needs as power plants and specialized livestock sections. Assertedly, these institutions provide an important means for reducing the remaining differences between the two organizational forms. Conceivably, the economic burden of an outright transformation of the kolkhozy into sovkhozy could be avoided by a compromise combining a low minimum wage guarantee with a promise of higher incomes by adapting the kolkhoz piece work system to the scheme. Such a move could provide the means

[27] "The Evolution of Soviet Collective Farms," St. Antony's Papers on Soviet Affairs, January, 1957, p. 18.

of ending the remaining differences between the two agricultural forms.[28] Unless some such scheme is devised, the two forms can be expected to continue the separate existence in the foreseeable future.

Khrushchev's "Revolution From Above"

Stalin's forced collectivization drive was a momentous "revolution from above." In spite of his success, however, it was an incomplete revolution for at least three reasons: (1) While controls over the peasantry were greatly expanded, when contrasted with the balance of Soviet society, agriculture remained in the shallows of the Soviet sea. (2) The necessity to allow the continuation of limited peasant private enterprise proved to be both a drag on the collectivized economy and an ideological embarrassment to the socialist scheme. (3) Although the average peasant would seem to have come to accept the Soviet system of rule, his socialization had not progressed to the point of gladly suffering the kolkhoz.

As noted previously, Khrushchev has been able further to expand controls, however, his completion of what Stalin left undone depends largely upon an improvement of the situation regarding points two and three. Not surprisingly, Khrushchev has concentrated considerable effort upon reducing peasant ties to their private enterprise. Above and beyond his repeated pleas to the peasantry, especially those on the wealthier farms, to plant their plots in orchards and sell their cows to the kolkhozy, a most important move against such peasant activity was taken at the time of the February plenum.

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[28] Sel'skoe khozyaistvo, December 26, 1959, pp. 6 and 7.

Although little publicized, this change undoubtedly will have a greater impact upon the individual peasant than any action taken since forced collectivization. This was a resolution demanding that henceforth the individual peasant and his family stay away from the kolkhoz markets. The markets themselves are to continue, but representatives of farm cooperatives are to manage the sales of the peasants' "surpluses."[29] Not only does this change forebode a later, more direct move to abolish peasant private enterprise entirely, but the market decree in itself involves a major means of furthering the socialization of the peasantry.

Although the party has been able to penetrate the balance of the collective farmer's life, almost by definition the party was excluded from the peasants' private economic activities. As they operated in the past, the markets provided a natural, but wholly undesirable, media for uncontrolled social interaction. A controlled society abhors spontaneity, but just because the markets were there an important focal point of vital peasant interest existed, outside of the formalized structure and not under the jealous arm of the totalitarian system.

The markets provided a means of communication (surely not always confined to personal gossip) among peasants from various villages and between the peasants and townspeople. The markets must have provided a means for forming unwanted attitudes and for passing on undesirable rumors outside the party filter through which all information is supposed to flow. To whatever degree the peasantry has resisted the Soviet

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[29] Sel'skaya zhizn, February 26, 1961, p. 2.

totalitarian system's efforts to divide and control by complete atomization of the individual, the markets, next to the family, must have been the major leak in the totalitarian dike.

Although most important in itself, the denial to the peasants of the market as an informal social organization is but one of the many forces released by the Khrushchev reforms that can go a long way towards furthering the socialization of the Soviet peasant. Perhaps the term socialization is unappropriate, but by whatever name the move has been impressive. In addition to the forces already documented above, the emotional pull of joining the Soviet bandwagon as its successes rapidly unfold cannot have left the peasantry unaffected. Finally, attention needs to be given the expansion in number and import of the so-called "voluntary people's militia squads."

How dependent the party has decided to become on the manipulation of seemingly spontaneous social pressures is not as yet clear. Nevertheless, at least twice in the history of the evolution of controls over the peasantry the exploitation of such pressures through the organization of the "committees of the poor," proved highly successful. Although called by another name, this new means of exploiting the discontents of the masses for state ends is strikingly reminiscent of the old committees. Organized throughout the country, the squads' most important achievements to date seem to have been in the new lands area.

In his report to the Tenth Party Congress of Kazakhstan, D. A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central

Committee admitted that the unsettled situation in Kazakhstan had precipitated the creation of some four thousand "militia units" composed of 132,000 individuals by the spring of 1960. The prime target of these vigilante committees has been the Kazakh native. Their task has been to root out customs and religious survivals of the past that are assertedly responsible for "private-ownership mentality, a disdainful attitude to labor, theft of public property and other ugly, anti-social phenomena."[30] Before the new lands project can be truly successful such "survivals" as these must be rooted out, Kunayev declares. All is part of the attempt to shape the new Soviet man in the drive to achieve communism.

Reflecting on the guidelines established at the 21st Party Congress, A. I. Denisov underscored the import of such social pressures.

> The growing role of public organizations is manifested by countless processes in the life of society, in particular by the transferring to the jurisdiction of public organizations of a number of functions exercised by state institutions... The Congress expressed its profound belief that the public could play an exceptionally important role in combatting breaches of socialist law and order. "Our public organizations" N. S. Khrushchev said at the Congress, "have no less adequate capacities, means and forces for this than the militia, the courts, and the prosecutor's office."[31]

Russia's Number One Peasant

The name N. S. Khrushchev runs through any analysis of the contemporary Soviet agricultural scene "like a red thread." The importance of his

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[30] Kazakhstanskaia pravda, March 11, 1960, pp. 2-7.

[31] "On the Relationship of State and Society in the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Communism." Sovietskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 4, April 1960, pp. 29-40.

leadership in agriculture has been so great that any review of the situation would be incomplete, without special attention given to his role.

Policies that promised to correct the sorry legacy of Stalinist agriculture provided the central plank of Khrushchev's platform during his campaign for power. A major sin of the anti-party group was their failure to perceive the wisdom of his agricultural reforms -- particularly the new lands scheme. [32]

Bertram Wolfe has speculated that the totalitarian leader is subject to irresistible forces that will shape a paranoidal personality. Nowhere has this process been more evident than in the unfolding leadership of Khrushchev in agriculture. Khrushchev is at once Russia's number one peasant, her first agricultural scientist, and the nation's leading agricultural economist. In such acts as his revival of Lysenko he has not hesitated to cast his shadow over agricultural science. The relative success of the new lands scheme in the early years is repeatedly cited as proof of his superior wisdom. A new peak in this campaign to raise him to an unassailable position in such matters was reached during the February plenum, when he unhesitatingly engaged in what the editors of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press aptly dubbed the "Khrushchev dialogues."

During the conference, large and small among the agricultural leadership paraded to the rostrum to report on the successes of their methods

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[32] See, for example, Khrushchev's Speech...to the Workers of Virgin Land Territory, Pravda, March 19, 1961, pp. 1-4.

and the performance achieved in meeting plans. Most of the published presentations revealed lack of restraint upon the part of the Premier in interrupting, correcting, admonishing, and sometimes applauding the speakers. Fortunately for the rapporteurs Khrushchev was able to keep his sense of humor most of the time. Nevertheless, the nature of his insistence upon imposing his point of view on any and all matters, and the increasing tone of sycophancy adopted by the defendants revealed two seemingly inseparable aspects of Soviet totalitarian rule, particularly manifest in agriculture under the reign of Khrushchev. The diologues revive haunting memories of the days of the Stalin cult. The following is an exerpt from the now famous exchange with Podgorny of the Ukraine:

> Khrushchev - I'm sure, Comrade Podgorny, that the figures for corn yield that you have given here represent only half the crop. The other half of the corn that was raised was pilfered, plundered on the stalk.
>
> Podgorny - You are right, Nikita Sergeyevich.
>
> Khrushchev - That explanation for the poor corn crop is wrong. Why do I say this so confidently? In the first place I know the practical side of things, and in the second place, corn cannot yield a mere 16 to 17 centners a hectare in the Ukraine...[33]

No wonder Podgorny and others were inspired to include such remarks as the following in their presentations:

> All progressive mankind speaks with deep appreciation of the untiring fight of our party and government, and of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally, for the triumph of the immortal ideas of Marxism-Leninism and for peace and friendship among peoples...

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[33] Pravda, January 12, 1961, pp. 4-6.

> A large part in the preparations for the Central Committee plenary session was played by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's memorandum to the Presidium of the Party Central Committee. The fundamental, vitally important problems in the further development of agriculture that it raised, the sharp criticism of shortcomings in the management of agriculture and the thoroughly developed specific proposals are of exceptional significance for the whole Party.[34]

To the Latvians Khrushchev insisted, "sugar beet sowings must be introduced as widely as possible in your republic."[35] The leader of the Lithuanian Party reported that Comrade Khrushchev rightly advises that more hay be put into mixed feed.[36] And again, the integrated brigade system of operation employed by Gitlov (famous for corn growing) and others "should be introduced everywhere."[37] Although, in the name of decentralization, complaint was registered against the wrong district or regional figure issuing the wrong bureaucratic order (i.e., it failed to produce results) by his own admission, in the round of speeches following the meeting, Khrushchev came the closest to losing his temper in laying down the charge that responsible /party/ officials failing to exercise proper direction is the major fault for the persistent shortcomings in agriculture. In his own words,

> Comrades! I tell you frankly that it is hard to keep from using the sharpest language in referring to this state of affairs. How can appeals for improving the well-being of the working people, for

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[34] Ibid.

[35] "Report by Comrade A. J. Pelse..." Pravda, January 14, 1961, pp. 3-5.

[36] "Report by Comrade A. J. Sniekus..." Pravda, January 14, 1961, pp. 2-3.

[37] Pravda, January 14, 1961, p. 1.

> building communism, be squared with the extremely low standard in the management of agricultural production, with the fact that many farms have been marking time over a long period, while some have even lost ground?
>
> Plainly, it is in the first place our executive personnel who bear the responsibility for this situation...[38]

In his speech to the virgin lands group the telling forces of the system were revealed. While his left hand led him to call for the elimination of "bureaucratic methods," such as those employed by comrades who "impose pledges on the collective farms, dictate pledges from above," his right hand led him to conclude that the only solution to the problem of leadership in the new lands is that the "transfer of directors of large...state farms...be carried out with the consent of the Party Central Committee."[39]

As practice and the Soviet lexicon would seem to imply, the advance to Communism is a measured approach to strengthened disciplined control by the central will, wherein both the economic enterprise and the individual citizen are increasingly sensitized to the desires of the central dictatorship. Under constitutional systems the evolution of the institutions of rule is subject to a maximum degree of influence by broad public forces. Although a totalitarian system cannot ignore public opinion, much less than in the democracies the major instruments of rule are forced into being by the will of the dictatorship. Lenin created the secret police and Stalin imposed the once powerful MTS on the rural society.

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[38]"Speech...in Sverdlovsk," Pravda, March 7, 1961, pp. 1-3.

[39]Pravda, March 19, 1961, pp. 1-4.

Although the Khrushchev decision to preside over the decline of the secret police was undoubtedly in response to public pressures, the decision to restrict the use of terror is his. Even more his own was the decision to direct the fall of the MTS. By contrast with other societies, and particularly the democracies, Soviet political institutions are highly artificial. Reorganizations, reforms and new institutions decreed into being by the leader pass by at a dizzying pace. In recent years this process has been greatly accelerated in agriculture and, as has been documented, the imprint of the Khrushchev personality has been great.

Unlike the doggedly persistant private plots and village markets, such institutions as the MTS, and perhaps even the kolkhoz, can appear and disappear over night, subject to the whim of one man. However, with the passage of time the forces released by even the most artificially created institutions will take their toll on attitudes, and constant official opposition can undermine the most popularly supported organizations.

The Soviet peasants are not rushing voluntarily to give up their private activities, but opportunities for the expression of individual interests increasingly are being pushed into a corner.

A peasantry relatively secure from police terror increasingly dependent upon collectivized farming for their welfare and subject to incessant indoctrinational efforts designed to effect conformity will be hard put to resist joining the ranks of Russia's other directed, organizational men.

One of the most interesting observations to come out of the Harvard study of former Soviet citizens was the degree to which their outlook had been shaped by the Soviet environment. Although, at the time of the interviews, the study indicated that the peasant "is outstandingly the most oppressed, exploited, and disadvantaged man of the Soviet era..." the reporters did note that outside of the kolkhozy "the peasants find many of the general institutional features of the regime quite acceptable."[40] In the changing environment, shaped by Khrushchev's rural reforms, the forces have been mounting that are conducive to shaping a popular view ever more akin to the one demanded by Communist doctrine.

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[40]Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckholn. How the Soviet System Works, Vintage Books, New York: 1960, pp. 211-216.

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TWO CHEERS FOR ARTHUR BENTLEY

Earl Latham

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Prepared for delivery at the 1961 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 6-9, 1961.

The devaluation of Arthur F. Bentley has proceeded swiftly in the last five years. A measure of the fall in his currency may be found in pages of the APSR almost ten years apart. The reviewer of a new edition of The Process of Government said in 1950:

> If someone were to compile a list of the most important books on government ever written in America, this reviewer would heartily recommend The Process of Government for inclusion. If a list were to be made of the most important books on government to have been written in any country, this book should be on that list also.

Ten years later, the epithet, "cynical conservative" was applied to Bentley; and he was damned by the dictum that "In a rapidly changing world...the teachings of cynical conservatism are inadequate." One does not know whether such teachings would be adequate in a slowly changing world, or in any other context of cliche, but one supposes not. This sad judgment was expressed in a symposium titled "Bentley Revisited," in which Bentley's visitors, on the whole, felt that his contribution was hardly worth the trip.

The purpose of this paper is not to praise Bentley--nor to bury him. It is, rather, to make some comments on the enthusiastic hostility shown recently towards group approaches to the study of politics. There is a difficulty at the outset in making such comments, for although there is persistent reference in the critical literature to an amorphous company called "group theorists," there is singularly little specification of the membership; and such specification as there is is not always very convincing. The point of view being criticized is not often stated with clarity, nor the offensive doctrine defined. It is sometimes referred to as "pluralism," although the real American pluralists on the English model are in the American Medical Association, not the American Political Science Association. The phrase, "group theory," is also employed but the amount of theoretical writing extant is not very great, and there are substantial differences among the few who attempt it. So the attack tends to center on Bentley, and extends, sometimes by specific reference, to those who think he said something worth thinking about. And since the attack centers

on Bentley, this paper, then, deals with that attack. But it may be kept in mind that the attack really goes beyond Bentley to deal with a whole way of looking at politics of which Bentley is one example.

The general attack on group approaches to the study of politics makes certain specific objections, as follows: that the terms of the group approach are ambiguous, especially the central concept, "group"; that the group approach says nothing new; that the group approach ignores values; that the group approach harbors and conceals objectionable values; and that the group approach makes no provision for the concept of the "public interest." These objections will be dealt with in order.

I

The objection that the terms of the group approach are ambiguous would be more persuasive if ambiguity were not a universal fault in the discourse of politics. We need only reflect on the blur of thought and words that has produced varying conceptions of such a key term in political science as "state." Some theories of the state have found political equivalents for the head, heart, soul, eyes, ears, tongue, sides, stomach, intestines, and feet. The state and the church have been characterized in terms of complementary sexual attributes. The state has been presented as the simulacrum of the just man, with the principal classes of the political system arrayed, according to a simplified psychology, as reason governing the appetite with the aid of the spirit. The state has been endowed with will and personality. Besides biological and psychological theories of the state, there have been many others--anthropological, economic, juristic, and geopolitical. The concept of the state that runs throughout the rich literature of politics is certainly not more precise than the concept of the group as a subject of study.

But perhaps one does not meet the charge that the concept "group" is imprecise, by saying that other key concepts of political science are also imprecise. It might further be said, then, that the concept of the group in Bentley that some think is imprecise is not Bentley's concept at all, but their rendering of it. In what I think is the best short statement of Bentley's position in literature, Richard W. Taylor has pointed out that Bentley was not interested in crude causal connections. He rejected both "self-actional" and "inter-actional" approaches to social observation. In the first, there is a bifurcation of man and society; and in the second, there is a "presentation of particles or other objects organized as working upon one another." He rejected both these approaches to social observation, and preferred one that he and John Dewey, with whom he worked it out, called "transactional." Although Arnold Brecht thinks that "transaction" is an unfortunate word for Dewey and Bentley to have chosen, it means the observation of activity in the whole context within which it occurs, not as things acting under their own power (self-acting) nor as balanced against other things in causal relations (interaction).

This point of view is the logical consequence of the philsophy of Dewey and Bentley which, more radically than others, discards the traditional basic differentiation of mind and matter, subject and object, self and non-self.

Bentley then was interested in the flux and flow of activities in human behavior, but to study it requires some discrimination among the material. In the well-known metaphor about the citizens of the United States in a sperical mass (he called it "nothing more than a crude attempt at illustration"), it is possible, Bentley said, to pass an unlimited number of planes through the center of the sphere, each one representing some principle of classification--race, economic interest, religion, language, and so on. Although he calls these categories, "groups," he also calls them "groupings," and the second of these terms is closer to his meaning than the first, for it is only by so supposing that another well-known remark can be properly understood, namely, the observation that "When groups are adequately stated, everything is stated."

The worst that can be said about this is that it is a tautology, and this is bad enough, because then the statement tells us nothing. When we have classified all human behaviors in all the possible ways, we have come to understand human behavior in its entirety, because the whole of human behavior is the sum of all the possible classifications. This is not very helpful. But at least even this version of Bentley would not vindicate those who think he was an advocate of Watson's psychology and Newton's mechanics.

But the statement is not tautology, and it is not meaningless. Bentley hoped to work towards a descriptive political science that would not make use of animistic causes, believed that human behavior could be understood only in its activities, found focus for these activities in what he called "groups" or "groupings" which were ways of classifying behavior in a social context, regarded these groupings as processes and not as assemblies of people in organizations, and hoped that by stating all the respects in which these behaviors could be described in a social context, investigators would come closer to "knowing" than earlier rationalistic approaches, in his opinion, had succeeded in doing. In an essay written over forty years after <u>The Process of Government</u>, in which he restated his "transactional" theory, Bentley dispensed with "group" entirely and used "cross-section" instead.

Although for purposes of illustration, Bentley did reify groups, he was neither so reductive nor simplistic as his critics suppose.

II

Then there is the invitation to reject Bentley and group approaches to the study of politics on the ground that he and they present nothing new;

it has all been said--in Greek and Latin, as well as French, German and English. As one formulation of the view puts it, "To assume that Arthur Bentley discovered or invented the group as a vital factor in government and politics is, to say the least, something of an exaggeration." And then a long roster of witnesses is summoned from history to testify that, indeed, they were talking about groups all the time. Plato constructed a theoretical political system of stratified groups, Aristotle recognized the importance of groups and especially the family, Madison, Marx, and Calhoun were all talking about groups, Polybius, of course, Althusius, sure enough, and so on.

There is irony in the argument that group approaches should be ignored because political philosophers for twenty-four centuries have dealt with the subject. Perhaps this is an inversion of the fallacy of authority characterized by Bentham as "The Wisdom of Our Ancestors, or Chinese Argument," for here we are invited to reject group approaches not because they are new, but because they are not. If professors of political science were under order to say only that which has not been said before, we should stand mute before our classes, and the Review would be a volume of blank pages.

The group approaches that are found objectionable, however, are in fact old, not new; and they represent a point of view that the classical philosophers did not exhibit. David Easton in The Political System has pointed out that in the twentieth century, a new concept crept gradually into political research, "the idea that political activity is part of a process," As to Bentley who stands "at the watershed between the simple realism of Wilson and the complex realism of the group approach to political process," it was Easton's conclusion that he "comes closer than any earlier writer and most subsequent ones to discerning the true nature of the apparently changing data with which traditional political science has been concerned."

In sum, one can find in the great works of political theory much reference to the group sub-structure of political systems, although this particular terminology is, happily, absent. Montesquieu quite clearly recognizes the existence of "intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers," Burke is full of allusions to combinations and oppositions of interests, to the "reciprocal struggle of discordant powers," and to the social pluralities that radical democracy would convert into a homogeneous mass. De Tocqueville mentions the "secondary powers placed between the sovereign and his subjects," as opposed to such "simple and general" notions as that a great nation is "composed of citizens all formed upon one pattern and all governed by a single power." But these and a hundred other examples fail to disclose an effort to employ the group concept and the concept of the political process for the systematic description of political behaviors.

III

A common charge against group approaches to the study of politics is that they ignore values. This delinquency is not peculiar to group approaches since it is presumably shared by all empirical studies, except the kind sometimes characterized as "goal-oriented." Concern over the

general issue has led, as we all know, to one of the longest dialogues in professional political science, that between the "behaviorists" and those who would keep values at the center of the discipline.

Now Bentley has some hair-raising talk about ideas, values, sentiments, and feelings, all of which he tended to lump together in a single rejection as "mind-stuff," "spooks," and so on. From this, and other statements, it has been inferred that he and those who try to work with group approaches to the study of politics "have all but banished reason, knowledge, and intelligence from the political process." But it is Bentley's view that psychological labels, ideas, and "social wholes" are subjects of inquiry as individuals use them to relate themselves to the world of which they are a part, and in which they participate. These are part of the scientific appraisal of man's behavior because they are behavior.

Oliver Garceau ten years ago pointed out that some were concerned that "political science, in a fresh enthusiasm for empirical research, may become so engrossed with uniformities and determinants that it will obscure or abandon the normative commitments of a democratic polity"; but he thought that students of political behavior "need not grasp either horn of such a dilemma in order to push on with their immediately pressing work." In fact, such observation would help to understand the heritage of democratic belief more perceptively, because there has been a tendency to afford descriptive validity to the normative literature of our culture.

I do not think that it should be necessary at this late and sophisticated stage in the study of politics to argue that there is no necessary hostility between fact and value, although there are hostilities between fact-mongers and value-mongers. The difficulty with the quarrel is that each partisan pushes the other into a position he did not adopt, and complains because he finds him there. The fact-monger is wrong who supposes that his observation is uninfluenced by choices, predilections, and perhaps even unconscious commitments. The mere fact that he chooses some things to study and not others requires a principle of selection.

And the value-monger may not be fully aware of the nature of many of his formulations. Perhaps there are no concepts of politics that do not embody latent empirical propositions. The philosopher may have neither the time nor the inclination to develop these latent empirical propositions. Fact and value I think are inextricable; and the differences between the partisans of both are not differences about two products, each free of the other, but differences about the nature and consistency of the mix.

IV

A companion to the charge that group studies ignore values--especially those of liberal democracy--is that they actually serve con-

servative values--those of the status quo. It is said that group studies have a kind of built-in bias, that research inquires into the nature of things-as-they-are, and that researchers then tend to feel that things-as-they-are are things-as-they-ought-to-be. As there has been a tendency to afford descriptive validity to the normative literature of our culture, so, it is said, is there a tendency to give normative validity to the descriptive findings of empirical research. Perhaps because the charges seem to fit so badly the writers of liberal stripe who concern themselves with group approaches, Bentley is made to do service for all, although he, too, is hard to cast as the anti-liberal villain, since he was an activist political reformer in 1924, supporting the Progressive Party of LaFollette and Wheeler in Indiana. Another example of the refusal of individuals to fit the categories into which the critics put them is the exchange in the New York Times Magazine between Russell Kirk and Robert K. Merton. Russell Kirk attacked behavioral studies because (in part) they do not lead to support of the existing order but encourage the notion that it is possible to devise a "new rational social order."

But the charge that group approaches serve conservative values does not depend upon particular persons. Henry Kariel in his excellent recent work on American pluralism has said that he does not think that conservatism is inherent in social science, but he does feel that there has been an orthodoxy among American social scientists which takes the pluralism of the American political and social system and idealizes it, that is, makes it the general norm. Thus their studies, he thinks, tend to support the manipulative adaptation of individuals to the ideal, to adjust them to things-as-they-are, because things-as-they-are are good.

In an appraisal of the charges that group approaches tend to support conservative values, I think that a distinction between description and prescription may be useful. There is surely a difference between a Bentley who postulates groups as the concept by which he thinks the political process can be most accurately described; and a Figgis, writing at the same time, who asserted that the church has an autonomy and independent existence, a life and vitality of its own, and claims to loyalty quite different from and even in conflict with those that the state may require. The first is empirical in temper and intent; and the second is normative.

But perhaps the distinction is somewhat illusory. Do not the empirical and normative statements come together and reinforce each other? Did not the English pluralists say that the state does not absorb all of the loyalties of the citizen in fact, and that, therefore, its claims to do so should be resisted? And do not the group studies tend to reinforce the status quo as Kariel has said? Do not what we may call the philosophical pluralists and those we may characterize as analytical pluralists merely use different idioms to say the same thing, namely, that power and authority in society are fragmented, there is no universal authority or set of institutions to govern this plurality, and none should be erected? Even if this

were so, it would be hard to see how the charge of unavoidable conservatism could be maintained. Far from being preservers of the status quo, the English pluralists were reformers of the society.

The philosophical pluralists need not necessarily be either conservative or liberal, for pluralist ideas have been made to serve opposing normative ends--those of partisans who have favored manor, church, and throne, and those who would subvert and revolutionize any system in which these elements predominate. Conservative interests, especially those of church and property, have made and still make anti-statist arguments that favor group interests, and thus support pluralistic perspectives. But liberal goals have also been served by normative pluralism. The Lockean conception of an ethical state of nature and the philosophy of the Framers of the American Constitution were intended to protect the liberal values of individualism.

Nor need the analytical pluralists be "conservative." Even on the terms imputed to them, a description of what is, does not require the inference that what is, is what should be. To <u>postulate</u> that groups are the key to an understanding of the political process is to make no commitment of any kind about the pattern of group interests that will come closest to some normative ideal. And merely to attempt to make non-normative statements about the way in which the political process operates does not in itself mean that the investigator thereby lends support to those who, for normative ends, would fix it in some pattern thought to be desirable. Great corporations in the United States flourish in the highly pluralized political system which makes possible their considerable freedom from effective political control, but to say so does not demand endorsement either of the system or of the autonomy.

V

Group approaches, and especially that of Bentley, have been criticized for making no provision for the public interest in the political process. Although Bentley is often accused of unacceptable ambiguity in his conception of "interest," his critics seem to suppose that the "public interest" they discuss has some established meaning, although a recent book concludes that there has been no public-interest theory at all worthy of the name. In a sweeping statement about all group theories, McIver said that, however dissimilar in many respects, they were alike in that they all rejected "the integrating function of the state." Commentators like R. E. Dowling have denied this dictum, and have shown that Bentley did not ignore the state, although he certainly did not mean by it an association absorbing all the loyalties of all. The critics seem to agree that there is a public interest that is different from the sum of all private interests, that the state is the agency through which this public interest is secured, and that so-called group theories, and especially Bentley's, reject both public interest and the state.

But both Bentley--and Truman--posit a social whole, a complex of habits, "rules of the game," and so on. There is a social context within which groups operate; there are sets of procedures, inhibitions, restraints and caveats grounded in custom and experience; there are belief systems within which groups operate. The state exists as an agency for enforcing the rules that are agreed by the culture.

Some commentators--E. E. Schattschneider in The Semisovereign People is a very recent one--have found disturbing some remarks I made ten years ago that seem to leave out the state and public interest. These remarks were a description of the legislative process in which it was said that the legislature referees the group struggle, that the legislative vote on any issue tends to represent the balance of power among contending groups at the moment of voting, and what may be called public policy is the equilibrium among the contenders at any moment of observation.

Although these mild observations were referred to by another writer as a rush "upwards to dizzying theoretical heights," the ascent can really be made without vertigo or the risk of intellectual nosebleed. On looking over these words again after so many years, they still seem to me to be quite ordinarily descriptive of most of the business of the Congress. I should say that they are closer to an explanation of what has happened in this session on the bill for Federal aid to education than abstract talk about transcendent public interest in the search for which Congressmen have been bending every nerve and sinew.

My earlier statement about the legislative process did not omit the consideration by Congressmen of opinions asserted to represent the "public interest" and voiced by its official custodians, to wit, the executive branch of the United States Government. For the description of the legislative process I presented took account of the activities of "official" groups as actors in the conflict to write the rules of the society. And it was clearly said that the Congressmen are not human equivalents of the cash register, ringing up the additions and withdrawals of strength, a mindless balance, but that they have a corporate interest and identity in which the values of public responsibility and interest are given some vague and indeterminate weight and place. So, group approaches to the study of politics do not necessarily neglect what some call the "public interest," although it would certainly be difficult to find many instances where that interest could be shown to have been operationally productive in public affairs.

Conclusion

Bentley doubtless deserves neither the extravagances of praise or abuse that he has received. He was not writing a full theory of the political process but attempting to "fashion a tool," as he said, for the study of political activity. He exaggerated his complaint against idealist formulations in politics. He failed to develop operational methods for using the tool he was trying to fashion. His sociology is archaic. He

does not seem to have been primarily interested in politics at all, but rather in the more general problem of scientific method in social investigation.

But he introduced a new perspective for the study of politics, suggested fruitful concepts, led to the development of useful empirical studies of pressure group activity, and enlarged the comprehension of many about the relation of society to government. American empirical research into group activities has not been without influence abroad--England, France, and Australia, for example--where the study of voting and interest group behavior has been active since the end of the Second World War. Such studies have done something to revise understanding of the British political system, especially, where the role of interest groups now seems to be more significant in the political process than was once supposed.

Bentley's contribution to political science, then, has, I think, been substantial. And so I say "two cheers for Arthur Bentley." I do not yet say "three cheers for Arthur Bentley" because his contribution is not fully realized. His insights have been incorporated into empirical work, but have yet to make much of an impression on those more concerned with normative speculation.

Frederick Watkins has said that he strongly suspects that concern for groups has "tended to make us neglect the broader possibilities of democratic politics." I should put it another way, namely, that our concern for the broader possibilities of democratic politics has tended to ignore the meaning of groups in democratic systems. I think that there can be no effective development of the broader possibilities of democratic politics unless we realize, as Louis Hartz has pointed out, that "in the real world of democracy, the group is a permanent fact." He has said that the system of democracy works by virtue of certain processes that its theory never describes; that indeed no modern political system, as it has risen to power, has ever developed an image that corresponds to the real procedures by which it works. Thus "..democracy has always worked through group coercion, crowd psychology, and economic power."

Instead of turning away from Bentley, normative theorists might illuminate the broader possibilities of democratic politics by taking him more fully into account.

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THE CRISIS IN WESTERN SOCIALIST THEORY
A CONTINENTAL VIEW

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In addressing ourselves to the topic, "The Crisis in Western Socialist Thought," our concern is not primarily with socialism as a philosophical system or an economic theory, but with socialism as the animator and ideological manifestation of the European labor movement--and in particular with the socialist parties which linked these social movements to socialist ideology and related both to political action. And since it was precisely the great historical virtue of Marxism to transform socialism from a mere thought system into the motor force of a social movement, fusing socialism with the working class, we are particularly concerned with marxist socialism--the form of socialism which did in fact establish its hegemony in one form or another on the continent.

If it be objected that we are concerned then only with "vulgar" socialism and "vulgar" Marxism, as assimilated by the organized masses, and tempered by political expediency, herein, in our opinion, lies the historical and political significance of socialism and of Marx. Indeed this comes close to the heart of the problem, for the long-term crisis of European socialism was in no small measure the crisis of an abstract ideology and revolutionary social movement confronted with the exigencies of practical political action in an unfriendly milieu--and the milieu is always more or less hostile to visionary utopias which would reconstruct it radically. There is, in other words, a necessary interaction between the ideology and the movement. The idea complex is already somewhat attenuated in becoming the ideology of the social movement; it is of necessity further transformed as polical parties attempt to relate it and translate it into political reality. And the ideology itself is judged historically in terms of the final and not the original product.

Socialism was in its origins essentially chiliastic and socialists originated a new type and concept of party--a mass party, the well-articulated instrument of a revolutionary social movement, whose aim it was to seize power and usher in a "new Jerusalem". But such a repudiation of existing society made it difficult for the party to relate itself to political reality, creating what Daniel Bell calls the dilemma of the separation of ethics and politics, or the "ethics of ultimate ends" and the "ethics of responsibility", to use Max Weber's terminology.[1]

If the revolution had been near at hand there would have been no contradiction, but when the existing order proved resistant, the tension between the ideal and the real became too great and socialism had either to become 'extroverted', pursuing more immediate and limited objectives, or remain a sect without political influence or mass support. But 'extroverting' the party meant playing the game of politics, whose rule and art is compromise. Could the socialists work within a system whose very principle they opposed in order to change it? If so, could they maintain the force and vision to 'do final battle' with the system when the opportunity arose, or would they become absorbed into it by an insidious kind of osmosis? The tension between the 'ethic' and the exigencies of politics would increase as the parties gained in strength, and there would inevitably come a time when they, while not in a position to overturn the social order, would nonetheless hold sufficient power to frustrate the realization of their own objectives were they not prepared to share in the responsibilities of power.[2]

History has given us the answer: the Socialists' 'ethic' has been relativized; they no longer stand outside the democratic system; they have participated in governments, becoming in effect co-directors of the system they wanted to overthrow, in

order to transform it from within. But they have done so with uneasy consciences and mental reservations. And their loss of mystique has not been compensated for by a corresponding increase in strength. They have espoused the democratic principle, yet it is not sure they can realize their goals by democratic means of action--nor are they entirely sure anymore of what these goals are. Nearly everywhere in the West we witness the decline of socialism as a dynamic mass movement. Socialists decry the decline of militancy, the aging of party cadres, the difficulty of recruitment. (The communists have recently been voicing the same complaints.) Their electoral appeal has, with few exceptions, reached the point of diminishing returns, and only in Scandanavia and Austria is there prospect of their becoming the majority.

With their very survival as a 'democratic alternative' at stake, socialists have been forced to an 'agonizing reappraisal'--which touches not only the methods of realizing socialism as in the past, but the end goals themselves. Socialism, which began as a protest, is now called on to affirm, whether as a constructive opposition or (hopefully) as a governing body. So long as socialism was a small opposition movement, a simple doctrine of "irreducible" opposition to the regime, with only the vaguest allusions to the socialist after-world was sufficient, but the closer socialism came to the real world and to power, the more complex things became and the less adequate was their doctrine--even replastered. For many it ceased to have any meaning, but without a guiding doctrine, they became disoriented. Those who loyally defended the old dogmas were equally disoriented. All too often they found themselves fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Assuming that socialism is to survive as a real political force in the West, the first task of socialists, then, is to remedy the virtual absence of theory--even British Socialists are today discovering that pragmatism is not enough--seeking a new doctrine which corresponds to the realities of an "affluent" society and yet still has a distinctly socialist character. It cannot be merely negative and critical; it must be able to inspire the enthusiasm of the broad public, recreating a new view of a new society, but one which is more instructed by history and more in contact with reality than the old. It must, in addition, serve as a positive guide to action, identifying and addressing itself to the existing and emergent problems in a program which is capable of realization.

In the last few years, especially, socialists stand before the challenge, although their diagnosis of the problem and their proposed cures may differ. The Social Democrats have fused (even abandoned?) socialism for liberalism; the Belgians have desired to appear faithful to the old doctrine; while the French Socialists have posed the problem but do not seem anxious to answer it. But even for the parties which have taken a position, the dialogue, we may assume, will continue, for it has raised as many questions as it has answered. Socialists and Socialism are still searching their conscience. We shall return to current events after examining the causes of the crisis. Wisdom and want of space would dictate that we limit this analysis to a single aspect of the crisis; passion to comprehend renders us less circumspect, though we must sacrifice in depth what we may gain in breadth.

I

A major part of this paper will be concerned with placing the current crisis of European socialism in its historical perspective, for it does not date, as is often supposed, from the communist schism and two devastating world wars, or from the realization of parts of its program. The crisis existed before the parties rallied to the national defense, before they lost their elan and worker base to the communists, before they shared governmental power, and before parts of their program became law. Indeed from our opening remarks it would appear that the crisis of socialism was inherent in its very nature.

Socialism in Europe before World War I was still a rising star, and in retrospect this appears indeed to have been its heroic period. It was then the conscience of mankind; the parties were led by giants and sustained by the militant passion and

self-sacrifice of the humble and obscure, for whom the Party was a way and a reason for life. And yet this socialism contained in itself the seeds of its own destruction, and this was in reality a period of great internal crisis, the later crisis of European socialism stemming from the paramount questions and choices evaded in this period. While the degree of affliction may have varied, most of the parties were stalemated between the poles of revolution and reform, unable or unwilling to pursue to a successful conclusion the logic of a policy of democratic reform, but unable also to constitute a truly "irreducible opposition", or to advance in any significant way the forces and cause of revolution. The parties never precisely determined their role in a parliamentary democracy and never related their tactics to the ultimate goal of social transformation. Indeed into the vital question of the relationship between means and ends, the parties had but little insight, if even they had a clear awareness of the problem.

While Marxism succeeded in gaining hegemony over European socialism, it never displaced completely the earlier varieties, which arose phoenix-like from the ashes of their seeming destruction. Organized socialism was from the beginning divided into two armed camps--revolutionaries and reformists, according to whether their method was principally one of penetration or of assault. (It will be noted that the debate was chiefly one of means, not of ends, which were never clarified beyond the simple goal of collectivizing the means of production.) The reformists would gradually reform the system from within, while for the revolutionaries, the party was to be a war machine, parliamentary action in a pre-revolutionary period being only a means of propaganda and of entering the enemy citadel, trojan horse style. Reforms were new arms of combat, never a method of socialism. This debate--a product of the dilemma of ethics and politics--long preceded the 'Theses' of Bernstein, which but gave reformism a theoretical and 'scientific' basis. And it continued to dominate most of the continental parties before World War I--long after it ceased to have much practical significance, except to delay consideration of more urgent matters.

The difficulty was that neither camp won out, and the result was a negative synthesis of the two methods! French Socialism, the center of some of the most heated controversies in the Second International, will serve us as an example of this negative synthesis. The Guesdists epitomized the revolutionary method described above, although they were never "impossibilists" as is sometimes made out, and from the beginning they entered elections, sought reforms, and even appealed to peasants and shopkeepers. (Marx himself wrote the preamble to their "Minimum Program" of 1880, deeming universal suffrage an important means of organizing the proletariat "transformed thus from the instrument of dupery...into an instrument of emancipation".)[3] But the Guesdists did not expect socialism to be legislated pacifically, and prepared for the ineluctable revolution they judged to be near at hand. In the other camp were those who wanted to "immediatize" the objectives of socialism in order to render them possible.

But while in the 80's the gulf between the camps seemed unbridgeable, in the 90's it was bridged by the common denominator of electoral and parliamentary action. The revolution did not materialize, and as the elections of 1893 brought success, the Guesdists mistakenly assumed the progression would be geometric and began to view elections as the likely instrument of revolutionary transformation--"the first great electoral triumph was also the first great revolutionary defeat".[4] But the price of electoral success was retreat from splendid isolation, and the socialist parties more and more concerted their action, often joining with the Radicals. The confounding of socialism and democracy in the Dreyfus Affair brought home to the revolutionaries the logic of the new tactic. They summoned the workers to disengage themselves from a "struggle which /was/ not their own",[5] but the republicanism of their members nonetheless forced them to play an active role. When a socialist entered the government of republican defense, they again sounded the alarm (and narrowly

risked defeat at the hands of an outraged rank and file!)[6]

This was how for the first time in Europe the question of participation in a 'bourgeois' government came to be posed--a question which plagued French Socialists right up to World War II. French and International party congresses reached ambiguous decisions, discouraging participation, "a dangerous and transitory experience", but nonetheless a question of tactic, not principle, and at times an admissible expedient.[7] Participation gave way to a parliamentary coalition and steering committe of which Jaures was architect and prime-mover, but the question remained, the revolutionaries charging that the reformists had abandoned socialism for anti-clericalism (they did not, in fact, press the government to elaborate a social program).[8] Yet a the polemic did not change the fact that both groups would defend the Republic and reforms, and their differences crystalized especially over a precise question of tactics. Since whenever the government was threatened, the revolutionaries voted in its behalf, their intransigent formulas must be seen as an attempt to throw up a roadblock against the drift of their own past tactic.

But collaboration which proved so fruitless in social reform soon lost much of its appeal, and the left opposition gained steadily in the reformist camp. In the end Jaures, sensing the passionate desire of the workers for unity, changed horses and forced his party to break with the tactic he himself had fashioned--an action which many considered intellectually dishonest and politically disastrous. Thus did the reformists consent to bear the Marxist standard, after their defeat at the International Congress of Amsterdam (1904) which denounced Revisionism in favor of the "proven and glorious tactics of the class struggle" and prohibited participation, alliances with 'bourgeois' parties and the vote of the national budget.[9] But since th Dresden Motion approved fully of reforms, and since the actual terms of French unity admitted of the possibility of "accidental" combinations and "exceptional circumstances", the reformists were not quite made to 'go to Canossa'. They no doubt realized too that the disparity between the word and deed of the revolutionaries made likely the ultimate triumph of their tactic.

But however ambiguous the compromise of unity, the juxtaposition of revolution and reform did correspond to the natural dilemma of ethics and politics: socialism stood to lose its driving force unless it maintained its posture of opposition, and its mass support unless it could gain reforms. The ambiguity corresponded too in som peculiar sense to the psychology of the French working class, ardently republican an reform-conscious, yet gifted with an instinctive desire for revolutionary struggle. If, on the one hand, it was ready to compromise, it always regretted its lost chastity --especially as its hopes were seldom gratified. (Thus while the militant base of the revolutionary camp pushed their leaders into the republican struggle, that of th reformists eventually pulled theirs back.)

These compromises resolving nothing, the dialogue between revolution and reform continued in all the European socialist parties, with an ever greater air of unreali new voices being added, so that the parties resembled a multi-party system in miniature. While, as we shall see, the French party remained on dead center, the Italian party achieved the same result by moving first in one direction, then cancelling it out by moving in the other. Thus the reformists, or "minimalists", gained steadily and may have been close to imposing their logic on the party when in 1912 war with Turkey led to a sudden shift of opinion, resulting in the expulsion of the right, and the ascendancy of the "maximalists".[10] Elsewhere the results were not so much 'ministerial instability' as immobilisme. In Germany after 1905, the really vital elements in the party were the revisionists at one extreme and the insurrectionists at the other. But their center position gave the Marxists the balance of power. They had long accepted the paramount importance of elections and parliamentary actic and the increased militancy of the extreme left facilitated a modus vivendi with the right. They openly accepted the tactics of the revisionists, while the latter paid

lipservice to the revolution, Kautsky arguing that this was the only way of imposing a reformist tactic on the working class.[11]

In the French party the outcome was similar, but with an important new twist. The two extremes were also the vital elements, in the sense of offering up clear alternatives, although the right lacked a popular base and the left disintegrated entirely after 1912. The right wing was very heterogeneous, but it included outstanding revisionists like Eugene Fourniere, who warned that "as long as the party lacks the force to choose between the reformist and the revolutionary idea, or rather the courage to eliminate the latter, it will flounder in contradictions".[12] It asked collaboration with the Radicals for reforms, but did not insist on formalizing it, given the party's attitude (and the disarray of the Radicals).*

The syndicalists and especially the insurrectionists (known for their incendiary anti-parliamentary, anti-patriotic campaigns and support of the general strike) on the other hand assailed reformism, deploring "the permanent destruction of a great revolutionary will by its own tactics...."[13] "The party", said Herve, "thought it was only putting its little finger into the parliamentary machine, but the whole body was sucked in."[14] But they attacked with special violence the dogmatism of the Guesdists, who made of doctrine a "terrible dissolvent of revolutionary spirit",[15] deploring no less than the right the Guesdist habit of disparaging reformism, while supporting reform and rejecting all but parliamentary action. When old methods fail, they warned, it is necessary to find new ones. These 'Revisionists of the Left', therefore gave Marxism a romantic, activist, syndicalist base.

The Guesdists were in a most delicate situation. At least for Guesde and Lafargue (if not for many of their followers) the revolution never became a shibboleth as it probably did for their German counterparts, but remained an article of faith. But like Marx, they had a mechanistic view of the inevitable revolutionary transformation and reduced everything to the political dimension--the necessary acquisition of political power (universal suffrage seeming a likely means to this end). From this goal there were to be "no deviations!", and for this reason they repudiated "direct action". But they were 'true believers' disoriented, rendered lame by their inability to relate their reformist practice to their revolutionary goal--history sparing them the need to become engineers of the applied science of revolution. As with the party as a whole, their tragedy lay not so much in their evolution as in their failure to evolve--either to the right or to the left. Instead they became, as one of their ranks unguardedly admitted, thinking to disarm the new left, "conservative revolutionaries...for the old methods and the old socialism".[16] Unlike the case of the German Marxists, their evolution to the right on the terrain of tactic never led to a rapprochement with the right, partly because of their extreme doctrinal intransigency, but also because no hand was extended them.

The conquering force in the party was the rather heterogeneous center, whose unchallenged chef was Jaures. On a number of occasions, Jaures challenged the party to rid itself of the old formulas it no longer believed in. But Jaures was no Bernstein. In an important sense he undid the work of Bernstein. While he passionately believed that socialism would "take possession of democracy...like the silent budding of trees in spring" by "the conquest of universal suffrage by Reason";[17] defending each reform as a step to the "supreme ideal", viewed as a kind of "kindly taking over; a relief of the guard by Humanity, with salutes exchanged";[18] he yet proclaimed his socialism to be a synthesis of pre-Marxian and Marxian socialism. He accepted the class struggle, surplus value theory and dialectical materialism--all interpreted with a great

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* One lone député did insist on formal collaboration (Breton), and to make a test case, voted the Budget of 1908, presaging the action of the Neo-Socialists in 1933. He decried the party's "quasi-religious rites" (voting the individual chapters of the budget for reforms contained therein, but rejecting the whole), which made the party into a "political hermaphrodite". But the party congress refused to pick up the gauntlet and simply chose to ignore his action. ("Le Parti Socialist et le Vote du Budget", Revue Socialiste, March 1908; Parti Socialiste...

deal of latitude to be sure--[19] and when in 1900 he was crowning Bernstein's argumen by a policy of participation, he yet proclaimed "in the controversy between Bernstei and Kautsky...I am in the main with Kautsky", but he went on to say, "there is in Kautsky already a little of Bernstein and when I approve fully of Kautsky, by the same token I approve partially of Bernstein".[20] Is it any wonder that Sorel could re refer to him as a "magnificant marchand de bestiaux" or that Peguy could say of him "A man so gifted for the explanation of everything is ripe for every surrender"? [21]

Jaures' passion for the dialectical reconciliation of opposites did nothing to enrich socialist thought, but it worked fire on the level of practical politics--wit serious consequences for the party. Everything in his democratic conception of socialism called for eliminating every appeal to violence, which would render impossibl collaboration for reforms and delay the creation of a socialist majority, but a rare combination of idealism and power politics led Jaures not merely to pay lipservice t the Marxian 'superstructure' of the Guesdists, but also to woo the extreme left by championing the general strike and insurrection (giving them an influence all out of proportion to their numbers), making the center into a "salad of all the other elements". He seemed honestly to believe that pure reformism or revolutionism would be dangerous and that the excesses of one could somehow be held in check and its truth enriched by the other--his personal concept of the dialectic at work in all things. But he also wanted to win the majority in the party, and keep it against the Guesdists (his revenge on Amsterdam?). Jaures was a rare leader and tactician and migh be called the Lenin of Revisionism. A shrewder politician than Bernstein, he may wel have reasoned that a frontal attack on the left would have failed, and in stealing their thunder, he did hasten their demise. But he also prevented the right from imposing its solution (which was also his own) on the party.

Under the leadership of Jaures, then, the party continued the equivocal compromises, showing in fact a mania for "blanc-negre" unanimous resolutions, surprising in a country which prides itself on intellectual clarity. The party claimed to be not party of reform but of revolution and class struggle, "fundamentally and irreducibly opposed" to the bourgeois order, but at the same time it affirmed its desire to work for reforms (apparently resigned to run the race with one leg). The only resolution to define the party's general orientation before the war declared "precisely because it is a party of revolution...it is the party the most essentially, the most actively reformist...", a motion reflecting Jaures' dexterity at reconciling opposites but which did little to clarify the situation. [22]

In practice this meant that the party 'refused' the national budget, participation and official coalitions with the Radicals, but multiplied the "accidental" encounters --which nonetheless had something suspiciously like the systematic pattern about them Thus on the question of the electoral tactic for the second ballot, the party neither officially proclaimed "republican discipline" as the right urged, nor marched to the polls in splendid isolation (and sure defeat) at the behest of the left, but remitted to the federations the task of determining the tactic 'in accord with the interest of the proletariat, tied to the maintenance of the Republic'. Thus the party secured the fruits of republican discipline while escaping official responsibility for it.* This suited the center, and it suited the Guesdists who were not averse to the practice of republican discipline by any other name, admitting that "frequently, say 99 times out of 100" they marched with the Radicals--but they insisted (not without justice) in the interests of the proletariat and the party, not the Republic! Similarly, while the party never lost the opportunity to proclaim its "fundamental and irreducible opposition" to all bourgeois parties, on nearly every important vote of confidence for a government of the left (it could be timid, if sincere) the party either

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* That it was able to do so by the peculiarities of the French electoral system, maximizing conflict with the Radicals on the first ballot, while combining with them unofficially on the second, was a not unimportant factor in the stalemated position of the party. A different system would either have permitted it preserve its isolation or required that it form an alliance.

voted affirmatively or took refuge in a safe but not very splendid abstention.*

Thus the party's revolutionary theory did not prevent the adoption of an increasingly reformist and supple tactic, but the alliance was unholy and on the whole barren. The compromise was uneasy. The party 'made its peace' with the parliamentary system, but the revolutionary incantations and "reservations"[24] which it attached to that peace ruled out the one tactic which might have made it into an effective force for reform--while at the same time they were ineffective in preserving the elan of of the party or the force of its revolutionary ideal. Ad hoc collaboration was no substitute for a coalition. The golden opportunity for reforming French democracy, effecting a constitutional settlement, integrating the working class into the body politic and creating the basis of a stable coalition system cast along progressive-conservative lines may well have been lost at this moment--when the Republic was in high esteem, economic prosperity general, and the party unrivaled for the loyalty of the working class. It must be said that in our opinion this is highly problematical, given the disarray and conservatization of the Radicals on the social question. Nonetheless, in view of the extent of the party's evolution, there was every reason to give this tactic a fair trial--and if it failed draw the necessary conclusions.

If from one angle what stands out is the evolution of French socialism away from its revolutionary origins, the tragedy of the party--and of European socialism--lay in its failure to evolve. The party was caught up in a vicious circle. Its revolutionary faith yielded before the exigencies of politics, but the resultant frustration led it to impose arbitrary restrictions on its action--which in turn frustrated this action. This goes far towards explaining the curious phenomenon of a revolutionary party which was absorbed into the system while still in the opposition and without achieving even its minimal program of reform.

There is no denying that this wedding of a revolutionary doctrine to a democratic tactic corresponded to the wishes of the rank and file, with its opposition to the bourgeois social order and its essential loyalty to the political system fashioned by that order. But the choice had to be made; the future of the party and socialism depended upon it. Given persuasive arguments, the workers and party might have been led to it. Jaures was the one person who could have done this. His failure to do so was of great consequence, since later socialists who wished to remain faithful to the party's past glory measured themselves against him. Whatever the elan his transcendental idealism imparted to the party, Jaures did nonetheless bequeath to it a legacy of intellectual and spiritual confusion. So forceful was his rhetoric, that it seemed to many he actually had created a viable synthesis between humanistic and Marxian socialism. Blum, it would seem, was one of these. While he won the party to the idea of participation (by creating a somewhat spurious distinction between the "exercise" and "conquest" of power, and later sought to transform it into a Labor party, at the same time, like Jaures before him, he always acted as the "hyphen" between right and left, the old socialism and the new. By proclaiming his fidelity to the principal Marxist tenets and to revolutionary socialism, he lost the chance to reform the party.

Just before the war there was a definite decline of doctrine and simultaneously a disintegration of the separate factions and a convergence around the center, due in large measure to the desire of the rank and file for action and their displeasure with the leadership's continual oblique injection of questions of dogma into party debates. Their distaste for a doctrine corrupted into stock formulas and rendered impotent by reason of its divorce from practice was understandable. Such a doctrine disoriented the members and merely served, it was felt, to keep the party from confronting more vital questions and to close off certain paths of action.

The party was also, apparently, moving towards a new realism, and its language seemed to be approaching the level of its practice. With the increased militancy of

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* The Guesdists sometimes regretted the 'good old days' when ultra-conservative governments made anything but "irreducible opposition" impossible.

the nationalist reaction and danger of war, the question of collaboration and participation was in the air. The members seemed restless and on the verge of an important shift of opinion. Still attached to the party's "absolute independence", they were nonetheless increasingly anxious to see socialism pass from the opposition and "penetrate and mold democracy".[25] Guesde for a long time maintained a discreet silence while a number of his lieutenants seemed ready for the Bloc. Curiously enough, Jaure now became the repository of orthodoxy, for while he judged the Bloc impossible large ly on circumstantial grounds, he expressed himself in the old Guesdist phraseology.*[26] The Bloc did not materialize, but nonetheless the party seemed about to commit its Marxian doctrine to the attic of party tradition and to define a more constructive approach to the immediate tasks confronting it. As Albert Thomas said, the party had made its choice, and lacked only the "resolute acceptance" of a policy of reform, and the confidence that it would lead to the social transformation.[27]

With the decline of dogma and the new realism came also the loss of mystique. From the 'introverted' instrument of a revolutionary social movement, socialism had now come of age, fashioned in the image of a more traditional democratic party--albeit imperfectly. Unfortunately this occurred without any real clarification having been effected in the realm of basic goals and strategy, and without this the party was apt to merely drift. Even a negative doctrine had the virtue of keeping the eyes trained on some distant, if indeterminate goal.

Thus we conclude that a principal source of the crisis of socialism lay in the absence of any real doctrine which could offer a positive guide to understanding and action. This may seem curious in an era where "doctrinal" considerations seemed so paramount, and yet there was so little real attention given the long-range goals of socialism. And presumably choice of the proper tactics would await a clearer definition of the goals themselves. As Marxism was more and more abandoned de facto, the reformist tactic became the decisive thing in orienting European socialism, for as de Man said, "unless the principles determine the tactics, in the long run tactics will determine principles". And yet as we have labored to show, this was not quite so, since if the doctrine could not positively orient party policy, it could and did impose important negatives on it. And tactic was no substitute for a doctrine and strategy, which alone could mobilize energies and direct them toward ultimate goals. In failing to re-examine the parties' goals, deciding among the alternatives open to them and then refashioning the parties around the requirements of this choice, there was surely a major failure of leadership.

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If we have insisted on this early history, it is because it is less known and because it makes the point that the current crisis of socialism is not a correlate of old age, but that socialism has in a sense been in crisis since birth. World War I, of course (with Socialists' desertion of internationalism and participation in governments of national defense) dramatized the internal contradictions in socialism, and after this moment of truth, one would have thought socialism could never be the same. And the Russian Revolution made any middle ground between the democratic path to socialism and the destruction of capitalism by assault difficult to conceive. The socialists were put to a test after the war, for capitalism and state authority were badly shaken. So it appears was socialism. Even before the war it was extremely doubtful that the socialists could have risen to a revolutionary challenge; the debacle of socialists in Germany and Italy, where revolutionary tensions reached a peak, seemed to offer convincing proof of their revolutionary incapacity, and of the impossibility of any middle road.**

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* Whether he sincerely believed it undesirable at that time, whether he felt that only by paying lipservice to dogma could he disarm its opponents, or whether he was merely the victim of his own prestidigitation, is difficult to say.

** Germany after the war was practically a soviet republic, but the Social democrats in power, captives of their legalitarian practice, in effect kept or restored the old state apparatus and capitalist framework, resorting to the drastic ex-

All these events made it impossible to reestablish socialism on the old ideological premises after the war, yet the attempt was made, and while in many places the drift to a less doctrinaire variety of socialism was accelerated, in the French and Italian parties the old shibboleths were given a new lease on life. The communist schism was an important factor here, for if it should have facilitated the rethinking of socialism by throwing the parties to the right, the Socialists' desire to limit the proportions of the schism was translated--predictably--into an effort to regain their revolutionary purity, disputing with the communists the inheritance of Marxist orthodoxy and the revolutionary tradition.

The communist schism rendered the French Socialists incapable of consummating the new realism which had arisen just before (not to say during) the war. But the party's theoretical intransigency and resurrection of the old hybrid resolutions did not long prevent renewed progress towards reformism on the level of practice--but this progress was not linear because the balance of forces in the party was not as stable as before. Thus the party entered its first peace-time coalition with the Radicals in 1924, proffering full support, even on the budget. And while the party was the last on the continent to keep its distance from government power, participation was narrowly defeated in 1929; it almost materialized again in 1932, but the Radicals demurred, startling the socialists and pushing them to the left once more. The question finally came to a head in 1933 when the Neo-Socialists, determined to wrest the party from its old ideological moorings, voted the budget. That the party should insist on these rites when all of Europe was traversing a truly revolutionary period, seemed to them a 'monstrous tragedy'. They unveiled the doctrinal crisis of the part and warned that fascism was something new under the sun and would have to be fought with new methods, urging socialism to pose as the standard of order and authority, as an alternative to capitalist anarchy. Their diagnosis of the crisis was just, if their cure was not, but they were never given a serious hearing and were finally expelled, the party returning to its "fundamental doctrine", blaming the crisis on the party's departure from it.* But if the party moved to the left before the threat of fascism, Blum's "punctilious respect of legality"[29] in accepting direction of the Popular Front as an "exercise of power" within the capitalist framework, moved the party further to the right than the Neo's themselves had anticipated.[30]

As the fact of the Russian Revolution dominated the socialists in the 20's, so did the depression and fascism in the 30's, and only in Scandinavia, especially Sweden, and Belgium did Socialists produce any original ideas and devise a program to cope with the depression. The task was facilitated by the fact that here there were no strong Communist parties or internal fascist threats (and Sweden was less hit by the depression and had a high standard of living, progressive social legislation and and extensive public sector of the economy). Nonetheless the Socialists were able to succeed only because they had a plan of action. The Swedish party was one of the first to stress planning in its program of 1920, and in power the party pursued a policy that was essentially 'Keynesian', but did not attempt any radical structural reforms. In Belgium, under the leadership of de Man, the party revised its old doc-

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= pedient of organizing the frei corps to crush the revolution and having successfully contained it, they were themselves gradually eased from power. It is probably true, however, that the only alternative was the abdication of a democratically elected government to an armed communist minority. In Italy the socialists were a major political force, some think they could either have made a revolution or set up a socialist dominated government and effected basic reforms. (It is probable, however, that neither was a real possibility at that time.) Instead they temporized; rejecting cooperation with the liberals, they proclaimed their adhesion to communist principles, yet backed down from the revolution during the occupation strikes of 1920, causing the tide of revolution to ebb while fascism flowed. Still until 1922 they rejected an anti-fascist coalition as a diversion from the fight against capitalism, and even expelled the right wing in order to appease Lenin (unsuccessfully). (See Carl Landauer, European Socialism, Vol.I, Berkeley, 1959 G.D.H.Cole, History of Socialist Thought, Vol.IV, Part I, passim.)

* The Secretary General did bury the myth of violent revolution with the Neo's.

trine and adopted the Plan du Travail, designed like the Swedish plan to meet the depression, although not as successful in the implementation. [31] In France, the socialists in the Popular Front were up against nearly insuperable odds, pulled between communists and Radicals and facing an extremely menacing internal situation. The program, while certainly moderate enough, was impossible to apply in time of major economic crisis. It is difficult, therefore, to be too severe in judging the Blum experience, but it is also true that the party lacked an economic policy and was unable, therefore, to escape the premises of a deflationary policy. It is difficult, too, to know how Blum could win the necessary confidence of the middle classes when his own theories clearly implied that his government would be used to accelerate the ruin of capitalism.

Even more serious was the socialists' failure to understand the significance of fascism, somewhat contradictorily considering it as both a diversion from the struggle against capitalism ("a boulangisme which has succeeded" said Vandervelde) and an aberration or arm of capitalism. Even when they ceased to criticize it in orthodox Marxist terms, they could devise no effective plan of action against it. In Austria the party did put up a valiant struggle. In Germany the party saw the need to cooperate with very moderate parties to prevent dictatorship, but its constant compromising undermined its resistance in the end, and it capitulated to the fascists without a skirmish. 32

Thus when the state authority and capitalism were on the verge of collapse and liberalism rudely shaken, it was the fascists, not the socialists, who plucked the victory. In many places socialists had settled down into a permanent minority status, and where they were in power, they made strides in favor of the welfare state, but showed little zeal for socialism as an alternative to capitalism. The need for a doctrinal 'reformation' was growing, but with the notable exceptions alluded to, Socialists were too disoriented by their "intellectual baggage" and too busy keeping above water to undertake the necessary reappraisal at this time.

However, while this will somewhat diminish the force of our argument thus far, it is necessary to point out some of the obstacles and the limitations under which the socialists operated, if only because some have left this in the shadow. All movements are essentially conservative with regard to their central myth, and if revolutionary symbolish did not save the socialist parties from contradictions, its retention may be seen as an effort to resist complete absorption into the 'bourgeois' system--the last prop, as it were. The parties also feared that by eliminating this symbolism they would lose contact with the working class and undermine their self-confidence and combativeness. If workers wanted reforms, they were still alienated from the system, and especially in France and Italy the messianic revolutionary appeal had struck deep roots. Perhaps a largely verbal revolutionism sufficed, but this much they appeared to want. Even today the rank and file of the parties are reluctant to give up these shibboleths and harbor a nostalgia for the old faiths.

And objectively there was not much real possibility of social revolution in Western Europe at any point in this period. At the same time in many countries basic reform was scarcely surer. The socialist parties, even when they were the largest party, were still an opposition minority (and often ineffective) before World War I, which rendered their oppositionist attitude and suspicion of power understandable. When neither revolution or reform seemed possible, a compromise which would have the benefit of preserving the unity of the workers and the party may have seemed expedient, although of course it made failure and schism virtually inevitable. It would seem, then, that the orientation of the socialist parties was in large measure conditioned, if not determined, by situational factors.[33] Thus the Scandinavian (Norway excepted) and British parties were never much caught up in the ideological dispute (though Socialism in Scandinavia was officially Marxist), in accordance with the pragmatic 'political cultures' of their countries, the relatively high standard of living, and the possibility of reform by peaceful means. On the other hand, while Germany possessed a rather progressive social legislation, the Social Democrats were isolated

despite their great power in parliament, by reason of the nature of the regime, whic helps explain their penchant for theoretical intransigency. This penchant may be explained in the French and Italian parties by the existence of a revolutionary tradition, the weakness of the parliamentary tradition, and the social conservatism of the liberals which dimmed the prospects of basic social reform.*

Finally, one may note there is often a considerable time lag until the lack of correspondence between a theory and the facts it "interprets" is appreciated--it often happens that a theory is formulated just about the time when its factual basis is disappearing. And if objectively there was little possibility of revolution in Western Europe, the Russian revolution of 1905 and the expectation of revolution in Germany still seemed to render the idea plausible. (And later the Russian Revolutio and Communists gave the Socialists a bad conscience and made them "secretely ashamed of their legality.) The difficulties of capitalism, the great depression and the rise of fascism seemed to render plausible talk of the collapse of capitalism. (Even in Britain, where the influence of Marxism was extremely limited, it became a predominant preoccupation of intellectuals in the 30's.)

Socialists were clearly on the defensive in the inter-war period--against communism, fascism, and the increasingly anti-socialist middle classes. They were torn between contradicting priorities: to save the republic get reforms and broaden their social base, they had to eliminate Marxism and adopt a more supple tactic; to win back workers from the communists, they had to accentuate their intransigency.[34] Socialists had long been (and in many places still were) an ineffective opposition minority. And the basis of a class policy was undermined by the depression, just when the socialists were ready to come to power.[35] Unlike the Bolsheviks, who keep power once they get it, the socialists were condemned to succeed quickly or leave behind them an imperfect work--yet their opposition status had not prepared them for the complexities of government. If all this rendered the necessity no less urgent --even more urgent--it does place the socialists' dilemma in its actual context.

(of rethinking socialism)

II

This brings us specifically to the role of Marx in the crisis of socialism. Many critics (democrats and communists alike) have condemned the socialist parties, particularly the orthodox Marxists, as having emasculated Marx and turned him into an arm-chair philosopher,[36] Marx himself remaining, apparently, in a state of grace. While we surely have not absolved the parties from their responsibility in the debacle of Marxism, and while nothing is more futile than to engage in the polemic of "refuting" Marx or 'arguing Marx against Marx', it is always legitimate in the history of ideas to reflect back upon the "original sin", if it can cast light upon later developments. For philosophers are in some sense responsible for the uses history makes of them (especially when they have not refrained from making use of history), and in any case what Marx really said or really meant is less important than how he was understood and how he influenced his followers.

We come back to our original point of the separation of ethics and politics, which is enshrined in Marx's system. As de Man noted, to remain pure, Marxism would have had to remain isolated from practical politics; but when related to practice, it lent itself so perfectly to a kind of casuistry, justifying a given action (or inaction) and treating important questions of principle as mere questions of tactics Marxism was "too rigid as a mode of thought and too easy-going as a rule of conduct"[37] The dichotomy we found in the socialist parties, and especially the orthodox Marxists, between theory and practice (or intention) one finds, apparently, also in Marx. Did Marx himself, then, institute the dualism of revolution and reform which so plagued the socialist parties?

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*This attitude was reinformed for the French socialists by the failure of the reformists to gain reform from within a coalition at the turn of the century, and again later in the inter-war period, until the Popular Front.

Sidney Hook considers the essence of Marxism to be an exhortation to action and his theoretical conclusions to be merely derivations,[38] but how a rigorously deterministic doctrine, which had the effect of rooting out the utopian well-springs of action could be derived from an exhortation to action is not clear. There is a clea dichotomy between Marx's intentions or hopes and the logic of his system. A revolutionary method (the Blanquist revolution en permanance) and a deterministic philosophy of evolution, coexist without being reconciled in Marx's thought, but while revolutionary strategy was primary before 1848, after that date he leaned towards 'revolutionary evolutionism' in which capitalism was to perish by a ripening of its own internal contradictions, and his writings after that date bear the mark of a deterministic, evolutionist, anti-Blanquist conception.[39]

In spite of his economic determinism which relegated politics to the superstructure, Marx established the primacy of politics. Everything was subordinate to political action; the only road to socialism was the road to power. Yet he never clarified the nature of the inevitable revolution or the acquisition of power (or the dictatorship). While in his early phase he no doubt believed in revolutionary action by a minority, in his later phase, the weight of his argument falls on the side of evolution or reform, and hence the majority.[40] He was never explicit on this point, and perhaps was purposefully ambiguous, but against Bakunin who opposed parliamentary action and politics as killing the revolutionary spirit, Marx considered the ballot one of the most important means of action.[41] (supra, p.3) And after his diatribes against the revolutionary activists of his day and any premature violence, there would seem to be nothing left but elections and parliamentary action. In his program for the International Working Men's Association, he spoke of factory legislation as a means of emancipating the workers,[42] and of course Marx and Engles' later admission that in some countries workers might attain this end by pacific means are too well known to bear repeating here. This would seem to put Marxs own views and tactics very close to those of the orthodox Marxists in the socialist parties.*

Marx was also ambiguous on the class struggle; while his revolutionary method combines with the class struggle (which would create a major obstacle to reform and collaboration), his historical determinism would support an alliance with the bourgeoisie to achieve reform and democracy as a necessary stage on the road to socialism (which would undermine the class struggle). And again, in his later phase, the second view seemed to predominate.**

In light of the great difference between the young Marx and the old, therefore, one might say that Marx himself was the first revisionist, but unlike later revisionists of the right or left, whose revisionism led to activism plus either reform or revolution, that of Marx led away from activism and revolution, toward dogmatism and reformism-- which was precisely the case in the socialist parties! If Marx's historical determinism could exalt the workers and increase their confidence and combativeness in the early stage of socialist organization, when socialism became a power it could only too easily serve to discourage action and offer an excuse for inaction. The system without the revolutionary faith could (and sometimes did) lead to the most mediocre reformism and pious justification of whatever existed (the time is not ripe, the masses are not ready...).[43]

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* It is interesting to note that when Guesde was considered to have been a "pure" Marxist by his later critics, Engles (in 1881) spoke of his "excess of ardent drive for action which sometimes becomes vexatious", and still considered him a "credulous optimist" twelve years later. (Bernstein, "Lettres inedites de Friedrich Engels", Mouvement Socialist, Nov.1, 1900)

**Thus Marx tried to impose an alliance with the bourgeoisie on the League of Communists, was shocked when Lassalle contemplated an alliance with Bismark to free the workers from their dependence on the liberals, and condemned Guesde for breaking with Clemenceau in the Radical's fight for their republic. (Michel Collinet, La Tragedie du Marxisme, Paris, 1948, p.10; Landauer, op.cit. p.243; Bernstein, op.cit

Thus it would seem that Marxism led both to revolution and reform, offering a simple phraseology and eschatological appeal to the masses, while satisfying the reasonable aspirations of the reformists, offering no obstacle to an exclusively reformist tactic. If this flexibility was a strength of Marxism and explains its tenacity in the socialist movement, it was also a great weakness. Only the deus ex machina of history could save Marx and the Marxists from contradictions and permit them to pursue reforms and class collaboration without becoming enmeshed in the system; but since historical inevitability was a theory, not a fact, it did not save them but only turned them away from the problem of what precautions it was necessary to take in order not to become absorbed into the system.

Related to this is another difficult in Marx. While in his analysis the bourgeois revolution merely legalized their power, having already created their own institutions, Marx rejected any idea of building socialism within the bosom of capitalism. There was no question of transition to socialism; everything was put off until the seizure of power, and Marx placed a virtual ban on all "utopian" discussion of the structural problems of socialism, which of course discouraged analysis and innovation by his followers. But in time of revolution, one cannot preserve power or effect fundamental changes without a blueprint. This applies equally to the exercise of power and helps explain how socialists were so intellectually unprepared when they came to power.[44]

It would seem then that Marx's theory itself (not just the adaptation of it) had a direct bearing on the crisis of socialism as a political movement. It is curious that the evolution of the parties roughly paralleled Marx's own evolution. In their early period the revolutionary parties put the stress on the exhortative-activist side of Marxism, taking from his determinism only an invigorating sense of confidence; when the revolution did not occur and the parties gained in strength and came under the influence of political necessities, they emphasized the evolutionary method, with a purely verbal activism, using their dogma to justify their actions and vouchsafe the revolution. Marxism seduced the masses and their leaders, becoming thus itself something of an opiate of the socialist movement, giving them the wrong set of reflex reactions and distorting their vision. When values are institutionalized by a movement, as Marxism was by socialism, their influence is very hard to shake off and they seem to resist objective analysis. By its ambiguities and contradictions, Marxism invited heresy and necessitated revision. This was done on the right by Bernstein and de Man. It was done on the left by the syndicalists, insurrectionists, guild socialists, and most conclusively by Lenin. Both of these revisionisms had in common their emphasis on an ethic (humanism on the right, revolutionary faith on the left) and the voluntarist method; both were vitally concerned with the transition to socialism and the construction of the new institutions.

III

Having dwelt at such length upon what seem to us to be the more deep-seated causes of the Socialist crisis, we can turn now only briefly to some of the more immediate causes of the current socialist reappraisal--chiefly related to structural changes in society. First, the social structure has not evolved in the direction Marx indicated, but in the exact opposite. Instead of a proletarization or polarization of classes, there has been a kind of convergence of classes, as a function of the level of industrial development and the trend towards the welfare state. The workers will never become a majority, and have for nearly a century been decreasing, relative to the total population. Pre-capitalist classes remain; the new middle classes have proliferated, and if the lower levels of this grouping have lost status and earning power vis a vis the workers, this signifies rather the embourgeoisment of the workers than the proletarization of the middle classes.[45] The workers have prospered, and within the working class the proportion of unskilled laborers has steadily declined. All this has made for increasing complexity in the social str-

ucture. There is of course still a hierarchically ordered social system, but communication between classes has increased and class lines have become more fluid, while differentiation and competition within social classes has increased. And in any case, class divisions are not the most important source of division in modern society. Sociologists are no longer agreed on a definition or evaluation of social class, or even whether the concept is still valid. Some would substitute for it a more functional concept or the concept of status. And the Belgian socialist-sociologist, Henri Janne, considers class traits merely survivals and assimilates the working class to the "general public".[46]

As one would expect, political behavior is different in a fluid class society than in a rigid one, and contrary to Marx's prediction, the social evolution has led to a decline in class consciousness. The revolt of the proletariat as an out-group secured its incorporation into the dominant society, and in leaving their revolutionary ghetto, the workers left behind the traditional class norms, taking on the values and characteristics of the dominant class, or rather the segment of it nearest them --the petty bourgeoisie. If a class mentality still exists in France and Italy, most notably, because of historical traditions and relative economic backwardness, it appears that this is in the process of diminishing, and the impact of the Common Market will probably hasten this trend. The novelty of this is, in fact, a matter of degree. To some extent the impact of Marx's analysis probably caused sociologists as well as socialists to oversimplify class cohesion and overrate its significance as a determinant of behavior. For in point of fact the working class was never homogeneous, either economically, politically or psychologically, and though Marx assumed the proletariat as an alienated group would be revolutionary, in fact it contained a great many conservatives. As de Man pointed out, there probably never was a proletarian culture but only a proletarian condition; and in seeking to escape that condition, the workers tended to accept unquestioningly middle class culture and values--every new contact and material improvement increasing this tendency.[47] In a sense, thus, in getting rid of its old chains, the working class forged new chains --or links--to bourgeois society. A revolutionary class consciousness usually existed only where the workers were excluded from the system, as in France, but even here in normal times, for the mass of workers, the revolutionary current went underground, while the placid surface dominated. It may well be that Marx and his followers incessantly repeated their intransigent formulas because they knew too well the passive nature of the working class and wanted to prevent their integration into middle class society.

The significance of this for the socialists is clear. Though social class will probably remain an important determinant of political behavior, the class basis of the socialist parties has nonetheless been challenged, and the working class can no longer serve as the historic agency of social change in the West. Confronting as they do an increasingly middle class electorate and a much changed working class, the old theories and phraseology of the parties is completely dysfunctional. Since the socialists are not likely to return to the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat, it is obvious that they must broaden their appeal to other social categories if they are not to remain a permanent minority. And this concern is clearly reflected in the new programs which the socialist parties are today adopting. The process was begun long ago by nearly all the socialist parties and was one factor, though not the primary factor, in their 'radicalization', but there is now a new sense of urgency.

These changes in the structure and psychology of social classes are themselves part of a broader evolution. If the workers have become integrated into 'bourgeois society, this society and capitalism have themselves been transformed almost beyond recognition. Property has become diffused, ownership divorced from control, capital increasingly anonymous, and the state the biggest capitalist. As Crosland said, "...the mischievous enemy has retreated and gone into disguise" [48] And with the

the greater complexity and anonymity of capitalism and the disappearance of the glaring social evils, socialists have been deprived of a personalized enemy and the traditional revenge motive. Liberalism and capitalism have in a sense become socialized, or put another way, socialism has become "a part of reality", —witness increased state intervention in the economy, the redistribution of the wealth by taxation and social legislation and the democratization of education and culture.

Socialists have "rubbed their eyes" before this socialization, and asked themselves whether they should join the movement or denounce it as the supreme ruse of the adversary class.[49] Is it a beginning or the end of socialism? Some socialists see in it the transition to socialism, while others argue that it has reinforced capitalism and enabled it to survive. In point of fact, if the conditions seem "objectively ripe"for socialism , the subjective prerequisite is still lacking, and while the socialist ideal and even forms have penetrated reality, the political organization of socialism is nonetheless in crisis. The irony is that by organizing the workers and successfully exerting pressure for reforms, the socialists changed the environment which was one of the factors of theirown being, but this is the irony of all protest or reform parties.

If the liberal (even conservative) and catholic parties have 'socialized' their programs (Pope John's new encyclical on the Christian social doctrine must have come as a hard blow to some socialists; indeed parts of it are remarkably similar to the new program of the Social Democrats), they have driven a hard bargain and forced the socialists in a sense to 'capitalize' their own. Paradoxically, socialists in power have often been forced to practice a conservative policy (stabilizing and developing the economy as a prerequesite for reform; becoming respectable as a prerequesite for gaining and keeping power), while similar considerations have led the conservatives to introduce reforms.[50] While not all socialists or conservatives can bring themselves to admit it, the mixed economy and welfare state have,in effect, become a part of the current political consensus. Socialism and capitalism have been moving in opposite directions, but towards each other, and instead of a violent collision occurring, there has been a mutual interpenetration, on the level of ideals as well as economic forms—a kind of dialectical synthesis, but how unMarxian! Democracy has been the agent of this interpenetration, acting as a shock-absorber of the class struggle (instead of encouraging it,as Marx believed), and permitting the workers access to power.

This brings us to the last element in this complex, the 'decline of ideology' in the West. This is of course an over-simplification and in part reflects a nostalgia for the past, as the West measures itself against the combativeness of the new world, but it would seem to correspond to some reality. Everywhere in the West, there is talk of the lack of a 'public philosophy' and social conscience, the growth of conformism, the lack of public issues. There seems too to be a declining belief in the efficacy of collective action as a means of solving problems. (All this seems even to be the case in France today, the land of ideology par excellence.) This is partyly a product of generalized prosperity and the acquisitive, affluent society. The most acute social problems have been solved; the most acute inequalities and injustices eliminated—and these were the tensions which generated social change. The workers, long the agents of social change, no longer seek the kingdom of heaven; they have become a pressure group (perhaps was this always true, the kingdom of heaven being only a means to improvement in this world). The serious problems which remain in the West do not seem to be of a nature as can readily be solved by collective action. Indeed the complexity of modern society and the problems it engenders is a cause of the decline of ideology, since people are not easily led to believe in all-embracing philosophies and ready-made solutions. The significance of this for socialism is clear, since it threatens the ideological basis of the parties, and explains why some socialists have a hankering for the "bad conditions of the good

old days".[51] If the trend continues, parties will come more and more to resemble one another, dividing on specific issues rather than on broad philosophies.

IV

These changes revolutionize the climate and conditions in which socialism must operate, and must of necessity condition its objectives and tactics. But will adjustment to reality signify the end of socialism qua socialism and of the traditional opposition between socialism and liberalism. No ready answer can be given. These changes clearly signify the end of classical socialism and Marxism. They will not, by themselves, work for socialism, but they might be made to work for socialism. The rise of the middle classes and dimunition of the working class and its revolutionary mentality may even correspond to the new needs of the socialist parties, enabling them to cast out the revolutionary logomachy in order to appeal with greater success to the middle class, without still alienating the workers. And if the task of socialism today is not so much redistribution of the wealth as increasing liberty, and if, as Lipset indicates, the working class is not apt to be the primary bearer of a more liberal society,[52] then broadening the base of socialism is all to the good.

Prosperity is what the socialists have always wanted and provides the material base for the realization of a better society. Whether the current 'socialization' of society will shore up capitalism or establish the primacy of public over private interest, encouraging economic growth and a more democratic society depends on the use made of it. If the decline of ideology lessens the attraction of socialist ideology, it also lessens that of anti-socialism (on the right and communist left alike). And if the socialists eliminate their own dogmas and develop real alternatives on practical issues, they may gain in popular support, even drawing from the communists. If the old class and ideological basis of parties made for a certain political stability, it also encouraged strife or immobilisme by rendering compromise on action-programs and any regroupment of forces difficult.

The necessary (if not sufficient) condition of success is rising to the challenge. And the first problem is that the parties had no doctrine, but only the illusion of having one, and with much of their program either realized, discredited or questioned, their lack of long-range strategy became apparent. If once the problem of socialism was an ethic isolated from politics, now the problem was lack of an ethic. It isn't simply a question of casting out the remaining ornaments of a Marxist doctrine, but of creating a new doctrine.[53] Socialists, for example, have to define liberty and the relations between individual and group liberty and between individual liberty and property. (The Declaration of the French party, drafted by Blum in 1946 still declared "the distinct character of the socialist party is to render human liberty dependent on the abolition of...capitalist property", and socialists are only beginning to examine other and more decisive sources of alienation.) Socialism arose with class, but socialists are divided on the concept of class and the nature of social evolution. Socialists lack a political theory, occasionally still stigmatizing the state as the executive committee of the ruling class, and while in effect they accept the plurality of parties and seek to transform society by "successive advances and retreats", some still reveal their secret anguish by distinguishing between the democratic 'exercise' and revolutionary 'conquest' of power. Socialists also lack an economic theory and plan, having accepted Keynes in practice while not renouncing Marx, often criticizing capitalism as it existed nearly a century ago.

But the new doctrine must be less rigid than the old, and it is no longer the purpose of socialist parties to "save souls". As one put it, socialists must give up the practice of being too firm in the opposition and too supple in power (a kind of extension of the old revolution reform compromise) and devise a doctrine and program which concides with the possibility of realization.[54] Such a "supple doctrine and perfect technical preparation" which would allow socialists to adapt to new conditions and to proceed quickly and smoothly with their program when in power, is the

precise opposite of the old rigid dogma and fluid tactic.

Most socialists have lost all taste for the revolutionary ghetto and would like to return to power, recognizing to this end the necessity of reforming their doctrine and program. But they are still divided as to the cause of the stagnation, and the remedy. The division between right and left is not so much a question of logical analysis as of feeling. The left still considers capitalism as in its very nature immoral and inefficient, and even though they recognize that it has evolved, and are ready to accept some changes of program (alternatives to nationalization, for example), they don't want to renounce full-blooded socialism for mere "penetration". To the right, capitalism is not diabolical and they wish only to reform it, for which they must gain power. Hence they would eliminate those features of socialism which alienate the electorate and fail to correspond to reality.

The controversy is in some respects analogous to the controversy within protestantism, the Marxists being the fundamentalists who cling literally to the Old Testament prophecy and dogma of the church; the democratic socialists being the liberal Unitarians who would not only do away with the concept of the trinity but theology itself. In between are the many socialists, as the many churchmen, who reject a literal interpretation of the doctrine but attest to its symbolic value and fear what would happen to organized religion if it were abolished. Some orthodox Marxists keep Marx's categories—proving, for example, that a proletarianization and pauperization are occurring because salaries are in the great majority, and profits and investment are increasing faster than wages. Others relativize Marxism to claim it is only the caricature that is under attack, neglecting that this may be the "living Marxism". Some go back to the 'pre-historic' Marx to prove him a democrat and humanist, neglecting that his system sacrificed the individual. Others contend that even if Marx's prognostics were wrong, Marxism is above all a method of analysis—although one might question the value of a method of analysis which produced so many unscientific results, and in any case Marx has no patent on the scientific method.

That it should be difficult to officially renounce Marxism is understandable, as it provided so many socialists with a religion and was so closely identified with socialism as an organized movement. And since it is not yet clear what doctrine can be substituted for Marxism which would have the same appeal, many cling all the harder to the formulas and the flag, fearing that without Marxism, socialism will fall into simple humanism or "pseudo-positivism". Some fear too the use the communists would make of any socialist revision, but the communists have now initiated their own official revision of Marxism. Today finally the bell has tolled and everything indicates that European socialism is on the threshold of a major doctrinal reformation, although the final outcome has still not been determined.

The Germans on the right, the Belgians on the left and the French socialists to our latest knowledge still on dead center, represent the three positions in the battle that has now been joined. The Social Democrats did not begin the post-war revision, but they have carried it furthest.* Coming from the party long the repository of orthodxy (though long since effectively Marxist), the Godesberg Congress of 1959 came as something of a shock. The reformulation was facilitated by the rise of younger, less doctrinaire leaders in the unions and party and the successive election

* In the interwar period the Belgian, Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavian parties introduced fundamental changes in their programs, and after the war the Dutch Socialist Party fused with the liberals and Christian Democrats to form the Labor Party which while calling for the socialization of the key sectors of the economy, recognized the mixed economy and emphasized planning, stressing particularly the humanistic and liberal side of socialism. (E. Vermeer, "Le Nouveau Program du Partij Van de Arbeid", Socialisme, no. 39, May, 1960) And the International Congress of Frankfurt in 1951 called for the collective interest to "take precedence over the pursuit of profit" and stressed the goal as social justice, liberty and the "full flowering of the human personality. (Lucien Laurat, Problems Actuelles du Socialisme, Paris, 1955, pp.21f)

defeats after the war.* The program and declaration stressed the need to build (not await) a better order of society "worthy of man", "in which the dignity of man is inalienable" and in which the individual can increase his personal liberty and cooperate in a responsible manner in the service of the community. In recalling the source of Social Democracy, no mention was made of Marxism (!), but only the Christian ethic humanism and classical philosophy. The program affirmed its complete adherence to parliamentary democracy and political pluralism. As to economic policy, the leitmotif is the establishment of an economy "at the service of the community", with particular interests subordinated to the general interest. Recognizing that the concentration of power in the hands of the state can be dangerous to political liberties if it passes a certain level, the program considered nationalization as merely a last resort and preferred indirect controls to direct state planning, under the motto: "as much free competition as possible--as much planning as necessary". It proclaimed the aim of giving all men the right and means to (private) property and called for an extension of co-determination. This program would seem almost an attempt to restore laissez faire capitalism, state intervention being justified only when competition is absent or has untoward consequences.[55] The Swiss and Swedish Socialists, always rather pragmatic, revised their doctrine in a similar manner in 1959 and 1960, respectively.[56]

The Belgian socialists represented the other 'extreme'. The Belgian economy lags behind its neighbors and the economic malaise is very pronounced, explaining the renewed militancy of the working class in recent years. In 1933, the party had adopted de Man's revisionist program, but after the war it returned to the Quaregnon Declaration of 1894, which was Marxist and collectivist, but of a non-doctrinaire variety. Most of the leadership, it appears, wanted to formulate new principles, but the rank and file and left wing union leaders have challenged the leadership in recent years, forcing it somewhat to the left. The result was that the party kept the old Declaration, insisting on the incompatibility of socialism and capitalism. However, the "supplementary" programs adopted in 1959 and more recent party reports indicate that on the level of economic policy, the trend is also towards "supple and democratic planning" to achieve "control" of key sectors of the economy, rather than nationalization.[57] In Austria, the rank and file also remained attached to the old doctrine and leftist in sentiment, the party therefore reaffirming in 1958 the traditional "Austro-Marxism", rigid in doctrine and supple in practice. The party thus still proclaimed the decisive task of the party to be the "vanquishing" of capitalism and the abolution of classes. But at the same time the statement made clear that property which rested on labor was legitimate and clearly implied that the key enterprises would be "integrated" into the collective economy by democratic planning and control rather than by further nationalization.[58] Thus the Belgian and Austrian parties did not differ in essentials from the revisionists on the level of economic policy, though they still proclaimed fidelity to the old doctrines.

In Italy, the problem does not arise in the same manner, for the party is already split into the right wing social democrats and the Marxian Nenni Socialists, who since 1955, however, have been seeking a "democratic alternative", considering unity with the social democrats and even, until recently, an alliance with the Christian Democrats. The French party seems more attached to its past in some respects than any other, and was the last to take up the question of a revision--"pardon, d'adaptation", as one put it--of its doctrine. It seems likely to follow the Belgian and Austrian example, yet without this corresponding to a genuinely leftist sentiment. The plight of the French socialists is far more serious and the gap between its doctrine and its actual practice greater than in most parties--at least since 1956.

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* The program passed by a vote of 340 to 16 (99 voting in the opposition on the section concerning socialisation.) It is reported that the mass of members took no interest in the discussion, and that the greater part of the Congress delegates were party or union officials. Some, it is said, sincerely believe in the new program; others rallying out of electoral considerations. (Gerbel, Fourth International, #8, Winter 1959-60, pp.17f.)

(The party has lost about 25% of its pre-war vote, and its membership has fallen from 180,000 in 1939 (and 353,000 in 1946)to 79,000 in 1960.) Its critics accuse it of being a simple pressure group, retarding economic development by a demagogic "distributive socialism", defending "les petits contre les gros", becoming a "welfare society for the protection of the incapable".[59]

The principle of participation finally ceased to preoccupy the party after the war, and the question of becoming a democratic Labor Party was debated at length but finally rejected, the party substituting Guy Mollet, then the "scourage of the revisionists", for the more 'heretical' Daniel Mayer. Most of the recent debate over party policy has concerned its attitude towards the current government and Algeria rather than more general issues.* In 1958 the Autonomous Socialist Party broke off from the party, but the break came mainly on specifics again, and the new party included revisionists like Andre Philip** and Daniel Mayer, orthodox Marxists like Rosen fell, and later new recruits to socialism like Mendes-France. Divided in itself, it allied in 1960 with a number of extreme left wing groups, forming the Parti Socialis Unifié, on the basis of a coexistence of differnt political philosophies, a progressive social and economic program and opposition to the regime and its Algerian polic Internal divisions and an increasing sectarianism render its initial hopes of creating a "rassemblement de gauche" unlikely to succeed.

In 1958 Jules Moch set up a commission of General Doctrinal Studies to study th question of doctrinal revision. While not officially Marxist, the party has retaine most of the traditional Marxist tenets. The party's only official statement of principles is contained in the Statutes of 1905 and the supplementary Declaration of Principles drafted by Blum in 1946, which while a step towards humanistic socialism (proclaiming as the goal the liberation of the human person in a society founded on "equality and fraternity"), still proclaimed the party to be"essentially revolutionary" and called for the elimination of capitalist property, the source of classes and class conflict.[60] At the end of 1960 the draft "Fundamental Program" was presente Again the emphasis is on a more humanistic, less doctrinaire variety of socialism, and it proclaims the party's complete adherence to democracy (considering a strong and stable executive as an indispensible element of a democratic regime!) While still proclaiming that a capitalist economy is inefficient and founded exclusively on profit, its economic program joins the other parties, especially the Austrian. The program is less orthodox than the 1946 Declaration, but at the same time it proclaims its fidelity to that declaration and to its past.

The Program is clearly a compromise, or "synthesis", as Moch said in presenting it (shades of Jaures); it was not a question of doctrinal revision but merely of "adapting to...new conditions an ensemble of principles which conserve their full value And when the program was discussed in 1959, Mollet proclaimed his fidelity to the method and principal tenets of Marxism, rejecting any notion of "revisionism" and admitting at the very most only of doctrinal "clarification". He called attention to the fact that "the text...doesn't speak for a second of Principles...the earlier Principles remain as they were".[61] As Bonnel put it, "as always, innovation passes

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* The left called on the party to openly break with the "monarchy" and demanded the right of independence for Algeria. At no time did it seriously challenge Mollet's hold over the party, though it did put him slightly on the defensive (to the point where he has now accused de Gaulle of "homicide by imprudence".(Monde, July 14-15 1961.)

** Philip is something new under the sun in French Socialism, and hard to classify— a kind of non-dogmatic revolutionary, and much inspired by de Man. He stands for a radical social and economic transformation, including the socialization of most of the base industries and comprehensive planning and rationalization of the economy. At the same time he is a revisionist, returning to a humanistic socialism and calling for the elimination of ideology, replacing it with a flexible and tolerant doctrine, conceiving of parties as "action groups" and desiring a regroupment of the left.

only under cover of fidelity, and the traditional coup de chapeau to /the traditional principles/ permits..heresy".[62] And he warned that while new horizons were now opened, "the doctrinal renovation remains to be undertaken".*

If we summarize the salient points in the current revision of Western socialist doctrine, we note that though there are important differences of degree and of sentiment, what is striking is the similarities and the new elements--even for those who still retain the 'Old Testament'. First there is a marked change of emphasis from the primacy of economics to the primacy of the political (though some Socialists demur, notably the Belgians). If Marx stood Hegel on his head, the socialists seem to be doing the same to Marx, returning to the ethical, democratic and humanistic source and goals of socialism. So much emphasis did Marx place on economic forces and collectivization, that many socialists lost sight of the fact that these were means to an end, not ends in themselves. Tacitly, at least, socialists admit that while Marx subordinated liberty to equality, the former would seem to be the more pressing concern for the West today. (Thus the Social Democrats recognized the dangers as well as the opportunities which technological and material progress constitute for the intellectual and moral development of man--a very un-Marxian idea.) Socialists are also anxious to distinguish themselves from communists, and therefore lay special stress on their acceptance of democracy, pluralism, rights of minorities and the division and decentralization of power, but they emphasize too that democracy must be extended to the economic and social spheres.

While the interest of the community is stressed, there is nonetheless a marked tendency also to return to the individual--almost all the programs pose as the goal the"full flowering of the human personality". There are of course differences of degree and thus the Austrians constantly pair individual liberties with correlative duties of the individual to society and the collectivity. Related to this is the declining emphasis on class. Most of the programs speak of the general interest, the community, or humanity, instead of the working class (or even collectivity). And most of the programs make their bid to turn the parties into people's parties.

Another interesting point is the new attitude towards religion--a kind of socialist 'Rerum Novarum'. In their desire to broaden the appeal of socialism and either draw from the Christian Democratic parties or render cooperation with them possible, the parties now renounce their traditional anti-clericalism. Many stress the religious inspiration for socialism, and all stress the compatibility of socialism with Christianity, and other philosophies. (The Dutch and Belgian parties recognize the principle of subsidies to confessional schools.)

Similar trends are found on the level of economic policy. In effect all the parties accept a mixed economy, but while some make of this a question of principle (the Social Democrats recognize a mixed economy as an important guarantee of political liberty), others like the Belgian and Austrian parties condemn capitalism in principle, and place the emphasis on the need for state intervention. Most recognize that the question of ownership of property has become less vital than that of control--whether economic or political. Thus collectivization (which generally came to be identified with nationalization), long considered a central principle of socialism --the one aspect of the future society Marx talked about--is now being put in its proper perspective as a means of socialism, and only one among many. While none renounce the principle, and some would make considerable use of it, the tendency is to make it an exceptional means or expedient. This question does not raise the same controversy or passion as in England; even the more orthodox parties speak less of nationalization than of collectivization, now generally being loosely interpreted as the 'control of the power of disposal of the means of production', municipalization

* The Congress of last Maywas to have discussed the program, already several times delayed, but it was referred to a coming National Council; we have no knowledge of this having taken place.

cooperatives, or merely public control being placed on the same level as nationalization. In fact the emphasis is now placed chiefly on planning and controls--some preferring direct, others indirect controls.

Somewhat less pronounced, but still present in many of the programs is the trend away from demanding a more equal distribution of the wealth towards emphasizing the need to rationalize the economy and increase investment and productivity, but not all the parties are so willing to draw Andre Philip's conclusion that since general mediocrity rather than unequal distribution of the wealth is the real exploiter, workers must restrict their demands and accept sacrifices, unless they can devise means of increasing productivity.[63] And many of the programs undermine this point by stressing the need to defend the interests of the small producer.

Finally all the programs stress the need to build industrial democracy--on the national level and that of the enterprise by some form of codetermination. This is not a new element in socialist programs but it has recently been receiving serious study, reflecting the desire of socialists to activate democracy, providing for more participation at all levels of government and the economy. This reflects also the realization that socialism will not be realized automatically and that the construction of socialism is as much a moral and political problem as a technical and economic one--that in fact socialism is hindered less by capitalism than by the deficiency aptitude, and more important, will on the part of the workers to realize collectivization. One notes also, and for the same reason, a stress on democratizing education and developing popular education.

The current revision of European socialism is long overdue; the answers are still tentative and halting, at least for some, reflecting the fact that though many socialists would be ready to replace their old doctrine, they are less sure of what they can replace it with. If the answers do not always qualify as genuine theory, they represent an important progress in this direction. It seems clear that European socialists are returning to their pre-Marxian socialist origins, and beyond this to liberalism, stressing the ethics and ideals of socialism obscured by Marx. But at the same time there is an effort to render socialism less utopian, less abstract, less absolute, more practical--more able to be translated into real political alternatives. Implicitly at least, socialists are accepting the reformist premise of penetrating a system to change it gradually from within. They seem to realize, at least implicitly, that the transition and the construction is the decisive thing, and that it is an unending process. As the Austrian program put it, "today workers have more than their chains to lose, but there remains a world for them to conquer", or as Carlo Schmidt said, socialism is not a torch to brandish but a series of solutions.

Socialists are putting in their bid to become a democratic alternative instead of remaining a pressure group. The question remains whether they can succeed, presenting a real alternative to the liberals. Some think that in eliminating Marxism or nationalization socialism loses its raison d'etre. And it is true that socialists seem to be going back to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Second Treatise. Their distinction, presumably, is to realize liberty and individualism within and by society. But in their desire to distinguish themselves from the communists, socialists did leave somewhat in the shadow what distinguishes them from the liberals, and it remains to be seen if they can offer new and better ways to realize the ideals and values which are those of all Western Civilization.

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56. For Swiss program see articles in Socialisme, nos. 21 (May 1957) and 38 (March 1960); for Swedish program, see article in Revue Socialiste, no. 134-135, June-July, 1960 by Raymond Fusilier, "Evolution des Partis Socialistes Nordiques".
57. See Garnier-Thenon, "Rapports sur the Programmes des Partis Socialistes Occidentaux", Revue Socialiste, no. 131, May 1960; Henri Janne, "Programmes Socialistes", Socialisme, no. 44, March, 1961; Delsinne, Socialisme, #31, January, 1959; Fourth International, Winter 1959, no.5.
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59. Andre Philip, "La Situation politique francais", Socialisme, No. 32, March 1959; also "Taches actuelles du socialisme", Socialisme, No.33, May 1959
60. For text of projet and the Blum Declaration, and commentary, see Revue Socialiste, No. 138, December, 1960.
61. Le Monde, May 12, 1959, p. 4; also Bonnel, Revue Socialiste, April 1961, pp. 421 f.
62. Revue Socialiste, April 1961, p. 422.
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TOWARD A DEFINITION OF EDITORIAL POLICY FOR THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

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(For presentation at a special panel at the annual meetings of the Association, St. Louis, September 8, 1961.)

Editorial policy reflects in part an image of an ideal, in part a code of operating practice. It is the Editor's business to maintain some gap, but not too large a gap, between the two--to keep the ideal always some distance ahead of the practice, and to keep the practice from lagging too far behind. And it is inherent in the notion of policy that both ideal and practice embody a degree of rational consistency in statement and application that rules out mere personal caprice.

The distinctive characteristics of the Review are marked out for it in the main by its functions as a scholarly journal and as an institutional medium, the official journal of the Association. It is not in any significant degree, therefore, as a journal of opinion may be, a vehicle for the predilections of the Editor; his duty is to formulate and apply standards appropriate to the purposes of the Association that supports the Review and furnishes its principal audience. Because the Association is a national professional society, rather than either an organ of a particular educational institution or the outlet of a group committed to a particular school of thought, the Review must be correspondingly catholic in its outlook. Because the domain of political science--however its boundaries are defined--is so broad, the doors must be open to a diversity of subject matters, including occasional essays in neighboring disciplines. Because the Review audience--even if narrowly conceived as the dues-paying membership of the Association--extends well beyond the ranks of teachers of political science, to take in many people in public life here and abroad, whether officials or not, materials addressed to questions of public policy have a place along with those confined to more strictly scientific concerns. And because, hopefully, a significant part of the Review's ultimate audience is still unborn, or at least has not yet emerged from school, while verity is supposed to be timeless, the range of appropriate material is not, like a newspaper's, significantly limited by considerations of timeliness to topics of current interest.[1] On the contrary, one criterion of quality is posed by the question, how well will an item read five years or more hence? Finally, because the Review is made up mainly from contributed materials, the distribution of emphasis must reflect primarily the interests of those who are moved to write, rather than any *a priori* scheme of the Editor's.

In one sense, editorial issues may be thought to arise, like budgetary decisions, from the necessity of choice: space is scarce, more material is available for printing than the customarily available space in the Review will contain, and so an ordered scheme of preferences and allocations is needed. Five or six times as many manuscript pages of articles are offered as are printed; a great many books are listed as "received" without being reviewed; the authors of book reviews and especially of book notes are allowed severely limited numbers of words; news and notes items are cut down or rejected, and so on. The amount of space can be increased somewhat by using a double-column page with narrower margins and smaller type, by increasing the number of pages, or by increasing the frequency of issues. But there are financial and other practical limits on all these palliatives, and the overall pressure for space is unremitting.

1/ I must in candor acknowledge that references and citations in current literature to issues of the Review that antedate the end of World War II are quite uncommon. This must be set down as one of the marks of the gap between the ideal and the practice, either on the part of the Review or of the current literature.

Nevertheless, the lively and recurrent policy questions ordinarily emerge in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. Only occasionally, at the margin, does the process of choice work like a zero-sum game where, if A is excluded, B can be admitted. For one reason, since the change in format last year, and because the Association is solvent, there is no longer a fixed number of pages setting an absolute and mechanical limit to the size of each issue. A few more pages, within reason, can always be bought. For another, the several departments of the Review--articles, book reviews, bibliographical sections, news and notes, and advertising--are autonomously edited and only put together at press time, and their space requirements vary from issue to issue; so that specific allocations of page limits set in advance for each section would usually be unduly arbitrary or unfeasible. In the upshot, then, the criteria of selection and rejection must in the main be formulated and applied qualitatively to each candidate for inclusion on its merits with sufficient rigor to forestall the necessity of a harsher method of choice, word by word, on a dog-eat-dog basis. This conclusion is reinforced by the reflection that the primary purposes of the Review as a scholarly journal are qualitative, the advancement of the profession and of the understanding of its disciplinary subject matter: better a small journal, if need be, of top quality, than a guaranteed output of a scheduled number of pages.

Bearing these general considerations in mind, I shall try im what follows to clarify the principal issues and to some extent to codify the practice of Review policy. Since no other journal has quite the same audience or purpose, I shall refrain from advice on how other journals ought to be conducted, that might seem gratuitous.

The main issues, in my experience, can be conveniently discussed under a baker's half-dozen heads, which I shall take up in the following order: (1) the sources of supply; (2) the rule against reprinting; (3) the balance between service and research functions; (4) the place of opinion and public policy arguments; (5) the room for specialists; (6) the priority for analysis over description; and (7) style, or the sanctity of an author's words.

I. Sources of Supply

Market principles of supply, demand and incentive have a bearing on the output of materials the Review needs, and so policy must take into account some elementary differentials in the operation of these principles. At one end of the line, the Editor has not yet discovered any qualified person who is willing as a labor of love to contribute over 100 hours of her time and disrupt her Christmas vacation in order to furnish the indispensable annual index to the Review, in the form and on the schedule the printer requires, for the sheer satisfaction of seeing her name on the cover page. So the index must be procured and paid for; and so too must the annual listing of dissertations. In a different category stand the stalwart compilers of the bibliographic sections, sorting out the current periodical literature for the convenience of the inquisitive. They respond to a call to duty, in a species of selective service, and like good soldiers are compensated (at a page rate) rather for out-of-pocket expenses than for the economic value of their time; but they must be called.

In a third category are the book reviewers. They are far more numerous, and if they respond at all to invitations, they need no more tangible reward than the retention of the books they review. But they are free agents, not conscripts. They may and often do refuse to serve when called upon. Moreover, they can seldom know in advance what new books are forthcoming, which need reviewing or which are already provided for; and if they volunteer, their motives may sometimes be suspect. So the Book Review Editor will welcome suggestions

from any quarter but must generally take the burden of selection and solicitation book by book. I need not go into the criteria he applies, for I believe these are widely understood and not often in controversy. He has a formidable managerial task, challenging his imagination, his range of acquaintance and his resources for locating appropriate reviewers beyond his acquaintance. Quarrels with his performance are apt to be rather ad hoc or ad hominem than based on policy or principle, and critics need to bear in mind, what they cannot ordinarily know in a particular case, that the reviewer may have been his first or his last choice. On editorial questions other than the allocation of space he can afford to allow reviewers the more latitude of expression because the Communications section provides a medium for complaint, reply or rebuttal.

The News and Notes materials stand on quite a different footing. Editorial policy calls for quarterly notices to department chairmen inviting the submission of materials; obituaries are occasionally invited; and official committees of th Association are informed of deadlines for notices they may wish to see printed. But the Review maintains no staff of reporters or correspondents and makes no other systematic provision for securing news items for this section. The section editor gives a semblance of order to the materials that are volunteered, uses his blue pencil on items that seem unduly verbose or self-serving, tries to reward brevity in response by inclusion where possible,and excludes classes of items that have the least claims on general attention. Readers sometimes complain that space is given to trivia, but volunteers also complain when items that concern them are rejected. Perhaps no other section of the Review poses so sharply the conflicting demands for saving space and for accommodating personal inclinations; none so perplexingly defies the editor's attempts to formulate criteria that will be uniformly applicable and satisfactory. And all suggestions to date that look toward improving on the vagaries of the present reliance on volunteerd items by introducing a more regularized system of positive procurement of news m material have foundered on one of two rocks: they make impossible demands for staff unless substantial sums of money are to be paid; and they promise even more disappointments for those who want to see their activities noticed unless substantially more space is allocated for the purpose.

Still different considerations apply to the supply of article manuscripts. Here, in contrast with some of the service features, with commercial magazines and (so I am informed) with the practice of some scholarly journals abroad, no question of payment arises. The satisfaction of seeing an article in the Review, and of getting a modest number of reprints free, is a sufficient reward for contributors. Nor, in contrast with the book reviews, are invitations to contribute needed to secure an adequate supply of manuscripts that are acceptable or can be made so. There is no consistent surplusage, particularly of the highest quality, but in recent years at least there has been a sufficiency. Review policy accordingly has been to depend, for the supply of articles, mainly upon a selection from amongst the manuscripts offered. 2/ I shall come presently

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2/ Customarily, only two of the 40-odd articles published each year--the President's address and the annual review of developments in constitutional law--have been regularly solicited. I have not hesitated to follow up occasional tips from trustworthy sources telling me of significant work in progress that might be had for the asking; and on other occasions I have invited comments on a manuscript already in hand, to be published along with it. But these are infrequent and ad hoc departures.from the usual policy of reliance on offerings.

to the criteria of selection. At this point it is relevant to ask whether more of the present offerings should be rejected in order to make room for the fruits of a different policy, that by active solicitation might procure articles of a sort not now, or seldom, offered.

Two possibilities may be suggested as alternatives. One would seek more control over the subject matter by a systematic editorial selection of topics in need of treatment, followed by invitations to scholars qualified to treat them. In this fashion symposia might be constructed, and presumably the Editorial Board would find a larger scope for collective deliberation on the choice of subjects and authors than is feasible now in the appraisal of two or three hundred random offerings annually.

The other would seek to alter the sources of supply by securing a larger proportion of the articles printed from authors who are senior statesmen in the profession and recognised masters in their special fields. The overwhelming majority of manuscripts now submitted comes from younger scholars with reputations still to be made or in the making, and that publication in the Review is less often a sufficient incentive to induce established authors to submit their thoughts in writing, unasked. Presumably, direct invitations to contribute might be productive. 3/

A first objection to either alternative is self-serving: it would mean more work for the Editor, and indeed would hardly be practicable without a full-time editor, or unless the responsibility were parcelled out, as with the Program Committee for the annual meetings, so that a series of associate editors took charge of particular areas or undertook to fill successive issues in turn. But putting the editorship "in commission" would surely dilute the responsibility for the finished product.

Taking higher ground, I would also doubt the wisdom of the concentration of power, and its anti-democratic implications, inherent in an arrangement for the management of the official journal of the Association that was premised on the assumption that one editor--or even a small group--knew, better than those who are engaged in their own research and writing, what topics are most in need of attention, or which scholars deserve, in advance of their production, a preferred and protacted claim on the Review audience for their output. I believe it possible to find and to replace editors with the critical faculties needed for the appraisal of manuscripts they have not themselves inspired, and who are skilled in helping an author to put his best foot forward in matters of style, logic, organization and the like. I think the Association might soon grow restive with an editor, however conscientious, who was charged with programming the scholarly output that the Association will publish. Finally, considering the difficulties in rejecting articles that have been invited sight unseen, I am not persuaded that the products of a policy of planned contents for the Review would in fact be superior to those now obtained. I favor the continuance of the present policy, therefore, without prejudice to opportunistic exceptions of the sort already noted.

3/ In a conversation I had some years ago on this point with the editor of an esteemed British journal he expressed astonishment on learning of Review policy: "With us, no one who is anyone would dream of sending off an article to our journal without first receiving a nod of invitation from the editor." We concluded that his journal fills its requirements in the way that American departments prefer to make their appointments, by consulting knowledgeable friends informally; while the Review works in the way the British make appointments, by a public advertisement inviting all who think themselves qualified to come forward and submit their credentials.

II. The Rule Against Reprinting

The Review has a one-way policy of long standing that expresses a preference for the advancement, as against the diffusion, of knowledge: except in its advertising pages and masthead it does not knowingly publish materials of substantially the same content that have already appeared elsewhere in print, even in another country, even in another language. On the other hand, if the author consents, permission to reprint from the Review is ordinarily given as a matter of course.4/ So an article which will presently become a chapter in a book may be accepted and published with a notice to that effect--book publishers seem to welcome that form of advertising--and so may an article that has had a mimeographed circulation. But an article drawn from a book, even if very recently published, or from an address published as a separate pamphlet or in official proceedings, or a translation from a foreign journal--buried in obscurity though these may be for practical purposes--will be rejected.

A good reason but not the real reason for the rule is the risk of infringing copyrights when materials are reprinted. A better reason is the need to conserve space in order to afford an outlet for original work, the encouragement of which is a prime purpose of the Association and of the Review. A final reason is that without it--and stopping points would be hard to define--the Review might be transformed into an anthology, if not into a reader's digest of "great" articles. There is much to be said for such a publication, since no doubt, across the spans of space and times, more distinguished pieces have been written, and have perhaps escaped the notice of the contemporary American audience, than any particular issue of the Review is apt to contain. Nevertheless, articles meriting reprinting may find their way into the books of readings and other outlets that commercial publishers will support. An insistence on originality, in the form of a rule against self-plagiarism, is one buttress to a larger policy of promoting the highest quality standards attainable.

Like any mechanical rule in human affairs, this one presents evident difficulties and occasional inequalities in application. This is why the reservation of scienter was included in stating it. The Review has sometimes been taken unawares in violation of the rule, since the Editor and his advisers have not read everything in print and authors do not always call attention to their prior or pending publications. In close cases where the timing is crucial, adjustments in publication schedules might lead to unintended violations; and here, if a commitment to publish has been given, the Review does not retract it. It is easy to sympathize also with an author who, when he has once committed his thoughts to paper, would like to see them appear in as many places as possible; or who, impatient with the time it takes for one journal to reach a decision, submits them to several and finds it hard to withdraw if more than one accpets what he has written. But an author who hopes to publish in the Review a second time would be shortsighted if he deliberately took advantage of the Editor's ignorance in a knowing violation of the rule.

III. Service vs. Research Functions

Considerably more than half the printed matter in any issue of the Review comes under the general rubric of the diffusion rather than the advancement of knowledge--a proportion that is in line with the definition of a conservative as one who realizes that most of men's time and energy must be devoted to preventing things from getting any worse than they already are. The sections given

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4/ Over the signature of the Executive Director of the Association, not the Managing Editor, since the Association holds the copyright.

over to advertising, index, news and notes, bibliographies and book notes--which because of space limits can seldom be more than expository--are all of this nature, and all have a tendency to grow. The conscientious bibliographer, for instance, as well as the indiscriminate one, leans toward inclusion rather than exclusion; and as the volume of materials he canvasses increases, so does the number of entries. The indexer inserts cross-references to be more helpful; the dissertation list is expanded to include Canadian titles; the northern and southern California schools form separate associations with separate programs and lists of officers to record; and so on. All this is useful and desirable, and moreover, some part of the diffusion, not specifiable a priori, leads indirectly to further advances in knowledge later on. Even if this were not so, a profession that earns most of its bread and butter by teaching has needs that constitute an independent justification for the provision of reference materials of a specialized nature not readily accessible elsewhere. What, then, is an appropriate balance to maintain between these service functions and the provision of an outlet for original research, in the Review?

One answer, of course, is to stick with the status quo. Whenever suggestions have been made in recent years to drop or reduce drastically one or another of the existing service sections, defenders of the target have arisen to protest, and approximately the present balance has been preserved. No strong pressure for a sharp reduction has developed, because the volume of manuscripts of articles of acceptable quality has remained in rough correspondence with the space remaining after some modest economizing measures.

So long as these conditions continue, I am at a loss to suggest a more elevated principle for justifying or altering the present balance, other than the one implicitly given above, that the service materials carried be not readily accessible in other sources; and a corollary, that the burden of proof should lie with those who argue for their expansion. That burden I believe has been sustained for the services I have mentioned at about their present levels.

A further criterion of allocation--though hardly a lofty principle--might be a rule that service materials should not be accepted as articles or occupy space allotted to articles. In conformity with that thought the "bibliographical essays" that appear from time to time are located in the book review department and occasional "teaching notes" have been relegated to rear positions.

But to state such a rule in this way risks pre-judging the most perplexing and controversial case posing this general issue that has arisen in my tenure: namely, the future of the annual article on constitutional law, an issue precipated last winter when its eminent author for the last dozen years asked to be relieved of continuing it. It has been a regular feature of the Review for upwards of 35 years at least, surviving the demise of annual reviews of the sessions of Congress, of developments in state constitutional law, and perhaps other subjects. It has been located and counted among the articles. It is intentionally a service to the diffusion rather than the advancement of knowledge, and is valued as such. It is capably and carefully done, and widely and on the whole favorably known. It is long, as articles go, but it has not precluded the publication of other articles on constitutional law topics in the Review. Even if that were not so, authors in that field probably have, in the plethora of law journals, more opportunities to find outlets for their writings than scholars in most other branches of our discipline. Should the annual article be continued?

In my search for counsel on this question I encountered two characteristic and opposing views. Specialists in the field, with a few exceptions, see no need for it that is not better supplied in more specialized services familiar and available to them--in the more exhaustive annual surveys of the Harvard Law Review, in the volumes from the Chicago Law School, and in a variety of official and commercial undertakings. They would prefer to see the space freed for the fruits of original analysis and research. Defenders of the article--not all of them readers of it, nor any longer teachers in introductory courses--urge not so much their own needs as those of harried teachers in smaller places who are not specialists in the field and have heavy loads and limited library facilities that do not include much in the way of legal materials; and of those in other fields altogether who want an annual refresher. For such as these, it is said, nothing else is so handily available or gives so much in comparable space. Some correlation between age and attitude is also observable: the seniors I have consulted in the profession are more apt to favor continuing the tradition; the juniors are readier to discard it.

My own view is that the annual article has lost much of its former utility, not through its own fault. In part, it cannot any longer be a unique and pioneering effort as it once may have been; teachers and students in constitutional law are far better supplied than before the war with a variety of materials and resources that reduce their dependence on an annual survey. In part also, approaches to the teaching of American government have shifted away from the systematic exposition of constitutional doctrines, so that teachers who are not constitutional lawyers have less occasion to brush up on recent cases. But if the article has thereby in some degree become outmoded, its many loyal friends are testimony to the strength of the case that can still be made for it.

Other considerations enter into editorial policy. The annual article is a species of a potentially numerous genus. It is anomalous standing alone. If there is one in constitutional law, why not one also on, say, the state of the public finances, or the activities of the President, or of the UN--all topics presumably of as much importance and general interest, and as hard to keep track of from day to day? More basically, it is anomalous because, alone among the articles it does not, by design, meet two of the criteria, novelty and a problem focus, that are applied to the others. But these objections would lie in principle against any service article, and it would be dogmatic to rest on them entirely. All in all, sound policy at this stage appears to counsel, not abandonment, but a conclusion that the time is ripe for a period of experimentation with alternative approaches to the design ond concept of the article and the purposes it may serve.

IV. Opinion and Public Policy vs. Science

Most articles coming to the Review embody the results of inquiries by their authors, aimed at furthering our understanding of some political ideas, institutions, interests, personalities or processes, singly or in combination, or of more effective ways of studying them: inquiries that may be called more or less scientific in a loose sense of that term. Depending on the subject--and on the perspicacity of authors and readers--they have a bearing more or less remote or immediate on practical concerns of the day, on public policy of the past and future; depending on the authors' interests, this bearing may be emphasized or subordinated; and depending on the authors' temperaments, their policy views may be expressed with judicious caution or passionate conviction. A concern for policy may have been the motivating inspiration of a study; more often it appears to be an incident to reflection on the significance of the results.

All this is proper and to be expected in a social science journal; and the present occasion is not the one for arguing fundamental questions of the relations between knowledge, opinion and action, between research and policy, or of the nature of science itself in social studies. A fair regard for the diversity of views on these matters, as well as the traditions, alike of individual scholarly responsibility and of the freedom of scholarly inquiry and expression, counsel a latitudinarian policy for the Review. The Editor may question particular phrases or passages in a manuscript as needless editorializing or as opinion masquerading as fact though unsupported by any evidence offered; but he is not a censor. If there is room for both behavioralists and philsophers in the profession, there is room for them both in the Review.

Questions of editorial policy arise, however, in the appraisal of manuscripts offered that are explicitly pitched to argue issues in current policy. A scholarly piece like Professor Osgood's recent study of the inner contradictions in American concepts and policies of deterrence is acceptable and accepted. A report of a scholarly advisory committee endorsing larger appropriations to the State Department's historical staff, to expedite publication of the series, Foreign Relations, is a marginal case, legitimate if there is space for it. But an editorial criticising, for instance, our policy toward Castro, or a plea for more federal aid for urban redevelopment, or a review of events, say, in Algeria, leading to the conclusion that the French should or should not concede Algerian claims in the Sahara, or a speculative peering ahead into the next ten years of Sino-Soviet relations, will be rejected, no matter how closely they correspond to the Editor's personal views. How is the line to be drawn between these and the first example?

One part of it, not often needed, is suggested by the Association's self-denying constitutional prohibition against partisan political activities or commitments. Although the Review disclaims responsibility for an author's views, it has no reason to provide a vehicle for views of that sort.

More cases can be disposed of on principles of the division of labor. The Review is a quarterly with editorial and production processes that span three to six months or more. Arguments on topics of the day are apt to lose their timeliness or need recasting in the light of unfolding events during such a period: better leave them to the daily and weekly press that can move more nimbly.

The rest of the line is marked out by the differences between journalism and scholarship, between decision and proof, and between authority and evidence. A journal of opinion like Foreign Affairs, to take a distinguished contemporary example, may publish an article by a prominent or controversial public figure at home or abroad whose views are important because they are his views, whether or not they are persuasive; or an article, say, on British policy toward the Common Market because it is important whether Britain joins that organization. Allowing for some overlap at the margin, the Review's criteria of importance are different: as the scholarly journal of a profession it is properly more concerned with the grounds and articulation and theoretical implications of an argument than with its sponsorship, its outcome or the practical stakes that hang on it.

V. The Room for Specialists

Very few members, I suppose, even start to read all the articles in any issue of the Review; the titles alone are enough to warn most readers away from many pieces as "outside their field" or "too specialized," and the savor of the first two or three paragraphs will lead them to abandon still more at that point on the same ground. Very few authors, by the same token, choose

topics (or if they choose them, are able to carry them off successfully) so evidently broad in scope or pervasive in significance as to command the general attention of the profession. Considering the diversity of the potential audience, what room should the Review make for specialists who talk only to specialists?

A reductio ad absurdum response to the progress of specialization may not seem altogether fanciful after a glance into some scientific journals: let the Review be converted into a sort of bibliographical telephone directory where authors list their names and the titles of their works. Then if some umpire made sure that the titles were truly descriptive, each solitary reader by consulting the classified yellow pages could ring up the author who had something to say to him alone, and listen to it; and so the publication of tiresome articles might be avoided. But this solution disregards the interests of authors who want to be published more than they want to be read. The opposite solution, of rejecting anything that does not have something to say to at least a majority of the possible readers, is a more attractive goal but perhaps no more realistic. Specialization is here to stay.

One line of accommodation is to consider the provinces of more specialized journals and refer authors to them--to the regional journals, to the journals in history, philosophy, law, international law and politics, public administration, municipal affairs and so on. But no journal likes to think of itself as an outlet for hand-me-downs, so that direct referrals are seldom practicable. And while many authors, including established authorities, seek the journals in their specialties by preference, whether because these lead more surely to their selected audiences or because they present fewer uncertainties about the publication of specialized contributions, the Review has prestige enough to attract a great many articles that, good or bad, would interest only a circumscribed clientele. If they seem good enough, the Review will accept them even though more specialized journals, offered the chance might gladly have taken them. The problem of editorial choice is not solved by the existence of the other journals.

A more feasible accommodation is to distribute the selections so that in any particular issue there will be, if possible, at least one or two articles in each of the four or five main branches of the discipline. This is editorial policy, in order that each issue may offer something to nearly everyone, but it does not help with the question of choosing the articles that are to be so distributed.

No single criterion of excellence will settle that choice. No line distinguishes big facts from little ones objectively; the presence of a large idea helps, but does not guarantee that it will be effectively exploited. As Thomas Huxley demonstrated many years ago, in a celebrated essay On a Piece of Chalk, an author with insight and imagination can sometimes invest an apparently small thing with a large significance. Even an unpretentiously small point, written up with economy and elegance, can be a gem. A solid and lengthy study that exhausts a narrow subject may seem pedestrian by contrast, but may have offsetting virtues too.

A useful distinction can sometimes be drawn between innovation and application. The Review, for example, published two or three quantitative studies of Supreme Court decisions, and two political interpretations of Shakespearean plays--all controversial, but seemingly pioneering efforts--and then drew the line for a time against refinements and extensions of these themes, on the ground that their possibilities had now been shown and further exploitations in the same vein would interest only a limited number of specialists. For the same reason it might decline to take an extended series of local voting studies, or opinion poll

analyses, all employing more or less the same method, even though conceivably some day the accumulation of such studies might furnish the basis for comparative generalizations.

Apart from such considerations as these, and the standard criteria of scholarship, editorial policy toward highly specialized pieces can hardly go beyond seeking the counsel of other specialists in the field in appraising their relative values, and perhaps tempering the wind somewhat in favor of articles from specialties that are infrequently represented in the incoming flow.

VI. A Problem Focus: The Room for Description

No other single shortcoming accounts for the rejection of so many manuscripts as that they are "purely descriptive" or narrative. The criterion that requires a problem focus and gives priority to an analytical treatment of a subject is what chiefly distinguishes a good article for the Review from a good article for an encyclopedia. For the one, the author must give the reader a reason for staying with him; information alone will not usually hold him long unless his curiosity is engaged; and economy in the provision and use of facts is a virtue guarding against irrelevance. For the other, the reader brings his own questions with him; makes what he can, or needs to, from the information furnished; and is grateful for fullness.

A double reason justifies the criterion, the difficulty of abundance and the concerns of political science. On the one hand there are more millions of facts--events, transactions, recorded utterances, deeds, thoughts, etc.--than the Review or any journal can possibly notice; some selection is inescapable and it is not enough to take only what comes handily to reach. A problem focus in an article supplies the standards of relevance and exclusion and suggests the organization of analysis. A working rule of editorial policy therefore calls upon the author, somewhere early in the introductory paragraphs of his paper, to state as explicitly as may be what he is up to: what problem he is addressing himself to, and why that problem matters. There are artists who can write an absorbing article--like a mystery story that builds suspense to the end--without being explicit about their intentions at the beginning; but these are exceptions.

On the other hand, a clear and accurate statement of the problem often suffices to dispose of the article, by identifying it as within or without the boundaries of the significant professional concerns of an audience of political scientists. Not just any problem will do.

So, for example, if an author's statement says in substance, "I have been looking into the subject of X, and let me tell you what I have found," the odds are overwhelming that what follows will be purely descriptive. If he says, "I mean to inquire whether the United States should have dropped the atomic bomb," or "I will argue that capital punishment is self-defeating," then he has a problem and the start of an editorial or a piece for a journal of opinion, but not an article for the Review. If he poses a problem of fact, e.g., "It is commonly supposed that Wilson was the father of the principle of self-determination, but I will show that the true origin was much earlier," then editorial judgment is suspended until it appears what answer he makes to the political scientist's demurrer, so what? An unsatisfactory answer here is a reason why historians so seldom succeed in placing articles in the Review. Generally speaking, the problem needs to be political and it needs also to be intellectual. Whether it is one of substance or technique, whether it is a problem in theory, in doctrine or in behavior, it should invite the reader to join in a search for

explanations of something hitherto hidden or obscure, something that it is the business of political scientists to understand if they can.

Having stated this standard of editorial policy I should at once acknowledge that not all articles published in the Review meet it, or meet it in equal degree. The border between information and analysis is not sharp. A study of an institution or of a doctrine may be more or less descriptive or critical. Expository treatments of such subjects ideally belong presumably in textbooks, but if these are inadequate a claim can be advanced for an article, similar to the claims on behalf of the service features already discussed.

VII. Style: The Sanctity of an Author's Words

No one expects or wants a journal of articles by different authors to maintain a uniform English style except in its most mechanical aspects; and even in the form of footnote citations some diversity in authors' practices is harmless. Questions of editorial policy respecting style consequently turn on two points: the minimum standards applicable to manuscripts submitted for consideration, and the sanctity of the author's language in an article that has been accepted--or, putting it the other way around, the extent of the Editor's license to tinker with that language.

On the first point there is little to say. Minimum literary standards are a notable barrier to the serious consideration of articles by foreign authors whose native tongue is not English, and unless the Review were to print in other languages this will probably remain true. In the past five years, six foreign authors have seen their articles published, only two or three of them from countries outside the English-speaking world, and two at least of these had been in the United States for extended periods. Literary deficiencies have been contributing factors in the rejection of a good many articles from domestic sources as well, but here, with one special type of exception, they are usually associated with other more fatal difficulties, of conception, logic, organization and the like. The exception is professional jargon and takes me to the second point.

I have heard it argued, and with conviction, that an article manuscript is an author's property and inviolate; and that the business of a professional journal is to reproduce it untouched--unharmed, some might say--for who else knows better what he means to say, and how else can colleagues judge him if they cannot be sure that what appears under his name is altogether his?

An editor would be exceedingly fortunate, in my experience, who could afford to accept that position. In practice it yields to two other considerations. An editor who can ultimately reject a manuscript can also insist on stipulated revisions before he accepts it, unless the author prefers to withdraw rather than revise. In turn, this power relationship evidently imposed professional and moral restraints on the editor, and with good will on both sides is generally understood and accepted. Beyond this is the fact that the editor has a responsibility to the audience as well as to the author, and because he is inevitably a reader himself, he may be more sensitive than the author to the audience's concern for a clear and readable style. In most cases these interests are not really in conflict and the editor does a service to both in helping an author to put his best foot forward.

In this view, editorial policy should encourage the editor, in preparing a manuscript for the printer after it has been accepted--except in the case of state papers such as the presidential address--to improve on the language wherever he thinks he can, to clarify and simplify, to economize on the use of words, to sharpen points, etc., saving to the author the right to see and

object to changes, and the right, after argument, not to have words put into his mouth against his will. In practice the likeliest of the infrequent occasions for unreconciled disagreement in this give-and-take process arise when an author wants to employ a technical vocabulary to express what the editor believes can as accurately and more simply and understandably be said in words that are closer to common speech. No formula will settle all these differences, but a clear and readable style ranks high enough among the criteria of excellence in the Review to warrant a considerable prerogative in the Editor to attain it.

If a conclusion can summarize in a single sentence the points this paper has touched, perhaps it can be phrased in a reversal of Gresham's law: let the editorial policy of the Review throughout be to encourage the superior to drive out the not-so-good.

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THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY —
THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

By Will Maslow

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THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY --

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

By Will Maslow*

In recent years, the defense of civil rights and civil liberties has become increasingly the task of organized groups. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (Jehovah's Witnesses) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have each a string of impressive victories to their credit. The NAACP bore almost the entire brunt of the litigation which culminated in the School Segregation Cases,1/ not to mention at least 60 other Supreme Court decisions. 2/ According to Clement Vose, the Jehovah's Witnesses from 1938 to 1958 won 44 out of 55 cases which the United States Supreme Court had agreed to review.3/ The ACLU has won resounding victories in censorship, loyalty and free speech cases and in many other areas.4/

The American Jewish Congress (AJC) was constituted in 1918 as a democratically elected parliamentary assembly representing all American Jews. Its initial purpose was to obtain treaty provisions at the Versailles conference protecting the rights of Jews in the defeated countries and international support of the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In the 30's, under the energetic leadership of Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the AJC organized a nation-wide boycott against Nazi Germany and sought in other ways to protect Jews abroad. In the 40's, AJC became a membership organization and pioneered in a program to invoke governmental sanctions against racial and religious discrimination. Throughout its history AJC has likewise sought to foster Jewish cultural traditions. It has always been pro-Zionist in its orientation.

This paper is not a description of the entire program of the American Jewish Congress nor even of its legal and legislative work. It is rather an effort to describe a portion of that work and to set forth the strategy and tactics of the various legal, legislative and educational campaigns in support of religious

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1/ Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2/ See list in GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 401-402 (1959).

3/ Vose, Litigation As A Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 THE ANNALS 20, at 22 (1958); see also Waite, The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses, 28 Minn. L. Rev. 209 (1944). On one day, May 3, 1943, the Supreme Court decided 13 cases brought by this religious body, 12 in its favor. See Waite, supra, p. 209.

4/ E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496(1939); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (the indigent "okie" case); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (loyalty oath for those claiming tax exemption.) See also Note: Private Attorneys' General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, Analysis of the ACLU, the NAACP and the Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress 58 Yale L.J. 574 (1949).

LIBERTY AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.5/ THIS EFFORT WHICH BEGAN IN 1945 AND STILL CONTINUES IS CARRIED ON FOR AJC THROUGH ITS COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, MANNED BY FULL TIME COUNSEL IN NEW YORK CITY, PART-TIME COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON, CHICAGO, BOSTON AND SAN FRANCISCO AND GUIDED AND ASSISTED BY A NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD OF LAWYERS, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND DISTINGUISHED JEWISH LAYMEN.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

AJC IS COMMITTED TO THE PROPOSITION THAT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IS BEST PRESERVED WHEN GOVERNMENT REMAINS STRICTLY AND SEVERELY ALOOF FROM ALL RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH NEUTRALITY IS BEST CULTIVATED BY THE ABSOLUTE AVOIDANCE OF "LAWS WHICH AID ONE RELIGION, AID ALL RELIGIONS OR PREFER ONE RELIGION OVER ANOTHER...."6/ WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH NEUTRALITY IS IMPOSSIBLE IF ANY "TAX, IN ANY AMOUNT, LARGE OR SMALL" IS "LEVIED TO SUPPORT ANY RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES OR INSTITUTIONS WHATEVER THEY MAY BE CALLED." 7/ SUCH FINANCIAL SUPPORT, WE CONTEND, EMBROILS THE STATE IN RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES, ENCOURAGES RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL DIVISIVENESS, PENALIZES NON-BELIEVERS AND COMPELS THE TAXPAYER OF ONE FAITH TO SUPPORT THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF ANOTHER IN VIOLATION OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT OUR COUNTRY'S HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT CHURCH AND SYNAGOGUE ARE AT THEIR STRONGEST WHEN THEY MUST DEPEND ON THEIR SPIRITUAL RESOURCES FOR THEIR STRENGTH AND SUSTENANCE AND DO NOT LEAN ON THE COERCIVE OR INTERFERING ARM OF GOVERNMENT. FINALLY, WE AGREE WITH JUSTICE JACKSON'S PROPHECY IN THE ZORACH CASE THAT: "THE DAY THAT THIS COUNTRY CEASES TO BE FREE FOR IRRELIGION IT WILL CEASE TO BE FREE FOR RELIGION - EXCEPT FOR THE SECT THAT CAN WIN POLITICAL POWER.8/

TO SAFEGUARD THE PRECIOUS INHERITANCE BEQUEATHED TO US BY MADISON, JEFFERSON AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AJC SEEKS TO WIN EVER-INCREASING POPULAR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF THESE PRINCIPLES. OUR FIRST TASK IS THEREFORE AN EDUCATIONAL ONE. OUR EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED FIRST WITHIN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY, THEN AMONG THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND FINALLY THE PUBLIC GENERALLY. AJC'S LEGAL STAFF AND PARTICULARLY ITS EXPERT ON CHURCH-STATE PROBLEMS, LEO PFEFFER, HAVE CONTRIBUTED FREQUENTLY TO LAW REVIEWS, ADDRESSED BAR ASSOCIATIONS, LAW SCHOOLS AND TEACHER GROUPS AND ENGAGED IN COUNTLESS RADIO AND TV DEBATES. INDEED, THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE TREATISE ON THE SUBJECT, PFEFFER'S CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM, IS INDISPENSABLE TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEXITIES IN THIS AREA.

5/ SEE NOTE, CITED FOOTNOTE 4, SUPRA, AND MASLOW, THE USES OF LAW IN THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, 22 SOCIAL RESEARCH 297-315 (1955). FOR AN ARTICULATION OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, SEE PEKELIS, FULL EQUALITY IN A FREE SOCIETY: A PROGRAM FOR JEWISH ACTION, IN HIS LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 218-260 (1950).

6/ EVERSON V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). THIS LANGUAGE WAS REPEATED AND APPROVED IN MCCOLLUM V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) AND MCGOWAN V. MARYLAND, 29 U.S. LAW WEEK 4488, 4499 (MAY 29, 1961).

7/ EVERSON V. BD. OF EDUCATION, SUPRA.

8/ ZORACH V. CLAUSON, 343 U.S. 303,325 (DISSENTING OPINION).

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

GENERALIZED EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO BRING ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT. NEGOTIATION WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PARTICULARLY SCHOOL OFFICIALS IS NECESSARY. BECAUSE THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST "ESTABLISHMENT" IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT OR AGAINST "AID" TO "RELIGION" SET FORTH IN THE EVERSON, MCCOLLUM AND ZORACH CASES ARE NOT DEFINED WITH PRECISION, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS FIND THEMSELVES WITHOUT FIXED GUIDES. CAUGHT BETWEEN CONFLICTING PRESSURES, THEY VACILLATE, YIELDING ONE DAY AND HOLDING FIRM ON ANOTHER. MOREOVER, THE CAMPAIGN BY SOME RELIGIOUS GROUPS AGAINST ALLEGEDLY "GODLESS" PUBLIC SCHOOLS HAS INVOLVED SCHOOL BOARDS, SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS AND COMMISSIONERS OF EDUCATION IN A VARIETY OF CONTROVERSIES.

MERELY TO LIST THESE CONTROVERSIES IS TO DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFRONTS IN THE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN A SECULAR PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM:

1. RELEASING CHILDREN FOR RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION.
2. OBSERVANCE OF RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS BY THE SCHOOLS.
3. RECITATION OF THE LORD'S PRAYER OR "NON-SECTARIAN" PRAYERS IN CLASS.
4. READING FROM THE BIBLE IN SCHOOL ASSEMBLY.
5. DISTRIBUTION OF GIDEON BIBLES TO SCHOOL CHILDREN.
6. RELIGIOUS CENSUS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN.
7. POSTING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
8. TEACHING OF "MORAL AND SPIRITUAL" VALUES TO PUBLIC SCHOOL CHILDREN.
9. RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZING IN SCHOOLS.
10. RELIGIOUS QUALIFICATIONS FOR TEACHERS.
11. NUNS TEACHING IN THEIR RELIGIOUS GARB IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
12. HOLDING PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES IN CHURCH BUILDINGS. 9/

IN THE TYPICAL CASE, A REPRESENTATIVE JEWISH LEADER, A RABBI OR COMMUNITY COUNCIL OFFICER, CONFERS PRIVATELY WITH A SCHOOL PRINCIPAL COMPLAINING OF A PRACTICE DEEMED IMPROPER. A FAILURE THERE TAKES THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT. IF THE PROTEST CONTINUES TO BE UNSUCCESSFUL, THE JEWISH GROUP MAY ABANDON ITS PROTEST OR, DEPENDING ON THE STRENGTH, COURAGE AND THE UNITY OF ITS FOLLOWERS, TAKE A MORE FORMAL STEP AND APPEAL TO THE LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD. AT THIS STAGE, THE CONTROVERSY BECOMES PUBLIC. SIDES ARE DRAWN, PROTESTS ARE MADE AND REPORTED IN THE PRESS AND THE OPPOSING PARTIES ARE THEN HEARD AT A PUBLIC SESSION OF THE BOARD. IF THE PROTESTING GROUP HAS SOME COMMUNITY STRENGTH, THE SCHOOL BOARD WILL FREQUENTLY SEEK A COMPROMISE. IF IT FAILS, LITIGATION IS THE NEXT ALTERNATIVE ALTHOUGH RECOURSE TO THE COURTS IS INFREQUENT. ONLY WHEN SCHOOL AUTHORITIES DISPLAY AN INSENSITIVE RIGIDITY IS LITIGATION SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATED.

9/ SEE DIERENFIELD, THE EXTENT OF RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 56 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 173 (1961), SUMMARIZED IN DAVID LAWRENCE'S COLUMN IN THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE OF MAY 25, 1961. ACCORDING TO PROF. DIERENFIELD, GIDEON BIBLES ARE BEING DISTRIBUTED IN 42.74% OF THE 4000 PUBLIC SCHOOLS QUERIED; 86.84 HELD RELIGIOUSLY ORIENTED BACCALAUREATE SERVICES; 33.16% HELD "HOME-ROOM" DEVOTIONAL SERVICES, 41.74% CONDUCTED BIBLE READING, 7.76% HELD CLASSES IN CHURCH BUILDINGS AND IN 5.76% MEMBERS OF RELIGIOUS ORDERS TAUGHT.

CHURCH-STATE CONTROVERSIES ARE NOT, HOWEVER, CONFINED TO THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS BUT INVOLVE ALMOST EVERY TYPE OF EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. AJC HAS PROTESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE NEW YORK CITY HOSPITAL BOARD THE REFUSAL OF THE NEW YORK CITY HOSPITAL COMMISSIONER TO ALLOW PHYSICIANS ON MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL STAFFS TO PRESCRIBE CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES. IT APPEALED TO THE JERSEY CITY COUNCIL TO PROMULGATE A CODE OF NON-SECTARIAN MEDICAL PRACTICES PRIOR TO AFFILIATING THE CITY'S MEDICAL CENTER TO A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY. IT COMPLAINED (SO FAR UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO THE MAYOR OF CHICAGO ABOUT THE DISPLAY OF A CRECHE ON CITY PROPERTY. SIMILAR COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE POSTING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS ON PUBLIC PROPERTY HAVE BEEN MADE TO A PARK COMMISSION IN INDIANA AND TO POSTMASTERS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. APPEALS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS WHO HAVE SCHEDULED EXAMINATIONS ON SATURDAY TO ARRANGE ALTERNATE DAYS FOR OBSERVANT JEWS WHO WILL NOT WRITE ON THE JEWISH SABBATH. PROTESTS ALSO HAVE BEEN FILED WITH UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARDS DENYING RELIEF TO SABBATARIANS WHO DECLINED JOB OFFERS REQUIRING THEM TO WORK ON SATURDAY AND WITH ZONING COMMISSIONS WHO SOUGHT TO BAR CHURCHES AND SYNAGOGUES FROM RESIDENTIAL AREAS.

FINALLY, ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL, AJC SPOKESMEN HAVE NEGOTIATED WITH THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ABOUT NEW REGULATIONS FOR THE SLAUGHTERING OF ANIMALS (IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW FEDERAL HUMANE SLAUGHTER STATUTE AND JEWISH RITUAL SLAUGHTER). 10/ THEY HAVE ALSO NEGOTIATED WITH THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS WHICH IN 1957 WAS CONSIDERING THE INCLUSION OF A QUESTION DEALING WITH RELIGION IN THE 1960 CENSUS. (A NATIONWIDE PROTEST AGAINST THE PROPOSED QUESTION RESULTED IN THE ABANDONMENT BY THE BUREAU OF THIS PROJECT. 11/)

AJC'S TECHNIQUE OF PROTEST IN THESE SITUATIONS IS QUITE UNIFORM: FIRST, TO ENSURE THAT ITS POSITION IS UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED BY MOST OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY. SECOND, TO PERSUADE OFFICIALS BY UNPUBLICIZED NEGOTIATION BEFORE ANYONE HAS A CHANCE TO LOSE FACE TO ELIMINATE THE OFFENSIVE PRACTICE. THIRD, TO WIN OVER AS MANY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AS POSSIBLE AS ALLIES, PARTICULARLY CHRISTIAN GROUPS. FINALLY, TO BRING THE CONTROVERSY OUT IN THE OPEN WHERE IT MAY ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION AND SUPPORT. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE MAKE NO ATTEMPT DURING THESE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE AND SEEK COMPROMISES WITH OPPOSING RELIGIOUS GROUPS BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC OFFICIALS ALONE, IF THEY FOLLOW THE LAW OF THE LAND, SHOULD DECIDE SUCH QUESTIONS. 12/

EDUCATION OR PERSUASION ALONE IS NOT ALWAYS EFFECTIVE TO CHANGE THE POLICIES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THERE IS COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES FROM

10/ 7 U.S.C. 1902 (B).

11/ SEE RICH, A VICTORY FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, CONGRESS WEEKLY, MARCH 3, 1958; PFEFFER, IS IT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS?, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, OCT. 30, 1957; AND THE LETTERS FROM DR. ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN, THEN PRESIDENT OF AJC, WHICH APPEARED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES (JULY 8, 1957), WASHINGT POST (JULY 16, 1957) AND IN JULY 1957 IN THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR AND OTHER LEADING DAILIES.

12/ DURING THE TRIAL IN THE MIAMI PUBLIC SCHOOL CASE, CHAMBERLAIN V. DADE COUNTY BD. OF INSTRUCTION, 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, DECIDED APRIL 15, 1961, AND BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, COUNSEL FOR AJC AND ACLU MET WITH THE DADE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS AND HIS COUNSEL IN AN EFFORT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BUT WAS REJECTED BY THE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION PROVED TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS THAN THE TERMS OF THE TENTATIVE SETTLEMENT.

OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS. AT THIS POINT, A GROUP DISSATISFIED WITH A GOVERNMENT POLICY HAS FOUR CHOICES: TO SEEK A REVERSAL OF THAT POLICY BY AN ORGANIZED CAMPAIGN OF PUBLIC PROTEST, TO LITIGATE THE ISSUE IN THE COURTS OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, TO STRIVE FOR THE ENACTMENT OF REMEDIAL LEGISLATION OR TO ABANDON THE PROTEST UNTIL A LATER OR MORE PROPITIOUS TIME.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS

AJC BY SELF-IMPOSED RESTRAINTS DOES NOT EXERCISE COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION. AS AN AGENCY SUPPORTED BY THE ORGANIZED JEWISH COMMUNITY, IT HAS RESPONSIBILITIES TO THAT COMMUNITY. UNLIKE A PRIVATE CITIZEN, WHO CAN INSIST ON LEGAL REDRESS FOR HIS PRIVATE GRIEVANCES AT ANY TIME, AJC MUST FIRST PERSUADE THOSE UPON WHOSE BEHALF IT ACTS THAT ITS PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IS NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE AND THAT THE GAINS FROM SUCH ACTION OUTWEIGH THE RISKS. A CHURCH-STATE CASE IS NOT AN ORDINARY POCKETBOOK ACTION OF CONCERN ONLY TO THE LITIGANTS. AN OBJECTION, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE PERFORMANCE OF A NATIVITY PLAY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IS CONSIDERED BY MANY AN ATTACK ON RELIGION ITSELF; A PROTEST AGAINST THE USE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS TO AID CATHOLIC PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS MAY BE REGARDED AS AN ACT MOTIVATED BY ANTI-CATHOLIC BIGOTRY. IF THE PLAINTIFF IS IDENTIFIED AS A JEW OR HIS CAUSE IS PUBLICLY SPONSORED BY A JEWISH ORGANIZATION, THE LOCAL JEWISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL MAY FEAR THAT OTHER JEWS, NOT INVOLVED IN THE LITIGATION, MAY BECOME THE TARGETS OF OSTRACISM OR BOYCOTT OR THAT LATENT ANTI-SEMITISM MAY ERUPT OR EVEN THAT THE HARMONIOUS RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND JEWS IN A COMMUNITY MAY BE DISRUPTED.

AJC HAS ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT SUCH FEARS ARE EXAGGERATED AND REFLECT A BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL INSECURITY OF A MINORITY GROUP.13/ WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WHATEVER HOSTILE REACTIONS OCCUR WILL QUICKLY SUBSIDE AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN A RELIGIOUSLY-ORIENTED COMMUNITY WILL RESPECT A COURAGEOUS AND PRINCIPLED DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY BY A JEWISH ORGANIZATION. 14/ UNFORTUNATELY, SOCIAL SCIENTISTS HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THEMSELVES TO THIS PROBLEM AND APPARENTLY ONLY ONE STUDY OF THE COMMUNITY-EFFECTS OF SUCH LITIGATION HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN. IN DECEMBER 1957 AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE LITIGATION IN THE OSSINING CRECHE CASE BUT AFTER A YEAR'S CON-

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13/ SEE MASLOW, IS AMERICAN JEWRY SECURE? CONGRESS WEEKLY, MARCH 27, 1950.

14/ WHILE THE TRIAL OF THE MIAMI CASE WAS IN PROGRESS, SOME PROTESTANT RELIGIOUS GROUPS ATTEMPTED TO STIR UP PUBLIC REACTION. A 24 HOUR CONTINUOUS PRAYER MEETING AND "VIGIL" WAS ORGANIZED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS FROM "GODLESS INFLUENCES." AFTER THE TRIAL BUT BEFORE THE DECISION WAS HANDED DOWN, THE LOCAL MINISTERIAL ALLIANCE CAMPAIGNED OPENLY AND ACTIVELY FOR A SCHOOL BOARD CANDIDATE WHO HAD ANNOUNCED HIS OPPOSITION TO THE SUIT AND WAS RUNNING AGAINST ONE WHO NOT ONLY WAS AN OFFICER OF BOTH THE AJC AND THE ACLU BUT WAS ALSO A BROTHER-IN-LAW OF ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE SUIT. (HE WAS ELECTED.) THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS WERE, HOWEVER, RESTRAINED IN THEIR EDITORIAL COMMENTS, WELCOMING A DISPOSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BY THE COURTS. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ENJOINED THE MORE SERIOUS RELIGIOUS INTRUSIONS BUT UPHELD THE BIBLE READING (REQUIRED BY STATE STATUTE) AND THE LORD'S PRAYER RECITATION. AJC HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENT TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. THE DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD HAS VOTED NOT TO APPEAL AND HAS BEGUN TO REVISE SCHOOL PRAYERS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DECISION. LOCAL OBSERVERS REPORT NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIPS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY EXISTED BETWEEN JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN GROUPS.

TROVERSY IN THE TOWN, 15/ THE BOARD OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE NEW YORK EAST CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST CHURCH WITH THE AID OF A SMALL GRANT FROM THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC BEGAN A STUDY OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES. IN ITS REPORT ENTITLED "MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CASE STUDY IN COMMUNITY CONFLICT," IT CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE "MILD AND ALMOST NEGLIGIBLE RESULTS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AND MIGHT ALMOST BE INTERPRETED TO INDICATE NO EVIDENCE OF CONFLICT AT ALL!" 16/ IN ANY EVENT, AJC BELIEVES THAT THE FEAR OF AROUSING ANTI-JEWISH REACTIONS SHOULD NOT DETER AN EFFORT TO DEFEND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY WHERE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS ARE INVOLVED AND THAT SOME DEGREE OF RESENTMENT IS PREFERABLE TO ACQUIESCENCE IN DELIBERATE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.

ALMOST EVERY LARGE CITY IN THE COUNTRY (EXCEPT NEW YORK CITY AND CHICAGO) HAS ESTABLISHED A "JEWISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL" OR A "JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL" TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND TO COORDINATE THE NETWORK OF JEWISH CHARITABLE, RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL WELFARE AGENCIES. THE LOCAL UNITS OF THE NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING AJC, ARE REPRESENTED IN SUCH COUNCILS. BECAUSE AJC BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT SUCH COUNCILS FILL AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN REACHING A COMMUNITY CONSENSUS, IT FOLLOWS SCRUPULOUSLY THE POLICY OF NOT INITIATING ANY CONTROVERSIAL LOCAL COURSE OF ACTION WITHOUT FULL DISCUSSION WITH THE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES OF SUCH COUNCILS.

OCCASIONALLY, AJC HAS SOUGHT TO ACT NOT ONLY IN ITS NAME BUT ON BEHALF OF A LARGER JEWISH CONSTITUENCY. IN SUCH SITUATIONS IT IS OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY TO OBTAIN CONCURRENCE IN THE PROPOSED ACTION. FORTUNATELY MACHINERY EXISTS WITHIN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY FOR ACHIEVING THAT CONSENSUS EVEN ON NATIONAL ISSUES. THE SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA IS AN "UMBRELLA" ORGANIZATION WHICH, WHEN UNANIMITY IS REACHED, IS ABLE TO ASSERT A JOINT POSITION ON BEHALF OF ITS SIX CONSTITUENTS: THE NATIONAL RABBINICAL AND THE NATIONAL CONGREGATIONAL BODIES OF EACH OF THE THREE AMERICAN DENOMINATIONS OF JUDAISM: ORTHODOX, CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM. THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL (NCRAC) IS A SIMILAR COORDINATING DEVICE FOR SIX NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS (INCLUDING AJC) AND 57 LOCAL COMMUNITY COUNCILS. THESE TWO NATIONAL COORDINATING BODIES, INCLUDING IN THEIR MEMBERSHIP PERHAPS 80% OF ORGANIZED JEWRY, ESTABLISHED IN 1946 A "JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS" THROUGH WHICH CONSENSUS IN THIS AREA COULD BE ARRIVED AT AND WHICH WOULD ADVISE AND ASSIST LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN MEETING DAY-TO-DAY PROBLEMS.

THIS MACHINERY HELPED TO PRODUCE A BRIEF AMICUS (AS A FRIEND OF THE COURT) FILED BY THE SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL AND THE NCRAC IN THE MCCOLLUM RELEASED TIME CASE AND IN

15/ BAER V. KOLMORGEN, 14 MISC. 2D 105, 181 N.Y.S. 2D 230 (1958). IN 1956, THE OSSINING SCHOOL BOARD BY A 4 TO 3 VOTE AUTHORIZED THE INSTALLATION OF THE CRECHE ON THE SCHOOL LAWN A FEW DAYS PRIOR TO THE CHRISTMAS VACATION. IN DECEMBER 1957 THE AUTHORIZATION WAS REPEATED BY THE SAME VOTE. THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS DENIED IN DECEMBER 1957. THE ACTUAL TRIAL DID NOT BEGIN, HOWEVER, UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1958 AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS HANDED DOWN DECEMBER 15, 1958.

16/ THE INTERVIEWERS FOR THE METHODIST CHURCH QUESTIONED 80 PERSONS IN OSSINING DURING DECEMBER 1957, JUST BEFORE THE SUIT STARTED, 57 OF WHOM WERE "OPINION LEADERS." ALTHOUGH TWO OUT OF THREE PERSONS IN THE SAMPLE FAVORED THE DISPLAY OF THE CRECHE, LESS THAN ONE PERSON IN TEN "NOTICED ANY DIFFERENCE IN RELATIONSHIP DUE TO THE CONTROVERSY...."

THE SUNDAY LAW CASES.17/ TESTIMONY ON THEIR BEHALF HAS ALSO BEEN SUBMITTED TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 18/ THE LEGAL WORK OF THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE IS DONE BY AJC.

THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IS MONOLITHIC, EVEN IN A FORMAL SENSE, OR THAT THERE IS ALWAYS A SINGLE JEWISH POSITION ON EVERY CHURCH-STATE ISSUE. TWO INFLUENTIAL NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE AND THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, AT ONE TIME MEMBERS OF NCRAC, HAVE WITHDRAWN AND DO NOT AS A MATTER OF POLICY SHARE ANY LONGER IN THIS FORMAL COORDINATING AND COMMON PLANNING PROCESS. AND IN SOME ISSUES THERE IS A SHARP CONFLICT IN THE POSITION TAKEN BY JEWISH GROUPS. 19/

AJC ALSO MAINTAINS FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH MANY NON-JEWISH AND NONSECTARIAN GROUPS. IN THE NEW JERSEY GIDEON BIBLE CASE, THE DIOCESAN AUTHORITIES NOTIFIED US THAT A CATHOLIC PARENT WOULD BE WILLING TO JOIN OUR JEWISH PLAINTIFF IN CHALLENGING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE KING JAMES (PROTESTANT) BIBLE IN THE SCHOOLS AND AJC REPRESENTED BOTH PLAINTIFFS IN THE ACTION, WHICH RESULTED IN A COURT VICTORY. 20/

AJC HAS FILED BRIEFS AMICUS IN CASES IN WHICH ZONING BOARDS DENIED CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT CHURCHES THE RIGHT TO BUILD IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS. 21/ IT HAS DEFENDED THE RIGHT OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS 22/ AND FINALLY IT IS FREQUENTLY ALLIED WITH PROTESTANT GROUPS IN CHALLENGING VIOLATIONS OF THE SEPARATION PRINCIPLE. 23/

AJC AND ACLU WHOSE GENERAL POSITIONS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CASES ARE ALMOST IDENTICAL HAVE JOINTLY BROUGHT TEST CASES, JOINTLY FILED BRIEFS AMICUS AND WORKED TOGETHER IN COUNTLESS WAYS.

17/ GALLAGHER V. CROWN KOSHER SUPER MARKET AND BRAUNFELD V. BROWN, 29 U.S. LAW WEEK 4505, 4512 (MAY 29, 1961).

18/ E.G., TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OPPOSING THE SO-CALLED "CHRISTIAN" AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD HAVE DECLARED OUR COUNTRY OWES "ALLEGIANCE" TO JESUS CHRIST.

19/ THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE FOR MANY YEARS URGED SCHOOL AUTHORITIES TO PROMOTE JOINT CHRISTMAS-CHANUKAH CELEBRATIONS WHILE AJC WAS OPPOSING OBSERVANCE OF RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS IN THE SCHOOLS AS UNWISE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. IN ONE COURT CASE BROUGHT BY AJC CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NEW YORK SUNDAY CLOSING LAW, AS APPLIED TO A KOSHER BUTCHER STORE WHICH KEPT CLOSED ON SATURDAY, THE LOCAL KOSHER BUTCHERS ASSOCIATION AND THE KOSHER BUTCHERS WORKERS UNION FILED A BRIEF AMICUS DEFENDING THE STATUTE, PEOPLE V. FRIEDMAN, 276 APP. DIV. 1008, AFFIRMED 302 N.Y. 75, APPEAL DISMISSED, 341 U.S. 907 (1951).

20/ TUDOR V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 14 N.J. 31, CERT. DENIED 348 U.S. 816 (1954).

21/ ROMAN CATHOLIC WELFARE CORP. V. PIEDMONT, 289 P. 2D 438; AND MATTER OF ST. MATTHEW EPISCOPAL CHURCH V. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. (UNREPORTED).

22/ TARY V. OHIO, 119 N.E. 2D 56 (1954); SWENSON V. MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, 65 N.W. 2D 709.

23/ E.G., THE PARALLEL PROTESTS IN SEPTEMBER 1958 AGAINST THE ACTION OF THE NEW YORK HOSPITAL COMMISSIONER FORBIDDING HOSPITAL PHYSICIANS TO PRESCRIBE CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES. IN BEGLEY V. BEGLEY, N.Y. APP. DIV. ___(1961) THE PROTESTANT COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK FILED A BRIEF AMICUS WHICH RECITED SIMPLY THAT "IT SUPPORTS THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND THE CASES PRESENTED IN ITS BRIEF."

GENERAL STRATEGY

THE FIRST AMENDMENT MAY PROCLAIM THE DUAL PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION BUT THEY ARE UNDER CONSTANT ATTACK AT EVERY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND IN ALMOST EVERY CITY. RARE INDEED IS THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO STANDS FIRM AGAINST EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION BY INGENIOUS AND INGENUOUS DEVICES. THE RESULT IS THAT ONE OVERWHELMING LEGAL OR LEGISLATIVE VICTORY THAT WILL ONCE AND FOR ALL SETTLE THE PROBLEM IS IMPOSSIBLE. AJC'S STRATEGY IS THEREFORE TO PREVENT BOTH THE OBVIOUS BREACH AND THE SUBTLE EROSION. IT SEEKS BY A GRADUAL ACCUMULATION OF FAVORABLE RULINGS AND A NECESSARILY SLOW EDUCATIONAL PROCESS TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF OPINION THAT WILL NURTURE AND PROTECT THE CONCEPT OF A SECULAR STATE.

BUT SUCH A STRATEGY MUST BE FLUID. WE CANNOT DECIDE FOR EXAMPLE TO REMAIN WHOLLY ON THE DEFENSIVE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRESENT POSITIONS. A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT ITSELF FOR A REVERSAL OF PAST POLICY. AJC HAS FREQUENTLY PLANNED TO CHALLENGE A STATUTE BUT COULD DO NOTHING UNTIL AN INVITATION CAME FROM A PERSON AGGRIEVED TO SPONSOR A TEST CASE ON HIS BEHALF. THUS IN THE NEW YORK SUNDAY LAW CASE, WE BROUGHT TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT A CASE[24] IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN FINED A TOTAL OF $10. WITHOUT OUR INTERVENTION, THE DEFENDANT, LIKE SCORES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, WOULD HAVE PAID HIS TINY FINE WITHOUT QUESTIONING A STATUTE THAT HE DEEMED UNJUST.

SOMETIMES, HOWEVER, THE CHOICE IS NOT OUR OWN AND WE ARE COMPELLED TO JOIN ISSUE IN A FORUM AND ON A QUESTION NOT ORIGINALLY SELECTED BY US. AFTER THE DECISION IN THE McCOLLUM CASE, BARRING RELEASED TIME ON SCHOOL PREMISES, WE OPPOSED ANY EFFORT TO EXTEND ITS DOCTRINE BY ATTACKING RELEASED TIME PRACTICES OFF SCHOOL PREMISES UNTIL THERE WAS GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULING. SUDDENLY WE LEARNED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF A "FREE THINKERS SOCIETY" HAD BROUGHT SUIT IN NEW YORK CITY ATTACKING ITS RELEASED TIME PLAN IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN OFF SCHOOL PREMISES. THIS PLAINTIFF, HEAD OF AN ASSOCIATION TO COMBAT ORGANIZED RELIGION, HAD BROUGHT MANY CHURCH-STATE SUITS IN THE PAST AND HAD LOST ALL OF THEM. WE WERE FEARFUL THAT LITIGATION BY AN AVOWED ATHEIST HAD LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS IN AN AREA WHERE RELIGIOUS VIEWS ARE USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY INTENSE EMOTION. WHILE WE BELIEVED THAT RELEASE TIME WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVEN IF THE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN OFF SCHOOL PREMISES, WE PREFERRED NOT TO LITIGATE THAT QUESTION FOR A FEW YEARS. WE THEREFORE PLEADED WITH HIS COUNSEL TO DISCONTINUE THE ACTION. BUT HIS CLIENT WOULD AGREE ONLY ON CONDITION THAT WE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO AN INDEPENDENT SUIT CHALLENGING RELEASED TIME OFF SCHOOL PREMISES. WITH MANY RESERVATIONS, WE, ALONG WITH OTHER JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, BROUGHT SUIT ON BEHALF OF PARENTS OF CHILDREN ATTENDING THE PUBLIC SCHOOL. THE FINAL RESULT WAS THE SUPREME COURT 6-3 DECISION IN ZORACH V. CLAUSON[25] UPHOLDING RELEASED TIME OFF SCHOOL PREMISES WHERE, ACCORDING TO THE COURT, THERE WAS NO INVOLVEMENT OF SCHOOL PERSONNEL.

SIMILARLY WE COUNSELED STRONGLY BUT IN VAIN AGAINST INITIATING THE DOREMUS[26] CASE WHICH CHALLENGED A NEW JERSEY LAW THAT REQUIRED THE DAILY READING IN THE PUBLIC

24/ PEOPLE V. FRIEDMAN, SUPRA, NOTE 19.

25/ ZORACH V. CLAUSON, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

26/ DOREMUS V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 5 N.J. 435 (1956), APPEAL DISMISSED 342 U.S. 429 (1952).

SCHOOLS OF VERSES FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT WITHOUT COMMENT AND AUTHORIZED THE RECITATION OF THE LORD'S PRAYER, BECAUSE THE ANTI-RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION BULKED LARGE IN THE SUIT.[27] NEVERTHELESS, THE SUIT HAVING BEEN STARTED, WE FILED A BRIEF AMICUS BUT THE CASE WAS ULTIMATELY LOST.

WHERE WE DO HAVE A FREE CHOICE, WE EXERCISE IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRIORITIES. THUS WE BELIEVE THAT FINANCIAL GRANTS BY THE STATE TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS ARE LESS SIGNIFICANT THAN GOVERNMENT COERCION, WHETHER BLATANT OR SUBTLE, TO PROFESS A RELIGIOUS FAITH THAT IS NOT ONE'S OWN. THE MOST IMPORTANT BATTLEGROUND FOR US IS THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM BECAUSE IMMATURE CHILDREN ARE INVOLVED AND BECAUSE THE STATE COMPELS THEIR ATTENDANCE. TACTICALLY TOO, THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN THIS CHOICE BECAUSE OF THE NON-SECTARIAN TRADITIONS OF THE SCHOOL AND BECAUSE EDUCATORS SHARE OUR RESENTMENT AT EFFORTS TO CONVERT THE SCHOOL INTO A BATTLEGROUND FOR OPPOSING RELIGIOUS GROUPS.[28]

THE STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FORCES DICTATES ANOTHER STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATION: THAT VIOLATIONS, HOWEVER BLATANT, SHOULD NOT BE ATTACKED IF THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE REGARDED AS DE MINIMIS BY JUDGE OR LEGISLATOR. THUS AJC BROUGHT NO SUIT CHALLENGING THE RECENT LAW THAT ADDED THE WORDS "UNDER GOD" TO THE STATUTORY PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE.[29]

TIMING IS ANOTHER TACTICAL CONSIDERATION. WHENEVER POSSIBLE, WE PROTEST CHRISTOLOGICAL OBSERVANCES OF CHRISTMAS OR EASTER MUCH IN ADVANCE OF THE HOLIDAY. IN THE OSSINING CASE, HOWEVER, WHERE A CRECHE WAS DISPLAYED ON A SCHOOL LAWN JUST A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY, A SUIT COULD BE BROUGHT ONLY WHILE IT WAS ON DISPLAY. A SUIT AFTER IT HAD BEEN DISMANTLED MIGHT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS MOOT.

THE STATE IN WHICH A CASE IS BROUGHT IS USUALLY OF NO GREAT CONSEQUENCE. IT IS TRUE FOR EXAMPLE THAT ADOPTION CASES THAT CAN BE WON IN THE STATE COURTS OF MISSOURI WILL BE LOST IN MASSACHUSETTS[30] BUT SINCE WE USUALLY STRIVE FOR A DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, IT IS SOMETIMES TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO SEEK A FORUM IN WHICH THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF AN APPEAL TO THAT COURT.

THERE ARE ALSO SOME MINOR TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. OBVIOUSLY ANY SUIT OR LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN WHICH PROMISES LASTING AND DESIRABLE RESULTS IS PREFERABLE TO ONE WHICH ATTACKS A TRANSITORY EVIL. A PROCEEDING THAT MAY RESULT IN A NEW OR SIGNIFICANT PRECEDENT IS MORE DESIRABLE THAN THE REAFFIRMATION OF WELL-ESTABLISHED RULE. SOME PROJECTS, WHILE OTHERWISE ACCEPTABLE, MAY HAVE TO BE POSTPONED FOR TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, I.E., TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF OTHER LITIGATION. FINALLY, SINCE ACTIVITY OVER TOO BROAD A RANGE IS LIKELY TO MAKE FOR A DIFFUSION OF EFFORTS, WE ATTEMPT TO HUSBAND OUR LIMITED RESOURCES IN ORDER TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON ANYTHING WE LAUNCH FROM OUR NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK CITY.

27/ THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT EMPHASIZED IN ITS OPINION THAT "NO RELIGIOUS GROUP" WAS CHALLENGING THE PRACTICE.

28/ ON THE OTHER HAND, JEWISH GROUPS HAVE RARELY BEEN SUPPORTED BY CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN SUCH PUBLIC SCHOOL LITIGATION.

29/ 36 U.S.C. 172.

30/ COMPARE PETITION OF GOLDMAN, 331 MASS. 647, 121 N.E. 2D 843 (1954) WITH IN RE DUREEN, 335 MO. 1222, 200 S.W. 343 (1947).

ALTHOUGH LOCAL CHAPTERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO UNDERTAKE LEGISLATIVE OR EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS NOT DEEMED SUITABLE FOR THE NATIONAL OFFICE, ALL OUR LITIGATION IS NATIONALLY DIRECTED.

STANDING TO SUE

THE DECISION TO LAUNCH A LAW SUIT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TECHNICAL LEGAL OBSTACLES BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE COURTS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IS THE JUDGE-MADE RULE OF "STANDING TO SUE." BEFORE A PLAINTIFF IN A FEDERAL COURT AND IN A MINORITY OF STATE COURTS[31] MAY CHALLENGE A STATUTE OR SOME OFFICIAL PRACTICE, HE MUST SHOW THAT HE PERSONALLY IS AGGRIEVED BY THE ACTION COMPLAINED OF. THE FEDERAL COURTS REFUSE TO ALLOW ANY CITIZEN ACTING "PRO BONO PUBLICO" TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR LEGALITY OF A STATUTE OR PRACTICE, EVEN THOUGH IT IS DEMONSTRABLY INVALID ON ITS FACE. AS JUSTICE FRANKFURTER PUT IT IN 1939: "WE CAN ONLY ADJUDICATE AN ISSUE AS TO WHICH THERE IS A CLAIMANT BEFORE US WHO HAS A SPECIAL, INDIVIDUALIZED STAKE IN IT. ONE WHO IS MERELY THE SELF-CONSTITUTED SPOKESMAN OF A CONSTITUTIONAL POINT OF VIEW CANNOT ASK US TO PASS ON IT.[32] SINCE 1923, WHEN MASSACHUSETTS V. MELLON WAS DECIDED[33], THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS REFUSED TO HEAR A CHALLENGE TO A FEDERAL STATUTE BROUGHT BY A FEDERAL TAXPAYER.

THE COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED ON TWO GROUNDS: THE "COMPARATIVELY MINUTE AND INDETERMINABLE" INTEREST OF THE TAXPAYER "SHARED WITH MILLIONS OF OTHERS" AND THE DANGER THAT ALLOWING SUCH SUITS WOULD RESULT IN A FLOOD OF LITIGATION. [34]

THE BAN ON FEDERAL TAXPAYER SUITS THUS MAKES IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO CHALLENGE IN THE COURTS FEDERAL GRANTS TO RELIGIOUS BODIES THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE OBVIOUSLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[35] A SIMILAR BAN IN NEW YORK STATE PREVENTED A COURT REVIEW OF A GRANT OF STATE FUNDS TO A JESUIT COLLEGE TO ERECT A STUDENT DORMITORY[36]

31/ SEE JAFFE, STANDING TO SECURE JUDICIAL REVIEW: PUBLIC ACTIONS, 74 HARV. L.R. 1265, 1278 (1961).

32/ COLEMAN V. MILLER, 307 U.S. 433.

33/ 262 U.S. 447.

34/ THIS RULE IS COMPARATIVELY RECENT. IN 1899, THE COURT ALLOWED A TAXPAYER TO SUE TO ENJOIN FEDERAL GRANTS TO A CATHOLIC HOSPITAL IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. BRADFIELD V. ROBERTS, 175 U.S. 291. NOR DOES IT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL DIGNITY. IN 1952, THE COURT STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION GAVE IT JURISDICTION ONLY AS TO "CASES" OR "CONTROVERSIES" IT WOULD NOT REFUSE TO HEAR A PROPERLY PLEADED STATE TAXPAYER'S ACTION. DOREMUS V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).

35/ SEE SUTHERLAND, DUE PROCESS AND DISESTABLISHMENT, 62 HARV. L.REV. 1306, 1326-1335 (1949), JAFFE, STANDING TO SECURE JUDICIAL REVIEW: PUBLIC ACTIONS, 74 HARV. L.REV. 1265, 1312 (1961).

36/ BULL V. STICHMAN, 273 APP. DIV. 311, AFFIRMED 298 N.Y. 516 (1948). AJC FILED A BRIEF AMICUS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ARGUING THAT THE COURT HAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN SUCH SUITS. NEW YORK STATUTES ALLOW TAXPAYERS SUITS ONLY AGAINST MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS.

DESPITE AN EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION FORBIDDING THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS "IN AID OR MAINTENANCE" OF ANY SECTARIAN SCHOOL.37/

MOST STATES, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT ADOPTED THIS RESTRICTIVE POLICY AND DO ALLOW TAXPAYER CHALLENGES TO ILLEGAL EXPENDITURES OF STATE FUNDS.38/ DESPITE ITS BAN ON FEDERAL TAXPAYER ACTIONS, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT WILL REVIEW DECISIONS IN STATE TAXPAYERS' SUITS WHERE THE DECISION RESTS SOLELY ON A FEDERAL ISSUE, 39/ PROVIDING THAT THE TAXPAYERS' INTEREST IS PROPERLY PLEADED AND A "MEASURABLE APPROPRIATION OR DISBURSEMENT OF STATE FUNDS IS INVOLVED.40/ INDEED, IN THE EVERSON 41/ CASE, INVOLVING BUS TRANSPORTATION TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS, THE SUPREME COURT ENTERTAINED THE APPEAL FROM A STATE COURT BY A LOCAL TAXPAYER WHERE THE TOTAL SUM COMPLAINED OF WAS $357.74, DISBURSED OVER A SIX MONTH'S PERIOD.42/

AJC HAS AVOIDED THESE PITFALLS BY REFRAINING FROM ANY SUIT IN WHICH ALL THE PLAINTIFFS ARE TAXPAYERS. THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE TEST CASES IT HAS INITIATED OR INTERVENED IN HAVE USUALLY BEEN PARENTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN OR OTHER INDIVIDUALS DIRECTLY AND PERSONALLY AGGRIEVED WHO COMPLAINED NOT OF PECUNIARY INJURY BUT OF A VIOLATION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. THEIR STANDING TO SUE HAS NOT BEEN QUESTIONED.43/

37/ N.Y. CONST. ART. II, SEC. 4.

38/ SEE COMMENT, TAXPAYER SUITS: A SURVEY AND SUMMARY, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).

39/ APPARENTLY THEREFORE LESSER STANDING IS REQUIRED TO COMPLAIN UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THAN WHERE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ALONE IS INVOLVED.

40/ DOREMUS V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). THIS CASE IS OFTEN MISINTERPRETED AS HOLDING THAT THE SUPREME COURT WILL NO LONGER ENTERTAIN CASES BROUGHT BY STATE TAXPAYERS. BUT THERE THE TAXPAYER'S COUNSEL DID NOT EVEN ALLEGE THAT THE PRACTICES HE COMPLAINED OF ADDED TO THE SCHOOL EXPENSES. THE COURT SAID THAT IT DID NOT INTEND TO "DISPARAGE" TAXPAYER ACTION TO RESTRAIN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS "WHICH RESULT IN DIRECT PECUNIARY INJURY." ON THE VERY DAY DOREMUS WAS DECIDED, MARCH 3, 1952, THE SUPREME COURT (WITH ONLY JUSTICE FRANKFURTER DISSENTING ON THIS ISSUE) TACITLY UPHELD THE RIGHT OF NEW YORK TAXPAYERS TO CHALLENGE A STATE STATUTE AIMED AT "SUBVERSIVE" PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS. ADLER V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

41/ 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

42/ THIS IS THE ESTIMATE OF LEO PFEFFER WHO CITES PAGE 49 OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE RECORD IN THE EVERSON CASE. FOR CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RIGIDITY IN THE STANDING TO SUE DOCTRINE, SEE CAHN (ED.) SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW, PP. 26-31 (1954).

43/ ZORACH V. CLAUSON, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) AND TUDOR V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 14 N.J. 31, CERT. DENIED 348 U.S. 816 (1954) (PARENTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN); PEOPLE V. FRIEDMAN, 302 N.Y. 75, APPEAL DISMISSED, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (OWNER OF A KOSHER MEAT STORE); TORCASO V. WATKINS, 223 MD. 49 (1960), 29 U.S. LAW WEEK 4865 (NOTARY PUBLIC); HEISLER V. BD. OF REVIEW, 156 OHIO ST. 395, APPEAL DISMISSED 343 U.S. 939 (1952) (APPLICANT FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION); PETITION OF GOLDMAN, 331 MASS. 647, CERT. DENIED 348 U.S. 942 (1955) (FOSTER PARENT SEEKING APPROVAL OF ADOPTION). HOWEVER, IN BAER V. KOLMORGEN, SUPRA. NOTE 15, A PARENT OF CHILDREN ATTENDING A SCHOOL OTHER THAN THE ONE AT WHICH THE CRECHE WAS DISPLAYED WAS FOUND BY THE COURT TO LACK STANDING TO SUE. THE COURT HELD, HOWEVER, THAT ANOTHER PARENT-PLAINTIFF POSSESSED THE REQUISITE STANDING. THESE PARENTS ALSO SUED AS TAXPAYERS.

IN ONLY ONE AJC CASE, AND THERE ON A MINOR ISSUE, WAS THE STANDING OF ALL THE PLAINTIFFS TO CHALLENGE A COMPLAINED OF PRACTICE DENIED. IN PARALLEL SUITS BROUGHT BY AJC AND ACLU AGAINST A MIAMI SCHOOL BOARD (CONSOLIDATED FOR TRIAL), THE PARENTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN COMPLAINED OF A VARIETY OF "RELIGIOUS AND SECTARIAN PRACTICES AND INSTRUCTION" IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS INCLUDING AN APPLICATION FORM FOR TEACHERS WHICH ASKED "DO YOU BELIEVE IN GOD?" THE TRIAL COURT HELD THAT ONLY A TEACHER COULD PROPERLY COMPLAIN OF THE APPLICATION FORM.44/

IN CHURCH-STATE LITIGATION, IN WHICH COMMUNITY FEELINGS RUN HIGH, THE OBJECTING INDIVIDUAL OFTEN VOLUNTEERS TO SERVE AS PLAINTIFF, PROVIDED THAT HE IS NOT THE ONLY ONE. IN THESE SITUATIONS, WHERE THE PLAINTIFF'S MORALE IS IMPORTANT, AJC HAS NOT RIGOROUSLY SCREENED OUT ALL PLAINTIFFS WHO MIGHT RUN AFOUL OF THE STANDING-TO-SUE RULE. THUS IN THE OSSINING CRECHE CASE,45/ IN ADDITION TO THE SOLE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS A PARENT OF A CHILD ATTENDING THE SCHOOL IN WHICH THE CRECHE WAS DISPLAYED, THERE WERE 27 OTHER PLAINTIFFS, INCLUDING PARENTS OF CHILDREN ATTENDING OTHER SCHOOLS AND EVEN ORDINARY TAXPAYERS.46/ THE MULTIPLE PLAINTIFFS IN OSSINING ALSO SERVED TO DEMONSTRATE THE MULTI-SECTARIAN, WIDESPREAD LOCAL OPPOSITION TO THE CRECHE.47/

MOOTNESS

ONE OTHER PITFALL LIES BEFORE THE UNWARY LITIGANT: MOOTNESS. IF A PLAINTIFF'S STANDING TO SUE DEPENDS UPON A PARTICULAR STATUS, LOSS OF THAT STATUS BEFORE THE SUIT IS FINALLY DISPOSED OF MAY RENDER THE ACTION "MOOT," I.E., NO LONGER AN ACTUAL CONTROVERSY WHICH THE COURTS WILL DECIDE. THUS IN THE DOREMUS CASE, THE CHILD OF THE NON-TAXPAYER PLAINTIFF HAD GRADUATED FROM THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AFTER THE CASE HAD BEEN STARTED BUT BEFORE IT REACHED THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. THAT COURT REFUSED TO PASS UPON HER RIGHTS, STATING: "...THIS COURT DOES NOT DECIDE ARGUMENTS AFTER EVENTS HAVE PUT THEM TO REST."

IN THE GIDEON BIBLE CASE BROUGHT BY AJC,48/ THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN A CATHOLIC AND A JEWISH PARENT OF CHILDREN IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. THE CATHOLIC PLAINTIFF HAD COMPLAINED THAT BY THE TEACHINGS OF HIS CHURCH HIS CHILD WAS FORBIDDEN TO READ THE KING JAMES VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT DISTRIBUTED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. BY THE TIME THE TRIAL BEGAN, THE CATHOLIC CHILD HAD WITHDRAWN FROM SCHOOL. THE COURT HELD THAT THE ACTION HAD BECOME MOOT

44/ CHAMBERLAIN V. DADE COUNTY BD. OF INSTRUCTION, 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, DECIDED APRIL 15, 1961. IT IS SUBMITTED, NEVERTHELESS, THAT PARENTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN RELIGIOUS OR OTHER TESTS IMPOSED ON THE TEACHERS OF THEIR CHILDREN.

45/ BAER V. KOLMORGEN, FOOTNOTE 15, SUPRA.

46/ DURING THE LITIGATION, THE OSSINING NEWSPAPER DISPLAYED PROMINENTLY IN A BOX ON ITS FIRST PAGE THE NAMES OF ALL 28 OF THE PLAINTIFFS.

47/ THIS MOTIVATION EXPLAINS WHY AJC OCCASIONALLY SEEKS TO JOIN ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFFS AFTER THE LITIGATION HAS BEEN STARTED.

48/ TUDOR V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 14 N.J. 31, CERT. DENIED 348 U.S. 816 (1954).

AS TO THE CATHOLIC PARENT BUT NEVERTHELESS BASED ITS DECISION ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE GIDEON BIBLE TO CATHOLICS AS WELL AS JEWS.

SINCE TWO OR THREE YEARS MAY ELAPSE BETWEEN THE TIME WHEN A SUIT IS COMMENCED AND THE FINAL DECISION HANDED DOWN, LAWYERS FOR PARENTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN WHO ACT AS PLAINTIFFS MUST BE SURE THESE CHILDREN WILL REMAIN IN THE SCHOOLS UNTIL THE LITIGATION IS OVER. THESE DANGERS EXPLAIN THE PRECAUTION OF HAVING MORE THAN ONE PLAINTIFF BRING THE ACTION. IN THE MIAMI PUBLIC SCHOOL CASE, THE FOUR PLAINTIFFS, PARENTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN, ALSO SUED ON BEHALF OF "ALL OTHER RESIDENTS, TAXPAYERS AND PARENTS OF MINOR CHILDREN ATTENDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN DADE COUNTY." WHILE SUCH A "CLASS SUIT" DOES NOT AVOID THE DANGERS OF MOOTNESS, IT DOES ENSURE THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT WILL INURE TO THE BENEFIT NOT ONLY OF THE PLAINTIFFS BUT ALL OTHERS "SIMILARLY SITUATED."

A MORE SERIOUS APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS OCCURRED IN THE MARYLAND NOTARY CASE, IN WHICH AJC AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PROSECUTED THE APPEAL.[49] A MARYLAND CITIZEN SEEKING TO BECOME A NOTARY PUBLIC CHALLENGED A STATE LAW REQUIRING THE HOLDER OF AN APPOINTMENT AS NOTARY PUBLIC TO AVOW A BELIEF IN GOD BEFORE HIS APPOINTMENT BECAME VALID. THE APPOINTMENT, IF CONSUMMATED, WOULD HAVE BEEN VALID ONLY FOR TWO YEARS. DURING THE ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, THE POINT WAS MADE THAT THE CASE MIGHT HAVE BECOME MOOT BECAUSE THE APPOINTMENT ORIGINALLY MADE WOULD HAVE EXPIRED BY THAT TIME. THE MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL LATER ADVISED THE COURT, HOWEVER, THAT TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF MOOTNESS, THE MARYLAND GOVERNOR WOULD IN DUE COURSE ISSUE ANOTHER COMMISSION TO THE PLAINTIFF.

IN THE OSSINING CASE,[50] THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL BOARD HAD ALLOWED A CRECHE, I.E., A DEPICTION OF THE NATIVITY SCENE, TO BE DISPLAYED ON THE SCHOOL LAWN JUST BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS VACATION. A REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER DURING THE LITIGATION WAS DENIED. BY THE TIME THE TRIAL WAS OVER AND THE COURT'S DECISION HANDED DOWN, THE CRECHE HAD BEEN DISMANTLED. HOWEVER, THE COURT FOUND THAT THE CRECHE HAD BEEN REMOVED NOT BECAUSE OF ANY CHANGE OF POLICY BUT "BECAUSE OF THE VERY NATURE OF THE DISPLAY" AND VIEWING THE QUESTION AS A "CONTINUING CONTROVERSY" HELD THAT THE ACTION HAD NOT BECOME MOOT.

FEDERAL COURTS VERSUS STATE COURTS

WHEN A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS INVOLVED, THE LITIGANT MAY HAVE A CHOICE OF BEGINNING HIS ACTION EITHER IN THE FEDERAL OR THE STATE COURTS. IN SOUTHERN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, THE NAACP AND OTHER LIBERTARIAN GROUPS, DISTRUSTING SOUTHERN STATE COURTS, HAVE ALMOST ALWAYS PREFERRED FEDERAL COURTS.[51]

THERE ARE TECHNICAL DANGERS, HOWEVER, IN THE FEDERAL CHOICE. THE UNITED STATES

49/ TORCASO V. WATKINS, 223 MD. 49 (1960) 29 U.S. LAW WEEK 4865 (JUNE 16, 1961).

50/ BAER V. KOLMORGEN, FOOTNOTE 15 SUPRA.

51/ OF THE ORIGINAL FIVE PUBLIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES, THOSE ORIGINATING IN KANSAS, SOUTH CAROLINA, VIRGINIA AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WERE BROUGHT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE DELAWARE CASE IN THE STATE COURT.

SUPREME COURT, DETERMINED TO AVOID UNNECESSARY OR PREMATURE DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, HAS PREFERRED THAT STATE STATUTES BE INTERPRETED FIRST BY STATE COURTS BEFORE THEY REACH THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.52/ THIS ATITUDE IS REFLECTED IN THE OPENING SENTENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURT'S OPINION IN THE CROWN KOSHER SUPER MARKET CASE:53/ "IT IS ALWAYS AN UNPLEASANT TASK FOR A LOWER FEDERAL COURT TO SIT IN REVIEW UPON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LEGISLATION...."

UNLESS STATE COURTS HAVE, BY PRIOR DECISION, INDICATED THAT CHANCES OF SUCCESS ARE UNLIKELY,54/ LITTLE LITIGATION IN THIS FIELD ORIGINATES IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS. THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT FEDERAL JUDGES ARE MORE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE OR MORE SENSITIVE TO ABUSES THAN STATE JUDGES.55/

THE BRIEF AMICUS

AN ORGANIZATION MAY PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN A LAW SUIT EVEN WHEN IT HAS NOT INITIATED IT AND DOES NOT CONTROL IT. IT CAN STILL ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE COURT'S THINKING BY FILING A BRIEF AMICUS (AS A FRIEND OF THE COURT). THE CONSENT OF THE COURT IS USUALLY REQUIRED BEFORE SUCH A BRIEF CAN BE FILED BUT SURPRISINGLY IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT THE COURT'S APPROVAL IS NOT NECESSARY, IF THE OPPOSING PARTIES IN THE LAW SUIT CONSENT TO SUCH FILING.

AJC HAS FILED BRIEFS AMICUS CURIAE IN DOZENS OF CASES AND BELIEVES STRONGLY IN THEIR USEFULNESS. A BRIEF AMICUS SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE MORE THAN A PARROTING OF THE ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN A PARTY'S BRIEF; UNLESS IT CONTAINS MATERIAL NOT ALREADY BEFORE THE COURT, IT IS AN IRRITATING WASTE OF THE TIME OF THE COURT56/ OR A FORM OF JUDICIAL LOBBYING57/

52/ HARRISON V. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). IN STAINBACK V. PO, 336 U.S. 368 (1949), THE COURT INSISTED THAT A CHALLENGE EVEN TO A TERRITORIAL STATUTE BE INITIATED IN A TERRITORIAL NOT U.S. DISTRICT COURT. THIS "JUDGE-MADE RULE" WAS FASHIONED IN 1941. SEE HARRISON V. NAACP, SUPRA (DISSENTING OPINION).

53/ CROWN KOSHER SUPER MARKET V. GALLAGHER, 176 F. SUPP. 466 (D.C. MASS. 1959).

54/ THE CROWN KOSHER SUPER MARKET CASE WAS PRESUMABLY BROUGHT IN THE FEDERAL COURT FOR THIS REASON.

55/ THE CROWN KOSHER DECISION BY A THREE-MAN COURT WAS THE FIRST FEDERAL DECISION HOLDING THAT COMPULSORY SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS ARE INVALID AS AN AID TO THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, AT LEAST AS TO SABBATH-OBSERVING JEWS. A THREE-MAN FEDERAL COURT IN PHILADELPHIA HELD RECENTLY THAT COMPULSORY BIBLE READING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS WAS FORBIDDEN BY THE CONSTITUTION, SCHEMPP V. SCHOOL DISTRIST OF ABINGTON, 177 FED. SUPP. 398 (E.D. PA. 1959), JUDGMENT VACATED ON OTHER GROUNDS, 364 U.S. 298 (1960). BUT A SIMILAR COURT IN THE SAME DISTRICT UPHELD A SUNDAY BLUE LAW. BRAUNFELD V. GIBBONS ___ F. 2D. SUPP. (E.D. PA. 1960) AFFIRMED SUB NOMINE BRAUNFIELD V. BROWN, 29 U.S. LAW WEEK 4512 (MAY 29, 1961) AND TWO GUYS FROM HARRISON-ALLENTOWN V. MCGINLEY, 184 F. SUPP. 352 (E.D. PA. 1959), AFFIRMED 29 U.S. LAW WEEK 4500 (MAY 29, 1961).

56/ SEE JUSTICE JACKSON'S SARCASTIC REFERENCE TO A BRIEF AMICUS FILED BY THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION IN CRAIG V. HARNEY, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1946). UNFORTUNATELY, SOMETIMES A BRIEF AMICUS IS FILED ONLY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL VANITY. SEE VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY 166 (1959).

57/ SEE HARPER AND ETHERINGTON, LOBBYISTS BEFORE THE COURT, 101 U. OF PA. L.REV. 1172 (1953); VOSE, LITIGATION AS A FORM OF PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITY, 319 THE ANNALS 20, AT 27-28 (1958) AND THE STUDIES CITED THERE IN FOOTNOTE 34.

AJC BRIEFS AMICUS HAVE ON OCCASION BROUGHT TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION A RELIGIOUS LIBERTY QUESTION OVERLOOKED OR IGNORED BY THE PARTIES. IN AN HAWAIIAN CASE,[58] CHINESE LANGUAGE SCHOOLS HAD CHALLENGED THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A TERRITORIAL WAR-TIME STATUTE WHICH FORBADE ANY SCHOOL TO TEACH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE TO ANY CHILD BELOW THE FIFTH GRADE WHO DID NOT MAINTAIN AVERAGE SCORES IN ENGLISH READING AND WRITING. THE STATUTE WAS ATTACKED AS A TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. THE AJC BRIEF AMICUS RAISED THE ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT THAT THE STATUTE BY ITS TERMS PREVENTED JEWISH CHILDREN FROM LEARNING HEBREW AND THUS VIOLATED RELIGIOUS COMMANDS.[59] (UNFORTUNATELY, THE SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE APPEAL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS.)

IN THE MIRACLE CASE,[60] A MOTION PICTURE DISTRIBUTOR CHALLENGED A NEW YORK MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP STATUTE UNDER WHICH THE ITALIAN FILM THE MIRACLE HAD BEEN DENIED THE REQUIRED PERMIT BECAUSE IT WAS ALLEGEDLY "SACRILEGIOUS." THE ORIGINAL CHALLENGE WAS BASED MAINLY ON THE CLAIM THAT MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP WAS A DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. AJC FILED A BRIEF AMICUS BEFORE THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS[61] IN WHICH THE ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT WAS MADE THAT ALLOWING STATE OFFICIALS TO CENSOR A FILM BECAUSE IT WAS SACRILEGIOUS WAS A USE OF STATE POWER TO ENFORCE RELIGIOUS DOGMA IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ULTIMATELY STRUCK DOWN THE STATUTE BECAUSE: "THE CENSOR IS SET ADRIFT UPON A BOUNDLESS SEA AMID A MYRIAD OF CONFLICTING CURRENTS OF RELIGIOUS VIEWS, WITH NO CHARTS BUT THOSE PROVIDED BY THE MOST VOCAL AND POWERFUL ORTHODOXIES... APPLICATION OF THE 'SACRILIGIOUS' TEST, IN THESE OR OTHER RESPECTS, MIGHT RAISE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S GUARANTY OF SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE WITH FREEDOM OF WORSHIP FOR ALL.[62]

WHERE THE POSITION OF THE ORGANIZED JEWISH COMMUNITY ON A RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUE IS RELEVANT, THE AJC OFTEN SEEKS TO FILE A BRIEF AMICUS. IN THE ILLINOIS RELEASED TIME CASE,[63] THE BRIEF AMICUS, PREPARED BY AJC'S LAWYERS, WAS SIGNED BY

58/ STAINBACK V. PO, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).

59/ THIS WAS PROBABLY THE FIRST TIME THAT THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, THE MISHNAH AND THE SHULCHAN ARUCH WERE CITED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT. FOR A COMMENT ON THE AJC BRIEF, SEE KOHN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA, LEGISLATIVE FACT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136,160-161 (1960).

60/ BURSTYN V. WILSON, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). FOR A PERCEPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY, SEE WESTIN, MOVIES, "MIRACLES" AND THE SUPREME COURT, (MARCH, 1961) (ABOUT TO BE PUBLISHED).

61/ 303 N.Y. 242 (1951).

62/ A BRIEF AMICUS WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT JOINTLY BY THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AJC, PROTESTANTS AND OTHER AMERICANS UNITED FOR THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ORGANIZATION AND AN OPPOSING BRIEF BY THE NEW YORK STATE CATHOLIC WELFARE COMMITTEE. THE ATTORNEY FOR EACH OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES REFUSED TO GIVE HIS CONSENT TO THE FILING OF A BRIEF AMICUS BY THE ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED BY HIM UNLESS THE OTHER COUNSEL CONSENTED TO THE FILING BY OTHERS FAVORED BY HIM. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER IN HIS CONCURRING OPINION REFERRED TO THESE BRIEFS AND CRITICIZED THEIR "ABSOLUTE AND ABSTRACT" POSITIONS.

63/ MCCOLLUM V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

THE SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA AND THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL.[64]

IN THE MASSACHUSETTS SUNDAY LAW CASE,[65] IN WHICH AJC WAS REFUSED THE PERMISSION TO FILE A BRIEF AMICUS, LEO PFEFFER FILED SUCH A BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS.

SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA

ONCE THE DECISION TO START A LAW SUIT HAS BEEN TAKEN, THE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS SCREENED, THE COURT AND THE VENUE DETERMINED, THE FINAL QUESTION IS WHAT "EVIDENCE" SHALL BE OFFERED.

A RECURRENT ISSUE IN CHURCH-STATE LITIGATION IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH CERTAIN COMPLAINED OF PRACTICES ARE TRULY VOLUNTARY. CLEARLY, IF SCHOOL CHILDREN ARE COMPELLED TO ATTEND RELEASED TIME CLASSES OR PARTICIPATE IN RELIGIOUS EXERCISES, THEY ARE DEPRIVED OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. BUT SCHOOL AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY RELY ON THE CLAIM THAT CHILDREN MAY AT THEIR REQUEST BE EXCUSED FROM A PRACTICE THEY DEEM OFFENSIVE OR MAY REFRAIN FROM ACCEPTING A PRIVILEGE OFFERED TO THEIR CLASSMATES. THE AJC-DRAFTED BRIEF AMICUS IN THE McCOLLUM CASE ARGUED (CITING PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATISES OF WHICH THE COURT COULD TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE) THAT THE CHILD HAD IN FACT NO TRULY VOLUNTARY CHOICE BECAUSE "IN A TEN-YEAR-OLD CHILD FEAR OF BEING SINGLED OUT AS A NON-CONFORMIST IS A POSITIVE DETERMINANT OF CONDUCT." THIS ARGUMENT WON THE SUPPORT OF JUSTICE FRANKFURTER (AND THREE OTHER JUSTICES WHO JOINED IN HIS CONCURRING OPINION) WHO OBSERVED "...NON-CONFORMITY IS NOT AN OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTIC OF CHILDREN.[66]

IN LATER LITIGATION, WE SOUGHT TO STRENGTHEN OUR ARGUMENT BY HAVING PSYCHOLOGISTS AND EDUCATORS TESTIFY IN THE TRIAL COURT AS EXPERTS ON THIS ISSUE AND A RELATED ONE: THE DIVISIVE EFFECT SUCH PRACTICES HAVE UPON SCHOOL CHILDREN. IN THE NEW

64/ JUSTICE FRANKFURTER IN HIS CONCURRENT OPINION STATED (FOOTNOTE 18) THAT THE "DIVERGENT" VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE SEVEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAD FILED SEPARATE BRIEFS AMICUS SHOWED THAT THE RELEASED TIME MOVEMENT "HAS BEEN A DIVISIVE AND NOT AN IRENIC INFLUENCE IN THE COMMUNITY."

65/ CROWN KOSHER SUPER MARKET V. GALLAGHER, 176 F. SUPP. 466 (D.C.MASS. 1959). THE OCCASIONAL DANGER TO THE NARROW INTERESTS OF A PARTY IN THE TOO CANDID COMMENTS OF A FRIEND OF THE COURT IS DEMONSTRATED IN THIS CASE. THE ATTORNEYS DEFENDING THE SUNDAY LAW STATUTE HAD ARGUED BEFORE THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT THAT THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE WAS TO ENFORCE A DAY OF REST AND THAT IT HAD NO RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION. BUT WHEN THE BRIEF AMICUS FILED JOINTLY BY THE LORD'S DAY LEAGUE OF NEW ENGLAND AND THE ARCHDIOCESAN COUNCIL OF CATHOLIC MEN DECLARED THAT THEY HAD IN COMMON "THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING THE FURTHER SECULARIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE LORD'S DAY," THE COURT OBSERVED THAT THEIR BRIEF "LETS THE CAT OUT OF THE BAG."

66/ THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT FOUND IT UNNECESSARY TO CONSIDER THIS ISSUE. JUSTICE JACKSON IN HIS SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION "DOUBTED WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH OF COURSE PROTECTS THE RIGHT TO DISSENT, CAN BE CONSTRUED ALSO TO PROTECT ONE FROM EMBARRASSMENT THAT ALWAYS ATTENDS NON-CONFORMITY, WHETHER IN RELIGION, POLITICS, BEHAVIOR OR DRESS."

JERSEY GIDEON BIBLE CASE, PUPILS WERE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY BY THEIR SCHOOL TEACHERS OF BRINGING HOME A REQUEST FORM FOR THEIR PARENTS TO SIGN WHICH WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO A FREE "GIDEON BIBLE" (CONSISTING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, THE BOOK OF PSALMS AND THE BOOK OF PROVERBS). THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT DECIDED UNANIMOUSLY THAT THE SO-CALLED FREE CHOICE "IGNORES THE REALITIES OF LIFE." IT CITED THE TESTIMONY IN THE RECORD OF TWO PSYCHOLOGISTS AND AN EDUCATOR THAT SUCH DISTRIBUTION BY THE TEACHER "WOULD CREATE A SUBTLE PRESSURE ON THE CHILD," "WOULD CREATE TENSIONS AMONG THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS" AND THAT "THE BACKING OF THE STATE WOULD INEVITABLY BE INTERPRETED AS BEING BEHIND IT."67/

NEVERTHELESS, EFFORTS TO INTRODUCE SIMILAR TESTIMONY IN SIMILAR LITIGATION WE HAVE BROUGHT HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IN THE OSSINING CRECHE CASE, THE COURTS SUSTAINED OBJECTIONS TO SUCH TESTIMONY, GIVING NO GROUNDS FOR ITS RULING. IN THE MIAMI CASE, THE COURT ALLOWED TESTIMONY TO SHOW PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE TO THE NON-CHRISTIAN CHILDREN PARTICIPATING BUT REFUSED TO ALLOW TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS ON THE ISSUE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL COERCION.

ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNSEL

THERE IS STILL A THIRD WAY IN WHICH AN ORGANIZATION LIKE AJC CAN INFLUENCE LITIGATION IN THE FIELD. BECAUSE OF AJC'S REPUTATION IN THIS AREA, COUNSEL FOR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS OR FOR PRIVATE LITIGANTS FREQUENTLY ASK FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE FROM AJC'S EXPERIENCED LAWYERS. THIS AID IS GIVEN IN A VARIETY OF FORMS AND AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE LITIGATION. WE ARE OFTEN ASKED TO DRAFT THE LEGAL PLEADINGS OR TO COMMENT ON DRAFT COMPLAINTS. OCCASIONALLY AN AJC LAWYER IS ASKED TO CONDUCT THE TRIAL OF A CASE IN WHICH ANOTHER LAWYER IS THE ATTORNEY OF RECORD. SOMETIMES WE ARE ASKED TO TAKE OVER THE APPEAL IN THE CASE AFTER A DEFEAT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. NEEDLESS TO SAY SUCH HELP IS GRANTED FREELY.

LEGISLATION

LEGISLATIVE WORK IN THIS AREA TENDS TO BE DEFINSIVE: TO RESIST EFFORTS DESIGNED TO BREACH THE WALL SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE. THE BEST EXAMPLE IS THE OPPOSITION TO THE CURRENT DRIVE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS TO OBTAIN FEDERAL LOANS FOR PAROCHIAL ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. OCCASIONALLY LEGISLATION THREATENS RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS WELL. THUS HUMANE SLAUGHTER BILLS MIGHT HAVE MEANT THE END OF JEWISH RITUAL SLAUGHTER. JEWISH GROUPS WITH DEEP HISTORICAL MEMORIES RECALLED THAT NAZI AND OTHER ANTI-SEMITIC GROUPS HAD FREQUENTLY ATTACKED JEWISH RITUAL SLAUGHTER AS CRUEL TO ANIMALS AND THAT INDEED NAZI GERMANY HAD BARRED SUCH RITUAL SLAUGHTER. THE SPONSORS OF THE BILL, TO OVERCOME JEWISH OPPOSITION, THEREFORE OFFERED TO AND DID EXEMPT JEWISH RITUAL SLAUGHTER FROM THE SCOPE OF THE ACT. BUT AJC AND OTHER JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS WERE NOT CONTENT WITH THIS EXEMPTION WHICH MIGHT HAVE CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT SUCH SLAUGHTER WAS INHUMANE BUT EXEMPT BY CONGRESS FOR POLITICAL REASONS. TESTIMONY WAS PRESENTED THAT JEWISH RITUAL SLAUGHTER (SHECHITAH) WHICH REQUIRES THE INSTANTANEOUS DESTRUCTION OF THE ANIMAL BY A SWIFT CUTTING OF ITS TWO NECK ARTERIES WAS NOT CRUELER TO THE ANIMAL THAN FIRST MAKING HIM INSENSIBLE BY A BLOW ON THE TEMPLE AND THEN KILLING HIM. THE SPONSORS OF THE BILL THEN DEFINED THE ORTHODOX JEWISH METHOD OF KILLING AN ANIMAL AS HUMANE. THE STATUTE WAS ENACTED AND JEWISH GROUPS THEREUPON SPONSORED VETERINARY STUDIES TO DEVISE THE MOST PAINLESS METHOD OF PREPARING AN ANIMAL FOR SLAUGHTER.

67/ TUDOR V. BD. OF EDUCATION, 14 N.J. 31 (1953), CERT. DENIED 348 U.S. 816 (1954).

THE DIFFICULTIES IN SEEKING LEGISLATIVE AID TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SEPARATION PRINCIPLE ARE ILLUSTRATED BY AJC'S TWELVE-YEAR, AND THUS FAR UNSUCCESSFUL, STRUGGLE TO AMEND NEW YORK'S COMPULSORY SUNDAY CLOSING LAW.

NEW YORK'S SUNDAY LAWS FORBID WORK ON SUNDAY BUT PROVIDE A STATUTORY EXCEPTION FOR THOSE PERSONS WHO FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS OBSERVE ANOTHER DAY OF THE WEEK AS THEIR SABBATH.[68] THE EXCEPTION, HOWEVER, PROTECTS ONLY EMPLOYEES OR OTHERS WHO PERFORM PHYSICAL LABOR; IT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THOSE SABBATARIAN OBSERVERS WHO WISH TO KEEP A SHOP OR PLACE OF BUSINESS OPEN ON SUNDAY.[69]

IN FEBRUARY 1949, AJC DECIDED TO SEEK LEGISLATIVE RELIEF. A JOINT COMMITTEE FOR A FAIR SABBATH LAW WAS ORGANIZED ON WHICH WERE REPRESENTED ALMOST EVERY IMPORTANT JEWISH ORGANIZATION IN NEW YORK STATE, RELIGIOUS AND LAY, CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM, AND A BILL WAS INTRODUCED BY SYMPATHETIC LEGISLATORS. THE JOINT COMMITTEE DECIDED THAT FOR TACTICAL REASONS IT WOULD NOT SEEK THE REPEAL OF THE ENTIRE COMPULSORY SUNDAY LAWS, ALTHOUGH AJC WAS THEN (AND STILL IS) OPPOSED TO SUCH STATUTES AS AN AID TO RELIGION. INSTEAD, THE BILL WAS NARROWLY DRAWN TO GRANT A LOCAL OPTION TO CITIES THROUGHOUT THE STATE TO PERMIT STORES TO REMAIN OPEN ON SUNDAYS, WHERE THE OWNERS OBSERVED ANOTHER DAY AS THEIR SABBATH AND THE CONDUCT OF THE BUSINESS DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE PEACE AND QUIET OF THE COMMUNITY.[70] THE LEGISLATURE ADJOURNED WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE BILL.

ON JUNE 15, 1949, SAM FRIEDMAN, AN ORTHODOX JEWISH BUTCHER, WAS CONVICTED OF KEEPING HIS KOSHER BUTCHER STORE (IN A JEWISH NEIGHBORHOOD) OPEN ON SUNDAY AND WAS FINED $10. AJC'S LAWYERS REPRESENTED THE DEFENDANT AND ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD CARRY THE CASE TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IF NECESSARY. WHILE THE LITIGATION WAS PURSUING ITS SLOW COURSE THROUGH THE COURTS, THE LEGISLATIVE EFFORT CONTINUED AND THE BILL WAS REINTRODUCED IN 1950 AND 1951 WITHOUT SUCCESS.

THE DISMISSAL BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN 1951 OF THE APPEAL IN THE FRIEDMAN CASE (TECHNICALLY EQUIVALENT TO A DECISION ON THE MERITS AND THEREFORE OF GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN A MERE REFUSAL TO GRANT CERTIORARI)[71] SPURRED AJC TO MORE INTENSE EFFORTS. AJC APPEALED TO GOVERNOR THOMAS E. DEWEY AND IN JANUARY 1952 HE URGED THE LEGISLATURE TO APPOINT A JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE PROBLEM. THE "PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON SABBATH LAW"[72] FAILED, HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER THE PLIGHT OF THE SABBATH-OBSERVING STOREKEEPER. (THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED, HOWEVER, A BROADENING OF THE EXEMPTION FOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS.)

68/ N.Y. PENAL LAW, SEC. 2144.

69/ PEOPLE V. FRIEDMAN, SUPRA, NOTE 19. AT LEAST NINE STATES DO, HOWEVER, PROVIDE SUCH AN EXCEPTION FOR STOREKEEPERS. MCGOWAN V. MARYLAND, 29 U.S. LAW WEEK 4518, NOTE 103 (CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE FRANKFURTER). SEVERAL STATE COURTS HAVE HELD INDEED THAT SUCH AN EXCEPTION IS A SINE QUA NON FOR THE VALIDITY OF SUCH LAWS. SEE CASES CITED IN EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1190 (1958 ED.).

70/ THE WACHTEL-BRESS BILL, SENATE INTRODUCTORY 2190, ASSEMBLY INTRODUCTORY 2748 (1949).

71/ FOR A CRITICISM OF THE FRIEDMAN DECISION, SEE NOTE: SUNDAY STATUTES IN A MODERN COMMUNITY, 61 YALE LAW J. 427 (1952).

72/ LEGISLATIVE DOC. NO. 50 (1952).

THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE PROMISED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD CONSIDER THE PROBLEM OF RETAIL STORES AT A LATER DATE AND IN JANUARY 1953 HELD A PUBLIC HEARING IN NEW YORK CITY AT WHICH SPOKESMEN OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE APPEARED. FOR THE FIRST TIME, PROTESTANT SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSED CHANGE DEVELOPED WHEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROTESTANT COUNCIL OF NEW YORK CITY AND THE STATE FEDERATION OF CHURCHES SUPPORTED THE LIBERALIZING PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE 30 JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS. THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE BY A VOTE OF 5 TO 2 REJECTED THE PROPOSAL SPONSORED BY THE JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS. THE MAJORITY REPORT ASSERTED THAT THE PROPOSED CHANGE WOULD BE "IMPRACTICAL OF REGULATION, VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE OF EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AND LEAD TO UNCONTROLLABLE ABUSES." IT CONCLUDED: "IT IS NOT A DENIAL OF JUSTICE OR FAIRNESS TO A CLASS OF CITIZENS WHEN THE MORES OF THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE OVERWHELMINGLY FAVOR THAT THE DAY OF REST BE DEFINITELY FIXED TO MEET THE CONVENIENCE OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE."73/ A LAST-DITCH EFFORT IN THE LEGISLATURE TO REJECT THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION WAS DEFEATED BY A VOICE VOTE IN EACH CHAMBER.74/

THE JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED TO PRESS THEIR FIGHT. IN 1955, IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME UPSTATE, I.E., RURAL OPPOSITION, THE STATE-WIDE OPTION BILL WAS NARROWED SO THAT IT APPLIED ONLY TO CITIES HAVING A POPULATION OF A MILLION OR MORE, A DEFINITION WHICH FITTED ONLY NEW YORK CITY.75/ BUT THE CHANGE DID NOT IMPROVE THE BILL'S PROSPECTS, BECAUSE OF THE IMPLACABLE OPPOSITION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CODES COMMITTEE TO WHICH SUCH BILLS WERE REGULARLY REFERRED.

IN 1956, THE STRATEGY WAS REVISED ONCE MORE TO AVOID REFERRAL OF THE BILL TO THE CODES COMMITTEE AND TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL IN THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE. BILLS WERE THEREFORE INTRODUCED IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE TO AMEND THE NEW YORK CHARTER, WHICH WERE REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.76/ THIS ENTAILED MUCH GREATER DIFFICULTIES, FOR NOW NOT ONLY WAS A MESSAGE FROM THE MAYOR AND AN ENABLING HOME RULE RESOLUTION REQUIRED FROM THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL (OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A TWO-THIRD'S VOTE FROM THE COUNCIL IN THE ABSENCE OF THE MAYOR'S MESSAGE) BUT A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY WAS NEEDED IN EACH HOUSE OF THE STATE LEGISLATURE.77/ NEVERTHELESS, THE NEW COURSE WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY. THE LEGISLATIVE BATTLEFIELD THEREFORE SHIFTED TEMPORARILY FROM ALBANY TO NEW YORK WHERE THE JOINT COMMITTEE FOR A FAIR SABBATH LAW ATTEMPTED TO MUSTER SUPPORT FOR THE ENABLING RESOLUTION.

THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS IS, OF COURSE, STRONGER IN NEW YORK CITY WHERE JEWS CONSTITUTE ABOUT ONE-FOURTH OF THE POPULATION THAN IN THE STATE AS A WHOLE WHERE THEY ARE ONLY ABOUT ONE-EIGHTH. UP TO THIS POINT, CATHOLIC ORGANIZATIONS OR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HAD REMAINED RELATIVELY INACTIVE ON THIS ISSUE. BUT AS SUPPORT FOR PASSAGE OF THE HOME RULE RESOLUTION COUNTINED TO MOUNT,

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73/ SECOND REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON SABBATH LAW, P. 11 (1953); N.Y.TIMES, MARCH 12, 1953.

74/ SEE PFEFFER, A SETBACK FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, CONGRESS WEEKLY, MAY 25, 1953.

75/ SEN. INT. 1980, PRINT NO. 2103 (1955).

76/ SEN. INT. 3411, PRINT NO. 4081; ASS. INT. 3913, PRINT NO. 4958 (MARCH 1956).

77/ N. Y. CONSTITUTION, ART. 9, SEC. 11.

THE CHANCERY OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK ARCHDIOCESE RELEASED A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SOME 60 CATHOLIC LAY GROUPS AND THE CHANCELLOR OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OPPOSING THE RESOLUTION.78/ THE PROTESTANT COUNCIL OF THE CITY SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION. THE JOINT COMMITTEE FOR A FAIR SABBATH LAW DID LIKEWISE, SUBMITTING A PETITION TO THE MAYOR SIGNED BY 350 ORTHODOX, CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM RABBIS IN NEW YORK CITY.

THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE PRODUCED A SPLIT ALONG RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC LINES AMONG THE 24 DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF THE 25-MAN CITY COUNCIL AND THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS. THE HOME RULE RESOLUTION WAS SUPPORTED (PRIVATELY) BY MAYOR WAGNER (GERMAN-IRISH CATHOLIC) AND CARMINE DE SAPIO (ITALIAN CATHOLIC), THEN THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL BOSS OF THE CITY. THE 11 JEWISH COUNCILMEN VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION, AS DID THE THREE PROTESTANTS (TWO OF WHOM ARE NEGROES). SEVEN OUT OF EIGHT IRISH CATHOLIC COUNCILMEN VOTED AGAINST IT (THE EIGHTH PRESIDED AND DID NOT VOTE) AND THE THREE ITALIAN CATHOLICS ABSTAINED.79/ THE RESOLUTION THUS PASSED BY A VOTE OF 14 TO 7.

THIS TACTICAL VICTORY WAS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE TO THE WRITER'S KNOWLEDGE IT WAS THE FIRST TIME IN HIS GENERATION THAT ANY LEGISLATIVE MEASURE PUBLICLY OPPOSED BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HAD EVER BEEN APPROVED IN NEW YORK CITY OR ALBANY. DESPITE THE NEW YORK CITY VICTORY, THE BILL FAILED TO OBTAIN IN THE LEGISLATURE THE TWO-THIRDS VOTE REQUIRED BY THE HOME RULE PROVISION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND WAS THEREFORE AGAIN DEFEATED.

IN 1957, NO REAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORT WAS MOUNTED FOR IN THAT YEAR THE MAYOR AND THE CITY COUNCILMEN WERE UP FOR ELECTION AND THE CHANCES OF GETTING OPEN SUPPORT WERE DEEMED SMALL. DISHEARTENED BY THE SUCCESSIVE DEFEATS, THE EFFORTS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE FOR A FAIR SABBATH LAW GREW WEAKER. ALTHOUGH THE BILL WAS REINTRODUCED IN 1958 AND 1959, NO EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN COULD BE ORGANIZED. ON MAY 18, 1959, A THREE-MAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN BOSTON HELD THAT THE MASSACHUSETTS SUNDAY LAW (COMPARABLE TO THAT OF NEW YORK) WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO A CORPORATION OPERATING A KOSHER SUPER-MARKET AND TO ORTHODOX JEWS WHO TRADED IN THE STORE. THIS DECISION WHICH OPENED UP THE POSSIBILITIES OF A FRESH CONSIDERATION OF SUNDAY LAWS BY THE SUPREME COURT RESULTED IN A VIRTUAL SUSPENSION OF THE NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE EFFORT WHILE THE CASE WAS BEFORE THAT COURT.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN THE FOUR SUNDAY LAW CASES OF COURSE END THE POSSIBILITY, AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS, OF A JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF COMPULSORY SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS. THE STRUGGLE MUST NOW SHIFT FROM THE MARBLE PALACE IN WASHINGTON TO THE LEGISLATIVE HALLS OF THE 50 STATES. PARADOXICALLY THE CHANCES OF LEGISLATIVE RELIEF FOR SABBATARIAN OBSERVERS MAY HAVE EVEN IMPROVED. THE BOSTON PILOT, OFFICIAL ORGAN FOR THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BOSTON, HAD BEFORE THE CROWN KOSHER CASE OPPOSED INTRANSIGENTLY ANY AMENDMENT TO THE MASSACHUSETTS SUNDAY LAW THAT WOULD HAVE EXEMPTED ORTHODOX JEWS FROM ITS PROHIBITIONS. YET ON JUNE 3, 1961, FIVE DAYS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION, THE BOSTON PILOT EDITORIALLY URGED THAT A "WORKABLE FORMULA /BE/ ARRIVED AT WHICH PROTECTS THE RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT OF SABBATARIANS WITHOUT DESTROYING THE SUNDAY OBSERVANCE OF THE MAJORITY."

78/ N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, MARCH 19, 1956.

79/ IN 1961, OF THE 25 MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, 12 WERE ROMAN CATHOLIC, ELEVEN JEWISH AND TWO NEGRO PROTESTANTS. N.Y. TIMES, MAY 24, 1961, P. 49.

CONCLUSIONS

IN DECEMBER 1959 THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA AND THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL SPONSORED A THREE-DAY CONFERENCE TO REASSESS "STRATEGY AND APPROACHES" IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL.80/ AFTER CONSIDERING THE WORK IN THIS AREA FROM 1946 TO 1959, THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDED:

> "1. THE EXTENT OF RELIGIOUS TEACHING AND PRACTICES HAS BEEN LARGELY CONTAINED AND SERIOUS ABUSES HELD WITHIN CLOSER L LIMITS THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE IN THE ABSENCE OF OUR EFFORTS.
>
> "2. THE QUALITY OF INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONSHIPS HAS IMPROVED.
>
> "3. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION HAS GROWN MORE REASONED."

THIS EVOLUTION, IT IS SUBMITTED, HOLDS TRUE FOR THE ENTIRE AREA OF THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

JEWS CONSTITUTE ABOUT 3% OF THE POPULATION. THEIR INFLUENCE WITH MOST LEGISLATURES IS OBVIOUSLY WEAK, PARTICULARLY WHEN THERE ARE COUNTERVAILING RELIGIOUS PRESSURES. THEY HAVE THEREFORE UNDERSTANDABLY RELIED PRIMARILY ON THE COURTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. IN THAT JUDICIAL STRUGGLE THEY HAVE BEEN IMMEASURABLY AIDED BY A TRADITION NOW ALMOST 180 YEARS OLD. IN THAT EFFORT BY AND LARGE THE COURTS IN THE LAST 15 YEARS HAVE DEFENDED THAT TRADITION.

(7/17/61)

80/ RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, PUBLISHED JUNE 1961, BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON REASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL.

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ORGANIZED LABOR AS A BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

by
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With the announcement of official top level labor support for the re-election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936, the Gomperian dictum of neutrality in politics received a mortal blow. Labor's neutrality, which had long been an equivocal tradition anyway, was laid to rest in 1955, with the merger of the politically aggressive CIO with the less politically oriented AF of L. These and other much publicized events, such as organized labor's role in the 1948 Truman victory and the 1958 Congressional elections, have contributed to a widely-held popular belief that labor represents a monolithic force on the American political scene, capable of placing a massive vote at the doorstep of the Democratic party. Yet recent scholarly studies demonstrate that, despite increasing political involvements of union leaders, particularly in campaigns, there are a substantial number of union members who vote contrary to the public endorsements of their leadership; who note with disapproval, as detracting from the vital business of contract and grievance negotiation, any display of political activity by union leaders; or who remain politically apathetic, leadership exhortation to the contrary not withstanding. Moreover, within the union movement, a substantial number of union leaders still attempt to stay out of politics, especially election campaigns, and refuse to allow their unions to become closely identified with any political party or its candidates.

The intention of this paper is to discuss, first, the generalization that union organizations and their members occupy varying positions on a continuum of political opinion and activity, and that as a result the AFL-CIO cannot guarantee a substantial bloc of votes for candidates in national campaigns. In the light of previous studies, this point does not merit detailed documentation and analysis. The major focus of this discussion is on an analysis of organized labor, particularly the AFL-CIO nationally, as a base of support for Democratic candidates for presidential and congressional offices. Such analysis involves two questions: Why is labor sought as a base of support? What is the effect, positive and negative, of such support?

I

While union leaders have over the years fought for the right to strike, to organize, to bargain with employers, and to engage in the collective promotion of their economic and social welfare by means of the ballot-box and lobbying, they seldom agree on candidates, parties, or issues. It is not a novel proposition to point out that "the American labor movement is a highly complex social phenomenon with myriads of dissimilar features at lower levels. These diversities are multiplied in the alliances and organizational arrangements improvised for political purposes within organized labor and

between organized labor and other political groups."[1] For example, the bulk of the political activity carried on by AFL-CIO in national campaigns is supported extensively by only a few unions; namely, The United Auto Workers, The United Steel Workers, the ILGWU and the Machinists. And even within this group, there are some variations. The Auto Workers Union in Michigan is openly partisan and for all intents and purposes is an integral part of the Democratic party in that state. In New York state the ILGWU's political arm is the Liberal Party, which occasionally nominates its own candidates, but usually gives its support to the Democrats.[2] A more moderate approach is taken by the Steel Workers which, under President David MacDonald's leadership, has stopped short of open affiliation with the Democratic party and extensive participation within the party's internal framework.

Furthermore, a substantial part of the union movement has been conservatively oriented politically. Conservativism among unions, I define in the following manner: (1) apathy toward or avoidance of national election activity; (2) an overwhelming concern with the political and economic problems of their own union, with little or no interest in the problems

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[1]Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy, Chapel Hill, the University of North Carolina Press (1960) p. 176.

[2]Murray Seidler, "The Socialist Party and American Unionism," Midwest Journal of Political Science (August, 1961) p. 228.

of other unions or other segments of society; (3) tight control from the top, with few avenues open for membership participation in policy decisions. Dominated by the late William Hutcheson, a Republican, the Carpenters Union has a reputation of headquarters control and political conservatism and disinterest. Building and other skilled trade unions have manifestly turned their energies toward control of jobs rather than concern with political issues, and have avoided direct participation in election campaigns. In brief, organized labor is not unified politically and it is very unlikely that it will be in the foreseeable future. Strictly speaking, organized labor is not, in terms of its organization and leadership, a unified base of support for any candidate or party.

The growing body of union vote analysis supports the point made earlier that the union membership, while characterstically voting for Democratic candidates, is by no means in the pocket of its leadership or the Democratic party. In the 1956 presidential election, for example, the Survey Research Center found by dividing their sample of union members according to their one-time AFL or CIO affiliation that AFL respondents voted 51 per cent Democratic, whereas 60 per cent of the CIO members favored Stevenson.[3]

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[3]Angus Campbell, et. al., The American Voter, New York, John Wiley and Sons (1960), p. 312.

E. E. Schattschneider in his most recent work points out that although the AFL-CIO membership totals 16,000,000, generous estimates put its normal voter-turnout at about half this figure. The Republican party's share is estimated at 30 per cent of the 8,000,000 votes cast, leaving the Democrats with approximately 5,600,000.[4] In brief, the total Democratic vote supplied by organized labor may be only about one-third of the total membership figure. Supporting the implication of Schattschneider's rough calculations are the findings from surveys ordered by George Meany, following the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. The surveys of union voting conducted in Illinois and New Jersey revealed that the turnout of eligible voters among unionists was below the national average of non-union voters. The AFL-CIO president was, thus, induced to call for a vigorous union-sponsored get-out-the-vote drive for 1960. Another conclusion coming out of the Meany surveys was that while union men had, on the whole, supported Stevenson, their wives had voted for Eisenhower.

Some unions, however, are much more solid in terms of voting behavior and become significant bases of support for candidates running for national or congressional offices in the areas of their membership concentration. The UAW membership

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[4]E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston (1960), p. 50.

in Michigan, for example, strongly supports the Democratic party, although its membership elsewhere has not been recognized as a unified potent political force. Kornhauser, Sheppard, and Mayer, and later Sheppard and Masters, found that a majority of union members in the Detroit area consistently support Democratic candidates in state and national elections, and generally approve of and support the UAW's extensive political commitments. Nevertheless, both studies demonstrated that 15 or 20 per cent of the membership are opposed to the union's political policies and about 25 per cent are either apathetic or uncommitted though normally inclined to vote Democratic.[5]

With such disunity in labor's ranks, why all the fuss about labor endorsements? The data supplied by scholarly studies and academic discussions seem to imply that there is little operative political necessity for any elaborate efforts to gain organized labor support except in those areas, such as Detroit, where unionists constitute the bulk of the population and are mobilized through union political organizations. A prevelant belief is that failure to gain labor support is not a major disadvantage to a Democratic candidate in the majority of cases, and that the immediate political power of

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[5]Arthur Kornhauser, Harold L. Sheppard, Albert J. Mayer, When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers, New York University Books (1956); and Harold L. Sheppard and Nicholas A. Masters, "The Political Attitude and Preferences of Union Members: The Case of the Detroit Auto Workers, American Political Science Review (June, 1959).

labor at the polls is fairly limited. Unfortunately, labor's role in presidential and congressional elections has not been properly appraised. Although we have learned a great deal about the political variations within the labor movement and the voting behavior of unionists from recent studies, we have neglected to examine how organized labor functions as a base of support for the Democratic party in national campaigns. The remainder of this paper is devoted to such an examination.

II

Votes, Money, and Organization--The closeness of the 1960 presidential election has again brought home the point to politicians that any stratagem that will affect even the slightest sprinkling of votes may be extremely critical to the final result. The same election also showed the tremendous influence of the large urban areas on electoral vote majorities. In view of the concentration of the most politically active and vigorous unions' membership--unions which support the Democratic party--in the large urban areas within states having the largest electoral votes, AFL-CIO support has come to be regarded as essential for the effect it may have on perhaps only a small portion of the total union membership in these areas. That is, endorsement and active leadership support may persuade a few more unionists and members of their families to vote for endorsed candidates, or simply to vote. Although political scientists have not yet developed precise methods for measuring

the effect of open support and related activity, Campbell, et. al., have hypothesized that when individual members of a group begin to get a clearer perception of the proximity of the group and the world of politics--and presumably aggressive political action programs are more likely to generate clearer perceptions--the susceptibility to group influence in political affairs increases.[6] True, politicians may not use this vocabulary or they may not be able to articulate the point at all, but most of them are aware of the fact that the elaborate political activities of unions have had an impact on the voting decisions of some members. Consequently, candidates for the presidency and for Congress in areas of labor concentration want identification with, and the support of both unions in the area and the AFL-CIO nationally, not because union political actionists control a large bloc of votes, which they can swing one way or another--because they cannot--but rather because they may be able to affect the size of the urban majorities for the Democratic party. This fact alone, despite the political variations within the labor movement, gives the AFL-CIO nationally a much greater voice in the Democratic party and governmental affairs. National labor leaders know they are regarded as necessary,

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[6]Campbell, et. al., op. cit., p. 311.

and they exploit this position to their own best advantage.

It should be pointed out that, however, for organized labor to maintain its political power nationally it must support the Democratic party. Labor's political strength lies in Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, New York, Los Angeles, St. Louis, etc., the cities that produce the large majorities for the Democrats in presidential and state-wide election contests. This means, not only that the Democrats are dependent on the large industrial unions for support, but also that in order to maintain a strong and viable bargaining position in the political arena, the AFL-CIO must remain Democratic. It is extremely doubtful that the AFL-CIO could directly influence the size of the Republican minorities in these areas, and the idea that an independent third party can be formed in the event of dissatisfaction with the Democrats is ridiculous. The present structure of the labor constituency is a relatively recent development which, in part, may account for organized labor's earlier caution in political affairs and its refusal to identify with either party. In the past, particularly before the emergence of the large industrial unions, union membership was not concentrated in the cities, and the cities were not as Democratic as they are today. The United Mine Workers Union twenty years ago, for example, despite considerable political activity, had little influence on elections, because its members were not so strategically located as are the members of the industrial unions today.

It should be noted also that the conservative unions are the ones whose memberships are sprinkled throughout the nation. Thus, in a desire to attain more influence in government, the AFL-CIO has adopted the political positions of its industrial-CIO type unions rather than those followed by the older craft AFL type. AFL-CIO leaders have turned to election activity in addition to lobbying because they know their economic power can be severely curtailed by political actions (Taft-Hartley, Landrum-Griffin, etc.). Labor's influence over votes presumably prevents incumbents from using their power indiscriminately against Labor, or guarantees that incumbents will be favorably disposed toward ~~them~~ labor's goals. This being the source of its political bargaining power, the AFL-CIO's alliance with the Democratic party is firm, though not always openly espoused.

In addition to the influence labor leaders may have on the size of urban majorities, organized labor has gained representation at Democratic national conventions. Approximately one-eighth of the delegates to the 1960 Democratic National Convention were unionists. It comes as no surprise that the majority of the union delegates were from the big industrial states, although there were a few from Southern and Western states. Organized labor, obviously, did not control the convention but ~~their~~ its delegates, coupled with the votes of delegates not directly related to the labor movement but committed to its objectives, gave labor a strong voice in the

choice of candidates, and an even stronger voice in the formulation of platform provisions. The following data illustrate the delegate strength of unions from some of the large industrial states:

1. Michigan--102 delegates, 50 alternates; 34 union officials and 7 industrial workers.
2. Minnesota--62 delegates; 10 union.
3. California--162 delegates; 16 union.

On the Republican side, only ten delegates to the party's national convention were unionists.

Organized labor has been able to extend its influence outside of the areas of labor concentration by offering candidates who are pro-labor a scarce and essential commodity; namely, money. Alexander Heard points out, "the two million dollars, or so, of free funds that 17 million union members gave in 1956, about equalled the reported voluntary contributions of $500 and over made by 742 officials of the nation's 225 largest business concerns." (The two-million figure is equal to only approximately three-tenths of 1 per cent of annual union dues) Candidates for Congress in predominantly rural and non-industrialized areas, e.g., Montana and Idaho, where labor identification does not mean the kiss of death, but where local labor unions are not large enough to be affluent, seek labor endorsements "from the East" in order to obtain AFL-CIO money. In such instances, both labor

and the candidate may have to play down labor support somewhat because the popular image of organized labor is not entirely favorable, and some of the members of a candidate's own party may resent "outside" influence. Of course, the source of money in campaigns is seldom kept quiet, at least for very long, and opposing candidates have not hesitated to use the labor domination theme. The influx of labor money has resulted in situations today where conservative forces are using a traditionally liberal symbol. Conservatives, rather than liberals, since they are now able to finance their own political activities almost entirely out of local and state sources, are the ones who charge the opposition with "domination of the monied interests from the East."

How extensively national labor money is brought into the various states during a campaign can be noted from data on the 1956 presidential election. In that year, national labor money "went to back Democratic Senatorial candidates in 22 of the 33 states from which Senators were elected, the remaining 11 consisting of seven Southern and two Northern one-party states plus Arizona and Kansas." In the same election, "one or more Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives received national labor gifts in every state but six, all of the latter being one-party states, except New Mexico."

That contributions from national labor are more crucial than efforts of local unions in the financing of certain campaigns can be inferred from the fact that in 1956 of $1,024,258 total labor donations to candidates for federal office or to their campaign committees, $831,700 of it came from 17 national labor groups, with only $192,558 coming from 155 state and local labor groups.

Heard breaks the figures down further in tabular form, showing that of the money coming from national labor organizations, by far the largest single amounts were spent on behalf of specific candidates for the House and Senate, with amounts of $335,155 and $326,045 respectively. In addition, $109,000 was donated to political committees on the national level and $61,500 was given to political committees on the local level. The bulk of the money from local and state labor groups $138,893 was spent to aid specific candidates for the House of Representatives. Of the remainder of local labor money, $42,863 was spent to aid specific senatorial candidates, $7,678 went to local political committees and $3,124 was donated to national political committees.

Except for $3,925,which was split among eight Republican candidates for the House of Representatives, all labor money went to Democratic candidates. And, for the years 1952 and 1956 about "one-seventh of the direct expenses of national-level pro-Democratic committees were met with labor money."[7]

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[7]Heard, op. cit., pp. 179-211.

Party professionals seemingly complain more about the lack of party organization and money than anything else. The AFL-CIO has been able to provide for the Democratic Party one thing business interests have been unable to supply for the Republicans; namely, organization. In the 1960 election, the AFL-CIO launched the biggest effort in its history. An account of some of the steps it took in this election serves to illustrate what organized labor offers as a base of support for the Democratic party.

1. Registration Drives. Based on the carefully documented assumption that more people are Democrats than Republicans, COPE, the political arm of the AFL-CIO, assisted by a special committee set up to handle fourteen key states, embarked on an all-out registration drive in each of the fifty states early in 1960. The effort, financed from donations from each AFL-CIO union at the rate of five cents per member, with any deficits to be made up from the general treasury, yielded impressive results. In St. Louis 407 unionists registered 85,077 new voters in one day. In Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania 43,490 new Democrats were registered as compared with 29,724 new Republicans. In co-operation with other groups, labor registered 100,000 new voters in Spanish-speaking sections of California. In addition to manpower, COPE furnished money to help pay for office rent, radio and TV spot announcements, gasoline, baby-sitting, loudspeakers, floats in parades, etc.

2. Distribution of Literature. COPE published and paid for 10 million leaflets on the voting records of congressmen which reported their "right" and "wrong" positions according to AFL-CIO standards with respect to 10 issues. In addition, five million leaflets were distributed that revealed Senator Kennedy voting "right" 91.6 per cent of the time as compared with Vice-President Nixon's 76.6 per cent "wrong" voting record on key labor issues.

3. Get Out the Vote. Employing a variety of tactics ranging from transportation to baby-sitting for voting mothers, large crews of union workers, some of them paid from union funds, attempted to get unionists and members of their families to the polls. COPE, for example, in Senator Kefauver's successful battle for Tennessee's Democratic senatorial nomination made 60,000 telephone calls, mailed 300,000 copies of Kefauver's campaign literature, distributed 160,000 leaflets, and set up a central file containing the names and addresses of 65,000 unionists in the state.

Beyond its organizational efforts in an election year, the AFL-CIO, along with a number of its international unions, conducts political education programs, informs members about the voting records of incumbents, registers voters, etc.

The Liberal Sanction--Endorsement and support from organized labor, or some segments thereof, frequently help a candidate to rally support from other self-designated liberal groups. Organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action,

the National Association for Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties Union and their thousands of local chapters or units usually will not back a candidate whose acceptability to organized labor is highly questionable. Moreover, the National Committee for an Effective Congress seldom supports a candidate with an anti-labor background.

The importance of the liberal sanction, I think, is illustrated by the pre-convention struggle among the Democrats prior to the 1960 election. Opening discussions of the desirability of union neutrality in the 1960 presidential election ended with the realization that in the impending presidential contest, labor neutrality increased the chances of a Republican president. In fact, it was soon realized by some union leaders that even though no formal action could be taken nationally before the Democratic nomination, organized labor had to get into the pre-convention fight to insure the nomination of a liberal candidate. Early in that year, Democrats Kennedy, Symington, and Humphrey were busy lining up labor endorsements not only because labor could affect votes both at the convention and in the election, but also because it helped to pave the avenues toward other liberal endorsements and acceptability. But failure to attract organized labor as a base of support significantly damaged Lyndon Johnson's bid for the Democratic presidential nomination.

For a number of reasons, Johnson was almost totally unacceptable to organized labor, and even after he received the vice-presidential nomination many labor leaders remained decidedly cool. Unacceptability to organized labor made it difficult for Johnson to gain support from other liberal groups, and without it he was virtually cut off from the large body of delegates representing the Northeastern industrialized areas. The extent of labor opposition to Johnson was aptly expressed by The Economist.

> ....It is doubtful whether the unions could swallow the gnat of Senator Johnson's nomination, even if this refusal subsequently obliged them to digest the camel of Mr. Nixon's Presidency.

Johnson was distrusted by labor primarily because he was trusted by Southern Democrats. It was felt, particularly by the UAW in Michigan, that Johnson, despite his New Deal background, had too many commitments to Southern legislators and the oil interests of his native state of Texas to use the power of the presidency to protect and promote the interests of labor. There is little doubt that labor support might have gained Johnson the nomination. As Talcott Parsons states, support is a significant "imput"factor in campaigns which functions so that the acts and statements of the endorsee will be accepted and understood by the public. Such support serves to prevent distrust or lack of confidence in the candidate by those sympathetic to or appreciative of a group's views, and who judge a candidate as to whether he can speak authoritatively

in approval of programs advocated by a particular group. Johnson, despite his record could not speak authoritatively in support of labor goals before liberal groups committed to labor's programs.

I do not intend to imply, however, that organized labor support guarantees that other groups will be similarly inclined. A candidate for the presidential nomination with labor support simply has a better chance than others. And, of course, labor itself is strongly influenced by the acceptability of a candidate to other groups, liberal and conservative alike. In the 1960 pre-convention period, for example, the sentimental favorite of organized labor was Senator Hubert Humphrey. But Humphrey could not convince labor and other liberal groups that he was a winner, and principles alone were not a sufficient ground for support. A long, hard look at the results of the Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries indicated to labor leaders that support for Humphrey would be futile. Today, labor recognizes that its support inevitably involves burdens and obligations that may cause other segments of society to react adversely, or with total disapproval. Thus, an effort is made to generalize its support, endorsing candidates who have broad, across the board approval, and recognizing that they must appeal to other groups. Labor leaders felt that the Humphrey appeal in an election would be confined to what may be loosely termed the organized labor--northern liberal bloc, a combination not powerful enough to capture the nation.

A Symington candidacy, on the other hand, was considered by many labor leaders to be desirable because he had avoided being labeled an extremist, and his background made him acceptable to management groups. (Perhaps, the explanation is that he did not talk as much and as often as Hubert did.) Symington's efforts certainly did not ignore labor. Early in the pre-convention campaign, Symington received the endorsements of James Carey, President of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers and George M. Harrison, President of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks. Unquestionably these endorsements made Symington's bid for the nomination more acceptable to other liberal groups, as evidenced by their desire later for him to receive the Vice-Presidential nomination, but they did not result in widespread support. "Models for industry" was the slogan attached by Carey and Harrison to contracts negotiated by Symington while President of Emerson Electric.

But the Kennedy bandwagon rolled on, not to be upset by a few endorsements for other candidates from within the labor movement. In fact, significant forces within organized labor, assessing the potentialities of not only those who might be acceptable to labor ideologically, but also looking for a sure winner, attached themselves to Kennedy even though his equivocal stand on McCarthyism and his failure to fight for civil rights legislation dampened their enthusiasm. The UAW, USW, and the Textile Workers endorsed Kennedy early, and devoted their

pre-convention efforts to insuring his nomination.

In Michigan strong UAW backing was instrumental in convincing party professionals and leaders of liberal groups that Kennedy should receive the state's delegate votes at the convention. Leaders of Negro groups, in particular, who were at first very cool toward Kennedy, were persuaded by union officials to support his candidacy. In effect these unions and other groups were playing the percentages, fearful of being left out should the Kennedy forces win. With this much pre-convention support, particularly from two of the largest and most politically active unions within AFL-CIO, it was a foregone conclusion that AFL-CIO would give its endorsement in the post convention meeting of its general board. A few unions still refused to go along (the Carpenters, the Machinists, and, of course, the Teamsters), but the base of support was there. The industrial unions, whose memberships were strategically located in the big cities were prepared to put on an all-out effort for Kennedy's election.

Propaganda Advantage--A significant part of the success of any candidate is to gain and hold the attention of the attentive public, to make sure that informed people are aware of his candidacy and his position on the various issues in the campaign. The difficulty involved in becoming known is not commonly appreciated. Money is a crucial variable and labor supplies some of the funds necessary for purchasing TV time, radio programs or announcements, newspaper ads, etc. Articles about

candidates and their backgrounds in labor publications--and there are hundreds of them--which reach and are read by intermediate level union leaders help to provide a flow of information to the rank and file membership. Invitations to candidates to speak before union meetings, thereby furnishing them with captive audiences,also contribute to the significance of labor as a base of support for candidates for public office. Perhaps of greatest significance, however, is that a candidate can cut into the network of interrelationships among community elites through labor leaders. AFL-CIO leaders, through overlapping memberships, help to do this for presidential candidates, Labor leaders within particular internationals, or who are part of the state and local AFL-CIO bureaucracy, help candidates of other offices. Today labor leaders participate extensively in a variety of civic, fraternal, and political groups in their communities, and are included in all sorts of academic, governmental, and business conferences where they interact with the leaders of other groups. Labor leaders acting in these arenas where their opinions are respected can and do advocate candidates for office.

III

In assessing labor as a base of support it is necessary to look into its limitations.

<u>"Excessive" Liberalism</u>--The political education programs initiated and conducted by the various political arms of the labor

movement have borne fruit, but the fruit is often unsophisticated and the efforts have frequently promoted a rigid, closed minded adherence to pat liberal solutions for complex issues. The programs of necessity have been sloganeering and superficial, and the propaganda has insisted on an uncompromising liberal, pro-labor commitment. This commitment has frequently made it difficult for Democratic candidates to maintain full labor support and at the same time adjust their positions to existing political realities. Intermediate and lower-level union leaders have in a great many cases shown a reluctance to support, or refuse to support vigorously, candidates who do not buy in total the "Labor" position on economic and social issues. In the eyes of some veteran observers, "the screaming liberal line" found in the education programs has made it difficult for labor's top echelon, when they desire to take a more practical position, to sell their members on candidates who do not meet all the issues head-on. Moreover, the tough ideological line in some instances has even forced the leadership to narrow its perspective in order to keep faith with the local and intermediate level of the union bureaucracy.

Rigid adherence to the anachronisms of the New Deal ideology has often left labor with no place to go in campaigns and has, in some cases, severly handicapped its efforts to promote the passage of legislation it favors. On the whole, labor, especially the national headquarters of the AFL-CIO, is moving

away from dogmatism and is attempting to offer more generalized support, but seemingly at a less accelerated pace than some other liberal groups. Kennedy's candidacy, for example, raised serious doubts in the eyes of those union leaders who supported him most strongly, specifically because of his record on the two issues mentioned previously, and more generally because he demonstrated few ideological commitments.

Decline of the Industrial Unions?--Labor leaders have begun to express grave concern about the future. For some time they have been talking about the threats of technological unemployment both to the union movement and the national economy. In a few states unions have proposed the creation of some kind of state commission to control the effects of automation. Today, technological unemployment is no longer merely a threat to unions, it is a reality with which they must cope. Membership has begun to drop off significantly in some unions, especially the UAW's and USW's. For the first time, union leaders are accepting the idea that they do not have a self-perpetuating future. Until very recently, labor leaders, somewhat analogous to our early pioneers who thought there were endless forests, looked at all the unorganized workers and felt that they could always maintain their relative power in society through periodic expansion.

But now they can see that before very long their political and economic power will begin to decline unless something happens to alter the picture. Most labor officials are of the opinion that their power is at its apogee at present and is about to turn down. The lifting of the recent recession without substantial change in unemployment figures shows the speed with which the new automation and technological revolution is progressing. Although I cannot document this, there seem to be fewer jobs today than five years ago that are potentially unionizable.

What does this mean politically? In the first place, the big industrial unions have been hit the hardest by automation. And as mentioned earlier, these are the unions that are the most active politically, that contribute most of the money and organization in national campaigns, and that have their membership most strategically located in terms of affecting the outcome of presidential elections. If the resources and membership of these unions begin to dwindle, the significance of labor as a base of support for the Democratic party will dwindle. It is, of course, plausible that union leaders will turn more to pressure group politics and away from party and campaign politics nationally to delay uncontrolled change and to compensate for the economic power slipping from their grasp. Walter Reuther's increasing concern about the outcome of decision affecting agriculture is, in part, explained by a desire to forge stronger alliances with other economic groups, in this case the Farmers

Union, to offset labor's declining political power. But the road ahead for the AFL-CIO looks rough; it may have fewer votes to play with, less money, and a weaker organization.

The Popular Image--It is not difficult to substantiate the point that organized labor still conveys a poor image. The publicity engendered largely by investigations conducted by Senator McClellan's Committee has hurt American trade unions to a point where the AFL-CIO has felt the need to institute a $1.2 million public relations program.[8] Such adverse publicity has served to confirm in the minds of many the negative stereotype they have of trade unions in general and union leadership in particular.

The image labor conveys, of course, limits and affects its political role. As previously mentioned, in some areas labor endorsement carries the kiss of death, and even in Michigan where organized labor is recognized and accepted as an integral part of the Democratic party, elaborate efforts are made by party professionals to make certain that the public does not think the party is dominated and controlled by the UAW. More widespread participation of labor leaders in community affairs has helped to change the image, but many people in rural and non-industrialized areas still view unions with suspicion and massive distrust and refuse to support candidates prominently identified with them.

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[8]Gerald Pomper, "The Public Relations of Organized Labor" The Public Opinion Quarterly (Winter 1959-60), pp. 483-494.

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TRADE UNIONS IN POLITICS WITHIN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, WITH EMPHASIS UPON AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND*

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The development of strong trade union movements is often thought to occur mainly in countries which have significantly industrialized.[1] Yet unionization has also been effective in such predominantly agrarian economies as existed in New Zealand and Australia during the first part of the Twentieth Century.[2] The major concerns of this paper are to observe the operation of trade unions in the Australian and New Zealand political scenes, and to establish, if possible, a frame of reference for the comparison of such movements within the British Commonwealth and other countries.[3] The significance of trade unions in the interest group structure will be mentioned in a brief discussion of the general social, economic and political conditions in each commonwealth country. The political activity of unions in Australia and New Zealand will be analyzed in terms of their contacts with the public, parties, legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies. In addition, the role of the unions will be observed in the judicial system.[4] Throughout the discussion comparisons will be made of trade union experiences in Australasia and in the other "older Commonwealths" (this term refers to the countries which were members of the Commonwealth before World War II and will include South Africa until its withdrawal in 1961). Some preliminary observations will also be made about the political importance of unions in the new Asian-African commonwealth countries.

Interest Groups in the Society and the Government

Brief comments on certain aspects of Australian and New Zealand social development will provide some background for the assessment of the political significance of unions in these countries. At the present time Australia has felt the effects of more heterogeneous factors upon its population, economy, and governmental system than has New Zealand. A predominant part of the population of each country is of British origin. Australia, unlike New Zealand, has a large minority population of Irish Catholics,[5] and has many new immigrants from Britain, and such European countries as Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, and Germany, a number of whom were assisted by the government.[6] The New Zealand government has also encouraged immigration from Great Britain and, in smaller numbers, from such European countries as the Netherlands and Germany.[7] Economically both Australia and New Zealand were mainly agrarian until well before the Second World War.[8] Australia, with numerous resources, has been developing its industries extensively. New Zealand, with much more limited resources, only in 1958 began a comprehensive program for the development of secondary industries. Politically, at the present time in Australia problems of federal-state relations penetrate much of the governmental process. On the other hand, in New Zealand all governmental authority is today placed in the hands of the national government. The institutional structure of the respective governments

was mainly inherited from the British parliamentary system, with some similarities to the American federal system being seen in the Australian experience.[9] Since 1949 in the Australian Commonwealth and in some States the governments have come from a coalition of the Liberal-Country Parties, while in New Zealand the government has been recently chosen from one of the two major parties in the one-body legislature. The parties in both Australia and New Zealand have strong parliamentary groups, and have control over their members. For a time the recent split in the Australian Labor Party presented an exception to such control. In both countries the bureaucracy is considered to be non-partisan and to be made up of career personnel. The court system in Australia has both federal and state bodies, while in New Zealand the courts are included in a less complex, single system. In both countries provisions have been made, with the development of the arbitration and conciliation machinery, for arbitration courts as a part of the judicial systems.

Through use of these governmental institutions have developed the policies of the government which often have reflected the major interests of special groups within the countries. From the late nineteenth century in Australia and New Zealand the interest of the farmer and of labor were reflected, from time to time, in the programs of the political parties and the government.[10] Today we find the most powerful interest groups in the Australian Commonwealth to be the manufacturing and business interests, while in New Zealand these groups along with the farm interests enjoy primary place. It should be noted in addition that brewery and hotel interests maintain some influence over certain areas of governmental activity. Labor in both countries has from time to time been placed in a dominant position when the labor parties were in control of the government. Yet these labor governments have also taken into account the interests of business and the farmers before many decisions were made. Commercial and banking groups hold an important place in the Australian and the New Zealand political scenes. Other interest groups have been organized, and have sometimes been effective on specific areas of policy. Such groups include veterans organizations, professional associations, cultural and scientific associations, and religious-ethnic and regional groups.[11] The latter two groups have been more politically effective in Australia than in New Zealand. Recent representatives of the religious and regional groups in Australia include the Catholic Social Movement and the "groupers" in the trade union movement, both of which were instrumental in bringing about a split in the Labor Party not only in the federal body, but also in state organizations.[12]

In the other older commonwealth countries we also find many aspects of the British parliamentary system in operation. However, both in Canada and South Africa a greater cleavage has developed between ethnic groups than has been demonstrated in Australia since 1945. No such organized cleavage is apparent in New Zealand at this time. Canada with an operative federal system of government has not only the problems of provincial-national relations, but also the historic problem of French-British relationships. South Africa has experienced more serious ethnic conflicts in its multi-racial problems between Afrikaners and English, between the Europeans and non-Europeans, and between the Coloured, the Natives, and the Indians. Thus, many if not most, governmental problems in Canada and South Africa are clouded more by these ethnic-racial rivalries than by simple occupational-functional interests. The ethnic-racial elements frequently

are not as well organized into formal interest groups as are the occupation and functional interests in each country. Outside these ethnic relations there come the powerful and more defined business and commercial interests, including banks and employers' organizations in Canada and the Chamber of Mines in South Africa. Farm interests, which are best organized in the Canadian middle west and among the Afrikaner in South Africa, also have exerted some important influence in both countries. Yet trade unionization has not developed along the same lines as in the Australian-New Zealand movements. In Canada both the American union attitudes including support of no one political party and British ideas including support of a party for labor have appeared and influenced the labor movement. In South Africa, even though the Europeans had formed unions patterned after the British examples during the early 1900's, these organizations did not include the majority of labor --the African native forces. The unions supported the now defunct Labour Party, especially in the twenties when the party with a policy of protecting white labor was able to participate in a coalition government. However, today unionism is faced with some of the same problems that the rise of nationalism has brought to Asia and in particular to other areas of Africa.[13]

In the new commonwealth countries of Asia --India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the Malayan Federation, and of Africa-- Ghana and Nigeria, some patterns of British political institutions have been adopted. Federal elements have been included in the constitutions of India, Malaya, Pakistan (now under martial law), and Nigeria, while unitary governments have been established in Ceylon and Ghana. The problems of combining older cultures and methods of government with the British system, and of reconciling the diversities in ethnic groupings are major concerns in the governmental policies of these countries. With the increase of urban populations and the development of industry, labor has been organizing. However, labor does not have as powerful groupings in any of these countries as it did in New Zealand or Australia during the early parts of the twentieth century when they were chiefly agrarian economies, or as labor does in Canada, a developing industrial nation. In the new Commonwealths, business and commercial interests in many instances do enjoy a powerful position.[14] With increased governmental activity in the economy, these groups probably will not continue to enjoy such an influential place. With further developments in industry and in unionization, labor may still become a very important interest group within these new commonwealth countries.

Comparisons of the Australian and New Zealand Trade Unions and Their Political Activity

Trade unionism in Australia and New Zealand has developed from the organization of individual craft unions and industrial unions to the rather successful formation of federal or national groups.[15] Today with the continually increasing powers of the federations, it is possible to describe the labor movements mainly through the activities of these national bodies.

Organization and Objectives

The Australian labor force is not as unified through one national organization as is the New Zealand force. In New Zealand three-quarters of the

industrial union membership (total force 850,500; wage earners, 609,000; industrial union membership, 324,400) belongs to unions which are affiliated with the Federation of Labour (NZFL). About 50% of the wage earners are in industrial unions.[16] On the other hand, almost 60% of Australia's around 3 million wage earners (total labor force is 4 million) belong to unions and specific functional and industrial federations, a large proportion of which are affiliated with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU).[17] About 5% of the wage earners belong to the Australian Workers Union (AWU) which is not affiliated with the ACTU. The AWU in 1959 considered affiliation with the ACTU, but decided instead to help create an Australian federation of unions which would be "free of communistic influence."[18] Other Australian organizational arrangements range from individual company unions to district and state organizations of crafts or industrial unions, and to federations for specific skills and industries.

The present organizations of the ACTU and the NZFL are similar, since both are federations. In Australia the individual trade unionist is a member of a union which can be affiliated with both an urban Labor Council and a district division of an occupational or industrial federation. The Labour Councils usually are affiliated with the state organization of the Labour Councils which handles state affairs, and with the ACTU which handles federal affairs. In addition, the district division of the occupational federation may have state and federal offices. Thus the individual member may be a part of the ACTU through one or two groups. Both the unions which are allotted conference delegates, and the State Labour Councils choose the delegates to the ACTU biennial conferences. In like manner, the New Zealand trade union may belong to a branch of the labour council and to a trades or craft union federation, both of which are affiliated to the NZFL. The NZFL holds annual conventions. Because of the organizational structure in each country, the trade union leadership does overlap from one group to the other within the union movement as well as within the labor parties.[19]

In both Australia and New Zealand there have been some unions that have remained outside these major groupings. Examples of such unions in both countries have included the waterfront workers. After the 1951 strike in New Zealand there were several unions on the water front, including the older union which had combined all waterfront unions in the country and which was not then recognized by the government or the NZFL, and the newly created unions in each city which negotiated with the government. In 1955 the older union in Wellington combined with the new one. Unions not in the ACTU, besides some waterfront unions at times (the Waterfront Workers are now affiliated to the ACTU), have included such state and amalgamated unions as the Furnishing Trades Society of New South Wales, the Metal Trades Federation, and the Electrical Trade Union.[20]

The effect of governmental regulations on conditions affecting labor should not be overlooked in the description of the unions in these countries. Not only have there been laws to permit organization, but also there have been laws which had the effect of promoting unionization. Conciliation and Arbitration laws were first passed in New Zealand and in some Australian states during the nineties, and in the Commonwealth in 1904. Compulsory arbitration was legislated first in Australia by New South Wales in 1901, and was incorporated in the 1904 Commonwealth Act. It was not until 1936 that such legislation was provided in

New Zealand. The New Zealand laws have had the effect of compulsory unionization, while the Australian unions are still discussing this possibility. The laws in New Zealand also specify the necessary structure for registered industrial unions.[21]

The Australian and New Zealand trade union movements have focused attention traditionally upon three major areas —industrial conditions, social and economic conditions, and political activities. The individual unions have been usually concerned with improving working conditions and providing services to their members, while the federations have tended to be more involved in national policies dealing with trade union organization, industrial relations and general social and economic conditions. However, neither group has devoted itself exclusively to such interests. Much discussion has appeared in recent writings about union objectives and goals in Australia.[22] There is general agreement that the unions in Australia are concerned with working conditions and services[22a] while the ACTU works on national policies[22b] and relations with the political parties. In the constitution of the ACTU it is stated that the Council should also have responsibility for controlling its affiliates. However, the ACTU has never fully exercised this power. On the other hand, the constitution of the NZFL does not provide explicitly for such control, but it does give the Federation power to carry out decisions of the conferences and reserves to the district councils powers over their local affairs. From the activities of the Federation it would seem that the New Zealand body has exercised more control over its affiliates than has the Australian Council. Yet, today the ACTU has begun to realize, as the NZFL is also realizing, its objective of central control over industrial disputes by increasingly representing affiliates in arbitration cases before the courts. Both constitutions provide for the federations to give educational and publicity assistance to their members. Because of the small staff maintained by the ACTU, it has not been able to perform this function as well as the NZFL with its slightly larger staff.[23]

During the middle 1800's the trade union movements in the Australasian colonies were concerned mainly with the industrial conditions of their members. As the movements received more recognition through legislation providing for organization and better working conditions, the unions began to consider the formation of federations and the taking of political action by labor. At the turn of the twentieth century Trades and Labour Councils in both Australia (through the Australian Labour Federation) and New Zealand made attempts to form political parties to represent labor interest in parliament. However, other Australian unionists, who were familiar with the American Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), urged the One Big Union (OBU) concept which mainly emphasized class struggle, direct action, and industrial unity, and mentioned ultimate worker control over parliament (hereafter such ideas will be referred to as radical or militant). Members of the New Zealand movement learned about militant action and the OBU movement in large part from Australian immigrants. During the pre-World War I years and immediately after, sections of the labor movements in both countries attempted to start such movements. In New Zealand the "Red" Federation of Labor (1907) incorporated some militant socialist ideas, while the Alliance of Labour from 1921 attempted to build on the OBU concept. The latter concepts had a much greater impact on the Australian movement during the early 1920's than they did on New Zealand labor. One of the bases for the

All-Australasian Trade Union Conferences (Congresses) in the twenties was the OBU concept. It was from such a conference in 1927 that the ACTU was formed. However, the Council has not in practice supported this concept.

The radical industrial groups gave some support to the political parties which were being formed to support labor. A socialization objective was only tolerated by most New Zealand labor in 1916 when it was accepted by the newly formed Labour Party, and was adopted finally in 1921 by the Australian Labor Party. In New Zealand the Trades and Labour Councils were reluctant to have such an objective, while the "Red" Federation supported it. In Australia some Labour Councils hesitated, while the OBU movement helped to smooth the way for the objective.[24] In fact, the Australian Workers Union (AWU), even though opposed to the OBU, had been inspired during the 1890's to accept as part of its aim a form of socialism --the cooperative system. It was the first large Australian union to recommend social and political action.[25] Today the Federations in both countries have modified their original socialist objectives either through practice as with the ACTU, or through constitutional changes as with the NZFL. The AWU has also become in practice a more conservative force in the labor movement and has demonstrated anti-communist sympathies.[26]

With the affiliation of unions and federations to the parties and with the formation of labor governments (both national and state in Australia and national in New Zealand), the ACTU, AWU, and NZFL have become more concerned with general social and economic legislation.[27] However, some industrial actions have continued. Strike actions in Australasia during the thirties were frequently inspired by communist action, and in the period after 1945 especially in Australia were supported mainly by groups which had some connection with the Communist Party through communist members in the leadership.[28] For example, the Australian waterside unions which struck in 1950 had some communists among their leaders. This strike, it has been said, was exported to New Zealand in 1951. The Australian Engineering Union has taken an independent course which has led to a rebuke from the ACTU.[28] Another waterside strike took place in Australia in 1955 and 1956. Less favorable labor decisions which have been handed down in the past few years by the conciliation and arbitration machinery have contributed to the causes for recent strikes in Australia.[29]

For the realization of industrial and political policies the unions in Australasia have turned increasingly to their state and federal organizations. While the unions have supported some strike action throughout their history, they have more and more participated in the activities of the labor parties and negotiations with the governments.

Relations with the General Public

Usually the first step in determining the political significance of an interest group is to observe the group's relation to the public. Because the organized working force makes up a large part of the population in both countries, it is difficult to determine the point at which the workers' interests supported by the unions can be separated from the interests of the general public. Union contacts with the public are made by the union organizations as well as through the political parties to which they are affiliated. In Australia the AWU and

some of the occupational federations, such as the Australian Railway Union, the Miners' Federation, and the Ironworkers' Union, have their own newspapers. However, these are usually circulated to members only. The New Zealand labor paper, The Standard, was discontinued during the last part of 1959 because of financial problems. During recent years no daily newspaper with a labor editorial policy has been available to the general public in either country.[30] Generally a more favorable attitude on the part of the public exists towards labor in both countries than there is found in the United States. The reason is probably because of the acceptable place which labor occupies in the political arena, the achievements of the labor governments, and the results of long-time union regulation by the governments.

Contacts with Political Parties

Trade unions in Australasia occupy a very influential place in the party systems, especially since in each country the unions have supported mainly one political party throughout most of the century. In both countries socialists and trade unionists made several attempts from 1890 to 1920 to form labor parties. Within a number of the Australian colonies a Labour Party, supported mainly by the Australian Labour Federation and the Trades and Labour Councils, had been successfully formed and had held intercolonial meetings before federation. These parties intended to work mainly for parliamentary representation of labor. The New Zealand Trades and Labour Councils were not as successful with their attempts to form labor parties. It was only after the attempt in 1913 to unify the new radical-militant labor groups with other trade unions, and after the Social Democratic Party (SDP) began to decline, that labor succeeded in revising the SDP to form the less radical Labour Party.[31] The trade unions in each country tended to support the labor parties after their establishment. Some sections of the union movements have occasionally questioned the views of the labor parties or have urged the support of any party which has taken a favorable labor stand. The radical and militant movements of the 1920's in both countries tended to ignore political activity.[32] Even sections of union federations in Australia which are affiliated with the Labor Party have given some second thoughts to the sole support of one party. Because of both unrest on account of some governmental actions restricting labor, and the more favorable view of some union members towards the Communist Party, both the ACTU and the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council passed, in 1942, resolutions supporting cooperation between all working-class parties.[33]

Today in both countries the majority of labor party membership and affiliations comes from trade unions. Constitutionally the controlling policy body of each party is the Conference. Yet the executive councils and parliamentary leaders usually direct and control decisions of the parties. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) is a much more closed organization group than is the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP). The ALP conference, held triennially until 1951 and biennially thereafter, is limited to six delegates from each of the six State ALP branches and is held in closed session.[34] On the other hand, the NZLP conferences resemble the British Labour Party practices to a greater extent, because they are held annually in large sessions, and delegates are selected from branches, affiliates, and Labor Representation Councils (LRCs).[35] The LRCs are formed in each election district from delegates selected from branches and affiliates.[35] It should be noted that the largest Australian trade union federations, the ACTU and AWU, are

affiliated with the ALP, while the NZFL is not so attached to the NZLP. Thus in New Zealand individual trade unions join the LRCs, and unions or their federations affiliate with the party. In 1950 the National Government passed a measure requiring a vote of a majority within a union to allow funds to be given as affiliation fees to a party.[36] Despite the lack of official ties between the NZFL and the NZLP, a large part of the party's leadership is taken from prominent union members who are also likely to play a significant part in the NZFL. Some dissension has occurred occasionally within the ranks of the NZLP, but on the whole a strongly supported party by the trade unions has resulted.[37] Joint consultation machinery between the executives of the parties and the federations has been established in Australia from 1939 to 1951 and in New Zealand from 1953 to the present.[38]

In the Australian Party the influence of the trade union leadership can be readily seen through a review of the major schisms within the party which have occurred at least each decade of its life.[39] The major dissent of the 1950's had already begun in the forties, and arose from the support by a part of the party for an anti-communist movement to rid the unions of communist leadership and to modify the party's "extreme socialist ideas". The demands by the movement resulted in the unusual party action of attempting to influence the internal affairs of some unions. The party gave support to the establishment of groups which were to take over offices within the state and local branches. At the 1951 ALP conference a resolution was adopted to repudiate the Communist Party. The climax of this movement came when rival state delegations, which opposed H. V. Evatt as too radical a leader, appeared at the 1955 Conference. That year part of the federal party left the ALP to form the Anti-Communist Party in Parliament and in New South Wales. By 1957 these factions formed the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) to contest the federal election. A split also occurred in the ALP (Queensland Branch) during 1957, and the new Queensland Labour Party then joined with the DLP. As a result the ALP has not been able to recapture the federal government, nor to maintain either a threatening opposition in Victoria or the Labor Government in Queensland.[40]

The continued important place of the trade unions in the organization and the policy formation of the labor parties can be seen in a review of the parties' objectives.[41] The major union attitude --interest in workers' affairs without concern for an overall purpose for society, is reflected in the first objective of the Australian Labor Party, and in the later modification by both the ALP and the NZLP of the socialisation objectives earlier urged by the radical-militant unionists and the socialists.

The first objective of the Commonwealth Party, adopted in 1905, urged the cultivation of an Australian sentiment based on racial purity and the collective ownership of monopolies. The principle of a white Australia was retained until 1959 in either the "Fighting Platform" or the "Methods".[42] In the 1920's the principle of maintaining a self-governing Commonwealth was adopted. A socialisation objective was added in 1921, and was immediately limited by the section on "Methods" and by a very moderate resolution known as the Blackburn Interpretation. Thus from 1921 to 1951 socialisation, limited by the "Methods", remained as the ALP's written objective. During the 1950's almost every conference of the ALP reconsidered and changed the objective. Thus today the objective of the ALP, as qualified in 1957, is:

> The Democratic Socialisation of Industry, Production, Distribution and Exchange --to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in those fields-- in accordance with the Principles of Action, Methods and Progressive Reforms set out in this Platform.[42]

The DLP, which now represents a small section of labor, has not accepted a socialist objective, but has urged social action for the benefit of society and labor.[43] Its election policies in 1958 were very similar to the ALP's, except for the concentrated attack upon the ALP and its alleged communistic sympathies. In November 1960, after Evatt had resigned as leader of the ALP to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in New South Wales and A. A. Calwell was selected leader, the members of the DLP parliamentary group stated willingness to join with the ALP on the conditions that a clear statement against communism be made, and that the ALP industrial groups be reinstated.[44]

Even though there have been a few internal power struggles, the NZLP has not suffered great schisms or ethnic cleavages.[45] Through the influence of the traditional union attitude, it gradually withdrew from its socialisation objective until 1951 when socialisation was dropped altogether. Today the very moderate "Purpose" and "Objective" of the NZLP read:

2.-Purpose

> The purpose of the Party is to educate the public in the principles of Co-operation and Socialism; to elect competent men and women to Parliament and Local Authorities; and to ensure the just distribution of the production and services of New Zealand.

3.-Objective

> The objective of the Party is to promote and protect the freedom of the people and their political, social, economic and cultural welfare.[46]

All of the Leaders of the Party from 1916 to the 1940's --notably Holland, Savage, and Fraser-- had been active at some time in union affairs, while the present Leader, Walter Nash, was a book dealer before entering Party affairs in the 1920's. Nash interprets socialism as the social use of resources.[47] Until 1960 the President of the Party was from the trade union movement; in that year A. M. Finlay, a member of the former Fabian Society, became President. Trade unionists have held and still hold other positions within the party.[48]

In both countries the position of the major labor parties towards the socialisation was certainly modified by their formation of several labor governments during this century. Hence, when considered, the overall objective of socialisation received secondary attention to quests for solutions to immediate social and economic problems. Even when the parties were in the opposition, the trade union movements, more noticeably in New Zealand than in Australia, subdued the emphasis on socialism and directed attention to industrial and workers' problems. During Evatt's leadership of the ALP more discussion seemed to be given to socialism

within the ALP than was given to this concept by the NZLP during the same period. Despite such discussions, the limitation and modification of the socialisation objective reflect the general ALP attitude and the views of the party leaders.

The trade union movement has not been ignored by other parties, although it has continued mainly to support a labor party. In Australia today the Liberal Party, which was formed as an opposition to Labor in 1944, does not cater to any one interest group exclusively. Thus, it has been able to include in its programs some appeals to sections of labor by its emphases upon its program for increasing work opportunities, for promoting industrial peace and social services, and its discussion of the ALP and communistic sympathies.[49] The Australian Country Party, which has support from a major interest group, the farmers, has been in coalition with the Liberals. In its objectives the Country Party mentions goals of full utilisation and conservation of natural resources, and the support of "the maximum of reproductive employment", of high living standards, national health and social services.[50] The Communist Party continues to make appeals to labor, yet it has no official support from trade union federations, the ACTU and AWU, and from the ALP. It receives insignificant support from unionists and the voters in elections. Most organized trade union support still goes to the ALP; and is slightly split in Victoria, Queensland, and Western Australia with the DLP which received almost 10% of the total federal votes for the House in 1958.[51]

Appeals to labor from the existing non-labor parties in New Zealand, as well as from some previous parties, are seen in their programs. Before labor was able to form an effective party of its own in New Zealand, the Liberal-Labour Party of 1891-1906 catered to labor demands as well as to the small farmer's needs. Because of its program and government activity, the formation of a labor party was probably delayed for some years. The National Party today has a program which has accepted some of the basic governmental approaches of the previous 1935-1949 Labour Government. The National Party formed a government between 1949 and 1957 and won the November 1960 election. Partly because the NZLP was more unified during the 1950's than was the ALP, the New Zealand party was able to form another government between 1957 and 1960. The official trade union movement has continued to support the Labour Party, yet in 1960 some individual union members certainly either cast their vote for some other party or stayed away from the polls. The latter may have been the case, because the percentage of people voting declined in 1960 as compared to previous elections. The Social Credit Party which first ran in 1954, has only been able to collect about 10% of the votes, while the Communist vote has been very slight.[52]

In both Australia and New Zealand trade unions have not only tended to support the labor parties, but they have also exercised a very significant influence upon the activities of these parties through large contributions both to membership and leadership, and to the substance of party programs and policies. Although some unions have at times shown discontent with certain party actions, and while other political parties have appealed to the rank-and-file unionists, the unions have by and large continued with major support of the labor parties.

Relations with the Legislatures, Executives, Bureaucracies, and Courts

In Australasia unions have also developed contacts with each branch of the government. These contacts differ from the type made by American unions in that

the Australasian unions have a political voice in one party and operate within a parliamentary rather than a presidential system.

Parliament:

In the parliament of both Australia and New Zealand since the 1890's there have been some members who have mainly represented labor interests. Effective labor party organizations had been created in the Australian parliaments early in the century. Labor governments began to appear in some Colonies such as New South Wales and Victoria in the early 1890's, and in the Commonwealth in 1910. In New Zealand the Labour Party, being formed later than some Australian parties, only became an opposition party in 1926. The most active political support for union interests in Australia and New Zealand has come from these labor parties. However, labor and union interests have been supported or had to be considered by other parties in the legislatures when they were in control of the government. The governmental program of the New Zealand Liberal-Labour Party, already mentioned, is the best example of a non-labor party supporting labor interests, yet this party arrived on the scene before the NZLP was formed. The non-labor parliaments and governments of the 1950's in both Australia and New Zealand have had to deal with governmental programs including labor affairs.[53] Because of the effective caucus organizations in the parliaments for all parties, the programs of the parties and of the governments are usually supported by each party's parliamentary membership.

A large number of manual workers and trade union officials have been elected to the Australian parliaments and to the New Zealand Assembly. However, the numbers have been slightly decreasing in the Australian Federal House of Representatives compared with the first parliaments of this century.[54] The usually strong influence of the New Zealand unions, especially through the NZFL,[55] helps to maintain a constant awareness of union problems within the Parliamentary Labour Party. Mention has already been made of the number of former unionists among the NZLP leadership. They also have become leaders in the parliamentary parties. In Australia a number of unionists, for example the present leader Calwell, can also be found among the top leadership of both the party and the parliamentary group. Certainly union interests in both countries are well maintained in the parliamentary bodies through leaders and other party members of union persuasion.

Executives and Bureaucracies:

For almost a century in Australia and New Zealand Prime Ministers and Cabinets have proposed labor legislation, and administrations have handled laws affecting working conditions, wages and hours. However, these executive and administrative duties did not become very important until the turn of this century.[56] After the establishment of the labor parties, the unions have normally supported these parties in elections and in their parliamentary programs. Yet when the Parties have formed governments, there has been a tendency on the part of unions, especially after the Second World War, to pay specific attention to industrial affairs, and if they thought it advisable to strike, oftentimes in spite of the Government's pronounced policies against strike action.[57] However, the NZFL in 1951 did support the Labour Party in taking no steps favoring the strike actions of the waterfront union. According to the "Parliamentary Report" to the 1960 Labour Party Conference, moreover, there had been excellent relations between the industrial section including the NZFL, and the Ministers and Parliament. However,

during the 1958-1960 period Walsh and the NZFL did criticize some Labor Government's actions.[58a] Even though the ACTU and the AWU were dissatisfied with the Labor Government towards the end of the war, these federations supported much of the Government's program through 1949.[58b]

Previous union members can certainly be found among the labor ministers of all labor governments in both countries. In New Zealand half of the 1935-1949 ministry was drawn from industrial workers. The occupations of the various Australian ministries would certainly include a large number of industrial and union workers.[59] No matter what the occupation of the ministers might be, unions have not hesitated to send delegations to ministers when matters of labor concern arose.

Both the ACTU and the NZFL have developed good working relationships with the Ministers of Labour from non-labor parties. In 1956 it was noted that the Deputy Leader of the Australian Liberal Party and the Minister of Labour had an effective working relationship with the President of the ACTU. Thus amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Acts and the Stevedore Acts had resulted. In New Zealand the National Party's Minister of Labour in the previous and recently elected governments has been able to work with the Federation of Labour. In 1951 the Federation supported the governmental de-registration of the waterside workers' union. Also in that year, because of Federation protests, the Government seemed to change its policy on the amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act. In 1947 the Labour Government had passed such legislation over the protest of the Federation. However, the NZFL has not been able to block action on some other recent National policies. Mr. Shand, the National Party's Minister of Labour, was consulted in December 1960 about policies on some labor problems. Even though the president of the NZFL has been deploring some of the National Government's economic policies, some agreement on National labor action will probably be worked out with the Federation. However, such agreement may not be forthcoming on the National Government's proposal to abolish compulsory unionism.[60]

In Australia and New Zealand, Boards and Commissions have been established within the administrative system to handle special problems arising in labor affairs. Both Wage Boards and Conciliation Commissions had been created to handle labor conditions by the first part of the century within the Australian Commonwealth and States. In New Zealand similar institutions were also established around the turn of the century. During the early 1950's investigations of the stevedore industries and unions took place both in New Zealand and in Australia. The findings led to changes in regulations in both countries, and in Australia to the establishment of a permanent board to administer regulations and to handle conditions on the waterfront. The New Zealand Board had been established before the dispute.[61] Labor representatives are now appointed to governmental boards in both Australia and New Zealand. Australian labor is represented on several Commonwealth Boards, for example by selected representatives before the Commonwealth Industrial Court. In New Zealand, the Federation of Labour sends representatives to a number of boards and committees including the Industrial Advisory Council, the N. Z. Standards Institute, Consumers' Council, Gas Council, Safety Councils, Workers' Compensation Board and Scaffolding Committee.[62]

The trade unions in Australia and New Zealand have been affected organizationally by governmental laws and decisions, and have been able to penetrate,

usually through party participation, the inner-workings of the parliament and the government. An informal relationship has developed with ministers of the government, no matter what their party. In addition a number of legal provisions have made it mandatory for labor representation to appear before and to serve on certain administrative boards. Hence labor has achieved governmental administrative status, as well as legal status.

Courts:

Trade union contacts with the judiciary and the effects of court decisions should not be ignored in a complete investigation of union political activity.

←The discussion in this section will be mainly limited to the arbitration machinery in which courts handle disputes between labor and employers.

The Arbitration Courts have been considered a part of the New Zealand judicial system for some time. In 1956 the Australian High Court made it plain that the Arbitration Court, now the Industrial Court, was a judicial body.[63] Through the arbitration and conciliation laws, which were first passed in the Australian Commonwealth in 1904 and in New Zealand during 1894, regular systems for the settlement of disputes between labor and employers have developed. The Australian states also began to establish, early in the century, machinery to handle labor affairs and disputes which has taken various forms, but which includes judicial procedure for handling disputes. The systems have had the effect of compulsory arbitration in Australia since 1904, and in New Zealand since 1936. The Federation of Labour has continued its support of the principle of compulsory arbitration, while some unions in Australia have had some questions about its continuation.[64]

Once a case comes to the courts in either country, the union through its local branch, or through the state or national organization, presents its case and urges its interpretation upon the judges. In like manner the employers' association also pleads its case in the dispute. For a time in Australia until 1952-1953, the courts accepted in wage discussions the principle of a quarterly adjustment for increases in cost of living. But in 1953 the Commonwealth court stopped this practice as an automatic procedure. New South Wales has now passed laws providing for this automatic adjustment. Tasmania discontinued in 1960 the granting of automatic cost of living adjustments for State employees covered by federal awards.[65] In New Zealand this principle has not been generally accepted. The New Zealand Court of Arbitration has powers to adjust rates through General Orders only when called upon to make awards. The Court has power both to make laws by promulgating awards and apprenticeship orders, and to interpret and enforce industrial laws. On the other hand, the new Industrial Court in Australia only has powers to interpret and enforce industrial laws, and to impose penalties on individuals and organizations violating decisions. The federal Conciliation and Arbitration Commission now has the power to determine hours and wages.[66]

Unrest among unions began to increase in Australia during 1960 when the courts handed down some unfavorable decisions for the unions. In New Zealand there has also been some discontent recently with court decisions. However, more strike action seems to have developed in scattered parts of Australia.[67]

Other courts in Australia and New Zealand, besides the arbitration courts, have handled cases involving labor affairs throughout this century. In Australia the High Court has taken appeals, and made final decisions on a number of labor cases. The 1956 decision limiting the powers of the Arbitration Court made necessary immediate legislation which created the Industrial Court. The Court of Appeals in New Zealand also has, on numerous occasions, entered into the interpretation of the industrial conciliation and arbitration acts. One of its first major interpretations was to prohibit the Arbitration Court from granting preferences to some members and not others in the same union. In New Zealand since 1908 the ordinary courts, with powers over procedural labor, have had power to deregister for two years a union participating in the Industrial Conciliation Act, if the union has been connected with a strike.[68]

Contacts with the courts are made by Australasian trade unions mainly as participants in cases before the arbitration courts and at times before other courts in the judicial systems. Court decisions in both countries do frequently have an important effect upon labor organization and conditions.

Commonwealth Comparisons

Both Australia and New Zealand have nurtured a strongly regulated and organized union movement within their party systems and legal structures, despite the radical-militant and socialist influences which have spasmodically marked their union and labor party history. The actions of the radicals were more frequently and persistently felt in the Australian system. However, both movements for a time gave lip service to socialisation which was implanted in the objectives of parties and unions. By the 1950's these objectives in the Australian Labor Party, attacked by a strong ethnic group within the movement, were further modified and more fully explained. This modification only reflected the long standing attitudes of the unions and the Labor Governments in their concern about immediate problems rather than about the overall purpose for society.[69] The New Zealand unions by the early twenties had begun to ignore discussion of purposes for society, and to concentrate on immediate problems. Their views were taken over by the Labour Party and Governments in their activities, and finally were officially adopted by the Party in 1951. Yet some Australian Labor Party members in the fifties continued to discuss the party's program for socialism, while the New Zealand leaders confined their discussions to a limited and modified definition when the term was mentioned. The anticommunist actions of the Australian movement have tended to split the union and party activities and to leave the Australian movement in a much more divided state than is the case in New Zealand. Yet the Australian trade unions still tend to support the older Labor Party rather than the new Democratic Labor Party.

The development of unions in both countries has generally been encouraged by the policies of legislative, executive, administrative and judicial bodies. With the accession of the labor parties into a majority position, further social and economic programs supported by the unions have been advanced. Today, even the non-labor governments have gone along with the existing system for union development and for most social and economic services, despite some restrictive measures on union activities. Usually the unions have continued to maintain their interests through direct contacts with both the labor and non-labor governments.

Thus Australia and New Zealand give us a standard for the observation of trade unions as a well organized and important section of interest, with a well

regulated organization recognized and prescribed by legislation, with an effective political arm, and with official and unofficial roles in the parliamentary, administrative, and court systems. The laws in both countries support peaceful and compulsory settlement of labor disputes through administrative and judicial institutions. Despite tight legal controls and the general acceptance by labor of its place in the governmental structure, New Zealand and to a larger extent Australia have continued to experience some industrial strikes.[70] For our purposes of observing unions in politics within the Commonwealth countries, it will be useful to compare the good relations between the unions and governments that have existed in New Zealand and Australia with such relations in other countries. Even though an agrarian country, New Zealand developed a strong union structure and has known few critical problems in its union and political history, probably because of its small homogeneous population, its relatively small territory, and its unitary system of government. Australia, with vast territory gives us the example of a country which, despite problems of federation and numerous internal schisms, had already developed a strong union organization within the legal structure before its emphasis on industrial development. Australia will increasingly continue to give occasion for observations of an established union structure in a system faced with stresses caused by growing diversity in population, ethnic and economic conditions.

Within the Commonwealth, New Zealand and Great Britain[71] would probably vie for first place in union political development. Yet New Zealand still is highly agrarian, while Great Britain has a matured industrial economy. Great Britain has not as yet incorporated compulsory arbitration into its legal system, but it has experienced a strong unionization movement with a political arm, which has, from time to time, gained control of the government. Great Britain now, like Australia, is realizing problems of different ethnic groups moving into the economy and society. The religious basis for political differences has not developed in England, but greater problems may stem from racial differences. Australia would come very close to the top of the scale for a well organized union system in politics, and represents a developing industrial economy, unlike Britain with a matured economy or New Zealand with slowly developing secondary industries.

The position of Canada and South Africa in regard to unions in politics can now be considered. Neither of these countries has developed an overall union movement as have New Zealand, Great Britain and Australia. Each has known more historic and fundamental ethnic cleavages than has either Australia or Great Britain to date. Canada since 1945 has noticeably been developing its industries and strengthening its union movement, while South Africa with a mainly agrarian economy had developed early in the century, only for white workers, a strong union system with a political arm. Canada, like Australia, is developing its industrial economy in a federal system. But unlike Australia, Canada had no strongly organized labor movement which was active in politics before industrialization, nor has it experienced a strong labor party within its party system. In both countries since World War II at least three parties have frequently appeared on the ballots. However, the party representing labor in Canada, unlike the Australian party, has only been a minority group. Some attempts to counter the American anti-labor party attitude have been expressed in parts of Canada and were successful along with the farmer and socialist groups in establishing the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in 1932. Yet federally this party has not been able

to become a principal opposition despite some favorable indications in the early forties. Some reasons for the failure of the party in such development included the lack of a unified labor organization and the problems of incorporating French Canada into the movement. The CCF, as the other commonwealth labor parties, adopted a socialist objective. While this objective was moderate in comparison to the first objectives adopted by the other labor parties--probably because of the late date of its adoption, the party's program--the Regina Manifesto of 1933, contained support for socialization similar to the other early commonwealth party programs. Unlike other commonwealth labor parties, the Federation has had certain successes in appealing to the farmer, particularly in Saskatchewan where today the CCF has controlled the government since 1944. With increasing industrialization and the growth of union membership, the unification of the trade union movement was enhanced by the formation of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) during 1956. This Congress represents about 80% of unionized labor. A large minority of the French Canadian labor force remains outside the Congress and continues to be represented by the Confederation of National Trade Unions--known as the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour before November 1960. In 1959 the Congress through its affiliates represented over 1,150,000 of the 1,458,000 trade union members. (The non-agricultural paid workers excluding small shop owners and managers were around 3.8 million). Negotiations soon began within the labor movement, the CLC, and the CCF for the formation of a new political party which would widen its base and appeal to more sections of the country's interests. This new party was formed at a Convention on July 31 to August 4, 1961. It is to be called the New Democratic Party (NDP). There is no objective in its constitution, but in the preamble to its program support is given to social planning and to the purpose of guaranteeing human rights and dignity. In the program no mention is made of the terms socialism or socialization. Socialism was still mentioned by some leaders of the NDP, and was strongly supported for mention in the program by a faction of the delegation from the western provinces. A large representation of farmers from Saskatchewan, labor from Ontario, and former members of the CCF have joined the NDP. The non-labor parties, parliaments, and governments within the Canadian federal and provincial systems have not been as influenced by organized labor as has been the case in the other three above-mentioned commonwealth countries. However, in some provinces or sections of provinces, such as in Ontario, where labor organization is growing, the parties and parliamentary representatives have certainly considered, and at times worked for, programs supported by labor. The administration does receive deputations from labor. Laws in various forms, depending on the province, have been established to protect working conditions and wages, and to regulate strikes. All provinces have labor relations acts, and all except Saskatchewan provide for compulsory conciliation; in Saskatchewan conciliation is voluntary. Only interprovincial industries and around 10% of labor are affected by federal provisions for mediation and conciliation. Trade unions and employers are required to bargain collectively. The farm province of Saskatchewan, under the influence of the CCF, has been establishing a legal system which promotes unionization and contains some favorable features for labor. Thus, a similarity between the early New Zealand and Australian union movement may be developing in this agricultural province.[72]

The Union of South Africa has not developed a strong union movement that is politically effective for all labor, despite its early organization of unions supporting a labour party which was successful in participating in some coalition governments during the twenties. Afrikaner workers probably have more influence on politics than any other union membership today. South Africa still has most

of its labor unorganized because of failures to include coloured and native forces; the white workers are well organized, while Indians and Coloured are only partially organized. The Labour Party has had its parliamentary representation reduced from 21 members in 1920, the largest delegation after Union, to 6 in 1955. There have been no labor members since 1958. This party, during its height supported a "civilized Labor policy", despite the party's appeals to social justice under a socialist objective which was adopted in 1908. The section on common ownership is very much like the socialist objective adopted by the British Labour Party in 1918. The major decline of the Party was already beginning to occur in 1946 when one section of its organization was successful in having a program adopted for the gradual achievement of native political rights. Both the Capetown and Natal sections of the Party had withdrawn by 1955 when the major representation at the annual conference was from Johannesburg. At this time some leaders of the South African Trades Union Council (SATUC) were still active in the Party. Even the white union movement was in a state of transition during the fifties. Thus, even though the SATUC had the largest union membership in 1955, there were still three other legally recognized federations to divide the union movement. This situation continues today. The trade union movement has been greatly affected by the Afrikaner nationalist movement, the British oriented unions, and the conflict between the European and various racial groups. The Nationalist Government has strengthened its regulations against all unions and federations and tends to deal mainly with groups, such as the Coordinating Council of Trade Unions, that support nationalist policies. Thus it is now more difficult to negotiate with the government for federations with even moderate policies toward race relations, such as the SATUC with some Coloured membership. SATUC had made presentations in 1955 about changes in the trade union conciliation laws. The Council was also included among a group of four federations invited to confer with the Government in 1959 about delegates to the International Labor Organization. Other federations include the South African Federation of Unions which leans towards all white unions, the South African Trades and Labour Council which is a small group of the 1949 Council remaining outside the SATUC, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions which was not legally recognized and has encouraged African unions.[73] It is unlikely that the South African unions will be able to realize, in the near future, any type of overall labor organization, much less a labor party. Yet through these South African experiences of diverse ethnic and racial groups, and of an agrarian country establishing an early union system with political significance, we can come closer to some of the problems which are facing the newly organized political systems in the Asian and African commonwealth countries.

The problems of relations between the Europeans and the natives in these newer Commonwealths have been erased to a large extent by the acquisition of self-government within these territories which did not have a large group of European settlers. Perhaps South Africa's next step will be along the lines of African nationalism, and then she will be behind the newer Commonwealth in some parts of union development. On the other hand, her limited experience with African unions may be of some assistance.

All of the new Commonwealths have many parliamentary institutions like the British, but they do not have the traditional two-party systems or unionization found in New Zealand, Great Britain, and to some extent Australia. Australia is now tending toward a three-party system more like the present Canadian system. In the new Commonwealths the dominant party has usually been the group which urged self-government and nationalism. Thus, in effect, when self-government came, this group took over the government with large support of the people. With the

opposition of the old colonial government being withdrawn, the new majority party does not face an effective opposition party in the parliament. Hence in most of the parliaments and the governments of these new countries there tends to be in effect a dominant one-party system with some factional groups appearing. On the other hand, within the new Nigerian parliament there are at least three major district parties resulting from the federal territorial divisions. Each of the dominant parties, as in India and Ghana, continues to support the major goals of the nation which at this time are usually directed toward economic development. Traditional ways of government and various cultural or tribal groups constitute the major pulls away from these national developments, while the measures for urbanization and industrialization are pulling toward nationalism, and thus toward the creation of new labor interest groups and toward the foundations for unionization. Hence it may be that with national development the major goals of the countries will embrace, through governmental action, the development of occupational interest, of unionization, and possibly the development of political parties supporting special interests such as those of labor. All these countries have some organizational arrangements for industrial labor. In the Malayan Federation not only several labor federations have been established with some dating back to pre-federation days, but also several parties supporting labor, including the Labour Party, have appeared during the fifties. All of these countries have some regulation of labor conditions and organization. Both Ghana and Nigeria have already established legislation for the protection of trade unionization and for arbitration of labor disputes. Pakistan established central conciliation machinery in 1947. Malaya and Ceylon, compared with many other Asian countries, have rather extensive laws controlling workers' conditions. Some of the leaders within these countries have had British training and will thus carry some concept of unionization from Britain to their countries.[74] Certainly the governments are considering, and will have to consider increasingly, the interest of the new industrial and craft workers.

Some economists[75] maintain that in developing countries governmental support of unionization and welfare measures can detract from economic growth. From Australasia come examples of countries that had developed strong labor movements in predominantly agrarian economies which had only slightly industrialized. Industrial expansion, especially in Australia, has gradually continued over the last fifty years. Today with less dependence upon British trade and large welfare expenditures, which were encouraged by the organized labor movement, the economy still is developing industrially. New Zealand also has developed services and has spent for welfare before industrializing. The new Asian and African countries in attempts to develop their economies may also decide to further labor movements and provide welfare measures, and thus may profit from the experiences of New Zealand and Australia.

Strong unionization and active labor parties have thus far developed only in countries with rather homogeneous populations in which the concepts of unionization and labor movements were strongly imbedded. Australia and New Zealand provide illustrations of such developments. Yet less developed union movements in more heterogeneous populated countries either have continuing or are initiating political influence. In very heterogeneous populated countries the ethnic or [illegible] divisions, which have been characterized as non-associational interests,[76] have frequently outweighed the importance of labor interests, and have made it impossible for labor to make its demands heard effectively throughout the country. Within the

new Asian-African countries it is still too early to judge what will be the course of labor development, whether only industrially or both industrially and politically. Labor interests will certainly exercise increasingly some form of political influence because of the organizational strength that will probably result from legal provisions already established and from the planned economic expansion.

FOOTNOTES

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1. Stanley Rothman states that trade unions are a product of industrial society in "Systematic Political Theory", American Political Science Review, 54 (March 1960), 20. Many studies on European trade unions are mentioned in Henry W. Ehrmann (ed.), Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), et passim; and in Val R. Lorwin, "Recent Research on Western European Labour Movements", Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, 7th Annual Meeting, pp. 1-12.

2. Sources on the Australian and New Zealand labor movements are mentioned in Josephine F. Milburn, and Taylor Cole, "Bibliographical Material on Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa", American Political Science Review, 52 (March 1957), 199-213. References to other [illegible] 199-213. References to other sources since 1957 are included in W. A. Townsley, "Australia", in Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 31-32; in Australian Institute of Political Science, Trade Unions in Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1959); and in S. R. Davis and Colin Hughes, "Literature on Australian Government and Politics", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 4 (August 1958), 118-120.

3. For the comparative study of interest groups in politics, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council and a conference of the International Political Science Association have recommended several approaches, including comparisons within the specific area interests of the researcher. Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Study of Interest Groups", American Political Science Review, 52 (March 1958), 272-273; and Ehrmann (ed.), op. cit., pp. v-x, 1-8. See also Rothman, op. cit., 15-33; Joseph La Palombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations", Journal of Politics, 22 (February 1960), 29-49; Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis", Journal of Politics, 23 (February 1961), 25-45; R. E. Dowling, Myron Q. Hale, and Robert T. Golembiewski, "Bentley Revisited", American Political Science Review, 54 (December 1960), 944-971.

4. The judiciary should be examined in any interest group study, yet it has not appeared in most recent recommendations for comparative observations. Almond, op. cit., 273-281; and Ehrmann, op. cit., 1-8.

5. Major histories of Australia and New Zealand include: W. K. Hancock, Australia (London: Ernest Benn, 1930); R. M. Crawford, Australia (London: Hutchinson's Univ. Library, 1952); Gordon Greenwood (ed.), Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1955); and Ernest Scott, A Short History of Australia (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 7th ed., 1947); Alfred Saunders, History of New Zealand, 1642-1893 (Christchurch: Whitcomb and Tombs; and Smith, Anthony, Sellars and Co., 1896, 1899), 2 vols.; G. H. Scholefield, New Zealand in Evolution (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909); J. B. Condliffe, New Zealand in the Making (London: Allen and Unwin, 2nd rev. ed., 1959); and a recent short history, Keith Sinclair, A History

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6. Australia, Year Book, 1960, op. cit., 317-324.

7. New Zealand Department of Statistics, Official New Zealand Year-Book, 1960 (Wellington: Government Printer), 57-69.

8. J. C. Horsfall, Australia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955); J. C. Condliffe, op. cit.; and J. C. Condliffe, The Welfare State in New Zealand (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959); and Australia, Year Book, 1956, op. cit., and New Zealand Official Year-Book, 1960, op. cit.

9. For some sources on the operation of government in the Commonwealths see: Leslie Finlay Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (Melbourne: Longmans, Green, 1955); S. R. Davis (ed.), The Government of the Australian States (London: Longmans, Green, 1960); The British Commonwealth, The Development of its Laws and Constitutions (London: Stevens), Part 2 (1952): G. W. Paton (ed.), Australia, and Part 4 (1954): J. L. Robson (ed.), New Zealand; Leslie Lipson, The Politics of Equality (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1948); André Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand, 1904, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914); Leicester Webb, Government in New Zealand (Wellington: New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, 1940); W. P. Morrell, The Provincial System of Government in New Zealand (1852-76) (Longmans, Green, 1932); J. C. Beaglehole (ed.), New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster (Wellington: Victoria University College, 1944); A. E. Currie, New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (London: Butterworth, 1944); and K. C. Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 1953). Other sources on the Australian and New Zealand Governments with emphases on specific aspects include: Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Government Today (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1954); John Donald Bruce Miller, Australian Government and Politics (London: Duckworth, 1959); William Anstey Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (Sydney: Law Book Company of Australia, 1956); J. D. B. Miller, "Party Discipline in Australia", Political Science, 5 (March 1953), 13-15, (September 1953), 21-36; The Federal Guide (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, Yearly); March 1956 decision of the High Court, Age, 9 (March 1956); For "The Amendment to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1956" see Australia, Year Book, 1957, pp. 156-158. Leslie Lipson "Origins of the Caucus in New Zealand", Historical Studies - Australia and New Zealand, 2 (April 1942), 1-10; Robert Stephen Milne (ed.), Bureaucracy in New Zealand (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1957); and Raymond Joseph Polaschek (ed.), Government Administration in New Zealand (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1958). For other sources on Australia see Davis and Hughes, op. cit., 107-133.

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11. See W. A. Townsley, "Australia", in Ehrmann, op. cit.; Davis and Hughes, op. cit., 118-120; and Milburn and Cole, op. cit., 206-207; 211-212. Sources on other specific groups include: John Hedley Brian Tew, Wealth and Income (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1955); and John Liddle King Gifford and J. Vivian Wood, Australian Banking (Brisbane: Univ. of Queensland Press, 1955).

12. Truman, op. cit. See other sources in footnote 5 and Milburn and Cole, op. cit. 202-203; D. W. Rawson, "The A.L.P. Industrial Groups - An Assessment", Australian Quarterly, 26 (December 1954), 30-46; and a new book not available at this writing, Henry Mayer (ed.), Catholics and Free Society (1961).

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14. Some comparative sources on Asia and Africa include: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960); Wilbur E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman (eds.), Labor Commitment

and Social Change in Developing Areas (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960);Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Eleanor H. Lattimore, Labor Unions in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945); and two publications from the Duke Univ. Press, Durham: P. T. Bauer, Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (1957), and Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development (1961).

A few sources on Africa: I.L.O., African Labour Survey, op. cit.; R. E. Luyt, Trade Unionism in African Colonies (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1949). F. M. Bourret, Ghana (Stanford: Univ. Press, 1960); James S. Coleman, Nigeria (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958); Gold Coast Year Book, 1958 (London: Graphic Press, 1958); J. I. Roper, Labour Problems in West Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1958).

Scattered sources on Asia: Selig S. Harrison, India (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960); Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India (Princeton:Univ. Press, 1957); Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, Leadership and Political Institutions in India,(Princeton: Univ. Press,1959); Ceylon Yearbook (Colombo: Government Publication Bureau); Amar Navain Agarwala, Indian Labour Problems (Allahabad: Kitahistan, 1957); Keith Callard, Pakistan (New York: Macmillan, 1957); Keith Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959); Handbook of Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1957); J. Norman Parmer, Colonial Labor Policy and Administration (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1960); Alex Josey, Trade Unionism in Malaya (Singapore: Donald Moore, 2nd ed., 1958); T. H. Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1959); Charles Gamba, Labour Law in Malaya (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1955).

15. The most important sources on the history of the labor movements are also mentioned in the references listed in footnote 10 [illegible], supra.; also see Kenneth F. Walker, "Australia", in Walter Galenson (ed.), Comparative Labour Movements (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952). More recent and some specific sources will be mentioned as particular subjects are covered in the following text.

16. New Zealand Official Year Book, 1960, op. cit., pp. 601, 626 1061, 1084-1086, and J. Roberts, telephone discussion with K. Baxter, Secretary of the NZFL, July, 1961. These figures include some agricultural workers whose total number about 130,000, and some self-employed proprietors, 44,000.

17. Some of the statistics on the wage earners and union membership include sections of agricultural workers. Information about AWU membership in 1959 was around 80,000 workers. The sources for the statistics include: Australia, Year Book, 1960, op. cit., 464-468; Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour Report, 1955-1958 (Canberra: Government Printer); and "Political Review" Australian Quarterly, 37 (March 1959), 101. Recent historical references to the Federations include Kenneth F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 311-319; R. M. Martin, "The Rise of the Australian Council of Trade Unions", Australian Quarterly, 30 (March 1958), 30-42; and D. W. Rawson, "The Frontiers of Australian Trade Unionism", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1 (May 1956), 196-209. K. F. Walker gave the membership of the AWU in 1956 as 150,000 in op. cit., pp. 259-261. He also discusses the function of the labour councils or the trades hall councils on pp. 317-319. Also

see an account with some Marxist interpretations in Lloyd Ross, "Organized Labour in Australia", in H. A. Marquand (ed.), Organized Labour in Four Continents (London: Longmans, Green, 1939).

18. "Political Review", Australian Quarterly, 39 (March 1959), 101. K. F. Walker describes the AWU's gradual change from a radical to a conservative attitude in his Industrial Relations in Australia, p. 260.

19. ACTU, Constitution, as adopted by June 1941 Congress; and NZFL, Constitution as adopted in 1951. Also see K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, pp. 313-319; and R. M. Martin, "Twenty Years of Compulsory Unionism", Political Science, 8 (September 1956), 104-121. James R. McClelland states that freedom of unionists in Australia is more secure than in 1942, Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs, Labor in a Free Society (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959), p. 161.

20. Sources on the strike and the waterfront unions are quoted in footnote 28, infra.; Milburn, "Twentieth Century", op. cit., 188, fn. 40; and Martin, op. cit., 112-113.

Sources concerning unions outside of the ACTU and NZFL include Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, and NZFL, Report, 1961, 62-63.

21. AWU, Australian Worker, 1961 issues; K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia; for 1958 amendments to ICA acts see John Herefore Portus, The Development of Australian Trade Union Law (Carlton: Melbourne Univ. Press, 1958), p. 261; R. M. Martin, "Compulsory Unionism in New Zealand", op. cit.; and New Zealand Official Year-Book, 1960.

22. (a) K. F. Walker has not only discussed the organization and purposes of a select group of unions but also has described the general objective of the unions as a whole, see his Industrial Relations in Australia, pp. 319-322, and 39-294, et passim. (b) Representatives of management and of labor, including the president of ACTU, commented on the present and future goals of labor, see Lloyd Ross and A. E. Monk (ACTU) in Australian Institute of Political Science, Trade Unions in Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1959); and also R. G. Fry (management) and H. J. Souter (ACTU) in K. F. Walker (ed.), Union, Management and the Public (Nedlands, Western Australia: University of Western Australia, 1956).

23. R. M. Martin discusses the function of the ACTU in "The Rise of the Australian Council of Trade Unions", op. cit.; and K. F. Walker mentions the small staff of the ACTU in his Industrial Relations in Australia, p. 318. Also see ACTU, Constitution and Rules, June 1941, 3, Method b and c.

NZFL, Constitution, 1951; and NZFL, Report, 1960, p. 70-71. One of the recent publications of the Federation includes Sid Scott, Retreat from Moscow, 1957.

24. See sources mentioned in footnote 10 and Lloyd Ross, op. cit., 15-19. K. F. Walker noted that the Amalgamated Mines Association of Broken Hill worked for the OBU concept but discarded the notion by 1924. Industrial Relations in Australia, pp. 106ff. Other sources include: Allan M. Morrison, "'Militant' Labour in Queensland, 1912-1927", Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 38 (November 1952), 209-234; and Lloyd Ross, "Early Aims of Trade Unionism",

Australian Quarterly, 21 (September, 1949), 21-32.

25. Also see the AWU Constitution as adopted in 1894, reprinted in 1909 by W. G. Spence, Australia's Awakening (Sydney: The Worker Trustees, 1909), pp. 72-77; and in Ebbel, op. cit., pp. 122-124.

26. The objective of the ACTU reads as follows: "The Socialisation of Industry, i.e., production, distribution and exchange". see Constitution, 1941.

The objective of the NZFL before 1949 included a socialisation aim, however in 1949 the "Objective" section was changed to "Aims", and one of the nine aims was "to work for a more equitable share of the national income and ultimately production for social use and not for private profit." Constitutions, 1943, 1951, and Report, 1949.

For the AWU objectives see K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, p. 255.

27. See the biennial Reports of the ACTU, and the annual Reports of the NZFL. Also see the AWU Report, 1949.

28. On Australia see Australia, Department of Labour and National Service, Industrial Disputes in Australia (Melbourne: 1958); K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, pp. 319-322; James W. Kuhn, "Strikes and Australia's Industrialization", Australian Quarterly, 28 (September 1956), 58-68; and the political chronicles and reviews in each issue of the Australian Journal of Politics and History and the Australian Quarterly.

On New Zealand see A. E. C. Hare's annual reports from 1942-1944 concerning arbitration, disputes and unions in Labour in New Zealand (Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1942-1944); R. T. Newman, Moderates and Militants in New Zealand Labour Movement 1901-1913 (Canterbury University College: M. A. thesis, 1948; copies in Labour Party Office and with Mabel Howard, M. P.); H. E. Holland, "Ballot Box" and R. S. Ross, The Tragic Story of the Waihi Strike (Wellington: Workers Printry, 1913); F. W. Rowley, The Industrial Situation in New Zealand (Wellington: Harry H. Tombs, Ltd., 1931); P. N. (sic.) Pettit (Phyllis Muriel Pettit), The Wellington Watersiders (Wellington: Federation of Labour, 1948), based upon her M. A. thesis, A History of Labour on the Waterfront up to 1937 (Victoria University College, 1946); Dick Scott, 151 Days (Auckland: Southern Cross Books, 1954); and John Gordon, Crisis of the Waterfront (Wellington: Tolan Printing Co., n.d., 1952).

29. See the 1959-1961 issues of the two journals mentioned in footnote 28, and the Labour Reports put out by the Commonwealth and New Zealand governments. Australia, Year Books and the Official New Zealand Year-Books also give information on strikes.

30. Townsley, op. cit., pp. 19-21; Australian Worker, January 6, 1960; ALP, New South Wales Branch, A.L.P. News; May 15, 1961, p. 5.; D. W. Rawson, "Labour, Socialism and the Working Class", The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 7 (May 1961), 75-94; Louise Overacker, The Australian Party System (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952), 216fn. 51, 274-278, 322-323; and Walter Nash in the Evening Post, November 25, 1960.

31. Overacker, op. cit.; Louise Overacker, "The New Zealand Labor Party", American Political Science Review, 49 (September 1955), 708-732; L. F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901-1951 (London: Longmans, Green, 1955), p. 49; and Milburn, "Nineteenth Century", and "Twentieth Century".

32. See reference in footnotes 10, and 24; Robin Gollan, "Trade Unions and Labour Parties, 1890-94", Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand, 7 (November 1955), 17-26; and R. C. J. Stone, "A History of Trade Unionism in New Zealand, 1913-1937" (Auckland Univ. College: M.A. thesis, 1948).

33. D. W. Rawson explains this change of attitude as a reflection of communist strength among union officials at that time. "The ALP Groups--An Assessment", op. cit., 32.

34. ALP, Report, 23rd Commonwealth Conference, 1959, pp. 66-67. Also see L. F. Crisp, op. cit., Chapter 2, especially pp. 19-23.

35. NZLP Constitutions, section 2 and 3, and NZLP Report, 1951, pp. 9-14; and 1961, p. 27. John Penfold, "The New Zealand Labour Party: Its Formal Structure", Political Science, 6 (March 1954), 3-16. Louise Overacker, "The British and New Zealand Labour Parties: A Comparison, Today", Political Science, 9 (September, 1957), 15-31.

36. NZFL, Constitution, p. 6; John Penfold, "The New Zealand Labour Party", op. cit.; and R. M. Martin, "Twenty Years of Compulsory Unionism", op. cit., 120, and the Political Disabilities Removal Act, 1950, and New Zealand, Year-Book 1960, 1082.

37. NZFL, Report, 1954, pp. 28-29, and Reports from 1955-60. See also Milburn "Twentieth Century", op. cit., 180, footnote 60 on p. 189; Overacker, "The New Zealand Labour Parties: C Comparison, Heritage", Political Science, 9 (March 1957), 33-34.

38. NZLP, Report 1961, 21; NZFL, Report, 1954, 28-29; and Crisp, Australian Federal Labour Party pp. 194-204.

39. Overacker, Australian Party System, op. cit., pp. 112-170; L. F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party, et passim; Townsley, op. cit., p. 14.

40. ALP, Official Report, 18th Commonwealth Triennial Conference, 1948, 50-51; and ALP, Official Report, 1951, 51-52. Refer to sources in footnotes 10, and 24; and to the "Political Chronicle" in Australian Journal of Politics and History, 5 (May 1959), 93. Election results in 1958 for Commonwealth House of Representatives were:

	ALP	DLP
Victoria	42%	14.75%
Queensland	43%	11%
Western Australia	45%	10%

In July 1961 the DLP received 17% of the vote in the state elections.

41. ALP, Official Reports, 1951, 1955, 1957, 1959, 1909, 1927, 1930, 1948. See L. F. Crisp on the programs and objectives until 1951, op. cit., pp. 207-300,

and D. W. Rawson, for discussion of objectives until 1957 in "Labour, Socialism and the Working Class", op. cit., 80-93. Also see A. A. Caldwell, The Australian Labour Party (Sydney: Halstead Press, 1953); and John Burton, Labor in Transition (Kingston, ACT: Morgan Publication, n.d., 1957?).

42. For the moderate views on socialism of Evatt and Calwell see ALP, Reports, 1951-1959, and A. A. Calwell, op. cit., ALP, Official Report, 1957, pp. 48-50, 84; 1959, pp. 36-39, 60.

43. The recent encyclical of Pope John XXIII should have a moderating effect upon the Catholic Action groups in their attempts to be dissociated from support of a socialisation objective.

For sources on the DLP see J. Little, For a Better Victoria...The Policy of the Australian Democratic Labor Party, June 16, 1961, (Prahran: Clancy Printing, 1961), and Political Quarterly, 29 (January 1957), 103;"Political Chronicle", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 5 (May, 1959) 89-91, and 6 (November, 1960), 235.

44. "Political Chronicle", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 5 (May 1959), 91-97; 6 (November 1960), 235; 7 (May 1961), 97-98.

45. NZLP, Reports, 1951 and 1960; Milburn, "Twentieth Century", op. cit., 180; Bruce Brown, "The New Zealand Labour Party, 1916-1935" (Victoria Univ. College: M.A. thesis, mimeo., 1955); Overacker, "The New Zealand Labor Party", op. cit., and her "Heritage", Political Science, 9 (March, 1957), 33-34.

46. NZLP, Report, 1951, pp. 9-14 and Constitution, 1953, p. 3.

47. Milburn, "Twentieth Century", op. cit., 179.

48. Ibid., 174-175.

49. Milburn and Cole, op. cit., pp. 203-205; publications by the Australian Liberal Party, include Liberal Achievements, 1949-1954; and The First Ten Years, 1949-1959 (Sydney: Land Newspaper, 1959).

50. Australian Country Party (Federal), Platforms and Policy, November 1953, (Sydney: Land Newspaper), pp. 2-3.

51. Australian Communist Party, Program, 1958 (Sydney: Current Book Distributors, 1958). Election results are printed in ALP, Official Report, 1959, pp. 26-27; and in the "Political Chronicle", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 5 (May 1959), pp. 91-97.

52. Milburn and Cole, op. cit., 208, 210-211; National Party, 1960 leaflets to The Householder, "A Policy for Young Voters" and "A Three Years Wiser Vote". Election returns for the 1960 election were printed in the Evening Post, November 28, December 6 and 8, 1960. The campaign was also rather well covered in the Evening Post from the end of October to election day.

53. Australian Liberal Party, The First Ten Years (Sydney: The Land Newspaper, 1959); New Zealand National Party, Freedom, issues from 1950 to 1957.

54. Crisp, op. cit., p. 328; Overacker, The Australian Party System, et passim. Townsley on legislature, op. cit., pp. 24-26.

55. Norman D. Stevens, "Labour Candidates for the N. Z. House of Representatives, 1890-1916", Political Science, 7 (March 1955), 38-48; (September 1955), 128-137; 8 (September 1956), 128-138; 9 (March 1957), 61-71; (September 1957), 63-70. Overacker, "The British and New Zealand Labour Parties: A Comparison", Part 2 Political Science, 9 (September 1957), 27; and R. M. Martin "Compulsory Unionism in New Zealand", op. cit., 120-121.

56. Australia, Year Book, 1956, General historical materials on pp. 1-26, 65-88; 166-212; and New Zealand, Year-Book, 1960, pp. 15-37, 1009-1125. See also sources in footnote 9..

57. Townsley, on the cabinet, op. cit., p. 28, and Overacker, Australian Party System, pp. 4-6.

On 1951 strike see in Milburn Political Science, 12 (September 1960), 188 fn. 40; NZLP Report, 1951, p. 2, and 1960, p. 16. See also footnote 28.

K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, et passim, and sources mentioned in footnote 28.

58. (a) NZLP, Report, 1960, p. 16, and NZFL, Reports, 1960 and 1961.
(b) See footnote 28, and K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia.

59. Peter Campbell, "New Zealand Ministers, 1935-1957", Political Science, 10 (September 1958), 66. L. F. Crisp, op. cit., and Louise Overacker, Australian Party System, give some information about the Australian cabinets.

60. R. M. Martin, "Compulsory Unionism in New Zealand", op. cit., 107-108; Townsley, op. cit., p. 23, 28. Discussion stating that Menzies interfered with the Commonwealth Arbitration Court is in Australian Worker, May 25, 1960. For recent relations between the Minister of Labor, Mr. Shand, see Evening Post, December 16, 17, 20, 1960 and January 6, 9, 17, 1961; and NZFL, Report, 1961, 31-32, 57-58. For NZFL's favorable view of compulsory arbitration see ibid., 22-27, 46-48, 55-57; 72-78.

61. New Zealand, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Waterfront Industry, 1952, H-50, Australia, Committee of Inquiry under Stevedoring Industry Act 1954, Report, November, 1955, and R. M. Martin," Compulsory Unionism in New Zealand", op. cit., 120, 121.

62. Australia, Year Book, 1960, 417; and NZFL, Report, 1960, 69; 1961, 58-59. Details about ACTU and AWU representation on governmental board is not available at this time. See Australian Worker, January 18 - March 15, 1961, for report of AWU 1961 conference.

63. "Political Chronicle", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 2 (November 1956), 96; D. X. Oxnam, "Recent Changes in the Federal Arbitration System", Australian Quarterly, 29 (March 1957), 78-84, James W. Kuhn, "Strikes and Australia's Industrialization", Australian Quarterly, 28 (September 1956), 58-68; and A. Hagger, "The Arbitration Court in the 1950's," Australian Quarterly, 30 (June 1958), 42-56.

64. NZFL, Report, 1961, 22-27, 72-78, 55-56; Martin, "Compulsory Unionism in New Zealand", p. 121; and K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, pp. 6-13, 14-36, 332, 354-362, 370-374. Also see John Horefore Portus, op. cit.; Mark Perlman, Judges in Industry, (Carlton: Melbourne Univ. Press, 1954). See also James Arthur Gale, "The First Arbitrationist Trade Union" (Auckland Univ. College, M.A. thesis, 1953); A.E.C. Hare, op. cit.; Mark Perlman and Norman G. Paul (as a Ph.D. thesis) have been investigating phases of New Zealand arbitration.

65. A. Hagger also discusses the acceptance of "Capacity-to-Pay" principle by the courts in op. cit., 50-56; ALP, Report, 1959, p. 62; and "Political Chronicle", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 6 (November 1960) 236.

66. New Zealand, Year-Book 1960, p. 1016-1018; Australia, Year Book, 1957, p. 156-158; and Oxnam, op. cit.

67. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 6 (November, 1960), 236; and 7 (May 1961), 109, 118-119.

68. Deregistration mentioned in Martin, "Compulsory Unionism...." pp. 110-111, and 105-106; and the New Zealand Year-Book, 1960, p. 1016, 1030, 1087.

69. K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, pp. 321-323; and Robin Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, 1850-1910, op. cit., pp. 153, 208.

70. See "Political Chronicles", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 6 and 7 (1960 and 1961).

71. Sources on British interest groups and trade unions in politics are many. Some of the more recent studies include: Samuel E. Finer, "Great Britain", in Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 117-144; J. D. Stewart, British Pressure Groups, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958); Samuel H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain", American Political Science Review, 50 (March 1956), pp. 1023; Special issue on "Pressure Groups in Britain", Political Quarterly, 29 (1958); Henry Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-1900 (London: Macmillan, 1954); Henry Pelling and Frank Bealey, Labour and Politics, 1900-1906 (London: Macmillan, 1958); B. C. Roberts, Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956); Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945 (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1960); see also Josephine F. Milburn "The Fabian Society and the British Labour Party", The Western Political Quarterly, 11 (March 1958), 330.

72. References on the Canadian union and party history include: J. F. Milburn, Interviews with Eugene Forsey, Research Director; A. Andras, Director, Leg. Dept.; and A. E. Homming, Executive Secretary, CLC, July 28, 1961; CLC, Canadian Labour

April, 1961; James C. Cameron and F. J. L. Young, The Status of Trade Unions in Canada (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, 1960) see bibliography on pp. 168-169; H. A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1948); A.E.C. Hare, The First Principles of Industrial Relations (London: Macmillan, 1958); S. Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1957); Samuel H. Barnes, "The Evolution of Christian Trade Unionism in Quebec", Industrial and Labor Relations Review 12 (July 1959); Samuel H. Barnes, "Quebec Catholicism and Social Change", The Review of Politics, 23 (January 1961), 52-76; Eugene Forsey, "History of the Labour Movement in Canada", Canada Year Book 1957-58 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1958), 795-806, Canada Year Book, 1960, 796-97; Provincial Labour Standards; H. D. Woods, "Canadian Collective Bargaining and Dispute Settlement Policy: An Appraisal", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 21 (November, 1955), 447-465; Howard A. Scarrow, "By-elections and Public Opinion in Canada", Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Spring 1961), 79-91; Harold Amos Logan, State Intervention and Assistance in Collective Bargaining (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1956).

Secondary sources on the CCF include: Leslie Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif., 1950); Frederick C. Englemann, "Membership Participation in Policy-Making in the CCF", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 22 (1956), 161-173.

Primary sources on the CLC and the CCF - new party include: CLC membership was mentioned in the reports of the 3rd convention in 1960; Donald MacDonald, "Why Labour Opposes Compulsive Arbitration", Canadian Labour, 2 (May, 1957), 11-12. Stanley Knowles, The New Party (Ottawa:CCF, 1961); The Committee for the New Party, (Ottawa: 1961), Constitution and Platform and Policies of the New Party; CCF, Constitution, 1933, and Reports of Regina and Winnipeg conference, 1932 and 1933 (CCF office); Saskatchewan Statutes 1953, Chapter 259, Amendments to the Trade Union Act, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1958. See reports of New Party founding convention in Mail and Globe (Toronto), July 30-August 5, 1961, Records of the convention, and J. F. Milburn, Notes on the convention, July 31-August 4, 1961.

The CCF has spelt socialization with a "z", while in Australasia the term is spelt with an "s".

73. Walker and Woinbron op. cit. on the 1959 conference; SATUC, Reports and mimeographed copies of the presentations made during 1954 and 1955 (in J. F. Milburn's collection). A new journal called UNITAS has been printed since 1955, no copies received since 1958.

South African Labour Party, Constitution, December, 1945. Interviews with Alex Hepple, November 1955; and with Dolcie Hartwell, November 1955; J. F. Milburn, Notes on observations at November 26, 1955 SALP Conference. In December 1955 most of the SALP reports from 1910 were located in the Party's offices; however Walker and Woinbron reported in 1961 that the records are not to be found.

Also see sources mentioned in footnote 13.

74. Most sources available on the Asian and African unions and labor parties have been mentioned in footnote 14. Especial note should be taken of the ILO, South Africa Labour; Moore and Feldman (eds), op. cit.; Subratosh Ghosh, Trade Unionism in Underdeveloped Countries (Calcutta: Bookland, 1960); Roper, op. cit.

Gamba, op. cit., Parmer, op. cit., Josey, op. cit., Agarwala, op. cit.; A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (Northern Rhodesia) (Manchester: Univ. Press, 1958); W. A. Warmington, A West African Trade Union (Southern Cameroons) (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960); Hugo Wolfsohn, "Some Problems of Indian Trade Unions", Australia Outlook, 14 (August 1960), 173-181; Pakistan, Minister of Labour, Labour in Pakistan (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1955); Pakistan, Labour Year Book (Karachi: Manager of Publications); and Charles Gamba, "Labour and Labour Parties in Malaya", Pacific Affairs, 31 (June 1958), 117-130.

75. J. J. Spengler, "Economic Development: Political Preconditons and Political Consequences", Journal of Politics, 22 (August 1960), 387-416; and Rothman, op. cit.

76. Almond and Coleman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 33-38, and sections on interests throughout the book.

ECONOMIC GROUPS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

* * *

LAMBERT H. MILLER, GENERAL COUNSEL,
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,
PREPARED FOR DELIVERY AT THE 1961 ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION,
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, SHERATON-JEFFERSON HOTEL.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1961

Some background outlining general objectives, purposes, organizational structure and methods of operation would seem to be a condition precedent to a discussion of the National Association of Manufacturers in terms of your subject, "Economic Groups and the Judicial Process."

The National Association of Manufacturers was founded in Cincinnati, Ohio, in the year 1895. It was incorporated in 1905 under the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New York and maintains its principal office in New York City. It is supported and controlled by a purely voluntary membership comprised of about 19,000 member companies. By far the greatest number of the member companies are small businesses as that term is generally understood, since 83% of the membership employs fewer than 500 persons.

As set forth in its Constitution, the objects and purposes for which the Association was established are as follows:

> "Sec. 1. The general objects and purposes for which the said corporation is formed are the promotion of the industrial interests of the United States, the fostering of the domestic and foreign commerce of the United States, the betterment of the relations between employer and employee, the protection of the individual liberty and rights of the employer and employee, the dissemintation of information among the public with respect to the principles of individual liberty and ownership of property, the support of legislation in furtherance of those principles, and opposition to legislation in derogation thereof.
>
> "Sec. 2. The particular objects and purposes of said corporation are to establish and maintain a mutual and cooperative organization of American

> manufacturers in the United States for the fostering of their trade, business, and financial interests, to reform abuses relative thereto, to secure freedom from unlawful and unjust exactions, to diffuse accurate and reliable information as to the system of private competitive enterprise and other matters, to promote a more enlarged and friendly intercourse among manufacturers, and to do all things necessary to carry out the aforesaid purposes for the mutual benefit and protection of its members, under and subject to such regulations, conditions, and limitations as may be prescribed by the Constitution and By-Laws."

The objects and purposes I have just stated have been the basis for activities for the National Association of Manufacturers throughout its existence. In brief, it is the broad purpose of the NAM to develop and promote, in every appropriate way, better public understanding and acceptance of the economic and social principles responsible for the nation's progress. To promote its objectives, the Association carries on many and diverse activities and programs, varying according to changing conditions and requirements. Some of its activities in this regard are judicially and law oriented, many are not.

The work of the National Association of Manufacturers begins with the formulation of industry viewpoints on the major public issues and economic affairs of our times, which are of significance to manufacturers as well as to all citizens. It seeks to bring to public attention the views of American industry on the social, economic and related problems of our time, and to provide constructive proposals for the solution of these problems. The process by which these judgments are formulated has been carefully developed through the years, and today we believe the NAM policy-making mechanism provides the most practical method thus far devised for reflecting the considered views of American manufacturers.

These views are derived from the research, discussion and conclusions of 13 large policy committees, representing more than 3,000 member companies of all types and sizes, and from

all industries. When formulated by such committees and adopted by a majority vote, they are submitted to the NAM Board of Directors. The final determination of NAM policy is a function of the Board, and no individual or executive group of either staff or members may stand between a committee recommendation and the Board of Directors. In order to assure the widest possible support, a two-thirds majority vote by the Board is required.

Official NAM policy is the result of this forum of opinion operating continuously. All existing policies are reviewed annually, and new policies are developed to meet newly arising problems and proposals of public interest. Policies of the Association are normally stated in terms of broad principles.

In sum, the policy positions of the NAM seek to present to the American public the best thinking which American industry can bring to bear on public affairs, in full confidence that their acceptance by private citizens and by government will result in maximum growth of our economic system and greatest good to the greatest number in our society.

As a spokesman for organized industry, an important function of the Association is to act as liaison or point of contact in presenting industry's views to the Executive and Legislative Departments and administrative agencies of the Federal Government. Since many of these activities are legally oriented, the Law Department, of necessity, has definite functions and responsibilities for the furtherance of the Association's objectives and policies in this area.

The Law Department of the Association is located in Washington, D. C. It consists of a General Counsel, Associate General Counsel and three Assistant Counsel. The functions, responsibilities and activities of the Law Department fall into four major categories:

I. <u>Legal adviser to the Association, Officers, Directors and Committees.</u>

As legal adviser to the Association, it is the responsibility of the Law Department to advise and consult with its officers, Directors and committees and, at their request, or on its own initiative, to prepare legal opinions on matters coming before them for consideration. Such advice and consultation pertains to questions arising in actual or contemplated Association programs or activities, as well as the formulation of policy through standing committees or the Board of Directors.

The Law Department is also responsible for bringing to the attention of officers, Directors and committees any developments in the field of law, legal policy, legislation, or government administrative action which have a bearing on Association policies or activities. Thus, members of the Law Department staff are available for attendance at NAM committee meetings, when it is anticipated that information or advice on any question of law pertinent to the discussion will arise. In this way, we bring to the attention of the Association legal developments which may necessitate formulation of Association policy or a discussion of ways and means to implement existing policy.

II. Association business activities.

Since the NAM is a corporation, it has many of the same internal legal problems common to any business enterprise. These include such matters as:

A. Application of federal and state law to NAM business operations;

B. Review of contracts, leases, etc., to which the Association is a party;

C. Consultation on and handling of matters involving actual or possible litigation;

D. Interpretation of the NAM Constitution and By-Laws and the New York Membership Corporation Law as bearing on actual or contemplated Association organization and operations.

While these "housekeeping" chores do not bulk large in the amount of time required of Law Department personnel, there is a rather constant flow of such matters throughout the year.

III. Legal information services to members.

As I have indicated, a major activity of the Association is providing an information service for its membership. In this regard, the Law Department is responsible for supplying the membership adequate information pertaining to current developments in federal law.

This information is communicated to the membership through our Review of Legal Developments published regularly in the NAM NEWS. In addition, we publish memoranda on particular subjects as developments warrant. These "Memos" include analyses of pending legislation, court decisions of general interest, rulings and regulations of administrative agencies, and the like.

Beyond this, as occasion warrants, we put out special publications of a more formal nature analyzing a particular subject or development which is of interest to the membership. Such publications, for example, might include an interpretative summary and analysis of decisions under the National Labor Relations Act or those in the field of trade regulation. Our objective in such studies is to point out and analyze trends in administration of the law.

We also handle oral or written inquiries from members for legal information. In this connection, it should be noted that as a corporation we are forbidden from practicing law. In response to specific inquiries, we supply whatever background information we have available and thus try to assist members to reach an informed judgment. We do not, however, provide member companies with legal opinions or suggest a course of action.

IV. Government activities.

One of the several purposes of the Association is the support of or opposition to legislation as that legislation is judged in light of the principles stated in the NAM Constitution and as amplified by the Association's official policy positions.

Because of the importance of Government activities to the Association's membership, there is need for prompt dissemination of accurate and adequate information on developments as they occur, or when government programs are in the planning state. Consequently, a great part of the time and effort of the Law Department personnel is devoted to the field of government activity.

In this broad field, the functions and responsibilities of the Law Department can be divided into three areas: (1) Administrative, (2) Judicial, and (3) Legislative. As you know, these governmental activities are not exclusive; frequently developments are intimately related with a considerable amount of overlapping and intermingling.

(1) Administrative Agencies and Governmental Departments.

Without question, administrative rulings, court decisions, and legislative proposals relating thereto, have had an important bearing on the formulation, expression and implementation of Association policy over the years. Inevitably, this has become of greater importance to the membership as government has more and more extended into the regulation of business. Merely to recall the titles of major domestic legislation enacted in recent years suggests the direction and important impact of government on the everyday activities of manufacturing enterprises.

Statutes normally provide only a framework for regulation, leaving more precise guidelines and standards, which ultimately

govern business conduct, to be filled in by administrative interpretations and regulations and by court decisions. Since such guidelines and standards are constantly changing, one of our functions is to furnish information regarding such changes in order to assist members to conform with changed or new interpretations of the law.

It is our further responsibility to advise the Association as to important administrative or departmental decisions or rulings and, consistent with Association policy, to assist in planning and carrying through with individual agencies or departments programs for seeking modification or clarification of existing administrative regulations or decisions and to represent the Association in any formal proceedings before such agencies.

A recent illustration is our activity in connection with the new Executive Order and regulations in the matter of Equal Employment Opportunity on government contract work. This included a memorandum-analysis of the Executive Order (No. 10925) when it was first issued. We participated in the hearings before the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and presented a brief analyzing the proposed regulations, pointing out some of the practical problems which would confront manufacturers seeking to comply with these regulations. Following promulgation of these regulations in final form, we prepared another memorandum-analysis and made wide distribution of this, together with the text of the regulations, to all interested members.

Other illustrations would be our participation in the General Motors-UAW[1], "Agency Shop" case and the American Potash Company[2] case, a craft severance matter before the

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1/ General Motors Corporation, 130 NLRB No. 54 (1961). The issue was whether employees could be forced to pay a union sums in lieu of dues to keep their jobs in Indiana where the State right-to-work law prohibits compulsory union membership.

2/ American Potash and Chemical Corporation, 107 NLRB 1418 (1954). In this case the Board reviewed and revised its policies relating to severance of craft units from existing plant-wide or other comprehensive bargaining units.

National Labor Relations Board. In each of these instances, our participation was by invitation of the Board, since it was seeking the views of interested persons on these matters in an effort to formulate a policy for future application. In these instances, our views were presented in the form of amicus curiae briefs.

(2) Judicial.

Some of these interpretations or decisions by administrative agencies are controversial and must be litigated in order to obtain clarification in the courts. As matters of this sort come along involving issues of broad interest to the membership, we frequently intervene in an effort to make known the views of organized business with respect to the probable impact or practical effect of a particular decision. Being a national organization, such intervention is not at the local or state level. Intervention is usually at the national level when a case is before one of the administrative or executive agencies or departments or when a case has reached the Supreme Court for review. Many more requests for participation in particular cases are received than can be complied with; hence, intervention must be on a highly selective basis, with a determination made largely on the basis of the issue involved, its potential impact on industry generally, and whether an Association policy is involved.

Illustrative of our activities in this area are Williams v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc.[3], dealing with the question of state taxation of interstate commerce, the Hanson[4] case, involving the legality of a union-shop contract under the Railway Labor Act in a state having a "right-to-work" law, the

3/ Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959).

4/ Railway Employees' Department, AFL, IAM, et al v. Hanson, et al, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).

Richfield Oil Corporation[5] case, where the issue was employee stock purchase plans as subjects for compulsory bargaining, the Cutter Laboratory[6] case, having to do with the right of employers to hire and fire for reasons other than union activity.

The Bay Ridge Operating Company[7] case, on the matter of "overtime on overtime" under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Mt. Clemens Pottery Company[8] case, dealing with portal-to-portal and clean-up time under the Fair Labor Standards Act are other examples of cases in which we participated. Actually, in the latter instance, our intervention was at the invitation of the District Court Judge, since he was desirous of obtaining views of interested persons who might be affected by the decision in this case. In this instance, we were also invited to present oral argument, along with the Department of Justice and other organizations, such as the CIO and AFL. Appearances and oral argument in matters of this kind are a rather rare occurrence since it is not often permitted by the various courts.

(3) Legislative.

The foregoing will suggest that the outcome of litigation frequently dictates the necessity for or desirability of corrective legislation. It is, I believe, fair to say that most remedial Federal legislation is stimulated by, or results from,

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5/ Richfield Oil Corporation v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717 (CADC 1956).

6/ Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).

7/ Bay Ridge Operating Co., Inc. v. James Aaron et al, 334 U.S. 446 (1948). The basic issue here was whether contractually provided overtime payments were required to be included in the total of employee compensation in computing the "regular rate" upon which statutory overtime premium pay is based.

8/ Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). In the Supreme Court, prior to remand, the question was whether certain activities preliminary and postliminary to actual work was working time for purposes of computing statutory overtime.

administrative rulings or court decisions. This was the situation in the so-called "portal-to-portal" and "overtime on overtime" cases. Following the final decisions in these cases, Congress recognized that there should be some clarification of the law in order to avoid the possibility of very substantial retroactive back pay liability and unanticipated "windfall" payments to employees covered by the statute. Corrective legislation was therefore introduced, and after extended hearings by both House and Senate Committees, the Fair Labor Standards Act was amended in a manner designed to minimize the possibility of future litigation of a similar nature.

Legislation also resulted from the Supreme Court decision in the Stockham Valves & Fittings Company case. This case presented the question of whether a state could levy its general net income tax on the interstate selling activities of the respondent company without violating the protection afforded by the commerce clause and the due process clause of the Constitution. In other words, whether the imposition of such a tax on purely interstate business constituted such a burden on interstate commerce as to be forbidden by the Constitution.

The Court held that states could impose such taxes, which raised the probability of companies having to pay income taxes on interstate business done in all fifty states with the definite likelihood that in many instances taxes would have to be paid on more than 100% of net income. In recognition of the problems thus created, legislation was introduced and, after hearings and debate, the Congress enacted into law language designed to minimize the broad impact of the decision. Admittedly, the language adopted was not a complete solution of the problem since it defined only a relatively small area of business activity to be protected against this multiple burden of taxation. In the same legislation, however, the Congress provided for a further inquiry by Congressional committees, looking toward a more comprehensive and equitable legislative solution.

It is anticipated that committee hearings pursuant to this legislation will be held later this year.

A series of Labor Board and court decisions, and the growth of union economic power, over a period of 12 years, focused attention on, and made clear the need for, Congressional action to make the Wagner Act of 1935 more equuitable in a number of respects. Decisions circumscribing the right of free speech of employers, permitting broad-scale secondary boycott activity and jurisdictional disputes, as well as certain union unfair labor practices, were among decisions considered and which Congress sought to correct by appropriate amendments. These amendments, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, were made a part of the National Labor Relations Act. Somewhat the same situation led to further amendments embodied in the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 when Congress again felt it necessary to correct Labor Board and judicial decisions which had opened loopholes in several of the remedial provisions adopted in the Taft-Hartley Act.

Court decisions are almost constantly suggesting legislation in the field of trade regulation law. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil[9/] case, upholding the "good faith defense" provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act in price discrimination cases, is an example of a decision which has led to the repeated introduction of legislation designed to overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute.

The foregoing will illustrate activities of the Association which relate to the judicial process and which of necessity are a major concern of the Law Department. All legislation, whether proposed or enacted, has legal implications which must be understood and evaluated in terms of its potential impact on business and therefore the members of the Association.

Frequently, legislation is not the result of administrative

9/ Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).

decisions or the judicial process but is designed to initiate or modify a national policy. Tax policy, housing, public power, wage and price controls, are among the subjects of frequent legislative consideration and action. In all these broader areas of public policy, the Association has a legitimate interest. Its activity with respect to Federal legislation may be summarized under four rather definite stages to indicate the normal procedure or pattern of activity connected with any program undertaken by the Association.

(1) Formulation of Association position or policy with respect to legislation. This may cover the substance of specific legislation introduced and pending before Congress; or it may involve development of viewpoint with respect to a general question of public policy which may or may not currently be a subject of consideration by either House of Congress. As I have indicated, this process necessarily is a continuing one, in many instances a necessary precedent to adoption of any Association policy, and to the extent that it relates to any specific legislation, it may continue beyond its enactment or defeat.

(2) Seeking to inform the general public, as well as members of the Association, of the import and possible effect of legislation or general questions of public policy with the definite object of gaining public acceptance of the principles or viewpoint of manufacturers as reflected through a policy or position adopted by the Association.


(3) Acquiring and reporting information concerning the scope, effect and prospects for legislation of particular interest to manufacturers, in much the same manner as newspaper investigating and reporting. This includes the reporting of developments at public hearings, reporting the progress of legislation through the Congress, and in general keeping members of the Association advised on legislative trends and developments.

(4) Direct efforts to influence legislation, on which the Association formally, officially, and publicly has taken a

definite position or attitude. These efforts include communication of NAM policy position to Members of Congress in the form of letters from officers of the Association, appearances of witnesses representing the Association before Committees of Congress in public hearings, and by direct communication to members of the Association from time to time suggesting that if they have a viewpoint with respect to particular legislation pending in Congress, they communicate that viewpoint to their representative.

As you might have gathered from this outline of the NAM's purposes and methods of operation, its effectiveness in all of its activities is primarily dependent upon the actions of its members. Especially is this so in the area of federal legislation. Thus the Association, through its staff, serves essentially as an agent for its members to report to them trends and developments, as well as the content, scope and progress of legislation in the Congress. It should be emphasized, however, that the Association exercises no control over the action or inaction of its individual members.

Nor does the Association seek to influence legislation, either directly or indirectly, by engaging in political activities seeking the election or defeat of candidates for public office. The Association, as a corporation, is subject to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and makes no contributions or expenditures for or against candidates for public office. As I have indicated, the Association's legislative activities consist primarily of presenting its viewpoint to the Congress at public hearings, or by written or oral communications to individual Members of Congress, without coercion, threats of reprisal or promise of benefit.


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POLICY PREFERENCES OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AND CONSTITUENTS*

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One of the fundamental propositions of democratic theory and practice calls for a responsive linkage between the policy desires of the constituent and the policy acts of the political leader. A properly classic simplicity characterizes the institutional forms designed to promote this proposition in American government. Particularly at the national level, single member districts, short terms, and popular election by the majority rule are all directed in a very straightforward fashion at maintaining public surveillance and control over the actions of public officials. The objective is to assure that government of and for the people is also government by the people.

The evolution of political form and practice has been little influenced by the work of behavioral science. The politicians, "the interests," and the reformers--those whose social or economic values have been affected by the acts of government--have been responsible for the important controversies over the design of government and the institutions of politics. And yet, in a rather curious and roundabout fashion, modern behavioral science through various bits and pieces of evidence has of late asserted the relevance of its concerns for the problems of government and political theory. It has called into question the adequacy of some of the assumptions and the propriety of some of the aspirations which underly prescriptions for changing--or maintaining--the institutional framework within which the actions of government are sponsored and executed. The social scientist has certainly done no better than the nuclear scientist in resolving the questions surrounding the civic and professional roles of the scientist, hence there is great hazard in attributing a point of view to social science rather than social reform. Nevertheless, an Almond writing about The American

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People and Foreign Policy, or a Schumpeter writing about Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, or a Berelson, writing on Voting are writing in part out of dispassionate interest in the discrepancy between the world they have come to know as scholarly observers and the world as others have described it.

At least one substantial body of information supplied by social science has, in its regular accretions through recent years, moved strongly against one of the bastions of democratic theory. The assumption that the citizen at large is competent to speak on matters of public policy has been challenged. The challenge takes the form of documentation of the lack of public information, knowledge, interest or involvement in political affairs. At times the idiocy of the investigator and the good will of those members of the public whom he interviews combine to mock the man in the street. This occurs when he is asked in apparent good faith for his opinion on the American Metals Act or some other non-existent phenomenon, and when he obliges by favoring or opposing the fabrication of reality. But even under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to discover evidence of a reasonable level of competency in public consideration of policy alternatives.

One consequence of the apparent demonstration that a mass electorate cannot cope with crucial questions of policy has been an attempt--of probably dubious merit--to change the rules of the game. If the public cannot choose among policies it does not understand, the argument runs, it can choose between candidates--between people it has come to know. Some part of the current interest in the cult of political personality must be attributed to the commentators, including some political scientists, who have taken empirical findings about public knowledge of issues at their inferential value and have proceeded to argue that candidate personality must be important because nothing else is. In some mystical manner the argument at times is brought full circle; democracy would be threatened by the paucity of popular concern over issues, except for the richness of popular interest in candidates, and since the winning candidate will make the policies, his personal appeal constitutes a viable surrogate for his policy position as he contends for public favor. Whether such argument has substantial merit is less pertinent than the fact that it is made with increasing frequency--and by the liberal defender of democracy as often as by the detractor.

The other gross alternative to the presumed problem--denial of its existence by denial of the validity of assertions of limited public political competence--is scarcely more acceptable. The idea that virtually everybody, and certainly everybody who votes, understands and rationally appraises alternative schemes for financing medical care or education, or for changing the national tax structure, flies in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Public competence in solving the problems of society is gravely restricted. The quality of public involvement in politics is probably

closer to that assumed by the proponents of autocratic schemes of government than to that assumed by most theories of democratic government. And yet it seems premature to attempt definitive conclusions about the inevitable fate of democracy or about the desirability of various alternatives designed to affect that fate. Recent methodological innovations make it possible to extend exponentially our information about the actual operation of our present system of popular government. And many of the consequences of this extension argue that the system in fact works somewhat differently, and possibly better, than some of us have recently come to believe.

I: Public Demand and Legislative Response

One problem constantly before both the political analyst and the political practitioner is that of comprehending a process that is of immense scope and intricately complex in form. It is difficult for the single person to observe more than a portion of the phenomena involved in a national political system, it is impossible for the single person to know intimately more than a fraction of that which he observes. The research techniques of modern social science serve variously to increase the sweep and scope of systematic observation or to add to the depth and intensity of more limited explorations. Survey research is peculiarly suitable for the former objective. It has in the past made possible the rigorous study of theretofore unmanageably large populations. It can also be utilized for the analysis of the functional intersection of conceptually separable populations, any one of which would be excessively large for detailed study by the individual scholar. In the case at hand, the sample survey may be adapted to the systematic study of some of the interrelationships which bind together the constituents and their elected governmental representatives. The ability to array systematically data comparing the policy positions taken by constituents--or constituencies--and by their representatives reduces the need for inference about many problems. As usually follows when new information is acquired, that ability also defines new problems and creates the need for new inferences.

The basic design for the investigation to be considered in this paper calls for the analysis of covariation between the policy demands of constituencies and the policy acts of their representatives. The constituencies are, in this instance, congressional districts and the representatives are the congressmen (and for some purposes, the non-incumbent candidates for congress) from the same districts. The policies at issue include the extent of American international involvement, the extent of federal social welfare activity, and the extent of federal civil rights activity. In the present exposition we shall treat only the topic of social welfare legislation in any detail.[1]

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[1]The components of our measurements of policy position on social welfare are: three statements of policy assessed by the constituents who are asked to agree or disagree with the desirability of national governmental involvement on full employment, aid to education and the

It may be noted that it is not necessary for the analysis of covariation to argue the intrinsic or absolute location of respective policy positions. It is sufficient to sustain the proposition that the information about individual policies provides for differentiation between individuals, separating those more in favor from those less in favor of a general proposition about the extent of federal governmental activity. By assigning ordinal values to the response patterns of individuals we can estimate the aggregated or average policy position of the constituency or the central tendency of a candidate's position. We are thus content to order constituencies, and congressional candidates, on presumed continua extending, simply, from "greater support for activity" to "less support." With such orderings achieved, we can then ask such particular questions as, "are those constituencies most in favor of a specified activity by government represented by those congressmen who are also most in favor of the same activity?" "Do anti-civil rights congressmen come from anti-civil rights districts more often than do pro-civil rights congressmen, where pro and anti are really defined in terms of relatively more and relatively less support for civil rights action?" More generally we can ask, is there a correlation between the relative policy positions of congressional constituencies and the relative policy positions of the candidates from the constituencies?

The answers to this question vary by policy area. Table 1, below, summarizes the data. These basic findings do not provide an adequate response to the large concerns about public competence in treating the major issues of the day. In fact, they serve more as a brake on our desires to draw any simple conclusion. On the one hand, we have absolutely no experience in assessing the magnitude of such statements of policy agreement between representative and represented. There is no obvious basis on which to judge how high is high. It may be that a correlation of .5, as in the case of civil rights, is too high. Viewing the contemporary scene, one is tempted to conclude that the polarization and drawing of lines which bind constituency and congressman together at that level indicate we have passed at least marginally beyond the boundaries within which government can achieve compromise and the peaceful as well as equitable resolution of social conflict. At the same time, the social welfare correlation stands at .3, and yet there is considerable evidence that some aspects of political polarization around social welfare matters have recently--as in 1948--been much more accentuated than at present without the tensions presently associated with civil rights.

On the other hand, although we know little about the implications of varying magnitudes of policy correlation, it seems evident that substantial agreement between constituents and congressmen can and does

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production of electric power and housing; four statements of policy assessed by the congressional candidates who are asked about their positions on full employment, aid to education, public housing and public development of atomic power; and the roll call records of members of the 85th Congress as they pertain to the general topic of governmental action on social welfare legislation.

Table 1

District Policy Preferences in Relation to Roll Call Behavior of Congressmen

A. Social Welfare

Congressional Roll Call Position	District Policy Preference: Pro	Moderate	Con
Con	192*	117	625
Moderate	322	108	244
Pro	418	122	296

Rank Order Correlation, Tb = +.25

B. Foreign Policy

Congressional Roll Call Position	District Policy Preference: Pro	Moderate	Con
Con	297	451	151
Moderate	318	122	157
Pro	361	274	345

Rank Order Correlation, Tb = -.06

C. Civil Rights

Congressional Roll Call Position	District Policy Preference: Pro	Moderate	Con
Con	60	116	605
Moderate	197	88	90
Pro	774	276	240

Rank Order Correlation, Tb = +.46

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*The table entries are sums of weights assigned to the districts located at each intersection. The weights are derived from a complex sample and do not directly reflect the effective number of cases involved, but merely the apportionment of those cases.

exist. Without yet understanding the mechanisms which produce that agreement, we may note some provocative indications that it is not entirely a matter of the charity of the congressmen. Foreign policy, at the bottom of the totem pole, is also the area most remote from the constituent. Civil rights, at the other extreme, has recently become the focus for the most intense and widespread of public opinions. Social welfare matters, although at the moment perhaps less salient politically, are the subject of persistent public interest extending back through two or more decades in the current era. There is, in short, a rough coincidence between the level of policy agreement and the amount of public information and concern about the policy area. This is not unlike that which the proponents of popular government might envision as proper--although the reasons for its existence may well be considerably off the democratic mark. The point is the obvious possibility that those of us who have denied and decried the likelihood of popular decisions on matters of policy may have overstated the case.

Specification of the correlation--the level of policy agreement--between the policy positions of constituency and congressman is in some senses the ultimate objective of the analysis planned for this study. But equal interest and greater theoretical significance may lie in the other elements of the representational process which the study is designed to reflect. If the policy demands of the electorate constitute the "input," and if the roll call behaviors of congressmen constitute at least a provisional "output" of the system, what devices do we use to explain the connection between the two? One possibility, and that with which we will now be concerned, assumes that the linkage is to be found within the perceptions and attitudes of the congressman.

Three conceptually distinct mechanisms would seem to exhaust the logically possible alternative connections. First, the congressman may be a representative in the broadest sense; he may be typical of, or close to the average of, all persons in the constituency. Of course, many congressmen assert this to be the case, "How do I know what my people want? They want what I want, but not because it's my idea--we just all think alike on problems like this." Insofar as the congressman really is of his district, definitions of role, instructions from the party or the congressman's morning mail provide only a superficial overlay, a minor supplement to his intrinsic ability to reflect district sentiment in his own behavior because he is representative of the district.[2]

In addition to the involuntary representation which occurs under such circumstances, there is also the representation which is a consequence of the congressman's perception that the constituency favors a

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[2]A persuasive discussion of this point is presented in Aage Clausen, "A Theory of Involuntary Representation," unpublished manuscript.

particular position. That position may or may not coincide with the congressman's view of the right and the just, but he is aware of it as an entity separable from his own view. It should go without saying that his perception of district position may be less than completely accurate, and it may be of minor importance to the congressman in his decision making. Nevertheless, if the district position is perceived it is at least possible for it to be transmitted by the congressman into roll call behavior.

The third mechanism which may unite district sentiment and congressional behavior is to be found in the category of policy demands which are not perceived by the congressman as reflecting district sentiment but which are in line with constituency desires. Thus, without knowing whether or not the party organization reflects general district interests, a congressman may well respond upon occasion to party demands. If the party is in tune with the district, it will be advancing the cause preferred by the district. A responsive congressman will be "aided" in his representation of the district even though he perceives the demand in less inclusive terms.

Two of these three modes of linkage, the congressman's own attitude and his perception of district opinion, can be treated directly in the analysis plan. The third must be introduced inferentially as concern for less-than-district-wide factors and is treated as a means of testing relationships involving direct reflection of district opinion. Both the latter mode of linkage and the congressman's perception of district attitudes may be viewed primarily as mechanisms involving communication from the district to the congressman. Where involuntary representation may be a function of party recruitment policies or the location of the congressman in the district's social or economic structure, the other mechanisms come into being only as a consequence of direct communication attempts.

To illustrate the information which can be derived through analytic combination of the two modes of the linkage for which we have direct evidence, let us consider the general case involving social welfare legislation. Figure 1 displays eight of the relationships which may be generated among the four variables which have now been identified. The correlation for Relationship (1) indicates a modest degree of accuracy in congressmen's perceptions of their districts' policy positions. Although the relationship is considerably less than perfect, +.19, the districts expressing greater support for federal action on social welfare did tend to be so perceived by their congressmen, opposing districts tended to be seen as opposing, etc.[3]

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[3]The correlations reported here and in the balance of the paper are computed by a process involving the averaging of differences of proportions. In general they are somewhat higher than Kendall's Tau Beta computed on the same data, exceeding Tb by .02 to .05; they are very close approximations of standard product moment correlations. The multiple correlations are also an approximation of a more standard expression in that they are derived from contingency statements rather than from regression analyses.




Figure 1.

Social Welfare: Representation Relationships Among Basic Design Variables

The relationship between district opinion and the congressman's own personal opinion is reflected by the correlation of +.22 for Relationship (2). In this particular instance, there was about the same degree of congruence between a congressman's position and that of his district as there was between his perception of district position and the actual district policy preference.

We have two indications that a congressman's attitude and his perception of district opinion are not identical. The more direct measure is provided by Relationship (4), which expresses the correlation between the entities. The +.35 correlation pertaining to social welfare matters suggests considerable overlap but also very substantial independence. Conservative congressmen did not always see their districts as conservative, more liberal congressmen did not always see their districts as liberal, etc. An immediately more important indication of the relative independence of the congressmen's attitudes and perceptions is provided by Relationship (3). This relationship involves the combined or multiple correlation between district attitude on the one hand and a combination of congressmen's attitudes and perceptions on the other. The independence of the latter two is reflected in the fact that in combination they provided a better account of district attitudes than did either element taken alone.

Another way of stating the same thing is to think of each correlation as a measure of ability to predict district opinion knowing only the congressman's attitude or knowing only his perception of district opinion. Either piece of information by itself would allow a better than chance prediction of district attitude; when they are taken together, the ability to predict cumulates and improves quite substantially.

The magnitude of this multiple correlation is important because, except for the intervention of the third mechanism of linkage, it sets an upper limit on the ultimate tie between district attitude and congressman's roll call. When taken together, congressman's attitude and perception of district may account for or reflect only a portion of the variability in constituency preferences. It seems intuitively clear that even if subsequent roll behavior is a perfect mirror image of the combination of congressman's attitude and perception of district, that mirror image can reflect only as much of district attitude as has been captured by the two intervening mechanisms.

The same logic may be applied separately to candidate attitude or to candidate perception of district attitude. Only that part of the variance in district attitude which is reflected by a mechanism can be transmitted through the mechanism to the floor of the House and eventuate as roll call behavior.

The last four relationships specified in Figure 1, those labelled (5), (6), (7) and (8), illustrate the consequences of this logic in the particular case chosen for illustration. Both candidate attitude and candidate perception of district attitude were highly correlated with the

candidates' roll call behavior, with simple correlations of +.57 and +.47 respectively. In combination they explained a considerable portion of that roll call behavior, a multiple correlation of +.59. Nevertheless, the ultimate tie between district attitude and congressman's roll call was represented by a correlation of only +.25. (And this correlation may have been supported in part by the third category of mechanisms--factors which influenced the roll call and helped bring it into line with district preferences although they were independent of the congressman's own attitude, and were not perceived by him as reflecting district opinion.) Consequently, it seems that the weaker points in the linkage are those responsible for connecting the congressman to his district rather than those having to do with the roll call implementation of those connections. His roll call may be very closely related to his perception of district preferences, but he is restricted in his ability to reflect those preferences because of perceptual inaccuracies. His roll call may be even more closely related to his own attitude; it is the relatively tenuous tie between his attitude and the preference of his district that forestalls more faithful representation by this route.

Depending upon one's expectations and one's values, this first display of data may have induced silent despair or barely contained exultation. The preferences of the people were reflected in the acts of their leaders. The reflection was nearly as much a matter of congressional honoring of constituent wishes, for whatever reason, as it was of the recruitment of representative representatives. At the same time, the variations in district preference were captured only in minor part by the congressman, and his subsequent adherence to his own values and to those perceived in his constituents was only moderately successful in transforming constituent demand into policy action.

For some purposes it is appropriate to treat the constituency as an undifferentiated whole, as we just have done. For the purposes of exploration and understanding, however, it is useful to contemplate at least one major division of the district into two parts, those constituents (both voters and non-voters) whose choice between contending candidates goes to the incumbent and those who are the supporters (both active and inactive) of the challenging non-incumbent.

In parallel fashion, it is instructive to juxtapose incumbent candidates (who have been treated thus far as congressmen) and the non-incumbents who contest for their seats. By definition this division of candidates precludes a symmetrical exploration of roll call behavior. The triad of relationships involving constituent attitudes, candidate attitudes and candidate perception of constituent attitudes will, therefore, be the focus of the next part of this discussion.

The subdivision of constituents and the comparison of relationships involving both parts and their respective candidate choices discloses a number of important elements in the process of representation. Four features of Table 2 may be singled out for brief comment.

Table 2

Representation Relationships Among Selected Basic Design Variables, in Relation to Two Categories of Candidates and Two Definitions of Constituents

	Candidate Attitude by District Attitude (Relationship 2 in Figure 1)	Candidate Perception of District by District Attitude (Relationship 1 in Figure 1)	Multiple Correlation (Relationship 3 in Figure 1)
Incumbent Candidates			
Incumbent Supporters	+.37	+.26	+.41
Non-Incumbent Supporters	+.08	+.05	+.14
Non-Incumbent Candidates			
Incumbent Supporters	-.41	+.31	-.08
Non-Incumbent Supporters	+.01	+.11	+.07

One of the striking discoveries involves the relationships between candidates' attitudes and the attitudes of their supporters. Each set of candidates shows relatively more agreement with its own supporters than with the supporters of the opposition. The differences are substantial: .29 for incumbents (the spread between +.37 and +.08), and .42 for non-incumbents (the difference between -.41 and +.01). The implication is, of course, that candidates are clearly more representative of their own groups within the district than of the district as a unit. It is also of at least passing interest to note that, in somewhat more absolute terms, neither set of candidates gave a particularly faithful reflection of the policy preferences of the supporters of the non-incumbents. The rather sharp party cleavage which permeates social welfare issues apparently found non-incumbent challengers taking positions that were more in opposition to the incumbent candidates than they were in line with the policy preferences of their own supporters.

The general in-group out-group differentiation of the candidate's own attitudes appears even more significant when contrasted with relationships involving the candidates' perception of district opinion. Here, we may infer, political reality is more or less efficiently communicated to both sets of candidates. Non-incumbent and incumbent alike perceived their districts more in terms of the dominant group of constituents (the supporters of the incumbent) than in terms of the minority. (An appropriate shift in definition of constituent sub-groups, separating majority from minority, supports this interpretation with a heightening of the appropriate differences.) Although a candidate's own attitude may be a product of his supporters' desires and his own desire to accentuate the differences between himself and his opponent, he is not blind to the political reality of the actual division of policy sentiment in his district.

The reflection of constituent attitudes in the combination of candidate attitudes and perceptions follows from the simple relationships involving the component parts and contains no major surprises. As we should expect, incumbent candidates did a better overall job of responding to the sentiment of their supporters (multiple correlation of .41) than they did to the sentiment of the total district (.36, as in Figure 1). Non-incumbent candidates would, inferentially, do a much less faithful job of mirroring district sentiment. In fact, they promise to perform less well in reflecting even their own supporters' sentiments than do the incumbents. We know too little to predict the consequences of the impact of actual participation as a congressman on the representative potential of a candidate. It seems likely that the election process winnows out those least likely to reflect district demands. It is also probable that candidate attitudes and perceptions both undergo substantial change once the candidate faces the challenges of performing as a congressman and then standing for reelection. Subsequent analysis of such possible consequences of the operation of the political process can and will be pursued in at least a limited fashion. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to note here that the social welfare policy alternatives offered by the non-incumbent challengers were not calculated to mesh with district demands at a level competitive with the promise or indeed the performance of the incumbent. And this despite an accuracy of perception of constituent demands fully on a par with the perceptions of the incumbent candidates.

II. Communications: Effort, Channels and Results

The accuracy of a congressional candidate's reflection of constituent policy preferences may be attributed to many factors but it is certainly very much a function of direct communications between them. It would be highly desirable to know in detail the patterns of communications between candidates and constituents but we have only limited information available for our present analysis. There is doubtless considerable variation in the extent to which constituents attempt to inform and influence their candidates, just as there is variability in the effort candidates expend in ascertaining district opinion. Unfortunately, we have no information about the quantity or the quality of communications attempts initiated by constituents. Our information comes exclusively from the candidates' side. This information includes a general assessment of the relative effort expended by the candidate to find out about district opinion. It also embraces the candidates' descriptions of the means by which they gather this information. The incidence of each of these is described in Table 3, below, for the incumbent candidates in our study.

The congressman's general efforts to exploit the various channels of communication in order to ascertain the policy preferences of his district quite apparently pay off in terms of the resultant level of policy agreement. The mechanism by which agreement between district attitude and congressman's roll call is ultimately achieved is, however, not entirely a matter of information gathering. Figure 2, below,

presents the first set of pertinent data. The general outline of differences in representational relationships associated with the extent of the congressman's effort to learn about district opinion is quite marked. All but two of the relationships are substantially larger when the congressman makes a great effort.

Table 3

Information Gathering Characteristics of Members of Congress, 85th Congress

		Reliance on...				
	Effort Expended	Opinion Polls	Party Organization	Newspapers	Mail	Personal Contact
A great deal	51%	6%	8%	5%	25%	62%
	--*					--
Quite a bit	28	7	10	27	30	19
					--	
Some	16	11	15	24	23	8
			--	--		
Not much	3	15	28	29	19	8
		--				
None	2	61	39	15	3	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Indicates division used in defining categories of congressmen for analysis of communications effect.

The information seeking congressman does not simply acquire a more accurate picture of his district; both his personal opinions and his perception of district opinion are more tightly bound to the actual preference of the district. At the same time, the information seeker does, apparently, give greater weight to his sense of constituent preferences when it comes to casting a roll call vote. There is virtually no difference between the two categories of congressmen (those making greater and those making lesser effort to ascertain district opinion), in the extent to which their own attitudes are bound into their perceptions of district attitude (correlations of +.35 and +.37, respectively). Nor is there any difference in the combined contribution of these two elements to their roll call behavior (multiple correlations of +.62 and +.68, respectively). There is a striking difference, however, in the relative contribution which each element makes to that behavior.

It would seem that the congressman's expenditure of energy in search of information may reflect a pervasive and important aspect of role orientation. The congressman who is less active in seeking out the views of his constituents is less likely to reflect those




Figure 2, A

Social Welfare: Representation Relationships Among Basic Design Variables for Those Congressmen Who Make a Great Effort to Ascertain District Opinion




Figure 2, B

Social Welfare: Representation Relationships Among Basic Design Variables for Those Congressmen Who Make Less Effort to Ascertain District Opinion

views in his perception of them; he is also less likely to reflect those views in his own attitudes and, consequently, in his roll call performance. Instead, he defers to his own policy preferences with great regularity when called upon to take legislative action. The information seeker not only acquires more accurate information about his district, he also gives more weight to that information when reaching a policy action decision point. The net result is an appreciably higher level of policy agreement as his actions on the floor of the House match the preferences of his district back home.

Although very few congressmen consider themselves to be practicing social scientists, it is possible to imagine a good many of them recognizing both the intent and the consequences of these patterns of attitude and action. Unless the congressman is a data gathering social scientist, it is less likely that he would anticipate the consequences of these patterns for each of the two parts of the constituency we have mentioned earlier, the supporters of the incumbent and the supporters of the non-incumbent. To facilitate inspection of the relevant data, Table 4 presents the four sets of representation relationships in tabular form rather than as entries in schematic diagrams like those used in Figures 1 and 2.

The congressman's thirst for knowledge about his district benefits the entire district as the view which he adopts as his own appears to reflect a compromise honoring the preference of his opposition as well as that of his support. Very possibly, the causal sequence is actually initiated by his conception of his role as that of agent for the district, a representative both of and for the entire constituency. His own views thus may be intended to be representative views, and he may continue to strive to achieve familiarity with views other than his own. Where his perception of constituent demand reflects the actual demand, as in the case of his own supporters, his ability to represent that demand exceeds the potentiality offered by his own preferences alone. Where his perception is less related to constituent preferences, as in the case of the demands of the opposition, his roll call behavior is less often in keeping with the aspiration. But even though his legislative decisions reflect opposition demands less often than the demands of his supporters, the net result is substantial policy agreement with both.

The congressman who strives less diligently to know his district may intend to emulate Burke, but inadvertently or not, he ends up behaving as the agent of his supporters and the enemy of the opposition. The key to his roll call behavior is found, as we have noted, in his own policy commitments. Whether as a consequence of party recruitment policy, the necessities imposed by political competition in primary or general election, or for some other compelling reason, his own policy views are closely related to those of his supporters and are systematically out of phase with the preferences of the opposition. Since his perception of district demand plays but a minor role in determining his roll call vote, the fact of moderate agreement of his perception with the preferences of his supporters, and even modest agreement of his perception with the preferences of the opposition, is submerged by the greater importance of the respective agreement and disagreement of attitudes.

Table 4

Representation Relationships Associated with Candidate Effort to Ascertain District Opinion, for Two Categories of Constituents

	Candidate Attitude + Candidate Perception = District Attitude		Candidate Attitude x District Attitude	Candidate Perception x District Attitude		Candidate Attitude x Candidate Perception		Candidate Attitude x Roll Call	Candidate Perception x Roll Call		Candidate Attitude + Perception = Roll Call		District Attitude x Roll Call
Candidate Makes Great Effort													
Incumbent Supporter	+39		+22	+31		+35		+48	+56		+62		+33
Non-Incumbent Supporter	+32		+37	+03		+35		+48	+56		+62		+18
Candidate Makes Less Effort													
Incumbent Supporter	+58		+57	+32		+37		+75	+30		+68		+53
Non-Incumbent Supporter	-09		-29	+10		+37		+75	+30		+68		-23

Our speculation about the contributions of different role orientations to the process of representation is supported, rather than challenged, by the division of constituents into the two categories. The distinct functions performed by candidate attitude in one setting and candidate perception of district attitude in the other are accentuated by the differentiation of constituent groups. However, the implications of these findings go well beyond the simple set of ideas with which we have been working. One wonders about the nature of Incumbent Supporter--Non-incumbent Supporter relations in the two sets of districts defined by the information seeking activities of the candidates. Is information-seeking simply a consequence of role definition or are both the result of a given level of partisan competition or of a particular degree of discipline exerted by the party organization? Do the classic distinctions among representational roles produce the assumed consequences (greater policy agreement with the agent and lesser agreement with the trustee) or is the overall level of policy agreement more dependent upon intra-district homogeneities than we have imagined? When roll call agreement with four different groups of constituents may range from +.53 to +.33, to +.18 and down to -.23 it would seem that we are confronted with variations in the functioning of the system which our present level of understanding fails to comprehend. Exploitation of data at hand should allow us to find answers to many of the questions we are now led to ask.

The detailed analysis of the individual modes of information gathering which are used by candidates is no less illuminating than the study of candidate information seeking in general. Each medium of communication is associated with a more or less unique set of representational relationships. Some of the relationships are quite predictable, or at least not unexpected. Others are less orthodox, or at least they seem so until one's compulsion to comprehend makes them seem as reasonable as any.

The reportedly most prevalent mode of congressman-constituent communication, personal contact with constituents, bears little responsibility for the evidence we have observed of overall policy agreement with the entire district. The data associated with reliance on personal contact are noteworthy, however, for the sharpness with which they outline the potential for differential functioning of the linking mechanisms of our model.

Most striking is the singular role played by the congressman's own attitude for those congressmen who place relatively less emphasis on personal contact. As the third row of Table 5 indicates, the moderate agreement between candidate and district attitudes (+.35) apparently bears sole responsibility in this situation for the ultimate degree of policy agreement, the correlation of +.25 between congressman's roll call and the attitudes of his supporters. Among these congressmen, perception of district attitude is totally unrelated to the actual attitudes of supporting constituents or to the congressman's own attitude; and there is only a tenuous relationship between perception of district and the congressman's roll call (+.10).

The congressman who emphasizes personal communication with his constituents presents a picture of better integrated and better balanced reliance on both his own attitude and his perception of district sentiment.

Table 5

Representation Relationships Associated with Congressman's Reliance on Personal Contacts For Information About District Attitudes

	Candidate Attitude + Candidate Perception = District Attitude		Candidate Attitude x District Attitude	Candidate Perception x District Attitude		Candidate Attitude x Candidate Perception		Candidate Attitude x Roll Call	Candidate Perception x Roll Call		Candidate Attitude + Perception = Roll Call		District Attitude x Roll Call
Relies More on Personal Contact													
Incumbent Supporter	+41		+23	+35		+56		+45	+66		+63		+36
Non-Incumbent Supporter	+07		+13	-12		+56		+45	+66		+63		-01
Relies Less on Personal Contact													
Incumbent Supporter	+32		+35	+01		+03		+82	+10		+64		+25
Non-Incumbent Supporter	+41		+13	+23		+03		+82	+10		+64		+15

He does follow his sense of district demand more closely than his own policy preferences when a roll call is tallied, and that sense of district sentiment is relatively well informed insofar as it is tied to the demands of his supporters. (Among congressmen emphasizing the different channels of communication, only those relying on party organization have a perception of district demand that is more closely linked to the actual preferences of their supporters.) But perception of district is also highly related to own attitude, and the combination of the two apparently accounts for a slightly higher level of policy agreement with his supporters (+.36 to +.25).

Dependence on personal contact does not produce a higher level of policy agreement with the entire district because it clearly inhibits representation of the opposition. Reliance on personal contact, as is the case with the active use of any of the other modes of communication as well, leads to a negative relationship between the policy demands of non-incumbent supporters in the district and the incumbent's perception of the district position. When accompanied by emphasis on perception of district in one's roll call behavior, the resultant statement of policy agreement involving supporters of the opposition is zero or slightly negative. (This is also the case with congressmen who rely on party organization or on newspapers.)

The problems of causal inference cannot be treated lightly in this analysis. In the absence of sequential data about the relevant attitudinal and behavioral states of the congressmen, it is always possible that choice of a particular communications channel is a result--or a correlate--rather than the cause of a given pattern of representation relationships. In the instance of personal contact, it may be that the meaningfully motivated act is that of the strong minded congressman avoiding the arguments and petitions of his constituents. He steers his own course and survives the electoral battle if that course coincides with the desires of his supporters. Such a sequence of events might account for a part of the sharp contrast between those who place greater and less reliance on personal communication, but it would not account for the well ordered pattern of relationships exhibited by those who make greater use of personal contacts. Our strategy for the future, in this instance as others, must be to search out the implications of each causal assumption and attempt relevant if not crucial tests of validation.

In the case at hand, it is at least consistent with the one array of data to argue that regard for district sentiment leads the congressman to seek out that sentiment through personal contacts. These contacts, we may infer, are with his source of electoral support and they produce a moderately precise clue to the predominant sentiment of that support. The congressman's own attitudes remain somewhat more often at odds with those of his supporters, perhaps as less partisan attitudes and therefore coincidentally modestly related to the attitudes of his opposition. Deference to his achieved view of district sentiment produces roll call behavior which resembles more his perception of district and less his own policy preferences. The result gives legislative effect to his supporters' demands while leaving the opposition to look elsewhere for a champion of their cause.

Avoidance of personal communication, whether out of temperament or because of severe adherence to imagined role perception, may be a risk-filled alternative. It may well be that it is successfully chosen only by those who through involuntary representation manage to serve their districts. Certainly among those who managed election to the 85th Congress we find no evidence of greater ultimate lack of responsiveness to district demands. Indeed, the slightly restricted degree of policy agreement with their own supporters was more than offset, for the district at large, by their legislative support for the demands of their opposition.

Congressmen reported only limited instances of reliance on the district party organization for information about district policy positions. But aside from the marked difference in incidence of use, reliance on the party organization seems to perform much the same set of functions as does personal contact. A few minor variations in the data blunt some of the sharper elements of the patterns of relationships observed in the analysis of personal contact, but no emendations of the general observations made there seem necessary. In fact, with party organization as the chosen source of information, agreement with supporters and disagreement with the opposition seems even more understandable.

Where data pertaining to the use of party organization and personal contact fire the imagination because of variations in the functional roles of attitude and perception, use of public opinion polls draws our attention as the communications technique most clearly associated with a high level of policy agreement. Again we do not know but what congressmen already in close rapport with their constituents chose opinion polls as a favorite confirming device. But two salient facts bear emphasis. Policy agreement between the roll calls of congressmen who make any use of polls and the policy preferences of their supporters reaches a correlation of +.61. This correspondence of roll call behavior and constituent demand far exceeds anything else we have discovered thus far in the study.

Moreover, policy agreement with the supporters of the opposition is higher for these congressmen than for congressmen who do not rely on polls (+.15 to +.04). This occurs despite substantial disagreement between opposition demand and congressman's perception of district demand. It apparently occurs because of the congressman's emphasis on his own attitudes in his roll call behavior--an emphasis which results in the roll call reflecting the considerable attitudinal agreement which exists between the congressman and both groups of constituents. Those who profess no interest in polls show only marginal policy agreement even with their own supporters (+.12).

The remaining channels of communication, newspapers and the congressman's mail, are associated with actual reductions in policy agreement with both sets of constituents. The data concerning use of the mail are set forth in Table 6. Once more, the comfortable explication of a causal sequence will become possible only after further analysis. Congressmen whose own attitudes are only tenuously integrated with district demands may turn to the press and letters from home for guidance. Or, congressmen who accept guidance from newspapers or mail may acquire attitudes less in tune with

Table 6

Representation Relationships Associated with Congressman's Reliance on His Mail For Information About District Attitudes

	Candidate Attitude + Candidate Perception = District Attitude		Candidate Attitude x District Attitude	Candidate Perception x District Attitude		Candidate Attitude x Candidate Perception		Candidate Attitude x Roll Call	Candidate Perception x Roll Call		Candidate Attitude + Perception = Roll Call		District Attitude x Roll Call
Relies More on Mail													
Incumbent Supporter	+26		+21	+12		+46		+73	+38		+65		+26
Non-Incumbent Supporter	+05		-01	-06		+46		+73	+38		+65		-06
Relies Less on Mail													
Incumbent Supporter	+51		+53	+01		+32		+54	+60		+70		+42
Non-Incumbent Supporter	+32		+26	+25		+32		+54	+60		+70		+22

those of their constituents. In any event, such guidance as they receive apparently does not result in any great accuracy in their perceptions of district sentiment. At best, neither the newspaper nor the mail appears capable of fulfilling the function its users among the congressmen assign to it. Whatever the ultimate explanation, those who rely on these devices to inform them of their constituents' wishes rely on relatively weak reeds and do not succeed in matching their colleagues' standards for representation of district demands.

We suggested at the beginning of this section that our early impressions from the analysis of specific modes of information gathering were impressions of quite unique patterns of representational relationships associated with each mode. Such impressions are also fostered by other aspects of the larger study. One of the predictable consequences of innovation in study design and data collection seems to be the discovery of variety and complexity where unity and simplicity had been thought to prevail. Although most of the data presented in this discussion have an obvious relevance for one or more of the ideas common to previous studies of representation and the legislative process, presentation of the data has raised more questions than have been laid to rest. Our collective ignorance concerning many elementary problems of political representation has been exposed. Our hope is that full exploitation of the data now incorporated in the study will permit a modicum of certitude in the results of the complete analysis. The study design was intended to permit virtual replication of many relationships, juxtaposing incumbent candidates and non-incumbent candidates, embracing three different policy areas, measuring constituent attitudes in 1956, 1958 and again in 1960, drawing on the roll calls of the 84th, 85th and 86th congresses, and using a wide range of perceptual, attitudinal and behavioral data gathered from both candidates and constituents. Old age, financial bankruptcy or other more academic ailments may interrupt the analysis now underway. But completion of the analysis should equip us with a fuller appreciation of what to do next time if not with a definitive understanding of the democratic processes of representation in the modern world.

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POLITICAL THEORY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA

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In recent years questions have frequently been raised about the contribution of the study of the political ideas of the past to a political science increasingly oriented to systematic knowledge about the present and future.[1] Without derogating the importance of political thought as a kind of interesting intellectual artifact and a part of the cultural heritage, students of politics may well wonder why it is worthwhile to devote their attentions to the political writings of bygone ages, particularly when the social problems of those ages seem, on the surface level, so different from our own. In answer to this question, it may be suggested, among other things, that political theory in itself has presumably been a variable in the shaping of political institutions, processes, and policies.[2] The relationship between ideas and practice poses problems, not new by any means, of interest to a

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[1]Charles S. Hyneman, The Study of Politics: The Present State of American Political Science (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), esp. chap. 11 and "References;" J. Roland Pennock, "Political Science and Political Philosophy," American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 1951), 1081-85; Harry Eckstein (rapporteur), "Political Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference," American Political Science Review, L (June, 1956), 475-87; David G. Smith, "Political Science and Political Theory," American Political Science Review, LI (September, 1957), 734-746; David E. Apter, "Theory and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, LI (September, 1957), 747-762; Arnold A. Rogow, "Comment on Smith and Apter: or, Whatever Happened to the Great Issues," American Political Science Review, LI (September, 1957), 763-775; Andrew Hacker, "Capital and Carbuncles: the 'Great Books' Reappraised," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (September, 1954), 775-786; etc.

[2]Cf. Frederick M. Watkins, "Political Theory as a Datum of Politics," Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. by Roland Young (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 148-54; Robert G. McCloskey, "American Political Thought and the Study of Politics," in ibid., pp. 155-71; Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 484-5; Thomas I. Jenkin, The Study of Political Theory (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1955).

variety of social science disciplines. These problems are very much apparent in the subject matter of political science. Politics is a sphere of activity about which men have been unusually articulate and reflective, and the writing and studying of political thought has often proceeded on the assumption, sometimes unexamined, that theory does have an impact on political practice.

It seems pertinent, therefore, to ask questions about the nature, intensity, and direction of this influence of political ideas on the arrangements and activities that make up the political matrix in social life. Such questions are implied in our general topic, political theory and national development. The subject is one on which the interests of students of the history of political thought converge with those of students of structure and behavior. It involves the use of the storehouse of data provided by political history in the exploration of a persistent and central social relationship. It evokes consideration of the meaning of intellectual activity, prescription, valuation and description. It is a subject that provides one of several bridges between segments of the discipline sometimes thought to have dissimilar and even antithetical purposes. This bridge, however, is one that can be used only with some difficulty. The operations required to uncover the linknges between idea and action are in any case troublesome. They are perhaps particularly so at the level of the gross units of analysis with which political science characteristically deals and on which our topic is stated. Because of the importance of these problems of approach, and because it is clearly impossible in the brief scope of this paper to "cover" the contribution of political theory to the development of the Anglo-Saxon nations, what follows will be devoted largely to the problems of the problem itself, with illustrations drawn from American and English experience.

The nature of some of these problems of approach can, and probably must, be illustrated at this point by reference to the matter of the definition of variables and units of analysis. It is not our intention here to dwell at length on the general problem of definition or on alternative meanings and the ways they might be made operational. Reflection on the topic suggests, however, that the major terms, "political theory" and "national development," require considerable refinement, at least in the mind of the researcher, if they are to lead to an analysis with any measure of specificity. "Political theory" usually seems to mean the systematic and explicit generalizations about politics of those who are commonly identified as "political theorists." It is perfectly possible, of course, to utilize such a definition in research, identifying a universe or sample of political theorists by personal taste or scholarly consensus, though such an operation risks the wrath of those whose favorites are omitted. The difficulties of achieving complete satisfaction in these ways could probably be easily illustrated by the inspection of lists of those whom scholars would be willing to call "American political theorists." The problem is not, however, insoluble. But it must be suggested that "political theory" as it is used in the title might be given other definitions more satisfying in some respects. It might be taken to mean something broader, something commonly called ideology, i.e., widely shared prescriptive ideas about politics. Or, it might be defined in even broader terms, as something like "national tradition," which would seem to embrace both "theory" and "ideology" in the narrower senses.

Similarly, the term "national development" is open to a number of interpretations. In the first place, "development" implies evolution or

"progress" toward a state of good, an assumption that might well be subjected to examination. Alternatively, the teleogical implications of "development" may be overlooked and inquiry directed to a more neutral "change in state" or simply to "things as they are and have been." In any case, national development is a variable that may embrace changes in institutions, processes, policies, or even changes in ideology.

These comments do not, of course, "solve" the problems of definition but point out some possible choices and suggest the importance of explication. Such problems at least can be resolved through careful selection and communication. Though perhaps it is obvious, it seems important to note, however, that the selection of definitions conditions to some extent the research procedure. The evidence required to demonstrate the impact of a particular theorist on the shape of national institutions would seem to be different from the evidence required to show the influence of a "political tradition" on those institutions. Likewise, it would seem to take something different to show the influence of theory on a national political system as a whole than on a particular institution within the system.

THE "LIBERAL TRADITION" AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: AN OUTLINE DISCUSSION

The contributions of theory to the development of political practice and institutions can probably be most convincingly demonstrated at a specific level. Official documents, the papers and memoirs of statesmen, the writings of theorists, and the speculations of journalists sometimes yield evidence about the direct influence of particular ideas on certain instances of practice. Such studies, however, can hardly be definitive, especially when they reach into the more distant past, for in the nature of

things much of the key evidence of influence is lost and some of it highly selective. Taken singly, too, they lack the sweep and generality that is likely to be sought in studies of political theory and national development. Given the magnitude of the "national" unit of analysis and the traditionally historical orientation of the political theory field, the subject seems most likely to be handled at higher levels of generality, more specifically at the level of "what is the influence of theory (in the sense of theoretical tradition) on the development of political institutions, processes, and policies." The discussion of American and English experience that follows will proceed on that level in an experimental and summary way. Rather than try to explore a specific instance of influence, we will try to assess the general influence of theory on practice by the examination of two or three theoretical themes.

Perhaps the most striking thing about American and British theory is the extent to which it has been joined into a shared set of central beliefs. The hegemony of a "liberal tradition" in Anglo-American political thought is a theme ably traced in the works of a number of recent commentators.[3] From the point of view of the whole, this tradition seems to afford a plausible gross line of interpretation, perhaps the most plausible one. It not only ties together the core ideas of the leading thinkers of the two

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[3]See especially Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). Also Frederick Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West: A Study in the Development of Modern Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948); T. D. Weldon, States and Morals (London: John Murray, Ltd., 1946); C. J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and Company, 1950); A. D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943); William M. McGovern and David S. Collier, Radicals and Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1957).

nations, but it also provides a solid theoretical ground for differentiating them from the liberal theories of continental Europe, particularly France.[4] With some few exceptions, American and British political theories can without difficulty be interpreted as explications of, amplifications of, or revisions of the predominant liberal outlook.

The development of this theme is familiar. While its roots lie deep in the past, the liberal tradition took on its articulated shape in the empirical individualism of John Locke, with substantial assists from Hobbes, and Harrington. It reflected the rejection of Medieval organicism, the impact of Protestant theology, and the rise of atomistic and mechanistic modern science. The central elements of the Anglo-American liberal tradition, distilled from its principal spokesmen and commentators, might be summarized as follows.[5]

First, and most basic in a theoretical sense, this tradition has been individualistic. Its individualism, generally based on a secular version of natural law, has fused moral and factual premises. That is to say, it has made the individual the fundamental building block in its model of the social universe, and at the same time has postulated his moral integrity. From this set of mixed assumptions, most of the other elements in the tradition flow, more or less directly.

Second, this tradition has been based on faith, albeit limited faith,

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[4]Cf. Guido Ruggiero, A History of European Liberalism, trans. R. G. Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), esp. chaps. 1 and 2; and George H. Sabine, "The Two Democratic Traditions," Philosophical Review, LXI (October, 1952), 451-74.

[5]Cf. J. Roland Pennock, Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1950), esp. pp. 9-19.

in individual reason. Although some find in liberalism an unqualified commitment to human rationality, such an interpretation seems to overstate the case. Liberal political theory is a theory of authority as well as a theory of liberty, and its explanation of authority grows out of its assumptions about the tenuousness of man's ability to subsist in society with his passions checked only by self-imposition of the restraints of reason. Nonetheless, the core liberal theory of government relies heavily on reasonability to give form to political authority, and it places its hope in the power of reason to guide authority according to liberal prescriptions.

Third, it sees the state as a mechanism or artifact, a creation of the interaction of individual human beings. Thus the political structure is seen as an instrument for use by men in furthering their ends, particularly the end of keeping the peace in society.

Three further elements of the liberal tradition are derivative of or instrumental to the three just cited. One of these, the fourth in our general list, is the idea of democracy, the prescriptive notion of consent. While democracy is not necessarily liberal, the British and American versions of political thought have closely associated and often combined the two concepts. The connection of the principle of government by consent with the assumptions of individual moral autonomy, rationality, and the artificial nature of the state is close, so close that the procedure of democracy itself has often been regarded as having a primary moral status.[6]

Fifth, the liberal tradition has emphasized human equality, which in theory has generally meant that each man has an obscure kind of fundamental

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[6]Sabine, op. cit.; J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1960).

claim to the recognition of his individual moral stature. Within and without the tradition we are describing, of course, the idea of equality has been subject to much interpretation and qualification.

Sixth, and last, liberalism has meant limited government. The idea of limited government is the extrapolation of individualism into institutional prescription. Its cue has been the doctrine of natural rights. It combines again, however, basic liberal individualism with the concepts of the reasonable individual and the mechanistic state, for the liberal image of limited government is heavily dependent on the self-control of man and the mediating efficacy of political structures.

Although the summary nature of this analysis probably forces us to overstate the case, the ascendance of the liberal tradition in English and American thought seems broad and clear. Nearly the entire intellectual history of politics in the two nations seems to document it. It may be worthwhile to illustrate by considering briefly the power of liberalism over the ideas of those who would have made basic revisions in the tradition, a list that stretches from Burke to Laski and might include such figures as T. H. Green, Calhoun, and John Dewey. In a major sense the theories of all of these men embody a basic departure from the core assumptions of the liberal tradition. All of them have sometimes been interpreted, of course, as falling squarely within the tradition, a circumstance interesting in itself. But more significantly, all were deeply influenced by essentially liberal concepts, particularly the concept of rights. The theory of Burke, for example, seems to begin from an organismic conception of the historical community. It led, however, to a defense of the rights of Englishmen, a conception of the British Constitution stated in contract parlance,

and a healthy though modified principle of consent. Green, basically representative of a communitarian idealism, states his case in terms of the end of individual self-development and has generally been interpreted in terms of his contribution to liberalism. Our list and comments could be expanded and amplified, but perhaps as they stand they are sufficient to suggest the nature of our case. The point is that most British and American political thought has taken on the tone of liberalism and explored variations on the liberal theme, even when it has started from un-liberal premises. Those mentioned, of course, have contributed importantly to the shaping of the tradition as well as to the shaping of theoretical alternatives. It should be unnecessary to say that the case made in this paragraph is meant to be an entirely neutral one.

The discussion of Anglo-American theory in terms of a common tradition obscures some interesting and important national differences. The typical theoretical product of each country displays some distinctive characteristics. Once again, the gross nature of our task forces us into sweeping description, and we will focus on one major theme. An over-all look at American and English thought suggests that the former has tended to focus on the construction of political institutions, the latter on the nature of public policy. That is to say, American theorists have been more concerned with the liberal tradition's prescriptions for governmental structures and processes. English theory, on the other hand, has been concerned chiefly with the types of governmental action the tradition prescribes and the limits it puts on governmental action. Thus the difference is one of relative emphasis.

If this distinction is valid, it is not difficult to explain in rough

terms. Despite its direct inheritance of British political ways, the American nation has been under practical pressures to build and adapt institutions. The American Revolution, even if not a rejection of the English tradition, was a call to the reconstruction of political devices. American experimentation with the separation of powers, for example, was more an institutional manifestation of the liberal spirit than slavish imitation of an atrophied British arrangement, though this is not to say that functional separation was an American invention. This pressure has doubtless found reflection in American political thought. England, on the other hand, has not since the 17th century experienced such an abrupt break in institutional continuity. It has also not had so accessible a frontier to serve as an outlet for economic and social unrest. The British, therefore, have not experienced a similar stimulation toward reexamination of institutional arrangements, but have been much more inclined toward questions about the policies that those arrangements might yield for the amelioration of substantive problems. Perhaps it could be said that these divergences in emphasis have led to different national theoretical and political styles.

As to the differences in emphasis in theory in the two countries, consider the high spots of British and American thought over the past two centuries. While English utilitarianism was concerned both with structure and with policy, its main thrust was toward the policy side of politics. Bentham primarily sought guides to the best substance for legislation. The classical economists were likewise concerned, insofar as they dealt with politics, for the establishment of policy, in this case a policy of no policy. The "revision of liberalism" sought by John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green, a reaction to the classical position, was primarily substantive

in direction, though Mill of course was much interested in process. Green's idealism led principally to emphasis on the political conditions for welfare and opportunity. England was also the home of Spencerian liberalism and Fabian socialism, contrasting positions, to be sure, but both policy-directed. If these comments are acceptable in general terms, it seems not unreasonable to say that the tendency of attention in English thought has been programmatic, turned toward what politics does rather than how politics does it.

A similar sampling of American thought, on the other hand, seems to yield quite a different impression. It must be noted at the outset that American political thought is to some degree different in origin and form from the English, i.e., less the product of individual philosophers and more the product of pamphleteers and political advocates, though the extent of this difference can easily be exaggerated. At any rate, American theory seems to gravitate to themes like constitution-building and operation of such institutions as separation of powers and judicial review. Such was the focus, for example, of The Federalist, which has been called the greatest American contribution to political theory. Among the more interesting theoretical themes of the post-constitutional period were those that revolved around the problem of the extent of the franchise. The distribution of power in the federal system has been a persistent and widely debated problem in American thought. The work of Calhoun, a systematic and deep-reaching theorist, comes finally to rest on structural devices for the achievement of policy aims. The issues of the Civil War period, in large part moral and economic, were much argued in terms of the meaning of American federalism. Even pragmatism provided not so much a guide to policy as a guide to the instruments for its development. Lastly, we might submit

in evidence the highly institutional orientation of the academic political science discipline in America. Even the most notable activists among the early political scientists, the "Progressive scholars," put their hopes on the reconstitution of political structures. And it seems fitting to note that the major collective efforts of the American Political Science Association to contribute to political ideas and action in recent years have been directed toward structural reform.

There are, of course, important exceptions from both sides of the water. From British theory we might cite James Mill's Essay on Government and John Stuart Mill's Representative Government as examples of structural orientation. On the American part, aside from the ambiguous case of Jeffersonianism, we might mention the development of the doctrine of substantive due process and the popularity of Social Darwinism in America as evidence of the existence of substantially policy-oriented theory. Nevertheless, the general distinction we propose seems sufficiently viable to add substance to our general description of the political theoretical traditions of England and the United States.

Against the background of this cursory outline of Anglo-American theory, we might now turn to its reflections in the development of political practice. It is as difficult and risky to summarize practice in a few paragraphs as to summarize theory as we have done above. Quick reflection on the relationship of the liberal tradition to national development in England and America, however, suggests that the former has been very influential on the latter. If one were required to provide a brief, rough characterization of the political institutions of the two countries, he might well do it in terms of the principles of limited authority and government by consent,

two direct derivations from the central tenets of liberal theory. In other words, the historic core practices of politics have in general conformed to the prescriptions of liberal thought. Constitutionalism and the idea of a constitution in the modern sense, most highly developed and longest preserved in the Anglo-Saxon nations, are manifestations of the individualism and mechanistic cast of the political theory of liberalism. Furthermore, many of the significant alterations in the politics of Britain and the United States over the last two hundred years seem clearly to reflect liberal doctrines. The steady expansion of the franchise and the growth of equality in other political and social spheres are examples that come readily to mind. What this amounts to is a claim that in England and the United States the liberal prescriptions for political organization and action have been persistently effective despite high maintenance costs. In the face of an increasingly complex and threatening world, the traditional values embodied in substantive liberties, property rights, and procedural protections have shown remarkable staying power. Their vitality seems to reflect a deep-running consensus informed by a strong and relatively cohesive political theory.

Furthermore, what one might call the "tone" of politics in the Anglo-American countries seems to be differentiated from that of most other countries (excepting most notably those where English influence has been strong, i.e., certain Commonwealth nations) by adherence to the principles of this particular brand of liberalism. This difference in "tone" is hard to document or even to explain. Politics in Britain and the United States seem more mechanical in operation, less amenable to appeals to general will, more attentive to individual will and private property. Of course, they

are not devoid of attention to common claims. But when sacrifice to the public interest is demanded, the burden of proof rests with the community; individual interest, in other words, has generally been accorded a preferred position. And relative to the experience of other societies, institutionalized choice and dissent have been preserved for an impressively long time.

It obviously cannot be maintained that there have been no counterforces at work in British and American politics, nor that the liberal tradition itself has undergone no revision over the years. On the latter count, there has been considerable shifting as new social, economic, technological, and external political forces have come to bear. It can be argued, however, that what we have called the "core" of the tradition has stayed surprisingly intact. Also, what some might call "changes" in (or "deviations from" or "subversion of") these national traditions may also be interpreted as heightened emphasis on some elements, e.g., individual welfare, at the expense of others, e.g., property rights.

Perhaps a brief example of the operation and limits of the counterforces will help. A variety of conditions that need not be described here have led over the past two centuries, and particularly over the last thirty years or so, to the expansion of the power of the executive in American and English governments. While this movement of power is not unilinear, its reality and importance as a tendency can scarcely be questioned. This development is potentially if not inherently threatening to the liberal principles of consent and limited government. Yet in a negative way it illustrates the strength of the liberal values. For perhaps the most striking thing about the growth of executive power in America and Britain, when it is considered in terms of the pressures of events and the experi-

ences of other nations, is the extent to which it has been contained. Circulation of executives through the operation of electoral institutions continues to be effective. Legislative bodies continue to exercise real checking power through policy-validating, watchdog, and appropriations roles. And, in the United States, the courts occasionally impose restraints on executive power, dramatically demonstrated in the Steel Seizure Case of a decade ago.

In a preceding paragraph it was proposed that differences between the English and American versions of the liberal tradition lay mainly in orientation toward policy in the one and toward structure and process in the other. From our generalized perspective, similar variations in practice seem apparent. The American nation has concentrated much of its political energy on constitution-writing, and along the way has often assumed that institutional reform is the key for curing social and political ills. The written constitution itself is partly based on such an assumption, as is the broadened suffrage, a development in which the United States led Britain. Other typically American foci of political interest show similar tendencies. Among these we might list, for example, the initiative, referendum, and recall; the electoral college; direct primary systems; municipal reform, with its variety of palliatives, notably the city manager plan; executive reorganization; the organizational study commission; and regulation by independent plural boards. It is interesting that the failure of the recent adventure at arms in Cuba was followed as much by teeth-gnashing about organization and responsibility as about the fundamental policy issues involved.

All this is not to say that American politics are policy-less, nor

will we maintain that British politics are without structure. Once again we are dealing with matters of relative emphasis. Our comments about British practice will be confined to one observation, that welfare measures have moved further faster in Britain than in the United States. The successes of mild socialism in England as compared with the failure of socialism to take significant root in America might be laid to the preparatory groundwork done by English liberal theory and its welfare-oriented offshoots.

SOME COMMENTS ON METHOD

Over the past several pages we have considered the impact of political theory on national development in the United States and England. Our case might be summarized in terms such as these: Theory in both countries has centered around a liberal tradition, the main elements of which are individualism, responsive government, and consent. Although it blankets somewhat disparate sets of ideas, the concept of an Anglo-American tradition seems to afford a meaningful and convenient way of describing political thought in gross terms. A look at the political institutions and policies of England and America suggests that this core of liberal ideas is reflected in practice. Further, characteristic national variations on the liberal theme in theory also seem to correlate with counterpart variations in political modes. American thought and practice, we have proposed, have leaned toward emphasis on the effects of political structure and procedure, while English thought and practice show a greater tendency to emphasize the prescription of substantive policy. Thus, within the limits of the kind of analysis here attempted, we might plausibly contend that English and American political theory has indeed had a substantial impact on policy.

It may be unfair to suggest that the procedure followed and the conclusions drawn are typical of anything, but they seem to suggest some rather traditional ways of approaching subjects like the one with which we are concerned. In substance, of course, there is much in the foregoing account that might be contested. At best the analysis has suggested, in narrative form, an overall hypothesis and some subhypotheses about the relationships of political theory and national development, at the level and in the fashion that the title seems to imply. At all points, the analysis needs to be much filled out with detail to provide a satisfactory explanation. The difficulties of carrying this next step far enough are many; it is at this point that the study of political theory so often seems to fall short. A discussion of these difficulties and some general ways of handling them will occupy our attention for the remainder of the paper.

It is a little as though on the basis of the type of treatment outlined above the effect of political theory on national development cannot be doubted, but also cannot be explained. The problems to which we shall address ourselves are not simply the problems of lack of detail, but reach to the method itself. They may conveniently be classified into five items.

One of these, the matter of concepts and units of analysis, has already been the subject of comment.[7] In the preceding discussion the units are gross and the concepts vague. If theory is defined, as here, as national tradition, it seems almost impossible to identify in any but the

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[7]For a general discussion and bibliography of this and related problems in political science, consult Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford University Press, 1960). No effort will be made in the present paper to cite the considerable technical materials relevant to the techniques of the study of politics.

most impressionistic terms. If theory, alternatively, is identified as ideology, the problem is nearly as difficult.[8] In both cases, the analyst runs the risk of identifying theory, the independent variable, by the behavior of development, the dependent variable, and demonstrating nothing but a neat circularity of design. If by theory we are to mean the ideas of theorists, the problems are somewhat different, involving the method of selection, mentioned above, and the difficulty of assessing influence, discussed below. As to the use of the nation as a unit of analysis, without quibbling about the problem of defining a nation (which, after all, does not seem very acute where 19th and 20th century England and the United States are concerned), it may fairly be suggested that the job of sorting out the strands of theory that have influenced the institutions, processes, policies, and behaviors of a nation is at least an extremely complex one. To say that the New Deal was influenced by pragmatism seems to slight the influence of Jeffersonian democracy, Hamiltonian mercantilism, Keynesian economics, social pluralism, syndicalism, etc., on that complicated web of innovational and conservative phenomena. To say that it was influenced by all is to say nothing very definitive. Another alternative, the piecing together of imputed influences on specific policies and political figures is a more acceptable method and also a more painful one.

A second item in this critique has to do with the matter of handling other variables than theory, or, to put it in another way, with the pitfalls of attempting explanation by reference to one variable only.[9] It is clear

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[8]For a more extended discussion of this point, see David W. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, forthcoming in November, 1961.

[9]Cf. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, op. cit., pp. 20-23.

that the simple explanation of national development entirely in terms of political theory is not satisfactory. To account for the variances in national development occasioned by political theory (either longitudinally or by comparison across units) requires holding other factors constant: geography, demography, external pressure, technology, etc. Here again complexity is a source of trouble, and we must usually be content with something less than desirable by ordinary standards of verification.

A third problem has to do with the nature of influence and the direction of causation. The theory-practice relationship often raises a chicken-and-egg question, the question of which causes which. It is not necessary to assume a hard sociology of knowledge position to suggest that thought can never be entirely dissevered from its historico-environmental context. Perhaps the point is most apparent in American theory, where ideas are so often obviously stimulated by events and so often embedded in social movements.[10] Consider, for example, the theory and institution of separation of powers. Its greatest American commentary is doubtless found in three of Madison's Federalist papers. These of course followed in time and were directly stimulated by the incorporation of separation into the Federal Constitution. But we know that Madison and others of the framers were acquainted with Montesquieu's commentary (an instance of evidence of the influence of foreign theory on national development), and that was in turn an examination of English constitutional practices. Meanwhile, the entire developing structure of American government was heavily conditioned by

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[10] A consideration which has prompted some commentators to conclude that there is no American political theory, or very little, or very little that is significant and original. On this matter, see Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

colonial and post-revolutionary state political experience. Given such a sequence of theory and event, the disentangling of influences is probably impossible.

Suppose one seeks, however, to short-cut this problem by undertaking what seems to be a simpler task, assessing the influence of a particular theorist or group of theorists on a particular political actor. Here evidence may be available in documents and public and personal papers, and it may be possible to size up background influences by the examination of school curricula, reading habits, associations, etc. The sorting out of the effective from the ineffective elements of the environment, and of post hoc rationalization from introspective understanding in autobiographic evidence, however, requires a most careful type of imputation. The linking of outside ideas to behavior is an extremely intricate operation probably impossible to perform with precision in most situations. Thus when the influence of theory on political practice is sought at either the level of the nation, or the level of the individual, the problem of identification of linkages is acute and one must be satisfied with inferring relationships rather than proving causes.

A fourth problem, probably the most important of the list, is closely related to the one just mentioned. The discussion of political theory and national development above was concerned almost entirely with propositions about the effects of the one on the other. But little was said about the mechanisms of influence, about how theory operates on practice as distinct from what it has done. The consideration of mechanisms would add another dimension to the analysis, and this would seem to be a vital dimension if one of the aims of studies of this kind is to develop a generalized

framework for understanding the impact of political theory on practice. The problem here is again one of identifying linkages, of discerning the processes by which ideas at the level of theory are translated into institutions and policies. This facet of the subject highlights the importance of studying political theory and national policy in close harmony, for knowledge of the mechanisms of influence would seem to depend on understanding of the processes of policy-making. It also suggests the importance of studying ideology, because the folk-theory of ideology is probably one of the fundamental and most interesting of the pertinent channels of influence.

This discussion has also not taken account of the limitations on generalization and testing of hypotheses imposed by the scarcity of pertinent units of study, particularly where inquiry is aimed at the nation-state level. If one seeks to develop truly general theory about the relationship of political thought to national development, he has a relatively small sample with which to work. The discussion above is only an outline for a single case-study. The seriousness of this problem probably depends on the view one has of the nature of political science, the importance he attaches to comparison as part of the process of verification, and the intensity of his insistence that the nation state is a unit that cannot be compared with other units of social organization. At least to some extent it would seem to be a problem with which political science on the gross level will have to live.[11]

In view of these problems of method, it may well be asked what future

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[11]See Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1955), esp. pp. 26-7.

there is in studies of the relationship of political theory and national development and similar subjects. One alternative is to abandon the quest for rigor and the ambition to adhere to standards of verification. Some think such standards are irrelevant to the study of politics anyway. If this position is accepted, the study of political thought, insofar as its ends are descriptive rather than normative, would seem to resolve to intellectual history and literary criticism. It will yield appreciation, perhaps, but not explanation, and its relevance to the systematic understanding of current politics and to prediction would seem to lie only in the models and propositions it might incidentally suggest.[12] This comment is not intended to question the defensibility and importance of intellectual history or literary criticism or political prescription, but only to wonder about their contribution to systematic knowledge about politics. Anyway, since political scientists will without doubt continue to discuss such empirical problems as the influence of political theory on national development, it seems very hard to defend the claim that questions about evidence and verification cannot and should not be asked.[13]

Granting the propriety of such questions, however, it can still be argued that studies of the influence of political theory on national development, and similar problems, should be carried on in traditional fashion, both at the level of national tradition and at the level of individual influence,

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[12]See the discussion of the relevance of classical theory to the study of local politics in Norton E. Long, "Aristotle and the Study of Local Government," Social Research, XXIV (Autumn, 1957), 287-310.

[13]A stimulating discussion of the thought-practice relationship in politics from a vastly different perspective than that of this paper may be found in Hannah Arendt's Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1961).

lacking rigor but reaching for the best evidence available. This contention seems defensible on the ground that studies of this kind are in themselves interesting, that the discipline must continue to do what it can with the questions it is asked, and that one way of improving method is through trial and error with substance. Semi-impressionistic studies, and the accumulation of additive analyses of specific political events and individuals, have created a significant store of theory and evidence on the relationship of thought and political practice.[14]

At the same time, it seems important that improvement in method be sought consciously. Many of the specific points at which attention is in order have been identified above. In a more general vein, it might be added that studies at the macro level, at which political science has excelled, might gain in precision if explicit attention were paid to the techniques and results of studies at micro levels, and if studies of the data of the past were done in the light of what we discover we can find out about the present.[15] While problems of translation and conversion from level to level are themselves difficult, might not the more empirically manageable studies of the impact of ideas on policy in small groups and in local communities, for instance, suggest a great deal about the study of their impact on the grand scale of the nation state? And might not lessons learned in examining the construction or growth of contemporary policies

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[14]The number and variety of works that have made this kind of contribution are so great that it seems unnecessary to specify examples.

[15]Here again the number of potential examples is so large that it is difficult to single out any particular one or few for citation. See, however, the following note for a few items dealing with the concept of influence.

and structures yield clues for understanding the forces involved in the development of national politics in the past? Particularly, our vital understanding of the operation of mechanisms of influence seemslikely to be enhanced in this way.[16] Thus, at least so far as the present subject is concerned, the greatest needs seem to be for maximum utilization of the potential contributions of other parts of the discipline to the study of political thought, and maximum utilization of the contributions of political thought to other foci of attention in the discipline.

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[16]By attention, i.e., to current studies of "influence" in political affairs on various levels, and to conceptual analyses of influence. See, for example, Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," American Political Science Review, XLIX (June, 1955), 431-51; James G. March, "Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence," Journal of Politics, XIX (May, 1957), 202-26; James G. March, "Influence Measurement in Experimental and Semi-Experimental Groups," Sociometry, XIX (December, 1956), 260-71; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, II (July, 1957), 210-15. Also Floyd Hunter's "power elite" studies and commentaries on them, e.g., Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," Public Administration Review, XIV (Summer, 1954), 205-12; Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power: Three Problems," American Sociological Review, XXIV (December, 1959), 796-803; Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, LI (June, 1958), 463-69.

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INDUCED ELITE CHANGE:
AN EXAMINATION OF WESTERN TECHNIQUES OF ARTIFICIAL REVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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The hypothesis that the political texture of a society may be changed by changing its political elites has not yet been convincingly demonstrated. Elites that can be objectively identified for the sake of external control include the highly vulnerable political leadership and generally impervious the functional specialists necessary to perform essential social operations, whether administrative, technical, or entrepreneurial. Major twentieth century efforts to preserve, eliminate, or encourage elites of the second type have demonstrated that the operational requirements of society are more fundamental elements of elite change and stability than adventitious shifts of personnel or of formal status.

Western efforts to change the character and composition of elites in other countries have included three distinctive approaches:

a) Modernization of tribal elites, involving stabilization and renovation of colonial societies under indirect rule.

b) Democratic replacement of totalitarian elites by systematic purges in defeated nations under military government.

c) Modernization and democratization of elites in transitional societies by renovation through foreign aid.

The purpose of this paper is to explore these approaches and assess their consequences.

The concept of "artificial revolution," already applied to the Western occupations of Japan and Germany,(1) could also describe some aspects of the

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the changing and sometimes inconsistent purposes of democratization and stabilization, of de-industrialization followed by re-industrialization, and of introducing a peaceful world order while strengthening the capacity to resist communism. Colonial indirect rule also involved changing and inconsistent purposes, including permanent occupation on one hand and eventual independence on the other; preserving traditional values and yet modernizing the political, social, and economic institutions; and serving the mercantile and financial needs of the mother country while strengthening the viability of the colonies in order to reduce their deficit financing. There were also parallels in the process by which they went about displacing elites. In both cases external sanctions were applied or implied with the aim of introducing political and economic change; the changes that occurred were not necessarily those intended; the evidence suggests that in both cases the direction of the change was democratic; and in both cases the roles and personnel of the various elite structures were altered.

The sequence of events in these two settings was threefold:

Stage I	Stage II, transition	Stage III
A form of authoritarian (non-democratic) elite	Military government or indirect rule →	A modernized, non-authoritarian (quasi-democratic) elite

The succession of elites in the totalitarian states begins with an already modern society with strong traditional components in which (a) totalitarian elites rise, (b) they are succeeded by military government-favored elites, and finally (c) they merge with a rejuvenated elite structure including elements of the pre-totalitarian and totalitarian elites but often more prospects for democracy. The parallel sequence in the tribal examples to be discussed involves (a) a series of traditional elites which were succeeded

or joined by (b) new elites under British indirect rule and modified by the reform operations of the colonial period, finally emerging with (c) nationalized traditional elites which also offer democratic possibilities (see Figure I).

FIGURE I

Patterns of Elite Changes
in Two Social Typologies

A. Modern Elite —E→ Nationalistic Elite —W; MG; P; R→ Potentially Democratized Elite

B. Traditional (Tribal) Elite —K→ "Indirect Rule" Elites —C; Pr; R→ Nationalized Traditional Elite

Legend: E, time and internal factors; K, conquest; MG, military government; C, colonial administration; P, purge; Pr, protection; R, reform

An examination of this historical sequence in Germany and Japan and in Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda, and a comparison of the techniques used for inducing elite change will suggest conclusions about the social consequences of our current foreign aid operations.

I

The retention of captive kings as remote tributaries of a great empire is a device as old as civilization. The principle of indirect rule, however, is considered a modern British innovation, departing from previous colonial practices in three major respects. It not only to the native country was involved, the colony itself being usually a definite property; the imperial purpose included some element of training, leading, however vaguely, in the direction of self-rule rather than of eventual annihilation; and the conqueror entertained a large degree of tolerance and even sympathy toward the colonial society, absorbing its customs into the imperial government with a relatively small commitment to any mission civilisatrice and making no effort to destroy the "barbarous culture" of the lesser society.

British practices in indirect rule doubtless benefitted from experiences in India, Egypt, Basutoland, Fiji, and elsewhere, although it is generally agreed that the policies developed by Fredrick Lugard in Northern Nigeria represent the most systematic expression of the technique. In his hands it approached the level of doctrine, spreading to other parts of British Africa and being finally introduced in Tanganyika in 1925.(3) It continued to be a matter of British policy until about 1951.

The Lugard plan was to use and support native chiefs and kings, but it implied the power to alter undesirable characteristics in the native administration, thus representing a general commitment to restoring a measure of sovereignty as the tribal elites qualified themselves to exercise it. It functioned best in areas where large-scale traditional states were already in existence, as in Northern Nigeria; less well in the smaller but highly centralized chiefdoms of Western Nigeria and Southern Ghana; and only with difficulty where there were dispersed tribal societies or small autonomous local communities, as in Eastern Nigeria and parts of Uganda. Once indirect rule was accepted as a principle of government, both Lugard and his followers applied it even in cases where they had to create pseudo-traditions in their zeal to use Native Authority. Indirect rule thus implanted pseudo-traditional elites where none existed after the desired model.

Where indirect rule was employed most successfully (i.e., with least challenge to the existing elite), it served to amalgamate the genuinely traditional and the new; it merged new functions and traditional personnel; and it permitted the rise of new traditional elites by emphasizing the desire and prospects for Western education, for political nationalism, and for economic development. Where "pseudo-traditional" leaders had to be supplied, indirect

rule served as a temporizing device by which innovation could be partially controlled. But indirect rule also appeared in a perverted form (in the rural reserves of South Africa, for example) as a means of keeping tribal groups from progressing to a point where they might threaten white hegemony. It has also been used in practice by the French, Belgians, and Portuguese who in principle follow direct rule patterns but are willing to make use of village notables and others in authority in extending law and order under their protection. Economy of operation may, of course, recommend indirect rule on a temporary basis while the imperial power is arranging for a large enough staff to take over the roles of government. Since such approaches are not intended to convey any internal social change, this analysis will confine itself to parts of East and West Africa where indirect rule was used more or less consciously as a means of developing modern self-governing (i.e., decision-making and administrative) capabilities.(4) This objective implies making certain functional changes in the elite structure and permits the adding of new elite groups to perform roles not required in the traditional society. The assumption behind indirect rule, then, is either that existing tribal elites can be functionally modernized by a process of technical assistance offered by resident officers under the threat of imperial reprisals for refusals to take urgent advice; or, alternatively, that new, modernized elements of a tribal population can be developed under the protection of an imperial power to perform the technical functions of governing without wholly displacing the traditional elites.

In Northern Nigeria the British ruling was resisted by the Fulani rulers but, according to British sources, welcomed by their Hausa "serfs."(5) The Fulani rulers had imposed their rule by force upon the weaker Hausa peoples

some decades earlier; but even after several generations of rule they were still unable to elicit enough local support to defend the old order when the British arrived. Their governing skills appealed to Lugard nevertheless, perhaps especially because of their tax system; and faced with insufficient means to depose them in favor of any possible Hausa "restoration," he decided to place the prestige of British arms behind the Fulani "usurpers." In some cases, in fact, he appointed native authorities that had not previously been able to secure recognition, thus setting the stage for the use of pseudo-traditional leaders when the existing forms failed to satisfy his requirements.(6) He preserved traditional forms where possible, however, purging them of their excesses, and enriching them with new functions; emirs, chiefs, and elders continued to exercise authority with British advice and,

occasionally, reproof. But by the same token, many of the traditional restraints upon these traditional leaders were removed: intertribal warfare as a means of deposing weak or unpopular chiefs disappeared, and whatever responsibility the old elites had felt toward their tribal constituency was largely replaced by an upward responsibility toward the British. Thus in Northern Nigeria an unpopular elite was supported by the British, given instructions in governmental techniques (especially in law and finance), and safeguarded against the accidents of political overthrow from internal and external forces. Indirect rule thus made its first assault upon the old order in the very act of protecting a traditional elite.

The consequences of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria were more predictable than elsewhere in Africa: the rulers supported by British indirect rule were able to survive, leveling their feudal claims to leadership against radical modernizers, educating their sons and nephews to man the new functional elites, absorbing party activism stemming from the slowly rising middle class, and averting the westernizing ambitions encountered by southern Nigerian native authorities who also had the support of the British government.

The North secured temporarily immune from the native forces of nationalism which was responsible for the gradual replacement of the old elites in the Eastern and Western Regions of southern Nigeria. In these regions, especially in the East, traditional authority was less well entrenched; and when indirect rule was introduced there a decade later, there was little traditional authority on a large-scale, organized basis to preserve. The conservative Islam of/the Hausa religion was not available to the traditional leaders of the South as a means of offsetting reforming tendencies; and at the same time general economic influences toward modernization, including an increasingly profitable cocoa export crop, were much stronger. In the Eastern Region the

new economic and technical elites developed political interests, soon repudiating the traditional chiefs because they were associated with British imperialism and retrogression; while in the Eastern Region this tendency was still more pronounced because many of the chieftaincies themselves had been created by the British for want of a satisfactory indigenous administrative organization.(7) Thus new elites had introduced themselves in the two southern regions by 1952, while in the North a decade later they still had little independent standing.(8) "Pseudo-tradition" in Nigeria permitted quicker modernization and a faster elite change than true tradition.

Yet even in the North the institutions of government were being modernized. There were new political elites in the membership of the elected assemblies, and over the years this group increased its proportion of educational personnel, substantially increased its representation of private entrepreneurs, and showed a marked decline in members who had been local governmental officials under the traditional order (see Table 1). Even so, a significant proportion of these political elites in the North rose through the ranks of the traditional/native administration; while in the southern regions, most assemblymen had begun as "employees of the Christian missionary societies, . . . or as members of the junior/civil service in the government of Nigeria."(9) non-traditional/

The nationalistic and modernizing elites tended to charge that indirect rule was least effective, and as a product of Westernizing influences rather than the conservative tradition represented by the native administration protected by indirect rule. This development of modern elites was not immediately welcomed by the British. In the South they attempted to protect the traditional order by discouraging the Westernized groups. Candidates who were required in the government service were trained as officials but were subordinated to the political role of the hereditary chief. As Lord Lugard stated, it was "a cardinal principle of British Colonial policy that the

interests of a large native population shall not be subjected the will . . . of a small minority of . . . Europeanized natives . . . whose interests are often opposed to theirs."(10) But until the 1950's did the British policy begin to shift in favor of using educated Nigerians not actually occupying tribal offices/ and even then this did not apply with full force in the North. where those existed, A very large population of Western-educated clerks, teachers, and technicians from the South were of noble families. They were thus eligible for acceptance into the Native Authority, and an amalgamation of the two groups came about.(11) All of these factors tended to delay the emergence of a unified innovating elite in the North equivalent to that which dominated the two southern regions during the nation-building 1950's.

Taking contemporary Nigeria as a whole, the new elites are in large measure Westernized in education and profession; but about a third of them are descendants of the traditional elites.(12) The political and bureaucratic elites certainly do supercede the commercial, military, & rural elites, whose members are rarely listed in Who's Who or elsewhere mentioned as leaders by their fellow citizens.(13) Undeniably in the Nigerian elite still carries personal prestige in a traditional sense even though is may not be exploited in non-traditional ways. There is now a elite range of personal mobility throughout Nigeria permitting much departure from tradition; but nowhere -- even in the urban centers of the south -- can tribal lines and loyalties be disregarded in the contexts of political leadership.

Indirect rule made colonial political integration more difficult in

not be fully absorbed into the power structure. It may have delayed their appearance by strengthening the resistance of traditional forces. Coleman goes so far as to conclude that direct rule produced more cosmopolitan, more nationalistically unified, and better organized new elites than was possible under indirect rule because the policy of assimilation did not exacerbate the tensions between westernized and traditional elites.(14)

In the Gold Coast (Ghana), apart from the Northern Territories, perhaps, indirect rule never achieved the full integration between native authority and British policy that Lugard accomplished in Northern Nigeria. Strong support of the position of the chiefs weakened British control over their practices, and traditional forms persisted with little modification. The Ashanti chiefs exercised considerable authority and many of the traditional functions of office, but nothing like the powerful administrative apparatus or religious sanctions of Ghana had possessed social and religious/sanctions available to the Moslem emirs. But because new ruling functions imposed by the imperial government had to be fulfilled, new administrators had to be recruited and trained to perform them. Indirect rule denied the chiefs the power to raise armies, authorize the carrying of arms, impose taxation, pass legislation, or appropriate land for public purposes or commercial purposes; and their claims to authority (such as lineage, tribe, age, and sex) were confined more and more to their traditional bases. In the meantime, powerful modernizing forces were at work elsewhere in the society. Commoners had found other means of acquiring status -- role, education, wealth from the cocoa crops, and even legitimacy under British conceptions of government. The commoners played a role in the legislative councils at least equal to the chiefs.(15) Few of them possessed enough education to participate independently in the modern bureaucratic structure. However, even the educated chiefs could not hold their own against the more educated westernizers who devoted their energies to rebuilding any of their

members who had cooperated with the British.

The Gold Coast's central government had been established by the British before indirect rule was introduced locally through the native authority. As a result it was the national government that offered the best opportunities for the Westernized elites.(17) In Ghana, therefore, the traditional elements seemed aligned with the British against the Westernizing elements;(18) the processes of modernization occurred rapidly, and new values were introduced cogently into the villages from the center rather than via their local traditional leadership.

In Uganda indirect rule was often still further removed from traditional government than in the Gold Coast. In the Buganda Kingdom the kings themselves were retained,(19) but they were not always invested according to tradition.(20) Their subordinate chiefs, in the meantime, lost their own political powers and their sense of responsibility to the peasants, becoming modernized in effect/landlords(21) over properties previously held in common and collecting rents to which they were not traditionally entitled./ As elsewhere in Uganda, they also served as tax collectors, eventually becoming salaried local government officials, 16,000 strong, "involved in a chain of authority with official responsibility only upwards."(22)

The model of organization introduced in Uganda/was so outside of Buganda alien to traditions that it in itself constituted/a sweeping reform carried on under British direction. New chiefs were appointed who possessed technical (qualifications but often/lacked/any traditional authority (see Table II). In one county studied in 1954, for example, only one of ten chiefs had traditional claims to the office.(23) As the local councils became modernized in authority and composition, the chiefs became their executive officers, relying increasingly upon administrative skill as their principal basis of

authority. Where indirect rule encouraged the rise of these councils, it weakened the role of the chiefs; as it encouraged democracy in the selection and operations of the councils, it detracted from the traditional basis of political decision-making. The chief who took an active interest in the composition of these councils could preserve his authority to some extent, but such an effort required a certain amount of manipulation resembling Western styles of politicking. Moreover, with the passing of time these councils became increasingly democratic and difficult to control. The transition to modern forms thus started with an effort by the British to devise native authorities for local government even if an improvised substitute for traditional forms had to be imposed; followed by increasing reluctance to use the chiefs as governing agents when more efficient, Westernized leaders became available; after which the modernized councils became more important as arenas of legislation, gradually becoming so democratized that traditional means of controlling them were no longer available to the chiefs. The chiefs were thereafter functionally replaced as agents of local government by technicians, although remaining as co-ordinators of administration and repositories of local prestige.(24)

In summary, indirect rule took different forms in different social settings: in Hausa-Fulani Northern Nigeria, it achieved the fullest integration with the indigenous system. In Yoruba Western Nigeria, the powers of the chiefs were much less than those of the Northern emirs, especially over the urban settlements, and indirect rule did not function with full effectiveness. In the Eastern Nigerian, the administrators were still more remote as a political organization, and the result was still less substitution of traditional loyalties to indirect rule by the British. In both southern regions, in fact, most local administration was carried on by British district

commissioners. In Ghana, again, there were regional differences. Where strong tribal organizations existed, as in the Northern territories, the chiefs functioned effectively but the people remained largely illiterate and politically passive. In the two other regions of Ghana, the native authority was often appointed by the British, but with increasing opportunities for education, new modernizing classes rose to power on the national level. At the same time, however, it must be added that throughout West Africa the "traditional authority has survived the impact of colonial rule."(25) Although new forces are building nations, the chiefs are still interpreting and applying customary law, sometimes allocating tribal lands, performing religious duties, and collecting and/ in some cases allocating tax moneys. Among the pre-literate majority of the population they still occupy positions of great prestige. It is only in those functional political and administrative functions they have been largely superseded by the modernized elites. In Uganda, apart from the Buganda kingdom, local (often newly appointed) chiefs with little traditional authority were able to retain control to the extent that they modernized themselves and succeeded in out-distancing the possible opposition.

The most striking facts about indirect rule are that in some cases -- such as Ghana and Uganda, for example -- it did not preserve a going order, but installed a European model of the traditional society; while in others -- notably Northern Nigeria -- it maintained the traditional forms but weakened their vitality. The effort to preserve traditional elites while developing new ones succeeded best where a strong administrative system already existed [illegible] native authority was retained [illegible] in many parts of Africa as new functions introduced elite changes. Traditional chiefs through cultural erosion and possibly fatal laxness; the literate group schools by the chief were disappearing, along with his role as legislator

and interpreter of custom and his power to invoke sacred sanctions; the chief's real ritual significance was waning; and his role as protector of the interests of his village or clan was increasingly performed by political organs.(25) The chiefs' efforts to resist change by refusing a Western education to their sons and rejecting it for themselves(27) appeared to be only a temporary stay of sentence, although for a generation or so it is to be expected that chiefs will continue to enjoy a powerful following. Indirect rule did not provide a substitute for modernization of governmental functions and elites; stability did not prevent change because Westernizing influences were too strong to be deflected.

The most important Western influence was education, which suggested values that often seemed incompatible with the past. The educated groups (often representing families of the old elite) automatically became an elite regardless of their other claims to preferment, and thus purged or thrust aside their elders. Other Westernizing factors also undermined the very institutions of the traditional order, especially urbanization (which reduced tribal loyalties to social groupings and to a political resource) and economic development (which supplied new motivations and required the performance of new technical functions).

Indirect rule may therefore be said to have temporarily helped certain traditional elites by strengthening their claims to power; but this strengthening, where it occurred, removed the traditional elites from the context of loyalty in which they had previously functioned. This in turn led to an erosion of support in favor of the new Westernizing elites that were also interested by the British colonial administration. Certain traditional elites were not benefitted at all by indirect rule, since they were displaced by a "pseudo-traditional" elite that gradually became a reformed bureaucracy. The most

effect of colonialism was thus one of modernization, in which bureaucratic and technical elites rose to preferred positions. These durable elite groups thus outdistanced the traditional elites in those parts of Africa that were under indirect rule (see Figure II, Appendix).

The bureaucratic and technical elites also proved to be the most nearly invulnerable to attack under the totalitarian revolutions in Germany and Japan, and they survived best of any groups the purge that followed in the artificial revolutions under allied military government.

II

The much criticized failures in the attacks launched on German and Japanese elites by Western military governments provide another example of the process of survival available to functional elites. Indeed, considering Western deficiencies of understanding regarding the nature of totalitarianism, as well as the inconstancy of Western purposes in military government, it is surprising that the occupations should have succeeded as well as they did.

The characteristics of totalitarianism as described by Friedrich and Brzezinski (28) were not coherently and intensively attacked by the artificial revolutions that took place in Germany and Japan. It is true, for example, that the official ideology was challenged in its particulars of militarism, racism, and excessive nationalism, but its tendency to dogmatism, its encouragement of political apathy, and even many of its attitudes toward the state were not disturbed by the rise of an alternative ideology during the post-war years. Again, party activity as an alternative to the one party monolith was actually discouraged during the early years of the occupation in Germany in the hope of allowing democratic forces to grow themselves along traditional lines; and the military government tolerated the corruption in

party financing that took place in Japan when commercial interests became active. The third characteristic of totalitarianism -- police terrorism -- was attacked by institutional reorganizations and purges for a time, but even these efforts were half-hearted. There were purges of the mass communications media in both countries -- touching the fourth element of totalitarianism; but new public attitudes toward the press and the diffusion of press ownership were more important enemies of the totalitarian propaganda monopolies than were purge policies.(28a) Fifth, the state monopoly of force was not considered a dangerous symptom in either occupation.

And finally, the centralized economy of the totalitarian states seemed centralized, although competitive elements like those of the 1920's also developed in certain segments of the economy. It could not be said, in short, that the Western attack on totalitarianism constituted a thoroughgoing revolution that would be recognized as such by a Stalin, Lenin, or Hitler. This was not only for want of a ready-to-order ideology and a revolutionary vanguard, but because of the irrelevancy of most occupation policies to profound political change.

Democratic reformation required a powerful motivation, however, favorable situations for change and these results from factors not contemplated in the plans for totalitarian revolution. There were internal and with external revolutionary forces as such in the early post-war years.

The principal target of the attack on [illegible] totalitarianism was the surviving elite structure. In the decades following the establishment of the German Empire there were enough revolutionary changes to [illegible]

of all. During these changes, traditional elite elements managed to survive in positions of privilege and power, although on occasion they were eclipsed by bourgeois and even plebian upstarts (whom in turn they gradually absorbed). A combination of their family status, educational privileges, military, bureaucratic, and industrial opportunities, and political power enabled the traditional elites to be above the battle. They enjoyed their status and even their political power as an impersonal, almost non-political right. They represented the State, and they could survive shifts among parties and constitutions with equanimity.[29][30]

The Nazi political elite was revolutionary in the sense that it was produced by reaction against the traditional elite. In every sense it was marginal, as Daniel Lerner has demonstrated.[31] Yet as a middle-class movement, it represented in distorted form the "stable categories" of society -- the civil service, professions, and corporate business, led by alienated intellectuals. The latter served as spokesmen for a society suffering from the disasters of national humiliation, inflation, and unemployment following World War I. There was a nationalistic rather than social revolution, however, once the political leaders of the Weimar democracy had been displaced. While the non-political elites were able to survive the rise of the German totalitarian state, the Nazis subordinated and aborted their status and authority. In this way the Nazi political elite assumed far greater power than had previous political elites.[32]

The modernization of Japan had produced a concentrated elite by a [illegible], though ideologically disciplined, leaders. When the political [illegible] reinterpreted, the ruling families of the Tokugawa era were replaced by other noble families, and the new elite that emerged during the modernizing process divided its new functions among themselves and with the dismissed

Tokugawa elite: law and administration, indoctrination, and political leadership were an interlocking directorate.(33) The Meiji "Restoration" might not have been a return to ancient imperial traditions, but it restored the power of the old elite, as enlarged, in the new forms. Only the rise of the upstart military elite to political authority gradually weakened this monopoly in the pre-war decades, until the leadership of this group as well was gradually absorbed into the traditional social framework.(34)

The core of the military government attacks on the totalitarian elites was the purge program in Germany and Japan. Fortunately there are impressive reams of data about the nature and results of the military government purges, and the incidence of change can be traced much more precisely than in the indirect rule operations.

It is difficult to distinguish among the motives and purposes that prompted the attack on totalitarian elites: revenge against enemy leaders; humiliation of the victory and the principles of international justice; the desire to weaken dangerous and disturbed elements; concern over the prospects for political decency when cells of hedonism go unpunished;(35) and a number of hypotheses about the possibility of installing democracy by a single process of eliminating its known and institutional enemies and thus allowing the forces of freedom to prevail.(36)

The elements of punishment were more prominently displayed in the German occupation than in the Japanese, where no equivalent of the Potsdam de-militarization plan was prepared. Denazification in the American zone relied [illegible]

for certain public and, later, private offices. Thus at the height of the program in the American Zone alone, there were 545 German tribunals engaged in this screening, employing a staff of 22,000 persons and considering a maximum of 50,000 cases a month (Table III). Denazification carried severe penalties in some cases, as Table IV indicates. Eighteen million Germans completed the American Zone questionnaires, including transients -- more than the entire population of the Zone at any one time. In Japan a much smaller proportion of the population was screened, and there were proportionately fewer removed. Of the total of 210,288 purges, only 13,510 were actually holding office at the time of the purge, and 8,823 of these were arrest (See Table V) (37) Moreover, most purge restrictions were lifted gradually after the first Appeals Board began operating on March 3, 1947. (38) Once neither purge necessarily coincided with the principal elements of leadership and power, and in both cases its reach was relatively shallow and its duration limited.

In spite of the tremendous proportions of the German purges, denazification did not have a serious effect on the population as a whole. (Table II) Although at least 5000 Nazis were forced to change their names and live underground temporarily, only four percent of the Germans as a whole suffered job dislocation. Even among former members of the Nazi party (about 15 percent of the population), only 31 percent had been displaced, and four-fifths of these were soon reassimilated into the economy. (39) By 1953, only 2 percent of the population believed it had been personally disadvantaged by denazification. (40) The discrediting of the Nazi movement and the exploitation of Nazi leaders had been accomplished in a fraction before [illegible] and almost [illegible] height. Removal, classification, and punishment of Nazi party leaders and members had not significantly contributed to the eighty-hundring process

disillusionment with National Socialism. On the contrary, denazification seemed only to increase the political cynicism and the averted nationalism that were appearing in Germany in the early 1950's. The superficiality of denazification as a means of discrediting non-political elites was revealed in its impact on public opinion, where the dominant responses were apathetic and indifferent to issues of political morality. Although vigorous emotional resentments against denazification were revealed as the program developed, they tended to bring about withdrawal on the part of large segments of the population from any concern with government affairs in order to lead an "unpolitical" existence. A vast majority of Germans seemed to want to forget Nazism as a "bad dream," while only a few preferred to indulge in nostalgic reminiscences of the temporary successes and past glories as occasionally exploited in post-war novels and memoirs. On the other hand, no identifiable segment of public opinion recognized either the sources of Nazism in the German political system or the final purposes of denazification.

A firm, pro-Western government nevertheless succeeded in establishing and maintaining itself in Western Germany, and after 1959 the schools began to teach some of the unpleasant truths of Nazism. By 1961 the public was beginning to view documentary television programs on Hitler with approval and even to react sympathetically toward the Israeli Government's conduct of the Eichmann trial.

Like the colonial administrators in the indirect rule relationship, the military government used indigenous institutions and personnel to conserve manpower, sometimes without making any discrimination on the basis of [illegible] past student of ideology. (24) In Germany the decision as to whether or not to risk inefficiency in certain segments of the economy by removing Nazis from positions of influence was left to the corresponding technical services in

the armies of occupation. Thus the American Transportation Corps had to decide to what extent to denazify the railways, and the purging of the postal and communications chieftains was left to the Signal Corps. The extent of denazification in these different agencies varied widely, depending upon the attitude of the "using services" toward the relative importance of "denazification" and "efficiency." As in the case of indirect rule, major administrative and technical elites established themselves as independent of the political leadership.

The immediate political repercussions of denazification were trivial at first because no organized political community existed in Germany. In the beginning parties were permitted only on local and state levels, and they could reorganize into national blocs only by entering into a series of coalitions. Important ex-Nazis were denied both voting and candidacy privileges, and did not participate actively in the leadership of the major parties. No effective opposition to denazification was permitted: all parties were compelled, however reluctantly, to announce their support of denazification legislation. And when politics was once more possible, Nazi politicians had been replaced, principally by leaders who had been passive or relatively unimportant during the totalitarian interlude.(42)

The political elite clearly suffered the greatest displacement during the occupation. Avowed Nazis disappeared from the public scene. But the national and local bureaucracies, which had been heavily penetrated by Nazi ideology, recovered completely from the losses caused by denazification [illegible]. Federal agencies [illegible] were [illegible] to protect "victims of denazification" and give them preferential [illegible]. The [illegible] civil servants, of any, were [illegible]

from professional disadvantage ten years after the defeat. Only gradually were the former Nazi activists permitted to resume their political activities. Between 1950-57 about one-eighth of the German population were considered "hard core" Nazis, with another one-fourth emotional sympathizers.(43) But the obsolete politics of their leaders failed to attract an important national following. Occasional Nazi leaders were elected to the national and state assemblies, but extremists among them were soon discredited and the rest began to make their voting appeals on other grounds. No evidence of thoroughgoing Nazi ideology is to be found in any of the major parties or among holders of elective offices; in spite of an obvious upsurge of nationalism in the years following the occupation the German citizens preferred to be a-political. Political activism, whether on behalf of Nazism or a democratic philosophy, was obnoxious.(44)

The Japanese purge was both less vigorous and more selective than denazification. The purge in Japan was viewed as a preventive rather than punitive operation, and it was conducted according to administrative rather than judicial processes. It included suspected war criminals (until acquitted or released), career army and navy officers, leaders of ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, and secret patriotic societies, officers of financial and development institutions involved in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, governors and chief administrators of Japanese overseas territories, and a miscellaneous category subject to discretion and judgment on an individual basis. Other categories added later and somewhat controversially were those advising political leaders and public information enterprises. The delay in applying the criteria, the temporary retention of undesirable personnel, and the looseness of the screening note permitted essential Purgees to

continue without serious interruption. Moreover, since the first purge directive was not specific in setting forth the activities which were prohibited to purgees, much unofficial consultation between purgees and their successors took place during the year before Japanese governmental surveillance began. Nor were the effects of the Japanese purge severe or repressive: it amounted to a loss of official status, but not necessarily of prestige or public sympathy; it involved the loss of pensions and of the right to pursue an interdict career, but individual losses were usually checked by the family and personal adjustment. Close family members by both blood and adoption were subject to the same disabilities as the purgees, and in some cases were likewise barred from even entering the premises that had held their former offices. Yet the flexible Japanese social system enabled purgees to designate their successors, and if it was difficult or impossible for them to exercise control over their henchmen who had received the offices they had been forced to vacate, the process by which the replacements were selected insured some measure of ideological similarity or at least compatibility with the old order.(45) The purge probably did not discredit Japan's old leaders more than defeat and disillusionment already had; it is significant that selective as it was, it had to be enforced by law and administrative machinery rather than the pressure of public opinion, just as in Germany.

Yet by any measure of the elimination of the elite as a totalitarian political institution, the attack must be considered as unsuccessful as it was in Germany. The purge removed significant proportions of the old leadership from active public life. Only three cabinet ministers survived the first purge; 95 percent of the candidates for the Diet in its first post-war

elections were parliamentary novices;[46] nearly one-half of the House of Peers membership was purged. Conservative parties suffered a greater loss of membership than those of the Left, until the purge itself was turned against the Communists. In the industrial world, although the large enterprises with managerial strength in depth escaped severe losses, some small plants were forced to reorganize, and in certain cases to seek new means of financing as a result of the purge. Moreover, the characteristics of totalitarianism identified by Friedrich and Brzezinski are no longer identifiable in the Japanese elite structure, and the old elite has been unable to sabotage the new institutions introduced by the occupation. In Japan's post-war elites there is certainly no identifiable official ideology or propagandistic mass organization for the control of public opinion. The police have been severely restricted under the occupation, and although MacArthur's police decentralization policy was "completely overthrown"[47] in 1954, subsequent attempts to revive extreme police powers of investigation and control have been vigorously and successfully attacked. The mass media are far from captive to government policy or service to a single identifiable private interest. The absence of the state monopoly of violence is evidenced by the ungainly of dissident groups to engage in public disturbances and riots. (Although this is a classical protection against oppression, the use of violence by public gatherings is not unanimously a hopeful sign in a functioning democracy, especially when exploited by cohesive groups serving totalitarian objectives.) And finally, the Japanese economy, although highly centralized, is not an instrumentality of the state. [illegible] in both production and distribution, and the economy is responsive to changes in the private money market and the requirements of private and foreign

investors.

Japan is not now a totalitarian state; to which it must be added that the political elite as a sociological institution does not appear to be either self-perpetuating or inclined to use violent means to destroy competitive groups and organizations within the society in the future. Even the still powerful bureaucracy had lost some of its authority by the end of the occupation, with its loyalties to the emperor attenuated, its legislative function checked by the increasingly powerful National Diet, and its economic status undermined by inflation. The aristocratic recruitment processes by which government officials were chosen leveled off as outstanding university graduates began to choose other occupations, and the civil service examinations became accessible to men outside the traditional elite.(48) The political elite is sharply divided within itself by party and other conflicting loyalties and purposes; its new recruits are entering from an assortment of sources; it shows a responsiveness to public opinion that has more than once proved distressing to the prime minister and his cabinet. Japan may not yet be safe for democracy,(49) but the old form of totalitarianism at least is gone along with militaristic policies.

A comparative analysis of the purges in Germany and Japan based on the vast array of statistics available shows that the political leadership of the totalitarian period was almost entirely replaced by the end of the occupation, and that leaders of extreme nationalistic organizations had been substantially discredited. In neither country was the bureaucratic elite [illegible] the totalitarian elites although [illegible] the elite [illegible] were not destroyed, as only a few [illegible] enough by the land reform in Japan;(50) and the military elites were eliminated.(51) (See Figure XII).

The mechanics of introducing military government-sponsored reform through existing administrative channels closely parallels the British indirect rule system. The remarkable continuity between pre-surrender and post-surrender administrations in both Japan and Germany was a result of a half-deliberate policy as well as of the shortage of technical personnel. The notion was that the practice of democratic procedures in introducing reforms through the existing structure would in itself provide a training ground for democracy, and that even the unsympathetic elements within the bureaucracy would either be won over or be forced by public opinion to an acceptance of the new procedures. In retrospect, the elements of continuity available to the traditional order -- national pride, a vening of public enthusiasm for the imported values, unchanged social patterns, the switch in occupation priorities from democratization to stabilization because of communist threats to security -- seem to have been underestimated. But if these ideological considerations were generally ignored in the process of inducing changes, the passage of time made the old totalitarian principles seem obsolete as new functions and problems of statecraft emerged.

XII

Foreign aid has not been consciously employed as a device for inducing elite change. It is sometimes hopefully regarded as an instrument for promoting stability, but even when it has the effect of strengthening a regime in power, such consequences are usually incidental. In any case, foreign aid is officially -- and correctly -- regarded as an instrument of international diplomacy rather than a potential agent of internal revolution. That it has revolutionary potential is a fact not fully accepted even now, in spite of suggestions by political scientists.[32] As a result, there have

been no serious studies of the unintended social consequences of foreign aid, and an analysis of its potential in inducing elite change must therefore remain speculative and even, in any official sense, somewhat improper.

There can be little doubt that foreign aid tends to support the existing regime in the receiving country, even though it may be offered for purely technical and economic purposes and with the expressed intention that it continue regardless of any future collapse of the regime in power. But foreign aid implies modernization, and thus its collateral effects may be similar to those of indirect rule in that it tends support to the status quo with its official hand while with the other it is strengthening the forces of change (see Figure IV).

The foregoing studies of indirect rule and military government suggest that political leaders are easily the most vulnerable of all elites to attack born from internal changes and from the pressure of external forces. They also suggest that the administrative, technical, commercial, and military elites, in that order, are the most impervious to change under these conditions (see Figure V). One conclusion to be drawn from these facts is surely that attempts to use foreign aid to protect an entrenched political elite on the one hand, or to provide an aspirant elite with the means to power on the other, may be short-lived and self-defeating. Since the communists always seek to achieve a "permanent revolution," their attempt at inducing elite change seems to refute this principle. But a communist takeover is not achieved by mere elite change. The political leadership is brainwashed and removed from a sense of direct public responsibility. The political struggle is thereafter an attempt at replacing the leadership, the support of the proletariat is ordered by the destruction of the administrative apparatus. Since such reasoning is denied on the West, it may be well to consider which elites may be strengthened by

the tools of foreign aid and what the political consequences of such actions may be.

The components of foreign aid relevant to the induction of elite change may be summarized as follows:

a. Men: technical assistants, teachers, and supervisors of technical and administrative operations.

b. Materials: equipment for military, industrial, governmental, and other capital purposes, whether supplied through loans or grants.

c. Money: direct support for government and industrial operations; and foreign exchange dollars to permit the importation of consumer goods for which repayment is made in local ("counterpart") currency.

The effect these elements of foreign aid have on elite building depends upon the setting in which they are used and upon the relative proportions in which they are offered. Both the military elite and an administrative class may be considerably strengthened by individual training, by the organizational improvements that are introduced by technical assistance, and by the supplying of equipment which increases their effectiveness. Commercial and industrial classes may be encouraged and strengthened by all three elements, by technical assistance, by capital goods and services, and by support for the importation of consumption items. Rural elites, especially landowners, may be strengthened by improved agricultural technology, or, alternatively, reduced by technical and capital assistance to land reform. The existing political elite, of course, derive support from the fact that aid is obtained through them, and from the possibility of their allocating it to enhance their own prestige or benefit their supporters and colleagues. On the other hand, opposition political groups which represent potential elites may also benefit from foreign aid, at least indirectly. They may

themselves receive educational privileges that would not otherwise be available; even as outsiders they may perform technical and professional functions for which the demand is strengthened by the presence of foreign aid; and in a general sense they may benefit from the frustrations suffered by the public when foreign aid creates demands faster than they can be satisfied by the existing political elite.

Experience with indirect rule and military government would seem to suggest that once the bureaucratic, technical, commercial, and military groups have risen to elite status their position is virtually unassailable except by means of institutional reform. And there can be little doubt that these groups have been markedly strengthened by American aid operations in the past: military groups in Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia; administrative and technical groups in Pakistan, the Philippines, Greece, and Viet Nam; and commercial groups in Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Iran, and Greece. The political results of their rise have been no more controllable than the consequences of American support to political elites in Laos, Korea, Taiwan, or the Philippines. It is easily demonstrable that mobilization forces certain groups in a society, however repressed or frustrated they may be temporarily by traditional forces.

There remains the question of the extent to which induced elite changes can be accompanied by calculated political consequences. Clearly the rise of new elites is in itself no assurance of changes that would be considered desirable by the Western democracies. The possibility of directly influencing the political future of a rising elite is basically an ideological question, which cannot be fully explored here.[23] It would certainly involve offering special educational opportunities for elites destined to perform important public roles; creating opportunities for independent association by

intellectuals from developing nations about political problems without fear of reprisals; and a firm ideological commitment on the part of the Western nations to the essential values rather than to formal institutions. There has been little experimentation on the part of the Western powers with the devices by which various groups in the developing countries can be encouraged to seek out political solutions to their own problems in terms compatible with human dignity and freedom. Intellectual behavior is even more difficult to control than social processes, however, and practitioners of the arts of induced change must recognize that the prospects for inducing controlled change are slim indeed.

"Artificial Revolution," in its three forms discussed in this paper, deliberately induces elite change for the purpose of effecting changes in a society. Such changes have inevitably required the support of administrative and technical elites. Where, as in Africa, these elites have not previously existed, it has been necessary to create them. Yet, as has been shown, the administrative and technical elites, while supported by policies of an "artificial revolution" are not easily subjected to external control. Thus "artificial revolution" gives birth to agents of change, but it is relatively powerless in dictating the nature or composition of these agents.

The inducing of elite changes will be seen, then, as a social process, carrying no direct political content. In its use of indirect rule, British political purpose was not clear: its strong domestic commitment to democratic values and institutions never led to the direct imposition of the European model in Africa except for administrative purposes. Yet the British protection of traditional elites was not intended to prevent change and

modernization. New elites arose as the needs of society called for them, and even the strengthening of the traditional order did not prevent modernization. Similarly the intent of the allied military occupations in Germany and Japan was also obscure, once the destruction of the political leadership had been accomplished. There the bureaucratic and technical elites counterpart to those that had arisen under indirect rule were largely immune from the attack; and again it was the social needs that made the continuity of these elites possible. The appearance of change in Germany and Japan under military government was thus as complete as the appearance of stability had been in the first years of indirect rule, in both cases depending upon the relative change or stability of the political elite. But just as social and political needs undermined the stability produced by indirect rule, so they might yet undermine the change produced by military government.

Foreign aid has still less voluntary political content than indirect rule or military government. Like indirect rule it offers support to an existing order; but in the meantime it contributes equally directly to the forces of change. Reforms and purges are generally inappropriate to its operation, but so is open endorsement of any single elite group. The mechanisms, unlike those of military government, are positive: it cannot remove or ignore its enemies. In the long run its principal beneficiaries, like those of indirect rule, may be the modernized administrative and technical forces that so strongly resisted attack under military government.

The task of foreign aid is thus much subtler than that of indirect rule or military government if political developments favorable to the West are envisaged as among its purposes. And if not, the lessons of indirect rule

and military government are ominous: support to a political group cannot prevent change from occurring as new functional elites emerge; while at the same time in the modernized state, the administrative and technical elites being developed with foreign aid are not readily accessible to subsequent influence or pressure for achieving desired political ends.

FIGURE II

Effects of Indirect Rule on Traditional Elites

Social Setting	Traditional Controls Over Chiefs	Paramount Chief's Traditional Powers and Legitimacy	Chief's Capacity to Absorb New Functions	Chief's Capacity to Prevent Rise of Pseudo-Traditional Elite	Chief's Capacity to Prevent Rise of New Independent Elites
1. Large-Scale Traditional States (Emirates of N. Nigeria; N. Territory of Ghana; Buganda Kingdom)	W	S	S	S	S
2. Small, Highly Centralized Chieftaincies (W. Nigeria; S. Ghana)	W	W	S	W	W
3. Dispersed Tribal Societies (E. Nigeria; Pagan Tribes of N. Nigeria; Uganda outside Buganda)	W	W	W	W	W

W, Weakened; S, Strengthened. The terminology used for the three categories of states is that of James Coleman in Almond and Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: 1960), p. 254.

FIGURE III

Tabular Statement of the Consequences of Totalitarianism and Military Government on Elites in Germany and Japan

Elite	Totalitarian Revolution		Artificial Revolution	
	Germany	Japan	Germany	Japan
Political	R	P	R	R
Bureaucratic	P	H	H	H
Industrial	H	H	H	H
Technical	H	H	H	H
Community	H	H	H	P
Military	S	S	P	P
Extreme Nationalistic	S	S	P	P

R - Removed and replaced

P - Power reduced

H - Not seriously disturbed

S - Strengthened

FIGURE IV

Possible Host-Country Effects of Foreign Aid

Agent	Possible Strengthening Effects						Possible Weakening Effects
	Political	Mutl. Political	Military	Administrative	Socioeconomical	Moral	
Technical Assistance	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Material and Equipment			X			X	
Financial Assistance					X	X	
General Control	X						X
Prestige Increase	X	-	X	X	X		
Organizational Improvements	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Power Potential	X			X			X
Technical Improvements and New Skills	X		X	X	X	X	
Equipment or Mechanical Improvements in Efficiency and Prestige			X	X	X	X	
Commercial and Pecuniary Advantage	X	X	X		X		
Educational and Career Opportunities		X	X	X	X	X	
Concentration or Centralization of Regime in Power	X						X
Loss of Independence from External Association	X			X			X
Concentration or Centralization of Regime in Power		X					X
Creation of Multiple Centers of Power	X			X			X

FIGURE V

Comparative Analysis of Techniques for Inducing Elite Change

	Indirect Rule Colonialism	Military Government	Foreign Aid
Existing Political Elite	N	R	N
Alternative Political Elite	O	O	O
Rural Elite	S	S	S
Technical Elite	O	S	O
Intregrative Elite	O	W	O
Military Elite	S	W	S

N, Nominally Supports; R, Nominally Removals; O, Given Opportunities;
S, Strengthens; W, Weakens

TABLE I

Occupational Background of Elected
Elites in Nigeria, 1952-57

Profession	Northern Region a House of Assembly 1952	Northern Region a House of Assembly 1956	Northern Region b House of Reps. 1952	Northern Region b House of Reps. 1957	Western Region a House of Assembly 1952	Western Region a House of Assembly 1956	Western Region b House of Reps. 1952	Western Region b House of Reps. 1957	Eastern Region a House of Assembly 1952	Eastern Region a House of Assembly 1953	Eastern Region b House of Reps. 1952	Eastern Region b House of Reps. 1957
Educators	5%	7%	2%	10%	29%	33%	25%	20%	39%	28%	45%	28%
Professional	2%	1%	2%	0	21%	19%	30%	23%	21%	20%	22%	20%
Private Enterprise	3%	16%	0	5%	30%	35%	22%	43%	22%	30%	18%	26%
Native Authority	89%	75%	95%	63%	7%	2%	9%	0	17%	18%	15%	15%

Adapted from James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), pp. 380-81.

TABLE II

Comparison of Unofficials* and Official Members of Parliament in Uganda

	Unofficial Members 1951-53	Unofficial Members 1953-58	"County" Chiefs 1951-53	"County" Chiefs 1953-58
Education				
Literate	5	1.7	10	--
Primary I-VI	40	38.9	10	11.1
Junior Secondary I-III	15	25.4	--	5.5
Senior Secondary IV-VI	30	22.0	65	61.1
College	10	11.9	15	22.2
Religion				
Roman Catholic	45	53	40	40
Protestant	42.5	37	50	50
Muslim	5	5	10	10
Other	7.5	--	--	--
Land Ownership				
Inheritance	47.5	37.4	55	83.3
Purchase	27.5	23.7	45	16.7
No land	25	20.3	--	--
Previous Occupations				
Uganda Government	27.5	30.5	85	77.8
Protectorate Government	10	25.4	45	44.4
Army/Police	7.5	8.5	10	16.7
Teaching	22.5	32.2	--	11.1
Private Firms	10	1.7	5	11.1
Own Business	12.5	18.6	15	--

*Elected and appointed

Source: Adapted from David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton: University Press, 1961), p. 369.

TABLE XII

Summary of Denazification Tribunal Actions
(August 1950)

Category	U.S. Zone	British Zone	French Zone	Total
I. Major Offenders	1,654	?	13	1,667
II. Offenders	22,122	?	938	23,060
III. Lesser Offenders and Probationers	106,422	27,177	16,826	150,425
IV. Followers	485,057	222,028	298,789	1,005,874
V. Persons Exonerated	18,454	1,191,930	3,484	1,213,873
VI. Persons Amnestied	316,417	87,669	78,861	482,946
VII. Dismissed Without Charge	2,672,986	512,651	270,512	3,456,789
VIII. Total Cases Heard by Denazification Tribunals	3,623,112	2,041,454	669,068	6,333,634

Source: German Ministry of Interior, quoted in Report of High Commissioner of the French Government in Germany to Foreign Minister, 11 September 1950 (ms.).

TABLE IV

Denazification Penalties Adjudged under Allied Control Council Law No. 10
(1 January 1947)

	U.S. Zone	British Zone	French Zone	Soviet Zone
Imprisoned	12,425	3,038	1,936	14,820
Condemned to Death	206	124	20	133
Other	414	252	292	13,960
Acquitted	90	151	8	142

Source: Unpublished records in the Office of the French High Commissioner. Cf. also H. Friedmann, Allied Military Government of Germany (London, Stevens, 1947), p. 332. In the U. S. Zone most of the penalties were fines. In the French Zone most of the cases were internments. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, 24 December 1945, singled out members of criminal organizations and war criminals to be punished retrospectively through German judicial proceedings.

TABLE V

Elites Purged in Japan

Category of Elite	Number Purged	Percentage of Total
Military	167,035	79.6
Bureaucratic	1,809	.9
Political	34,892	16.5
Ultranationalistic	3,438	1.6
Business	1,898	.9
Information Media	1,216	.5
	210,288	100

Source: Statistics Bureau of Prime Minister's Office, reproduced in Hans Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation (Berkeley, California University Press, 1959), p. 60.

TABLE VI

Denazification in the Three Western Zones of Germany:
Military Government Phase

	American Zone	British Zone	French Zone
Total Population (1945)	17,000,000	22,000,000	6,000,000
Total Arrests and Internments*	95,950	68,500	67,179
Total Removals from Office**	292,089	112,577	54,064
Total Exclusions from Office***	126,218	56,565	8,515
Total Retentions in Office****	1,062,705	151,000	281,019

* Report by Allied Control Council to Council of Foreign Ministers (mn., January 1947), Chapter II, "Denazification."

** J. K. Pollock, J. H. Meisel, and H. L. Bretton, Germany under Occupation, Illustrative Materials and Documents (Ann Arbor: Wahr, 1949), p. 32.

*** W. Friedmann, Allied Military Government of Germany (London: Stevens, 1947), p. 332.

FOOTNOTES

(1) The concept of "artificial revolution" was proposed in John D. Montgomery, Forced To Be Free (Chicago, Chicago University, 1957), pp. 10-18, 174-191. It is contrasted with "natural" revolution of the classic French prototype [see Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (N.Y., Prentice-Hall, 1952) and George S. Pettee, The Process of Revolution (N.Y., Harper, 1938)] and "permanent" revolution as proposed by Karl Marx [see Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution (N.Y., 1942)].

(2) This point is argued in Margery Perham, "A Re-statement of Indirect Rule," Africa (VII:3) July 1934, pp. 321-334, p. 322. A contrasting view of the possibilities of indirect rule is reflected in Macaulay's classic statement in his minute on education (1835): "I am quite ready to take the Oriental learning at the valuation of the Orientalists themselves. I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia." (G. M. Young, Macaulay, Prose and Poetry, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 722). He concluded: "I feel with them, that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect." Same, p. 729.

(3) O. C. Lethem, "Indirect Rule and Education in East Africa," Africa (VII:4), October 1934, pp. 429-430.

(4) Sir Donald Cameron, credited with the introduction of indirect rule in Tanganyika, asserted that the League of Nations mandate required Britain to train the native population for "a full place in the political structure." The policy was "providing for the natives to develop on their own lines." Lethem, cited, p. 429-4. Lugard's views on its role as a means of improving native administration are summarized in Margery Perham, Lugard, the Years of Authority (London, Collins, 1960), pp. 138-154. F. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (3d Edition, London, 1926), pp. 207; 212-17. He uses phrases like "highest possible powers of self-government," and "object of complete independence at the earliest possible date," though at a moment "not yet visible on the horizon of time." Cited, Chapter X. The phrase "educate them so that they can govern themselves in an orderly and just manner" appears in Sir Harry Johnston's letter to P. J. Jackson, 23 January 1900. D. Anthony Low and R. Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955 (London: Oxford, 1960), p. 260. Indirect rule there reached self-government on an essentially local level, leaving to other forces the nation-building role. Same, 20%. The relationship of indirect rule to political independence movements is not always considered as self-evident as the framing of British policy suggest.

(5) Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years of Authority 1858 - 1945 (London: Collins, 1960), pp. 87-137.

(6) The Zulu, for example, had never acknowledged the Fulani of Nort before

the British set them in authority. C. K. Meek, "The Rulu in Northern Nigeria," Africa (VII:3, July, 1934), pp. 257-269, p. 259. Ingard himself believed that only in exceptional cases should pseudo-traditional leaders and practices be installed under indirect rule. He defended his favoritism toward the Fulani over the Hausa, however, by stating, "The Fulani of Northern Nigeria are . . . more capable of rule than the indigenous races." F. D. Ingard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1923), p. 190. He added that "in Nigeria it has been the rule that their [Fulani] power should not be re-established over tribes which had made good their independence, or imposed upon those who had successfully resisted domination." Some, p. 210. This principle was not always followed either in Nigeria or elsewhere.

(7) After Ingard's time the injunction to "Find the Chief!" led to the interpretation "Make the Chief!" Perham, Ingard, cited, p. 466.

(8) James S. Coleman, Nigeria, Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1958), p. 394; 353. There are even a number of cases where modern government officials up to the rank of minister have resigned in order to accept traditional chieftaincies. Professor Sylvester Whitaker states that "There are at least five such instances in Northern Nigeria since the war, if you count junior ministers (parliamentary secretaries)." Personal letter, August 12, 1961.

(9) Same, p. 379.

(10) Report on the Amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria...," Cmd. 468 (London: H.M.S.O., 1920), p. 19. Quoted in Perham, Ingard, cited, p. 416.

(11) Coleman, Nigeria, cited, Chapter 17, especially pp. 394-96.

(12) Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Stanford: University Press, 1960), p. 91; 268.

(13) Same, pp. 82-87.

(14) Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: University Press, 1960), p. 267.

(15) The term "native authority" relates to traditional chiefs, who, under the indirect rule, were supposed to carry out reform and modernize administration. The "Native' councils" were originally intended to manage "ritual and other interests of the stools." But "their members have not unanimously seen their chief concern in the maintenance of the customary privileges derived from their positions. Their composition is still largely dictated by tradition, and in only a few cases have they provided for the inclusion of men of higher education or professional experience." The councilors were not, in fine, expected to be influential in their councils. Lord William Malley, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part IV: A General Survey of the System... (London, H.M.S.O., 1951), p. 29.

(16) The provincial councils were gradually given the power of decision over enthronement and de-stooling (removal) of chiefs. Traditional functions did not necessarily prepare the latter for dealing with this additional threat. L. P. Mair, Native Policies in Africa (London: Routledge, 1936), p. 165.

(17) David E. Apter, Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: University Press, 1955), Chapters 6 and 7.

(18) For examples of British support to Ashanti chiefs against uprisings, see K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London: Oxford, 1951), pp. 105 f. The British also restrained or chastised chiefs considered to have abused their position. Same, pp. 107-109.

(19) The Uganda Agreement of 1900 provided in Article 6 that the King (Kabaka) of Uganda "shall exercise direct rule over the natives of Uganda." David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton: University Press, 1961), p. 135. As applied in Uganda, indirect rule was "not intended to be a training ground for democracy." Same, p. 219. The Governor, Sir Charles Bundas, described it as a "system of local government."

(20) For an example, see same, p. 120. "Neo-traditionalism" and "modern traditionalism" are discussed in Chapter 10, pp. 195-215.

(21) L. P. Mair, Native Policies in Africa, (London: Routledge, 1936), pp. 168-171. Cf. D. Anthony Low and R. Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955 (London and New York: Oxford, 1960), p. 142.

(22) F. Burke, "The New Role of the Chief in Uganda," Journal of African Administration (X:3, July, 1958), p. 154.

(23) Same, p. 155.

(24) J. C. D. Lawrance, "The Position of Chiefs in Local Government in Uganda," Journal of African Administration (VIII:4, October, 1956), pp. 180-1. For a description of the changing roles of the chiefs, especially in their heyday as administrators, see Aidan W. Southall, Alur Society, A Study in Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge, England, W. Heffer & Sons, 1953), pp. 255-267. See also David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton: 1961), pp. 107, 108, 137, 251, 252; and Low and Pratt, cited, pp. 163-178.

(25) Dr. Claire Burke, "Traditional Authority and Social Action in Tanganyika [illegible]," Journal of [illegible], (1957, Special Issue), [illegible].

(26) Dr. Claire Burke, same, p. 151.

(27) Professor Burke points out that of [illegible] 35 paramount chiefs in Buganda in 1958, only 3 were literate. Same, p. 152.

(23) The characteristics of totalitarianism as defined in C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Harvard, 1956), pp. 9-10, follow these: it proclaims an official ideology, organizes its followers under a single mass party, exercises terroristic police control, possesses a technologically-conditioned monopoly of the means of mass communication and the means of waging warfare, and operates under a centralized economy.

(23a) See K. W. Deutsch and Lewis Edinger, cited, pp. 117-120.

(24) Eugene N. Anderson, in "Freedom and Authoritarianism in German History," in Gabriel A. Almond, Ed., The Struggle for Democracy in Germany (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1949) points out that "In 1914 Germany retained a class society, with the upper elements -- the monarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy -- being under the authority of a few hundred families, interrelated by way of marriage, concord, membership on boards of directors, occupancy of top positions in the bureaucracy and the army, ownership of the press, and close connections with prominent educators and churchmen" (p. 20). See also p. 31. Also see Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

(25) Maxwell H. Smith, The German Republic, 1919-1933 (Stanford: University Press, 1933), especially pp. 46-47.

(26) Daniel Lerner, The Nazi Elite (Stanford: University Press, 1951). The Nazis were led by extremist intellectuals and disaffected plebians, acquired its principles, religion, primary life aims, occupation of fathers, education, age at marriage, foreign parentage, and higher education chosen. P. 83. Cf. also pp. 8, 9, 10-11, 28, 30, 31, 32, 51.

(27) Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

(28) C. Wright Mills, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, Political and Economic Problems of the Initial Period (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), pp. 80-90; 413-14.

(29) Hugh Borton, Japan Since 1931, Its Political and Social Developments (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), Chapter III, and Harry D. Holgrunsky, Japan Past and Present (New York: Knopf, 1946), especially pp. 110-135; 142-172; 191-200.

(30) See Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (Washington: Ronald Press, 1955), pp. [illegible]

(31) The use and "the elimination of Asians and Africans in all levels" [illegible] 20 years ago) and the removal of "persons who have been active supporters of militarism and ultranationalism." Over [illegible] "the exclusion of public or substantial private responsibility" U.S.

Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 24 August 1945). The goals of demilitarization and democratization are discussed in C. J. Friedrich et al., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York, Rinehart, 1948), and John D. Montgomery, The Purge in Occupied Japan, A Study in the Use of Civilian Agencies under Military Government (Washington, Johns Hopkins ORO, 1953).

(37) John D. Montgomery, The Purge in Occupied Japan, cited, p. 23. Of the total office-holding purgees, only 8,815 were screened by the national board, the rest being "locals."

(38) Of 45,518 appeals submitted as of April 28, 1952, 21,316 had succeeded. Same, p. 43.

(39) HICOG Opinion Survey, OMGUS, Report No. 80, 25 November 1947, p. 3.

(40) Special poll of 2,057 persons throughout the Western Zone, taken in November 1953 by the Institut fuer Demoskopie, Allensbach am Bodensee, on behalf of the author and the Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University.

(41) The Combined Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender (28 April 1944) specifically stated that military government was to be effected "through indirect rule," using German nationals as local government officials, but "no actual appointment of Germans to important posts" was authorized without approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(42) See Lewis Edinger, "Post Totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic," American Political Science Review (LIV:1, March 1960, pp. 58-82), p. 64, 68-9. Edinger finds that in his sample, only 18% of the contemporary German elite were in any major way involved in the totalitarian regime, "most of them as its opponents and victims." He also reports that in this sample, 24% were supporters, 57% ambivalent, neutral, or wavering, and 19% opposed (p. 75).

(43) Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy (Stanford: University Press, 1959), pp. 40-41. This study also notes an increased mobility in and out of the upper classes, both personally and between generations, suggesting that this factor makes class appeals less powerful than before while leaving all equally vulnerable to nationalistic appeals. Same, pp. 36-43.

(44) A 1952 poll asked a representative cross-section, "If a new party similar to the Nazi Party should come to power in the Federal Republic, what would be your attitude toward it?" Only 3% said they would welcome or actively support it; 20% would not like to see it, but would not do anything to prevent it. Norbert Muhlen, The Return of Germany (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), p. 50.

(45) Professor Masaji Kinoshita, 'Purge' Policy and After, Conference Paper prepared for 12th Conference of Institute for Pacific Relations, Kyoto, 1954. This process contributed to the selection of replacements for the old elite who were compatible with their predecessors. I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan (London: Oxford, 1960) pp. 13, 116, refers to the military government policy of indirect rule as one source of the bureaucracy's staying power in Japan.

(46) After the 1946 elections, 375 of the 466 Diet members were "freshmen," the largest number since the first Diet, July 1, 1890. But by 1952 this group of novices had gained as much experience, on the average, as the purgees had had, and this during a period of growing rather than (as in the case of the pre-war parliamentarians) receding parliamentary power. Moreover, the 1952 elections showed that purgees were at a disadvantage in running against non-parliamentarians with parliamentary experience. John D. Montgomery, The Purge in Occupied Japan, cited, pp. 52-53.

(47) Takeyoshi Kawashima, "Law," in UNESCO International Social Science Journal (XIII:1, 1961), pp. 25, 33.

(48) 89% of the career appointments in 1935 were made from the ranks of Tokyo (Imperial) University. By 1950 the corresponding figure had dropped to 45%.

(49) While it might be too much to suggest that a democratic counter-elite had emerged to replace the totalitarian elite, the occupation seems to have permitted democratic tendencies in Japanese tradition to emerge and achieve certain of its goals. See Takeyoshi Kawashima, cited, p. 32.

(50) Tadashi Fukutake, "Rural Society," in UNESCO International Social Science Journal (XIII:1, 1961), pp. 70-71. Local government, though democratically elected, is still dependant upon the central government for most of its financing. It has thus lost its strength as an elite stemming from the bureaucracy of the Home Ministry, and not gained the strength of a democratically elected self-supporting community leadership group.

(51) Although Article 9 of the Constitution outlaws war, the "Security Corps" and its successor the "Defense Corps" gradually developed an Army, Navy, and Air Defense. The constitutionality of this action has not been tested in the courts, but public opinion has remained hostile to any propositions to legalize these services by constitutional amendment.

(52) The present writer began to speculate on the possibility in the last chapter of Forced To Be Free (1957) and in "Gilded Missiles: Reflections on the Politics of Foreign Aid," which was written in 1957 but not published until 1959 (Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII:6, June, 1959). Cf. also "Political Discussions of Foreign Aid" in R. Braibanti and J. Spengler, editors, Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961); "Public Interest in the Ideologies of National Development," in C. J. Friedrich, Nomos V, Public Interest (New York:

Bobbs-Merrill, to be published); and The Politics of Foreign Aid (to be published. Harlan Cleveland has urged consideration of its political potential repeatedly in "Role and Character of Foreign Aid: The Convalescence of Foreign Aid," American Economic Review (XLIX:2), May, 1959, pp. 216-31, and most recently in Syracuse University's Operational Aspects of U. S. Foreign Policy, Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: GPO, 1960). In 1960-61 the Brookings Institution, under H. Field Haviland, Jr., began a series of discussions of the problem, involving a number of government officials.

(53) John D. Montgomery, "Public Interest in the Ideologies of National Development," in C. J. Friedrich, editor, Nomos V, Public Interest (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, to be published).

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FEDERALISM AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN CANADA

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The purpose of this paper is to suggest that there is a causal and necessary link between Canada's achievement of a relatively stable and coherent two-party system in the Dominion parliament and the considerable variety of parties established in the Canadian provinces. Normally such parties as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) and Social Credit are characterized as splinter parties in a national two-party system. This is in part quite justified. These parties do compete for seats in the Dominion parliament and have never attained a very large representation there. But classification of these parties, and of the Union Nationale in Quebec, merely as national splinter parties obscures the true nature of Canada's party system. It may be useful to conceive that within the context of Canadian federalism, the national party system has two distinct layers, and that these are mutually inter-dependent but can be separated for purposes of analysis. One layer of the national party system services the parliamentary institutions at Ottawa. The other layer applies to the tension between the Dominion government and the governments of the provinces.

It is suggested here that as ruling parties in one or more provinces, the so-called splinter parties of the first layer constitute an essential part of the second layer of the Canadian party system. As elements of this second layer, parties such as the C.C.F. or Social Credit are not merely also rans for power in the Dominion parliament. Far greater is their importance as factors in the federal balance of powers between Ottawa and the provinces. The maintenance of this federal balance is perhaps the most acute problem of Canadian politics. It is, in fact, so acute that a special dimension of the national party system appears to have emerged to oblige it.

The argument that follows therefore assumes that a party that wins power in a Canadian province plays three major roles. Obviously, it functions within the party system of its particular province; it is a factor in the top layer of the national party system, which involves control of the Dominion parliament; it also functions in the second layer of the national party system, which balances central and sectional interests within the federal structure. The roles of provincial ruling parties within provincial party systems and as contributors to the party politics of the Dominion parliament have been variously studied, but too little recognition is evident of their special function as a safety valve for sectional interests. The hypothesis is advanced that this special function is performed within the second layer of the national party system, and that the effectiveness of the stable two-party process in the Dominion parliament depends upon its fulfillment. It also seems that the character and operation of the second layer of the Canadian party system is unique, and that it owes its existence to the complex, inexorable logic of Canadian federalism.

The Canadian Confederation is not inherently stable. It is a truism that divisive forces threaten Canada's national unity. Everyone is aware of the problem of the French Canadians, self-consciously nationalistic, rooted in their language, their church, their customs, and therefore different from other Canadians. In fact, the situation of the French Canadians is so dramatic, their destiny so colorful, that over-concentration on the social problem for national unity they represent may blur recognition of other centrifugal forces no less powerful. These are primarily economic in origin. It must never be forgotten that the natural economic drift of North America

runs, like the course of its rivers and mountain ranges, on a north-south axis. Canada has created her national economy on an east-west axis in defiance of nature. Penned between the frontier of the United States and a vast arctic hinterland, the Canadian economy has no vertical, only horizontal mobility.

The problem thus posed for the Canadian national economic development has never been solved, although its difficulties have failed to defeat Canadians, who have manfully fought and to an extent subdued them. There are in Canada at least four major and quite distinct economic regions: the Atlantic Maritimes, the industrial and commercial heartland of Quebec and Ontario, the Western prairies, and the Pacific Coast. The logic of economic geography would link each to a southward partner region in the United States; the logic of national politics yokes them together. The compulsion of political nationalism is characteristically negative. To be Canadians is above all to be North American without being American (i.e., pertaining to the United States - and the usage galls north of the border), or British, or French. A common defiance of external pressures remains the most important factor that unites Canadians with conflicting interest - the bluenose from the Atlantic Coast, the French Canadian, Irish Canadian, British Canadian, the farmer of East European descent in the prairies. There is a sharp difference here between Canada and the United States. In the States, clashing intersts of sections and diverse peoples were and still are being overcome by an unrivalled homogenizing national prosperity, created essentially within the national frontiers and financed by domestic capital. Canada is poorer and lacks economic self-sufficiency. She has depended on London and New York for capital investment. At the sacrifice of a shared, homogeneous North American prosperity, she has austerely defied absorption into the economy of the United States. Her various regional interests - economic and social - retain their separate vigor virtually undiminished. The national politics of Canada involves a tense and struggling adjustment between national and sectional power quite different from the United States.

II.

Canadian political institutions reinforce and cater to this tension. Confederating in 1867, in pursuit of greater autonomy from Britain and in fear of the ambitions of a United States still in arms after the Civil War, the statesmen of the first four Provinces adopted federalism. They sought to make a nation; some hoped that their projected system would one day evolve into a unitary regime; but at the time French and British Canada could live as one only within a federal pattern that guaranteed their differences. The national purpose of the Fathers of Confederations is clearly evident in the British North America Act. In contrast to the Constitution of the United States, which had just endured the war between the States, the B.N.A. Act assigns both the general and residual powers of government to the Dominion, not the Provinces. By means of lieutenant-governors appointed by the Dominion government, the latter could disallow provincial legislation.[1] The design was created for the conquest of sectionalism from the Center.

1. B.N.A. Act, 91; 58, 56, 90.

But it was not to be so. It is commonly known that the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council abridged the general powers of the Dominion government and enhanced the legislative powers of the Provinces.[2] After 1887, it is equally clear, the power of disallowance of provincial acts came to be less and less frequently used. What is often not emphasized sufficiently is that this frustration of the hopes of national supremacy over sectionalism was not merely the result of caprice on the part of alien judges. Professor Brady is right in maintaining that these decisions "gave judicial expression to the upsurge of provincialism, evident from the early eighties to the decade after the First World War."[3]

In 1867 Canada consisted of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. By 1905 Ontario and Quebec had been vastly enlarged, and the Dominion had nine Provinces: Manitoba was created in 1870, British Columbia joined in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873, and Alberta and Saskatchewan were established in 1905. Sectional development, fed by immigration, was proceeding rapidly. Macdonald's national policy, inherited and adapted by Laurier, had linked the nation east to west by rail, maintained a tariff barrier against economic aggression from the United States, and had hugely lessened dependence on Britain. The nation existed, but sectional differences had grown apace with its progress. At the very heart of Canadian federal politics a classic pattern of tension between Dominion and Provincial governments was fully developed, around the focal point of financial relations. Dominion-Provincial financial arrangements symbolize Canadian diversity more validly than the problem of the French Canadians; and as a symbol and a fact they offer a rather neglected clue to the nature of the national party system.

This is not the occasion for a detailed review of the manifold intricacies of Dominion-Provincial financial relations in Canada.[4] Suffice it to explain that, from Confederation onward, the Dominion government has necessarily subsidized the Provincial governments. Deprived by the federal constitution of revenues from external trade, but not released under that constitution from their diverse functions, the four original Provinces received subsidies in the form of per capita grants and debt allowances from the Dominion. The terms fixed for these subsidies were meant to be final, and they were embodied in detail within the constitution itself.[5]

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2. See especially Tennant vs. Union Bank (1894) and Snider vs. Hydro-Electric Commission of Toronto (1925).

3. Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, 3rd. ed., Toronto, 1958, p. 46.

4. The best account of the matter up to the Second World War can be found in J. A. Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments in Canada, Cambridge (Mass.), 1937.

5. B.N.A. Act of 1867, 118.

In fact, they have been subject to constant bargaining and revision ever since Nova Scotia obtained "better terms" almost at once, in 1869. The number of Provinces and the divergent pressures grew; the alteration of subsidies has been virtually continuous.6.

The problem has had an extra dimension ever since British Columbia and Prince Edward Island were first given additional subsidies in the early 1870's in lieu of land turned over to federal public domain. Time and again the Provinces have besieged Ottawa for better terms; final settlement has succeeded final settlement. After the impact of the depression and the Second World War the present basis for an approach to the problem was developed. This involves the exchange of increased and adjustable subsidies to the Provinces for exclusive "rental" by the Dominion government of the personal income tax, corporation taxes, and succession duties.7.

III.

For our present purposes the significance does not lie in the constitutional and technical labyrinth enclosing the problem, but in the basic fact that the governments of the Provinces, meaning of course the parties that control them, inevitably must struggle and bargain for higher subsidies with the government at Ottawa, meaning of course the majority party in parliament. This is true even when the party in power in a Province is nominally the same as the party in power in Ottawa. And here we approach the nature of the second layer of the Canadian national party system .

In the first layer, two groups of adversaries are pitted against each other in the Dominion parliament in what is essentially a two-party system. These are parliamentary parties in nature, with relatively weak national organization. They operate in the British parliamentary context, which decrees that elections come irregularly and with little advance warning.

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6. Professor Dawson counts "over twenty special revisions and three general revisions since Confederation." Robert MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 2nd ed., Toronto, 1954, p. 120.

7. The rental of the taxing power had to be devised because of the ambiguity of the British North America Act, whichin section 91 (3) gives to the Dominion parliament the right of "The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation," but in section 92 (2) gives to Provincial legislatures the power of "Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the Raising of a Revenue for Provincial Pruposes;" thus exposing Canadians potentially to confiscatory levels of double direct taxation. Dawson hypothesizes the resident of Alberta who had an income of $1,000,000. In 1938, before the post-war rental schemes went into effect, he would have been liable for 105% of this amount in Dominion and provincial income taxes. Dawson, op. cit., p. 123.

(The sharp contrast with the regularity of Congressional elections in the United States and with the galvanizing national impact of the Presidential election must be noted.) For effective organization these national parliamentary parties depend upon the services of provincial organizations. The textbooks advise that "the provincial association is the effective head of the party organizations in Canada."8.

These provincial associations may bear the same name as the national parliamentary party, but they are in fact nearly autonomous. A national parliamentary party may in a Dominion election usefully be served by a provincial organization wholly autonomous and bearing a distinct and different name. The classic illustration of this is the role of the Union Nationale in Quebec. In its post-war hey-day it helped the Liberals nationally to capture the bulk of Quebec's seats in the Dominion parliament in four elections, and aided the Progressive-Conservatives in a fifth. Also, dominance of a province by a provincial party organization does not guarantee that the organization will deliver federal representation to its nominal partner in the Dominion parliament. Social Credit governed in Alberta and British Columbia in 1958, but all of Alberta's and most of British Columbia's seats in the last federal election went to the Progressive-Conservatives, and none to Social Credit.

This is no doubt confusing, but it is nevertheless logical, and the logic is that of the second layer of the national party system. Centrifugal sectional forces are very strong in Canada. These forces are to a large extent institutionalized in the politics of the Canadian provinces. These politics, and the parties that control them, are inevitably pointed toward conflict with Ottawa. And it is therefore true, as Professor Dawson suggests, that "while it may be advantageous for a Dominion Government to have its own party in power in the provinces, it may well be that a Provincial Government is more secure if it is politically opposed to the party in power in Ottawa."9.

The logic of the second layer lays down its own classic cyclical pattern. A Dominion government will be established with a majority in the federal parliament that rests on the support of a majority of the provincial party organizations. As that government stays in power in Ottawa, the governments of the provinces will gradually turn against it. Where the parties in power in the provinces bear the same name as the party in power in Ottawa, these parties in the provinces will tend to face defeat. To complete the cycle, a majority of party organizations in the provinces hostile to the government in power at Ottawa will in the end elect the opposition party to office in the Dominion parliament. Thus, for example, when the Liberal party under Mackenzie King returned to power in Ottawa in 1935, Liberal parties were in power, alone or in coalition, in all of the then nine provinces except Alberta, where Social Credit had just come into

8. Thus Dawson, Ibid., p. 529.

9. Ibid., p. 574.

office. When the Liberal party was defeated in the Dominion election of 1957, Liberal parties remained in power, alone or in coalition, in only three of the provinces; and in two of these, Manitoba in 1958 and Prince Edward Island in 1959, Progressive-Conservative governments came into office at the next provincial election..

In this fashion, the two layers of the national Canadian party system interact, and their inter-relationship is perhaps the most complex and unique phenomenon in Canadian politics. To win a Dominion election, a party must appeal for a national consensus, in face of all the divisive forces rampant on the political stage. From the birth of the Dominion it was apparent that a party appealing exclusively to either French Canadians or British Canadians could not hope to encompass a national consensus. In fact, such a party would, in its very nature, embody a threat to Canada's survival as a single nation. Total hostility from either of the two main racial groups also dooms a party's national chances. Flaws of leadership and historical circumstances deprived the Conservative party of the capacity to appeal to French Canadians for decades after the First World War. Until recently, therefore, it seemed that the Conservatives were doomed to be in opposition at Ottawa as a normal matter of course. To achieve national consensus and a national majority, parties must surmount not only social but economic divisions as well. This they can do mainly by advocating strong government to promote national economic development, which holds the promise of increased prosperity for a country still underpopulated, and still far from able to make full use of enormous natural resources. Strong national leadership, to keep the country together, to combat external pressures, and to develop the economy despite adverse geographical factors - this Canada needs and has usually received. It is what the parties successful in Dominion elections promise.

The themes are perennial: a national policy of energetic promotion, be it of a national railway or of natural gas; the vigorous assertion of separateness from the United States, running the gamut from protective tariffs to the attempt to force a distinctly Canadian culture into being. Only the theme of the British connection has altered, with the reality of completely achieved autonomy. The old negative separatist tone appears to be giving way to a more positive search for a forceful Canadian contribution to the Commonwealth. As all observers since Lord Bryce have noted, ideological questions play little role in Dominion politics. National circumstances do not encourage them.

Strong leadership at Ottawa appealing to Canadian nationalism, however, is never so strong as to be able to destroy the centrifugal forces at work. Sectional interests remain and must be somehow accomodated. In the absence of effective institutions to accomodate them within the Dominion government itself, they express themselves in the second layer of the party system. For practical purposes, sectional interests translate themselves into issues of provincial rights. What Canada requires is balance. Strong national leadership is required if the country as one is to survive at all. Yet national leadership which attempts to eliminate, or even over-ride, sectional claims would be destructive. There-

fore provincial centers of power must exist to counter the power at Ottawa and keep it within bounds. However, a rigid, permanent conflict between Dominion and provinces would be intolerable. So the power in the provinces, as in Ottawa, must be flexible. At times the provinces must sustain leadership at Ottawa, at other times frustrate it.

IV.

This is the essence of living Canadian federalism, and it is largely accomplished in the interplay between the parties in the provinces and the parties in the Dominion parliament. What is distinctively Canadian in the process is the vigor of provincial rights and what they represent, as well as the fact that the struggle for balance between them and the wider national interest is institutionalized in the party system. It is more usual in federal systems to find this struggle, often less severe than it is in Canada, institutionalized within the federal apparatus itself. So it is in the United States, chiefly within the Congress. But not in Canada, where the federal parliamentary institutions are unsuited to this purpose.

The Canadian House of Commons does not represent the provinces. Seats are allocated among and within the provinces roughly on the basis of population. The two forces in conflict in the House are normally the party of government and the opposition, which in the British tradition acts as a potential alternative government. Never far from the prospect of the next election, both government and opposition party must, as we have seen, bear in mind the need to appeal to a national consensus. To protect their political future, both attempt to mute and smother manifestations of divisive sectional forces. More than the government party is able to, the opposition party may choose to pose as the champion of provincial rights, and thus of sectional interests. But its freedom of action is also restricted. It dare not press issues to the point where its own opportunity to rally a national majority is endangered. Nor dare it make such commitments to provincial rights as will prevent its capacity for strong national leadership should it come to power at Ottawa. Operating under the authority of the Cabinet much as in Britain, the Canadian House of Commons tends very much to be the place where the policies of the government are put forth and enacted and where the two major parties in contention strive respectively to maintain or to achieve their appeal to a national majority.

It is well known that the Canadian Senate is not an effective institution, either for the accomodation of thrusting provincial interests or for most other purposes. This body of aged appointees, the great majority of whom owe their tenure to political services rendered in their more active days to the government that named them, does not even represent the provinces equally.[10] Even at the outset of Canadian Confederation the

10. The normal membership of the Canadian Senate is 102. In essence the body is designed to give each representation to four major geographic areas. Thus Ontario and Quebec have 24 Senators; the Western provinces have 24 Senators in all, six each for British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta; and the Maritimes originally had 24 Senators, ten each for Nova Scotia and New Brunswik and four for Prince Edward Island. With the entrance of Newfoundland the balance was altered by the addition of six Senators for the island.

Senate was designed less as an organ of federal representation than as a bulwark of social conservatism. And, as Professor Brady points out, whatever federal role was intended for the nominees for life has now been largely diluted, since they are not compelled to possess a practical accountability to their provinces or their regions.11. A weak second chamber, the Canadian Senate plays only a minor role in the parliamentary process, and virtually no significant role at all in Canadian federalism.

Within the Dominon cabinet, to be sure, all or at least most of the provinces are represented. The process of cabinet-making in Canada is made exceptionally difficult by the need of the ruling party to maintain its national strength by squeezing into the government as extensive a representation as possible from the ten provinces. However, such representation flows primarily only in one direction. It lacks a genuinely reciprocal character, and thus it does not serve to institutionalize the struggle for the federal balance completely in the cabinet. The governing party does not pick a cabinet in order to resolve federal conflicts. It seeks to have ministers from every province to demonstrate its truly national character and to sustain as widespread an allegiance as possible. There is a crucial overlap of purposes which falls short of identity.

In one sense a minister (or ministers) from a province does of course represent it. He can express a provincial or regional point of view, dispense some patronage and otherwise play an effective partisan role on behalf of his provincial party. But as a member of the cabinet oriented toward the British model he is not consistently an effective bargainer for provincial interests. Only at the very formation of a government does he does have an opportunity to make a really strong case for his province. An effective leader of the party in control of a province who is asked to join a Dominion cabinet being formed can make his acceptance conditional upon quid pro quos that will benefit his province. Once in office, however, his ability to work for the provincial interest is limited by the practice of cabinet solidarity. The collective decisions of the cabinet are of necessity oriented toward preservation and promotion of the national consensus. And most men will temper their advocacy of a provincial case once it is clear that they will pay with a loss of office if they persist too far.

It is hard to be absolutely clear on this point. Obviously a prime minister and a cabinet majority will go to great lengths to avoid a rupture that would see one of their number resign on the sensitive issue of provincial rights. Any cabinet formed by the ruling party at Ottawa will seek to retain the strongest fealty possible from among affiliated or allied provincial parties, and to accede to the needs of the latter whenever practicable. But the momentum of divergent forces is never arrested; no balance of forces is permanent. Provincial demands, especially financial demands, are by their very nature insatiable. Better terms here, a boon there are inevitably followed by demands for still better terms, bigger boons. As a Dominion government stays in power it becomes impossible to gratify continually all that is sought by the provinces, even those gov-

11. Brady, op. cit., p. 522.

erned by allied parties. In fact there is a danger that provincial demands feed on satisfaction. If too much is given by Ottawa too soon, the point may very early be reached within the cabinet where the line is drawn against provincial pressures.

V.

It is here, then, that the logic of the second layer asserts itself most forcibly. Within a province the feeling is apt to grow that the provincial cause - most often symbolized by financial terms though it may in actuality have a far more complex composition - is no longer best served by having the ruling party in the province represented in the cabinet of the ruling party at Ottawa. Such representation may have resulted in recognized initial benefits to the province. But soon there may be talk that the province's representative (or representatives) has been in Ottawa too long, that he no longer stands for the provincial interest. It may not be immediately practicable, or indeed desirable, to change parties both in the province and in Ottawa, and thus to await the next great stride in the provincial cause at the moment of formation of the new Dominion cabinet. But it may very well seem of advantage to overturn the ruling party in the province. This puts at the head of the provincial government men who no longer belong to the ruling party at Ottawa, but who at least will therefore be free to put the provincial case forward without reservation.

There are conflicting considerations involved, of course. Is it indeed wiser to trade muted advocacy of the provincial cause within the Dominion cabinet for strident efforts made outside the pale? Where the ruling party in the province and the ruling party in the Dominion are affiliated under the same name, prudent concessions from Ottawa may long persuade provincial voters to continue support of the affiliation and not to rupture it. Of greater interest to the argument at this moment is the alternative of keeping in power in a province a government not affiliated to either of the two major parties in contention at Ottawa. Is this perhaps the strategy that gives the most effective flexibility to the provincial case?

Such an autonomous party, in essential control over the province, is free to bargain with both of the contending parties at Ottawa each time there is a Dominion election. It will be rewarded each time that it supports a winner at Ottawa. True, it is not likely to be rewarded with direct partisan representation within the Dominion cabinet. On the other hand, however, its leaders remain free to criticize and differ with the Dominion government as they choose. The leaders of the ruling party in the Dominion can never ignore the autonomous party in the province as long as it rules there and has the effectively dominant provincial electoral organization. A Dominion election is always in the offing, and for the Ottawa leaders each Dominion election means that the process of bargaining for support from provincial organizations must be resumed.

No doubt the leaders of the two major parties in contention at Ottawa find such thinking vexatious and deplorable. But its potential appeal for the voters of a province seems real and apparent. The most virulently divergent pressures away from national consensus exist among French Canadians and in the West. It is then perhaps no accident, that until 1960 Quebec voters for years chose to support the Union Nationale in the province while usually voting Liberal in Dominion elections. Also, the Western provinces, with the very recent exception of Manitoba, are each in the control of a party not affiliated with either of the main contenders for Dominion power. Social Credit appears to be thoroughly dominant within Alberta and British Columbia, and not since the war has the C.C.F. lost contol of Saskatchewan.

These circumstances are scarcely understandable except in terms of Canadian federalism and a second layer of the national party system. The so-called ideology of Social Credit seems scareely relevant to the conduct of provincial government by the party, and of almost equal irrelevance to its voters. The Union Nationale, given the leadership of the late M. Duplessis and French Canadian nationalism, was and is not encumbered with an ideology that could be so labelled. There is, of course, a socialist-progressive point of view that distinguishes the C.C.F. ideologically, but there is little evidence of its relevance to provincial voting in Saskatchewan. It seems most likely that voters in general support these provincial parties with a pragmatic perception of the federal circumstances under discussion, i.e., with recognition of the two layers comprising the national party system.[12.]

VI.

Two obvious dangers attend this conception of an autonomous or nearly autonomous ruling party within a province as the most effective bargaining agent with Ottawa. Both have been evident in Canadian politics. The first is that dominance of provincial politics by one party will breed corruption and neglect or abuse of power. It is at this point that the third dimension of the party system relates to the two national layers. Sometimes the

12. My thesis is supported by brief suggestive statements made by F. H. Underhill, "Canadian Liberal Democracy in 1955," in G. V. Ferguson and F. H. Underhill, Press and Party in Canada, Toronto, 1955, pp. 27-46, and by Dennis Wrong, "The Pattern of Party Voting in Canada," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1957, pp. 252-264. It runs directly counter to the views of Howard A. Scarrow as expressed in his "Federal -Provincial Voting Patterns in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, May 1960, pp. 289-298. Mr. Scarrow attempts a comparative manipulation of Canadian provincail and United States state election statistics and concludes from this effort, which proves sterile, "that no simple formula is likely to provide an adequate understanding of the motivation underlying split or alternating elections within a federation."

political situation within a province will prevent voters from continued support of the traditionally dominant party, even if the effectiveness of the latter in bargaining with the Dominion government is undiminished. This may be the result of evident flagrant abuses of office held too long and too securely. Or it may follow, as in the recent case of the Union Nationale in Quebec, the loss by the traditional ruling party of its dominant personality.

In the event, the replacing of a ruling provincial party which was not affiliated with either of the two major parties in the Dominion Parliament is hard to assess in terms of its impact on both layers of the national party system. Usually,such a provincial party could be replaced only by a provincial party affiliated with one or the other of the two Ottawa contenders. The first question must be whether the shift in the province is temporary and is soon to be undone again, after the repudiated party has undergone internal reform. The second question, if the shift seems semi-permanent, is whether the victory of a provincial party affiliated with one of the two parties in the Dominion parliament signals an alteration in Ottawa. For example, with regard to Quebec today, it is not yet clear whether the Union Nationale will make a comeback soon within the province, or whether its forturnes have suffered a lasting reversal. And it is even less clear whether the success of the provincial Liberal party in Quebec signals the return of the Liberals to power in Ottawa or not. What is rather more clear is that lengthy dominance by one party is, despite disadvantages, habitual in Canadian politics, both at the Dominion level and in many of the provinces.

The second danger consists of the possibility of sterile deadlock or destructive hostility between the Dominion government and the governments of one or more of the provinces. This is in fact a constant potential threat within the structure of Canadian federalism. It is a threat not often realized because it is suicidal. The basic fact of the matter is that most Canadians are fully aware both of the need for strong national leadership that will hold the country together, and of the pressures of centrifugal forces pulling away from national unity. Awareness means more than recognition in this case. It means acceptance. The existence of centrifugal and centripetal forces is taken for granted, as is the tension between them. They serve as a basis for all Canadian political calculations.

Quite naturally both forces are embodied in the constitution, which demands their interaction. The Dominion must finance the provinces because it depends on governmental services only the provinces can render. The latter cannot function without the financial support of Ottawa, nor without the context of a national consensus which the Dominion government represents. Both forces are also institutionalized in the national party system, requiring the parties at Ottawa to bargain with provincial parties, either as such, or more frequently as the governments of provinces. To bargain is the antithesis of deadlock or naked hostility. Prolonged bitterness between Dominion and provincial governments can work to the advantage of neither.

Nevertheless, there have been occasional lapses into excess. Two illustrations of unusual interest come to mind. One is the famous quarrel in 1940 between the Ontario Liberal administration led by Mitchell Hepburn and the Dominion Liberal government headed by Mackenzie King. This reached its peak when the Ontario legislature, dominated by the provincial Liberal party, passed a motion of censure on the conduct of the war effort by the Dominion government. Thus challenged, Mackenzie King went to the country and was returned to power with an increased majority. The number of Liberals returned to the Dominion Parliament from Ontario declined by only one, from fifty-six in 1935 to fifty-five. At the next provincial election in Ontario, in August 1943, the provincial Liberal party was crushingly defeated. (Mitchell Hepburn had earlier resigned as provincial Premier, on 21 October, 1942.)

Of particular significance is the fact that this open breach occurred between a provincial and the Dominion party nominally affiliated under the Liberal name, which suggests that such nominal affiliation does not destroy the near-autonomy of a provincial party organization. Also of interest is the result of the conflict for the provincial party. Undoubtedly there was some feeling in Canada in the early years of World War II that the King government was not sufficiently vigorous in its war effort at Britain's side, and the voters of Ontario were as a group perhaps more loyal to the British connection than those of other provinces. However, the head-on challenge to the Dominion government flung down by the Ontario Liberal administration went too far in its expression of a divergent interest. Implicitly rebuked by King's success in the Dominion elections of 1940, and bitterly divided within itself, the provincial Liberal party lost its hold on Ontario.[13]

The other illustration is the notorious "five-cent speech" delivered by Mr. King in 1930. Speaking during the depression, Mr. King said:

> "So far as giving money from this federal treasury to provincial governments is concerned....I might be prepared to go a certain length possibly in meeting one or two of the western provinces that have Progressive premiers at the head of their governments, but I would not give a single cent to any Tory government....May I repeat what I have said? With respect to giving moneys out of the federal treasury to any Tory government in this country for these alleged unemployment purposes, with these goverments situated as they are to-day, with policies diametrically opposed to those of this government, I would not give them a five-cent peice."[14]

13. For Mackenzie King's reaction to Hepburn's challenge and his judgment on the Liberal defeat in Ontario in 1943, see J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Volume I, Toronto, 1960, pp. 62-65, 568-571.

14. Canadian House of Commons, Debates, 3 April 1930, pp. 1227-8.

Shortly after this speech the Liberal Administration of Mackenzie King fought a general election. The speech was extensively used against the governement. In the election the Liberals were defeated. No one could claim that they were defeated solely or even primarily because of Mr. King's utterance. Still, there can be little doubt that his statement was excessive and disastrous. Were such a view to become policy for a Dominion government vis-a-vis provincial governments affiliated with the opposition party at Ottawa, the basis of Canadian federalism would be destroyed. In Canada the center can no more wipe out sectional divergence than the latter can hope to over-ride the center.

Of the greatest interest, however, is Mr. King's allusion to his willingness to deal with Progressive premiers, or in other words with leaders of provincial parties not affiliated with either of the two main parties at Ottawa. His statement invites the suggestion that there may well be a positive benefit at the first layer of the Canadian party system that derives from the existence at the second level of provincial parties both nominally and actually autonomous. It was remarked above that the leadership of both of the major parties in contention at Ottawa probably deplores the existence of autonomous parties in the provinces. No doubt a Liberal prime minister of the Dominion would, for partisan reasons, much prefer to have provincial Liberal parties in power in every province, just as a Conservative prime minister at Ottawa would welcome the unanimous support of provincial Conservatives prevailing everywhere. But how would politics in the Canadian national parliament be served if only the same two parties in contention at Ottawa were available to provincial voters?

The pressures of Canadian federalism, as we have seen, dictate that in time the conflict between provincial forces and a government confirmed in power at Ottawa is bound to intensify. The classic cycle of the two layers would therefore indicate that, for example, a Liberal government that had come into power with the support of provincial Liberal parties dominant in most or all of the provinces would soon find itself confronted with hostile Conservative provincial parties coming to power in most or all of the provinces. It would then be rather rapidly succeeded by a Conservative government at Ottawa, which would in turn then undergo the equivalent experience.

At least two very grave disadvantages would inevitably seem to follow. First, the precarious national consensus of Canada would suffer. Governments at Ottawa would alternate more rapidly than is now the case, which is not necessarily desirable in itself.[15] It would also seem certain that they would succeed or fall increasingly on the divisive

15. For the argument that Canadian circumstances make the relatively extended rule of one party in the Dominion parliament advantageous, see my "Massive Alternation in Canadian Politics," Foreign Affairs, July 1958, pp. 633-44.

issue of provincial rights. Secondly, each alternation at the Dominion level would presumably be accompanied by the characteristic rewards granted to provincial supporters. The process of pressure for better terms would be opportunistically accelerated, and the present basis of Canadian federalism would be rapidly eroded.

Such dire results might be avoided only if the two Dominion parliamentary parties could discipline and manage their provincial affiliates. This, however, is unlikely to happen so long as provincial governments and political processes serve divergent social and economic forces which are indelibly part of the very essence of Canadian nationhood. With these considerations in mind, the prevalence of parties in office in several provinces that are not affiliated with either of the two contentders for Dominion power may be seen as a vital safety valve in the Canadian political process.

By voting Social Credit into provincial power, for example the voters of British Columbia can effectively express sectional interest, albeit in the guise of provincial identity, without necessarily damaging thereby the delicate balance of national unity. The autonomous provincial parties in power appear uniquely free to negotiate with both parties at Ottawa. It may well be that this fact offers a vital flexibility, not only to the voters of the provinces, but to the entire national party system. In this sense, then, these autonomous parties in power in the provinces are not merely splinter groups also represented in the Dominion parliament. They constitute part of a second layer of the national Canadian party system, and it is in large measure to their existence that the stable parliamentary life of Ottawa owes its viability.

Professor Brady has written that "Federalism is the most distinctive achievement of Canadian democracy."16. It is also true that the success of a national system of democratic politics in Canada is per se a magnificent achievement in the face of great odds. A century ago John Stuart Mill asserted: "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist."17. For Canada at least, Mill's dictum does not hold, though the experience of other nations well justifies his warning. Essentially it is Canadian federalism that has made the difference. More attention is justified to the ingenious and complex political process which animates the successful federal democracy of the Canadian nations. Within this process a two-layer national party system appears to have developed.

16. Brady, op. cit., p. 65.

17. John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, Oxford, 1948, p. 292.

RECRUITING POLICIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

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Communist parties are essentially different in organization and purpose from parliamentary parties of the West, and for this reason an analysis of recruiting policies in China must be placed within an appropriate context of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist assumptions and concepts or run grave risk of distortion.

Membership in a given political party of the West is likely to include many different kinds of people with many different ways of seeing things. This is notoriously true in the United States where Henry Wallace, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Byrd were Democrats and Nelson Rockefeller, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Barry Goldwater are all Republicans. Parties under the parliamentary system normally achieve somewhat more consistency of viewpoint --though neither Michael Foot and Hugh Gaitskill, nor G. E. P. Thorneycroft and R. A. Butler in his younger years have worn anything like identical lenses.

The political party in a western parliamentary system is usually a loose and somewhat diversified organization with a relatively small corps of leaders and a vast and heterogeneous rank and file membership. The leaders have enough interests in common to hold the organization together and to provide discipline for running campaigns and mustering votes in parliament. The rank and file belong to the party for reasons which are often scarcely known to themselves and which the inquiring sociologist and political scientist find maddeningly elusive. To maintain working cohesion between elections becomes a frustrating challenge to the leadership.

Communist parties scarcely belong in the same general category of organization. They have been compared with the religious sect and also with military and fraternal groups which demand deep commitments from their members.[1] Certainly, there are

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1. See, for example, Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

aspects of communist party recruitment, candidature and periodic examination (and further conditioning) prerequisite to advancement which suggest "conversion," "novitiate," "boot camp," ordeals for elevation to a higher "degree," and other phenomena associated with more or less "closed" systems demanding "total" personal dedication to the group, to its goals, and to its approved rituals and procedures.

The World View

It can be argued that all men see the world and what happens there through two "filter-lenses," the lens of their senses and the lens of their training, their bringing up, their experience, and their culture. What each of us sees--and does not see--existing and taking place around him, and the way each of us interprets these phenomena and reacts to them, depends to a very considerable degree upon the "filter-lens" each of us is wearing.

Every society takes pains to "shape" and "color"--to one degree or another--the filter lenses of its members. Schools, Sunday schools, churches, and many other institutions are maintained to perform these functions. The difference between an organization which is more or less "open" and pluralistic, on the one hand, and one which is more or less "closed" and monolithic and total lies in the degree to which differences in view--and differences in reacting to what is viewed--tend to be encouraged, tolerated or forbidden.

An important characteristic of communism is a relatively total and obligatory world view.

When the Russian Bolsheviks achieved power in 1917 they brought with them a highly-developed set of lenses, a total world view, which provided them with a detailed picture of man and his environment. The component images were part of a complex belief system which explained the entire course of human history and also the basic social and physical processes of mankind, the world, and the enveloping universe. This world view, according to Lenin, is "all-powerful because it is true."[2]

In China Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues accepted this world view in all its essentials, but "combined theory and practice" by making practical adaptations to suit local condition and circumstance. "If a man read ten thousand volumes by Marx, Engels, Lenin

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2. V. I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism" in Karl Marx, Capital, The Communist Manifesto, and Other Writings (New York: The Modern Library, 1932), p. xxi.

and Stalin, and read each volume a thousand times so that he could recite every sentence from memory," Mao told the Party School in Yenan at its opening day ceremonies on February 1, 1942, "he still could not be considered a theoretician." [3] To be a successful Chinese Communist theoretician a man must be able to apply Marxism-Leninism "in profound and scientific analyses of China's actual problems so that he can discover the laws of their development." [4]

Among the fundamental aspects of the Marxist-Leninist world view are the belief that conflict is central to human affairs, the assumption that long-range peace, justice and public welfare can be achieved only through elimination of the class enemy, and the conviction that communism is predetermined to win out.

We must keep in mind, of course, that communists--being human --do not all see the world operating in precisely the same way, however "closed" their system and "total" their doctrine. With whatever persistence a system of this kind struggles to maintain its "purity" and discipline and consistency, it is almost a law of history that doubts and disputes and modifications and schisms and heresies will creep in. The tighter the orthodoxy, indeed, the more certain, over the long run, will be the proliferation of dispute and faction and heresy. Lenin made fundamental alterations on Marx. Stalin and Trotsky maintained incompatible views on the comparative urgency of foreign and domestic policies, and today Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and Tito are at odds concerning substantial elements of economic, political and military tactics. Operating on the side of the free world is the historical certainty that over the long run these differences will multiply rather than diminish --though whatever orthodoxy enjoys major power at a given time may struggle ruthlessly to maintain its doctrine and solidarity.

It is right here, in any case, that we see the peculiar and essential characteristics of communist party purpose, structure, and process beginning to emerge. Whatever their other differences may have been, most major communist leaders have insisted that all party members ought to share a single world view. Nearly all of them have insisted upon this even when they have been at odds over which of their various world views was orthodox and "true." The doctrines of communism, even when they are in dispute, leave no room for any other loyalty, no allowance with any thought or inclination which questions or is in the slightest degree incompatible with party principles and teachings.

At the same time, however, and to the bewilderment of many Western observers, there is an essential corollary to the principle

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3. Mao Tse-tung, "Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature" in Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952), p. 13.

4. Ibid.

of total unity which asserts that--short of the stage of pure communism--party members will inevitably find themselves in conflict and that this intra-party struggle is an essential aspect of the party's functioning.

Unity and Solidarity

Solidarity and unity, according to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, are the very life of the party, the source of its strength, and it is the "sacred duty" of every member to safeguard this unity and solidarity.[5] Party members are expected to share not only the same world view, the same purposes and goals, but they are expected--once a decision has been made--to choose the same alternatives, to use the same means without equivocation or breach of discipline. "We must see that the marching order of the entire Party is regular and uniform," Mao Tse-tung has said, "and that it struggles toward a common objective."[6] Toward these ends the members must place the interests of the party and state above their personal interests and, in the event of any conflict between the two, must submit unswervingly to the interests of the party and state.[7] "Within the Party," according to Liu Shao-ch'i, "our Party members should have no interests apart from the Party, nor should they have independent individual objectives, for the Party member's individual objectives can only be a part of the objectives of the Party."[8]

Whoever follows personal ambition is an egotist, a creature of bourgeois idealism and a "fellow-traveler of the Party" rather than a Marxist-Leninist.[9]

There is no room for equivocation. "Even though the Party organ has wronged us, we must still regard the overall interests of the revolution as the most important of all and must under no circumstances stay away from the Party. A true revolutionary is willing even to sacrifice his life for the sake of the Party."[10] One wonders, indeed, why large numbers of men and women are attracted into an organization which demands so much. This is a question which will be raised again towards the end of the paper.

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5. For an English translation of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China adopted by the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, see Peter S. H. Tang, Communist China Today, Vol. 2 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 115.

6. Mao, "Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature," loc.cit. p. 24.

7. The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, loc.cit., Article 2 (5).

8. Liu Shao-ch'i, "Training of the Communist Party Member," Mao's China, loc.cit., p. 110.

Meanwhile, it will become clearer, as we go along, how this lock-step solidarity is perceived as giving rise to conflict which, paradoxically, contributes to greater solidarity rather than to the disruption which many Westerners tend to expect.

In maintaining this solidarity and discipline the number of party members must be kept relatively small in comparison to the number outside the party--not more than one percent, Mao thought in the 1940's. [11] Within this exclusive and carefully controlled membership "no action which violates the Party's political line or organizational principles is permissible, nor is it permissible to carry on activities aimed at splitting the Party or factional activities, to act independently of the Party, or to place the individual above the collective body of the Party." [12]

Struggle

In spite of--or because of--these uncompromising requirements, it is stipulated that members of the Communist Party of China must constantly practice criticism and self-criticism to expose and eliminate their shortcomings and mistakes. No concept or activity which violates or questions the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist world view--or even any minor part of it--can long be tolerated. To question any essential aspect of the movement is to support its class enemies. The party, according to its Constitution, "must prevent and resist corrosion by bourgeois and petty bourgeois ways of thinking and styles of work and guard against and defeat any Rightist or "Leftist deviation inside the Party." [13] In the case of party members who have committed mistakes, the party--in the spirit of "curing the illness to save the patient"--is expected to allow them to remain in its ranks and "receive education" to help them correct their mistakes--"provided such mistakes can be corrected within the Party." [14]

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9. K'ang Sheng, "Communist Party Members Should Be Marxist-Leninists, Not Fellow-Travelers of the Party," Hung-ch'i [Red Flag], No. 19, Oct. 1, 1959, E.C.M.M., No. 189, p. 4.

10. Yang Hsiu, "Dissatisfaction and Hatred Toward Criticism," Chung-kuo Ching-nien [China Youth], September 1, 1959, E.C.M.M., No. 193, p. 9.

11. Mao, "Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature," loc.cit., p. 29.

12. Constitution of the Communist Party of China, loc.cit., General Program, p. 115.

13. Ibid., p. 116.

14. Ibid.

In rooting out mistakes, the Propaganda Bureau of the Central Committee as early as 1942 made the following recommendation: "In discussion, contending views should be developed. During the stipulated investigation period, opinions, whether correct or mistaken, should be allowed free discussion and should not be curbed. However, leaders should skillfully direct their attention to guiding mistaken opinions in a correct direction, and should not allow opinions to become conclusions." [15]

The Hundred Flowers policy of more recent years was justified in these terms. "It is precisely for the purposes of employing the media of discussion, criticism, and education through persuasion to beat all non-Marxist and anti-Marxist ideologies with the Marxist ideology, and to beat idealism with materialism under the realistic conditions in China, thus achieving the end of bringing the fragrant flowers of socialism into bloom and weeding away the anti-socialist poisonous weeds, that we advocate the blooming of all flowers together and the contention of diverse schools of thought." [16]

The purpose is not to do away with the undesirable elements--unless there is no other alternative--but rather to "reeducate" and remold them according to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles. This process should be carried on carefully and assiduously at all times. "...the house must be frequently cleaned," said Yang Hsiu, quoting Mao in support of constant party purging, "and if it is not it will be full of dust." [17]

It is within this context of party concept and function that recruiting takes place.

The Need for Recruitment

At various points in its history the Chinese Communist Party has needed to expand its membership substantially in order to deal with new tasks facing the movement. The period of the Japanese War was one such time, the period following the achievement of power on the mainland was another, and the Great Leap Forward was a third. In each of these instances, after membership was enlarged, the leadership found that numerous "right deviationists," "bourgeois elements," and even "sabateurs" and "counter-revolutionaries" had

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15. "Report of the Propaganda Bureau of the Central Committee on the Cheng Feng Reform Movement," Yenan, April 3, 1942, Mao's China, loc.cit., p. 4.

16. Shih Hsi-min, "Long Live the Blooming of All Flowers Together and the Contention of Diverse Schools of Thought," Peking, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, October 8, 1959, S.C.M.P., No. 2132, p. 5.

17. Yang Hsiu, "Dissatisfaction and Hatred Toward Criticism," loc.cit, p. 7.

"infiltrated" the party ranks. It was precisely in the higher ranks, moreover, that the corrective purges often had to be made. "Any counter-revolutionary understands that it is only after he has entered the Party and occupied a high position of leadership that he can engage in more effective sabotage--as it is easy to take the fortress from within." [18]

The party has found it necessary to recruit intellectuals with particular caution. Many of them have emerged from landowning or other undesirable backgrounds, and the risks are high that a certain number will bring into the party--perhaps as unconsciously smuggled baggage--a variety of "bourgeois tendencies" and an inclination toward "Right deviation." In recruiting from among the higher intellectuals, therefore, it is necessary to be "active and careful" and "to criticize the phenomenon of recruiting" even while carrying it out. [19] It is also necessary to weed out some of the new recruits as unreliable, to "remold" others, and to tighten discipline and adherence to the correct "world view" and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist "theory and practice" throughout all the ranks.

In fact, the party is always functioning like a huge organ of metabolism reacting to a constantly changing environment. Its intake is greater or smaller, according to circumstance. A greater intake results in a larger body--necessary for the task at hand--but inevitably there is an added accumulation of fat and waste matter. So the organism operates to cast off what is not desirable, to work a little harder, sweat a little harder, to punish itself if necessary and to purge out the noxious elements.

Under these circumstances, it is a gross error for Westerners to interpret party purges as signs of weakness. As the demands of "socialist construction" grow heavier, the party recruits larger numbers of party members, but the standards are raised at the same time, and the frequency and intensity of purges are also increased. [20]

Upon seizing power on the mainland, the communists were able in many instances to take over existing institutions and hierarchies, making sure only that executives in key positions were communists

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18. Hsu Pang-yi, "From the Hu Feng Case to Careful Recruitment of Party Members and Selection of Cadres," Hsueh Hsi [Study], August 2, 1955, p. 21.

19. "C.C.P. Kwangtung Provincial Committee Issues Directive on Recruitment of New Party Members from Among Higher Intellectuals," Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, September 9, 1957, S.C.M.P., No. 1619, p. 33.

20. See Chou I, "Why Does the Chinese Communist Party Raise the Standard of Qualifications for Party Membership?" Kung Jen Jih Pao, October 10, 1956.

or communist sympathizers. The intent, however, was to remake the whole society, top to bottom and bottom to top, and as this total revolution progressed there was a rapidly increasing need for reliable and highly-trained communists who understood the program and the shape of things to come.

By 1956 the party reported that its membership had risen to 10,730,000, or a reported 1.74 percent of the total population.[21] Over the next two years--with pressures for higher and higher industrial and agricultural production--the party organized even larger recruitment drives. The period of commune development made especially heavy demands.

In some areas special stations were established in the fields, workshops and mess halls. Group talks and individual interviews were arranged before and after meals and work meetings. Blank interview reports and blank pledge sheets were carried into the fields and even into remote mountain areas so that screening could be accomplished on the spot.[22]

Standards of Recruitment

The kind of party candidate to be recruited has depended to some considerable degree upon the nature of the tasks at hand.

The period of land reform required cadres with political rather than technical skills. These were the young comrades who organized the peasants against the landlords, who set up the revolutionary courts, and who supervized the executions. As these basic revolutionary tasks were accomplished, the needs began to change.

Rapid industrialization and scientific progress required a more specialized kind of communist--the party member with a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism --who was also a construction foreman or an electronics technician or an agronomist or a physicist or steel specialist. Intellectuals were needed--even at some "security risk"--in order to carry out administrative and other sophisticated functions.

Preferably, the recruit will be distinguished by "a good class background," a "clear and firm stand," and "close contact with the masses." The attempt is made also to secure "advanced producers" and "elite elements" who not only work hard themselves, but exhibit also a capacity for inspiring others to work hard. In

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21. An Tzu-wen, "The Door of the Party Is Always Open to the Youth," Chung-kuo Ching-nien [China Youth], October 16, 1956, p. 2.

22. "Kweichow Recruits over 10,000 New Party Members This Year," Kweiyang Kweichow Jih-pao, November 23, 1958, S.C.M.P., No. 1926

1956 nearly 7,000 civilian workers on the Fukien railway system were admitted into the party. Among them, according to a local report, "was Lin Mu-ti who for 14 days and nights led the masses to fight against bitter cold winds to ensure the safe installation of a bridge; Yeh Tien-ti, a woman worker who headed a team of workers who abided by labor regulations and guaranteed 100 percent attendance and was never involved in accidents; advanced worker Kuo Chen-hai who studied diligently and created a detonation device that raised efficiency by more than 100 percent; the couple Cheng Yi-yu and Tung Chung-chien who stuck to their jobs even after suffering from minor injuries and who postponed their marriage three times because of work; and Chen Hsiang-tao, a chief cook who saw to it that meals and drinks were supplied to the work sites wherever the workers had reached." [23]

Newly recruited members are expected to be tested in terms of six ideas, five roles, and five leadership functions. The six ideas are: the idea of the state, the idea of labor, the idea of collectivism, the class idea, the mass idea, and the idea of party organization. The five roles are: fighter for production, director of work, professional technician, political agitator, the servant of the people. The five functions in which party recruits should lead are: participation in labor, learning techniques and skills, enduring of hardship, observance of labor discipline, and the execution of policies of the party and state. [24]

Conditioning Party Behavior

Party recruiting is not only a highly selective and purposeful process; it is also a means of educating and conditioning those who show promise. In a society where party members constitute the only elite and where most of the really worthwhile rewards are contingent upon membership, admittance represents in itself a substantial reward. It is not surprising, then, to find that the stages of candidature, such as promotion within the party, can be used like a carrot on a stick, to get the promising young subject, more or less "voluntarily," through the preferred gates of the societal maze. We learn, for example, that--after receiving preliminary indoctrination--prospective candidates are "all determined to accept the test of the Party in their actual work and to strive for admission into the Party. In this manner, the work of Party building propels the central work. After he joined the Party, production team leader Wang Cheng-kuo of Ts'aikuant'un ch'ü of Anshun hsien, was

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23. "Nearly 7,000 Civilian Workers on Railway in Fukien Join Communist Party," Foochow, Fukien Jih-pao, December 20, 1956, S.C.M.P., No. 1460, p. 15.

24. "How We Manage and Educate Newly Recruited Party Members," Chengchow Honan Jih-pao, December 29, 1958, S.C.M.P., No. 1959, p. 14.

so excited that he could not go to sleep. On that very night, he went out to work alone and excavated over 1,000 catties of ore. In the evening of the second day, he led over 500 men to launch a night battle and over 500,000 catties of ore were excavated." [25]

Party local organizations frequently expose candidate members to experiences which are calculated to inculcate the approved attitudes. One party branch "sent candidate Party member Chou Hai-t'ien to see how an advanced group of bricklayers led by Yi Po-chung did their work. The visit taught Chou Hai-t'ien a valuable lesson, and on his way back he discussed with his group leader the ways and means of making members of his group catch up with the Yi Po-chung group. The following day, the efficiency of Chou Hai-t'ien's group was raised more than five times in bricklaying." [26]

An Tzu-wen, elected to the Central Committee in 1956, once stated that the youth, in contrast to older people, "generally speaking" are "pure not only ideologically, but also in historical backgrounds." [27] But this viewpoint was later challenged by Central Committeeman Hu Yao-pang who asserted that even the best youth seeking party membership are not "pure like a white sheet of paper" and ready for unadulterated Marxist-Leninist imprint. All of them carry their past experiences deeply inscribed, and many bear traces of bourgeois backgrounds that they may not be at all aware of. The bourgeois world outlook, the bourgeois political tendencies, and the force of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois habit are not easy to eradicate. "In the ideological battlefield of the youth either the red flag of proletarian thinking or the white flag of bourgeois thinking is planted. There is no vacuum spot." [28]

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25. "Kweichow Recruits Over 10,000 New Party Members This Year," Kweiyang Kweichow Jih-pao, November 23, 1958, S.C.M.P., No. 1926, p. 11.

26. "Our Experience in Educating Candidate Party Members," Kweiyang Kweichow Jih-pao, November 14, 1959, S.C.M.P., No. 2158, p. 40.

27. An Tzu-wen, "The Door is Always Wide Open to the Youth," Chung-kuo Ching-nien [China Youth], October 16, 1956, p. 2.

28. Hu Yao-pang, "Communist Education for Chinese Youth," Chung-kuo Ching-nien [China Youth], October 1, 1959, E.C.M.M., No. 193, p. 12.

A major responsibility of party units on all levels is, first of all, to maintain a certain tension among those seeking membership--and also among members seeking advancement--and, second, to make sure that old, white, bourgeois imprints are eradicated and replaced by red.

The Communist Youth League, which carries on its activities under party supervision, is an important source of recruits. According to party leaders "the door is always open" for young people, though, on the other hand, only a limited number can be admitted. This circumstance inevitably causes frustration--especially among members of the Youth League. "We can neither move up (entering the Party) nor come down (remaining as Youth Leagues)." [29] In 1956 more than half of all Youth Leaguers were passing the organization's age limit--many without prospect of admission to the party.

The tension resulting from this discrepancy is counted upon not only to drive would-be members into further Herculean effort, but also to keep candidates and full members taut and eager.

Recruits, on achieving candidate membership, are assigned to party groups where they are expected to live strict, carefully organized lives under party supervision. During this period they are supposed to learn criticism and self-criticism, how to deal with their shortcomings, and how to carry out the obligations of a full-fledged party member. [30]

The best education for leadership, in the communist view, lies in struggle and disciplined participation in the mass revolutionary movement. The separation of education from practice is condemned as a bourgeois practice. [31]

Some candidates think one should be "professionally proficient before trying to be politically red." This, warned Central Committeeman Hu Yao-pang, is a bourgeois viewpoint. Others think that one should be "politically red first before trying to be professionally proficient," but this will not do, either. Today, according to Hu, "our six hundred and fifty million people are battling against the earth in order to change the features of our fatherland. This makes it necessary to apply modern science and technology as our weapon. There is no reason to belittle 'proficiency.' Our slogan is: be politically red and professionally

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29. An Tzu-wen, "The Door of the Party is Always Wide Open to the Youth," loc.cit.

30. "Our Experience in Educating Candidate Party Members," loc.cit., p. 39.

31. Hu Yao-pang, "Communist Education for Chinese Youth," loc.cit.

proficient at the same time--and be penetratingly red and proficient." [32]

Absorbing the Individual into the Collective

Party groups are supposed to make assessments of their candidate members at regular intervals--for both redness and proficiency. The assumption is that an organized life with periodic assessments will help the candidates to overcome their personal shortcomings and advance toward full membership. "Take, for instance, candidate Party member Liu Sung-ming, who had frequent personal troubles after joining the Party and who worked without any enthusiasm. After many individual talks and assessment by the Party group and with help from the Party group, he finally overcame his individualism and worked very well during the big fight in August and September, leading others in everything. The masses said 'how quickly Liu Sung-ming has changed!'" [33]

Candidates, then, do not simply "join the Party," but achieve --or are supposed to achieve--a total and unequivocal incorporation of individual self into the larger entity. Frequently this requires a long and painful "inner struggle" between forces of "good and evil" from the candidate's past. If he resists, if he finds difficulty in pressing this inner conflict, he may be required to take part in a mass "struggle meeting." The purpose, in any case, is to remold the personality, to remake the individual.

Contrary to many Western assumptions, the communists do not want a blind and slavish obedience, but something far more subtle and complete. The aim is to mold party members--and, in the long run, citizens--who see the world through almost identically the same "filtre lenses," whose world views are essentially the same, and who will react to the changing environment "freely" and "voluntarily" in substantially the same ways. "Some comrades are unwilling to reflect themselves in the mirror and wash their faces regularly," according to an article in China Youth, "or when they find 'black spots' in their thought, they feel guilty only and are unwilling to wash their faces openly." [34] The struggle is not intended to be easy. It is assumed that the prolonged review and criticism of one's own mistakes--especially in a struggle meeting

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32. Hu Yao-pang, "Communist Education for Chinese Youth," loc.cit., p. 15.

33. "Our Experience in Educating Candidate Party Members," loc.cit., p. 40.

34. Tseng Hsi-san, "Uninterrupted Ideological Remolding Amidst the Struggle Against Right Opportunism," Chung-kuo Ching-nien [China Youth], November 16, 1959, E.C.M.M. No. 22.

with sharp-witted comrades--will cause extreme mental agony." [35]

Yet there is no bearable alternative. The candidate must root out his individual desires and inclinations and immerse himself in the collective.

Assigned to a cadre, Lo Kuang-an, a worker and candidate party member, refused his new post because he would not be elegible for bonus wages and promotion would be slow. Later, after party conditioning, he changed his whole attitude. "My ideological knot is now untied," he said. "I did not want to be a cadre in the past, principally because I was bedeviled by individual thinking. I thought only of myself and had no consideration for my work and the collective. That was quite wrong." [36] Since then, according to the party, Lo Kuang-an has always willingly and actively accomplished every task assigned to him.

Membership in no sense absolves the individual communist from further "washing" and struggle. Throughout their careers all members are expected to study Marxism-Leninism and "unceasingly raise the level of their understanding." [37] The relentless conditioning is to continue, both as a minimal requirement of membership and as a test for advancement. "Some comrades," according to Central Committeeman Tseng Hsi-sheng, "take the view that after going through several rectification campaigns, there is no longer any necessity to examine their thought. This can be explained by their insufficient understanding of the difficulty involved in the ideological remolding...We must not think that because we are old activists there is no need to remold our thought." [38]

Why do young men and women--and older ones, too--join the Communist Party? Why are they willing to undergo such rigid endoctrination and training? Why are they willing to submit to discipline, give up their "freedom" and merge themselves with the party?

Totalistic movements--whether religious or secular--always appeal to a certain number of people inclined toward surrendering themselves to a large and wholly demanding authority. In times of great uncertainty, however, and particularly when an old society is threatened or breaking up, more and more people begin looking for support and security within some totalistic body.

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35. Cheng Chih, "How Should We Deal with the Uninterrupted Revolutionary Struggle and Ideological Front?" Chung-kuo Ching-nien [China Youth], March 21, 1960, E.C.M.M., No. 205, p. 27.

36. "Our Experience in Educating Candidate Party Members," loc.cit.


37. Constitution of the Communist Party of China. Article 2 (1).

38. Tseng Hsi-san, "Uninterrupted Ideological Remolding Amidst the Struggle Against Right Opportunism," loc.cit.

The Communist Party--prior to achieving power--is well designed for this function. The small cell-like basic unit provides face-to-face support and reassurance for the individual who feels bewildered and lost. The total "world view" provides him with "true beliefs" which he can quote to his fellows and rely upon. The discipline relieves his uncertainties and anxieties and fears and enforces a purpose which he has been unable to maintain alone. The program provides him with a sense of action, of massive progress, of identification with a movement that is making history and changing the world.

To a large degree the party survives and functions and grows because of its "enemies"--both the "outside enemy" and the "enemy within," both the symbolic enemy and the enemy of substance. Without enemies the party could not exist, and for this reason--if the enemies are temporarily lost sight of by some of the membership--they must quickly be found again. The enemy is the focus of all that is unpleasant and evil, the target for the individual's personal inadequacies and dissatisfactions.

Later, when the party achieves power, the individual finds that there are no other paths to success, recognition, or even self-esteem except through membership in it. He discovers, also, that there is no such thing as part-time affiliation. To succeed --to succeed in virtually any endeavor whatsoever--he must not only join the party, he must give himself up to it, merge with it, and accept its purposes unconditionally as his own. Such is the power of the Party.


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TRENDS IN DEMOCRATIC STATE PARTY ORGANIZATION

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Three recent trends seem apparent in the organization of most Democratic state central committees in the United States.

First, permanent headquarters and a paid professional staff have become common. Second, special courses in the fundamentals of precinct work and organizational leadership have been offered in many states. Third, door-to-door solicitation of small contributions, either through the National Dollars for Democrats drive or special state sustaining membership programs, has gained wide acceptance.

Elaboration of such generalities first requires a disclaimer, for describing trends in the organization of state central committees is a hazardous game. First of all, American political parties are semi-public organizations, with internal organization and even leadership positions designated by law in most states. Thus, both parties are structured alike, but official organization differs from state to state. Structural inventiveness may, therefore, be stimulated to adapt the legal framework to ongoing political realities.

Second, party decentralization, reinforced by organizational structure, often places real power at the county level. The party organizations are free to differ both in activities and public policy goals from state to state and within states. Some counties participate in state-wide programs, others do not. State party organization activities vary from year to year and change with the leadership.

1/ This paper was prepared prior to Dr. Ogden's joining the Technical Review Staff of the Department of the Interior. The opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the views or policies of the Department of the Interior.

Third, being united to win control of public office, both parties welcome followers of varied views and reflect a variety of policy positions from state to state. Although there are some identifiable differences in point of view between the parties, the internal differences greatly influence cohesion, leadership, and activity.

By and large, most Democratic state central committees are still ill-organized, ill-staffed, ill-equipped, and ill-financed. But many are trying to alter this situation.

Improved Facilities and Staff

Improved facilities and staff are the most common signs of change in Democratic state party organizations. Permanent headquarters are now maintained by 40 state central committees. At the beginning of 1957, only 28 states were so equipped. 1/ Moreover, many of the old established headquarters have recently been enlarged or improved by the addition of rooms or the acquisition of modern equipment such as mimeograph and addressograph machines. The states without permanent headquarters tend to be small or in the South: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming.

The employment of paid professional staff has been a second important part of the trend toward better central committee organization. Between 1957 and 1958, fourteen state committees employed an executive secretary: Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Vermont. Although Montana and Nebraska dropped their men after the 1958 election 2/ and Iowa and Kansas later, California, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia now also report having such staff assistance. In addition, South Carolina may have the beginnings of such a post and Iowa and Kansas report considering the restoration of theirs.

Instead of an executive secretary, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Washington employ the state chairman as a full-time staff person. Indiana and Minnesota employ both the chairman and an executive secretary.

1/ See Drexel Sprecher, "Report on Party Organizational Activity," a typewritten 26-page report, with appendices, to Chairman Henry M. Jackson of the Democratic National Committee (July 25, 1960), p. 9. In May 1961, I wrote each state central committee chairman and executive secretary asking for comments on the three trends described above and soliciting other observations. Twenty-four replied. The figures supplied are Sprecher's, as amended by the replies to my letter.

2/ Sprecher, op. cit., p. 10.

Several states have additional professional staff. The Indiana State Central Committee employs a staff of ten, including the chairman, vice chairman, an administrative assistant to the chairman, a personnel director, and a public relations director. The Michigan Central Committee, by far the most highly organized of all, has 14 full-time employees and three part-time employees who run offices in Lansing, Detroit, and Ann Arbor. Its professional staff includes an executive secretary, a finance director, a publicity director, and three field representatives. 1/

New York does not pay its state chairman, nor retain an executive secretary, but maintains permanent publicity and research departments in its headquarters at the Hotel Biltmore in New York City. Both the Ohio and Texas Executive Committees report they maintain a full-time staff, apparently of several persons. The Pennsylvania State Committee has this year contracted to pay both its chairman and vice chairman on a full-time basis. Previous Pennsylvania chairmen had drawn some compensation when their other duties permitted. The South Carolina Executive Committee for the first time in 1961 has hired a full-time employee, who will do some field work, and opened a permanent headquarters. Arizona retains a research assistant in addition to its executive secretary.

Other states employ only clerical staff. For example, Missouri has an "office manager" on its payroll.

Thus, at least 21 state central committees now have full-time professional staffs, and it seems safe to assume that they, and most of the others which maintain permanent headquarters, employ at least one clerical person.

Training Programs for Volunteer Workers

Every state central committee reports the existence of some training program for volunteer precinct and county workers. Most have used the carefully planned, three-level training program which the Division of Political Organization of the Democratic National Committee prepared under the leadership of Drexel Sprecher between 1957 and 1960. Several, however, appear not to be familiar with the Division's program and have developed their own methods. Inasmuch as the Division was abolished and its staff discharged at the close of the 1960 presidential campaign, the degree to which this hard-won development will continue must now be regarded as in doubt.

1/ Robert Lee Sawyer, Jr., The Democratic State Central Committee of Michigan, 1949-1959 (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1960), pp. 103-106.

In 1955 an Advisory Committee on Political Organization, composed of state and national Democratic leaders, was appointed by National Chairman Paul M. Butler. Its leader was Neil Staebler, the very successful chairman of the Michigan Democratic State Central Committee. Under Staebler's guidance, the Advisory Committee fostered the creation of the Division of Political Organization, the establishment of a staff of six regional representatives, and the preparation of three training programs, one designed for precinct workers, one for county party leaders, and one for state party leaders.

The Precinct Workers Training Program, initiated in 1957, depended upon two important documents and the expertise of some 30 volunteer professional adult educators. The Democratic Precinct Handbook, a slick-cover, how-to-do-it booklet, served as the textbook for precinct workers. A carefully prepared Instructor's Manual was sent to those qualified to offer precinct workers courses.

To initiate the program, the National Committee sent one or more of its panel of adult educators to every state willing to participate. The specialists would offer several courses designed to train instructors for precinct workers training courses. The instructors were then expected to offer such training courses at the local level as frequently as they were desired.

Between November 1957 and May 1960, 56 such Instructors' Courses were given in 34 states. Regional representatives pushed their use in every state and the National Committee gave them extensive publicity. The National Committee paid the travel and subsistence costs for the adult educator who gave the initial instructor's course in each state. Thereafter, the state or county committees requesting additional courses paid the expenses. Sixteen states held such additional courses and Ohio and Pennsylvania had four each. More than 1,500 persons completed the two-day training program.

The number of precinct workers trained by the instructors is unknown, for the National Committee has received no useful figures. However, various reports and the dissemination of handbooks provide a rough index. The Committee printed and distributed 50,000 precinct handbooks in a four-year period, at least 20,000 of which went directly to trainees in such courses.

The County Leader Workshop Program. In 1959 a carefully designed "do-it-yourself" manual for county leader workshops was prepared by the Division of Political Organization. The County Democratic Handbook, prepared in 1955 and similar in appearance to the Precinct Handbook, was used as the "text." No experts were sent to a state to conduct the workshops, but the manual raised the key questions which most county leaders face and proposed effective and varied group-discussion techniques to promote exchange of views.

The workshops particularly were used in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, Washington, and California. Where county leaders became involved in the workshops, very favorable results were obtained. My own state's committee became enthusiastically devoted to the program.

The Leadership Conference Program. From May 1959 to March 1960, the Democratic National Committee, through its Division of Political Organization, sponsored a series of eight weekend conferences which brought together state party leaders in various regions of the country. Meetings were held in "retreat" type settings whenever possible, preferably at a college, a center for continuing education, or a resort. Each participant was personally invited by the Chairman of the National Committee, who asked members of the National Committee, state chairmen and vice chairmen, and other persons recommended by state chairmen because of their statewide interest in party organization. Participants varied in number from 34 to 57. Altogether, 350 state leaders attended.

In his report to Chairman Jackson, Mr. Sprecher has described the atmosphere, the topics considered, and the methods used:

> "The essential differences between these and other regional conferences were that three or more professional leadership consultants conducted most of the sessions, and that the basic emphasis of discussion was on the 'why's' of leadership problems rather than on the 'how to' of administering specific tasks within the Party. In each case an early conference topic was political motivation: 'Why Do People Go into Politics,' and 'Why People Don't Go into Politics.' Other topics included different types of leadership: the troublesome problems of communications in a Party ('Is the Message Getting Through?'); the handling of the Party deviant, in which small groups discuss the candidate who departs from a leading plank of the Party platform during the last weeks of a campaign; the matter of how democratic a leader can be in handling different types of problems; the degree of commitment a leader can expect in terms of how genuinely members of the group are consulted in advance about goals and methods; various typical steps in problem-solving; dealing with 'independents' in politics, and so on.
>
> "The methods of learning used in these leadership conferences took a multiplicity of forms: short presentations by the group consultants followed by observations and questions by the conferees; case applications with six or seven leaders discussing a specific leadership problem before the entire group, followed by comment and analysis by the group; small group analysis of a particular political problem, with a spokesman then reporting back to the entire body; and the like.

"The meetings were held in an atmosphere of informality and from time to time the crowded schedule had to be adapted to permit additional discussion of points concerning which the conferees desired additional time. . . ." 1/

Training of volunteer party workers, whether part of a national program or whether locally inspired, now seems to be an established task of most state central committees.

Solicitation of Small Contributions

The use of door-to-door solicitation to raise small sums of money from a great many contributors has won increasingly wide support among Democratic state party organizations in the last five years. The Dollars for Democrats program has been the principal such effort, but the National Committee has had a mail solicitation of $10 "sustaining memberships," and many state committees have emulated the practice or instituted systems of monthly pledges.

Most chairmen responding to the author's inquiry endorsed such small givers' drives and either reported successful use of the Dollars Drive or the hope that better organization would improve the usefulness.

The Dollars for Democrats Drive achieved its highest level of participation during the 1960 presidential campaign. 2/ An unprecedented number of states and territories (48) officially conducted state-wide drives. Two other states, New York and Illinois, permitted individual counties to hold drives. Only Hawaii, Kentucky, Nevada, and the Virgin Islands officially did not participate.

By contrast, the Dollars for Democrats program in 1957 enlisted 36 state central committees; in 1958, 38; and in 1959 but 30. In 1959, however, individual counties participated in five other states.

Income derived from the drives has been substantial but far below the sums potentially available. In 1960 the National Committee received a record sum of $121,059.92. Previous drives had produced approximately $100,000 each. However, a very great deal of money--perhaps as much as $3 million--may have been collected by county central committes in the 1960 drive. The National Committee probably received a considerably larger sum from the drive than its records reveal, and it unquestionably did not receive one-third of the gross sums collected, as contemplated in the original plans.

1/ Sprecher, op. cit., pp. 22-23

2/ This writer was the professional staff member generally in charge of conducting the Dollars for Democrats campaign at Democratic National headquarters. He wrote the report on the 1960 Dollars for Democrats drive which was mimeographed earlier this year by the National Committee.

Several factors contributed to the inadequate record. Many state committees failed to identify the source of funds when remitting money to the National Committee. Other state committees had already met their annual quotas to the National and kept all the proceeds of the Dollars Drive. Still others were at war with the National Committee, had never forwarded funds, and had no intention of doing so. Then, after October 15, when the National Committee neared its $3 million spending limit, all incoming large sums were received by the Citizens for Kennedy-Johnson organization, which did not distinguish among sources. 1/

The 1960 drive was the largest in several other ways. The Committee distributed 400,000 certificate books, more than twice the number used the year before and a third greater than any previous effort. Their total value of $14,000,000 also exceeded all earlier efforts. The 1960 drive further was accompanied by the greatest publicity effort ever made to encourage small gifts for political purposes. 2/

Even so, support was more formal than real in several of the states which conducted official drives. One state returned all but 1,000 of its 10,000 books, after the drive was over. A few other states engaged in only token efforts. But many Southern states, which had had no previous record of interest in small-givers' drives, joined the 1960 effort. The Georgia committee conducted an especially successful drive and laid the groundwork for future efforts.

Several states have used the drive with very great success and are strong defenders of the system. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia especially stand out. In each instance, an energetic state drive chairman, often continued in office from one year to the next, was supported by the appointment of enthusiastic and well-organized county drive chairmen. The results have been so good in most of these states that a major portion of the regular budget of the state central committee can be met from the proceeds. The Washington State Central Committee, for example, has realized more than $25,000 per year from the drive.

Even in the most successful states, however, county participation varies. Dependence upon the better organized counties, regardless of population, is common.

1/ Democratic National Committee, "Report 1960 Dollars for Democrats Drive," (mimeographed, 1961), pp. 1-4

2/ Ibid., pp. 8-12

When a large county is effectively organized for a drive, the results can be phenomenal. In 1960 the Montgomery County, Maryland, Democratic Central Committee grossed $32,875.11. Every precinct but two was covered, door-to-door, although call-backs were not carried through in a few. Inasmuch as President Kennedy polled 66,000 votes in Montgomery county, the drive can be said to have grossed 50 cents per Democratic vote. Other counties with successful but not such comprehensive drives have demonstrated repeatedly that an average of 25 cents per Democratic voter can be obtained each year in such a campaign.

Two virtues, in addition to the revenue, commend the Dollar Drives to state and county chairmen. First, rank and file Democrats can make a direct contribution to their party. This consideration is lauded on the theory that a man's vote usually follows his money. Second, precinct workers are given an additional opportunity to assist in party goals and afforded an extra chance to talk to constituents on political matters.

Some chairmen, however, lack confidence in small-givers' drives. For example, the North Carolina chairman, rather sadly, commented:

> "Dollars for Democrats was not successful in North Carolina. It sounds good and it is difficult to find fault, but it has not worked in this State. Naturally, such drives are necessary, I think more to satisfy the voter, but generally speaking it has cost more to put on than we have received. Basically, it is the psychological concept of the Dollars for Democrats that does the job, not the money. Maybe it will come in time."

Others blamed lack of success on inadequate publicity, on inadequate precinct organization, or even inadequate patronage. Still others, like the Pennsylvania chairman, felt that fund-raising dinners were a more reliable source of money, even though Dollars for Democrats had been successful in some areas in his state.

While the sums collected in Dollar Drives will not begin to meet the expenses of a national campaign at all levels, and probably never should be expected to, they could provide ample monies for the provision of regular headquarters, adequate equipment and staff, proper training programs for party workers, and the supply of effective organizational materials and party campaign literature at all levels.

Sustaining Memberships in varied forms are used in several states. Maine's Central Committee reports depending on regular monthly pledges of $3 and $4 from many party supporters. These sums, plus the proceeds of fund-raising dinners, provide the income for organization work. New York had its own "Funds for the New Frontier" in the 1960 campaign, which solicited gifts from $1 to $10. The New York chairman reports that "financial contribution is still one of our biggest headaches."

Colorado, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota have successfully used a sustaining membership drive for several years. In 1960, the North Dakota committee used the Dollars for Democrats drive only where it would not conflict with the already well-established sustaining membership program.

Thus, it can be said that two principal patterns of small-givers' drives are in use by Democratic state central committees--the annual Dollars for Democrats Drive and the sustaining membership system. Yet, whichever system is followed, it is now clear that the use of small-givers' drives has become widespread and well established in the Democratic Party.

Other Prospects for Change

Internal Communication. A fourth trend may be emerging. Several state central committees are paying attention to more systematic internal communication, especially with party leaders, but even with the rank and file. Party newspapers, mentioned favorably, for example, by a former Colorado state chairman, are used in some states. Others have newsletters and bulletins. No systematic information seems available on this phase of state organization work.

Sawyer found such intense internal communication activity in the Michigan State Central Committee that he devoted an entire 40-page chapter to the process. However, the principal techniques used were group meetings which featured face-to-face exchange of information and the development of responsible leaders who reported back to their local organizations. 1/

"Issues Conferences" are more rare. The Washington State Central Committee sponsored a general one in December, 1959, and has plans to repeat the experiment. Oregon had a platform convention in 1960 for the first time in the century and followed it up with two successful issues conferences, one on "World Peace" and the other on "Parks and Recreation." A conference on "Social Issues" was held last April in Salem and two further conferences are scheduled for this year.

1/ Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 120-159

Clubs. Democratic clubs have been established in a few states, most notably in California, Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin. Arizona reports considering their use:

> ". . . There is some question in Arizona whether the 'Club' idea would not be more successful than the old disciplined organization. In some areas we have so many new people moving in, it is almost an impossible task for the precinct workers to keep track of them. In the Phoenix area and the Tucson area we have three-fourths of the state's population and more than half of those people have moved into the area since 1950, and the growth rate is still on the increase. We are developing a program to use both the disciplined organization and the clubs as affiliates of the political committee."

The earlier club movements ordinarily were an adjustment to an unsatisfactory official party structure or in response to a demand for an alternative source of leadership. In Michigan, however, the club movement was a deliberate effort by the leadership to involve more people in a variety of acceptable ways, and the Arizona trend also appears to be in that direction.

More Participation. Neil Staebler, who recently stepped down as chairman of the Michigan Central Committee to become its National Committeeman, suggests seven other trends which are a product of more intense and widespread participation in politics. All are especially notable in Michigan, but also seem to be appearing in states and counties where energetic, volunteer, non-patronage precinct committeemen have come to dominate the organization:

> More year-round party work.
>
> More volunteers at the state level and local levels.
>
> Bigger budgets, more money spent in campaigns and in year-round organization.
>
> More emphasis on educational operations as the nature of the issues changes.
>
> More state and regional meetings--perhaps due to improved transportation.
>
> Rising educational level of state party officials and workers.
>
> Increasing power of state organizations compared to city organizations due to changing issues, increasing responsibilities of governors, decreasing effect of patronage.

A few mature, open, effectively-led party organizations do seem to be experiencing the seven trends Mr. Staebler cites. Yet these appear to be more the exception than the rule.

Indeed, where the new volunteer organizations have arisen, as in parts of Washington, Oregon, and California, local leaders report a curious change in the focus of attention of precinct workers. National issues and national candidates are given first importance. Local candidates and local issues, long dominant in patronage-controlled machines, arouse little enthusiasm from the new workers.

Standards for Party Improvement

A direction in which state party organization might move in the United States was spelled out February 3 of this year by Neil Staebler in a speech, "The Recipe for a Two Party System," given before the keynote dinner at the Michigan Democratic State Convention. 1/

Mr. Staebler sees integrity, a sense of purpose, and "a corps of workers and leaders who subordinate their personal ambitions to the larger purposes of the party" as the essential ingredients of party success.

Ten methods make up his recommended procedures: (1) the open door, (2) vigorous precinct work, (3) a welcome for new ideas and techniques, (4) effective communication within the party and with the public, (5) responsible leadership, (6) money, (7) staff, (8) widespread citizen participation, (9) patience, and (10) party cohesion.

In his development of the latter point, Mr. Staebler especially shows the wisdom of the experienced leader in managing a multi-group association. His observations are so valuable they bear quoting at length:

> "Our party needs that quality of thoughtful cooperation of leaders and members that some people call party discipline, but that might more accurately be called party cohesion.
>
> "There is, indeed, a need for discipline in a party--for sanctions against people who willfully damage the party for their own advantage. There is, indeed, the need for the observance of party platforms and policies. But these bear only the same relationship to party behavior that disciplinary measures do to the upbringing of a child. There are other important elements that overshadow discipline.

1/ Congressional Record, VIII, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), Thursday, February 16, 1961. Extension of Remarks by Honorable Pat McNamara.

"It is the sense of purpose and the devotion of party members which create a party and preserve it. Party principles, party participation must be strong and vigorous. If a party ever begins to depend upon discipline to enforce its sense of purpose, disintegration has already set in.

"Party cohesion is difficult to maintain for many reasons--the normal and healthy clash of ideas, unexpected political events, the emergence of party leaders, and the shifting tactics of the opposition. If a party allows itself to become too rigid, too dependent upon the maintenance of a single point of view, it quickly finds itself outmaneuvered by the opposition. But when it has to change position, a party is saved schism and disintegration by the strength of its basic principles, the devotion of its members and leaders, by a spirit of tolerance and respect for differing points of view and for the internal party processes for discussing them. A sense of humor is not the least of the assets party people may possess.

"It follows, then, that if a party has good leaders, vigorous principles, furnishes opportunities for friendly discussion, preserves confidence between its parts by good communication, it will establish a basis for cohesion. These can all be summed up in a single word: party morale.

. . . . . .

"A political party is the most astonishing inclusive organization in existence--broader than any church, lodge, profession, or social group. If any one group were ever to dominate our party, the party would be destroyed. Our great strength lies in our diversity and our representativeness of all the people."

Conclusion

Advocates of the "party responsibility" theory try regularly to comfort themselves by identifying "trends" in the states toward ideologically centered parties, toward increased centralization of authority in state and national committees, toward improved party discipline in state legislatures, and the like. Such conclusions do not seem warranted by the evidence at hand.

The trends apparent in state central committee organization seem rather to point toward improved ability of state political parties to operate as semi-public, decentralized, multi-group associations, as they have throughout American history. The establishment of permanent headquarters, the employment of professional staff, the institution of training courses for volunteer workers, and the use of small-givers' drives all have strengthened the ability of Democratic state and county party organizations to get out their voters on election day, but such trends have not homogenized the party nor changed its basic characteristics.

Even the additional trends identified by Neil Staebler: the development of better internal communications, the emergence of more year-round party work, the use of more volunteers, the development of larger budgets, greater educational training of party workers, the holding of more state and regional meetings, and the coming to power of better educated party leaders are procedural in nature and affect relatively few organizations. They may hold implications for basic changes in party character, but such a conclusion is not a necessary one from the data.

Only Mr. Staebler's report, that he sees increasing power of state organizations over city organizations because of changing issues, increasing responsibilities of governors, and the decreasing effect of patronage, would seem to point toward centralization. But this is probably a product of suburbanitis rather than of conscious party redirection and it carries no necessary implications for national party organization. Moreover, his "Recipe for a Two Party System" talks of cohesion founded on sound ground-up group-work principles rather than on discipline, and recognizes ideological diversity as a vital attribute of a major political party.

We have not changed the basic constitutional arrangements which give our political parties their distinctive characteristics. We therefore should not be surprised to find that the trends in state party organization appear to operate within those characteristics, rather than toward changing them, nor to find experienced political leaders applauding those characteristics and seeking improvements which are consistent with them.

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Turkey and Iran: Political Development and the Problem of Disengagement from Traditionalism

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Turkey and Iran: Political Development and the Problem of Disengagement from Traditionalism

Political development in both Turkey and Iran may be divided, for the purpose of this paper, into three periods. The first extended from the early 19th century to the close of World War I. It was during this period that efforts were made to impose constitutional restraints on the ruling institution of each country;[1] secular law began to displace Islamic law to a substantial degree, particularly in Turkey; and, for the first time in over a millenium, the legitimacy of government was perceived as predicated on grounds other than those provided by Islam.

The second period includes the interwar years. In addition to continuing the process of secularizing politics initiated in the first period, the state assumed responsibility for introducing social and economic reforms. The political system of both Turkey and Iran was authoritarian in character. In this period the ideological themes of the national movement of each country defined the goals and techniques of modernization, with Western society serving as the model for the reforms introduced. At the same time, this desire to emulate the West was coupled with a deliberate rejection of Western political or economic influences.

The years following World War II constitute the third period. Social and economic changes introduced in the previous period now generate feedback pressures on the political system. The exact character of these pressures is not uniform in either country. What is of paramount importance in this period is the confusion that prevails in each country with regard to the role the state is to maintain in directing the process of modernization. The 1950 elections and the 1960 coup d'état in Turkey, dramatic as they were, do not mark any historical watershed to end this confusion. They are symptoms only of the indecision that still characterizes much of Turkish politics. In Iran the Mossadegh era and the subsequent years indicate a similar situation. The drafting of a new constitution for Turkey's Second Republic and the current political crisis in Iran might suggest that a "fourth" period is on the horizon for both countries. However, it is too early to determine if this is a fact.

It is Islam that has moulded much of the culture of both Turkey and Iran, the legal rules and institutions of Islam, given rigidity by centuries of acceptance, provided the framework within which traditional culture took form in each country. Throughout the past century the process of releasing Turkish or Iranian society from the fetters of traditionalism has necessitated continually redefining the relationship between Islam and society. A fundamental problem in each country is how to disengage society from traditional influences without in the process totally destroying the Islamic character of that society. This problem is particularly complicated in the case of Iran, where her sectarian brand of Islam tends to be a component element of Iranian nationalism.

The main feature of this Islamic traditionalism is the general support given the status quo (an'anat, or tradition) as compared to innovation (bid'at). What has been established by tradition as good is to be maintained. In practice, of course, this has frequently been interpreted to mean that which exists "ought" to continue to exist. This traditionalism has been manifested in resisting legislated law that contradicts the prescriptions set by Islam,[2] defining the community on

religious rather than national grounds, tolerantly acquiescing to a fate presumably ordained by God,[3] and generally repudiating political authority not designed to further the fortunes of Islam.

Against the force of Islamic traditionalism has been juxtaposed the force of a secularly-oriented nationalism, dedicated to divorcing political action from immediate modification by Islam. Islamic traditionalism and secular nationalism differ in their respective critiques of existing conditions, and in their interpretations of what constitutes the "good life." However, because Islam is a polity and a way of life, as well as a religion, it cannot be relegated to some unobtrusive corner during the drive to modernize society. The ubiquitous influence of Islam places the "modernized" sector of society in a difficult and incongruous relationship with the rest of society. To attack Islam in its political aspect, which is what has been done, in differing degree, in both countries, is to challenge the whole pattern of the traditional culture, and ultimately, Islam itself. This is particularly true in view of the fact that so much of Islam, as folk-Islam, is tightly interwoven with traditional ways of village life in Turkey and Iran. The modernization of Turkey and Iran appears to involve less the transformation of the traditional culture than its very displacement by one presumed to be more compatible with contemporary needs.

This process of displacement, as distinct from transformation, of Islamic traditionalism may be dated from the defensive, yet imitative, response made by the Ottoman Empire and Iran to the accelerated impact of the West on these countries after the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. Although Turkey was considerably more advanced than Iran in the 19th century, and has continued to develop more rapidly than Iran ever since, both were sufficiently distinct from Western society in the beginning that subsequent differences in development are more of degree than of kind. Of particular importance to this paper, 19th century Turkey and Iran, in spite of all the distortions wrought by history and the compromises made on the altar of political reality, were both essentially Islamic states.

Challenge and Response: The First Period

In theory the Islamic state is communal, rather than territorial, in scope, embracing all the faithful within the "domain of Islam" (Dar al-Islam). Its raison d'être is to administer God's law, the Shari'a (literally "way" or "path") to the "community of the faithful" ('umma al-mu'minin). It is the duty of the caliph (or imam) to maintain and enforce the Shari'a. The very word Islam means submission, and a Muslim is one who submits -- to the Will of God, the Shari'a.

The Shari'a is considered to be both logically and historically anterior to the state, and binds all Muslims, ruler and ruled alike. Government, argued the Islamic theoretician al-Ghazali (1059-1111), must be predicated on the Shari'a to ensure man's welfare in this world and prepare him for the hereafter.[4] Even such political realists as Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1849-1905) held that the "ideal" type of government was a caliphate administering the Shari'a to the faithful, and all less perfected types should be evaluated in terms of this "ideal" type.[5]

The scope of the Shari'a is presumed to be all-embracing, extending over matters of public law, private law, and international law. Political, economic, and social, as well as religious affairs are held to fall within the jurisdiction of this law. The Shari'a, however, is not a single compendium of divinely promulgated rules. In Sunni (orthodox) Islam four different sources of the Shari'a are recognized: the Qur'an; "sunna," the life and actions of the Prophet; "ijma," the consensus of opinion of the 'ulema (Islamic scholars); and "qiyas," or analogical reasoning. The Shi'ite sect of Islam followed in Iran rejects "qiyas" as a source and only considers authoritative "ijma" which included the participation of one of that sect's first twelve imams. The twelfth imam, ("disappeared" 878 A.D.) who is believed alive but "occulted," leads his community through the Shah, serving as the locum tenens of that imam, and the mujtahids (Shi'ite Islamic scholars).[6] The latter, by their "supreme effort and endeavor" are able to arrive at a complete knowledge of the Shi'ite Shari'a and can "interpret" this law through independent reasoning, or "ijtihad" (hence "mujtahids").[7] By contrast, "ijtihad" is rejected in Sunni Islam, since the "Gate of Interpretation" has been closed from c. 900 A.D. In both Shi'ite Iran and Sunni Turkey, despite the greater flexibility possible in Shi'ism, society in the 19th century was little different from a millenium earlier. Islam had literally frozen the basic pattern of society in each country. Innovation, in whatever sphere, carried with it the threat, open or veiled, that this social pattern might crumble. The tightly interwoven social fabric could submit to no breach in its seams.

In either Sunni or Shi'ite Islam it is the Shari'a that gives purpose to the political order. The Islamic state is not merely a theocracy; it is a nomocracy. Whether enforced or not the Muslim, qua Muslim, is obligated to follow the conduct set forth by the Shari'a. Even to this day in Turkey, the Shari'a is followed informally in many country villages, particularly with respect to family law.[8]

Practice had, admittedly, made serious inroads into theory in the world of Islam long before the advent of the 19th century. Still it has been contended that the Ottoman Empire of that day executed the Shari'a as effectively as had any other major Islamic state.[9]

The Ottoman Sultans and the Qajar Shahs found it increasingly necessary, however, to "supplement" Shari'a law by royal decrees having the effect of laws.[10] Both Turkey and Iran were in the community of nations and had to deal continually with non-Muslim countries. The Ottoman Empire also was ruling large numbers of non-Muslims, and it was particularly difficult to subject its non-Muslim citizens to a legal framework with such a strictly religious base as the Shari'a.

Moreover, both Turkey and Iran had an established culture that antedated the adoption of Islam. Custom ('adat) continued to regulate an appreciable sector of affairs in each country quite independent of the Shari'a. Both countries also found the Shari'a particularly inadequate in everyday affairs, especially those of a commercial nature.[11]

As a result, dual legal systems evolved in each country. Alongside the Shari'a, ostensibly to supplement it, was a body of positive law based on the ruler's prerogative to initiate rules for the good of the community. This prerogative, known as "'urf," was resorted to continually in both countries.

In Iran, since at least the Safawi period, certain decisions concerning matters of state (e.g., rebellion, rioting, murder) were almost always adjudicated by decisions based on 'urf. The Ottoman Empire used 'urf to insulate much of the military and administrative machinery of that country from Islamic influences. It is to be noted, however, that even a decision based on 'urf (known as qanun) made by the sultan-caliph was always presumed to be in accordance with the Shari'a, and the Sheikh al-Islam could, theoretically, override such a decision by issueing a "fetwa," or canonical decree, if such a decision was found to be in conflict with Shari'a law.[12]

It was this concept of 'urf that served as the wedge for the progressive displacement of the Shari'a in each country. It was also the recognition of this concept that prepared the way ideologically for the introduction of a completely different political formula for government in each country. It was but a short step from recognizing the prerogative of the ruler in promulgating rules for the good of the community to interpreting that prerogative as expressing the "general will" of that community. The shift in orientation is fundamental for it now identifies the community, rather than the ruler, as the source of this prerogative. A key problem still has to be answered, namely, what was to be the basis of such a community?

Nationalism was the answer coming from the West; but the acceptance of the idea of a "national" community as the basis of the political order ran counter to the Islamic conception of the community. In the case of Iran, the challenge of nationalism to the Islamic concept of community was less pronounced than in Ottoman Turkey. The adoption of Shi'ism by the Safawi dynasty in 1501 had already separated that country from the orthodox Islamic community. Moreover, Iran enjoyed an ancient national personality,[13] far older than her Islamic heritage.

The geographical distance of Iran from Europe, however, operated to impede the spread of nationalism as a political ideology to that country. The entrenched position of the Shi'ite 'ulema and the pervasive influence of Tsarist Russia (which viewed ideas of national self-determination with considerable misgivings, to say the least) also tended to limit the impact of nationalism in Iran during much of this first period. The abominable state of transportation and communication facilities in 19th century Iran, allowing for considerable provincialism, also hampered the spread of nationalism within that country.

In the Ottoman Empire, the corporate organization of society militated against the spread of a national identity that would be coterminus with the Empire. Each religious community or "millet" formed a juridical and political entity in itself.[14] While all citizens of the Empire were subject to the public law of the state, each millet was autonomous with respect to matters of personal status and family law. In these spheres, they applied their own law. They were taxed on a community basis and members of the non-Muslim community were even denied the dubious opportunity of performing military service. Loyalty tended to be focused on the millet to which one belonged, rather than on the Empire. As a result of this social fragmentation efforts to develop an "Ottoman" nationalism were singularly unsuccessful.

Nevertheless, identification of the Ottoman Empire as a political organization with a territorial base, within which all members were equal, was clearly expressed through the promulgation of the Hatti-Sherif of Guilhane in 1839, inaugurating the Tanzimat (reorganization) period of Ottoman history.[15]

The primary significance of the Hatti-Sherif is that it promised equal treatment to all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of religious affiliation. This was a direct challenge to the distinct separation made in Islamic political thought between the community of the faithful and the non-Muslims living within the Domain of Islam. Furthermore, the whole idea of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic state was weakened by relegating the position of religion to secondary importance in political affairs.

The Hatti-Sherif was 'urf based law. Its provisions, calling for further military, commercial, and fiscal reforms, established norms of legislation independent of the Shari'a. The millet system was continued, and foreigners still enjoyed their extra-territorial rights under treaties of capitulations; but Pandora's box was open. A definite step had been taken in introducing a secular purpose for the state, and defining that state in political rather than religious terms.

The Hatti-Sherif was followed quickly by the introduction of secular penal (1840) and administrative (1846) codes. Then in 1856 a commercial code was adopted, and in 1858 a code of land tenure. These were followed by a code of commercial procedure (1861) and a maritime code (1863). All these codes were modeled after European ones, particularly French.[16] While they were still considered as "supplements" to the Shari'a, the scope of the latter was continually being circumscribed.[17]

Furthermore, disputes arising under these secular codes were not assigned to qadis (Islamic judges) for adjudication. The rigid rules of evidence and procedure set by the Shari'a made that law particularly inadequate in these fields. Instead, secular courts (Nizamiya) were established. As a result of the jurisdiction claimed by these secular courts, the qadis were limited to handling cases only of personal status and family law (in the broadest meaning of these terms).[18]

Between 1869 and 1876 steps were taken to organize systematically sections of the Shari'a itself. Then in 1879 the Majallah was promulgated by the Ottoman Government.[19] This reflected the compromise between those who wished to secularize all Turkish law and those who sought to retain the Shari'a in matters of civil law at least. The Majallah was the codification of the civil law of the Shari'a, as interpreted by the Hanafite school of Islamic jurisprudence. In 1917 Ottoman Turkey went one step further and adopted a code of family law (the last preserve of Islamic law in almost every Islamic country). In this case the code was based on principles derived from all four orthodox schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

What is significant in all the legal reforms introduced after 1839 was the progressive movement away from the Shari'a in Ottoman Turkey. In many cases secular law displaced it, in other cases steps were taken to simplify and systematize it. Once, however, it became possible to say that the Shari'a was

not the law of the Ottoman Empire, the sultan-caliph's role as the executor of the Shari'a was seriously weakened. With each restriction of the Shari'a's jurisdiction, the legitimacy of the ruling institution was that much less based on Islamic grounds. Once the theoretical raison d'être provided by Islam was gone, no other basis could justify the exercise of political power in the Ottoman Empire unless one identified it as a pure Machtstaat, which was hardly possible in the 19th century.

In Iran the impact of the West did not prompt any progressive secularization of the legal system, as in the case of Ottoman Turkey. Throughout the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925), the Shi'ite 'ulema continued to wield considerable political influence. Moreover, despite the autocratic character of the government, its inability to exercise effective political authority in the provinces dictated responses of a different character. At the beginning of the 19th century, each provincial governor was virtually sovereign. The one advantage to this decentralization of effective political power was that at least the subject could escape a despotic ruler in one province merely by moving to another. The Russo-Iranian wars of 1813 and 1828 only led to increased centralization of government and more extensive effective control by the Shah. There was then no place to move. One Captain Adolphus Slade, recording his travels in Iran in the 1830's, summarized the effect of the Western impact on Iran by noting that:

> ". . . . when a nation, comparatively barbarous, copies the finished experience of a highly civilized state, without going through the intermediate stages of advancement, the few are strengthened against the many, the powerful armed against the weak. The sovereign, who before found his power despotic in name, circumscribed, because with all his will, he had not the real art of oppressing, by the aid of science finds himself a giant -- his mace exchanged for a sword."[20]

Ironically, the harsh Treaty of Turkomanchai ending the war of 1828 with Russia only rallied the country around the central government. That treaty not only resulted in territorial losses, but included also the imposition of capitulatory rights.[21] The Treaty of Commerce signed at the same time forbade Iran to impose a tariff on Russian goods of more than five per cent ad valorem. In 1836 Great Britain was granted similar privileges.[22] It is no wonder that a mission was dispatched by Iran at that time to get information from Prince Metternich on the latest methods of warfare.[23]

During the reign of Nasr ed-Din Shah (1848-1896) a whole series of concessions in Iran were granted by the Shah to European powers. In addition repeated loans were floated abroad by Nasr ed-Din Shah and his successor. The effect of the concessions, capitulations, disadvantageous commercial treaties, and foreign borrowing only intensified the xenophobia of the emerging Iranian national movement. Iranian nationalists, moreover, found it difficult to reconcile the ideas of European liberalism with the imperialist ambitions of the European powers in Iran.

It was not Islam but Great Power influence in Iran that constituted the major problem for the Iran nationalists in the 19th century. The movement to establish a constitutional government in Iran was designed to curb the power of the Shah, not because he was despotic, but because the Qajar Shahs were held

responsible for the weak condition of the country and because they had opened the door for Western penetration. The European powers, not Islam, had to be checked, and that meant putting restraints on the Shah. Indicative of this fact is the strong support given to the constitutional movement of 1906 by the Shi'ite mujtahids.[24]

The constitution forced on the Shah in 1906 represents a curious amalgam of Western liberalism and Shi'ite conservatism. The preamble to the 1906 Constitution includes as one purpose for its promulgation to "give effect to the enactments of the Sacred Law of His Holiness the Prophet."[25] The first two articles of the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 further document the Islamic tone of the Constitution:

> Art. 1. The official religion of Persia is Islam, according to the orthodox Ja'fari doctrine of the 'Ithna 'Ashariyya, which hence forth the Shah of Persia must profess and promote.
>
> Art. 2. At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National Consultative Assembly [i.e., Majlis] . . . . be at variance with the sacred rules of Islam or the laws established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind [i.e., the Prophet].
>
> It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology [i.e., 'ulema] . . . . to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the rules of Islam . . . .

The ambivalent nature of the Iranian constitutional movement of that time is reflected in the fact that Article 26 of the Supplementary Law cites the community as the source of all power; while Article 27 circumscribed that power by declaring no law shall be at variance with Shari'a law. Moreover, sovereignty is confided by the community in the Shah (Article 35) whose exercise of power is to give better effect to the Shari'a which assigns such sovereignty only to God.

It is significant to remember that this Constitution, as amended, and the Supplementary Fundamental Law constitute Iran's current basic law. None of the provisions cited above has been amended. While the political influence of Islam is considerably less significant than it might appear from reading the Supplementary Law, its constitutional position continues to demonstrate the Islamic character of Iran.

The constitutional movement in 19th century Turkey reflects the hope entertained by some "Ottoman" nationalists that the political formula of constitutionalism might forge together into one "national" community the heterogeneous confessionally organized groups that made up the Empire. This nationalist concept of government was liberal in tone and reflective of the influence of the Enlightenment on this group. French influence was particularly strong among this group, and words like Vatan (nation) and Hurriyet (liberty) gained increased importance among these nationalists.

The Ottoman Empire did get a constitution in 1876. It was reinstated by the Young Turks in 1908.[26] What was never clear to these "Ottoman" nationalists, however, was that their national movement had no meaning separated from Islam;

while "Ottoman" nationalism linked to Islam could not possibly accommodate the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. No constitution can reconcile the irreconcilable. The multi-national character of the Ottoman Empire doomed the efforts of the Young Turks from the very beginning. Their attempts to "Ottomanize" all the Empire's subjects only further stimulated the non-Muslim national movements; while among Arab Muslims it only politicized what had theretofore been a cultural nationalism. It was not until Kemalism arrived that an effective political formula was discovered to take the place of the traditional Islamic concept of the state, and by that time the problem had been considerably simplified by the effects of World War I on the Ottoman Empire.

Tutorial Authoritarianism: The Second Period

The decision taken by the Turkish nationalists to acknowledge the territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire following World War I was of major importance for the political development of Turkey. Confined to Rumelia and Anatolia, the new Turkey had a relatively homogeneous population. Although Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were found in urban centers like Constantinople (Istanbul) and Smyrna (Izmir), and a large number of Kurds (or, if you will, "Kurdish-speaking Turks!"), were in the eastern provinces, Turkey was free of most of the geographical, ethnic, and religious ambiguities that had prevented the rise of a viable Ottoman nationalism. Turkish nationalism, or Kemalism, during the interwar years had a clearly defined geographical and demographic scope. With no irredentist problems, the energy of Kemalism could be focused on the internal transformation of Turkish society.

The loss of the Arab territories, in particular, helped Turkey to develop into a modern nation-state. Islam had been the common link between Arab and Turk during the Ottoman days. A Political formula designed to include both Arab and Turk had to recognize and reaffirm this Islamic tie. The Turk "adopted" Islam, while the Arab has no recognized history outside that creed. Only after the Arab territories were lost could Turkey embrace a nationalism that antedated Islam and could be defined in secular terms.

The new elite of Turkey had a clear objective: implement with dispatch the reforms only gingerly adopted in Ottoman days and transform Turkey into a modernized, westernized, industrialized, and secularized nation-state. Their task was not simple, for beneath the thin stratum of western-oriented Turks was the bulk of the population, still clinging to the traditional ways set by Islam. The ancien regime still lived in the economic and social fabric of society. Even the westernization of the new elite was but a thin veneer over the heritage of the past. The myths, dogmas, rites, and symbols of Islam were an integral part of the Weltanschauung of most Turks. Could the spirit of Kemalism provide an alternative set of myths, dogmas, rites, and symbols? Or would Kemalism have to compromise with Islam? The pervasive influence of Islam demonstrated that while the role of Islam in the new Turkey might be redefined, it could not be totally denied. This Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) admitted himself when early in the War for Independence (1920-1923) he said, "As soon as the sultan-caliph is delivered from all pressure and cohesion, he will take his place within the frame of the legislative principles which will be determined by the [Grand National] Assembly."[27] In fact, the entire Anatolian revolt was initially justified as necessary to preserve the "Islamic Caliphate and Ottoman sultanate" from domination by European powers.[28]

The secularism of the Kemalist ideology was not to mean the separation of Islam from the state, as much as the subordination of Islam to the state. Thus, when Turkey was proclaimed a republic, Islam was made the state religion. Not until 1928 was Islam constitutionally disestablished. When the caliphate was abolished (March, 1924), a Presidency of Religious Affairs was established under the republic to supervise Islamic muftis. The muftis were, in fact, appointed and paid by the state. A Directorate of Pious Foundations (awkaf), however, was established to administer village imams and take care of almost 3000 endowed mosques in Turkey.[29]

The secularism of the new Turkey was directed not at Islam, per se, but at its debilitating and retarding influence as the chief architect of traditionalism. The regressive influence of Islam, contended the Kemalists, had to be extirpated from all spheres of Turkish life before that country could attain modernity.

In Iran Reza Shah subscribed to a similar view. He even entertained the idea of making Iran a republic like Turkey, but the Shi'ite 'ulema successfully resisted this impulse. Of great importance to Iran's political development was Reza Khan's decision to be Shah. Once he accepted this role, he accepted with it the whole traditional structure of Iran. In comparison, Ataturk's Turkey was really a new Turkey. Its geographical boundaries were different than those of the Ottoman Empire. The political system of the new Turkey was different. Even the capital of Turkey was different, and the deliberate selection of Ankara as the new capital served to differentiate this new Turkey clearly from the old. By contrast, continuation of the political framework of pre-war Iran, and the retention of Tehran as the capital city, tended only to perpetuate the influence of traditionalism in Iran.

Reza Shah could not go as far or as fast as Ataturk. In part, this was because the problems that he faced were quite different from Ataturk's. Over a century of close contact with the West had moved Turkey a long way toward modernity before Ataturk came on the scene. Ataturk's army was battle trained, and, after 1924, he exercised effective military and political control over all of Turkey. When Reza Shah first seized power his army consisted of a ceremonial palace guard, the Cossack brigade, and a motley collection of provincial levies. The tribes were exercising virtual political autonomy, and separtist movements were developing in Gilan, Mazanderan, Azerbaijan, and Khorassan provinces. Reza Shah had to assert his authority over Iran before he could begin to modernize it. In June, 1925 he introduced compulsory military conscription, French advisors helped him reorganize the army, and by the end of 1926 most of Iran was controlled by Reza Shah. Only the tribal areas of the southwest resisted his authority. A few years later this area, too, came under Reza Shah's control.

In comparing the development of Turkey and Iran in the interwar years, attention must be called to three basic differences between these countries in this period. In the first place Ataturk was supported by a much larger base of urbanized, western-oriented, secularly-minded nationalists than Reza Shah. Secondly, Reza Shah, because he was Shah, was an integral part of the traditional political, economic, and social structure. His legitimacy as Shah was still partly defined by Islam. It is significant in this respect that while the constitutional role of Islam was ignored by Reza Shah, he never amended the Iranian constitution to delete Islam's constitutional role. Ataturk, on the other hand, was dictator of a completely new Turkey, with a completely new constitution

resting on a completely new ideological base. Finally, Reza Shah had first to control Iran before he could reform it. Ataturk had his problems in this regard too, particularly with respect to the Kurds in eastern Turkey. But the separatist tradition in Iran has always been more troublesome in that country than in Turkey, in part because of the number of non-Iranians inhabiting the provinces on the periphery of Iran. As a result Reza Shah had to temper both the pace and character of his reforms, for fear of driving the provinces into open revolt.

Both Reza Shah and Ataturk recognized that the transformation of their respective countries involved introducing reforms in virtually all sectors of society. Only then could the influence of traditionalism be effectively reduced.

Turkey, as the previous section noted, was considerably more advanced in secularization of her legal system than Iran. Further reforms in this sector were introduced under the republic. In April, 1924 the Shari'a courts were completely abolished. On February 17, 1926 the Swiss civil code was adopted en bloc to replace the Mejallah.[30] In March, 1926 a new penal code based on the 1899 Italian one was introduced, and in May, 1926 a new commercial code, based on German and Italian sources, was adopted.

In Iran a civil code, drawn largely from French sources, was adopted in May, 1928. Matters of personal status, however, were still governed by the Shari'a, in that a unified and simplified verson of Shari'a law dealing with these matters was included in this code. In 1931 the scope of Shari'a law was restricted further by the adoption of a secular code for marriage and divorce. A secular commercial code was adopted in 1932, and a secular definition of penal crimes in 1936.

With the adoption of each secular code in Turkey and Iran, the capacity of Islam to influence man's earthly activities was commensurately restricted. In turn, secular influences penetrated society and contributed to weakening traditionalism. Admittedly, promulgation of secular law does not ensure its enforcement. In this context reforms in related fields play a vital role.

Reforms in the social field proceeded much further in Turkey than in Iran during the interwar years. In 1924 the Islamic educational institutions, the medreses, were abolished in Turkey and a Faculty of Theology within the University of Istanbul was established in their place.[31] In September, 1925 it was made a criminal offense to wear the traditional gown and turban unless the wearer was a mufti, imam, hatip, or village religious teacher. In September, 1925 the Dervish orders were banned in Turkey. In November, 1925 the wearing of western headgear was made compulsory. Ataturk's comment concerning this last reform is informative in demonstrating the psychology behind these social reforms:

> It was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanatacism, of hatred to progress and civilization, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headgear of the whole civilized world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilized mankind.[32]

Effective January 1, 1926 the solar calendar replaced the Islamic lunar in Turkey. Then on November 3, 1926 the whole Turkish alphabet was changed from one written in Arabic script to one written in Latinized form. In addition, courses in Arabic and Persian were deleted from the high school curriculum. As a result modern Turkey was cut off from much of its Islamic past, since the new generation of Turks would not be able to read anything printed before 1926. Purging the language of Arabic words and refusing to permit Arabic to be used in the call to prayer (Ezam) also contributed to isolating Turkish society from those Islamic influences inextricably interwoven with the Arabic language.

Other reforms in this field included the compulsory use of the metric system of weights and measures (1932), the adoption by Turks of surnames (1935), and the substitution of Sunday for Friday as the day of rest.

In Iran compulsory religious education was eliminated from the primary and secondary schools, the Dervish orders were banned, the Shi'ite pilgrimmage to Nejef and Kerbala (which are both in Iraq) was discouraged, the Shi'ite Passion Plays (Tazziehs) were suppressed, and the pious foundations (awkaf) were confiscated.[33] The founding of a secularly-oriented University of Tehran in 1934 also weakened Islamic influence in Iran. But an indication of the limitation of Reza Shah's ability to introduce secular social reform was the riots produced in Mashid following Reza Shah's "request" that Iranians wear western headgear.[34]

In the introduction of secular reforms in both the legal and social spheres Iran trailed far behind Turkey. In the political sphere the difference is almost too great to warrant comparison. In Iran it was essentially "plus la même chose." The only real difference was that the despotism of Reza Shah was supported by nationalism rather than Islam. Even in the case of Iranian nationalism, Shi'ism played too integral a part in defining that nationalism to separate them. The Iranian Constitution and Supplementary Fundamental Law continued theoretically to define political authority in Iran. The Majlis, while only a rubber stamp for Reza Shah still functioned as a stronghold for the conservatively oriented absentee landowner class.

Furthermore, Reza Shah's reforms were largely introduced ad hoc. With the exception of xenophobic sentiments, Iranian nationalism was devoid of any ideological content that could provide integration and justification to the interwar reforms. There was no ideology within the context of which the Iranian transformation could find direction. Reza Shah provided no substitute for traditionalism. As William S. Haas has written, "The organized omnipotence of the state which replaced the arbitrary individual despotism of the past, the wrecking of the structure of society . . . the uprooting of tradition in every field, made the individual homeless and created a social vacuum which modern civilization could not compensate . . . ."[35] There was no counterpart in Iran to the Kemalism of Turkey.

The influence of the Shi'ite 'ulema in Iran was considerably weaker in 1941 than in 1921. Still, the basic socio-political status of the Shi'ite 'ulema, as well as the absentee landowner class, had not been totally undermined by Reza Shah.

Particularly unfortunate for the modernization of Iran was Reza Shah's method of introducing reforms by decree from Tehran without preparing the population for the reception of these reforms ahead of time. This method promoted a Hajji Baba

like reaction to these reforms. They were imposed on society but they did not always gain roots in society. The result was that these reforms tended to assume a superficial and ephemeral quality. Reza Shah's tribal policy, for example, was ill conceived and ill executed, and despite the fact that the tribal Khans never regained their former political influence, once Reza Shah abdicated, tribal resurgence appeared. Even the merchant guilds, or Bazaar groups, that once enjoyed considerable corporate autonomy and persistently resisted Reza Shah's reforms, reemerged after Reza Shah's abdication to assert their traditional political influence.

Not only did Iran lack any articulated ideology for a program of modernization, but she also lacked any organizational medium by means of which both ruler and ruled could be identified with such a program, and, in consequence, with each other. Reza Shah ruled Iran with his army. His position as Shah linked him to the traditional context. As a result, only the coercive force of his army and the weight of traditionalism gave purpose to his rule. An ideological vacuum existed between the Shah and the reform-minded of Iran. The modernization of Iran, to rid that country of foreign influence, only deepened the feeling of Iranian xenophobism, and, paradoxically, only strengthened the traditionalists. While Reza Shah was bitterly anti-clerical, he never came fully to grips with the ideology of traditionalism. As in the case of the present Shah, his aim was to modernize Iran without directly challenging the traditional framework. His prescription was to cure Iran without resorting to surgery. This approach permitted the traditionalists, while resisting his secular reforms, to support the Shah and interpret the process of modernization as reinforcing the socio-economic position of the traditionalists, rather than a program directed against them.

Without any ideological link between the Shah and the reform-minded in Iran, and without any organizational medium to identify both in a common cause, the process of modernization under Reza Shah was without form or design. No one could feel himself being a part of that process except the Shah himself. Iran was the object of Reza Shah's reforms but never was allowed the opportunity of being a subject in the reform process.

In Turkey exactly the opposite condition prevailed. Ataturk and his followers girded the new Turkey with an ideology and an organizational medium to give it articulation. The 1924 constitution provided Turkey with a unicameral Grand National Assembly, within which all executive and legislative power was "concentrated" (Articles 5-30). While sovereignty was lodged in the nation (millet), it was the Assembly that wielded authority to give effect to that sovereignty (Article 4). The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and all other members of the Cabinet had to be chosen from this body. At the same time, all the deputies to the Assembly were members of one political party, the Republican People's Party (organized September 9, 1923). Ataturk's political power derived from not only his control of the army and his position as President of the Republic, but because he was chairman of this party as well. The dictatorial power of Ataturk was politically based. Undoubtedly he could have exercised equal power even if he had held no official position in the government. The government of Ataturk was essentially party government. The members of the party constituted the militants of the Kemalist revolution. The party extended into every part of Turkey and provided Ataturk with the institutional nexus that linked all Turks, willingly or not, to the Turkish transformation.

The party served also to propagate the message of this transformation, to explain, justify, and give ideological cohesion to the interwar reforms. From 1923 to 1945 all the reforms and policies of Turkey were initiated by the Republican People's Party. It served as an instrument of government, just as the government served as an instrument of the party. Both served as instruments of Ataturk.

The ideology of the new Turkey was articulated by the Party in 1931, when the "Six Principles of Kemalism" were adopted. These principles were: "Republicanism," "Nationalism," "Populism," "Etatism," "Secularism," and "Reformism" (sometimes translated as "revolutionism").[36] The "People's Houses," formerly community centers, were taken over by the Republican People's Party, for the dissemination of the party ideology and continual identification of party action as "national" action. The Turkish policy of deliberate involvement of the average Turk in the modernization process is one well known to political scientists because of similar techniques in Communist Russia. In Turkey this process was perhaps even more effective in that the identification of party to nation, and both to reform, was always intimate and without the strains produced by fitting an ideology with a professed universal scope to a single nation. The orientation of the Republican People's Party away from the ideology of Islamic traditionalism limited its effectiveness in generating the total involvement of Turk to party to nation, however, Nevertheless, compared to Iran, the introduction of mass-based party government in Turkey, and constantly expressing the ideological themes of the reform movement through that party, enabled Turkey to move dramatically toward modernity.

The catholic scope of the reform movement in Turkey demanded a concentration of political power in the hands of the new elite. The dictatorial, one-party character of Turkey in the interwar period was more a matter of necessity than choice. Twice, in fact, Ataturk tried to relax his authoritarian grip over Turkey. Each time the forces of traditionalism exploited this opportunity and threatened the pace and character of the modernizing impulse.

In November, 1924 an opposition political group, the Progressive Republican Party, was allowed to come into being.[37] While this party accepted the republican form of government, its leader Kiazim Kara Bekir had been a strong proponent of continuing the sultanate before the republic was established;[38] and Rauf Bey, another of the founders of this party, was known to be both a conservative and a partison of the caliphate idea.[39] As Kemal Karpat has observed, "the Progressive Party's liberalism, genuine though it might be, aimed specifically at protecting religion from the interference of a government whose secular views were already too manifest."[40] The party was suppressed in June, 1925 for allegedly taking part in the Kuriish revolt of that year.

In August, 1930 another attempt was made at permitting some degree of democracy to exist during this period of forced-draft modernization. This time Ataturk permitted the Liberal Party to be organized. This party, led by Ataturk's close friend, Fethi Bey, proposed a platform that differed little from the Republican People's Party.[41] It too supported a policy that was republican, nationalist, and secular in character. The special appeal of the party was primarily in advocating more individualism in the economic sphere. It was dissolved three months later, not because of its program or its leadership, but because it served as a focal point around which the religious conservatives could

rally to articulate politically their dissatisfaction with the pattern of reforms introduced by Ataturk.[42] Other minor parties established at the same time as the Liberal Party were dissolved along with that party.[43]

The dramatic reform of Turkish society inevitably threatened the power position of the traditional elite. New leaders were evolving in Turkey that derived their authority from sources drastically different in character from the sources justifying the leadership positions of the traditional elite. Only an authoritarian political order could stabilize society, given the strain produced by the displacement of old leaders by new. Over 50,000 were on hand, for example, to greet Fethi Bey when he arrived in Smyrna (Izmir) in October of 1930 to deliver an address on behalf of the emerging Liberal Party. Government offices were sacked, and the frustrations of a decade were released in enthusiastic support of that short-lived party.[44] The dream of Ataturk to transform Turkey into a modern nation-state was too revolutionary in design to execute under democratic conditions that would allow those resisting this modernization to voice their sentiments where they would count -- in the Grand National Assembly. By 1932 Ataturk was forced to face this fact. He is reported to have said at that time, "Let the people leave politics alone for the present. Let them interest themselves in agriculture and commerce. For ten or fifteen years more I must rule."[45] Ironically, it was in the economic sphere that the forces of traditionalism were most effective. So long as Turkey remained essentially a village-organized, agriculturally-based society, traditionalism could weather the storm of reform. In Turkey, and to a lesser degree in Iran, the forces of traditionalism had retreated in the political, legal, and social spheres. In both Turkey and Iran the community was unequivocally defined in national rather than religious terms. Islam provided no legitimacy to government in Turkey. It was, in fact, clearly subordinate to government. In Iran, the constitutional role of Islam was treated with salutory neglect by more and more segments of Iranian society. In Turkey the Shari'a had been completely displaced by secular law. In Iran its scope had been severely restricted. In Turkey the equalitarianism of the new ideology gave legal, political, and considerable social equality to women. In 1934 they had received complete political emancipation. The veil was seldom worn, the system of purdah was viewed with anathema, and women were sitting in the Grand National Assembly. The social mores and habits of traditionalist Turkey were relentlessly put under attack. Even in Iran, where attempts to modernize the social sector were not as strong, some progress could be noted, at least in the urban centers.

Nevertheless, traditionalism was still a major force in the rural areas of Turkey and Iran, and over eighty per cent of the population of each country lived in these rural areas. Decades, generations, even centuries of grinding economic stagnation had developed in the peasantry of both countries a whole complex of attitudes that worked against the modernizing impulse. Fatalism, fear, superstition, and suspicion governed the peasant's response to the world around him. Only the most sanguine could expect the peasant to turn his back on the village imam and accept the awesome responsibility for his own fate.

It should be noted, however, that the psychological condition of the peasantry in Turkey was considerably different from that of Iran, although both were incredibly poor. In Turkey the traditional pattern of land ownership has been that of small peasant proprietorship, with almost 95 per cent of those

engaged in agriculture either owners or part owners, of the land they tilled. In Iran, by contrast, as late as 1954, over 95 per cent of Iranian agricultural workers were tenant farmers.[46] The highly inequitable land tenure system of Iran has operated to focus both economic and political power in the hands of the absentee landowner. The peasantry could not easily view the state as the agent of reform when historically it functioned (when it functioned at all in the rural areas) primarily as the agent of the landowner. To the majority of peasants their sole contact with government had been as an object of military conscription or as some one to tax them. Without any apparent escape from domination by the absentee landlord, the peasant retreated deeper into Islamic traditionalism.

To be sure, the Turkish peasant's contact with the government had historically been little different from his counterpart in Iran. During the interwar years, however, the absence of any significant absentee landowner class in the ruling institution, coupled with widespread peasant ownership of land, generated in the Turkish peasantry a willingness to contest, within the political arena, the pace and direction of the modernization drive. The Turkish peasant might protest the domination of government by the reform minded urban elite. He might protest the high taxes he had to pay. He might protest the Kemalist efforts to restrict the role of Islam in the new Turkey. He might protest the authoritarian one-party rule of the Republican People's Party. But whatever might be the nature of his protest, it was part of the discourse of politics in the new Turkey. It was not expressed in the form of a retreat from politics. While the causes are more varied than suggested above, the idiom of protest and the framework within which it was expressed distinguished the Turkish peasant from the Iranian peasant; and this distinction is a fundamental one in terms of this paper. The politicized form of the Turkish peasant's protest indicated that the struggle between the force of Islamic traditionalism and that of a secularly oriented nationalism would, itself, unfold politically; while, in Iran, the struggle would not be different in character, but would unfold outside the political context. Reza Shah, as is the case with the present Shah, was reform minded, but he was also part of the traditional context. He had to work with a landowner-dominated Majlis, which by its very composition operated to perpetuate the traditional land tenure system of Iran. As a result, the effect of the interwar reforms in the economic sphere of Iranian society only incidentally touched the basic economic problem in Iran. In fact, certain economic steps taken during this period had the negative effect of strengthening, rather than weakening, the traditional economic framework. The Iranian peasant, separated from the reform minded Shah by the Majlis within the governmental structure, and denied any ideological or institutional link with the modernizing sector of Iranian society, was isolated from everything but the influence of Islamic traditionalism. Paradoxically, both the absentee landowner and his tenant peasant retreated behind the ideological wall of Islamic traditionalism; the landowner because it suited his economic interests, the peasant because it was his only refuge from the landowner. The Shah found unconditional support for his reforms only in the emerging middle class, concentrated in the urban centers. To get the support of the politically powerful but conservative absentee landowner class, the Shah had to turn to reforms in this field that could be supported by both this group and the urban middle class. Consequently, projects designed to curb foreign influence in Iran, initiate light industrial development, and establish economic symbols of modernity, without upsetting the basic economic framework of society in the process, characterize the economic reforms initiated by Reza Shah. The cost of effecting economic development in these lines was to be borne primarily by the politically weak peasantry.

Thus to finance development projects, Reza Shah used three basic methods, which, directly or indirectly, adversely affected the economic well-being of the peasantry. Only in a marginal way did they affect the middle or upper classes. First, large amounts of state owned land were sold for revenue purposes. This method permitted the absentee landowner to expand his holdings even more and subject the peasant, who previously had worked for the state, to his immediate control.[47] Second, he taxed the peasant directly in the form of a tax levied on crops produced. After 1930, eight per cent of the undivided crop was payable to the government. While technically this tax affected the landowner too, the peculiarities of the crop-dividing system in Iran made the burden fall disproportionately heavier on the peasant. Third, the peasant was taxed indirectly through the operation of state-owned monopolies, particularly those on sugar and tea. Indicative of the significance of this monopoly is the fact that almost all of the $125,000,000 cost of the trans-Iranian railway was met from revenues earned by this monopoly. The effect of this monopoly on the peasantry was to make even more expensive the only luxury he had from the drudgery of a subsistence-level standard of living. Additional monopolies established by the Iranian government during the interwar years included those for opium (1938), tobacco (1929), cotton piece goods (1934), silk goods (1934), silkworm eggs (1936), trucks and automobiles (1937), and wheat (1941).[48] All products imported or exported were also subject to government monopoly after 1931.[49]

The landowner in Iran was supposed to pay a land tax, in addition to the tax levied on goods produced. The taxes paid by the landowners to the central government, however, were nominal, and even then frequently went unpaid. Thus, out of total receipts of the government of Iran for the financial year ending March 20, 1939, less than four million rials were received in the form of land tax out of a total of 1,528 million rials.[50] That the financial burden of Reza Shah's economic projects were to fall almost entirely on the peasantry is indicated also by the fate of an income tax law proposed to the Majlis in 1927. Under the provisions of this proposed law all incomes of over 10,000 rials per annum were to be subject to taxation. It was never adopted.[51]

The government of Iran heavily taxed the peasant in the interwar years. What did the government do for the peasant? In 1925 tariff exemptions were granted for the importation of agricultural machinery. But, as Amin Banani has written, "Without a commensurate program of land-tenure reform the little mechanization that was introduced tipped the already uneven scale further to the advantage of the landlord and thereby added to social tension in rural Iran."[50a] In 1926 the peasantry was subjected to compulsory military service. In 1937 Reza Shah promulgated a Land Development Act which, if implemented, would have required landowners to bring idle, but arable, land under cultivation. But the law designated the landowners, sitting in regional councils, to administer its provisions. Since the intensified land use involves capital expenditure, the landowners favor extensive use of land to produce the same amount of crops. This permits the landowner to one-crop his land and substitute crop rotation for expensive fertilizing techniques.

Except to the degree that the peasant could share in the feeling that Iran was developing into an independent nation-state, he found little in the interwar reforms to comfort him. Since independence from foreign influence meant

independence of an Islamic country from the influence of a non-Islamic power, the sentiments of the peasant joined those of the middle and upper classes in the form of an intensely xenophobic nationalism.

Reduction of foreign (i.e. western) economic influence in Turkey and Iran was a basic aim of the national movement in each country. Both, however, were under an initial handicap in this regard since that influence throughout the twenties was guaranteed by international agreement in each case. The capitulations were not terminated in Iran until 1925; while western economic influence in Turkey could not be curbed until 1929. Although the capitulations in Turkey ended in 1923, the commercial agreement that constituted part of the Lausanne settlement denied Turkey the right to revise unilaterally the 1916 tariff schedule relative to imports from the states signatory to the Lausanne Treaty until 1929.

Both Turkey and Iran pushed railroad development in the interwar period. Both predicated the construction of railways primarily on grounds of military, rather than economic, considerations. Both saw in girding the country with railroads a symbol of modernity. At this point the similarity ends. In Turkey, where taxation is based primarily on gross income, the middle and upper classes shared the burden of railroad construction along with the peasantry. The latter was taxed, and heavily too, but it was not always a one-way affair. For example, in 1925 the agricultural tithe was abolished and direct taxes on the peasantry reduced. Some twenty state farms were established, and farm mechanization initiated. The emphasis throughout the interwar period was on industrial, not agricultural development. But at all times the peasantry in Turkey was a part of the political process, and was tied to it by a variety of institutional channels. The Turkish peasant was not, as in the case of the Iranian peasant, both psychologically and institutionally detached from the government.

Moreover, with the government firmly in the hands of the reform-minded, the construction of railroads was part of the general quest to modernize all of Turkey. Whether or not the construction of railways reflected a proper use of investment funds in interwar Turkey is beside the point -- it was perceived to be so at the time by the ruling elite. The peasantry could, and would, protest this allocation of funds politically. In Iran the construction of the trans-Iranian railway, while of military and psychological value, did little or nothing to influence the position of traditionalism in that country, precisely because it was not an integral part of a total effort to transform Iranian society.

It was military security that provided the primary motive for the construction of railroads in both Turkey and Iran. The Kurdish revolts of 1925, 1929, and 1930, while suppressed by the army, demanded that the eastern provinces be brought under tighter control of Ankara. Therefore, railroad construction was given central attention by the Grand National Assembly. Altogether the total mileage of railways in use by Turkey increased from 2,173 in 1925 to 4,530 in 1946.[52] In Iran the trans-Iranian railway served, inter alia, to bring the tribal areas in the south of the country into closer contact with Tehran. This railway, started in 1928, was finally completed in 1938.

In the thirties the advent of the Great Depression and the discriminatory trade practices adopted by the European powers to the disadvantage of raw material producers clearly demonstrated to both Turkey and Iran the delicacy of political independence without economic independence. Each country retreated

into a policy of economic nationalism to defend itself against the vicissitudes of world price fluctuations. The comparative character of this retreat is significant. In Iran, cotton mills, sugar refineries, and similar processing plants were built and operated by the state. Import quotas were established, and the export trade monopolized by the state. However, the reluctance of the state to mobilize capital by taxing the landlords, the lack of any domestic institutionalized "capital" market, and the nationalist opposition to borrow from abroad, limited the pattern of industrialization in Iran to a few light industries, for the most part state owned.

In Turkey economic nationalism was introduced under the ideological panoply of étatism. State promotion of industrial development had been part of the modernizing drive in Turkey during the twenties too, but without detailed ideological justification, and largely as supplementary to, rather than in lieu of, private industrial investment. As early as 1924 a Bank of Commerce had been established by the state. This bank owned the principal silk factories in Turkey, as well as extensive manufacturing and mining interests. In addition, the Bank of Commerce, together with two other state banks, operated the Turkish government's sugar monopoly. The board of governors of this bank was made up entirely of deputies from the Grand National Assembly.[53]

The dating of étatism in its full array is normally taken from the establishment of the Sumerbank on June 3, 1933. Since all these Turkish state-owned banks operated as holding companies, as well as carrying out regular banking functions, Sumerbank was assigned the function of "operating the factories which it [took] over from the State Industrial office and to administer the shares of the state in private industrial concerns in accordance with the provisions of the [Turkish] commercial law."[54] This bank was administered by a six-man board of directors, five of whom were appointed directly by the Prime Minister. The sixth man was appointed by a three-man agency, the General Assembly of Banks, two of whom were deputies from the Grand National Assembly and one an appointee of the Prime Minister.

In 1934 a Five-year Industrial Development Plan was adopted. This plan was supplemented in 1937 by a Three-year Industrial Development Plan and in 1938 by a Four-year Industrial Plan. Enterprises established under these plans were generally financed and operated by Sumerbank.

In 1935 the state-owned Etibank was created to finance the exploitation of mines and develop and manage metals industries in Turkey. It was this bank that ran the Turkish Karabuk iron and steel plant that began operations in 1939.

An indication of the scope of state ownership of industry in Turkey during the interwar years may be gathered from the fact that as late as 1958, a full decade after private enterprise had been given full rein in Turkey, almost fifty per cent of the total industrial production of that country came from state-owned enterprises.[55]

In 1935 the official exegesis of the concept of étatism was adopted by the Fourth Grand Congress of the People's Party. Private enterprise was recognized as a desirable mode of economic development, but the state would take an active part "in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible."[56] Moreover,

"every economic enterprise shall harmonize with united national work, as well as the general interest."[57]

The outlines of the third period may now be discerned. In Turkey the policy of étatism in practice tended to promote the growth of two different entrepreneurial groups. The first group was composed of those who operated or were employed by a state-owned enterprise. To this group may be added, politically, those within the Republican People's Party and/or the governmental bureaucracy who believed the fastest path for the modernization of Turkey lay in the continuation of tutorial authoritarianism. To this group the vigor, the élan, the sense of purpose that characterized Kemalism gave to Turkish nationalism a potent weapon to use against imperialism from abroad and traditionalism at home.

The second group was composed of all those private entrepreneurs who considered the role of the state in the economic sphere as restricting their opportunities for growth. To this group was added, politically, the traditionalists in general, and particularly the peasantry, as well as the countless number who for one reason or another were opposed to one-party rule in Turkey. This group was to receive immeasurable political support from the United States as the role of Turkey in the Cold War became more precisely defined. One seeks in vain to discover any positive ideological nexus to link the tradition-bound Anatolian peasant with the urban, westernized, proponent of political democracy and economic liberalism. Each supported the other against the tutorial authoritarianism of the Republican People's Party. Each sought to use the other to strengthen his own position. In terms of this paper, and at the price of being redundant, mention must be made again of the fact that the whole level of discourse had been raised to a higher level. One was no longer discussing the concept of the state, but, rather, the role of the state in struggling against Islamic traditionalism in Turkey.

In Iran the pattern of the interwar years also sets the pattern for the third period. The grip of the traditionalists over the government of Iran, which only increased after the abdication of Reza Shah, could be broken in only two ways: By the new Shah in coalition with the reform-minded westernized, urban middle class; or by a coalition of all or part of this middle class with the peasantry. Both methods have been tried in the third period -- both methods have failed. T he repeated warning to Iran -- reform or revolution -- has become meaningless. Today it is a matter of revolutionary reform as revolution.

This third period, possibly coming to a close at this time, records both the failure and the success of the attempt made in both Turkey and Iran in seeking to disengage these societies from traditional influences without the use of any articulated ideological framework.

Search for Direction: The Third Period

The number of critics of étatism in Turkey had increased considerably by the end of World War II. The fall of Germany brought about the severance of economic relations with that country, and weakened the ideological appeal of both étatism and the idea of one-party rule. In addition, the postwar diplomatic pressures put on Turkey by the Soviet Union led Turkey to align herself closely to the United States, where neither etatism nor one-party rule was popular.

Furthermore, little economic progress had been made under étatism in Turkey during the interwar period, despite the institutional and ideological framework that had been associated with that economic policy. While traces of initial industrialization could be found in the Turkey of 1945, and a nascent economic middle class had been formed, the price of industrialization had been high. In fact, many students of Turkey concluded that that country had realized either a very small increase in real per capita income, or had actually suffered a net loss of real per capita income under étatism.[58] And the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development concluded from its postwar economic survey of Turkey that: ". . . only a small proportion of the total population has benefited from the increase in production which has been achieved. The standard of living of the peasants, who constitute a large majority of the population, has not only failed to improve substantially, but in some respects has been adversely affected."[59]

Critics of étatism in Turkey also called attention to the lack of coordination and comprehensive governmental planning that characterized the execution of this economic policy. Even when coordination and planning did exist, the lack of entrepreneurial skill in Turkey limited the efficacy of such efforts. On economic grounds, étatism seemed to deny private enterprise adequate scope of opportunity, without providing any compensatory advantages. On political grounds, the policy of étatism as a method of strengthening the economic independence of the country appeared more and more anomalous as Turkey found herself increasingly integrated at the international level with Western Europe and the United States. Before the war, Turkey sought economic independence as a means of preserving her national sovereignty, but the postwar international context made political and economic isolation appear both impossible and unattractive.

Moreover, throughout the war Turkey had felt it necessary to keep more than 900,000 men under arms, necessitating the allocation of over one-third the budget to defense; yet demobilization of the army appeared impossible in the light of Soviet post-war pressures. This drain on the Turkish economy was only exacerbated by the poor harvest of 1945-46. As a result, Turkey was forced to devalue the lira in 1946. Pronounced inflation had plagued Turkey throughout the war, with the index of wholesale prices in that country rising to over 400 per cent of what they were before the war.[60] The urban middle class, therefore, found étatism on the domestic level and economic nationalism on the international level ill fitted postwar Turkey. Diplomatic and economic assistance was needed from the West. Turkey simply could no longer go it alone.

That economic, as well as diplomatic, assistance would be forthcoming from the West had been suggested as early as 1941. In that year Great Britain and the United States had pledged in the Atlantic Charter to pursue certain postwar policies that involved, inter alia, giving attention to economic development in

areas beyond their particular national boundaries. The Tehran Declaration, the war-time activities of the Middle East Supply Center, and the Charter of the United Nations gave further testimony to the fact that promoting economic growth in developing societies like Turkey and Iran would be part of the postwar policy of industrialized nations like the United States.

The move, therefore, to liberalize the one-party system in Turkey in late 1945 can be interpreted as both inevitable and opportunistically motivated. Not only would this legalize opposition to the political and economic policies of the Republican People's Party, but it could also be viewed as an attempt to court American favor at a time when support, economic as well as diplomatic, was needed from the United States. Political discontent within Turkey, particularly because of the repressive measures undertaken by Inonu during the war,[61] was high among the urban segment, as well as among the peasantry, in the postwar period. The alternative to liberalizing the political process might have been armed revolt against the regime.

The clash within the Republican People's Party in late 1945 indicated that discontent existed even among the leadership of the country. The expulsion from the party of Adnan Menderes and Fuad Koprulu, as well as the resignation from the party of Celal Bayar in September 1945, announced to dissatisfied elements in Turkey that an opposition party would have nationally recognized leadership. The 1946 amendment to the Law of Associations (enacted in 1938), permitting the formation of additional political parties, allowed the politically discontented to rally around the leadership of Celal Bayar and organize the Democratic Party.

A new political force, the Democratic Party, had come into being in Turkey, but it is to be noted that the leadership of this party was made up of men who had attained much of their political education and most of their political power while serving under the banner of the Republican People's Party. Bayar, Menderes, Koprulu, and others who left the ranks of Inonu's party to lead the Democratic Party were not a new elite emerging to challenge the old. They were, themselves, part of the old elite.

The program of the Democratic Party, therefore, was not fundamentally at variance with the Kemalist ideology. It was rather a watered-down version of Kemalism. The exact nature of their program tended to take the form of a limited, ad hoc, and opportunistic response to the program put forward by the Republican People's Party.

The Republican People's Party, for its part, was also compromising the ideology of Kemalism as a measure of political expediency. In 1947 the People's Party agreed to restrict the scope of étatism to heavy industries, armament manufacturing, mining, power stations, and public works.[62] The government also announced at the time the repeal of all decrees imposing restrictions in foreign capital invested in Turkey.

The Democratic Party was more anti-etatist than the Republican People's Party, but it would be a mistake to conclude that étatism was totally rejected by the Democrats. Celal Bayar, himself, had been remembered for his harsh étatist policies when he had been Premier under Inonu in 1938-39. In fact, one United Nations study conducted in 1958 pointed out that after eight years of President

Bayar's rule in Turkey, the state-dominated sector of the economy actually had expanded rather than contracted.[63]

The significance of this ambivalent attitude on the part of both major political parties (until the 1960 Revolution) in Turkey toward étatism is that it reflected the general weakness of Kemalism in postwar Turkey. As Turkey liberalized her party system, and the quest for votes became the raison d'être of party platforms, ideological considerations lost much of their force. In turn, what to modernize in Turkey and why became more difficult to determine.

The postwar policy of both parties toward the peasantry also demonstrates this point. Kemalism is essentially an urban ideology, and, while the peasant could participate in the Turkish transformation proposed by Kemalism, the very object of that transformation was to create a Turkey, within which the peasant would be disengaged from his traditional milieu. So long as only one party existed in Turkey, the peasant's political desires could be ignored. In postwar Turkey, however, the peasant assumed a new meaning; he counted as one vote. With eighty per cent of the population made up of peasants, the two major political parties were, therefore, acutely sensitive of the peasant's position in postwar Turkey.

Thus, in 1945 the Grand National Assembly "unanimously" enacted an agrarian reform law designed to provide land for landless peasants;[64] and, in 1949, under the Law on the Taxation of Income, the government exempted the peasantry from paying any income tax at all. The Republican People's Party even retreated a little from their position on secularism by permitting religious instruction to be reintroduced into the school system in 1947.

The Democratic Party was in a position to demonstrate its attitude toward the peasantry and Islamic traditionalism after that party took over power in 1950. The May, 1950 elections have been hailed as a rare instance of a one-party dictatorship allowing itself to be turned out of office in a free election. More significant to this study, however, is the fact that liberalizing the party system in Turkey put decisive political power in the hands of the peasantry. Where a westernized urban-centered elite seeks to transform society dramatically, can political power be deliberately given to those whose whole way of life is tradition-bound? The 1960 Revolution suggests, among other things, that this can lead to some undesirable, but predictable, consequences.

As a result of these elections the Democratic Party won 408 out of 487 seats in the Grand National Assembly. Celal Bayar became President and Adnan Menderes became Premier. The first piece of legislation enacted under the Democrats was a law permitting the call to prayer (Ezam) to be made in Arabic again. Telegrams were dispatched all over Turkey that same night (June 16, 1950) to announce this event.[65]

The Dervish orders also reappeared once the Democratic Party was in power. Members of one order, the Tijani, smashed several statutes of Ataturk in 1951, but in this case the Democratic Party felt the Tijanis had gone too far, and, in July, 1952 their Sheikh, Kemal Pilavoglu, was arrested and placed in prison. The Democratic Party displayed a great deal of tolerance toward the Dervish orders,

however. In December 17, 1954 the State Press, Broadcasting, and Tourism Department granted the Mevlevi Dervishes permission to dance in Konya, and at this celebration the wives of the President, Premier, and the Foreign Minister personally attended, escorted by three members of the Cabinet.

Additional indications of the relaxed secularism of the Democratic Party was the use of the government-owned radio in broadcasting selections from the Qur'an, and the outbreak of fez-wearing in the eastern provinces after 1950.

At the same time, the Democratic Party was not ready to reject secularism completely. Islam continued to be disestablished. The party did curb the Tijanis. And on January 27, 1954 the Democratic-dominated Grand National Assembly did dissolve the Nation Party (organized 1948) for trying to make political capital out of Islam and its anti-secularist platform. As in the case of etatism, the Democratic Party sought to steer a moderate course with regard to the problem of secularism. The result was a general weakening of Kemalism, with no substitute offered in its place. Philip Toynbee reported in 1950 that the Republican People's Party: ". . . had become corrupt, woodenly bureaucratic, complacent, and nepotistic. No one doubts that its earlier achievements as a party were gigantic . . . but in its last years of power the stature of the party had shrunk, its imagination had flagged, its energy had seeped away."[66] All this was unfortunately true. But the Democratic Party offered little to give the Turk a new sense of direction, a new sense of purpose. If anything he was more confused, since the ideology that had been part of the new Turkey since its birth had been seriously compromised on the domestic level, no less than on the international. A new generation had grown up since Turkey became a republic. For most of the time Turkey was under authoritarian rule. But behind that authoritarianism was the driving ambition to make Turkey into a modern nation-state. Under the Democrats, the way ahead was obscure, and the political price paid for the economic progress realized perhaps too high for the proud Turkish nationalists.

Turkey did make economic progress under the Democrats -- far more than she made in the interwar period. But much of this progress was due to the aid received from abroad. Turkey literally was borrowing herself into prosperity. By 1954 Turkey had to devote almost thirty per cent of her export earnings for repayment of external debts. Between 1947 and 1955 Turkey received one and one-quarter billion dollars from the United States. If one adds to this the funds borrowed from the European Payments Union, plus private capital inflow into Turkey, the total external assistance received by Turkey in this period came to about $100 per capita. At the end of 1957 the foreign debt of Turkey exceeded one billion dollars; yet, the Turkish government had to borrow an additional $359 million and devalue the lira from 2.8 T.L. - $1 to 9.0 T.L. - $1 at that time.

Inflationary pressures and currency devaluation were hurting the urban middle class. But opportunity to voice discontent politically was progressively curbed. The "Peoples Houses" were taken away from the Republican People's Party in 1951. In 1953 much of the funds, moveable property, and real estate of that party was taken over by the government. In 1954 a repressive press law was enacted which made violators liable to heavy penalties for writing anything that "could be harmful to the political or financial prestige of the state."[67] By the time of the revolution, hundreds of journalists had been arrested, and dozens of newspapers suspended under this law.

At the same time the peasantry received special attention. Toprak paid the peasant more for his crops than export prices. The government promoted farm mechanization, increasing the number of tractors in Turkey to over four times their number in 1950, maintained price supports for grains, cotton, sugar beets, and fruits, regulated the price of tea and tobacco, and provided extensive technological assistance. Moreover, by 1957 over six million hectares of additional land had been brought under cultivation. Finally, the massive road development program carried out in Turkey under the Democrats greatly facilitated the movement of crops to market.

In the postwar period, the peasant was brought into contact with the outside world as he never had been before. The practice of stationing army draftees from the rural areas in the cities, and vice versa, as well as providing elementary education for these draftees perhaps had great effect in moving the peasant away from the ideological themes embodied in Islamic traditionalism. But, as with his urban brethren, what ideological framework is to direct the modernization of contemporary Turkey if Kemalism is no longer suitable? The 1960 Revolution and the draft constitution of the Second Turkish Republic provide no answer. The November, 1960 shakeup of the Committee on National Unity demonstrated that moderate elements will direct the future Turkey. No evidence is available at the moment, however, to suggest how they intend to provide Turkey with an ideological framework that will simultaneously direct the modernization of Turkey under a democratic political system and which, ipso facto, will make the peasantry the dominant political force.

The absence of any politically-formulated direction or purpose for modernization is even more manifest in contemporary Iran. The traditional character of Iranian society still defines the boundaries within which the modernization process is to take place. In terms of the general problem of disengaging society from the influence of traditionalism, Iran is in what might be termed the pre-political stage of modernization. Under Reza Shah the political process was largely subordinated to his arbitrary will, which in the interwar period was the national will. With the abdication of Reza Shah the center of political power shifted from the palace to the Majlis. This legislative chamber, dominated by tradition-oriented absentee landowners, tended to articulate the national will in terms of two general considerations. First, the economic modernization of Iran was to take place within the traditional political and social structure. Second, expressions of nationalism were to be directed against foreign influence in Iran, rather than against domestic manifestations of traditionalism.

Unlike nationalism in Turkey, Iranian nationalism tends to reinforce the influence of Islamic traditionalism. Shi'ite Islam is historically intertwined with the Iranian national identity. While being a Muslim may no longer be an intimate spiritual experience for the modernized segment of society, professing that faith is still part of being an Iranian. Because of this fact, it is particularly difficult to juxtapose nationalism to the ideology of Islamic traditionalism.

The common denominator in Iranian nationalism uniting traditionalists with the reform-minded is xenophobism, and this negative sentiment makes that ideology particularly inadequate for the purpose of providing any positive direction for the modernization effort in Iran.

One example of the inadequacy of Iranian nationalism in this regard was its totally negative quality during the Mossadegh era. Dr. Muhammad Mossadegh was carried to power on a nationalist tidal wave that drew almost all of its force from its xenophobic attack on Great Britain (in the guise of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company). Tradition-oriented absentee landowners supported Mossadegh because he was dramatically directing attention away from the fundamental problems arising out of the feudal-like socio-economic pattern of Iranian society. Reform-minded intellectuals, army officers, and government bureaucrats took vicarious pleasure in Mossadegh's twisting of the lion's tail. Religious groups like the followers of Shi'ite Mullah Ayatollah Kashani and the fanatic Fadayan-Islam gave their support to Mossadegh as a crusader against what they could identify as the imperialism of a non-Islamic power. The Communist-dominated Tudeh Party supported Mossadegh because of the anti-British character of his rule. In addition, non-Communist, but leftish, political groups, like the followers of Dr. Mozaffer Baghai, enthusiastically rallied to Mossadegh's support.

Once, however, Mossadegh was in power, one group after the other withdrew their support as the intoxication of xenophobic nationalism began to wear thin. It was the negative side of Mossadegh's program that had united almost all Iranians, not even excluding the Shah. But there was no positive side to the Mossadegh era. No challenge was presented to the traditional framework of Iranian society until only a few days before Mossadegh's fall. His rule was too formless politically, and too weak economically, to carry out any successful attack on traditional privilege. He never did come to grips with the real problems besetting Iran, until he had become so dependent on the Communists that all Iran turned against him.

With his fall from power and the return of the Shah, the political structure of the ancien régime was reestablished. The traditionalists continued to wield significant political and economic power, and the whole traditional structure, while rocked by Mossadegh, was still standing. The role of the Tudeh Party in the Mossadegh period demonstrated only too vividly that the heir to traditionalism in a future revolution might very well be Communism.

A less radical mode of attack on traditionalism was the program of promoting the rapid economic growth of Iran. The reform-minded hoped that rapid economic development would inevitably and subtly bring about the necessary fundamental modifications of the traditional structure of society. At least, economic modernization was a preferable subversive element in undermining traditionalism than the machinations of the Tudeh Party.

Paradoxically, the traditionalists also enthusiastically supported a program of rapid economic development. This group interpreted such a program as a means of increasing the strength of the Iranian economy, without necessarily inviting changes that would threaten their social, economic, or political position. To ensure that the economic development of Iran would not directly threaten the power position of the traditionalists, the Majlis created a "plan committee" empowered to approve each development project.[68]

But the hopes of the reform-minded that Iran could be rebuilt from the "bottom up" by economic development is perhaps too sanguine in respect to the operational scope of the Plan Organization, the administrative agency for implementing the Iranian Seven Year Development Plan. It must operate along with other

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character," argues Alfred Bonne.[75] If not undertaken as part of a dramatic effort to radically alter the traditional socio-economic structure, a land reform program may have a most unwanted ideological effect. The peasant-turned-small-landowner may become a staunch defender of the traditional value structure, with which he is familiar, and resist the value structure implied in modernism as a potential threat to his newly acquired status as a "landowner." This is particularly true in a country like Iran where social, economic, and political prestige is associated with land ownership. The final result then may be an entrenchment of traditionalism, which, in turn, will strengthen the political power of the larger landowners sitting in the Majlis.[76]

Still, within the traditional framework of Iranian society, the force of modernity is making its marks. Tehran, which at the close of World War II had a population of only about 800,000 now has a population in excess of two million, almost ten per cent of the total of the country. As much as seventy per cent of the industry of the country (exclusive of the petroleum industry) is concentrated in Tehran. This city serves as the political, administrative, intellectual, transportation, and communication center of Iran. Perhaps one-half the doctors and lawyers of Iran live and work in Tehran.[77]

What is so significant about the impact of modernity on Tehran is the fact that the political process in Iran is almost wholly contained within that city. Whosoever controls Tehran, ipso facto, controls Iran, for no other area is sufficiently developed to countervail against the capital city. If "half the world is Isfahan," then surely all of Iran is Tehran.

But modernized Tehran is amid a sea of traditionalism. The events of the last few months of 1960 and the early months of 1961 seem to suggest that Tehranis are growing impatient at the pace and style of change set by the Shah. Only the army and the Shah's secret police (Savak) can prevent discontent over the modernization process from erupting into open political revolt. The army purges of 1954 and the coup d'état that almost succeeded in 1958 suggest that the loyalty of the military to the Shah may be less intense than that ruler might like.

As for the Shah he continues to be a political anomaly. On the one hand, he symbolizes the entire traditional structure; while, on the other hand, he seeks to direct the reform of that traditional structure. In 1958 the Shah defended his current authoritarian rule by saying:

> I need ten years' time to turn my country into a model state . . . We need not resort to fuss and nonsense to attain this end . . . our system is a natural regime which is easily accepted by all the nation, because it has not been imposed on the people. This regime can carry out reforms, not only in conformity with the progress of time and world civilization, but better and with greater speed.[78]

Some segments of Iranian society would not exactly agree with the Shah.

Both Turkey and Iran have come a long way in disengaging society from traditionalism since the early years of 1900. The progress of Turkey in this respect has been considerably more impressive than in the case of Iran. Still, both

countries seem today to be in a critical stage of development. Richard N. Frye captured the problem exactly when he said, "the 'asabiyya of religion is gone and there is nothing to take its place to unite and rally the people, nothing to point the way to further development or spiritual evolution."[79]

In Iran where Islam has been made the handmaiden of traditionalism, the reform-minded have simply turned away from that faith. Thus Professor Firuz Kazemzadeh writes, "As far as the educated classes are concerned, it would be safe to say that they have turned their backs completely on Islam."[80] Amin Banani suggested why when he recently wrote that "despite voluminous theoretical discussions, no workable model of a modern society organized on the principles of Islam has been created."[81] As Turkey and Iran disengaged from the ideology of Islamic traditionalism, a major question presents itself: Can a reformed Islam replace traditional Islam? If not, what alternative ideology can be adopted other than some vulgar interpretation of Western materialsim?

Footnotes

1. Cf. H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and The West, Vol. I, parts 1 and 2 (London 1950), for a description of the Ottoman Empire before the 19th century. Unfortunately this study does not include Iran.

2. Particularly with regard to matters of personal status. Cf. footnote no. 8 below for one example.

3. The prevalence of fatalism in the Islamic world has been noted by almost all Western observers. As Gibb and Bowen, op.cit., part 2, p. 206, have noted of 18th century Turkey "The one unpardonable blasphemy was to complain of misfortune: for this was to imply either that an event might occur otherwise than by the will of God, or else that the will of God was unjust. The correct response was an immovable calm and a reference to Kismet or Takdir." One of the most frequent expressions heard in the Islamic Arab World today is "inshallah," or, "if God so wills."

4. Rosenthal, E.I.J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, (Cambridge, 1958), p. 39.

5. Cf. Majid Fakhry, "The Theocratic Idea of the Islamic State in Recent Controversies," International Affairs, XXX (1954), pp. 450-462.

6. Because the Shi'ites of Iran believe that it is the twelth imam who is occulted, they are frequently called "Twelvers."

7. Levy, Reuben, The Social Structure of Islam, (Cambridge, 1957), p. 181; Cf. also A.A.A. Fyzee, "Shi'i Legal Theories," in Law in the Middle East, M. Khadduri and H. Liebesny, eds. (Washington, 1955), p. 3.

8. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has had to pass legislation from time to ti legitimizing the children of couples married under Islamic law rather than under civil law. Kenneth Redden, Legal Education in Turkey: A Comparative Study, (Ankara, 1957), p. 7.

9. Schact, Joseph, Esquisse d'une histoire du droit musulman (Paris, 1952), p. 79.

10. In Ottoman Turkey such "rules" were prefaced by the words, "be it acted as if enacted."

11. For example, the Shari'a prohibits dealings in conditional sales, futures, etc. Cf. Levy, op.cit., pp. 255-258, for some details concerning the methods used by Muslim merchants to obviate the Shari'a in fact, while technically adhering to it.

12. Levy, op.cit., p. 267. Cf. also Farhat J. Ziadeh, "'Urf and Law in Islam," in The World of Islam, J. Kritzeck and R. B. Winder, eds. (London, 1960).

13. This year, 1961, Iran is celebrating her 2500th year as a national personality.

Footnotes

14. Cf. Gibb and Bowen, op.cit., for details. The effect of this separation of society into religious units was to lend legal support to the perpetuation of national identifications, when such identification was linked to religion.

15. Text in English of the Hatti-Sherif of Guilhane may be found in J.C. Hurewitz Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. I (New York, 1956), pp. 113-116.

16. Cf. Hifzi Veldet Velidedeoglu, rapporteur, "Le mouvement de codifications dans les systèmes juridiques occidentaux," in Rapports Generaux au Ve Congrès international de droit compare, vol. I (Brussels, 1960), pp. 131-183, for an excellent analysis on the codification of law in Ottoman Turkey.

17. Still, as late as 1921, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey resolved that all laws enacted by that body were to be elaborated according to the "roots" of the Shari'a. Levy, op.cit., p. 269.

18. Anderson, J.N.D., Islamic Law and the Modern World, (New York, 1959), p.22; Velidegeoglu, op.cit., p.135.

19. On the Majallah, Cf. Velidedeoglu, op.cit., and S.S. Onar, "The Majalla," in Khadduri and Liebesny, op.cit., pp. 292-308.

20. As quoted in Bernard Lewis, "The Islamic Middle East," in Democratic Institutions in the World Today, G.W. Kietson and G. Schwarzenberger, eds. (London, 1958), p. 56.

21. Text of treaty in Hurewitz, op.cit., pp. 96-102.

22. Hertslet, Lewis, A Complete Collection of the Treaties of Commerce, vol. V (London, 1840), pp. 382, 597.

23. Elwell-Sutton, L.P., Modern Iran (London, 1944), p.62.

24. Cf. Edward G. Browne, Persian Revolution of 1905-09, (London, 1910). The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war and her subsequent domestic problems, together with support from Great Britain was what ensured the success of the constitutionalists in Iran at this time.

25. Cf. Edward G. Browne, A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia (London, 1909), Appendix 3, for the text of the preamble to the 1906 Iranian Constitution.

26. Cf. Ernest E. Ramsauer, Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908, (Princeton, N.J., 1957) for a description of events in Turkey at this time.

27. A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, (Leipzig, 1929), p. 380. Hereafter referred to as Speech.

Footnotes

28. Rustow, Dankwart, "Politics and Islam in Turkey: 1920-1955," in Islam and the West, Richard N. Frye, ed. (The Hague, 1957), p. 71.

29. Reed, Howard, "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslins," in Frye, op.cit., p. 110.

30. The Turkish Minister of Justice at the time, Mahmud Es'as Bey had studied at Lausanne, and considered the Swiss civil code simpler and more modern than that used in France. Count Leon Ostrorog, The Angora Reform, (London, 1927), p. 92, suggests that a prime motive for adopting the Swiss civil code was to further Europeanize Turkey and help rid that country of all Arabic influence.

31. Later (1933) the Faculty of Theology was replaced by an Institute of Oriental Studies, attached to the Faculty of Arts. Lewis, Bernard, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," International Affairs, XXVII (1952), p. 41.

32. Speech, p. 721.

33. Haas, William S., Iran (New York, 1946), pp. 152-157.

34. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1935; July 22, 1935.

35. Haas, op.cit., p. 217.

36. Cf. Kemal H . Karpat, Turkey's Politics, (Princeton, N.J., 1959), pp. 245-348, for a detailed analysis of each of these principles.

37. Speech, pp. 704 ff.

38. Von Mikusch, Dagohert, Mustapha Kemal, (Garden City, N.Y., 1931) p. 276.

39. The Times, (London), November 12, 1924.

40. Op.cit., p. 46.

41. Cf. N.Y. Times, August 14, 1930; Webster Donald E., The Turkey of Ataturk, (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 109; Karpat, op.cit., p. 65.

42. Lewis, G.L., Turkey, (New York, 1955), ch. 15.

43. Ibid., p. 43.

44. N.Y. Times, part III, October 5, 1930.

45. As quoted in Harold C. Armstrong, Gray Wolf, (New York, 1935), p. 278.

46. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954, (New York, 1955), p. 63.

Footnotes

47. The state has always been the largest landowner of cultivated land in Iran, possessing as late as 1954 between four and five million hectares (two and one-half acres) of land on which are some 1800 villages. Ibid., p. 64.

48. Motamen, Hassim, "Iran's Experiences with Import Quotas," in Middle East Economic Papers, 1955, (Beirut, Lebanon, 1955), p. 76.

49. Under the Monopoly of Trade Law of 1931. In 1937 more than one-third of the total foreign trade of the country was directly handled by the government, while the remainder was purchased under government licenses. Motamen, op.cit., p. 76.

50. United Nations, Public Finance Information Papers: Iran, (Lake Success, 1951), Table 3, pp. 98-100.

51 Soheily, Hassein, Essai sur l'industrialisation de l'Iran, (Montreux, 1950), p. 12.

50A Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, (Stanford, 1961), pp. 126-127.

52. Republic of Turkey, Monthy Bulletin of Statistics, no. 61 (Ankara, March, 1959), p.22 (in Turkish). Turkish capital investment in railroads in 1938, for example, accounted for 66.4 per cent of the total invested in this sector of the economy. Elden, Vedat, "Turkey's Transportation," Middle Eastern Affairs 4 (October, 1953), Table 1, p. 324.

53. Webster, op.cit., p. 247.

54. Article 2 of the Law on the Organization of Sumerbank. Text of law in Albert Gorvine and Lawrence L. Barber Jr., Organization and Functions of Turkish Ministries (Ankara, 1957), p. 199. Note the names Sumer (Sumerian) and Eti (Hittite) to symbolize the connection of the new Turkey with a pre-Islamic heritage.

55. Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Turkey: 1958, (Paris, 1959), pp. 11-12.

56. Part II 5 (d) of party program. Text in Webster, op.cit., Appendix E.

57. Part III 14 of party program.

58. Kirk, George, Middle East, 1945-1950, (London, 1954), p. 38; Thornburg, Max W., Graham Spry, and George Soule, Turkey: An Economic Appraisal, (New York, 1948), p. 145; L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, United States and Turkey and Iran, (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 102.

59. I.B.R.D., Economy of Turkey, (Washington, 1951), p. 29.

Footnotes

60. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Salient Features of the World Economic Situation, 1945-47 (New York, 1948), p. 100.

61. Such as martial law (ended 1948), a strict press law, and summary power to arrest anyone, "bringing harm to the security of the state." Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain XIII, p. 40. Hereafter referred to as Cahiers.

62. Sarc, Omer Celal, "Economic Policy of the New Turkey," Middle East Journal 2 (October, 1948), p. 445.

63. Development of Manufacturing Industry in Egypt, Israel and Turkey, (New York, 1958), p. 55.

64. The law permitted the state to expropriate individual holdings in excess of 500 hectares. Cahiers II, p. 295.

65. Reed, op.cit., p. 118.

66. As quoted in Kirk, op.cit., p. 54.

67. N.Y. Times, February 23, 1954.

68. Great Britain, Board of Trade, Overseas Economic Surveys, Iran: Economic and Commercial Conditions, (London, 1957), p. 72.

69. For example, from July, 1949 to September, 1952, state industrial enterprises ran a combined deficit of over 700 million rials. Motamen, op.cit., pp. 101-103.

70. Such as the Development Resources Corporation's work in the Khuzistan region in southwest Iran. This company was organized in 1955 by David E. Lillienthal and Gordon R. Clapp, both former officials of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

71. Gideon, Hadary, "The Agrarian Reform Problem in Iran," Middle East Journal V (Spring, 1951), p. 186.

72. United States, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Agricultural Development Programs of Iran, Iraq and Sudan, (Washington, 1958), p. 23.

73. Embassy of Iran (Washington) Iran Review IV (February, 1959), p. 3, cites distribution of only 7000 acres in one year.

74. Ayatallah Burujirdi, outstanding mujtahid in contemporary Iran, alleged that this law was contrary to the Shari'a and, therefore, unconstitutional. A.K.S. Lambton, "Persia Today," World Today, (February, 1961), p. 82, writes, "the general opinion appears to be that it is unlikely to be carried into effect."

Footnotes

75. Studies in Economic Development, (New York, 1958), p. 182.

76. A good discussion on land distribution strengthening traditional values is Paul A. Baran, "On the Political Economy of Backwardness," The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 20 (January, 1952), pp. 66-81.

77. Cf. E.A. Bayne, "Changing Teheran, "American Universities Field Staff, Southwest Asia Series X (May, 1961), for a survey of contemporary Tehran.

78. Government of Iran, General Department of Publication and Broadcasting, Facts About Iran, press release, dated October 30, 1958, p. 6.

79. "Iran and the Unity of the Muslim World," in Frye, op.cit., p. 188.

80. "Commentary," ibid., p. 195.

81. Banani, op.cit., p. 151.

ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPUBLICAN STATE ORGANIZATION

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One of the major effects of the 1960 election has been to direct the attention of Republican leadership to the problems of party organization. The soul-searching evaluation of Party weaknesses in the wake of the hairline defeat in the Presidential contest has given impetus to a major effort toward expansion and improvement of party organization.

In a photo-finish election like that of 1960, any one of a multitude of factors might be cited as decisive. Approximately twenty-three thousand additional votes for Vice-President Nixon, properly distributed in five states*, would have given him the electoral vote needed to put him in the White House. Or a switch of 11,874 votes in those states would have achieved this result. The question of which 11,874 votes in these five states made John F. Kennedy President of the United States is insoluble.

The result of the presidential contest could have been changed by a slight shift among city dwellers or suburbanites, among labor union members, among Negroes, among Catholics, among voters of Italian, Polish, Irish origin - to name the groups which most sharply reversed their voting behavior from the 1956 pattern.

The Big City Problem

Attention has been focused, however, on one area of chronic Republican weakness--the big cities in the industrialized and populous states of the northeastern part of the country--on Detroit, Philadelphia, Newark, Boston, New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Baltimore. The margins by which Kennedy carried the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Maryland and New Jersey--states with 173 electoral votes--were provided by one large city in each state. In the 13 cities of more than 300,000 inhabitants located in these 8 states, Kennedy amassed a plurality of 2,400,000 votes.

Of 20 cities of more than 300,000 population which lie in what would be the northeastern section if the United States were divided into four equal quarters, Vice-President Nixon carried only two--Columbus and Indianapolis. In only five others did he receive between 40 and 50 per cent of the vote--Cincinnati, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Rochester, and Toledo.**

The most striking aspect of the 1956 presidential election was the erosion of the position of the Democratic Party in these cities. For the first time since 1928 a Republican presidential candidate cracked these strongholds of the opposition. President Eisenhower carried 10 of the 20 northeastern cities and received more than 40 per cent of the vote in all but two - Detroit and St. Louis. His success led Samuel Lubell, writing in 1957, to conclude "the Democratic majorities in the cities have been slashed so drastically the Republicans must be rated as favorites to win the White House in 1960."***

* Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, and Nevada.
** The Republican big city problem is found in the geographical area described here as the Northeast. In Southern and Western cities Nixon ran well, carrying 7 of 11 of the largest Western cities and 5 of 9 Southern cities. In only one - New Orleans - did he poll less than 42 per cent of the vote.
*** "Can the GOP Win Without Ike?" Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 26, 1957 p.30.

The break-through of 1956 was not followed by the organizational effort which might have solidified some of these gains and attached to the Republican Party some of those who voted for Ike in his second campaign. Except for Nelson Rockefeller's strong showing in New York City, the 1958 elections indicated that the Republican beachhead established in these cities in 1956 had been lost.

The Loss of the presidency in 1960 forcibly directed attention to the "big city problem" of the Republican Party.

Senator Thruston B. Morton before relinquishing his position as Chairman of the Republican National Committee appointed a Big City Committee under the chairmanship of Ray Bliss, Republican State Chairman of Ohio, to study the problem of organizational weakness of the Republican Party in the major cities of the country and to recommend a plan of action for overcoming it. The work of this committee is now approaching its conclusion, and its report is expected during the fall of 1961.

The studies of the Bliss Committee already have made apparent the spottiness and shallowness of Republican organization in many of the major cities. They have found, for example, that in only 8 of 27 of our largest cities are all precincts manned by Republican Party workers.

Attacks on the Big City Problem: Chicago and Philadelphia

In at least two of the major problem cities - Chicago and Philadelphia - energetic efforts are under way to build a broader and stronger organization.

In Illinois, the Republican Citizens League of Illinois has been formed for this purpose. Although the Citizens League draws its membership from all parts of the state and plans operations in several areas of Illinois, its initial emphasis is upon the recruitment and training of a force of workers in the Chicago metropolitan area.

The Republican Citizens League of Illinois states its purpose as strengthening and supporting the Republican Party in close cooperation with the regular Republican organizations and their auxiliaries and affiliates. It was formed to do the jobs which the formal party organization had not successfully performed - to provide workers where the party organization had none, to take care of the difficult areas in which representatives of the Republican Party are captives of the Daley machine, to establish contact with voters who are untouched by or unresponsive to the organization. The Republican Citizens League has established a harmonious relationship with the formal Party hierarchy, including on its governing board those who hold important positions in the structure of the Republican Party.

In Philadelphia, a group similar in some respects to the Citizens League of Illinois has been at work since February of 1961. Known as the Republican Alliance, this group, formed at the initiative of Republican National Committeeman and former president of Temple University, Robert L. Johnson, is performing essentially the same tasks as those planned by the Illinois Citizens League. The Alliance is independent of the Republican City Committee. It does not enjoy a cordial relationship with the leaders of the party organization in Philadelphia.

The Alliance has carried on organizational activity and has engaged in spirited criticism of the Dilworth Administration.

It is noteworthy that in both cities the burden of reconstructing the Republican Party has been assumed by a group outside the existing structure of Party organization.

The Development of Republican State Headquarters

The effect of the 1960 election on Republican organizational activity has not been limited to the big cities. Perhaps the most significant development is found in a general movement to strengthen Party headquarters in the states.

When a comparison is made between the staffing of state headquarters at the present time with the situation of 1957, the best basis for comparison, a striking advance is found. One might expect that state party headquarters staffing after the Republican victory in the Presidential election of 1956 would be more extensive than after the loss of the Presidential election of 1960. The contrary is the case.

Seven states which had no permanent headquarters with paid personnel in 1957 had established such headquarters and staffed them with paid employees in 1961. Further, 13 states which maintained headquarters with paid personnel in 1957 have in 1961 an expanded staff and a bigger budget. Particularly striking is the substantial increase in the budgets of state committees when 1961 is compared to 1957.

Although it is not inconceivable that enlarged staff in state headquarters may co-exist with feeble organization at the grass roots, it seems more likely that an improved and augmented staff at the state party headquarters is a reflection of improved organization at lower levels. And it should be expected that a better staff at state headquarters will induce improvement of party organization at the grass roots.

Present Status of State Headquarters - Organization

The information contained in this paper about organization at the State Headquarters level is based on replies submitted to Chairman William E. Miller by the Republican State Chairman of 41 of the 50 states.

The typical Republican State Chairman is a man who divides his time between politics and private business interests. He is a part-time Party official, although many state chairmen would argue persuasively that they do full-time duty on each of two or more positions.

Eleven state chairmen, however, reported that they spent full time on their duties as Party officials. Seven of these receive a salary from the Republican Party for their services.

Thirty-six of the 41 states have a permanent headquarters staffed by at least one salaried person. Twenty-three states have at least one salaried person with professional, rather than purely clerical, duties. In 18 states then, either no state headquarters are maintained on a permanent basis or the size of the staff probably precludes doing more than affording a telephone service and handling the most essential correspondence.

Although important strides have been taken toward the establishment of an adequate professional staff at State Party headquarters, in most states there are still serious handicaps to the operation of an effective headquarters.

A shortage of professional personnel is one major handicap. In only six states do we find three or more salaried employees whose duties can be described as professional.

Turnover is high on the staff of State Party headquarters. Of 28 states which have professional staff, 11 have no staff member with as much as two years experience on the staff; 15 have nobody with as much as three years experience.

To some degree, of course, the limited period of service for staff personnel reflects the relatively recent establishment of staff positions.

Conclusion

The steps taken toward developing Republican organization on a wide front after the last election are significant. The movement to establish and strengthen Republican State headquarters in a large number of states gives evidence that one of the lessons of 1960 has been taken to heart.

A political party must function year round if it is to be effective. And it must maintain a highly qualified professional staff. An encouraging start has now been made in many places to provide these prerequisites of effective organization - encouraging to all who acknowledge the desirability of a competitive two-party system.

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CONCEPTS OF ACCESS AND REPRESENTATION IN METROPOLITAN AREA STUDIES

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The Vogue of Metropolitan Area Studies

Every year or so the United States Census Bureau announces that the nation has several more Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and already more Americans live in them than in smaller cities or villages or on farms. Their number is rapidly approaching two hundred and, though our politicking does not always reflect the fact, we are a nation of metropolites.

Metropolitan areas are the fastest growing part of our country and much of the increase within metropolitan areas is occurring in the suburban fringe. In the 1960 census, some central cities lost population though the urbanized area of which they were part increased markedly.

It is common place to point out that many metropolitan areas have become a wonderland of local governments. We mass produce suburbs just as we do automobiles. Cook county, which is only one part of the Chicago metropolitan area, by 1957 contained 445 units of local government: 102 municipalities, 30 townships, 156 school districts and 157 other special districts. Smaller metropolitan areas often include two or three suburban cities or villages plus a half dozen townships or unincorporated communities in the county area and a dozen or so school districts.

In recent years, in almost every metropolitan area in the United States, those citizens who like to think of themselves as civic minded have sponsored a study of the areawide problems of local governments. In some areas, as many as three or four citizen surveys have been conducted since New York set the style with its regional planning study of 1929. After World War II the outpouring increased, so that even small non-metropolitan communities have been studied.

The style of these studies of governmental organization and services generally have a monotomous similarity. One can almost predict the findings before you open the cover. A neatly printed monograph has charts and figures that demonstrate how a proliferation of local governments in the Boomtown area has led to duplication of facilities and administrative effort. The text argues that as local governments multiply, the results will be snarls and frustration in trying to handle common problems, costly and inefficient operation by some local units, marked differences in municipal service levels, differences in the regulations governing such activities as traffic control, zoning, and building construction and an uneven and occasionally a blatently unjust distribution of assessed valuations. One unit may have the industrial plant and its tax base while others have the workers' children and the school problems.

The study committee generally concludes that immediate action is needed to solve these problems and sometimes suggests that catastrophe is imminent

if what they recommend is not immediately put into practice. The solution generally presented with some fanfare is to merge the whole local governmental operation. Despite supportive newspaper editorials and the number of two and three color reports issued, suburbanites remain unimpressed by the arguments and generally manage to block this kind of recommendation. Usually the study committee has to settle for less than what it recommends; even when it couches its recommendations in terms that it considers "politically reasonable".

The Case for Integration

Edward Banfield and Morton Grodzins claim that merger of metropolitan area governments into one areawide government will not solve some of the most pressing urban problems and their point has some merit; though one which I think they perhaps over emphasize. Part of every metropolitan problem is the fact that the suburbs contain an important segment of the top leadership of the metropolitan area and these persons are thus handicapped in their participation in central city political action. Even the problems of housing, with which Banfield and Grodzins illustrated their case, might receive more attention if they were more directly a concern of suburbanites as well as central city residents. Perhaps the most relevant criticism of the Banfield-Grodzins position, however, is that fractionated local government encourages the making of important land use decisions by the private sector since one local government can be played off against another. Nevertheless Banfield and Grodzins are correct in stressing that integration can not be expected to bring about a heaven on earth as some of its proponents have seemed to suggest.

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[1]Edward Banfield and Morton Grodzins Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958).

The arguments for area wide integration are in fact impressive, even though study committees are occasionally guilty of exagerated prophecies of doom. There often will be some administrative gains in efficiency and a more economic use of resources if areawide functions are consolidated. Merger would in all likelihood result in a governmental body that is able to attack problems common to the whole area as for example, in such areas as planning and traffic control. The creation of strong areawide government in Miami and Toronto was followed by spirited attacks on area problems. Having a single government would also result in a more just distribution of metropolitan tax resources and such pooling of resources would make possible the financing of large scale capital improvements for use by all area residents.

Especially hard-hit by the present dispersion of governments are the core cities of the metropolitan areas. These urban centers have been losing upper and middle class residents as well as industrial and commercial tax base to the suburbs. The in-migration has been of southern rural Negroes and whites and this has generally added to their problems. Many big cities are faced with a creeping spread of slum areas such as was common during

periods of European immigration at the turn of the century. The local government of the central metropolis must cope alone as best it can with the problems of housing, racial conflict, and crime. Amos Hawley reports that the costs of services in central cities are higher where suburban governments have flourished.[2] Meanwhile many suburbs, with the blessing of state legislatures dominated by small town members, have been successful in cadging free or below-cost services from the central city or the county government (whose tax base is mainly in the central city). For example, the city of Chicago has been required by law to sell water to some suburbs at the Chicago residential rate. These then finance their own activities by reselling the water to suburbs farther out at three to four times the Chicago price. Free use by suburbanites of city libraries, parks, zoo, museums, beaches, and auditoriums is commonplace. At the same time the suburbs may require residency for use of their own facilities.

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[2]Amos H. Hawley "Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government Expenditures In Central Cities" Journal of Social Issues 7 (1951) pp. 100-108, reprinted in Paul K. Hatt and Albert Reiss, Jr. Cities and Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, revised 1957) pp. 773-82.

However, some suburbs can not be said to flourish even given this type of indirect subsidy. Too many only limp along on a kind of septic tank individualism, manning local government with volunteer or part time help; a situation that occasionally results in shocking service inadequacies. With increasing frequency medical authorities point to the rising rate in infectuous hepititis resulting from contamination of water supplies by septic tank effluent. The rural and small town philosophy of "Make it do, wear it out, use it up, do without" usually does not work very well for long in an urban environment.[3] Suburbs soon need schools, a water supply and sewage disposal facilities, particularly if they are ambitious about attracting industry. Most suburbs can only finance such large scale facilities with great difficulty, if at all.

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[3]See Max Schulman, Rally Round the Flag Boys.

Finally it has been argued persuasively by Robert Wood that the social segregation that follows from the splintering of the metropolitan areas into groups of little independent duchies is a form of escapism from pressing social problems and a withdrawal from the political process. He claims that suburban isolationist tendencies should not be encouraged in a society dedicated to democratic ideals[4]

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[4]Robert Wood "The New Metropolis: Green Belts, Grass Roots or Garguntua" American Political Science Review 52 (March 1958) pp. 108-22. See also Suburbia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959).

Almost every student of urban problems will find at least one or more of these arguments for metropolitan centralization convincing. Even Banfield and Grodzins admit the notion of metropolitan federation has merit if it can be achieved. Yet most suburbanites somehow manage to contain their enthusiasm. In the face of invitations to join a merger of local governments, their answer commonly is, "No!"

The Lost World of Municipal Administration[5]

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[5]See Lawrence J. R. Herson "The Lost World of Municipal Government" American Political Science Review 51 (June 1957) pp. 330-45.

A reform-research approach, typified by the work of the Public Administration Service, the National Civic League, and many University Bureaus of Government, until recently dominated the study of metropolitan government. Research organizations claimed in effect that a set of "scientific principles" about government was known and that these guided their studies. This approach to government was an offshoot of the scientific management movement at the turn of the century, with refinements added by political scientists. After the first world war, it bloomed as a science of administration with which any government could be neatly evaluated. Practitioners instructed the public that there was "one best way" to organize government, they prescribed their rigid blueprint, and (unless citizens were somehow wrongheaded), they claimed that the result would be an organizational machine that would be efficient and economical under all driving conditions.

The admonitions of the municipal reform movement are at base built on the assumption that the citizen is an individual devoted to political economy above all else and that his dominant interest in government is to get the most in services for each dollar of taxes he pays. Bertrand Russell reports that Sidney Webb, the Fabian socialist and student of local government, once said to him about government: "Emotions go into the wastebasket!" The statement characterizes well the style of the municipal reformist: a world would be created that would be antiseptic, nonpartisan, technocratic, and narrowly rational. The reformers preferred stripped down models, that like the Model T would come in any color you wanted so long as you wanted black.

When citizens expressed preferences for other values, as did for example the immigrants described by Lincoln Steffins who desired mercy and understanding from the courts rather than streamlined justice, the municipal reformer brushed aside such nonsense as irrational and patently venal. This kind of administrative middle class puritanism could not tolerate a conflict over values: government should strive only to be efficient and economical. It was a short step to look upon all politics as suspect; a little disagreement was perhaps all right because we were a democracy, but most such carrying on was irrational, undesirable and above all inefficient. The outcropping of the politican was rarely viewed as benign. Generally the reformer prescribed that it should be carefully operated on and removed from the structure just like a diseased appendix.

The criteria of efficiency should in theory apply only to means, not ends. In practice questions of value were often treated by reformers as if they were technical matters that could be solved by slide rule. Mayor LaGuardia occasionally stated with a certain tone of righteousness that there was no Democratic or Republican way to pave a street. As he well knew, however, there is a way of paving streets that takes into consideration other values than those of simple efficiency and economy in road construction. As Simon and others have pointed out there are often social costs not taken into account when efficiency and economy measures are applied.[6] It is even possible that political parties might divide in principle over such value choices. Robert Moses has demonstrated how an efficient program of road building can glut a downtown with more traffic than it can handle or park while at the same time bankrupting railroad commuter services; and all the while can proclaim that it is a program performed with the highest technical standards of efficiency and economy and "without politics".

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[6]Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958 2nd ed) pp. 74-5.

In metropolitan area studies the tendency to look at all problems with a calculating machine mind has meant that suburbanites almost always are automatically regarded as knaves or misled fools who should come to their senses quickly once they get the facts. Suburb "A" can be easily shown to be an administrative failure, because it costs a dollar and a half more a year per capita than it does in the central city to haul garbage (though there may be backdoor pick up and all garden cuttings hauled away free) and because their fire department does not have a training tower. In the face of such inadequacies it is implied that the government of Suburb "A" serves no useful social function. Other values, aside from administrative efficiency and economy, are in the standard study brushed aside as irrelevant. Some of these alternative values will be discussed later in this paper. The result of the reformist proposals has been the glorification of the bigger unit as one that grows better and better as it grows in size.

The metropolitan research of the reformers can be attacked even granting that efficiency and economy are the major ends that citizens wish to be achieved by government. There are no studies as yet that indicate whether there is an optimum size of cities for providing standard services. It may be doubted that a single big government is always more efficient and economical than several smaller governments. The growing megalopolis from Maine to Virginia with tenacles reaching out to East Lansing, Michigan and Kansas City is by this logic crying out for unified government, should it get it, local government in American will be well on its way to ending up as one big city.

There is also the problem of possible conflict between the values of efficiency and economy. A three times a day pickup of garbage is perhaps the most efficient system that could be devised from the housewife's point of view while letting the householder burn his own garbage is perhaps the most economical method from the taxpayer's perspective. Where is the line to be drawn between these two extremes? Should one value be

be maximized more than another? Can we demonstrate that it is wrong for some suburbs to have garbage picked up two or three times a week when once a week is the common practice in many large cities. Even substituting the nation of satisficing for maximizing, as Simon suggests, does not completely solve the value conflict since what is "good enough" for one resident is not so for another.[7] A judgment of the importance of conflicting values depends a great deal on the situations where they are to be applied.

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[7]Ibid., pp. XXIV-XXVII

Lurking behind the two values is the question of maximization for whom? Taxpayers associations will quickly answer maximization of efficiency and economy for the property owner as if he were the only resident and will find that the designs for the new school plant are uneconomical because the old building could still be fixed up. Lebrary administrators without any sense of political costs could logically applaud the efficiency on the New Jersey suburb where persons having delinquent books were arrested in the early morning hours. Generally hardest to fit into the picutre are estimates of these nongovernmental social and political costs and their relation to efficiency.

Another problem of applying economy and efficiency values is that of precisely measuring service performance. Clarence Ridley and Herbert Simon published a monograph shortly before World War II in which they described empirical measures by which the efficiency of some municipal services could be judged. Little new research has been added in terms of specific measures. Every researcher in metropolitan areas knows that some of the comparisons of services among units that have been made on the basis of per capita costs or performance costs are at best a tricky business and sometimes result in the proclaiming of gross distortions by civic leaders that border on the kind of quackery practiced in TV advertising.

Another difficulty usually overlooked by the civic reformer-researcher is that service performance may vary in efficiency throughout a governmental unit. For example in Chicago most of the schools on double shift for a twenty year period were in Negro areas. The same pattern of administrative selectivity can be detected in many efficiently managed cities when one looks closely at where the new schools, libraries, fire stations, streets, storm water drains, and other public facilities are built. The claim that suburbs that annex will receive the same kind of services as are received by many core city residents, an argument implicit in much comparative data, is often misleading. Newly annexed areas may not require as high a level of services as the older sections of the city or they may in fact be denied some services, such as water line extensions, in the very name of efficiency and economy.

These are some of the shortcomings of attempting to apply efficiency and economy values even when the relevancy of other values is denied. When other values are recognized as legitimately part of the situation the whole structure of reformist recommendations according to scientific principles wobbles and collapses. It is probable that residents of

metropolitan areas occasionally do apply such other values despite the preaching of reform. Citizens are influenced only in part by matters of efficiency and economy just as when they engage in any other human activity whether it be choosing a wife, selecting a job, buying a suit, rooting against the Yankees, planting a garden, going to church, looking at television, trading in a car or adding a room onto the house.

It is easy to criticize the administrative reformers for their shortcomings. However, we should also recognize the contributions of their efforts. Efficiency and economy, even though often we can only measure them inadequately, are usually a consideration in any action, though not the only ones. Secondly, the students of this approach did attempt some quantification of these values. The absolute nature of their "laws of science" will be modified, particularly by specifying under what conditions they are applicable or how different situations modify their application. Some "laws" will be scrapped. The reformist approach, nevertheless, was empirical to a degree and asked questions that were a beginning for building a science of administration. Herbert Simon in his introduction to Administrative Behavior notes he began his inquiry with the problem of whether a recreation program should be managed by the city or its school baord, a typical reform question. Third, anyone who has examined what has happened to urban governmental organization in the past half century can not help but be impressed by the impact of the efficiency and economy movement. One need only read in Louis Brownlow's autobiography how as a young city manager on his first job he attacked the problems that lay everywhere about him and almost effortlessly replaced a gross inefficiency and waste with reasonably efficient government. In metropolitan areas, the movement has led to the improvement of many facilities, though its association with low tax ideology has sometimes made its supporters reluctant to support the building of capital improvements. Under Moses, and with the Port Authority, bridges, airports, roads and tunnels were built on a pay as you go basis, accomplishments beyond the reach of most of the old style political machines.

Nevertheless, efficiency and economy are not sufficient to serve as the only guides for the planning of metropolitan area government. What other factors then should be considered?

Reaching Decisions On the Merger of Local Governments

When we look at how a particular metropolitan decision concerning metropolitan governmental structure was made, we can generally discriminate among three kinds of actors: public officials, interest group representatives and voters. The public officials and sometimes party personnel are among the most active on annexation questions because it is their job to be so. It is generally recognized that the suburban officials whose jobs are in jeopardy if an annexation occurs are among the most likely to be vocal in their opposition. It is less often noted but equally true that the central city public officials often stand to gain a great deal by a largescale merger. A school superintendent finds several more schools are part of the city system. A police chief may find that the area he is to protect has been increased substantially and his department's size is therefore also increased. As departments grow in size and importance, so too does the status and salary of the officials who head them. This is the practical aspect of expansion for the central city officials.

Interest groups within city and suburbs are also concerned, sometimes directly, with merger proposals. A change in organizational structure will affect and perhaps upset patterns of relationships between interest groups and officials. Drastic changes will occur in a suburban area that annexes to the central city. However, in general, most groups including business and manufacturing groups, are likely to become directly involved only when annexations concern the area in which they are located. There are a few groups that almost always have an interest in annexation. The downtown merchants are concerned about suburban shopping areas. The realtors and bank and savings and loan officials are concerned about providing fringe areas with municipal services. Some suburban businessmen and the neighborhood association if there is one and the community newspaper will be active. A general interest will be taken by the central city newspaper, which usually supports annexation, and the Chamber of Commerce which also frequently provides the funds and manpower for annexation efforts. In Grand Rapids, Michigan where I observed the annexation campaign, activity however, resulted usually from clear and present interest and even then was often expressed in haphazard ways. Often it seemed group representatives were too involved with their own "games" as Norton Long describes the process, to be really concerned about the accnexation or merger proposal.

In Grand Rapids, a major set of decision makers was the voters. As in most states, questions of annexation in Michigan are finally decided at an election. There are variations in laws from state to state, but the requirement generally found is that the voters in the area to be annexed must separately approve the proposal. This requirement is invariably found if the proposal is to merge two cities. Some of the most sweeping of recent reorganizations of metropolitan government have occurred where this requirement was relaxed. In Toronto, the metropolitan federation was established by an act of the provincial legislature. In Dade county (Miami, Florida) the metropolitan government proposal was placed on the ballot as an amendment in the structure of county government. The proposal was adopted by a majority in the county voting as a unit so that majorities in each of the twenty-six participating cities were not required. At the time of the vote the city of Miami had slightly over half the population of the county.

The activities of these three sets of actors are necessarily interrelated. Most commonly, however, analysis is made in terms of the first two. Delbert Miller and Richard Hanson for instance, have attempted to show that the outcome of elections can be predicted with mathematical precision given the attitudes and intensity of feeling of the leaders in the seven major institutional areas of urban life and the attitudes of the top and key influencials of the power elite.[8] Yet I believe that the crucial element in the decision making process in most metropolitan areas in the end is the attitude of the voters. The appeal must of necessity be made to these voters and in annexation questions a major effort of public officials and the interest groups is devoted to influencing the vote. One could argue that annexation or merger of cities so directly affects the suburbanite that his attitudes may be formed by his own experience rather than through a process of osmosis that transmits ideass from leaders to followers. In any case, it is my intention in this paper to focus primarily on the potential voter and relate some of his characteristics, attitudes and self reported actions to his attitude on annexat'on.

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[8]Delbert Miller "The Prediction of Issue Outcome in Community Decision Making" Procedings of the Pacific Sociological Society 25 (June 1957) pp. 137-47 and Richard Hanson "Predicting a Community Decision: A Test of the Miller Form Theory." American Sociological Review 24 (October 1959) pp. 662 - 71.

The alternative values to efficiency and economy that I will examine are access and representativeness.

The Grand Rapids Metropolitan Area

The data I will be reporting were collected in an opinion survey of the Grand Rapids, Michigan area in June, 1959. Respondents were selected from registered voter lists. For convenience I will refer to them as "respondents" or "residents" but it should be remembered that they are a sample of potential voters taken from registration lists. The total sample was 660, and of these 192 were residents of the central city. The survey was conducted by the Institute for Community Development of MSU.

Three of the suburban units were townships with populations ranging between 12-14,000. All had large land area and extensive residential development with some industry. Two were one party Republican in politics while one leaned Republican. Also in the sample were three suburban cities. East Grand Rapids was a garden city of 9,000 with a small land area, no industry, and high income residential development. Grandville was a city of 7,500 that had grown from a village settled about the same time as the city of Grand Rapids. It had some industry but still had an atmosphere of the village about it. It was the only one of the suburban units not contiguous to the city and therefore not in immediate danger of merger or annexation. The third suburban city was Wyoming, an industrialized middle and low income suburb of 45,000. It was the only one of the three suburban cities not overwhelmingly Republican. A half year before the survey was taken it had changed from a township to a city. Thus unlike the other suburban cities, it had large land area. The city of Grand Rapids at the time of the survey had a population of 189,000, and was the second or third largest city in Michigan (depending on which Chamber did the estimating). Within two years after the survey was completed it had annexed extensive area in all three of the townships; in all cases after several attempts. The suburban cities, however, voted against merger.

The survey was taken in the middle of a period of suburban change. Grandville two years before had annexed a large portion of what was then Wyoming township, a water authority for city and suburbs had been rejected by city voters and suburbanites had been unable to finance the project alone, one of the townships had rejected the charter township form (a kind of Michigan half way house in incorporation), Wyoming had once rejected incorporation and had then after the Grandville annexation voted to incorporate, one of the other townships also rejected incorporation, and there had been extensive school district consolidations. At the time the survey was taken the central city was putting pressure on suburbs by no longer permitting water and sewage extensions and setting dates for removal of tuition students from city schools. It was also attempting annexations of land without residents but with industry. This type of annexation was being challenged in the courts.

Access and Grass Roots Government

Students who discuss metropolitan problems with suburbanites are given many reasons for negative attitudes toward annexation or merger. Examples include loss of identity in the mass, invasion by unwanted groups, higher taxes, unwanted municipal services and controls, undesirable industrial or commercial development, change in the character of the community, becoming

involved in the conflects of big city politics, and fearing for the educational standards in local schools. The reader can probably add to the list. It is likely that not all of the reasons should be taken at face value. Also it is important to note that reasons offered by suburbanities differ.

Yet the sometimes contradictory and even seemingly irrational arguments against annexation can be tied together by the hypothesis that the suburbanite's attitude is that he can readily protect whatever values he considers important because decision points within his local government are readily accessible to him.

According to this hypothesis, the values and interests that suburbanites wish to protect will vary, but annexation or merger will be interpretted as meaning that policy decisions affecting such values will hence forth be made mostly by strangers and outsiders. Big city government will not generally be regarded as "Big Democracy" but may be more precisely summed up in the phrase, "You can't fight city hall." Small units of government, such as those in the suburbs, on the other hand are described as grass roots democracy, because they permit direct access by residents to the decision making process.

I have attempted to measure access by citizens to key points of decision making in local government where they will be assured their case will be given serious consideration in three ways. They are (1) attempted access by a citizen to an official about a local problem, (2) the presence of conditions of civic participation thought to be associated with greater access, (3) attitudes of confidence by citizens that access can be achieved. These categories have drawbacks similar to the measures of influence used in community power structure studies. Experience in itself is insufficient because influence attempts might meet with failure and also not having exercised influence directly does not mean a citizen might not have potential influence. The second measure assumes conditions suitable for general civic participation are also encouraging for access, at least by the politically active. The measure suffers, however, from the same problem as the previous measure in that grass roots participation need not always be a precondition for access or confidence in ones ability to achieve access. The third measure is based simply on belief by the citizen that he has access and can influence his local government. It goes without saying that some holding positive beliefs may be wrong.

There are several reasons why suburban claims of greater access have a certain plausibility. They are based on an assumption of greater grass roots civic participation in the suburbs. (a) One is that the suburban unit is smaller than the central city in population and frequently in land mass. As a result a citizen is presumed closer to his local government and more likely to personally know some of its officials. This personal touch is an important claim made for all kinds of grass roots government and parenthetically is a major reason why such governments are strongly criticised by Roscoe Martin.[9] (b) It is also presumed that because the

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[9]Roscoe Martin Grass Roots (University of Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1957).

citizen lives in a smaller local unit, he will have greater knowledge about his government. This knowledge coupled with the personal acquaintance with officials should lead to a greater instrumental knowledge: knowing how to approach government for aid in solving specific neighborhood problems.[10] (c) Perhaps the most important claim made for grass roots government is that it increases the direct participation of citizens. Small size is supposed to encourage local participation in the same way that the group dynamics technique of buzz sessions encourages individual contributions to a discussion. (d) An important variant of this claims is that grass roots democracy encourages participation by those who have relatively low resources for access because it generally limits the competition for access to local residents. A power resource of secondary importance in the metropolitan area, such as being president of a local PTA or even fifteen years of uninterrupted residence, might be made the basis of important influence in a suburb. Thus participation in local government is claimed to be more widespread among different types of citizens than in the central city.

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[10]Janowitz et. al. used the concept of instrumental knowledge in similar fashion in Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright and William Delaney, Public Administration and the Public Perspective in a Metropolitan Community (Ann Arbor, 1959) pp. 15-28.

To summarize, access will be measured in three ways: (1) reported attempts, (2) the presence of conditions of civic participation thought to be associated with greater citizen access, (3) confidence of citizens that they have access and can influence local government. The reasons for assuming that suburbia, as a form of grass roots government, encourages greater citizen participation than in the central city and therefore presumably greater citizen access are: (a) citizens are more likely to personally know officials, (b) citizens are more likely to have general and instrumental knowledge about local government, (c) citizens are more likely to participate directly in local government, and (d) this participation is more likely to be widespread so that citizens with low resources for access are more likely to participate than in the central city.

It is true that not all Grand Rapids suburbs fit the idealized version of grass roots democracy but all come somewhat closer to the requirements than does the government of the central city and therefore should show relatively greater civic participation.

The first hypothesis is that access is greater in the suburbs than in the central city, the second that if so, this helps to explain in part resistance to annexation and merger.

Access to Local Government in Grand Rapids Suburbs

Respondents were asked if within the past year they had written or spoken to local officials about a local problem. In general about twice as many residents reported (1) attempted access in the suburbs as in

the central city. However, in two suburbs, the city of 45,000 and one of the townships, reports of attempted access were not very much greater than in the central city.*

(2) Measures of general participation in civic affairs that are thought to be related to greater citizen access were examined next.

(a) Personal acquaintence with officials: Suburbanites were asked if they were related to a public official or knew one personally. About the same percentage of respondents in central city and suburbs were related to an official. Only in the two suburban cities of under 10,000 residents, did appreciably more respondents know officials personally than in the central city (66 and 67 percent vs 43 percent). Thus, personal acquaintance was found to be associated with small area and population size, qualities consistent with the grass roots ideal. It was not found associated with township government to a greater degree than in the central city perhaps because of the mixed rural-urban character and larger land masses of townships.

(b) A second aspect of grass roots democracy is that it is supposed to result in greater citizen knowledge about local government. Basil Zimmer and Amos Hawley in an opinion survey of township residents in the Flint, Michigan area concluded that residents knew very little about local government, so little in fact that they could not intelligently determine their own destinies.[11] A measure of general knowledge selected in Grand Rapids was ability to name office holders since this is knowledge assumed to be directly related to access. Central city residents were far ahead of suburbanites in identifying public officials by name. Suburban township residents had the least knowledge of their governing officials. About 6 out of 10 suburbanites could identify an executive official but less than a third could name legislators. Lowest identifications were again in the suburban city of 45,000 and a township. By contrast 76 per cent of city residents named a councilmen and 90 per cent an executive official.**

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[11]Basil Zimmer and Amos Hawley "Local Government as Viewed by Fringe Residents" Rural Sociology 23 (December 1958) pp. 363-70.

*Have written to or spoken to a local official about a local problem in the last year.

City of Grand Rapids	18%	Grand Rapids to township	20%
East Grand Rapids	50	Walker township	37
Grandville	38	Paris townships	42
Wyoming	24		

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Unit of Government	Percent Correctly Identifying		Number of Correct Identifications of Councilmen or Trustees*			
	Mayor or Township Supervisor	City Manager	0	1-2	3-4	5-6
Grand Rapids City	90%	70%	24%	50%	18%	8%
East Grand Rapids	64	38	44	36	16	4
Grandville	71	51	60	27	11	2
Wyoming	45#	47#	57	29	12	2
Grand Rapids Twp.	40	-	90	9	1	-
Walker Twp.	66	-	68	27	5	-
Paris Twp.	61	-	81	14	5	-

* Maximum possible in the four cities was six, in the three townships was four.

In Wyoming the elected Mayor served one week and then resigned to become city manager. This occurred four months previous to the survey. The number of incorrect answers in Wyoming was 16.8%, almost double the incorrect guesses in other units.

Central city totals were no doubt swelled by newspaper and radio-TV coverage, but residents of the two suburban areas with community newspapers did not rank higher on this type of information than did most other suburban communities.

Residents were asked a hypothetical question designed to measure their instrumental knowledge: "Suppose you had a neighborhood problem such as a corner needing a traffic sign, a proposal to re-zone for a gas station in your neighborhood, or getting trees planted along your street, who would you make certain was contacted so that action might be taken?" If they answered with other than the name of a public official, they were then asked if they knew of a public official who if contacted would look into this for them. The percentage of central city residents who could not identify either an office or an official who might help them with a neighborhood problem was not markedly different than for suburban residents (20-30 per cent for all units). In most suburban unites, however, residents could more frequently name the official by name. This was because suburbanites in all but the suburb of 45,000 tended to name the supervisor or mayor while central city residents more frequently answered department heads and were unable often to give their names. On the basis of general or instrumental knowledge, suburbanites did not rank appreciably higher than central city residents.

(c) A series of questions were asked about civic participation: attendance at school meetings, attendance at other public meetings, and discussion of local problems at organizational meetings. Voting in the annexation election subsequently held was also checked. On these measures suburban percentages were usually double the participation percentages of central city residents. An exception was discussion of local issued at organizational meetings. The most marked deviant from the usual suburban pattern was the city of 45,000, where participation ranked almost as low as for central city residents except for turn out of potential voters in the annexation election.*

(d) For several of the above measures, increased participation resulted in more participation by lower income residents in the suburbs than in the central city.

The first evidence of this fact was that lower income residents indicated they preferred units of smaller size. Respondents were asked their opinion of the ideal size city in which they would like to live. Suburbanites were classified in two groups, those who preferred cities of the same or smaller size than where they presently lived, and all others. Relatively large numbers of residents in the townships and the wealthy residential city expressed a preference for cities of more than 100,000, while smaller units were preferred by residents of the industrialized suburban cities. When these data were broken down by income, it was found that those with family incomes over $10,000 preferred larger cities while those with incomes of

* Civic Participation for Last Two Years

	Organizational Discussion	School Meeting Attendance	Other Public Meeting Attendance**	Attendance Totals*	Percent Voting # Of Registered	Percent Voting # Of Total Population
City of Grand Rapids	26%	25%	23%	36%	39	13
East Grand Rapids	34	40	42	56	80	43
Grandville	29	38	58	67	-	-
Wyoming	20	30	35	43	56	23
Grand Rapids Twp.	42	52	34	61	31	15
Walker Twp.	22	30	42	56	65	30
Paris Twp.	31	52	45	66	64	35

* Since some persons attended both an educational and other public meetings concerned with local government, the total column is less than the combined sum of the first two columns.

**The definition of a public meeting was broader than meetings of governmental bodies. It included citizen meetings to discuss school reorganization or bond issues, election discussions, debates on water and sewage financing, etc. As can be seen from the table about 20-38% of the suburban meetings on public issues were not meetings of regularly organized groups such as Rotaries, etc. In the central city 10% attended other than organizational meetings.

#Percentage given is that of voters participating in the December 1959 election on annexation held six months after the completion of the survey. Grandville did not participate in this election. The City of Grand Rapids total was the highest percentage voting on the separate annexation proposals.

$4,000 or less preferred cities of smaller size; for suburban city and township residents (p = .01). There was no relation between income and city size preference in the central city.

Answers, however, were also clearly related to residence in an incorporated or unincorporated area. For all income groups, the preference for smaller units was markedly greater for suburban city residents than the suburban township residents. As expected identifications with larger units shifted somewhat when residents were asked specifically about annexation of their areas to the central city, suggesting that some who said they preferred living in the larger unit still wished to remain legally separate from the core city. Nevertheless identifying most completely with smaller units was clearly associated with lower income.

Acquaintance with public officials was greater for low income township residents than central city residents. In central and suburban cities the upper income groups were more likely to know officials, but in the townships about the same percentage of all income levels claimed personal acquaintance.

The cross tabulation of attendance at meetings and family income indicated that the greater participation in the suburbs was accounted for mainly by increased participation of middle income groups (6,000-9,999) in the incorporated areas and by lower and middle income (incomes of less than $10,000) in the township areas.

Direct contact with public officials increased for middle and upper income families in the suburban cities. In the townships direct contact with officials was not related to family income again suggesting increases for lower income groups.

These data suggest that the move to the suburbs resulted in a leveling influence similiar to that found in frontier communities. The increase in civic participation was gained by the middle and lower income groups with the most sparsely settled areas, the townships, providing the greatest opportunity for participation in governmental affairs for the lower income families. In the more established politics of suburban cities, middle income groups made the largest participation gains.

The third measure of access was (3) confidence in ability to obtain access and influence local government. Residents were asked "Do people in this (city, township) have much say in how their government is run?" Eighty and 82 percent of respondents in the two smaller cities answered affirmatively as compared to 55 to 71 per cent in the other suburbs and 71% in the central city.

In summary, by all three measures related to access, suburban residents in the small cities and usually in the townships tended to have greater access than central city residents. The exceptions were cases where responses by residents of the suburban city of 45,000 were not markedly different from central city responses and the civic participation measures related to knowledge of local government.

While there was noticeably more civic participation in the suburbs than in the central city, there are a number of indicators besides lack of information about officials, that suggest grass roots participation and

access was far from an everyday occurance. For example when only six out of ten of the registered voted in an election in which merger with the central city was proposed this can not be described as frantic politicking. For perhaps a majority of the suburbanites it is possible that access was looked upon mainly as a standby resource. Contact with officials might occur infrequently by personal choice when there appeared to be an important reason for it. Access was an asset that could be cashed in when needed. Middle and lower income residents perhaps sensed the opportunities for greater access to suburban government but were not therefore moved to become activists in local politics. The open door to government was perhaps viewed just as one absently mindedly notes a nearby fire exit light in a theater.

However, even if we may conclude that citizen access as guaged by various measures was more likely to occur in the suburbs than in the central city, was access related to attitudes on annexation?

(1) Attempted access was not related to resistance to annexation to a statistically significant degree using chi square in either suburban city or township samples. However, a bread own of the suburban city total by suburb, revealed that in the suburban city of 45,000 there was such a relationship, significant at a high level $p = .01$ but there was no significant relationship in the smaller cities or the townships.

(2) All grass roots measures were found to be somewhat associated with greater resistence to annexation. To use a well worn phrase, all patterns of response went in the right direction, but to add in even familiar phrase, none of the relationships in the township sample were found to be statistically significant. In the suburban cities, however, personally knowing an official and attendance at meetings were significantly associated with holding opinions resisting annexation. ($p = .005$ and $p = .025$).

(3) The relationship between the third measure of access, confidence in influence on local government, showed no relationship with attitude on annexation in the townships but a statistically significant one in the suburban city sample. ($p = .02$)

The first fact revealed is the lack of relationship in the township sample between attitude on annexation and any of the three measures of access. At this point in the history of metropolitan politics in Grand Rapids, access was an irrelevant variable in the townships for forming opinions on annexation.

Secondly, two of the measures of access were significant in explaining attitudes on annexation in all suburban cities. The third, attempted access, was only significant where it was relatively rare and where there were few upper income residents; in the suburban city of 45,000. On the basis of this evidence, access appears to be a concept of importance in explaining some of the resistence to annexation in suburban cities.

Representativeness

I have defined representativeness as an attitude held by citizens that their officials personify the values of the community, rather than emphasizing only the attitudes on the content for control of specific decisions. Thus

officeholders are assumed to be characteristic of the citizens in some important ways.

For the citizen to feel his government is representative does not require of him a high degree of general or instrumental knowledge about his local government. It does not require citizen participation, exercise of access, or even a personal acquaintance with officials. A government may act in ways that an observer might regard as in the citizen's interest and still might not be regarded as representative by the citizen. The criticism of low income and labor residents of councilmen chosen at large or of the city manager system, is a fairly common case of dissatisfaction based in large part on attitudes that the officials are not representative. It therefore seemed important to investigate whether perceived differences in social status between officials and citizens would reduce opinions that local government was representative.

It is also assumed that representativeness is more likely where there is some homogeneity among residents. In this study respondents were asked if other voters tended to share points of view with them as one measure of such homogeneity.

Respondents were first asked if they thought the officials of their suburb might fit into their close circle of friends. Social similarity between resident and official was considered to be greatest by respondents in the two small suburban cities where 66 and 69 per cent felt such similarity existed. In the other suburbs and the central city the affirmative response was between 30 and 39 per cent.

However, suburban respondents did not seem to feel that such differences between themselves and local officials prevented general agreement on local problems. In fact, in all suburbs between 67 and 78 per cent of the residents felt citizens and officials generally agreed. This attitude was held to a greater degree in the two smaller cities and one of the townships. Also, 59 per cent of the central city residents said they felt officials shared similar ideas on local problems with the people who lived in their neighborhoods.

Respondents had slightly less confidence that other local voters felt as they did about important local issues. In the suburbs from 60 to 69 per cent held this attitude with such opinions slightly more common in the townships. In the central city 50 per cent expressed confidence in other voters.

These measures indicate that attitudes of representativeness were more frequently held by suburbanites than by central city residents. Social similarity of officials and citizens was not regarded as a crucial characteristic associated with feelings of representativeness in the suburbs. It was recognized to be present, however, in the two smaller cities.

To what degree, do these measures of representativeness relate to opinions on annexation? There was a regular tendency for increased feelings of representativeness to be associated with increased resistance to annexation in both the suburban cities and the townships, but the relationships in all cases in the townships were not statistically significant. In the

suburban cities there was a relationship at the .05 level between two variables (1) the attitude that officials shared opinions with neighborhood residents and attitude on annexation and (2) having confidence in voters and attitude on annexation. Those in other words who regarded their government as broadly representative and saw other voters as agreeing with them were most likely to resist ideas of annexation to the central city. Despite the recognized similarity between citizens and officials in the smaller cities, there was no relationship between this attitude and resistence to annexation. This was true of the suburban city sample as a whole and for each individual city.

Conclusions are similar to those found in examining access: feeling their government was representative was important in explaining attitudes to annexation in the suburban cities but irrelevant in the townships.

Resistance to Annexation and Merger

The fear of being governed by non representative rulers or governments not permitting access is not found only in metropolitan areas. What Lipset calls legitimacy or a nation's willingness to accept its rulers is relevant to the pattern of suburban resistance to annexation or merger.[12] World government is resisted, states in the Congo resist merger, Ireland resisted British rule though as Lipset points out it was efficiently administered, and independent suburbs resist metropolitan integration of governments. These differenct situations all reflect something of the same kind of attitude: fear of having decisions made by outsiders.

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[12] Lipset, Seymour M. Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1961) Chapt. 2

I have examined only a few of the facets that are part of the attitudes concerning access and representativeness. I should like to sketch briefly some other facets of these concepts that might be examined by metropolitan researchers.

There are a number of factors that might make the suburbanite regard the government of the core city as not really suitable for suburbanites. The very act of abandoning the central city to join a new community in the hinterland has something of the flavor of the old American frontier. Those who have made this move may feel they have more in common with each other than they do with members of the same social class living in the core city. Just identifying with the new is one factor emphasizing distinctiveness and separateness.

There is secondly the development of a unique life style that emphasizes what sociologists call neighboring and familism, informality, and a bland style of politics. Most observers agree with William Whyte that the Park Forest way of life characterizes a new pattern that is a distinct departure from that of central city style. William Dobriner in his collection of readings on suburbia finally must fall back on a legal boundary definition to draw the line between what is the suburban and non suburban way of life.[13]

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[13] William Dobriner, The Suburban Community (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958)

A third element is one of ideology. Charles Adrian traces three myth systems that he argues have dominated American politics: Frontier individualism (Jacksonian revolution), Industrial individualism which might be described as the rugged individualism of the gilded age, and the social service myth that characterized the New Deal.[14] Each of these three myths was the program of an emerging political majority, and each resulted from a change of living patterns as America's population center of gravity shifted and faced a new environment. This shift was from the frontier to the small town growing up, and then to the large city. The new majority in America resides in the suburbs and its experiences have resulted in a distinct political style and ideology. The old New Deal slogans somehow sound hollow on the patio or at the cookout. The new majority has yet to make its political break through, but its difference in ideology from the big city ways of thinking is not to be denied.

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[14] Charles Adrian, State and Local Government A Study in the Political Process (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960) chaps. 2-4.

All of these factors, I would argue, make suburbanites view merger with the core city as a mistake and a surrender. It is a return to the central city and its problems and a way of looking at politics that is regarded as alien.

These attitudes may be found to explain resistance to merger within the suburban city just as the measures of access and representativeness previously tested were found to. Are they, however, relevant in township areas? Why were the previous measures of access and representation found irrelevant in Grand Rapids townships in explaining opinions on annexation and why did largescale annexations subsequently occur in these areas?

Experience suggests that suburban cities rarely merge with central cities. Incorporation seems to close the issue for local residents because it creates a stable, organized group with which citizens can identify. The status of townships on the other hand appears to be regarded as a temporary way station. They are a mixture of rural and suburban residents scattered over a large land area. At any moment the unit may be split apart by annexations or by piecemeal incorporations. At the time the survey was taken the opinion in the townships about government structure seems to have been in the process of change.

There is considerable evidence that township residents at the time of the survey desired urban services. As service inadequacies in their eyes began to reach crisis proportions, they came to favor structural change. A hypothesis explaining initial resistance to urban services and structural change in townships is that such resistance is initially from those we may call marginal homeowners. These are persons who have recently purchased a home, and probably have paid about $1,500 more than they meant to. For a few years they feel they can not absorb an increase in taxes. As Zimmer and Hawley point out, however, there comes a time when the suburbanite is willing to pay more taxes if he can get adequate services.[15]

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[15] Basil G. Zimmer and Amos H. Hawley "Home Owners and Attitude Toward Tax Increase: The Flint Metropolitan Area" Journal of the American Institute of Planners (Spring 1956) pp. 65-73.

In Grand Rapids additional pressure for change was applied by central city officials who stopped water and sewage connections and set dates for removal of tuition students from city schools. In addition parcels without citizens but with industry were annexed and city voters rejected the water authority. Throughout a period of five years a number of changes or proposed changes regarding governmental structure were acted upon in the township areas: a water authority, annexation to Grandville, move to charter township or incorporated status, and finally annexation to the city. While there is no absolute proof to support the statement, there is a strong likelihood that annexation to the central city was the least preferred of these choices and only occurred when it was clear that alternative solutions were impractical.

Thus we are back at efficiency and economy values to explain attitudes but with these differences: (1) it is not that services were merely inefficient or somewhat uneconomical. It is that the desire for more urban services led township governments to be faced with a financial and service crisis with which they could not cope. (2) such crisis resulted in structural change but not necessarily always in the direction that efficiency and economy advocates would regard as most desirable.

Summary

I have argued first that efficiency and economy are inadequate explanations for attitudes on annexation and merger in suburban areas. Only under special conditions do they become important in explaining such attitudes. I proposed attitudes of access and representativeness of local government as alternative variables explaining opinions on annexation.

Access and representativeness were both found to be associated with resistance to annexation in suburban cities but not in the townships of the Grand Rapids area.

I proposed alternative facets of the attitudes concerning representativeness and access that might be tested as helping shape opinions on annexation: that core city residents were viewed as living in a different life style and holding a different ideology.

I also suggested a hypothesis that might explain the forming of township opinion on annexation. Shortly after settlement, I suggested, homeowning for many residents was marginal because they had spent more than they intended to. After a few years however, pressures for urban services resulted in pressure for change from township government since township government could not satisfy needs. In the Grand Rapids area city officials and residents added to the pressure to encourage annexation by cutting off services to suburbs, annexing industrial land have no residents, and voting down a water authority which suburbanites could not independently finance. Township residents without other practical alternatives in time voted to annex to the central city.

END

THE SOLDIER AND THE CIVILIAN: NEO-CLASSICAL THEMES

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THE SOLDIER AND THE CIVILIAN: NEO-CLASSICAL THEMES

The subsequent discussion will be very general and discursive. I shall ignore important related problems and oversimplify others. My purpose is merely to call attention to a neglected though important subject; a detailed exegesis would be too large a project to attempt here.

Most political theorists since Locke have emphasized the contrast between civil and military life. Civil society implied a relationship among 'equals' who had to negotiate or compromise their differences since they could not destroy each other. Diversity and tolerance were 'natural' to civilians and the art of politics--a civil art--was frequently taken to be synonymous with the art of persuasion.

The character of military life, on the other hand, was seen as rooted in the effort to prepare for war--an act of 'brute' power in which one contending group was crushed utterly. A military organization, as a result, tended to have a hierarchal form culminating in the arbitrary power of the general so that it would be more easy to concentrate the army's available strength at the tactically critical point. There was little room for 'spontaneity' in an army, and a uniformity imposed by coercion was evident in every aspect of military organization. States most suitably constructed for war did not permit much scope for civil society and politics. Military training, therefore, could hardly be considered a good method for educating men to assume responsible roles in civil life, and opinions similar to Spencer's that a soldier's life was 'positively demoralizing' for it 'deadens the sympathies and generates a state of mind which prompts crimes of trespass'[1] can be found in discussions by Blackstone, Hamilton, Madison, Benjamin Constant, Tocqueville, Lasswell, and numerous others.

Yet, there are very obvious considerations, or truisms, which suggest similarities between civil and military society. Civil life is not complete without a government which imposes sanctions and establishes subordination. Indeed, the subordination and restraints which constitute a civil order are so precise and profound that a student of law like Austin or Kelsen can describe it as a 'hierarchy of norms.' From the legal theorist's viewpoint, it would be difficult to say that the principles of hierarchy and coercion are more deeply rooted in one type of society than the other. Moreover, there is no prima facie reason to believe that arbitrary practises are particularly characteristic of one order. The officer who rules 'by the book' is no different from the magistrate whose discretion is limited by the law.

The argument may be pressed from another direction. Some type of government is indispensable to civil society, but a particular government will not survive unless it commands sufficient moral authority to check circumstances producing diversity. A durable government capable of imposing the law it formulates is inconceivable without a community which respects legitimacy: if the art of politics is primarily an exercise in persuasion, the terms used must ultimately be comprehensible and acceptable to the public. A government, in short, cannot permit general capriciousness without destroying itself, but it cannot secure the uniformity it needs by relying solely upon coercion.

> 'No power could stand if it relied on violence alone for force is not strong enough to maintain itself against the accidents of rivalry and discontent. The might that makes right must be different than that of the right arm. It must be deeply rooted in emotion, embedded in feelings and aspirations, in morality, in sage maxims, in forms of rationalization among the higher levels of cultural groups.'[2]

The problem for an army is similar; all great military leaders have realized that an army which depends principally on coercion has extremely limited combat value. 'All the ranks,' Cromwell said, 'must know what they are fighting for and love what they know.'[3] And Montesquieu, a keen student of comparative military history, pointed out that despotic states where governments are short-lived because they lack a sufficient principle of cohesion usually avoid international conflict as their armies disintegrate under stress.

> 'Those who foresee an approaching revolution hasten it by their disobedience. For men whose fidelity is entirely owing to the danger of punishment are easily corrupted as soon as it becomes distant: their aim is their own private interest. The empire is subverted, the capital is taken, and the conqueror disputes the several provinces with the governors.[4]

> 'Despotic states make incursions against one another; it is monarchies only that wage war.[5]

Parenthetically, I might add (to bring Montesquieu 'up to date') that in the last 150 years the area of the world where government has been most precarious--Latin America--is also the area where international conflicts most rarely occur.[6] When there is the slightest chance of avoiding war, both sides will strain every effort to do so; few will risk hostilities with a Latin American army. 'There is more than one way to skin a cat'; those interested in preventing war might do well to study our southern neighbors. Wither the cohesive sentiments, and

governments will soon learn never to test those sentiments in a trial of strength. To be sure, violence may be become more common in the internal life of states, for a coup d'etat or a street mob require no sustained effort or perseverance to be successful in toppling governments when the latter can command only weak loyalties.

In a recent book entitled Primitive War, Professor Turney-High, an anthropologist, summarized the relationship between civil and military order in this way.

> One certain test of . . . adequate military organization is a sense of tribalism which will prevent fighting inside the we-group.[7]

> Most Californians were absolutely non-military. They possessed none of the traits requisite for the military horizon, a condition which would have taxed their all but non-existent social organization too much. Their societies made no provision for collective political action. When a terrier bites a spaniel, the other spaniels as spaniels do not enter the fight, and the Californians felt much the same way.[8]

> . . . war is an essential part of the societal complex, perhaps one of its strongest links and certainly one of its clearest reflectors. The relationship of efficient social organization in the arts of peace and the arts of group conflict is almost absolute whether one is speaking of civilization or subcivilization. Successful war depends upon teamwork and consensus both of which require command and discipline. Command and discipline furthermore can eventually be no more than symbols of something deeper and more real than they themselves.[9]

To the modern political theorist, especially one reared in the liberal or conservative tradition, Turney High's views may seem startling, yet the fact is that it would not be difficult to find similar statements in the writings of most political theorists from Plato to Rousseau with the exceptions of the mediaevalists and Hobbes and Locke. For the purposes of this paper I would like to call your attention to a particular group of men during the Renaissance and the Reformation whom I have called the 'neo-classicists,' neo-classicists because their thought was shaped primarily by the philosophy and experiences of the Greeks and Romans. I particularly want to discuss Machiavelli, Lipsius, and Harrington, though there were many others in the group such as Campanella, Bacon, Montaigne, Sir Algernon Sidney and Walter Moyle.

Generally, the neo-classicists had deep republican sympathies, and, if modern terms can be meaningfully applied to this period, they were decidedly democratic, for they

believed in expanding the bases of citizenship and in giving their respective states a more egalitarian tone. They cherished the idea of 'the mixed state' as the ancients had known it; a 'government of laws not of men' was their common aim. To guarantee the internal stability of the systems visualized, to train members of the community for their rights and responsibilities, they argued for a system of public education--schools patterned after those of the ancients in which the military exercises were the chief activity. It is also worth mentioning that in obvious contrast to most modern theorists, the neo-classicists believed that republican institutions above all others were best suited for mustering the energies of a people for war. Finally, they, unlike their liberal successors, knew something about the art of war. For, with the possible exceptions of Polybius and Xenophon, it is doubtful whether any political-theorist, ancient or modern, has ever interested military thinkers more than Machiavelli and Lipsius have done. The other neo-classicists may merely have paraphrased the view of the Florentine and Flemish figures, but they relied at least on authorities which could command the respect of military men.[10]

To put the position of the neo-classicist in proper perspective, perhaps a brief sketch of the contemporary military picture might be helpful. From the Renaissance to the late phases of the Reformation Western states relied chiefly on ad hoc collections of miscellaneous, ill-disciplined, mercenary volunteers to fight their battles. The reasons for this development are too complex to be analzed in detail here,[11] but several considerations are worth mentioning. The military obligation in the mediaeval state was always extremely limited, and was confined to defense. The knight's duty consisted of thirty to forty days' service on home territories. Every freeman was obliged to defend the realm against foreign invasion, but local militias were rarely exercised and almost never used. Sovereigns were usually willing to accept extra financial contributions from the merchant in lieu of military service. Indeed, although the chief military energy of the mediaeval state was the knight, many knights preferred to pay extra taxes rather than support the state with their arms. No one was obliged to support the sovereign in his imperialist ventures; those who served overseas were always paid for their activities, and thus the mercenary appeared very early in European armies.

With the development of wealth and the increased interest in foreign expansion characteristic of the Renaissance, mercenaries--specialists in violence in the true sense of the term--became dominant figures in Western military systems as leaders and in the rank-and-file. They were used in aggressive and defensive encounters, and partisans never hesitated to muster them for civil conflicts.[12]

From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century it is scarcely possible to find a political theorist who accepted mercenaries with equanimity. The paid soldier's avarice for

money and his willingness to plunder the country that he was hired to defend led Sir Thomas More, for instance, to liken him to a 'robber' and the tone of More's language merely reflected the attitude of most theorists in the period.

> 'How dangerous it is to rear such wild beasts, France learned to its cost and the examples of Rome, Carthage, Syria and other nations show; for not only their empires but their land and even their cities have been more than once destroyed . . .[13]

But the most effective arguments against contemporary military practises was made by the neo-classicists who combated the conventional opinion that the abuses of the professional soldier had to be tolerated since he commanded an indispensable military expertise. The neo-classicists felt that the mercenary, in truth, possessed little talent for war, and they were convinced that the ancient world much more than the modern had correctly perceived the formula for a successful military venture.

All the ancient philosophers had recognized the occasional advantages of a mercenary army. It frequently possessed a superior military technique; its members had more war experience and more skill with their weapons and mercenary officers frequently commanded a more thorough knowledge of tactics and strategy than their respective counterparts in a citizen militia. Yet the ancients still considered that the military potentialities of a citizen army was incomparably greater. For the chief cohesive bond among mercenaries--personal financial gain--did not prevent them from fighting among themselves and from deserting their ranks when there was a possibility for plunder or when their common situation was desperate. Thus, Aristotle noted that a mercenary force would not fight when pitted against superior numbers, and that it frequently disintegrated under sudden and unexpected strains.[14] Only the armies of the polity could attain 'military excellence.'

To the philosophers of the Renaissance and Reformation who continually compared the marvelous exploits of the citizen armies of Greece and Rome with the clumsy military efforts of their own times, it seemed quite apparent that the ancient's extraordinary talents lay in his ability to discern that a sound army and a good political community were sustained by similar principles of cohesion and organization. Neither a political action nor a military expedition were possible unless those who participated in them shared a common purpose and mutual regard which ruled out violence within the group and kept each man from succumbing to the 'natural' urge to fend for himself in situations which produced immediate and often profound personal consequences for the various members. Both politics and war were complex rational activities requiring teamwork and planning. Men must be trained, labor must be specialized and coordinated, resources must be allocated to

meet likely contingencies which could split or disorganize the group. In an army the necessary quest for unity is expressed in the unrelenting effort to inspire respect for persons with authority. However, since authority can be abused, fomenting internal strife and antagonisms, the most effectively organized armies try to preserve authority by limiting it through a code of discipline which defines leadership and obedience, supraordination and subordination. In a state the esteem for law performs the same unifying functions that a respect for discipline does in an army and the most authoritarian state is always the one in which law governs all individual activity. The Romans and the Spartans had the reputation for being the most law-abiding people in the ancient world, and it was inevitable therefore, Harrington insisted, for their soldiers to excell all others.

> . . . the Heathen Politicians have written, not only out of nature, but as it were out of Scripture: As in the Common-wealth of Israel, God is said to have been King; so the Commonwealth where the Law is King, is said by Aristotle to be the Kingdom of God. And where by the lusts or passions of men, a power is set above that of the Law deriving from reason which is the dictate of God; God in that sense is rejected or deposed, that he should reign over them as he was in Israel. And yet Leviathan (Hobbes) will have it, 'that by the reading of these Greek and Latine . . . Authors, young men and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving strong and delightful impressions of the great exploits of War, achieved by the Conductors of their Armies . . . imagine that their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of Government' . . . (Yet) such an effect must have some adequate cause; which, to evade, he insinuates, that it was nothing else but the emulation of particular men; as if so great an emulation could have been generated without as great virtue; so great virtue without the best education; the best education without the best Lawes; or the best Lawes any other wise then by the excellency of their policy.[15]

Lipsius, the contemporary theorist who most excited the interest of soldiers actually engaged in military reform--Maurice of Nassau and Gustaphus Adolphus--put the matter more tersely.

> Valiant men are milde. . . . They which do most of all feare the laws are more bold upon the enemie, and they which do most stand in awe of their reputacion will least feare to do anything. For honestie maketh a souldier well framed, and shame while it keepeth him from flying giveth him the victoire.[16]

And the words of Machiavelli are familiar to all political theorists.

> . . . . It is (necessary) for a prince to have foundations good, otherwise he is certain to be ruined. The chief foundations of all states, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And as there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws.[17]

Nearly all the discussions of military problems inspired by the classics emphasized that modern failings stemmed from an inability to understand that the full moral and intellectual resources of the state had to be employed for war. Thus, contemporary statesmen were loath to consider the best way to gather and train recruits, and little effort was given toward finding the proper rules and regulations to govern a body of armed men. 'An enemie,' Lipsius pointed out, 'is to be overcome with the spade, that is by workes.'[18] Only men with industrious habits were fit to be soldiers. Yet modern armies by filling their ranks solely with volunteers were dominated by 'idlers,' 'turbulent spirits,' 'adventurers,' and 'violent men'--persons who could not earn their livelihood in civil society because they were unwilling to accept the routine and the careful attention to detail necessary in most ordinary pursuits. Machiavelli characterized contemporary soldiers as 'the woorste of a Province, for as moch as any be slanderous, idell, unruly, without Religion, displacers, in every condition evill brought up . . . whose customes cannot be more contrairie to a good and true servise.'[19] The consequences, Lipsius observed, were apparent in every military encampment. 'All thinges nowe are out of order and as though they were overcome with drinke . . . fitter for the facts and feasts of Bacchus than for Mars and military discipline.'[20] Roman policy made it possible to select the best citizens for service, Harrington pointed out,[21] and Lipsius referred to the resulting atmosphere of decorum, restraint, and solemnity that pervaded all Roman war bodies. 'There Justice, Chastitie, and Innocencie dwelt in Campe and their Souldiers were in no place but against the enemie.'[22]

'A good Souldier standeth not so much on his Courage as his Faithe,'[23] Lipsius said, and it was necessary to bring religious instruction directly into the camp to highlight the seriousness of the military occasion. Without religion, or some similar cohesive force, modern armies would continue to fight indecisive battles and unnecessarily prolonged wars for its participants would find the incentive to plunder stronger than the desire for victory. Machiavelli, in assessing the Roman experience, agreed that when the religious sentiment was strong an army would find it much easier to develop harmony and fellowship--the essential ingredients of discipline and the

will to conquer. Nevertheless, he expressed serious doubts about the particular value of the Christian faith for war since it encouraged loyalties which went beyond the political community. In Harrington's view a national army had to have a national religion, but he recognized that English religious schisms could not be easily exorcised, and he devised a complicated formula (patterned somewhat after that of the Ancient Hebrews, another excellent military people) which guaranteed some liberty of conscience while providing the public with a common worship.[24]

Above all, the importance of establishing a proper military government was emphasized to strengthen the initial advantages which good citizens and a common purpose bring to an army. 'Nature bringeth forth some valiant men but good order throw industrie maketh many more.[25] In so far as it was possible, all three theorists urged that 'idleness' and capricious behavior not be permitted, and each proposed a military code to define the nature of the authority vested in the officers and the rights and obligations possessed by each soldier.

Machiavelli and Lipsius, much more than Harrington, interested themselves in the qualities necessary for military leadership; both men felt that the military reformer would do better to recruit men with particular personality traits rather than those with military experience, for it was much easier to teach a man military techniques than it was to remake his 'character.' Machiavelli's ideal officer had to be capable of understanding the self-discipline necessary to realize the moral responsibilities of his office--to control his men he should have the courage to insist upon a <u>just</u> distribution of rewards and punishments--the essential preserver of cohesion and stable military government. Without <u>virtu</u>, the love of justice, discipline, and law, no man could master the military profession properly.

> 'But that which above all other thynge kepeth the armie in unitee is reputacion of the capitaine, the which onely groweth of his vertue (<u>virtue</u>) . . . because neither bloud nor authoritie gave it ever with vertue and the chief thinge which of a captaine is looke for to doe is to keep his souldiers punished and paid; . . . if thou paisest him and punishest him not, he becometh in every condition insolente, for that thou becomest of small estimacion, where thou chauncest not to bee able to maintaine the dignite of thy degree, and not maintainying it, there followeth of necessitee, tumulte and discorde, which is the ruin of an armie.'[26]

Lipsius developed a similar picture. For Lipsius, the rank-and-file's contemptuous attitudes toward any labor other than

fighting (which prevented it from taking elementary military precautions, such as posting guards, digging camp entrenchments, and providing minimum sanitary safeguards) could only be altered by an officer corps willing to lead by the force of moral example. 'No man will hold that reproachful which shall be done in common, which shall be done by the better sort, and sometimes by the commanders themselves.'[27] The ideal officer possessed virtu, prudence or caution, a capacity to insist tirelessly on the importance of detail, and a willingness to see war as a science requiring constant study of theoretical principles and understanding of concrete battle circumstances.

Since military perfection and a truly comprehensive discipline depended upon constant practise, it was necessary to utilize the available free time of citizens during peace to prepare for the inevitable renewal of international conflict. The good citizen would find little difficulty in meeting his military obligations, and also a properly organized system of military training would improve the capacity of all free men to exercise their civic privileges properly--so alike were the demands of politics and war imagined to be. Thus, Lipsius rated the military experience as the ancients utilized it, as the best school for civic training in all types of state except those ruled by tyrants![28] Harrington believed that the popular or republican politics of the ancient world depended upon educating the masses for public responsibilities through a long arduous course of military service, and appropriately he proposed military training in the Roman manner to be 'main education of this Common-wealth,' Oceana.[29] Machiavelli, with one eye on the Classical world, urged over and over again that a citizen militia was the most important part in a program to reform 'corrupt' peoples so that they might recover the talent for self-government, and he maintained that the final step in the corruption of Rome was Augustus' creation of a standing army which deprived the mass from its only available school for citizenship.[30]

The search for military strength, in short, led ultimately to a renewed appreciation of the sentiments and institutions necessary to transform a mass of loosely related persons into a community. A military authority, like a political authority, could not be arbitrary without destroying the moral basis of cohesion and its own ability to resist shock. Coercion was as essential to an army as it was to the state, but education and training was the real root of solidarity.

Conclusion

I have several concluding comments and conjectures.

For those interested primarily in the history of political theory, I should like to point out that the first page of Oceana tells us why the English are better soldiers than the French, that the last subject covered in the book is the budget of the army, and that about one-third of the intervening pages have various military references. Yet how many of Harrington's commentators have appreciated his interest in armies? What, indeed, does a theorist have to do to make us read the text as he has written it?

We have always known that Machiavelli was deeply interested in war, but we have still ignored his Art of War--the only book he saw fit to publish. That treatise may be nearly as important as The Discourses and The Prince for a proper estimate of his political thought. Recently, there has been a revival of Harrington's notion that The Prince and The Discourses are exercises in the problems of establishing a new state and reforming a corrupt one.[31] In my opinion, that is the only way to relate the two works, but I would also submit that to complete our understanding of Machiavelli on 'new foundations' and 'regeneration,' the Art of War must be examined thoroughly.

Book I, Chapter 9 of The Discourses is entitled "To Found A New Republic, or To Reform Entirely the Old Institutions of an Existing One, Must Be the Work of One Man Only." In it Machiavelli tells the secret of Romulus' success. Rome's founder kills Remus to make certain that Romulus alone has the power to frame the constitution, and then after organizing the state's formal institutions, he resigns his monopoly of power to retain only two privileges--the right to convoke the Senate and to command the army. The powers Romulus refuses to surrender do not seem to be important, when one remembers that no citizen was permitted to carry arms inside the city walls so that the army could hardly be used to coerce Romulus' opposition, yet Machiavelli considers the retained powers as ample for the founder's purposes. The full import of Machiavelli's assessment becomes clear when one reads The Art of War, where, incidentally, the traditional Roman prohibition against arms within the city is maintained. The army's commander is the state's headmaster; he assumes full responsibility for teaching the citizen how to cooperate.

Like all the Greek and Roman philosophers, Machiavelli was deeply concerned with how citizens are made, and The Art of War can be regarded as a treatise in public education and the ideal state. If one is curious about how Machiavelli would curb the idleness, egoism, and lack of perseverance he considered characteristic of corrupt peoples, calculate the

amount of time the citizen would have to spend learning Machiavelli's elaborate tactical system and imagine the human qualities necessary to make the plan work. If one wants to know how Machiavelli would safeguard the principle of the mixed state he treasures in The Discourses, look at the class basis of his military organization, and if one wants to know how the Prince would diffuse responsibility and develop a governing class, observe how he recruits his officers and the meaning of his small tactical formations which place a premium on independent initiative.

For those interested in the influence of political theorists on the development of institutions, I would suggest a study of Machiavelli and Lipsius' role in the military patterns of The Reformation. Max Weber somewhere said that Western armies, despite their possession of gun powder, were hardly a match for the Greek phalanx or the Roman legion in its prime until Maurice of Nassau and Gustaphus Adolphus realized the importance of drill and training in creating a military force with cohesion. He might have added that the improvement in the Western manner of waging war came partly as a result of the 'rediscovery' of classical military authors Xenophon, Polybius, Vegetius, and Frontinus, and to Machiavelli and Lipsius' authoritative interpretations of classical military systems. The Western armies of the seventeenth century did not evolve; they were created as intelligent adaptations of classical military principles to modern conditions. The ideas behind the 'new' military discipline were as important to the development of modern political life as any conceptions that the Reformation bequeathed.

Finally, the neo-classicists are interesting because they focused on matters directly relevant to our age. They were aware that technology was not nearly so important as cohesion and organization. Compared to members of the modern liberal and conservative traditions, they asked fundamental political questions--how does one create authority, community and public order? For too long a time we have simply assumed that order was 'natural' and that man was a social or group animal. We have glossed over the obvious fact that he has many anti-social or anti-group proclivities. More important, it should have been clear that man is not a political animal; our anthropological literature lists countless peoples who lacked a sufficient sense of public authority to insure domestic peace and collective action, and what student of history cannot find a large number of societies that lost the capacity they once had for government. Perhaps, only the pathetic picture of confusion in the 'underdeveloped' countries will enable us to understand once more the psychological essentials of community--a feat that Bagehot insisted was too difficult for modern man.

> '. . . Plato and Aristotle . . . had not had time to forget the difficultie of government. We have forgotten them altogether. We reckon as the basis of our culture, upon an amount of order, of tacit obedience, of prescriptive governability which these philosophers hoped to get as a principal result of their culture. We take without thought as a datum what they hunted as a quaesitum.'[32]

The neo-classicists were aware of the fact that government was not 'natural,' and in their opinion 'popular' states, especially, needed a formal school for citizenship which stressed military duty, a direct personal burden whose weight could not be reduced substantially by the economic or social influence of the obligee. They were not entirely right; most Western states have managed their affairs without a deliberately conceived system of civic training. But the neo-classicists were not entirely wrong either. Most textbooks on Swiss history argue that the common government finally achieved in the nineteenth century would have been impractical if it had not been preceded and sustained by a universal military obligation which keeps every Swiss male in the service for more than forty years.[33] According to Israel's prime minister, David Ben Gurion, his nation cannot dispense without a similar system to help her assimilate diverse immigrant peoples, by imparting to them necessary cohesive sentiments and modern technical skills.[34] For many underdeveloped lands, it is quite possible that the experiences of Switzerland and Israel may be more meaningful than our own. Certainly, if a state like Venezuela, which has never had a war worth mentioning, must have a military establishment, the army might as well be designed to serve a useful function. If Venezuela needs 'public-spirited' citizens, do we know another way to educate them?

Footnotes

1. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Pt. V, sec. 575.

2. Charles Merriam, Political Power (Glencoe, Ill.: 1950), p.102.

3. Quoted in Sir John Fortesque, Military History (Cambridge, England: 1914), p. 22 (emphasis supplied).

4. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, IX, 6.

5. Ibid., IX, 5.

6. Alberto Lleras 'The Secret of Peace' in A.N. Christensen, Evolution of Latin American Government (New York: 1951), pp. 697-704; and Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: 1942), Appendix XIX. Even a successful Latin American campaign introduced an element of uncertainty into politics. Almost every Latin American war was followed by a series of coups in both the victorious and vanquished state. Such minor operations as the dispatch of a Brazilian division in Italy in World War II and a Columbian battalion to Korea resulted in a revival of military conspiracy in states which had been comparatively 'stabilized' for some time.

7. H.H. Turney High, Primitive War (Columbia, S.C.: 1949), p. 230.

8. Ibid., p. 229.

9. Ibid., p. 235.

10. For a convenient estimate of Machiavelli as a military thinker, see Felix Gilbert, 'Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War' in E.M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy. Most military writers till the eighteenth century found Machiavelli well worth reading, and Maurice of Nassau and Gustaphus Adolphus commented favorably on his work. Some military commentators like Sir James Turner (Pallas Armata [London: 1683], pp. 29-30) thought Machiavelli a hopeless amateur but Turner was very much opposed to Republican principles and it is difficult sometimes to separate his military from his political judgments. Those who supported Machiavelli most enthusiastically also seemed to prefer his politics. Still, Marshal de Saxe and Clausewitz regarded him highly. For Lipsius' importance, see G. Oestreich, 'Der Romische Stoizismus und die oranische Heeresreform,' Historische Zeitschrift 176 (1953), 17-43; and G. Oestreich, 'Justus Lipsius als Theoreticker des neuzeitlichen Macht Staates,' Historische Zeitschrift 181 (1956), 31-78; and W. Hahlweg, Die Heeres reform der Oranier und die Antiqie (Berlin, 1941), 325 pp.

11. In my article, 'A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types,' the dominant characteristics of Western military systems are discussed in more detail. See Changing Patterns of Military Politics [ed. Samuel Huntington] (Glencoe, Ill.: to be published in 1961).

12. This early development in the West stands in striking opposition to the experience of the Classical world. Among the ancients, in so far as the military obligation was concerned, it was much more difficult to make a distinction between defensive and aggressive wars, and even the more 'liberal' states required the citizen to undertake a military obligation lasting forty-four years. Whereas in the West mercenaries were employed very early, it was not until the polis began to decline that she found it necessary to rely on professionals. In the Italian mediaeval city-states the military obligation was taken more seriously than was the practise in the larger kingdoms, but an early interest in commerce led the population into non-military pursuits.

13. Sir Thomas More, Utopia [trans., C.C. Richards] (Oxford: 1923), p. 23.

14. Aristotle, Ethics, III, 8, IX.

15. S.B. Liljegren (ed.), James Harrington's Oceana (Heidelberg: 1924), pp. 29-30.

16. Justus Lipsius, Sixe Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine [trans., William Jones] (London: 1594), V, 12.

17. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. XII.

18. Justus Lipsius, The Historie of Xenophon [trans., John Bingham](London: 1623), V, 2.

19. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War [trans., Peter Whitehorne, 1560](London: The Tudor Translations: 1905), Vol. I, p. 43.

20. Justus Lipsius, The Historie of Xenophon, op. cit., page reference lost.

21. Oceana, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

22. The Historie of Xenophon, op. cit., ref. loc. lost.

23. Sixe Bookes..., op. cit., V, 10.

24. Oceana, op. cit., pp. 37-39 and 69-70.

25. Lipsius, Sixe Bookes..., op. cit., V, 12.

26. The Art of War, op. cit., p. 197.

27. Histoire..., op. cit., V, 4.

28. Sixe Bookes..., op. cit., V, 10.

29. Oceana, op. cit., p. 163.

30. Art of War, op. cit., p. 39.

31. See Leslie Walker's edition of The Discourses (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950), Vol. I, p. 142 esp., and Sheldon Wolin's excellent discussion of Machiavelli in Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown 1960), pp. 195-238. My colleague, Professor Neal Wood, is preparing a book on Machiavelli which should deal partly with this problem.

32. Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (New York: 1900), p. 18.

33. 'The revolution...in 1815 is...significant. It was not a generally centralizing constitution which, transforming an alliance into a Confederation thereby incidentally unified its military institutions. It was on the contrary the universally recognized need for an improved system of national defence which imposed unification, in the military sphere, upon a group of statesmen very reluctant to consent to any limitation of cantonal sovereignty in any other matters. It was most emphatically not the Confederation which nationalized its army in Switzerland in 1815, but the army which far in advance of all other federal institutions was the main factor of the general centralization which came about a generation later. William Rappard, Collective Security in Swiss Experience (London: 1948), p. 77.

A prominent official in a Swiss pacifist group was quoted as saying: 'Should armies ever entirely vanish...it seems to me that we in Switzerland ought merely to do away with ammunition, our military organization being otherwise the best school of civic virtues and sane patriotism and the best sentiment of solidarity which should inspire all those who are united together for the realization of one and the same idea.' Julian Grande, A Citizen's Army (New York: 1916), p. 106.

Professor Robert Brooks, an American pacifist, observed, '...what is barracks elsewhere is for the Swiss a school. The term they employ, Rekrutenschule, is significant of their essentially pedagogical approach to all problems that confront them, the military no less than those of the civil life. Civic Training in Switzerland (Chicago: 1930), pp. 147ff.

34. Moshe Brilliant, "With A Patrol in Israel," New York Times Magazine (December 7, 1952), p. 22.

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T.H. GREEN AND THE INTRODUCTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM AT OXFORD:

A STUDY IN THE ENGLISH UNIVERSITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL THEORY

BY

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I

I have chosen not to attempt a survey of all contributions made by English universities to political theory from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries. Rather I shall consider in detail a case which has some intrinsic interest and which may serve also as an illustration of how this subject may be handled.

A century ago, English political philosophers were amateurs with no formal training, who woked for the most part outside the few universities then existing. Today the subject has become the specialized concern of university teachers, the most eminent of which hold chairs of " social and political theory " or " political science ."[1] Although this change no doubt appears natural and desirable to the members of this Association, systematic doubt should be practiced here in the interest of sharpening perception. Let me apply Rousseau's queries about man being in chains: How has this change come about? On this I think I can shed some light. What can justify it? That question I cannot answer.

The steps leading to the creation of political theory as a special subject are these: With Oxford Idealism there arrived the notion that philosophy is an autonomous and professional subject. From this followed further specialization of political theory, a development not unrelated to the fact that professional philosophers were beginning to lose interest in a subject, which for technical reasons, seemed remote from problems of logic and language. At the time that my paper begins, the arrival of T.H. Green at Oxford in 1854, the situation was not at all what it is today. Most of those speculating about politics were unaffiliated persons such as Herbert Spencer, often with private incomes as in the case of Bentham; sometimes civil servants like Sir George Lewis or employees of the East India Company like the Mills; barristers, men of letters, or editors such as Fitzjames and Leslie Stephen, and Walter Bagehot. All of them did their real work outside university walls, and published their exemplary prose in pamphlets, books, or reviews designed for the common reader. But with the introduction of Idealism at Oxford, there appears for the first time the figure of the professor, writing in technical language for his professional association or journal on matters for the most part intelligible only to experts. Affiliation with a university becomes characteristic. Green, Bosanquest, F. H.

Richter, "T.H.Green"
Hunter College

Errata

P. 1, l. 7, for voked, read worked.
" 6, for which, read whom.
" 13, " manly, " reverse.
" 14, " ran, " ran's.
" 36, " Bosanquet," Bosenquet.
2, 44, " ifluence, " influence.
3, 27, " politial, " political.
4, 33, " excape, " escape.
" 39-40, " preserve, " persevere in.
6, 20, " Bosanquet," Bosenquet.
" 23, " turbulent, " turbulent.
" 40, " fundamental," far-reaching.
" 42, " interpretation, read interpretation.
7, 6, " mid-Victorian, " mid-Victorians.
" 34, " istigation, " instigation.
8, 31, " alliance, " alliance.
9, 15, " conetmporary,read contemporary.
10, 6, " sister., read sister."
" 11, " encyclopedic, read encyclopedic.
" 24, " Aristotleians, " Aristoteliens.
" 32, " argumentation," argumentation and.
11, 2, " Yet, read Yet a.
" 44, " both over, read over both.
12, 1, " treated, read treated as.
" 12, " century, " century.
" 17, " 1800, " 18 .
" 18, " writtes, " writings.
" 31, " although, " altogether.
13, 33, " insistence," insistence.
16, 11, " indespensable, read indispensable.
" 21, " German, read Germans.
" 31, " that, read that philosophy.
" 34, " were, " are in.
17, 2, " indicated, read indicates.
" 25, " this, read this.
" 40, " which, " which when.
" 41, " trend," trend's tend.
" 43, " subtlely, read subtly.
" 44, " seeing, " seeing.
" 45, " crisis, " crisis.

P.22, l. 42, for persecute, read persecuted.
" 23, 4, " educated, read uneducated
" 24, 5, " by, read by the.
" 23, " Begreffsphilosophie, read Begriffsphilosophie..
" 26, " enunated, read enunciated.
" 30, " connection, and came, read connection, came.
" 32, " creation of, read creation of an.
" 35, 1, " unknown, read unknown.
" 2-10, delete all double quotes.
" 36, 1, for make, read make to.
" 10, " almost, " almost certain
" 29,34, " contmpporary, etc., read contemporary.
" 26, 27, " particular, read particular
" 30, " indispensible, read indispensable.
" 38, " par, read part.
" 42, " as, read as the.
" 37, 14, " presuppose, read presuppposes.
" 38, " refuse, read refute.
" 39, " consciousness, read consciousness holding.
" 39, " reconditi n, read recognition
" 29, 19, " center, read centering.
" 33, 35, " treatd, " treated..
" 35, " person, " persons.
" 44, " absured, " absurd.
" 31, 1, delete a priori.
" 33, 6, for if, read of.
" 11, " aba, " abandon.
" 27-28, " sosiety, read society.
" 31, " whcih, " which.
" 33, 10, " skelis, " skills.
" 34, 2, " socicy, " society.
" 14, 5 perhaps, " perhaps.

P. 31, l. 17, for Cellner, read Cellner.
" 30, " thought, " thought.
" 35, " Toynbee, " Toynbee.
" 35, 4, " undergardeate, read undergraduate.

Bradley, Lord Lindsay, and G.D.H. Cole taught at one or another time in Oxford; Sidgwick, Seeley, Maitland, Figgis, Lord Acton, and Sir Ernest Barker in Cambridge; Wallas, Hobhouse, and Laski in London.
Thus Oxford Idealism is worth study in terms of the consequences it produced, both upon universities and upon political theory. What happens when the attempt is made "to institutionalize fundamental thought in a society which has no official creed?" Is it true that as the amateur is ousted by the specialist, political theory tends to become scholastic and cut off from national life? Consideration of such issues have persuaded me that the advent of Idealism is the most significant episode in a transition not otherwise explicable.

Before beginning my inquiry, it may serve some purpose to define the subject of this panel from the point of view I propose to apply here. Few detailed investigations of political theory have considered its relation to the university.

Much monographic work and even more fundamental thinking about the concepts which might order such an inquiry will be necessary before the question posed here can begin to receive anything like an adequate answer. For the significance of the problem is matched by the difficulties inherent in assembling and analyzing the relevant data, which fall into the domain of no one conventional discipline. A.O. Lovejoy has discerned no less than twelve fields relevant to the history of ideas alone.[2] And although the development of political thought is presumably an area not unknown to us, few political scientists have regarded the history of universities as worth their attention, and almost none have taken into account the best empirical work done in the sociology of knowledge. Yet careful comparative analysis of the types of political ideas which have emerged from university settings ought to contribute much to a subject hitherto little marred by solid research: that of the social and psychological conditions which determine the emergence of new political theories and their subsequent acceptance, modification, diffusion, or rejection. There is no shortage of large general hypotheses about the part played by ideas in political and social action. Yet we know little about the matters most obviously relevant to the subject. Few worthwhile studies exist of the formal patterns by which intellectual life has been organized in universities, or of informal groupings such as the esoteric study group which may be even more significant. Despite all that has been written about intellectuals, there is not much of value on the life-histories, social origins, and religious backgrounds of political theorists. And too great a gap exists between the historian of ideas and those concerned with the sociology of knowledge. The intellectual historian is obsessed by the study of ifluence or by the immanent development of concepts in isolation from their institutional context; the sociologist of knowledge, bemused by theories of class or social role, is inclined to disregard the power of the exceptional individual or the exceptional body of ideas which may convert men chiefly by intellectual means. We need a new kind of intellectual biography and historical sociology to understand the contributions of univer-

sities to political theory. But there are formidable obstacles to any such development in the antipathy felt by historians to social theory and the no less blind rejection of historical materials by those who feel that human behaviour can be studied only in its most recent manifestations.

No less a difficulty is that of an adequate terminology. What exactly is meant by "the contributions of universities to political theory?" I take it that "political theory" carries in this phrase a broad rather than a narrow reference, that it includes what is usually meant by political philosophy, but is not limited to inquiries about the nature of the just political order. As voices from the University of Chicago have reminded us, classical political thought did not exclude careful study of actual political life, "the nature and determinants of political activity... and the method and techniques for conducting political research."[3] This point is relevant to Oxford Idealism, not beacuse its members practiced political theory of this sort, but because they did not. Although most of them had been trained in a classical curriculum, their milieu disposed them to pass over this part of Aristotle's interests. It will be suggested that their definition of theory derived from their theological preoccupations. In any case, Oxford Idealists left as their legacy to Anglo-American thought the notion that their subject is "essentially an ethical study, which regards the state as a moral society... and seeks to determine its relation to the moral constitution and moral development of man."[4]

This leads to a further query: in what sense do universities contribute to politial theory. The university has adapted itself to strikingly different periods of Western thought and society. Whitehead has written, "The universities have trained the intellectual pioneers of our civilisation - the priests, the lawyers, the statesmen, the doctors, the men of science, and the men of letters. They have been the home of those ideals which lead men to confront the confusion of their present times."[5] But this claim may go too far. Michael Oakeshott has contended that it is more accurate to consider the university as being "neither a beginning nor an end, but a middle."[6] Its students come to it already formed by family and school; they leave it to go on to other and possibly more decisive intellectual experiences. Yet in some cases, and this is an empirical question, a decisive stamp may be impressed upon both the substantive beliefs and the style of analysis which the student will use thereafter in his thinking about politics. The deposit that is left upon his mind in these forms can be called his university's contribution, what there is about a thinker which would be otherwise or not present at all, had he been trained elsewhere. Universities may be characterized by the presence of a pervasive ethos, say that of public service, or indifference to it in favor of a disinterested Wissenschaft; by their organization of knowledge into distinct faculties, or by the absence of specialization; by their formal curriculum or by what actually is taught through disputation, lecture, or tutorial; by their examination system and other sanctions; by the social composition of their

students and the extent to which they educate themselves as they live in colleges, at home, or in cities away from home. All these considerations, together with the presence of a faculty which has something to say about politics and the freedom to say it, will determine how students will be taught to speculate about the goals and functioning of the political order. The university may have its effect principally by the opposition it arouses, as in France where the most stereotyped of curricula produces a fierce intellectual individualism. But more often a man's university training will determine which problems will be for him the core of political theory and what the vocabulary will be in which he puts his speculations. It has been said that political science has never developed its own distinctive set of terms, but has always borrowed the language of other disciplines: thus the Greeks used the vocabulary of ethics; St. Augustine, that of theology; Austin, jurisprudence; and Spencer, biology.[7] And the recent past, has not much of what passes for political theory in this country been a controversy about which new language we ought to adopt, with economics, psychoanalysis, various styles of sociology, cultural anthropology, and cybernetics all presented as the suitable terminology? Such a choice is always closely related to a theorist's concerns, to the type of data he considers relevant, and to his criteria for determining what is true or meaningful. If he has begun to think philosophically while attending a university, his definition of that intellectual enterprise is apt to be determined there. For "philosophy is in large part a matter of explication - and choosing - our concepts, and, incidentally, of choosing what kinds of explications we find acceptable (which amounts to: how in general we view the world and ideas, and what kind of role, say passive or active, we are willing to see them play in our life and society."[8] Thus vocabularies are associated with schemes of explication, and further with angles of vision or political perspectives. It is the exceptional individual who once exposed to a compelling image of the good society can excape from it sufficiently to create an alternative view.

And yet such changes do occur. Occasionally a powerful mind and character can break the mould and replace it by one of his own. It would be a poor treatment of the contributions made to political theory by the university which could not account for the opening up of such a new track despite all the institutional pressures to preserve the old. This is one of the reasons impelling me to study the introduction of Idealism into Oxford. For we know little about what takes place when a previously unknown way of thinking about politics gains acceptance. Is this to be attributed exclusively to the personal qualities of the man founding the school? Or is it that he has capitalized upon circumstances he has discovered rather than created, changes in the mode of production, or in the locus of political power, or needs originating in some massive social or religious movement? These are familiar problems, but they cannot be ignored. The issues they pose may be summed up in the following questions about any theorist considered in relation to his university milieu: What

have been the effects of the university on the individual? Of the individual on the university? Of society, on both? Of both, on society? It is no easy matter to make such an analytical separations of phenomena which are in fact intimately interconnected. But these are the principal questions I shall seek to answer about Green and Oxford Idealism.

II

Although there are sharp limits to the utility of studying single cases, there are also compensating advantages in undertaking them at certain points in a field's development. Not the least of these is that investigators may judge just how promising a method is by applying it to materials previously worked over by conventional means. And few schools of philosophy have received more attention than the Oxford Idealists. Yet this period ranks among the more puzzling episodes in British intellectual history: the dominance in most universities between 1870 and 1914 of a school imported from abroad at a time when it was at low ebb in Germany, its country of origin L.T. Hobhouse could write in 1905: "For thirty years and more English thought has been subject...to powerful influences from abroad. The Rhine has flowed into the Thames, at any rate into those upper reaches of the Thames, known locally as the Isis, and from the Isis the stream of German idealism has been diffused over the academical world of Great Britain."[9] This Idealist victory has often been described, but never satisfactorily explained. For both before and after this interspace, British thought has been marked by a strong mistrust of metaphysics, sometimes taking the form of a marked preference for the language of common sense, at others by hedonism, empiricism, or the occasional tendency to exalt the method of the natural sciences as the proper model for ethics and political philosophy. Yet T.G. Green and his followers deliberately rejected this tradition article by article. How then could he attract disciples and found an all-conquering movement at Oxford? And why did Idealism in Green's hands become a rationale for political reform even in that most conservative of settings?

Perhaps because Oxford Idealism was the last British political theory in the grand style, a system, that is, based upon a metaphysic, epistemology, and ethics, and was even equipped with a theology and philosophy of history, it now receives little attention in the place where once it flourished. By the iron law of intellectual reaction, Idealism is considered by Oxford analytical philosophers as an uninteresting episode in that series of errors which constitutes the history of English thought between Hume and Russell. One of them, Mr. T.D. Weldon has given a sociological explanation of Idealism, not because he believed in sociology, but because trivial subjects deserve to be treated in a trivial way: "Idealism was a highly sophisticated word game", used "to give an a priori endorsement to the moral and political principles which the educational

system inaugurated by Dr. Arnold impressed upon the minds of those destined to be rulers."[10] In short, Idealism was an ideology serving the purposes of those established in control of Church and State.

This consideration is not supported by any evidence, and indeed, the facts point in quite another direction. Green's philosophy did not win its victories because it was a conventional apologetic.

When Green first began to develop his own ideas, Oxford was dominated by Aristotle in ethics and politics, while Mill was the last word in logic. Green's first converts to Idealism, students as gifted as F.H. Bradley and R.L. Nettleship, were denied First Class honors by examiners who were shocked by these young men presumptuous enough to discard the language of Aristotle and Mill for that of Kant, Hegel, and Green. Idealism at Oxford was begun as a movement of radical reform, not only in thought but in the fields of University organization and national politics. Where, then, is the explanation to be found?

This question can best be answered, as I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere, by examining the religious predicament of Green and those in his audience who shared both his inheritance and his dilemma.[10a] For he was the son of an Evangelical clergyman in the Church of England, as were Bernard Bosanquest, A.C. and F.H. Bradley. And in mid-Victorian Oxford, there existed an acute crisis of religious belief which was accentuated by the special conditions of the university and its relationship to the turbulant society outside its gates. There had been a momentous revival of religious faith in England. Evangelicalism emerged from the fundamentalist and ascetic Protestant movement begun by the Wesleys in the eighteenth century. The term applies to no one specific denomination. The Church of England had an Evangelical branch; the non-conformist sects, almost moribund in the previous century were revived in the nineteenth by the impulse originating in Methodism, which was forced against its will to leave the Established Church. Wesleyanism, which began as an attempt to rehabilitate Christianity among the lower classes, succeeded so well that it had a profound effect as well upon the religious beliefs, the manners and the morals of the middle class. As Elie Halevy has written in his magesterial history of nineteenth century Britain, we "witness Methodism bring under its influence, first the Dissenting sects, then the Establishment, finally secular opinion."[11] Or in the words of a contemporary witness, "... In 1810 only two gentlemen in Staffordshire had family prayers. In 1850 only two did not." But at the time Green began to formulate his ideas in the 1860's, discoveries in science and scholarship had begun to raise fundamental doubts in the minds of thinking men about the validity of this unreasoning fundamentalism based upon the literal iterpretation of the Bible.

In Green's Oxford, religion was the obsessive issue that eclipsed all others. In the memoirs of his more articulate contemporaries, again and again the same note is struck: always the recurring, undermining doubt raised by science and scholarship at war with the will to believe. In the place where the embers of the Oxford Movement still smouldered,

the claims of Christianity pressed upon men with an urgency that precluded indifference. Yet the educated and thinking person could not easily ignore the onslaughts upon the foundations of his Faith. Religious belief was being sapped by two separate types of inquiry: natural science and the higher criticism of the Bible. The results of their inquiries were particularly damaging to those who had been trainedto read the Bible as being true down to its last word. For most mid-Victorian Christianity seemed to involve four propositions: the transcendence of God; the origin of the world in an act of creation in time; the claim of scripture to be an authoritative revelation of truth otherwise unobtainable by men; and the salvation of individuals in a life beyond the grave.[12] But the Book of Genesis did not stand up before the geologists, nor could it be seen at first how Darwin could be iterpreted otherwise than as an unambiguous alternative to the Biblical account of creation. As for the higher criticism of the Bible, such as Strauss's Life of Jesus, which had been translated by George Eliot, its close scrutiny of texts and historical relativism tended to discredit belief in miracles on the basis of authority.

In Oxford, so long a training-ground for the Church of England, it seemed that men must choose between Faith and reason. The way to agnosticism or detheism lay open, but before this prospect many quailed. For what savor could there be in a life without God? And yet did one have the right to fly in the face of the best knowledge of the age? It was this dilemma that first brought Green to philosophy, and it was his decision to ally himself with one of the major parties in the dispute which accounts for much of the impact he was to have. Two strategies were available to those who wished to continue: either they could repudiate the new knowledge, ot else they could attempt to accomodate Christianity to it. The gap between these two views was very great, and at Oxford constituted one of the major issues dividing the High Church party of the Church of England from the latitudinarian Liberals known as the Broad Churchmen. Their animosity dated back to the days of the Oxford Movement when the famous Tracts written for the most part by Newman, were suspended at the istigation of the Broad Church party. The High Churchmen led by Pusey and Liddon, although they had not followed Newman into the Church of Rome, continued to argue as he had done that the truths of Revelation are simply not accessible to human reason. Hence the miracles reported in the Scriptures as well as the Biblical account of the creation must be believed on the basis of authority. Seen from this point of view, the Broad Churchmen were guilty of what Newman called Liberalism, "the mistake of subjecting to human judgement those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the devine word."[13]

The Broad Churchmen led by Benjamin Jowett argued that Christianity must adapt itself to the best knowledge of the age. The essential truths of Christianity are valid for all time but the intellectual formulae in which they are phrased must from time to time be altered.

Green's Broad Churchmanship is to be found in his attempt to drop the traditional dogmatic theology of Christianity which was phrased in historical terms in favor of a restatement based upon Idealist metaphysics. By this means, he thought he could remove the ostensible conflict between the truths of science and the truths of religion; that he could provide through his philosophy an a priori and hence unassailable basis for belief. And this he asserted could be done by the use of reason alone. But what does all this have to do with his political theory? A good deal, it will turn out, for Green made his appeal to those disciplined in Evangelical families, and what he proposed was that they turn away from seeking to save themselves in the next world to the task of improving the condition of the suffering in this one. In politics as in theology, the doctrine of citizenship and reform developed by Green can best be understood as a surrogate faith appealing to a generation which had been brought up to regard dedication to cause and self-sacrifice as the most spiritual and noble of human characteristics.

It is somewhat difficult for us to believe today that there could be such an intimate connection between theology and politics, or that very many could ever have been agitated by this clash of rival views in Oxford: The High Church party, Orthodox, insisting on the claims of authority; the Broad Church party, Liberal, modernist, advocating what it called the claims of reason. Yet a novel which sold a million copies, Mrs. Humphrey Ward's Robert Elsmere, is based on these theological differences, and Gladstone himself dropped his duties as Prime Minister to refute its message.[14] The book is dedicated to Green, and thinly disguised as Professor Grey, he plays a prominent part in it. Two themes dominate the novel: the crisis of conscience, and its resolution in a form which applies religious energies to the secular problems of modern life. Robert Elsmere, the hero and disciple of Professor Grey-Green, first becomes a clergyman in the Church of England, and then his faith shaken by the higher criticism, leaves the Church to practice a creed he believes consistent with reason. And the duties prescribed by Green's faith are activist, rather than contemplative, teaching te duties of applied altruism rather than personal piety. Man must show his faith by helping those less fortunate than himself, the upper classes should atone for their injustice and callousness to the poor.

The Liberalism of Green's theology led to Liberalism in politics, a connection inherent, not in logic, but in the special conditions of Oxford controversy. Green's Liberalism would not possess its distinguishing qualities had he not spent his career at Oxford amidst the forces Newman analyzed: the allience between reformers in politics, in university organization, and theology on the one side; and Toryism, High Church Orthodoxy, and resistance to change in the University on the other. It will soon appear how Green was given his chance to make philosophy an autonomous and influential field of study by the Broad Church party in the name of reason; it will become no less clear that

Green's philosophical method, which is at the heart of his political theory, was fixed, some might say vitiated, by considerations essentially theological in nature. For although ostensibly welcoming the results of science and history, Green sought to build his new foundations for belief on ground which could not be undermined by any empirical evidence whatever. The intellectual style which he used was in part a rebellion against the Oxford modes of thought which he had first learned as an undergraduate, and then taught as a Fellow of Balliol; but in its teleological emphasis, its definition of political philosophy as essentially a moral study, he reaffirmed in part the teaching of Aristotle, the master of Oxford's thought ever since its foundation in the twelfth century. And thus it is that men in conscious rebellion against the university which formed them, are not, in the final analysis, completely emancipated from it. Everyone who spends his adult life in Oxford will be marked by its conetmporary controversies and the powerful traditions of its past. The analytical philosopher may mock his Idealist predecessor, but all the same, some attitudes of both may be recognized as distinctive of Oxford. But at this point such remarks must appear to be mere assertion. Only by a closer look at the continuities and changes in the organization of philosophical teaching at Oxford will Green's place in its development be clarified. What did Oxford contribute to his thought, and he to its?

III

"Oxford", it has been said, "likes the taste of old wine too well; is too fearful of losing some subtle unanalysed residual value, to throw it away."[15]. Styles of thinking and ideas of human perfection persist there despite the most profound changes in English politics and society, in the governance of Oxford itself, and in what it teaches. Yet there is a danger, when emphasizing its continuity, of passing over such innovation as has been accepted. For more than a hundred years, the University has been pressed from both outside and inside to move faster than, left to itself, it would have done. This has brought striking results, and Oxford today has travelled even further from what it was in Green's time, than the University of his day was from the low point to which it sank in the eighteenth century. But the great modern University is not my concern here, although the values of old Oxford cannot be said to have been completely routed. Tobe a reformer there has always been a frustrating occupation. In attempting to trace the principal lines of development in Oxford's history, no doubt much that I say will be schematic. But surely not many will quarrel with the salient points that emerge: Oxford's consistent emphasis until the recent past upon a curriculum deliberately narrow in scope and centered on Aristotle; its identification, from the Renaissance on, of liberal education with that of a gentleman-amateur, proficient in Greek and Latin; the close ties linking the University to the center of political power in London

and to the governing class; the continuing significance of the Church; and the conservatism, which some might to prefer to call piety, alluded to above.

Not much will be said about Cambridge, that "most noble and most equal sister. [16]. But in attempting to grasp the extraordinary continuity of Oxford's intellectual tradition from the time of its foundation until Green's time, it may be useful to recall the words of a great historian of political ideas, who, meditating upon his experience at both Oxford and Cambridge, had this to say about the genius loci of each: "Oxford from an early date accepted the sovereignity of Aristotle and the authority of antiquity; it pursued a general and ancyclopedic wisdom, and it discovered the fountain of that wisdom in the past. Cambridge was later in finding a single acknowledged master; but the master when he came, was one of its own sons, Issac Newton, and he was a master of deep and ascertained knowledge in the one field of natural philosophy."[17].

John Henry Newman, in the lectures he delivered on The Idea of a University long after he had left Oxford, proved how strong was its imprint by his remarks on Aristotle: "While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotleans, for the great Master does but analyse the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind.... In many subject matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it."[18]. These remarks delivered in 1852 at about the time Green entered Oxford, indicates how persistent was Aristotle's influence. This had begun early. Like most universities founded in the middle ages, Oxford insisted that all students study for their B.A.'s the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy). The grammar was Latin, the universal language of educated men, and the key to further study as a Master. Rhetoric taught composition, and the arts of persuasion; logic, which in time came to virtually annex these two other fields, provided the means for argumentation training in rigorous deductive thought: "To analyse, to subdivide, to know the pros and cons of every argument, to be alert in disputation, in posing questions and in suggesting replies - these were the arts which appealed to teacher and student alike."[19]. And outstanding ability in disputation might open a brilliant career to the student. Already skill in debate and polished ease in presenting a case were highly prized; some aspects of the British political tradition go far back. The undergraduate, forced to spend at least four years at his studies, had to master not only the seven arts but also the three philosophies: Natural, moral, and metaphysical. In each of these fields, as in so many of the arts, the established authority was Aristotle. Althoughmost students terminated their work after they became B.A.'s, some persevered for three more years in order to gain the Master's which would allow them to teach. Professional schools existed for the study of medicine, law, and theology, long and difficult courses. For Doctors of Divinity sixteen to nineteen years of training were not thought excessive.[20]. But few chose to take the D.D. Contra-

ry to the usual impression, the university offered most men who became priests little religious training. Yet high proportion of students did take orders. There was a tradition of service, for the medieval university took care to assure, in the language of an ancient prayer, "That there may never be wanting a supply of persons duly qualified to serve God both in Church and State."[21] But the feudal nobility with its own system of chivalric education almost never appeared at the universities.

Although Oxford was fundamentally changed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the study of Aristotle and stress upon logic remained. But Renaissance humanism accented Greek and rhetoric in a new style, and grammar, freed from its medieval subordination to logic, was increasingly studied through classical authors. And Oxford, after it ceased to be controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, found that it had come under the closer scrutiny of the Crown. Archbishop Laud in 1636 completely revised and codified the medieval statutes of the University. As for the new science, although it found no place in the instruction prescribed by statute, nevertheless was often taught by college tutors to their students. The same was done with Machiavelli, Bodin, and other political theorists of the period.[22] And the social composition of the University was transformed. For the first time the nobility and gentry began to regard a university education as necessary and desirable. There arose a type, from this time on very influential, but hitherto unknown in the higher classes of society, the virtuoso or amateur gentleman of cultivation, "a man for whom learning is the means to dispose of wealth or leisure in the happiest fashion - and with the comforting assurance that he may also be serving the desiderants of philosophy, history, or art."[23] This ideal was to be one of the reasons why hereafter the British upper classes would scorn professional and scientific training. The Renaissance gentleman had a lasting effect on the definition of liberal education.

The eighteenth century is by common, if not universal consent, the nadir of Oxford's long existence. If the testimony of Gibbon, Adam Smith, and Bentham are to be believed, Oxford in this period ought to be studied as a case of institutional atrophy, an example of how an university may become decadent, ceasing to perform its traditional functions without replacing them by any positive contributions. Outside its walls, momentous changes were recreating society and knowledge as well; but the industrial revolution produced no echoes in Oxford, nor did the scientific revolution, which had been so advanced by Englishmen outside the universities, receive any aid or recognition from the ancient foundation. The enlightment failed to arouse it, Oxford slept on, Tory in politics, high and dry in theollgy. The University as such had virtually ceased to exist, for beginning in the Renaissance, power both over the course of study and finances had fallen into the hands of the college tutors, who provided instruction for all subjects wanted for the B.A.. As far as graduate instruction went, the situation had deteriorated considerably from that existing during the middle ages. Although the

faculties of theology, medicine, and law still existed in name, and further professorships had been added at various times by the Crown and private benefectors, this aspect of Oxford was pitiable in its futility. Often professorships were treated sinecures to be held along with one or more parishes by some clergyman who had political or eclesiastical influence. Sometimes he did not even deliver his statutory lectures; if unusually conscientious, he would hire a substitute at a fraction of his own salary. Even when professors were qualified and serious, audiences were not easy to come by. As late as 1852, the Regius Professor of Medicine had to abandon his lectures after the number of his hearers dropped from 10 to 4. In any case, even after nineteenth cenury reforms, undergraduates could not have been more indifferent since they knew that their degrees in no way depended upon their attending professorial lectures. But most striking of all, undergraduates received their degrees without examination. The medieval procedures that were supposed to govern those matters had fallen into such neglect that some of their terms were no longer even understood. The tangle of precedents, regulations, and bequests defied description, for the statutes had last been completely revamped during the reign of Charles I. The colleges, varied greatly in the resources and style of life available to their tutors. Even when colleges contemplated improvement, they were usually obliged to choose their scholars and fellows on the basis of considerations completely apart from merit, such as donor's kin, or preference for candidates from a favored school or district. All college fellows, the faculty in practice, had to be celibate clergymen. The university was an Anglican preserve, which by denying degrees to Dissenters, Roman Catholics, and Jews, excluded much of the nation, and in particular the increasingly powerful middle class. Needless to say, Oxford students contemplated few careers outside the Church of England, public life, the University or the public schools, the bar, or that traditional aristocratic occupation designated by the Balliol College Register simply as "landowner". Noblemen wore a special gold tassel on their caps until 1870; a class of poor students called servitors existed to render at small cost menial duties to "gentleman commoners".[24]

Much of this picture holds true of nineteenth century Oxford as well. There were important reforms within, and in time these were reinforced by the Royal Commissions which, beginning in 1850, prompted Parliamentary revision of Oxford's statutes. But religious discriminations were not removed until 1870, and every change in the old order was bitterly resisted. There were many who opposed any intervention by Parliament, some no doubt to protect their interests and privileges, others because they believed that Oxford was well on the way to doing what had to be done, and would suffer more in the long run if the rude hand of the state were allowed to interfere with the University.

What were the changes which could be cited as evidence of Oxford's spontaneous reformation? In 1880, the University for the first time produced a system of examinations mandatory upon everyone taking his

B.A., and providing as well the opportunity for exceptional students to receive honors, also by this previously unknown means of public and competitive trial of their abilities. But the spirit of innovation stopped here. This revolution in administration was in subject matter but a restoration of Aristotle. This is worth noting not only as a further example of Oxford reliance on that author, but as an indication that the use of the word "reform" still retained at this time its old meaning of restoring an institution to an earlier excellence by the removal of abuses. No one dreamed of improving the University by any radical addition or transformation, of raising it to a level unattained in the past. The subject remained what tradition had sanctified: grammar, rhetoric, logic, and rudimentary mathematics. The classics received their due in the emphasis placed upon knowledge of Latin and Greek, at least three authors from these languages had to be presented for sight translation. Some religious matter was also obligatory. This body of studies was known as Literae Humaniores, or "Greats". During the nineteenth century it was steadily expanded to include first ancient history, moral and political philosophy ("insofar as they may be drawn from the writees of antiquity"), and a paper in the history of philosophy.[25.]

In the early nineteenth century, a School of Mathematics and Physics appeared although its standard was low until the last quarter of the century. After such sweeping change, Oxford had to wait fifty years before the creation of a School of Natural Science and another of Law and Modern History. But no candidate could take any of these subjects without passing through Literae Humaniores. Not until 1911 was the Greek requirement waived for those taking science or mathematics. On the whole the University improved in the first half of the 19th century. The intellectual life, especially of honors candidates, became more lively and industrious. For the "pass men", a majority of the students, life at Oxford meant, in the words of a great social historian: "much unscientific cricket and rowing, a fair amount of riding and hunting, occasional street fighting, some wenching, and much drinking."[26.] The same authority remarks of the best men producers by the reformed Greats School, that although none of them could have discussed science with Prince Albert that "many were competent scholars, several were excellent scholars, and the imprint of a thorough, if narrow, classical education is visible in Hansard whenever the speaker is Peel or Lord John Russell, Gladstone, or Derby."[27.]

What is the significance of the peculiar characteristics of the Greats school? Whitehead has attributed to it and the schools which prepared for it, a great part of the responsibility for the failures and successes of nineteenth century England.[28.] Science, technology, specialized learning of the kind perfected in Germany, all this was as unknown to this ruling class with its classical education as was modern competitive society and its problems. But they thought logically and saw clearly what they saw at all. Classical emphasis on moderation "entered into our philosophy of statesmanship, sometimes reinforcing

our natural stupidity, sometimes moderating our national arrogance."[29] The landowners, the most successful men in business, and commerce, and the professional men who made up the ruling group were educated, either by private tutors or public schools, and then Oxford and Cambridge, in a style which insisted not only that the classics were the one thing worth studying for a gentleman, but also that the world, human nature, and politics were pretty much now as they had been then. It would be an interesting enterprise to attempt to determine the extent to which this was a useful assumption in domestic and foreign affairs, but it would take us too far afield. What is rather more pertinent here is the question of what part of the classical inheritance was found pertinent to the nineteenth century, and what the objectives of study in fact were. Whitehead's description of his own in training in a small public school of the 1870's probably reflects the university training of his masters of the previous generation, "a curious mixture of imaginative appeal and precise, detailed knowledge."[30] There was no attention given to foreign languages; For Latin and Greek did not fall into that category, but were simply the indispensable means for learning everything of importance that had ever been said. Ancient history was seen through the predispositions shared equally by Liberal schoolmasters, Tory parents, and students. "We did not want to explain the origin of anything. We wanted to read about people like ourselves and to imbibe their ideals."[31] Roman history stopped with the murder of Julius Caesar, because freedom ended at that time. But Athens was the ideal city. Not that Periclean Athens was exactly like mid-Victorian England; historical pedantry was not the issue. Rather the Athenian navy and the British navy were seen as the bastions of freedom. Russia in the nineteenth century looked rather like the Persia of Darius and India was seen in terms of what the Greeks said about the barbarians. Of all this Whitehead concluded:

"Although we were a happy set of boys receiving a deplorably narrow education to fit us for the modern world. But I will disclose one private opinion, based upon no confusing research, that as a course in philosophical imagination, the Harvard School of Politics and Government cannot hold a candle to the old-fashioned English classical education...."[32]

Whitehead's case for the type of education offered in the Greats School in part resembles the position taken by those inside Oxford who opposed Parliamentary reform of the University. Two arguments were employed by them: the first, a defence of Literae Humaniores as the best means of educating men into their humanitas, their true form, their essential human nature, this was eloquently put by Newman in The Idea of a University; the second, was Dr. Pusey's contention that the historic purpose of Oxford would be destroyed if it ceased to be an exclusively Anglican institution. In this respect, the High Churchmen applied to the issue of University reform what the Oxford Movement affirmed, "the passionate assertion that the Church must rule or society will cease to be Christian."[33] What was Dr. Pusey's conception

of the University?

"The problem and special work of an University, is not how to advance science, not how to make discoveries, not to form new schools of mental philosophy, nor to invent new modes of analysis, not to produce works in Medicine, Jurisprudence, or even Theology; but to form minds religiously, morally, intellectually, which shall discharge aright whatever duties God, in his Providence shall appoint to them.?[34] The notion that truth has been discovered, and that its authoritative form is to be found in the teaching of the Church, has seldom been put more sternly than this. And the political overtones are conservative in the extreme. They were dangerously out of keeping with developments in the country.

In the 1840's Oxford, so long protected from the reform movements of the century began to feel pressure from outside, and the middle-class had an increasing power to make its demands met. Elated by the passage of the First Reform Bill and the repeal of the Corn Laws, it began to take notice of proposals that would open Oxford and Cambridge to more than the fraction for whom they had been reserved. Principles of liberalism, utilitarianism, science, and specialization were in the air. Since that liberalism was pledged to remove the disabilities imposed upon Dissenters, to uproot ancient privileges, and aristocratic monopolies, it could be predicted that the exclusive position of the Anglican Church would not be mainained indefinitely. Within Oxford itself, a new group of men often themselves the products of colleges such as Balliol which now chose fellows on the basis of merit, began to advocate changes. The leader of this party was Benjamin Jowett, a liberal in theology as well as in university politics, and Green's tutor. Jowett and his party argued that there was but one defense against wholesale change imposed from outside: Oxford must reform itself and thus anticipate more drastic criticism. The main issue in their view was precisely the same in university organization as in the religious crisis. How could ancient institutions be adapted to the developments over the last two centuries which had transformed the nation and the state of man's knowledge? Stubborn insistance on maintaining antiquated forms would mean the loss of everything valuable in the essential spirit. What this meant for the University was that if the relations of social classes in the nation had been considerably altered, if learning and science were no longer what they had been, if faith had to be defended on grounds other than those which were traditional, then Oxford must adjust itself to the new situation. But of course prudence prescribed that change must not go too fast or go too far. Jowett was most concerned to put the teaching of Literae Humaniores on an efficient basis. He was himself so much the product of it that he cared little about the natural sciences and development of specialized and advanced studies, nor did he favor any drastic change in the prevalent system which assigned primary responsibility for teaching to the colleges rather than to university professors, as on the Continent. Jowett is an interesting example of a man who can see up to a given point

what ought to be changed in the institution which formed him, but will not go past that point. He set himself against the position taken up by his former partner in reform, Mark Pattison, who wrote in his Suggestions on Academical Organization, published in 1868: "There remains but one possible pattern on which a University, as an establishment for science, can be constructed, and that is the graduated professoriate. This is sometimes called the German type.... What I wish to contend is, that the Professor of a modern University ought to regard himself primarily as a learner, and a teacher only secondarily.... But we must go further than this: ... No teacher who is a teacher only, and not himself a daily student...can be competent to treat any of the higher parts of any moral or speculative science."35.

Green, who was to give very similar testimony before the next University Commission, had his essential disagreement with Jowett on this same issue. Despite all the genuinely conservative elements in Jowett's thought, he was nevertheless considered radical and even subversive in Oxford. Although now remembered principally as the translator of Plato and Thucydides, he was notorious to the mid-Victorians as the editor of Essays and Reviews, which caused one of the great religious scandals of that period. Jowett found himself accused of heresy and denied his pay as Professor of Greek by the hostility of the High Church party. What his crime amounted to, was the demand that clergymen be allowed to discuss the Bible in the light of modern criticism, and that all shades of theological opinion be tolerated within the Church.

All this is most relevant to the introduction of philosophy as an independent and professional study in the Oxford curriculum, for the rivalry between reformers and defenders of the existing order, between Broad Churchmen and High Churchmen, gave Green his opportunity and direction and also presented him with his greatest obstacle. When he was a student of Jowett, the older man introduced him to German thought and Biblical criticism. From this beginning, Green began to develop a comprehensive philosophy. Jowett had seen that the old course of study encouraged deference to authority and a narrow traditionalism. And so he and the other reformers moved to alter the books studied. In a letter to Florence Nightingale Jowett wrote: "When I was an undergraduate, we were fed upon Bishop Butler and Aristotle's Ethics, and almost all teaching leaned to the support of doctrines of authority. Now there are new subjects, Modern History and Physical Science, and more important than these, perhaps is the real study of metaphysics in the Literae Humaniores school--every man...who goes in for honors has read Bacon and probably Locke, Mill's Logic, Plato, Aristotle, and the history of ancient philosophy. See how impossible this makes a return to the old doctrines of authority.

The Hebrew Conservative, Dr. Pusey, has just found this out... and is going to try to upset all this.... But I think that we can

hinder him...."[36]

How had philosophy been studied before the changes to which Jowett alludes? Here it is important to understand not only what was taught, but how it had been taught, and even more, what was expected by the examiners. In Oxford lectures by professors counted very little in the life of an undergraduate, even one reading for honors. He was prepared for college lectures focused on the examinations, and most crucial of all, by meetings with his tutor, again drawn from his college. Tutorial was meant to be Socratic in method. It was not unusual as examinations approached to read certain subjects with a private coach who specialized in a given subject. On the whole, tutorial work tended to center on the set books, few in number and meant to sharpen the wits of undergraduates by the detailed reading, commenting, and expounding of works like Aristotle's used for this purpose over the centuries. This type of skill was developed further by the insistance upon mastery of the texts in the original Latin and Greek. In examinations, students were also asked to write general essays on philosophic topics, but rhetorical skill rather than systematic knowledge of philosophy was rewarded. Most often the candidate had memorized in advance essays, complete with brilliant phrases, and examples worked up the candidate with his tutor or coach. The questions were drawn up and marked by examiners who might have no particular technical competence. Nowhere in the University before Green, were students taught that there are better and worse ways of using philosophic concepts, or that a thinking man ought to attempt to make a principled choice if confronted with alternative systems. Nor except for a few lectures on ethics, was there any discussion of philosophical subjects, apart that is from texts and authors. The approach was literary and amateur, rather than technical and professional. In part this was due to the ideal of liberal education, but there was a new element in Oxford life which had been introduced by the competitive examination. This was an unanticipated consequence of reform. Both honors candidates and their tutors were completely caught up in the attempt to distinguish themselves and their colleges by success in the examination schools. Fellowships, careers in the civil service or elsewhere, all depended upon achieving first-class honors. In the scheme of things, there was little room for research or expertise. This barrier to conceiving of the University as a place where knowledge might be advanced came to be as formidable as the older and more leisurely ways. Jowett saw nothing objectionable in this situation; Pattison and Green thought it unworthy of a national university.

All this had prevented the development of any technical work in philosophy. Green had been first attracted to Idealism through German theology, which offered a means of paraphrasing Christian doctrine in such a way that it seemed adequate to the modern intelligence. One of the leading themes of the Broad Church movement was precisely its insistence that reason need not be feared by religion, and so Green found welcome support in German Idealism which buttressed this position with great subtlety and intellectual power. But it involved a technical

language and a metaphysical outlook of a kind not previously encouraged at Oxford. Jowett, at first Green's supporter, balked when he saw Green was acquiring a following which really took metaphysics seriously. For Jowett had originally viewed the study of metaphysics as a solvent of men's received opinions, not as the basis for a new faith. What he really believed in was the value of teaching the history of thought, which by revealing the failure of all known systems, had the effect of freeing young men from their prejudices without putting any new and inconvenient convictions in their place. To the older Oxford ideal of making its students gentlemen of character who had been trained how to think logically, Jowett added what he thought indipensable in the new age: the habit of hard work, the passionate desire to succeed, and the respect for demostrated merit by men despite their social origins. He taught aristocrats to labor and middle-class men to think in terms of public responsibility. Few men have had such power to affect the lives of their students, and the part played by Balliol in Victorian life is almost without precedent. But even if Jowett contributed to the formation of the Civil Service at home and in India, he never perceived the value of professionalism in the modern world. He once described someone to a student as "over-educated." His pupil, puzzled, asked just what that phrase might mean, and Jowett responded that "intellect might be developed beyond the character and will. It happens in the case of German mostly."[37] Jowett advised Marshall not to use mathematics in his Principles of Economics; he turned against Green when his student used the abstruse language of Idealism. As a reformer of Oxford, Jowett's goals were limited. Unlike Mark Pattison who thought that research and the training of advanced students had some place in a national university, Jowett championed Bildung as against Wissenschaft, the formation of undergraduates' characters and minds, rather than the advancement of learning. And it was Jowett who won on most questions.

Green came into conflict with Jowett on the issue of teaching Idealism. As a Fellow of Balliol, Green was charged with lecturing on Aristotle, Plato, and the history of early Greek thought. He took his lecturing and tutorial duties seriously, indeed he had little time to work on his own ideas. To teach Aristotle to undergraduates was not his ideal, but slowly a group numbering some of the best and most independent young men at Oxford formed around him, attracted by his belief in the "possibility of philosophy". The petition inviting Green to lead their discussion group called him "the man who does more than anyone else in Oxford to teach men to think." They implied that he alone of their teachers took seriously the problem of unifying man's fragmented knowledge, and bringing speculation into relation with contemporary life. Oxford is a place which generates movements, and many of them have had their origin in just such informal gatherings, not associated with any institutional aspect of the University. Sometimes groups of this sort are composed exclusively of students; sometimes as in this case dons are members as well. In this way the formal curriculum was not allowed to suppress fresh thought. But two

members of the essay society had missed their first-class degrees, allegedly because of their use of Idealist concepts they could have learned only from Green. Jowett, who was hypersensitive to success in examinations, immediately became suspicious of his erstwhile disciple, who was acquiring a following among the Fellows as well as the undergraduates. Green then began an unprecendented series of advanced classes on specialized topics in philosophy. Oxford was noted for scant attendance at any academic occasion which not directly connected to examinations, but Green was apparently the first to attract and hold an audience drawn by intellectual curiosity and made up of men already holding the B.A. All this was outside his Balliol duties. Indeed Jowett was fearful that Green might incite other Balliol students to endanger their careers by using Idealist modes of thought, or that he might ruin their minds. "Metaphysics", Jowett now wrote, "exercise a fatal influence upon the mind in destroying the power of observation and of acquiring knowledge."[38] He asked Green not to take any more philosophy classes, and he forced one of Green's brilliant disciples, A. C. Bradley, to leave Balliol. Nor was Jowett the only antagonist. By 1873 Green was the most influential and prominent philosopher in Oxford, and it seemed a foregone conclusion that he would be elected to the Whyte's professorship in moral philosophy which was vacant. But he was passed over in favor of a man who had no connection with University life for ten years. After this result, public opinion made itself felt, and after holding the chair for three years, the incumbent resigned in recognition of Green's claim. Finally he was elected in 1878, but four years before his death. Only then did his official duties permit him to develop his thought in the sequence and on the specialized subjects which interested him. His audiences were unprecedented, and the effect he produced was enormous. By the time of his death Green had pretty much established the point that requires professional competence, and that it is not a valid objection that the concerns of its practitioners oblige them to use specialized language. Green did not live to see advanced instruction for those already possessing degrees, a proposal made by him alone of all the witnesses appearing before the University Commission of 1877.

Asquith, who although a student of Green, was closer to Jowett, nevertheless testified "Between 1870 and 1880 Green was undoubtedly the greatest personal force in the real life of Oxford.... It is not too much to say that by the time of his premature death..., he had transformed both the atmosphere and the methods of philosophical thought and study at Oxford."[39]

By what means did Green produce this result? Here contemporary evidence cannot be disregarded. There were intellectual as well as religious reasons for the decisive impact of Idealism. The speculative and imaginative quality of the school, its connection to history and culture were conspicious contrast to the dryness of what passed for philosophy at Oxford and to the middle-class drabness of Utilitarianism, even when enriched by J.S. Mill. Some critics of Idealism have attempted to

attribute Green's success to qualities more appropriate to a preacher than a philosopher. But the evidence indicated that he was an lecturer whose personal reserve and intellectual austerity alienated many who came eager to be converted. But he was neither a propagandist nor a don obsessed by gaining success for his students in examination. C.E. Vaughan, whose history of political thought may be said to be the application in detail of Green's views, said of him as a teacher: "In teaching...he was great...because he made one feel that truth was to him, and ought to be for anyone who pretended an interest in learning, the one essential thing.... It was so obvious that truth was a serious thing to him...that it was hard to be with him and not to be driven on to learn with a purer interest than one was likely to have had before."[40] In tutorial, he would give his students the sense that he was equally dissatisfied with what they had written and with his own attempts to improve it. Both in lecturing and writing, he spurned easy conclusions and enforced upon himself and his audience the demands of an inexorable procedure. The autonomy and professional integrity of philosophy as a subject independent of"Greats" owes much to Green. The issue between him and Jowett was this: Is philosophy a subject to be taught by trained men who are trusted to develop it along whatever lines and by whatever rules they themselves decide? Or should it be considered as simply one means of producing certain intellectual qualities deemed desirable in young men by their wise elders?

This is not to say that Green was a great philosopher, or even that he met his own standards. There was in him tension between his will to believe and the high demands he postulated for the discipline he championed. This dichotomy was not one that he would have recognized, for his outlook consistently played down the possibility of irreconcilable claims. Green combined a great confidence in reason, in the conclusions issuing from disciplined and rigorous thought, with the hope that philosophy, when so practiced, will produce answers to problems defined in the recent past as religious. These two expectations may today seem discrepant, but they represent the principal causes of Green's attraction in his day. The intellectual strand of his appeal may be traced in the variety of uses that his students made of Idealist modes of thought. It may be that his own philosophical contributions were not decisive, and that all he contributed was the introduction to Great Britain of ideas which originated elsewhere. But for a generation the current ran strong. Philosophical Idealism provided a broadly spaced set of formulae which filled in with different values, could yield very different results. In Green's hands Idealism was a form of religious belief and a vehicle of reform; in F.H. Bradley's an aloof and agnostic conservatism. Followers of Green were to take up political positions varying from that of the Fabian Society to that of the Charity Organization Society, whose husband and wife team of the Bosanquets were responsible for the Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission of 1905, as the Webbs with another pedigree were for the Majority Report. In theology, students of Green invoked his name in favor of everything from ethical culture to the Lux Mundi school of Anglican theology, which

attempted to adapt the High Church movement to their teacher's criticism of it as being politically reactionary, and intellectually authoritarian. As a theological movement, the Lux Mundi group dominated Anglican thought for more than a generation; as a political movement, it founded the Christian Social Union, which did much to alter the teaching of its Church on democracy and socialism. Oxford was fundamentally changed by Green's professional attitudes towards the teaching of philosophy, and by the content of his political theory. It is this which must now be examined, for as the Oxford Magazine wrote after his death: "Oxford has turned from playing at the Middle Ages, or at a Renaissance in cupboards; and a new faith, with Professor Green for its founder,... is alive among us."[41]

What relation this bore to Green's milieu, and what he himself introduced as a distinctively personal contribution will be examined below. Before doing so, it might be well to look back at what has emerged thus far about Oxford as a field for action. Certainly by its stress on the threat to faith, it made the philosopher's task inseparable from the theologian's. But the spirit of the Broad Church movement and the stand it took on the reform of the University, led Green to champion the claims of philosophy as an autonomous and professional discipline, and to associate himself with the German ideal of Wissenschaft, rather than with Jowett's version of the gentleman-amateur. In short, Green's appeal was intellectual as well as religious and political. By appealing to the richness and broad learning of German Idealism, he himself revolted against the limited perspectives and goals of the Greats school. As will emerge from his own theory, he had further objections to the type of character and political philosophy produced by the textual study of Aristotle and ancient history. It is perhaps repeating that to while it is important to know what books are read a formal university curriculum, this is not necessarily decisive for the type of political theory apt to be produced there. Much depends upon the social origins of the students, more upon the way in which they are taught and examined, punished and rewarded. Nor in emphasizing the ethos of a university, should we disregard sources of innovation such as the numerous and unofficial discussion groups that flourished in the residential and collegiate setting of Oxford. Changes can come, and resistance movements successfully organized, but what was true of Jowett was also true of Green, that in the conservative atmosphere of a great and ancient institution, sharp limits are set on novelty and the new trends to be transmuted subtlely into the values of the old. But once these limits are recognized, it must be said that Green did much to change the political attitudes of Oxford.

IV

To the religious and university background of Oxford Idealism, there must be added some consideration of its political and social goals. The stress Green placed upon applied altruism and self-sacrifice rather than personal piety, his ideal of democtratic citizenship may be viewed as the merger of the upper-class Oxford tradition of public service and recognition of the state with a religious dynamic and social perspective which had its origin in classes previously excluded from the University. This emerges from the concern with the relation between education and politics found in one of his last speeches. He expressed the wish that all with the capacity and desire to learn should have open to them "what has hitherto been unpleasantly called the 'education of gentlemen'." 42 Note that Green does not reject the ideal of Oxford but wishes to make it available to all regardless of birth. He concluded, "I confess to hoping for a time when that phrase will have lost its meaning, because the sort of education which alone makes the gentleman in any true sense will be within the reach of all....A condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen."43

The concrete meaning and acceptance of idealism stemmed not only from a crisis originating in challenge to Evangelical theology by new developments in knowledge, but from the arrival at Oxford of the classes touched by the religious movement. This thesis could be applied to the Oxford Movement, for Newman was himself an Evangelical who had experienced conversion just before comeing up as a freshman, but what space available here will be devoted to idealism, often called the second Oxford Movement by contemporaries.

Great religious movements which base their claim on some special revelation must first take hold among those social strata largely unknown and uncared for by authorities established in Church and State. Only the poor and uneducated unite simplicity and the capacity to be lieve with primitive energy and an urgent sense of religious need. Their total surrender is unqualified by intellectual training and questioning habits of mind. Members of more reflective and educated strata put complicated queries, opposing human wisdom to the new revelation. Those who demand that belief remain within the bounds of reason tend to regard in relative terms what is absolute and unconditional to true believers of strata beneath them. But however intense may be the convictions of submerged groups, they can seldom determine the fate of their new religion. For they neither hold political power, nor can their belief in its original form convince those in the upper classes who control opinion. Thus a creisis develops: either the new faith receives a compelling restatement in the style of abstract thought respected by the educated, or else it remains confined to the lower classes, a belief tolerated or persecute but never exerting the full force upon the whole society that comes from

uniting faith with a creed formulated by first rate minds on the highest intellectual level. The history of Christianity from the second generation onwards demonstrates that when a simple set of beliefs originating with the naive and educated enlists men capable of making a philosophical restatement, it can go on to attain a position of preeminence. There is of course the danger that rationalization may go too far in the direction of sacrificing the essentials of the faith. But the contrary is no less true. If for some reason, credal or social, such a translation cannot be effected, then sooner or later unquestioning faith will be smashed.

This hypothesis, first applied by Ernst Troeltsch in charting the development of primitive Christianity, is highly suggestive when applied to the relation between Evangelicalism and Idealism. Indeed the rephrasing of the original creed may be said to have virtually transformed and attenuated it. And yet many of the characteristics of English Idealism are not comprehensible apart from the type of character and social position of those originally Evangelical. In this sense, Green may have owed much of his success to the response he made as a transitional figure redirecting the energies of powerful religious movement in a period of secularization. As Beatrice Webb has written, ". . . it was during the middle decades of the nineteenth century that, in England, the impulse of self-subordinating service was transformed, consciously and covertly from God to man." 44 "Self-subordinating" is a significant phrase. To subordinate one's self to the service of other men seemed obviously analagous to the surrender of self in divine worship. Both, Green's teaching suggested, might be called religious because abnegating personal desire for a principle outside and higher than the fleshly self. Indeed Green indicated that the sanctity of the public-minded citizen may be nobler than the sanctity of the believer concerned only with his private salvation. "True citizenship as unto the Lord...I reckon higher than'saintliness' in the technical sense." In this sentence, passed in judgment against Newman and Green's own student, Gerard Manley Hopkins, is summed up the most powerful tendency of his rephrasing of Evangelicalism. He would direct its zeal into a secular religion of reform.

Green's message was directed at the middle class, at men with philanthropic impulses, with consciences to be touched, and a guilt about their ebbing faith which could be turned into a guilt about their privileges. His strategy was not that of Marx or the philosophical radicals. Green did not renounce asceticism, nor did he declare that the Christian values of charity and justice are sham. Rather he refffirmed their validity, and them pointed out the discrepancy between these ideals and the situation which in fact existed. Green called more upon the emotion of guilt than that of anger, a fact which indicates the group he was addressing. He asked the privileged to sacrifice their unearned advantages so that the poor and weak might be given the chance to realize their potentialities. And what would the privileged gain in return? The release from bad conscience and more: that moral development which comes only from living in a moral society where all men are treated as agents, each of whom is an end to himself and to everyone else. And thus citizenship and reform be-

came moral obligations. This appeal was tremendously successful at Oxford which went from isolation and indifference to a high degree of involvement with contemporary problems.46 The settlement house and Workers' Extension movement, the Christian Social Union, the Charity Organization Society, and the Workers' Educational Association were all powerfully aided by teaching of Green and his students.

To call Green a transitional figure is, perhaps, not to say much. As one cynic has remarked, Adam no doubt said to Eve, "You know, my dear, we are living in an age of transition." But certain facts about Green make clear what is at issue. He was the first layman to be a Fellow of Balliol; the first member of his college and it may be of his university, to regard himself as a professional philosopher; and the first Oxford don to be elected to the Oxford Town Council. Although by a familiar evolution, his family was now Anglican, it had been Puritan and was proud that Cromwell's daughter figured in its lineage. Green identified himself with the Dissenters and the political figure he most admired was John Bright. A.V. Dicey, an undergraduate friend, was astounded by the fact that Green, admiring the Manchester School for its pacificism and active enmity towards the landed aristocracy and Establishment, should have chosen to find the rationale for his position in Kant and Hegel. But Green himself defined his task, "to saturate the English with German ideas;to hold fast the essential solid qualities of the English mind in politics and piety but to give them a new vigor and intensity, adapt them to a Begreffsphilosophie. 47 "For a man of his sympathies, he was somewhat strangely placed in mid-Victorian Oxford, but he made use of his position there, and in turn he was made useful to a far greater extent than if he had been outside one of the great centers from which emenated the political lines of force which ruled Britain. Despite his differences with Jowett on the question of philosophy, he worked with his old tutor on most issues. Thus it was that Green, as a promising young man of the Rugby-Balliol connection, and came to be named an Assistant Commissioner for the inquiry into secondary education by the Taunton Commission, one of the three great projects of its kind which led to the creation of effective public system by the end of the century. The degree of talent employed is perhaps indicated by the fact that Green's associates were Matthew Arnold and James Bryce. The investigation and report Green wrote gave him an extraordinarily detailed knowledge of English society. The point of view which he adopted was not that of the ruling classes, but that of an altruistic and public-minded civil servant attempting to use the power of the state in the interest of all its people. Had Green not been at Balliol, everything in his outlook and background would have disposed him to adopt the negative individualism of Nonconformity, and its advocacy of complete voluntarism in political and social life. But placed within a tradition of responsibility, and perhaps not untouched by the classical, political philosophy he had studied and taught, he moved in the direction Matthew Arnold had taken when, as an Inspector of Schools, he urged that the state provide an organized system of education. "We have not the notion," Arnold wrote, "so familiar on the Continent and to antiquity, of the State--the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent power for the general advantage, and con-

trolling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals."48

That much Oxford did for Green, but he was to do much for Oxford. His investigations had done much to convince him that in Britain no greater barrier existed to an adequate system of education and the utilization of the able than the class system. On the level of secondary education, every issue was complicated by distinctions of class, and impeded reform. The term "education of a gentleman" has acquired a meaning unkown elsewhere. What it seems to mean, Green remarked, was "a kind of manner and tone of feeling acquired by those educated at the miscalled 'public schools,'" ". . . which" foster an early suceptibility to the club-law of honor; form habits of ready address towards equals and of contempt towards 'those who are without'". As for Oxford, it was still too much "fed by the classes with whom it is traditional to look to it, the landed gentry, the people of private fortune, the clergy of the Establishment, and the wealthier members of the other professions."50 All this produced snobbery of a kind which he regarded as making impossible a healthy political society. Once he was travelling with a student, and an incident occurred which was never forgotten by at least one present there:

> The day we were at TinternAbbey,.. some young women came running down, and one of them said to me in rather an off-hand way, 'What's the time?' I did not make any answer, but walked on. He said, 'Why didn't you answer the young woman?' I said, 'Because she didn't ask properly.' He looked quite vexed and said, 'That's what comes of being at Oxford. Up at Oxford we literally lose the ordinary power of communication with our fellows, and think they mean to be rude when they do not speak like ourselves. It is you who were rude.'"51

To establish communication between Oxford University and Oxford City, beween the University and the nation was , he thought, essential. Without ostentation he showed what the life of citizenship meant by participating in an extraordinary number of civic activities. Among certain students already excited by the civic religion taught in his ethics. Green's unprecedented attention to the City of Oxford produced a sense of shock as though philosophy, by breaking through the barrier which separates thought from action, and town from gown, had proved itself capable of affecting everyday life. Somehow it became known that after the election which chose Green as town councilor, he had gone straight to give a lecture on the Critique of Pure Reason. Thereafter it did not seem plausible to accuse Idealism of failing to link theory with practice. Green's example was followed by a great many university teachers and professors, and so a new political type came into existence, often concerned with the same causes as he: settlement houses, university extension, the local day schools, easier access to Oxford, and the establishment of new civic universities. As for Green himself, this extensive experience with local organizations had a significant effect on his political theory. For his civic activities introduced into his thought an empirical element, which strictly speaking, ran contrary to the a priori method he himself regarded as the

principal contribution he had to make British philosophy. Again and again in his theory of state interference, his rationale of a particular intervention is preceded by and depends upon the formula, "But the fact is". His political theory prompted him to act as a citizen; his practical exprerience as a citizen prompted to take notice of the actual situation when his theory might have led him to disregard it. As Tocqueville remarked of Burke, an impressive practical wisdom may be gained from participation in the affairs of a free society. This type of knowledge is one of the recessive elements in political theory. To read the Principles of Political Obligation without any acquaintance with Green's setting is almost to result in a mistaken impression of what he knew and what he taught.

V

The philosophy Green introduced into Oxford with his own modifications of German themes seemed to represent a triumph of previously unrepresented political and social principles over older patterns of thought. But was his victory as complete as at first it appears? Was the power of Aristotle over the mind of Oxford effectively ended? And did a thoroughly professional and unapologetic type of philosophy come into existence with Green? Did he at last direct the attention of Oxford to the modern world and break down its intellectual isolation?

These questions may be properly answered only by careful study of ex exactly what it was that Green said in his technical work. And this must include not only his writing on political philosophy but all of his writing. He made it abundantly clear that the Principles of Political Obligation was but one part of a comprehensive philosophy of life designed to supplant the competing systems which he thought to be inadequate. The force exerted by Green upon his comtmporary audience derived from the unity of his views. In paritcular, this meant when he came to political theory, his arguments depended upon conclusions established earlier in lectures on metaphysics and ethics in the same Professorial series. This connection is not always recognized by those who read only his political theory. Thus it is easy for them to assume, not only that it is self-contained, but that its language carries the same meaning as ordinary discourse. But in fact Green by his philosophical method transforms nearly every term he uses. This procedure was clear to his contemparary audience which understood that when he spoke of "natural rights", the phrase carried a special meaning within the context of his own system. Thus Green assumed knowledge of his method. But he did not apologize for it. Rather he asserted that so to rephrase and transform words is an indispensible par of philosophical method. Here the example of German theology and philosophy was strong, and just as he had paraphrased God, freedom, and immortality into Idealist glosses, so he now proposed to do the same with the central concepts and problems of political theory. This will be recognized as relativism of the Broad Church movement and German historicism.

The pressure of theology is equally apparent in the design of Green's philosophical structure. What he is seeking is a vindication of the values he thought made life worthwhile, and one that is not subject to change on the basis of some new discovery of natural or social science. However much he proclaimed his faith in reason, he refused to contemplate the possibility that its verdict might turn against his deepest aspirations and beliefs. Step by step in his metaphysics and ethics, he attempts to establish as necessary truths every article of his creed: a theory of progress, the duty of altruistic self-sacrifice, the moral value of reform, the existence of the common good, the definition of active citizenship as a prerequisite of virtue.

Three motifs figure in every part of his work: the conceptions of teleological process, of self-consciousness, and of the organic nature of the elements of a system. By this last, he meant that facts are always found embodied in a set of relationships. The world is a system in which every element being correlative to every other, at once presuppose and is presupposed by it. By teleological process, Green understood the conception of an end or telos which is operative thoughout a process and determines its outcome without ever being identical with any stage of its development. A key notion in his theology, its only novelty in the rest of his work comes in its use against any naturalistic theories of mind and obligation. As Green employs this notion, it becomes closely associated with that of self-consciousness in his argument against an evolutionary theory of mind. The most primitive principle from which knowledge can be developed is already a perception of a fact which implies the action upon successive sensations of a consciousness which holds them in relation. Therefore this consciousness cannot be said to come before or after these sensations. It is the condition of there being sensation at all. And this is true a priori. It cannot be verified by reference to any empirical state of affairs.52

What is the function of these concepts in Green's scheme? His intention is to construct a system which is proof against what he regarded the excessive claims of science, or more exactly, of popularized philosophies claiming scientific sanction. As he saw the contemporary situation in English philosophy, there was a disturbing consensus that a natural science of ethics and politics is possible. This Green undertook to refuse because he believed that no naturalistic explanation can properly account for the use of such terms as "ought" or "ought not." In the Prologomena to Ethics, he undertakes to refute all such theories of ethics, in the Principles of Political Obligation, he does the same for theories of politics. He is concerned to demonstrate that just as facts imply a consciousness them in relation, so does a society, however primitive, imply the recongition of rights and a good common to all of its members. Knowledge, ethics, politics--all these are possible only on the assumption of certain states o mind. On their origin we speculate in vain. They are simply the prerequisite of experience. Hence all theories about the state having been founded by force or social compact, or as maintained by fear, simply miss the philosophical point. No theory of origins can explain a moral activity. Only a teleological explanation is in point.53 Scientific or historical discoveries are irrelevant. And so too would be any investigation

of how politics in fact function. That any society which can be called political is based on a conception of the common good--this philosophical position could not be affected by any evidence about how individuals and groups operate in the political system. If no conception of the common good is operative, then what exists is not a political society.

So much for the a priori element in Green's thought. What of his teleology? Is it of any significance? Here the answer must be that it is this strand of Green's thought which will be most useful for arriving at the contribution of Oxford to Green's political theory. Teleology is historically identified with Aristotle, and Aristotle in Green's time s till was the single most important author read in Greats. Nettleship comments that one of the aspect of Oxford life which seemed most constricting to Green as a tutor was the requirement ot center philosophical instruction on the Greeks. He felt that modern life and thought posed demands which could not be met by repeating that in Aristotle is to be found everything worth saying about ethics and politics. Green's belief in the possibility of progress both in theory and practice as well his critique of Greek thought is clearly stated in a term's lectures, later incorporated into the Prolegomena, on "The ideal of virtue in Plato and Aristotle compared with that by which we are now influenced."54 Yet it may be said without exaggeration that the debt Green owed to Greek thought was so great that it placed a decisive limit on how far he could remake political theory at Oxford.

This was ironical in the extreme. For the influence of Greek thought within the framework of Oxford was not at all to Green's liking. His moral and political ideals seemed to receive little support from Plato and Aristotle as studied in the Greats school. Their effect was to produce an aristocratic detachment and self-sufficency, and an effective isolation from personal commitment to the type of active reform which Green himself defined as the highest virtue. This is not to say that what classical political philosophy meant in Victorian Oxford at all corresponds to the essential spirit of Plato and Aristotle. What matters here is their practical effect, and to this there can be no better guide than Matthew Arnold, himself an earlier product of Rugby and Balliol, and engaged in much the same interprise as Green: that of providing a whole view of life adequate to his age. His medium was criticism and literature, wheras Green was committed to philosophy and politics, but the two were sufficently close in time and formation to justify the use of the categories of one to clarity the position of the other.

In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold had described the two competing philosophies of life in England as those of Hellenism and Hebraism, each of which had distinctive qualities related to a part of human perfection, and each of which was in itself incomplete.

> The uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see things as they really are; the uppermost idea with Hebraism is conduct and and obedience. . .The Hebrew notion of felicity. . .would

> not let the Hebrew rest till. . he had at last got out of the law of network of prescriptions to enwrap his whole life to govern every moment of it, every impulse, every action. . .The bent of Hellenism is to follow, with flexible activity, the whole play of the universal order, to be apprehensive of missing any part of it, of sacrificing one part to another, to slip away from resting in this or that intimation of it, however capital... The governing idea of Hellenism is spontaneity of consciousness; that of Hebraism strictness of consciousness.[55]

And clearly Matthew Arnold when he thought of Hellenism in England identified it with the spirit of Oxford, aristocratic, Tory, and orthodox Oxford inalterably opposed to middle-class Liberal nonconformity.

> Oxford, the Oxford of the past, has many faults; and she has heavily paid for them in defeat, in isolation, in want of hold upon the modern world. Yet we in Oxford, brought up amidst the beauty and sweetness of that beautiful place, have not failed to seize one truth--the truth that beauty and sweetness are essential characters of a complete human perfection. When I insist on this, I am all in the faith and tradition of Oxford.56

There can be little doubt about which of these two ideals Green preferred. He was a Hebraist who cared little for the cultured gentleman proud of his classics. When Green himself compared the Greek and modern ideals of virtue, he did render homage to Plato and Aristotle. But it is precisely what Arnold most esteemed and associated with Oxford that Green condemned: the intellectualism, of the Greeks and in particular, Aristotle's high estimation of the contemplative man. To the ancient Greeks, the only possible society consisted of a small group of freemen having recognized claims upon each other but using as instruments a much larger number of aliens and slaves with no such recognized claims. Then Christianity proclaimed that men, in a profoundly spiritual sense, are all equally dear to God. Yet historical Christianity failed to create a society organized its own principles of equality, justice, and mercy. This failure can no longer be tolerated by modern man, who by the immanent logic of his spiritual development, now has new and more demanding moral obligations. His own code and the structure of modern society demand greater sacrices of him than could have been made upon the Greek or medieval Christian. Contemplative and leisurely pursuits are not now appropriate:

> It is no time to enjoy the pleasures of eye and ear, of search for knowledge, of friendly intercourse, of applauded speech or writing, while the mass of men whom we call our brethren, and whom we declare to be meant with us for eternal destinies, are left without the chance, which only the help of others can gain for them, of

> making them in act what in possibility we believe them to be. 57

What is superior in the modern ideal, Green declares, is its secular asceticism and its theory of progress. Progress, Green had concluded in his metaphysics, is one of those a priori truths the existence of which is presupposed by the nature of knowledge and morality.58 It is involved in the nature of self-consciousness; it "expresses an inward demand for the recognition of a unity in the world answering to a unity in ourselves." The basis of progress is the Idea of true or absolute good which began to act upon man at the beginning of human history. Potentially this Idea contains the notion that good consists of the full realization of the soul's capacities. But in his first stages man is not conscious of the Idea, and does not reason about it. Yet even in this phase the idea creates a demand for a self-satisfaction which is not to be confused with mere pleasure. In the most primitive society, this is already for some well-being common to the individual and to the other members of his group. As the Idea develops further in history, the definition of the group included in the common good is extended progressively from the family to the tribe, from the tribe to the state, from the state to humanity. The modern ideal includes all men instead of a small class only. Thus Green has no hesitation in preferring it over that of the Greeks. It is quite wrong, in his view, to believe that the Greek or Roman citizen at the height of their municipal civilization had a fuller or richer life than that of the modern citizen under a regime of universal freedom and equal rights.

> The realization of human capacities has, in fact, taken a far wider range with us than in the most advanced of of ancient states. . .and every progress achieved opens up a further vista of possibilities.

Progress creates greater obligations than those acknowledged by the most virtuous Greek philosophers. Such moral progress means two things: an increased asceticism, that is a rise in the degree of self-sacrifice deemed essential to virtue; and an increased democracy, an expansion of the range of persons for whom self-sacrifice ought to be made:

> The hopelessly sick are being tended; the foolish and ignorant are being treatd as rational person; human beings whom a Greek would have looked on as chattels, or as a social encumberance to be got rid of. . .are having pains bestowed upon them which only a faith in unapparent possibilities of their nature could justify. 60

Aristotle would not have recognized such service to the sick and lowly as good. And so Green appealed to the asceticism of an audience which had been brought up under Evangelical discipline. He rehabilitated the moral value of asceticism and thus denied the judgment of Utilitarian hedonism, which dismissed self-denial as an absured survival of medievalism. And he

made social service and reform into the moral obligation of the conscientious man. Aristotle's "pleacures of the soul" no longer may be regarded as a proper ideal. Oxford must teach its best young men to leave it and go to the slums or wherever else they can help to bring their society up to is own moral standard.

> There are men, we know, who with the keenest sensibility to such pleasures as those of 'gratified ambition and love of learning,' yet deliberately forego them; who shut themselves out from an abundance of aesthetic enjoyments. ...in order to meet the claims which the work of realizing potentialities of the human soul...makes upon them. Such sacrifices are made, now as they were not in the days of the Greek philosophers...61

Yet the fact remains that for all his criticism of Plato and Aristotle, Green did not abandon that teleology which is one of the distinguishing characteristics of classical political thought. Even when criticizing its ideal, he paid tribute to the lasting contributions made to ethics and politics, and described their role in terms which he would have been pleased to accept as his own. For they did not claim to be "prophets of new truth, but exponents of new principles on which the citizen, if he thought the matter out, would find that he had already been acting." What they had done was toclarify the end or good of the bios politikos, citizen life. This praise of teleology is repeated and intensified in Political Obligation, where he declares that whatever their insufficencies Plato and Aristotle had the supreme merit of putting political theory on its proper basis: the teleological view of man and society. When treating natural rights, Green insisted that the concept could be maintained only on Aristotle's view:

> He regards the state (polis)as a society of which life is maintained by what its members do for the sake of maintaining it, by functions consciously fulfilled with reference to that end, and which in that sense imposes duties; and at the sametime as a society from which its members derive the ability to fulfil their several functions, and which in that sense confers rights.

Here Green announced his decision to persevere in the track of Aristotle. When combined with his Idealist a priori method of using concepts said to be true a priori, he so defined political theory as to exclude any systematic investigation of actual political activity. Although his method of preceeding was not precisely identical with Bosanquet, who attempted to erect a theory by analyzing the meanings of the concept of self-government both in individuals and in states, Green sealed off political theory from the study of any of the institutional and social developments which were remaking the country. In a sense, the field was difficult to develop along the lines he had staked out. For what was to be done if two men disagreed, and each of them was certain that his position derived from a necessarybut un-

verifiable truth? Perhaps it was this type of consideration which, after one generation of Idealist political philosophy led to a redirection of efforts into the study of historic types of states and their characteristic operative ideals. Thus the abstract quality of Idealism was to be remedied by concentrating upon ideas in their actual historical setting. The second generation if Idealists took this direction, which in part marked the defeat of the school on purely philosophical grounds. Lord Lindsay and Sir Ernest Barker are representative members of this wing of the school, and Laski, when still under Barker's influence, outlined a Grammar of Politics which would revise Green and Bosanquet by applying a statute of historical limitations to the theory of the state. Yet Idealist revisionism could not save the day, except in the new specialty of political theory, which was severed from philosophy at just about the moment professional philosophers began to aba.. the basic articles of Idealist philosophical method. Already before 1914 Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein had put together not only a critique of Idealism, but had put philosophy along new, constructive lines which did not have much to do with political theory. Sometime between the two wars, it no longer seemed to the younger generation of philosophers that they had to refute Idealism. By a process, which, although characteristic of intellectual life, has never been analyzed, Idealism came to recede into the history of philosophy, which is to say that it no longer had power or meaning except for an older generation. Why did this occur?

Two types of answer suggest themselves: the first, technical, stressing developments in logic, the theory of verification, and the analysis of language which undermined the Idealist premise that the nature of reality in some sense depends upon human thought; the second based on changes in sosiety and in the universities. If my hypothesis about the reasons for Idealism's success has any validity, it should turn out that Evangelicalism by this time had ceased to be a force, that the children of the generation whcih responded favorably to Idealism, had no need or understanding for its basic themes. Other explanations congruent with my own, include the probability of major changes in the position of the upper classes and the rise of the Labour Party. That is to say, some of the men likely to appear at Oxford in Green's day might be made to feel guilt about the enormous discrepancy between their own position and that of the thirty per cent of the population which lived at or beneath the level of subsistence.63 But the growth of the welfare state, the effective organization of the working class, not only in trade unions but in a political party, the decline of the once privileged classes relative to the rest of the population, and the traumatic experience of two world wars--all these altered the composition and perspective of the classes attending the Universities. It is not possible to discuss here the characteristics of the linguistic philosophy which now dominates philosophy at Oxford. As Sir Isaiah Berlin remarked in his inaugural lecture, it has for the most part ignored political theory.64 But it is striking how despite its redefinition of philosophy, this new Oxford school has retained the resistance to empirical social and political research which has been noted as characteristic of Idealism. It may be, as Lord Russell has suggested that Oxford still tends to judge what is worth

studying by what is required for a First in Greats, and thus rejects, not only all learning but only such as has been discovered since Erasmus.65 If so, this may help to understand its defensive posture towards science, natural and social, from the Victorian Age through the Second Elizabethan.

On this subject, and particularly on the refusal to pay any attention whatever to empirical theory and research, some suggestive remarks have been made in the 1958 Hobhouse Lecture by Mr. Noel Annan. His major thesis is that political theory in England is now in decline because it fails to take into account the sociological data and theory which has grown out of Durkheim and Weber:

> . . .we are still trying to produce ore from mines which have for long been worked out, namely the old concepts of state, society, will, rights, consent, obligation, and we have turned our back on the social studies and methods of analysis which alone could restore some value and meaning to those concepts.66

Whether Mr. Annan's proposed remedy would indeed have the effect he seems to desire may be doubted on the basis of American experience. Nor is this part of his argument relevant here. But his minor thesis, an explanation for the absence of interest in "the revolution in sociology" is directly pertinent. For he attributes to Idealism the responsibility of having diverted at a critical time of thinking Englishmen from continental sociology. Idealism developed a kind of social theory of its own based on the application of the concepts of Will, Rationality, and Freedom to both individual and social behavior. But Green, Bosanquet, and Bradley could do so only by juggling with words in a way that drained all factual content out of political philosophy.67

With much of this I should agree. But Mr. Annan's explanation of the basis for resistance curiously enough is not at all sociological, but reflects his own interest and achievement in the history of ideas. He fails to relate the attitudes of Oxford and Cambridge to any constant elements in their history, organization, and social base; he does not put the crucial question of what are the necessary social and political conditions for the development of empirical theory and research. Put in the briefest possible form, sociology seems to develop in conditions of social and political instability, at times of national defeat, or in an atmosphere where science is for some reason so highly prized that it seems worth extending to all the phenomena of existence, including the political and social. It might be said that none of these conditions have obtained in England in general or in the special case of Oxford. The means and the skells with which revolution and national catastrophe have been avoided are precisely those which produce indifference to a probing, relativistic sociology and political science. Principal among these means is the method of the Greats School at Oxford: training in logic rather than substance, distrust about applying any large general theories to concrete situations. Political and

social data is regarded as something to be acquired by common sense and practical experience. For example Green's knowlege of English sociey was considerable; it was based on his participation in civic affairs and the part he played in the investigations of a Royal Commission. The very success of British reform movements and the flexibility of political machinery seemed to make specialized social research unnecessary. An enormous amount of data was collected, summarized, and published by means that called for nothing more than practical experience on the part of expert witnesses like factory inspectors, and judgment on the part of upper-class gentlemen Commissioners, parhaps of the Oxford Greats School. This source and style of social and political research should not be too much denigrated, Karl Marx knew enough to profit from it. In any case it is not an accident that English social investigation has been so unspeculative and practical, and Oxford training for the political class, so exclusively logical and cut off from the modern world. I shall not attempt to say whether Oxford philosophers at present may accurately be described as teaching an Establishment religion, as suggested by Ernest Cellner in his Words and Things.[68] But certainly a conventional theory of ideology seems far too simple an instrument for so complex an issue as the contribution of a university to political thoght.

To return to my own garden: what has emerged from the questions that were raised at the beginning of this inquiry? What were the effects of Oxford on Green? For one thing, it defined the theological issue as the basic business of philosophy; for another, it confined Green as an undergraduate and fellow to the teaching of Aristotle, with the result, that his philosophical method was set by the religious need for an a priori basis for belief on the one side, and the teleological view of man and society on the other. Oxford also contributed the view of the state found in Greek thought, and a powerful set of connections to public life, which altered Green's disposition by birth and sympathy to side with the voluntary and individualistic tendency of the dissenting middle-class. Oxford, by its party alignments also caused Green to value reason and to wish to make philosophy a professional discipline apart from the Greats School. It is perhaps understandable that the balance he sought to establish between faith and reason now seems to represent more of the aspiration of theology than of the rigor Green himself thought to be the distinquishing characteristic of philosophy.

What was the effect of Green on Oxford? Certainly it was extraordinary, and demonstrates just how much power may be exerted by an individual who successfully adapts his own ideas to needs deeply felt but hitherto ignored. It was Green who established philosophy as an autonomous discipline; it was Green who created a social conscience and made Oxford a powerful supporter of philanthropic and reform movements. Lord Attlee never was much of an Idealist philosopher, but would he have entered the Labour Party, had not there existed Toyhbee Hall, bearing the name of one of Green's disciples, and supported by the current of feeling Green himself created at Oxford? A new type of don, closely connected to local movements and civic causes, came from Green's example. And most of all,

there was a great growth of communication beween the University and the Church on the one side, and the rest of English life on the other. Theology, philosophy, and political theory at Oxford all differed greatly after him from what he had found as an undergarduate.

What weight should be given to social forces and movements that had their origin neither in Green, or in Oxford? Obviously a great deal. The impact Green made depended upon the phase of Evangelicalism and religious opinion which he foundrather than created. And the secularization of the University was again a precondition of his influence, as was the new power of the liberal and dissenting middle-class. The previous neglect of German thought gave him resources not directly connected with his personal ability.

What effect did Green and Idealism have on English society and politics? Here diffidence is best. The part played by ideas in political action is too little understood to permit excessive claims. It is best to say that Idealism producedeffects which must be explained by reference to the type of social force discussed above. That is to say, it helped channel private piety to public service; on another level, it contributed to breaking down intellectual individualism of a kind which in the United States has been a barrier to the development of the welfare state. Actually the research has not yet been done which would enable us to answer this query with any greater accuracy. When investigations are made in greater depth than now is the case, there will be found evidence which may invalidate many of the hypotheses put forward here. But it is my hope that this will be done by using the method of inquiry, type of materials, and the questions asked in this study.

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Footnotes

1. The relevant Oxford chair is "Social and Political Theory"; those at Cambridge and the London School of Economics, "Political Science".
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6. Michael Oakeshott, "The Universities", Cambridge Journal, II, no. 9 (June, 1949), 515-42.
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11. Elie Halevy, England in 1815, (London: Benn, 1949), 387. For the Staffordshire evidence, cf. G.M. Young, Victorian England, (London, 1936), 84n.
12. C.C.J. Webb, Religious Life in England from 1850, (Oxford, 1933), 9.
13. John Henry Cardinal Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, (London, 1886), 288.
14. Mrs. Humphry Ward, Robert Elsmere, (London, 1888).
15. Sir Geoffrey Faber, Oxford Apostles, (London, 1933), 163.
16. The phrase is Ben Jonson's. Cf. Sir Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government, (Oxford, 1942), viii.
17. Sir Ernest Barker, Age and Youth, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 190.
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23. Ibid., 263, citing Walter E. Houghton, Jr., "The English Virtuoso in the Seventeenth Century", Journal of the History of Ideas, III (1943), 57.
24. Mallet, op. cit., III, 66-7.
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26. G.M. Young, op. cit., 95.
27. Ibid., 93.
28. Alfred North Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy, (N.Y., 1947), 9.
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38. Abbott and Campbell, op. cit., II, 109-110.
39. Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Memories and Reflections, (Boston, 1928), 21, 24.
40. C.E. Vaughan to R.L. Nettleships, MS letter, Balliol College Library, Oxford.
41. The Oxford Magazine, Nov. 21, 1883.
42. Thomas Hill Green, Works, ed. R.L. Nettleship, III, 475.
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44. Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship, (London, 1926), 143.
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46. For some evidence of Green's influence, see Richter, op. cit., 444, 468.
47. John Addington Symonds to R.L. Nettleship, MS letter, Balliol College Library.
48. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. J. Dover Wilson, (Cambridge, 1946), 445.
49. Green, op. cit., III, 459, xlix.
50. Ibid., 392.
51. C.A. Fyffe to R.L. Nettleship, MS letter, Balliol College Library.
52. T.H. Green, Prologomena to Ethics, ed. A.C. Bradley, (Oxford, 1883), 181-2.
53. "Teleological theories of obligation are based upon two general ideas, first, that in all deliberate action we have a single final aim or purpose, and second that an act is rendered what we ought to do by being that which conduces most to the realization of this aim, so that to discover what we ought to do, we have first to discover what this aim is and then to discover the act which would most conduce to its realization." H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, (London, 1949), 128.
54. Green, Prologomena to Ethics, op. cit., 264-314.
55. Arnold, op. cit., 131-2.
56. Ibid., 61.
57. Green, Prologomena to Ethics, op. cit., 291.
58. Ibid., 196.
59. Ibid., 277.
60. Ibid., 279.
61. Ibid., 290-1.
62. Green, Works, II, 363.
63. Beatrice Webb, op. cit., 247.
64. Sir Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 3-5.

65. Gellner, op. cit., 15.
66. Noel Annan, "The Curious Strength of Positivism in English Political Thought", (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 21.
67. Ibid., 10.
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AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH -- THE "SALA" MODEL

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(Panel 14: "Models" for the Study of Comparative Administration -- Alternative and Complementary)

The Need for New, Ecological Models

As we move toward an empirical science of public administration -- as distinguished from a normative doctrine intended to guide us in administrative reform or development -- we will need two kinds of knowledge: first, increasingly clear and relevant information about administrative practices, organization and history in particular countries; and secondly, more testable and tested hypotheses about causal relationships among administrative variables. Both types of knowledge should be useful in the practice of administration, but in the present context they are viewed as contributing to the growth of social, and especially political, science.

A basic tool in both kinds of inquiry -- area study and theory formation -- is the "constructed type" or "model," as I shall call it in this paper. Everyone uses such models, whether implicitly or explicitly, to provide a frame of reference, "criteria of relevance," in order to select from the undifferentiated universe of sense experience the data which contribute to an organized body of knowledge. They provide the outlines around which we assemble descriptive country or area information -- whether American, British, Indian, Cuban or Congolese -- and they suggest relationships which we link together in our propositions, statements of causal interdependencies.

Hitherto the models upon which we have relied in political science and public administration are predominantly those derived from the study of America, Britain, and other Western countries. Because of the relative uniformity of environmental factors in all these countries, it is possible to study administrative institutions and practices as though they had an autonomous existence, apart from their environment or setting. Yet the "ecology" of public administration is as much a limiting factor as is the ecology of biological species or cities. When administration in non-Western countries is studied with the help of our non-ecological models with their implicit assumptions of institutional autonomy, or when generalizations taken from these models are applied to situations in the "underdeveloped" countries, they tend to crumble away. Hence I suggest that we need to construct alternative, ecologically based models to help us in the study of administration abroad. I make this suggestion in all modesty, quite aware that much research of value can be accomplished within the framework of the available models, especially if one makes full use of those developed by our sister disciplines, notably anthropology and sociology in which a "holistic" or ecological approach is used. However, I am persuaded of the utility of trying to supplement the existing models by attempting, consciously, to create some alternative types.

Our greatest strength lies in concepts and typologies designed for use in our own and the relatively similar Western systems of government, where environmental influences are generally ignored. The social anthropologists and comparative sociologists have given us models particularly suited to the study of traditional or "folk" societies. But neither fit very well the conditions in developing countries with their mixture of tradition and industrializing-modernization. Hence I suggest our chief need is for an explicit model of transitional societies and their administrative sub-systems.

"Prismatic Society" and the "Sala Model"

I call one model for this purpose a "prismatic" system, not for the joy of using a new word, but because it enables me to impute to the model a limited number of characteristics, and hence to eliminate the clustering connotations that adhere to more familiar words like "underdeveloped" and "transitional."

The word itself is part of a larger system, in which polar types are used, based on definitions taken from structural-functional analysis. These terms are explained at some length elsewhere, and it would detract from this paper to repeat the discussion here.[1] Suffice it to say that the prismatic model is intermediate between a "fused" model, useful in studying traditional or primitive societies, and the "refracted" type, useful for analysis of government in advanced industrial Western societies.

Within the prismatic society one can construct sub-models for its various structures, e.g., its political, administrative, economic, social, religious. I call the administrative sub-model in a prismatic society, a "sala". The word is taken from current usage in much of Asia where a sala often means an office, but also a pavillion, drawing room, or place for religious meetings. I wish thereby to symbolize the resemblance of a sala to the "office" or "bureau," which may be taken as the typical locus or "ideal type" of administrative behavior in the "refracted" model. At the same time the diffuse uses to which the sala is put suggest the multi-purpose, undifferentiated character of the "home" or "court", as locus of administration in a "fused" society, where, indeed, we cannot find a separate structure for administrative as contrasted with other functions of the society.

Heterogeneity

One of the characteristics of a prismatic society is a high degree of "heterogeneity," which is to say, a mixture of traditional, "fused" characteristics, on the one hand, and modern, "refracted" traits on the other. Hence a

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[1] See, for example, "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration" in Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 5, June 1960, pp. 1-46, and my forthcoming book, Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, and N.Y., Taplinger, 1961)

modern city with a sophisticated, intellectual class, Western-style offices, modern gadgets of administration, is typically found in the same country with rural villages run by "chiefs", "headmen", or "elders" whose political, administrative, religious, and social roles may be quite undifferentiated and traditional in character. The significant administrative features of a prismatic society, however, would not be brought to our attention if we merely looked for this mixture of traditional and modern institutions, even though we found plenty of examples of both.

Even more significant in the mixture might be a set of new administrative structures, different from both the traditional and modern, and a product of the mixture. This new set of administrative phenomena is what I choose to call the "sala model." To repeat, the most characteristic administrative features of a prismatic society are to be found in the sala, but in the heterogeneity of a prismatic system, we will find the modern "bureau" and the traditional "court" as well as the sala. One problem of analysis in a particular situation is to find the proportions in which these structural features are mixed, and to explain the mixture I believe that only afterwards can we manipulate intelligently, i.e., re-shape the mixture to match our goals and aspirations.

Formalism

What, then, are the essential features of the sala itself? Some are suggested by a second major feature of the prismatic model, i.e., a high degree of "formalism". By formalism I refer to the degree of discrepancy or congruence between the formally prescribed and the effectively practiced, between norms and realities. The greater the congruence, the more realistic the situation; the greater the discrepancy, the more formalistic.

In both traditional or fused societies, and in modern industrial or refracted societies, a relatively high degree of realism prevails. Not that complete realism ever exists. The degree of formalism in our own society is a measure, perhaps, of the extent to which we are not fully refracted, to which prismatic conditions are to be found here. Indeed, one conclusion to which I have come is that our own administrative system, especially in local government and in the more "underdeveloped" parts of our country, is quite prismatic.

For the prevalence of formalism, to repeat, is a distinguishing mark of the prismatic system. In other words, the laws on the statute book are one thing, the actual behavior of the official is another. Not that the law is irrelevant to behavior. Indeed, the official may insist on literal performance of the law or he may disregard it utterly. What permits formalism is the lack of pressure toward program objectives, the weakness of social power as a guide to bureaucratic performance, and hence great permissiveness for arbitrary administration. Whether an official chooses to enforce a law to the letter or permit its total violation depends, presumably, upon his inclinations and his advantage.

It is easy to see that administrative discretion of this type opens the door to corruption. The client may have to pay the official to carry out the law -- as in the issuance of permits, licenses, quota allocations -- or to overlook violations -- as in the payment of taxes.

Some implications for administrative reform should also be evident. If reform is based on a change in the law, a re-organization, re-definition of positions and duties, etc., probably no effective change in behavior will follow the change in norms and prescriptions. In a refracted model, by contrast, where a high degree of realism prevails, clearly acceptance of a change of law or regulation can be taken as equivalent to corresponding changes in administrative behavior. Reasoning from the refracted model, the administrative specialist may conclude that similar changes in a basically prismatic system will have similar results. Were the specialist familiar with the sala model, however, he might consider such formal changes useless, and seek first to achieve a higher degree of realism, i.e., to bring about a closer approximation of practice to prescription.

Overlapping

A third feature of the prismatic model suggests even more implications for the sala, namely the phenomenon of "overlapping." By "overlapping" I refer to the extent to which formally differentiated structures of a refracted type co-exist with undifferentiated structures of a fused type. In other words, it is typical in a prismatic situation for new structures -- government offices, parliaments, elections, markets, schools -- to be set up, but the effective functions of administration, politics, economics, education, continue to be performed, at least to a considerable extent, by older, undifferentiated structures, such as the family, religious bodies, caste and communal groupings. New norms or values appropriate to the differentiated structures are given lip-service, but the older values of an undifferentiated society still retain a strong hold. Thus overlapping implies a social schizophrenia of contradictory formal (conscious) and informal (unconscious) behavior patterns.

In neither the fused nor refracted models do we find substantial overlapping. In the refracted model, insofar as the structures realistically perform their "manifest functions," there is no overlapping. In the fused model, since there is only one major set of structures for all functions, there is also no occasion for overlapping. The concept is, perhaps, not an easy one to grasp in the abstract. I will try to illustrate it by several applications to the sala model.

Nepotism: The Sala and the Family

The sala is, formally, a locus for governmental administration. In a relatively refracted society, considerations of family loyalty are effectively divorced from the conduct of office. Indeed, the American administrative expert

typically takes such a divorce so much for granted that he scarcely looks for it in studying or manipulating administrative behavior. In the sala, however, many administrative functions which were once performed openly under the aegis of familial or kinship institutions continue to be performed on this basis, but clandestinely. The new formal structures of an office are superimposed upon the family, and lip-service is paid to a new set of official norms.

One characteristic administrative result is the phenomenon of "nepotism." I do not think it appropriate to speak of nepotism in a fused society's administration. Here the family provides the formal basis of government. Positions are typically filled on a hereditary or "patrimonial" basis. It is scarcely appropriate to speak of nepotism when a king takes over by virtue of hereditary succession, but if an elected president or prime minister were to replace himself by a son or nephew, the epithet would be properly used. Similarly, we don't think of the inheritance of a small business by the son of the owner as nepotistic, but the appointment of close relatives to office in a large firm may be called nepotism.

My point is that in a fused society, hereditary succession to office is not nepotism; and in a refracted society, familial influence on appointments is negligible. Nepotism, however, is a characteristic mode of recruitment in the sala: characteristic because here patrimonialism is officially proscribed but actually practiced.

Overlapping of the family with the office occurs also in other aspects of sala behavior. The formal rules of the sala prescribe universalistic norms for the administration of the law, the general programs and policies of a government agency. However, family influence prevails, so that the law is applied generously to relatives, stringently against strangers. This becomes a matter of importance in law enforcement, the administration of contracts, purchase of supplies, enforcement of taxes, granting of licenses, foreign exchange control, import and export permits, etc. To the outside observer, the typical sala official appears "individualistic" or "anarchic" because he ranks his private and familial goals higher than the corporate goals of his agency, government or country.

"Poly-communalism" and "Clects"

In speaking of the family and kinship groupings I have over-simplified the basis of group solidarity. It is characteristic in a prismatic society for minority ethnic, religious or racial groups to become relatively "mobilized" for mass communications without, at the same time, becoming fully "assimilated" to the elite.[2] Such a condition produces several "communities" that live side by side in a relatively hostile interaction in the same society, "differentiated"

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[2]These concepts were developed by Karl Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communication. N.Y., Wiley, 1953.

in Deutsch's terms. Furnivall calls this a "plural society," but I prefer to speak of it as "poly-communal."

The development of poly-communalism has a characteristic impact on the sala. Whereas in principle a government office administers the law impartially as between or among all citizens, the sala official discriminates in favor of his own community and against members of other communities. Such discrimination affects recruitment. In other words, perhaps more significant even than nepotism is the tendency to fill positions in a sala only with recruits drawn from a dominant community. Alternatively, different offices may be apportioned on a "quota basis" to the several communities, leading to mutual hostility, or non-cooperation between the several agencies staffed by members of rival communities. When members of the different communities are mixed in the same office, obstacles to cooperative action also arise.

This characteristic feature of the sala is, in fact, found in America, especially in local administration in the South. The relations of the white and Negro communities of the South to each other are typical of poly-communalism. In the sala of the South, as in the sala abroad, administrative recruitment and law enforcement predictably favor the "dominant" against the "minority" communities.

A further consequence of poly-communalism occurs in the organization of "interest groups." The refracted model leads us to picture interest groups in the form of functionally specific associations, open on a universalistic basis to all who share the group's primary goals. Such associations interact with political and administrative agencies to propose and help implement public policy in diverse functional fields.

An implicit assumption of such associational patterns, however, is open participation on a universalistic basis. In a poly-communal situation, however, group membership is typically restricted to a single community. Consequently, instead of a single chamber of commerce or trade union federation, a different chamber and federation appears for each community. The result: interest group activity is designed not only to encourage a particular policy but to apply that policy "selectively" for members of the favored community, against members of disfavored groups. Or, considered from the viewpoint of the sala, administrative recruitment and policy is oriented positively toward groups based on dominant communities, negatively against groups drawn from deviant communities.

Because these interest groups exhibit characteristics different in crucial respects from the associations of a refracted society, I think it is useful to have a special term for them. They share some of the characteristics of cliques, clubs, and sects, but none of these words exactly identifies the category I have in mind. Consequently, I have coined an expression based, mnemonically, on sounds common to these three words, i.e., clects. A clect may be defined as an organization with relatively diffuse functions of a semi-traditional type, but organized in a modern, associational way. Sectarian oppositional political parties and revolutionary movements in a prismatic society are typically clects. They provide their members with an alternative solidarity

system to replace extended family, caste, village and religious units. They stand for a total way of life, and typically demand unconditional loyalty of their members. Whereas one may belong to a variety of associations, he can belong to only one clect. Of course, not all members of a prismatic society belong to clects. Typically, only a minority do. But the clect provides a disciplined core for economic, political, religious and social action. Clects tend to be uncompromising and hostile in their relations to each other, and to the sala.

Thus we find the sala often involved in close relations with clects, or itself taking on clect-like characteristics. A particular government office or agency may be captured by a clect. Then overlapping manifests itself in unofficial orientation toward the dominant clect, despite an official mandate to serve the general public interest. An example would be an agency to regulate business conditions which favors a chamber of commerce and business men of the dominant community, at the expense of traders in "outsider" communities. Often this means that the dominant group gets special privileges, licenses, permits, foreign exchange, tax rebates. However, the recipients of these favors often do not use them, since an easier road to wealth lies in blackmarket collusion with members of the outside or "pariah" business community.

Officials in the sala also profiteer from this situation, either receiving a "rebate" or "kick-back" from the privileged clientele, or taking a "bribe" from illicit entrepreneurs in the pariah community. Thus the clect-sala relationship serves to advance the special interests of an in-group as against the interests of an out-group in the same functional field, contrary to the ideal association-bureau relationship in which policy is shaped so as to advance the interests of all members of the society who share a particular functional goal or technique.

Sometimes a particular agency in the sala becomes itself a kind of clect. Once admitted, a member is treated as though he were part of an enlarged family. It becomes impossible to discipline or discharge a member, for example, just as a family would not consider expelling a member except for the most extreme reasons. Thus clect formation within the sala contradicts the achievement and universalistic norms, typical of a refracted government bureau or office. Here again overlapping means effective behavior contradictory to the prescribed norms of the sala.

Economy -- The "Bazaar-Canteen"

Elsewhere I have characterized the typical features of the "bazaar-canteen" as the economic sub-model of the prismatic society.[3] The bazaar-canteen is the prismatic counterpart of the refracted "market". Here typical price mechanisms are used for the exchange of goods, but they overlap with more

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[3]See "The Bazaar-Canteen Model," Philippine Sociological Review, Vol.VI, July-October 1958 [1960], pp. 6-59.

traditional "reciprocative" and "redistributive" institutions,[4] resulting in behavior quite different from that expected in formal economic theory.

One of these characteristics is "price indeterminacy". Although there are other important typical bazaar-canteen traits, this one will illustrate the phenomenon of overlapping. In the refracted model, market conditions are assumed. Hence such aspects of administrative behavior as budgeting, salary determination, purchasing and price decisions are based on market costs and equalitarian assumptions. By this I mean that a government service which is for sale to the public is sold at the same price without distinction of persons to all citizens. The salary of officials is based on the relative value of work performed and the market cost of labor without regard to the personal identity of the incumbent.

In the sala model the same assumption is made formally, but it does not work in practice. As we have already seen, poly-communalism is typical. Hence public services are sold at preferential rates to members of the dominant community or inside clects, but at higher rates to outside clects, to members of deviant or minority communities. Often, however, a formal price is announced, from which secret deviations are made. Victims sign a contract for purchase, but pay an under-the-table bonus. Those selling to the government may receive the official rate, have to "kick-back" an unofficial percentage.

In salary determination or appointment to office, the family considerations which I have already mentioned lead to the creation of "sinecures," i.e., an official is named to a salaried position without having to perform corresponding duties, or with only minimal duties. Again, substantial "fringe-benefits" are offered to privileged incumbents beyond the official salary. Others who lack "influence" or "pull" find themselves assigned to lowly posts, denied promotion or salary increases, unable to obtain fringe benefits.

Corruption is institutionalized in the sala model. Some officials are in advantageous positions to extort bribes and other favors from clientele groups. Part of this extra income must be passed on to superiors or influential members of the bureaucracy who protect the "rackets." Outside positions as "consultants," the privilege of concurrent employment in private firms, plus other devices for augmenting income through the exercise of influence mean that the effective income and living costs of officials diverge strikingly from that officially sanctioned.

These are administrative counterparts to the economic bazaar, in which the actual price paid by a customer, after protracted bargaining, reflects not only prevailing supply-demand conditions, but also a super-imposed set of interpersonal relationships between seller and buyer. A wide fluctuation in the price of a commodity, depending upon the identity of the buyer, tends to prevail.

The canteen model refers to a situation in which uniform prices are actually charged, but prices vary widely between market-places. In some, the

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[4] These concepts are based on Karl Polangi, et al, Trade and Market in the Early Empires, Free Press, 1957.

"subsidized canteens," prices are kept low for privileged members of an in-group; in others, the "tributary canteens," prices are raised for captive members of the out-groups.

Similarly the sala makes its privileges available to in-group members at bargain prices, as when it seels foreign exchange at the official rate to privileged business men of the dominant community. Penalized entrepreneurs of the "pariah" community are forced to buy at inflated prices in the "black-market," or obtain funds at official rates only after making informal bonus payments through extra-legal channels.

In a sense, the whole bureaucracy is privy to a subsidized canteen. Its privileges and status are a prize eagerly sought by ambitious individuals in the dominant communities. The proliferation of governmental functions, encouraged both by the first stages of industrialization and the rosy attractiveness of the "welfare state", give rise to rapid expansion of agencies, increase of offices, and conspicuous overstaffing. Yet at the same time, the economy as a whole remains poor, the national budget hopelessly unable to provide adequate salaries for all. The pitifully low salary schedule which results provides an economic incentive for capitalizing on every opportunity each incumbent encounters to augment his official salary from unofficial sources.

Whether in the bazaar or canteen form, then, price indeterminacy pervades the sala at all points where money is involved, in salaries and "fringe-benefits," contracts for purchase and supply of goods and services, in regulation of public utilities, customs and tax administration, budget making, accounting and auditing procedures, and the like.

Any analysis of the economic aspects of sala administration which accepts, at face value, the formal price structure will miss completely the effective price structure. The difficulty for analysis, of course, arises not only from the use of inappropriate models based on the assumptions of a refracted administrative bureau, but also on the formalistic discrepancy between the formally approved behavior, which is like that of the bureau, and the officially disapproved behavior, which is quite dissimilar. This consideration takes us to value systems in relation to overlapping.

Poly-normativism and Lack of Consensus.

The refracted bureau presupposes a set of "ground rules" or a "formula" which is generally agreed to by all participants, the officials in the bureau as well as the various clienteles served or regulated. Although there is often opposition to any particular policy or rule of government and administration, there tends to be unanimity on key rules governing adoption of norms, and on procedures to be followed to get them changed. Even those who oppose a particular rule, tax, or official procedure, generally concur in obeying the norm, even while protesting and seeking to have it changed through legal means.

In the prismatic society, however, these conditions do not exist. Here a new set of norms, political formulae and myths, based on experience in more refracted settings, are superimposed in a society which continues to adhere, in large measure, to older traditional norms, formulae and myths. The result is substantial lack of consensus.

Different individuals are involved in this lack of consensus in different ways: some adhere to traditional norms, others embrace the modern substitutes. But a substantial body of intermediate or transitional individuals are attracted ambivalently to both sets, sometimes adhering to one, sometimes to the other, sometimes to an attempted syncretism of both, and sometimes violently rejecting all norms. For these typically prismatic individuals we may speak of "poly-normative" and even of "norm-less" orientations.

The administrative implications of poly-normativism may be traced in the behavior of both officials and members of the public.

An official, while publicly adhering to a modern set of norms, may secretly reject them as meaningless or not binding. Hence the overlapping behavior of the sala becomes comprehensible in terms of the value system of the incumbent. For example, he can adhere publicly to the norm of objective, achievement oriented standards of recruitment, equality of status and universalistic norms, but privately subscribe to more subjective, ascription oriented standards, to a rigid hierarchy of status and particularistic norms. He can publicly castigate bribery and corruption, but secretly encourage it. He can insist, one moment on a strict and literal enforcement of regulations, but the next moment wink at their open violation.

Another contrast between the formal and effective norms in the sala model may be discerned in the "status-contract" distinction. The formally prescribed norm of the sala is based on contractual assumptions: obligations and rights are voluntarily undertaken by the public servant in an agreement between himself and the "government". But in the overlapping status system, officials have privileges and duties which stem from their personal identity, their family and social position, their station in life.

The sala bureaucrat seeks to maximize the advantages to himself to be gained from both the contract and status systems: to minimize the disadvantages. The typical manifestation of this status/contract mix is heavy stress on "rank". Rank differs from ascribed status in that it is not inherited or claimed as a matter of right but must be "attained." Typically, a school or university degree or an examination, lays the basis for a claim to rank. But unlike the achieved position of the bureau model, in which performance validates official rewards, in the sala model attained rank becomes its own justification. Thus one who has been granted a particular rank on a semi-achievement basis can thereafter claim its corresponding perquisites on a semi-ascribed basis. In other words, he seeks entry to rank by contract, but then rests on his laurels by status.

Another manifestation of the overlapping between refracted and fused norms may be discovered if we reflect on the relationship between ends and means.

In the refracted model a "scientific" or "rational" orientation is stressed, by which I mean careful study and testing of the adequacy of any given means to accomplish specified ends. Administratively, the ends are prescribed by political processes, and the bureaucrat takes them as given. Within limits, therefore, he strives for optimum utilization of scarce resources to achieve these specified goals. His goal is "efficiency"; his approach "rational."

By contrast, the official in a fused society focuses on ends as intrinsically important. He cannot test the efficacy of the means. This basic orientation is "ritual." Not that his ultimate ends are philosophically any less justifiable than those of refracted man. Moreover, he is also quite aware that his chosen means are not in themselves ends. A rain-making ceremony, for example, is clearly intended to bring rain, but its efficacy for this purpose cannot be demonstrated.

In the sala, the intrusion of rationalism has sufficiently discredited old rituals to throw doubt upon their effectiveness, but it has been insufficiently assimilated to provide satisfactory proof of alternative procedures. Hence the sala bureaucrat resorts to methods which are neither truly rational nor ritual. On the one hand, he may try to discover and revive ancient and presumably corrupted rituals -- a procedure we can call "ritualistic." Alternatively, he may borrow techniques from the administrative repertoire of a refracted society without knowing how they can really help him solve his problems -- a procedure we may call "rationalistic." The two approaches, looking to the historic past and the external present, the ritualistic and rationalistic, both imply an element of copying or imitation which we can term "mimetic." Hence another example of the characteristic overlapping in the sala model is a high degree of mimesis. This, incidentally, may help to explain a relatively high degree of receptivity to largely irrelevant technical advice from abroad in many countries today.

The same ambivalence of orientation characterizes the public in its dealings with the sala. On the one hand, the enraged citizen makes unreasonable demands and censures the administration for its failure to abide by modern, refracted norms. But the next moment, without any sense of contradiction, he busily works to undermine these norms by collaborating with corruption to secure special privileges for himself. Indeed, he lacks any strict sense of principle and the implications of a "rule of law." Rather, he takes advantage of opportunities to "break the law" when that serves his interest, but demands rigid "law enforcement" when that happens to fit his convenience. Ultimately, the public is cynical about law and administration. The official is viewed as a leech, and the accepted attitude toward government is normless. One abandons attempts to reform and seeks rather to "cope" with situations as they arise, pulling wires, paying what must be paid, hoping somehow to survive and, if possible, gain entrée to some of the spoils of the system. Objectivity and truth as criteria of information tend to dissolve, and the victim is left with no option but to judge information by the status of its source, its usefulness as a means.

Power Distribution: Authority vs. Control.

In closing this discussion of the sala model, I wish to note the phenomenon of overlapping in the power distribution system. A widespread observation of experts visiting "underdeveloped" countries is the tendency to extreme "over-centralization," inability to delegate authority, to decentralize. One of the most frequent recommendations made is to strengthen field offices, to train intermediate and subordinate personnel so they can take over more powers, induce superiors to delegate functions to others, in general to loosen up the bottleneck at the center which keeps the administration in a perpetual state of crisis.

Unfortunately, these recommendations mistake the formal aspects of sala behavior for the effective. If we bear in mind the concept of overlapping, we may see that other institutions than the prescribed office actually govern, to a greater extent, effective administrative behavior. Indeed, our whole discussion of corruption, nepotism, poly-normativism, clect influence, etc., suggests that effective power is widely dispersed in the sala model. If the central authorities had the highly over-centralized power attributed to them, all these deviations from the rules could scarcely be permitted.

The reality, as I see it, can only be understood if we distinguish clearly between officially sanctioned or legitimate power, i.e., "authority", and unofficially permitted or illigitimate power, i.e., "control." In both the fused and refracted model power includes both the elements of authority and control. Indeed, this linkage is so much a part of our thinking that we have difficulty making this distinction, or describing a situation in which the two are divorced. Yet one of the salient characteristics of the prismatic model, as noted above, is a high degree of formalism. Translated in terms of power structure, this means a separation of authority and control.

Or, in terms of overlapping, it means that the authority structure of the sala overlaps with a different kind of control structure. I have already pointed to the roots of the control structure in the prevalence of poly-communalism, the rise of clects, the pervasiveness of poly-normativism and normlessness. I suggest that in practice control in a prismatic society is highly dispersed. Traditionally-oriented groups in the hinterland resist central government control. Deviant communities and their clects also cannot be brought within the control system of the official government. Normlessness makes many, even members of the elite, surprisingly unresponsive to official norms, as reflected in widespread violation of tax and other laws. Even members of the bureaucracy itself, as our argument has shown, are singularly unwilling to subject themselves to effective regulation by the agencies of which they are nominally a part, at least in their formal requirements.

Viewed from this perspective, centralization of authority can be understood as a desperate attempt to bring the government and society under control. Indeed, when effective control weapons are so notably lacking, the cheapest and most apparent remaining weapon is the power of formal authority. Unfortunately, this nominal power turns out to be without potency, resulting, often enough, in a final resort to violence.

Centralized authority is largely formalistic. Hence recommendations to decentralize are greeted with fear as a threat to that limited power base which remains to the central authorities; or as irrelevant, since those on the inside already know how limited is their effective control.

The power structure of the sala model, then, may be said to consist of a highly centralized and concentrated authority structure overlapping a control system that is highly localized and dispersed. Here again, unless one has this model in mind, he is likely to rely on the refracted bureau as a model, and hence to look upon the formal authority system as a sound clue to understanding the effective power structure.

The paradox of overlapping may be viewed from another point of view, the relationship of bureaucratic to non-bureaucratic power. The formal administrative bureau in a refracted society is regarded as a purely instrumental "apparatus" for the execution of policies formulated by a separate political system, as institutionalized in legislative bodies and elected executives. Hence the formal model, in terms of which public administration in a prismatic society is both understood and evaluated, presumes that power is concentrated in directing centers outside the bureaucracy.

But the traditional locus of power in relatively fused systems is in the hands of officials working with an hereditary ruler. Here any distinction between "administrative" and "political" structures in quite arbitrary, since the same men and offices perform both types of function without even being aware of the distinction.

In the sala, the official continues to exercise the undifferentiated political-administrative functions of the fused model, but behind a facade of administrative institutionalism borrowed from industrial, relatively refracted societies. Hence he can scarcely admit to the public, or even to himself, that much of his actual behavior is essentially political, involving a struggle for power and participation in the making of whatever decisions are made for the society. The Western-trained observer who tries to identify the locus of decision-making in such a system comes away baffled, convinced that decisions are made surreptitiously, conspiratorially, clandestinely.

Thus the sala official who exercises control often lacks authority, first because it has not been formally delegated to him by his status superiors, and secondly because, as a bureaucrat, he is not supposed to make decisions according to the formally announced constitutional system. There are two characteristic responses for the sala official caught in this paradoxical situation. We may view these responses as polar opposites on a scale, typical behavior involving some combination of both, though in varying proportions.

At one extreme, the official takes the initiative and assumes the mantle of "tutelage". He announces that, in the long run, he will serve as an "instrument of the people," but in view of their present lack of education and political sophistication, he will teach them, help them prepare to assume real

political power. Thus he openly admits the exercise of power, but at the same time he gives lip-service to the view that his ultimate role, as a bureaucrat, should be instrumental.

The other extreme is suggested by the word, "sinecure." This is the posture of officials who give up the attempt to make decisions. The formal power holders -- the people and the "politicians" -- cannot guide or control him, and he abandons the attempt to seize the initiative himself. Rather, he accepts and clings to the privileges of office, but rejects any serious attempt to exercise the duties of office. While refusing to delegate responsibility, he is unable to exercise it effectively himself. This posture, of course, is not one to be rationalized but rather to be concealed, and so the sinecurist makes a pretense of busy-work, while in essence abandoning the tasks of government.

The extent to which officials in a sala make policy or reject responsibility may be disguised by the extent to which such policy is weakly oriented toward an agency's program goals. Where non-bureaucratic power is substantial, bureaucrats are provided with a strong incentive to promote program goals since success is well rewarded. Often, indeed, they "identify" to a great extent with these goals. When this happens, efforts by public servants to promote policy decisions are directed toward the realization of "principled interests," the manifest ends of the agency concerned.

However, when non-bureaucratic power is weak, bureaucratic achievement is poorly rewarded. Indeed, an official who "identified" with a public goal and sought its achievement would court punishment by his colleagues as a "rate buster." Familiar "feather-bedding" techniques come into play. Hence bureaucratic influence in policy is directed rather more to safeguard strictly bureaucratic interests -- such matters as security of tenure, recognition of seniority, fringe benefits, enhancement of status and prestige, toleration for violation of formal norms. In other words, bureaucratic policy-making is oriented chiefly toward "expediency interests" in the sala.

The observer who sees in every bureaucrat a man carrying out politically framed policy can only choke with indignation when he discovers officials who either arrogate to themselves the policy-making role, or meekly refuse to carry out any policy. Yet, if he were to analyze the situation in terms of the sala model, he might come closer to understanding the reasons for what he saw and perhaps even to discovering a way to stimulate the kinds of change he wanted to induce.

Conclusion

In closing, I should like to repeat the statement made in opening this paper that a model, like that of the sala, is not intended to serve as a description of any particular society or system of government. Rather, it serves an heuristic purpose. It gives us a tool by which we can better describe and, hopefully, understand, situations in real life. It seeks to relate administrative

behavior to ecological factors typical of transitional societies.

In other words, with this tool one should be able to go into a particular country and study its administrative system more illuminatingly. The model suggests possible ecological relationships to look for, relationships which would not be suggested by the more familiar, non-ecological administrative bureau models based on the relatively refracted situation in the United States. One might also be able to describe the country or governmental system studied as being highly prismatic, semi-prismatic, relatively refracted, etc. Indeed, one consequence of this exercise might be to enable students of American administration to recognize in a more systematic way the "prismatic" elements in our own government. I am convinced, for example, that we will understand much of our system of county and township administration better in terms of the sala rather than the bureau.

Finally, the analysis of relationships suggested in the sala model may enable us to formulate hypotheses or propositions about possible relationships between variables in administration. Such hypotheses, growing out of observation in a variety of settings and linked to the elements of the sala model, can be further tested by looking at new settings, or re-examining those first studied at a later date. In so doing, of course, the concepts could be refined and made more operational. As the hypotheses become stronger, they should give us a better basis for explaining and predicting actual administrative behavior. This, in turn, will provide us with a more powerful weapon for administrative action, since it will help us to establish demonstrable cause-effect relationships, and hence to change phenomena by modifying their causes rather than by attacking only the symptoms or manifestations of administrative pathology. In this sense I submit the sala model primarily as a contribution to the development of empirical, ecologically-oriented research in comparative administration, but also as a potentially useful weapon for those more particularly concerned with administrative development.[5]

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[5]The relationship of the approach outlined in this paper to the general development of research in comparative public administration is discussed in my paper "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," prepared for the ASPA conference, April 1961.

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CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE AND INITIATIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING*

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Studies of legislative influence are principally of two kinds. The first includes studies of the relative influence of the legislature in the total decision- or policy-making process in the United States. The second includes research on the patterns of influence *within* the legislature, such as who holds "power," membership in "the club," "folkways" or informal norms, and other factors associated with persons and roles which affect the outcomes of legislative decisions.

The literature on these two types of studies of legislative power or influence are quite different. The first is the older and primarily constitutes an argument about the relative weight of Congress vis-a-vis the executive in making national policy. Generally speaking, I should say that most commentators have made the judgment that the impact of Congress on national policy formulation has declined and they would probably date this point

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*This paper is also Chapter I of the author's *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making* to be published in January, 1962, by the Dorsey Press of Homewood, Illinois.

of decline sometime early in the 20th century.[1] A contrary

[1]Lawrence Chamberlain, The President, Congress, and Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 11, 17.

position, however, is taken by Willmoore Kendall who outlines an interesting argument that Congress remains a stronger and more influential participant in the making of policy than is usually supposed.[2]

[2]"The Two Majorities," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IV (1960), pp. 317-345.

Legislative influence studies of the second kind are of more recent origin and are characterized by perhaps more sophisticated conceptualization and more use of quantitative data.[3] They include recent efforts by Donald Matthews to

[3]For a convenient summary and comparison of such studies see Donald R. Matthews, "Patterns of Influence in the U.S. Senate: Five Approaches," paper prepared for the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, New York, September 8-10, 1960.

identify legislative process variables which are associated with the effectiveness of Senators within Congress[4] and the

[4]United States Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), esp. pp. 92-117.

attempts by Robert Dahl and others to find indirect indicators of men who are most influential within the body.[5]

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[5]Robert A. Dahl, James G. March, and David Nasatir, "Influence Ranking in the United States Senate," paper prepared for the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 6-8, 1956; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, 2 (1957), pp. 201-15; Duncan MacRae, Jr. and Hugh D. Price, "Scale Positions and 'Power' in the Senate," ibid., 4 (1959), pp. 212-18.

This chapter is addressed both to the influence of Congress, especially the Senate, in the total foreign policy-making process, and to the persons and roles who appear to be most associated with the production of legislative outcomes concerning foreign policy within Congress. Thus, we shall try to relate some observations of Congress and foreign policy to both kinds of legislative influence studies.

The concept of influence

The term influence and its close ally power are among the classical concepts of political science. One writer has suggested that "content analysis of the political writings from Aristotle to the present would no doubt reveal power as the central concept around which attempts to explain politics have revolved."[6] Although power and influence are distinguished

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[6]S. Sidney Ulmer, Introductory Readings in Political Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 332

by different writers, the usages of the terms are by no means constant. In some writings influence means what power means in other writings, while power sometimes means in one work what influence means in another. Further, power and influence ordinarily are distinguished from authority, although most writers grant that the three terms are closely related.

The concepts influence and power are intimately related to policy and decision. As used here influence and policy are the more general terms. Influence refers to affecting the persons and institutions active in the distribution of values. Policy refers to goals (objectives, ends) of any social system, the means chosen to effectuate those goals, and the consequences of the means, i.e., the actual distribution of values. Power designates participation in the making of policies involving sanctions, and it is such policies that are usually designated by the term decision.[7] Influence includes power as one form of

[7] On this point, see Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 74-75; Herbert A. Simon, "'Development of Theory of Democratic Administration': Replies and Comments," American Political Science Review, 46 (1952), 495; and Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Organizational Behavior Section, Foreign Policy Analysis Project, 1954), p. 57.

participation in the decisions of others, and policy includes decisions as one form of stipulation or determination of value

distribution.[8]

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[8]With this distinction between policy and decision, it is possible to unravel or avoid "the decision paradox," that is, having a decision without actually deciding. More precisely, the situation is one of having a policy without a decision by the unit under analysis. For examples, see Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," Political Science Quarterly, 76 (1961), 24-46.

For my purposes here I propose to ignore many of the other classical and refined problems which are treated in the literature on influence. For example, I shall say nothing about authority, nor worry about the issue of legitimate vs. non-legitimate use of power, nor introduce the problem of the intent of the actor in a power situation, nor be concerned about the normative as opposed to the positivistic usages of the concepts of power and influence.

It would be interesting, although this is not the place to do it, to collect a thorough inventory of definitions of power which appear in social science writings. If the concepts of power and influence are of classical interest to students of politics, they are no longer the exclusive interest of political scientists. In recent years a large literature has emerged in other social sciences which will be found under the terms power and influence in any psychological or sociological index. Although I shall not try to review that literature, one social psychologist has brought together in one place several

definitions of the term power.[9] Here one sees justipositions

[9]Dorwin Cartwright, ed., Studies in Social Power (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1959), p. 186.

of the use of power by such diverse writers as R. H. Tawney, Bertrand Russell, Talcott Parsons, Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Robert Bierstadt, Herbert Simon, and Robert Dahl. In these definitions one sees recurring use of certain synonyms. For example, one finds power defined in terms of the capacity to affect or modify the behavior of another group or individual. Power is also defined as the production of certain effects on another, or as the process of affecting the behavior, attitudes, or outcomes of others. Or power is sometimes synonymous with the causation of a change in another's behavior or attitude. In most usage, influence or power refers to affecting, controlling, modifying, altering, or causing, some activity, behavior, attitude, or outcome, of an individual or a group. Most of the political science writing so far has been well-formulated in Lasswell and Kaplan, and most of the writing since, as Simon modestly said of his own contribution,[10]

[10]Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: John Wiley, 1957), p. 63.

Can been footnotes to their formulation.

The analysis of power or influence in decision-making is really a search for explanation for why decisions turn out the way they do. Simon and March note that a case of power resembles a case of cause, and March also acknowledges that to say that one variable has influence over another is to explain the dependent variable in terms of the independent variable.[11] It seems to me that when one says that A has

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[11] Ibid., p. 65 and James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," American Political Science Review, 49 (1955), pp. 436-37.

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power over B, one is explaining B's behavior in terms of A. Or put another way, when one talks about the foreign policy outcomes of the foreign policy process in the United States and one asks what is the influence of Congress on those outcomes, one is merely asking to what extent can he explain United States foreign policy in terms of what is known about Congress. How much of the variance in the dependent variable, foreign policy, can be predicted in terms of the independent variable, Congress?

So, for me, when we talk about the influence of the Senate in foreign policy-making we are substituting influence for the term explanation. The explanation of foreign policy-making, so far as the Senate or the House will help understand that foreign policy will rest in terms of our identifying the weight of the Senate's participation in policy, the scope of values which it affects, and its domain.

If one asks whether this usage does not discard the concept of influence, I am prepared to give an ambivalent answer. Certainly I do not say that the concept of explanation is not useful just because it applies to a large number of cases. But the explanations for political behavior are of many kinds and consist of many rather low level concepts and theories. I do not see how a theory of influence, that is, a theory explaining national policy formation in the United States, can be constructed without many smaller and more narrow theories which relate to such matters as role interpretation, information and communication, organizational theory, etc. I think the issue here is different from the one which Dahl raises in the conclusion to his well-known paper on the concept of power.[12]

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[12]"The Concept of Power," op. cit., p. 214

The issue, as he phrases it, is that of the operational social scientist vs. the theoretical or conceptual social scientist. In the dialogue between these two characters, the operationalist holds that because the research operations are so different from one power study to another, in effect different concepts are being researched. The theoretical or conceptual social scientist takes the position that there may be something in common among these studies and that in the search for this commodity it is useful to continue to call them power.

The operationalist's criticism of power is that the research procedures for the study of influence or power vary

from project to project. My point is that a power or influence explanation for one study may take quite another form for another and that in a total explanation for a dependent variable, a power explanation will require several variables and perhaps a combination of several theories. Thus, throughout this work Congressional influence is used in the sense of what Congressional variables contribute to the explanation of why and how U.S. foreign policy is as it is.

To analyze Congressional influence in foreign policy-making, we shall separate the analysis of the role of Congress in the total process from the analysis of the patterns of influence with respect to foreign policy within Congress. However, in discussing both the total policy process and the internal Congressional process, we shall consider the same three elements -- weight, scope, and domain of influence.[13] Weight of influence refers to the

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[13]This usage also follows Lasswell and Kaplan, op.cit., pp. 73-77.

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degree, extent, or form of participation in policy or decision-making. We shall be concerned particularly with whether the form of participation is the initiation of policy, amendment of policies initiated elsewhere, legislation or the veto of another's proposals. Scope of influence designates the number and kinds of issues, policies, decisions, or values affected. And domain of influence points to the importance of the policies and the number of persons affected by them. More will be said about each of these elements in the measurement of influence as we proceed.

Congress and the Total Policy Process

Weight of influence

In considering Congress' participation in the total foreign policy-making process, it is useful to have in mind a model of policy processes. We shall adopt one which conceives of the decision process in terms of seven functions which are performed in the making of any decision.[14] These include the intelligence

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[14] See Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis (College Park, Maryland: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1956). For applications of this schema in its author's research, see, e.g., Richard Arens and Harold D. Lasswell, In Defense of Public Order: The Emerging Field of Sanction Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

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function, i.e., the gathering of information, which may include either information which suggests a problem for policy-makers' attention or information for the formulation of alternatives. A second function is the recommendation of one or more possible policy alternative. A third is the prescription or enactment of one among several proposed alternative solutions. A fourth is the invoking of the adopted alternative, and a fifth is its application in specific situations by executive or enforcement officers. A sixth stage of the decision process is the appraisal of the effectiveness of the prescribed alternative, and the seventh is the terminating of the original policy. The latter stages present the opportunity to gather new information, to evaluate the original policy, and to consider whether a new problem has arisen requiring new information, recommendations,

or prescription. Thus the decision process may begin again.

To consider the weight of influence which different roles and institutions within the total policy-making process exercise, it is useful to see which of these functions are primarily performed by legislatures as against executives. Although we lack the historical analysis, it would be interesting to have data to indicate whether there have been shifts in the predominant participation of executives and legislatures in each of these seven functions. It is my feeling, not based upon as hard evidence as one would like to have, that the legislative branch of the U.S. government is no more predominant in any one of these seven decision functions than it was, say, fifty years ago. For example, consider the intelligence function. It is not clear to me what the primary sources of information were for Congress fifty years ago, but it does seem relatively clear that its primary source of information now is the executive branch. If one examines reports and studies of legislative committees, he will readily find that the data in them and most of their bibliographic references are to sources within the executive branch. It is customary that bills and resolutions referred to committees of Congress are almost invariably submitted to the executive for comment and analysis. Executive witnesses ordinarily open testimony in hearings on any bill or resolution. With respect to foreign relations, anyone who has observed hearings before either Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations has noted the difference in attendance of the membership at a hearing on, say, the Mutual Security Bill when the Secretary of State or the

Joint Chiefs of Staff testify and when private and non-governmental groups testify.

Many people have commented on the "information revolution" of the 20th century.[15] The effect of the information revolution

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[15]See, for example, Kenneth Boulding, "Decision-Making in the Modern World," in Lyman Bryson, ed., An Outline of Man's Knowledge of the Modern World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 418-42.

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on executive-legislative relations is several-fold. First, it has increased by many times the amount of information which is available to policy-makers about the problems they confront. Although all decision-making has not been reduced to highly rational, computational techniques, rough observation indicates a great increase in the possibilities of comparing proposed means to given ends much more precisely than fifty or a hundred years ago. This fact probably has reduced the amount of guessing and judgment required when information about the problem is lacking. Second, for reasons which I do not fully understand, the executive branches of government have learned to specialize more than legislatures, and in specializing have developed resources for the accumulation of large amounts of factual data about policy problems. Why Congress or other legislative bodies have not developed more bureaucratic and staff support, I do not know. But it does seem plausible that their failure to do so has put them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive departments who have had the superior resources for handling the vast

new amounts of information available to the total policy-making process.

This alteration in the intelligence function, which is a product of the 20th century and which is changing the role of information in policy-making year by year, has had substantial effect on other parts of the decision process. Consider the recommendation function. The executive branch, because of its superior information, is in a preferred position for identifying social and political problems. Thus, it can structure the agenda for the total decision process, including the agenda of the legislative branch. One notes, in this connection, the apparent increase in the tendency of Congress, including its leaders, to expect the executive to assume the initiative in identifying problems and proposing solutions for them. Thus, Democrats complained that President Eisenhower was not a "strong President" who gave "leadership" to the legislative branch. What is a general tendency in policy-making is acute with respect to foreign affairs. In international relations the executive has always had something of an advantage constitutionally and the information revolution has accentuated it. In addition to possessing an advantage in the identification of problems, the executive has primacy in the formulation of alternatives for the problem. As a result there is an increasing inclination to rely on the executive for the presentation of a proposal to deal with problems. Congress' role, then, becomes less and less one of the initiation of policy alternatives and more and more the modifier, negator, or legitimator of proposals which originate in the executive.


The work nearest to a historical survey of the relative importance of Congress and the Presidency in the initiation of legislation is Lawrence Chamberlain's study of 90 bills enacted between 1880 and 1945.[16] The 90, unfortunately, do not contain

[16]Chamberlain, op. cit.

any foreign policy measures other than immigration and national defense bills. Unfortunately, also, the means by which the sample of 90 were chosen were unsystematic. They appear to be the author's conception of important legislation during that period. Nevertheless, one gets some very interesting relationships if he tries to graph the relative importance of Congress and the Presidency in initiating these 90 bills over time. See Figure 1. For example, Congress was the primary initiator prior to 1900 and then there was a sharp decline in its role concurrent with the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and then a slight increase again until 1925 when there is another peak of Congressional initiation almost as high as that of 1900. Then Congress' role drops off again and remains relatively low until the end of the survey in 1945. On the other hand, the Presidency, which was low as an initiator of legislation in 1900 and remains so through 1930 then takes a very, very sharp upturn through the 1930's before it begins to drop off again. Corresponding with the decline of Congress and the increase of the Presidency in the initiation of legislation there is an overlapping trend which shows an increase in joint participation of Congress and the Presidency. Thus, a summary view of relative

FIGURE 1

Origins of Legislation,
Congress or the Presidency



participation of Congress and the Presidency in the initiation of legislation in the 20th century looks like this: Congress declines as the Presidency participates jointly with Congress in the initiation of legislation. I would predict that an extension of Chamberlain's study from 1945 to 1960 would show that joint collaboration has given way to virtually exclusive initiation by the executive.

Scope of influence

Scope refers to the number and kinds of issues, policies, or values affected by the holder of influence. In this case, the question is what foreign policy issues does Congress participate in deciding or affecting?

The Senate possesses a classic constitutional advantage over the House by virtue of the requirement that Presidential appointments of Ambassadors receive the advice and consent of the Senate. The Senate has never rejected a Presidential nomination for an ambassadorial post, "although," as Senator Humphrey has said, "on several occasions Senate opposition was sufficient to induce the President to withdraw his nominee."[17]

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[17]Hubert H. Humphrey, "The Senate in Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, July 1959, p. 528.

On other occasions, a Senator's persistent opposition may lead a nominee to decline appointment, even when the Senate confirms him. This was the outcome of Wayne Morse's campaign against Clare Booth Luce, whom the President nominated as Ambassador to

Brazil, in 1959. We have no way of knowing how the "rule of anticipated reaction"[18] has worked to cause the President to

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[18]This rule, given a name by Professor Carl J. Friedrich, refers to the phenomenon of one actor's modifying his behavior in anticipation of how another actor would respond if one's behavior were not modified. Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), pp. 589-591.

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consider, before making a nomination, whether it would be acceptable to the Senate. On the whole, it seems fair to say, that the Senate has not actively used the confirmation of appointments as an opportunity to influence foreign policy. Senator William Fulbright has inquired into the diplomatic preparation and language competency of nominees, but in the one case in which he chose to oppose the nomination on grounds of competency, the Senate upheld the President.

On another occasion the Senate used the confirmation proceeding to give unprecedented support to a Presidential nominee who had been embarrassed by the President himself. In 1959 President Eisenhower chose Under Secretary of State Christian Herter to succeed John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. However, Mr. Eisenhower and his press secretary, James Hagerty, created the impression that the appointment was made with reluctance and with reservations. Under the leadership of Chairman Fulbright and Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, the Committee on Foreign Relations suspended its rule that nominations lay over six days before being acted on within the Committee. Instead, within four hours and thirteen minutes after receiving the

nomination from the President, the Senate unanimously confirmed Mr. Herter, and Senate leaders publicly expressed their support and satisfaction with the nominee.[19] Nevertheless, this is an

[19]See the columns of Arthur Krock on the editorial page of the New York Times, and Walter Lippmann, opposite the editorial page of the Washington Post and Times-Herald, April 23, 1959.

unusual occurrence.

In addition to the authority to confirm certain Presidential nominees, the Senate also has the unique constitutional authority to give its advice and consent to treaties. This was once the primary opportunity for the Senate to participate in foreign policy,[20] although the initiative rested with the executive.

[20]For historical studies of the Senate's influence through its authority to give advice and consent to treaties, see George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), II, pp. 569-720; Royden J. Dangerfield, In Defense of the Senate (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1933); W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933).

Nevertheless, the mechanisms of foreign policy have been altered, especially in the last twenty-five years. The executive agreement, introduced in quantity to handle tariff changes under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program, is much the most common form of inter-nation activity. Further, foreign aid, in its many forms, has become a much more salient instrument of foreign policy

The scope of Congressional influence in foreign policy extends especially to appropriations, and in this field the House of Representatives is traditionally regarded as having the advantage over the Senate.[21] One of the most notable

[21]Robert Ash Wallace, Congressional Control of Federal Spending (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960). Professor Richard Fenno of the University of Rochester is preparing a major study of the appropriations process.

post-World War II changes in the foreign policy values affected by Congress is the appropriation of money. The major foreign policies since 1947 have been foreign aid, sometimes called European Recovery, Point IV, technical assistance, foreign economic operations, mutual security, and most recently AID (Act for International Development). These programs have cost vast amounts of money, second in size only to the outlay of sums for defense. The effect has been to enlarge the scope of the House's influence on foreign policy.[22] Former Speaker Martin

[22]For a comprehensive study, see Holbert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958).

recalls that in the 1920s foreign policy was a less expensive business. "For one week the House Foreign Affairs Committee debated to the exclusion of all other matters the question of authorizing a $20,000 appropriation for an international poultry show in Tulsa. This item, which we finally approved, was about

the most important issue that came before the Committee in the whole session."[23]

[23]Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics, as told to Robert J. Donavan (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 49.

The effect of Congressional influence on appropriations is consistently to reduce or maintain executive requests for foreign policy allotments. Rare is the occasion when Congress will enlarge an executive request for or initiate an expenditure for foreign policy.

One subject on which Congress has dominated the executive is immigration. Chamberlain's survey of the origins of legislation from 1880 to 1945 included nine immigration statutes.[24] In each

[24]The President, Congress and Legislation, op. cit., p. 451.

case he assigned Congress the preponderant influence in determining the policy. Generally speaking, Congress has preferred a more restrictive immigration policy than the President, and Congress has ordinarily favored admitting new immigrants roughly in proportion to the distribution of foreign nationalities within the United States. Although Presidents have vetted legislation affecting immigration, Congress often has been united enough to override the veto, as in 1952, when the McCarran-Walter Act was adopted. The one occasion when Congress took the initiative more willingly than the executive was in the repeal of the Chinese

Exclusion Acts in 1943. In this case, the executive was reluctant to push the repeal, not for lack of sympathy for the objectives, but out of concern for whether there was sufficient support in Congress to complete repeal. Failure to succeed, once the venture was undertaken, would have been embarrassing for U.S. relations with China and the rest of Asia, was the reasoning of the executive.

The scope of Congressional influence also extends to the policy-making process within the executive. As we shall see in a later chapter much of Congress' foreign policy activity is in determining the organizational arrangements of the policy-making process, as distinguished from affecting substantive foreign policy by legislation. For example, during 1949-1958, more than half the Senate bills and resolutions reported by the Foreign Relations Committee dealt with administrative and organizational machinery in the executive branch. This legislation included such issues as where the International Cooperation Administration should be located, in or out of the Department of State.

Domain of influence

Measuring influence is a combination of guaging the degree of participation in making decisions, the scope or values affected by those decisions, and the extent of the consequences of and the number of persons affected by the decisions. Lasswell's

and Kaplan defined domain in terms of the number of persons affected;[25] I wish to include something more in computing the

[25] Power and Society, op.cit., p. 71

importance of the decision. Only to consider the number affected is to ignore the consequences of the influence. Although this raises the difficult problems associated with ranking the intensity of preferences of people and ranking value consequences, one can state the problem even if he can not satisfactorily solve it.

My interpretation of Congressional influence in foreign policy is that it tends to be influence "on the periphery," as Senator Fulbright is supposed to believe.[26] When House or

[26] C. W. Kenworthy, "The Fulbright Idea of Foreign Policy," New York Times Magazine, May 10, 1959, p. 74

Senate takes the initiative, they do so on marginal and relatively unimportant matters. The scope of their influence may be broad in that it is related to several basic values -- wealth, power, etc. -- but the domain -- the impact on those values -- is much slighter than the executive's. Consider the most notable case of Congressional initiative in foreign policy in recent years, the Monroney Resolution.[27] The scope of the

[27] James A. Robinson, The Monroney Resolution: Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy Making (New York: Henry Holt, 1959).

Resolution's influence included the economies of underdeveloped countries, the more efficient use of surplus local currencies owned by the U.S., and the possible reduction of the amount of U.S. foreign aid. Yet the International Development Association, created as a result of the impetus of the Resolution, was capitalized at only $1 billion and involved only a third that amount for the U.S. Further, as we shall note below, one explanation for why this attempt at Congressional initiative succeeded was that it was a marginal issue to which little cost was attached.

On the other hand, the most famous unsuccessful attempt at Congressional initiative, the Bricker Amendment to the Constitution, was viewed by the executive as containing potentially threatening consequences. Had Senator Bricker's proposed amendment been ratified, its impact could hardly have been evaluated in terms of the number who would have been affected by it. Yet the alleged consequences of the Senator's designs for changing the treaty-making process were considerable, and the Executive opposed it categorically and with the exercise of much of its own influence.

The view that Congress originates marginal proposals is supported by comparing the content of bills initiated in Congress with those initiated by the executive. This is done in greater detail in a subsequent chapter. At this point it is worth nothing that quantitiatively Congress initiates more foreign policy proposals than the executive. In the period 1949-1958, 80% of the Senate bills and resolutions reported by the Committee

on Foreign Relations originated with Senators and 20% with the executive. In historical research of this kind it is difficult to identify all the executive-initiated bills and resolutions. We are confident that the 20% is a minimum figure of executive measures, but a somewhat larger number may be more accurate, inasmuch as it is a common occurence for a legislator to receive a suggestion from one of the departments and in turn seek its help in drafting his proposal. Nevertheless, our data would have to be very inaccurate to deny the proposition that many foreign policy proposals initiate in Congress. Yet none of these are the measures which command the greatest amount of time of the Committee or occupy the attention of the "attentive publics." Foreign aid, fundamental international commitments, participation in international organizations -- these bills with the greatest domain originate with the executive.

Summary

To summarize, Congressional participation in foreign policy decisions is principally in the recommendation and prescription stages of the decision process. Recommendations of important measures frequently are initiated by the executive rather than the legislative branch. Thus, in the prescription stage Congress is legitimating, amending, or vetoing executive proposals. The scope of Congressional influence varies with the constitutional provisions governing the making and conduct of foreign relations. The Senate, with an advantage in confirming diplomatic appointments and approving treaties has not exploited the former and is finding

the latter less and less an important instrument of policy. The House, with an advantage deriving from its constitutional position with respect to appropriations, awaits the executive budget and reacts to it by legitimating or cutting it, but rarely by raising it. In the initiation and determination of immigration policies Congress has consistently prevailed over the executive, and the scope of Congressional influence also extends to the organization of the executive for making and executing policy. Finally, the domain of Congressional influence, especially when it is initiative, tends to be on marginal and relatively less important matters.

Influence within Congress

We turn now to patterns of influence within Congress, particularly within the Senate, with respect to foreign policy. Our aim is to sketch some principal legislative characteristics associated with the weight, scope, and domain of influence among Senators, as distinguished from the influence of Congress in the total foreign policy-making process.

Weight of influence

Among Senators participation in foreign policy is concentrated in the Committee on Foreign Relations. Donald Matthews has dramatically demonstrated that specialization, or devotion to a small number of legislative subjects, is one of the folkways of the Senate. Men who observe these informal,

unwritten norms are usually more successful in obtaining Senate passage of their bills and resolutions.[28] Specialization in

[28] United States Senators and Their World, op. cit.

foreign affairs is evidenced by the authorship of bills and resolutions referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations from 1949-1958. Members of the Committee (usually 13 or 15) very nearly recommended as many foreign policy measures as all other Senators combined. For this ten-year period, Committee members introduced 304 bills and resolutions pertaining to foreign relations, and non-Committee members proposed 310. The relative concentration of business among Committee members is more evident when one compares the data for the early years of this period with the later years. From the 81st through the 85th Congresses there was a shift in the source of recommendation of foreign relations proposals from non-members to members of the Committee. In the 81st Congress, 70 of 120 foreign policy bills were proposed by non-members; by the 85th Congress, 106 of 167 were proposed by members.

Not only do Committee members dominate the recommendation function of Senate foreign policy decisions, but they are even more associated with the prescription function, that is, the selection among the many alternative policies proposed. In this same ten-year period, the Committee reported 219 Senate bills and resolutions; 166 of these had been introduced by members compared with 53 by non-members. Among members of the Committee,

the chairman and others of the majority party are more active both in the recommending and prescribing functions. Of the 219 Senate measures reported, 92 were sponsored by the Chairman. The sponsors of the other 127 reported bills and resolutions were more likely to be members of the majority party. Majority party sponsors accounted for 84 of the other reported measures, and minority party sponsors saw 43 of their proposals reported. Although minority party members are not excluded from the recommending function, the practice is to yield most of the burden for sponsoring serious proposals to the party which organizes the Senate. The majority's record, especially the chairman's, is somewhat inflated by the fact that the latter introduces Administration bills, which have a successful record of adoption. Nevertheless, the source of most recommended bills is the majority party, which in turn gives its members a more successful record at the prescription stage of the policy process.

Once the Committee reports a bill or resolution, the chances are higher than 9 out of 10 that the Senate will pass it. During the years 1949-1958, the Senate upheld the Committee's position on 20% of these 219 bills which reached the floor. Although the Committee's recommendations were amended in about 20% of the cases, the overwhelming practice was to pass its bills without a roll call vote. Roll call votes were taken on only 17 bills, and the Committee lost only one of these. In short, the Committee on Foreign Relations dominates the recommendation and prescription stages of the Senate's process for considering foreign affairs legislation. To be sure, other committees

affect U.S. international relations, but with respect to those matters falling within the jurisdiction of Foreign Relations, that Committee is commanding.

Scope of Influence

Other writers have called attention to the need to identify the subject-matter which individual legislators can affect as distinguished from those they cannot affect.[29] One of the

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[29]Dahl, "The Concept of Power," op.cit., and Matthews, "Patterns of Influence in the U.S. Senate: Five Approaches," op.cit.

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outstanding characteristics of legislative organizations, as well as other kinds of complex, modern organizations, is their specialization. One is not, therefore, surprised to hear that a Senator does not affect issue A with quite the same force as issue B, since he is on the committee considering A but not the one considering B. Surprised or not, it is important to specify the issue or issues over which influence is exercised, if one wants to increase his capacity to predict the legislative success of a particular type of Senator.

We note this in comparing the utility of different indicators of influence to predict the success of bills before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Consider two measures of influence, that by Warren H. Hollinshead and that by Robert A. Dahl. For his senior thesis at Amherst College, Hollinshead adopted the "attribution" technique widely used in studies of community power

structures to identify the most influential members of the Senate. The "attribution" technique consists of asking a number of informants who they believe are the most influential members of whatever system it is they are being asked about.

Hollinshead interviewed 12 of 16 legislative assistants to Senators selected on the basis of party, seniority, geography, chairmen, and committee membership. He provided his respondents with a list of the 80 Senators who served in both the 83rd and 84th Congresses. He asked each of them to circle the names of the most influential Senators. If they did not circle as many as 20 names, he then asked them to check additional names until they had marked a total of 20. He scored a circle with 2 points and a check with 1 point. After totalling scores, Hollinshead categorized the 80 Senators into those with Very High Influence, High Influence, Medium Influence, and Low Influence.[30]

[30] Warren H. Hollinshead, "A Study of Influence Within the United States Senate" (A.B. Thesis, Amherst College, 1957).

Much of the criticism of this technique as employed in community studies[31] might be made in the case of Hollinshead's

[31] Nelson W. Potsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A Reassessment," Social Forces, 37 (1959), pp. 232-36; Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," American Sociological Review, 24 (1959), pp. 796-803; Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), pp. 474-84; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review, 25 (1960), pp. 636-44.

use. However, Matthews found that the attributed rankings of legislative influence correlated "very high"[32] with the

[32]Matthews does not report the correlation, but from Table 3 in his paper, "Patterns of Influence in the U.S. Senate: Five Approaches," op.cit., I compute a Pearson product-moment correlation of about.9, which indeed is "very high."

rankings of legislative effectiveness he devised. His measure of legislative effectiveness was the ratio of successful bills sponsored to bills introduced.[33]

[33]United States Senators and Their World, op.cit., pp.278-79.

Hollinshead's rankings are, nevertheless, not very helpful in predicting the success of Senators in getting their bills reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations. As Table I reveals, Senators with Very High Influence were notably successful

(insert Table I here)

in sponsoring bills referred to Foreign Relations in the 84th Congress, but their record was not as effective as Medium Influence Senators in the 83rd. Furthermore, in the 84th Congress, Senators with Low Influence had as high a percentage of their foreign policy bills reported as did Senators with High Influence, and Medium Influence Senators exceeded High Influence Senators.

I attribute the inability of Hollinshead's rankings to predict foreign policy success not to any necessary technical

or methodological deficiency in his indicators, but to the fact that his interviews measured something other than what we are trying to predict. Hollinshead was asking for a total, general summary of influence. He did not specify the scope of influence. In our case, we have a more specific scope (foreign policy) and a quite specific base or means of influence (bills and resolutions as distinguished from scheduling time, delays, vetoes, amendments, personal favors, etc.). An analogy to Hollinshead's measure are those widely-discussed rankings of universities. If one wants to know, say, where is the best Department of Agronomy in American higher education, he will not ask for a summarized influence rating of the general qualities of all universities. It may be that for a large number of departments, the Harvards, Chicagos, Michigans, and Berkeleys have a higher probability of having the best department, but for any single department one would want to have a more specific indicator. So it is with the general attribution devices for summarizing influence.[34]

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[34]The difficulties with generalized measures of influence, such as membership in the "Inner Club" are illustrated by this snippet from The New Yorker, July 22, 1961, p. 55: "In the Senate, Goldwater's breezy charm brought him quick entrance to 'The Club' -- the hail-fellow hierachy of off-hours friends who actually govern the Senate -- Time, June 23, 1961." "Washington does not take Barry Goldwater as seriously as the rest of the country. He is universally liked in the Senate, but his influence is negligible and he is not a member of its invisible hierachy, 'The Club.' -- The Times, July 3, 1961."

Let us now turn to a more specific indicator of Senatorial influence; namely, Dahl, March, and Nasatir's.[35] Theirs is a

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[35]"Influence Rankings in the United States Senate," op.cit. and Dahl, "The Concept of Power," op.cit.

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measure of the "difference between the probability that a bill will pass the Senate when S_1 favors it and the probability that it will pass when S_1 opposes it." Using foreign policy measures which came to roll call votes between 1946 and 1954, and considering only the 34 Senators who served throughout that period, Dahl, et al., ranked the Senators according to their measure of power. This measure is confined to a more specific scope than Hollinshead's and it also specifies the base or means of influence. In both respects it is more nearly related to what we are trying to predict; namely, whether a Senator's bill will be reported by the Foreign Relations Committee.

Let us now take the Senators from Dahl's list who introduced foreign policy legislation for the three Congresses in the period of our investigation which are also in Dahl's period. These three Congresses are the 83rd (1953-54), 82nd (1951-52), and the 81st (1949-50). They are at the end of the eight-year period analyzed. Only 22 of these 34 Senators introduced foreign policy items, so we can work only with them. Seven of them fell in Dahl's High Influence category, 8 in Medium Influence, and 7 in Low Influence. As Table I-2 reveals, the High Influence Senators had a markedly higher percentage (67.4%) of their bills

(insert Table I-2 here)

TABLE I-2

Comparison of Dahl's Foreign Policy Influence Rankings with Success in Having One's Bills Reported by Committee on Foreign Relations

	Reported	Not Reported
High Influence	31 (67.4%)	15 (32.6%)
Medium Influence	8 (22.9%)	27 (77.1%)
Low Influence	1 (3.0%)	32 (97.0%)

reported by the Foreign Relations Committee than the Medium Influence group (22.9%) and the Medium Influence Senators stood far ahead of the Low (3%).

Duncan MacRae and Hugh D. Price modified Dahl's measure by constructing a "batting average" indicating in relative terms how often the majority voted the same way as a given Senator did.[36] Using scaling techniques, they were able to

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[36]"Scale Positions and 'Power' in the Senate," op. cit.

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rank-order Senators in terms of the proportion of times each voted with the majority. As Table I-3 shows, MacRae and Price provide rankings, which like Dahl's, are much more helpful in predicting success than Hollinshead's on foreign policy matters before the Committee on Foreign Relations. The High Influence category succeeded in securing Committee approval of nearly 63% of their bills, compared to 20% for the Medium Influence group and 6% for the Low Influence group. MacRae and Price's rankings, like Dahl's, are consistent with what one would expect when applied to our data.

(insert Table I-3 here)

As a further indication of the importance of specifying the issue, i.e., the scope of influence, see how poorly Dahl's ranking of power over tax policies predicts success in foreign policy. Again using only the 22 of his 34 who sponsored foreign policy bills and resolutions, we note in Table I-4 that of those 22 the High Influence category on tax policy succeeded in securing

TABLE I-3

Comparison of MacRae and Price's Foreign Policy Influence Rankings* with Success in Having One's Bills Reported by Committee on Foreign Relations

	Reported	Not Reported
High Influence	32 (62.7%)	19 (37.0%)
Medium Influence	6 (20.0%)	24 (80.0%)
Low Influence	2 (6.0%)	31 (94.0%)

*I am indebted to Professor MacRae for providing data referred to but not reported in footnote 2 of his and Professor Price's paper.

Foreign Relations Committee approval of only 12.5% of their bills; the Medium Influence Senators were more successful (33%); and the Low Influence category were slightly more successful (41%).

(Insert Table I-4) here)

Domain of influence

The third element of influence is domain, defined as the number of persons over whom influence is exercised. In a way, domain relates to the importance of any single act. One of the problems which some students of legislative behavior have confronted is to compare the relative weight of the influence of a Senator who can secure virtually anything he wants for his constituency with the weight of a Senator who is primarily interested in large-scale programs such as foreign aid, atomic energy, etc. In an appendix, Matthews pointed out that one of the interesting indications of a Senator's influence, i.e., legislative effectiveness, is his capacity to get so-called small bills through Congress for the benefit of his home state.[37]

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37 United States Senators and Their World, op. cit., p. 278.

However, legislative effectiveness in this sense may be merely an indication of one's popularity with his colleagues. It may also mean that he has a very small domain of influence, that is, that he is able to have his values accepted in Senate decisions

TABLE I-4

Comparison of Dahl's Tax Policy Influence Rankings with Success in Having One's Bills Reported by Committee on Foreign Relations

	Reported	Not Reported
High Influence	2 (12.5%)	14 (87.5%)
Medium Influence	10 (33.0%)	20 (67.0%)
Low Influence	28 (41.0%)	40 (59.0%)

when they apply to his State, but that so far as his impact on Senate decisions affecting a larger domain, such as a national policy on foreign aid or a policy toward the Soviet Union, he may have considerably less influence.

We have noted above that the Senators who participate most extensively in foreign policy are the Committee members and the Chairman. They are also the members with the greatest domain of influence with respect to international relations. The Chairman introduces the major administration bills "by request," and he regularly has a better record of success in obtaining passage of his measures than any other Senator. In a later chapter we shall discuss more fully the characteristics of Senators associated with success on major as distinguished from relatively less important proposals.

Summary

Within the Senate the Committee on Foreign Relations, especially the Chairman and majority party members, are the primary participants in recommending and prescribing foreign policy legislation. As the earlier work of Dahl, and MacRae and Price indicated, influence among Senators varies with the scope of the issue being affected. Specialized leaders, principally on the Committee, are concerned with foreign policy. These are the same Senators who have the greatest domain of influence, i.e., those who propose and prescribe the major foreign policy programs considered by the Senate.

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THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A REFORM CAUCUS IN ACTION

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Over the last century and a half, the work of the Constitutional Convention and the motives of the Founding Fathers have been analyzed under a number of different ideological auspices. To one generation of historians, the hand of God was moving in the assembly; under a later dispensation, the dialectic (at various levels of philosophical sophistication) replaced the Deity: "relationships of production" moved into the niche previously reserved for Love of Country. Thus in counterpoint to the Zeitgeist, the Framers have undergone miraculous metamorphoses: at one time acclaimed as liberals and bold social engineers, today they appear in the guise of sound Burkean conservatives, men who in our time would subscribe to Fortune, look to Walter Lippmann for political theory, and chuckle patronizingly at the antics of Barry Goldwater. The implicit assumption is that if James Madison were among us, he would be President of the Ford Foundation, while Alexander Hamilton would chair the Committee for Economic Development.

The "Fathers" have thus been admitted to our best circles; the revolutionary ferocity which confiscated all Tory property in reach and populated New Brunswick with outlaws has been converted by the "Milltown School" of American historians into a benign dedication to "consensus" and "prescriptive rights." The Daughters of the American Revolution have, through the ministrations of Professors Boorstin, Hartz, and Rossiter, at last found ancestors worthy of their descendants. It is not my purpose here to argue that the "Fathers" were, in fact, radical revolutionaries; that proposition has been brilliantly demonstrated by Robert R. Palmer in his Age of the Democratic Revolution. My concern is with the further position that not only were they revolutionaries, but they were also democrats. Indeed, in my view, there is one fundamental truth about

the Founding Fathers that every generation of Zeitgeisters has done its best to obscure: they were first and foremost superb democratic politicians. I suspect that in a contemporary setting, James Madison would be Speaker of the House of Representatives and Hamilton would be the eminence grise dominating (pace Theodore Sorenson or Sherman Adams) the Executive Office of the President. They were, with their colleagues, political men -- not metaphysicians, disembodied conservatives or Agents of History -- and as recent research into the nature of American politics in the 1780's confirms,[1] they were committeed (perhaps willy-nilly) to working within the democratic framework, within a universe of public approval. Charles Beard and the filiopietists to the contrary notwithstanding, the Philadelphia Convention was not a College of Cardinals or a council of Platonic guardians working within a manipulative, pre-democratic framework; it was a nationalist reform caucus which had to operate with great delicacy and skill in a political cosmos full of enemies to achieve the one definitive goal -- popular approbation.

Perhaps the time has come, to borrow Walton Hamilton's fine phrase, to raise the Framers from immortality to mortality, to give them credit for their magnificent demonstration of the art of democratic politics. The point must be reemphasized; they made history and made it in the limits of consensus. There was nothing inevitable about the future in 1787; the Zeitgeist, that fine Hegelian technique of begging casual questions, could only be discerned in retrospect. One can always (to paraphrase John Selden) interpret past success as the work of the Holy Ghost, but if the Paraclete participated in the work of the Convention, the assembled Deists seemingly missed inspiration. What they were doing was hammering out a pragmatic compromise which would both bolster the "National interest" and be acceptable to the people. What inspiration they got came from their collective experience as professional politicians in a democratic society.

In this context, let us examine the problems they confronted and the solutions they evolved. The Convention has been described picturesquely as a counter-revolutionary junta and the Constitution as a coup d'etat,[2] but this has been accomplished by withdrawing the whole history of the movement for constitutional reform from its true context. It is quite true that the goals of the constitutional elite were "subversive" to the existing political order, but it is overlooked that their subversion could only have succeeded if the people of the United States endorsed it by regularized procedures. Indubitably they were "plotting" to establish a much stronger central government than existed under the Articles, but one could argue equally well that John F. Kennedy was, from 1956 to 1960, "plotting" to become President. In short, on the fundamental procedural level, the Constitutionalists had to work according to the prevailing rules of the game. Whether they liked it or not is a topic for spiritualists -- and is irrelevant: one may be quite certain that had Washington agreed to play the De Gaulle (as the Cincinnati once urged), Hamilton would willingly have held his horse, but such fertile speculation in no way alters the actual context in which events took place.

When the Constitutionalists went forth to subvert the Confederation, they utilized the mechanisms of political legitimacy. And the roadblocks which confronted them were formidable. At the same time, they were endowed with certain potent political assets. The history of the United States from 1786 to 1790 was largely one of a masterful employment of political expertise by the Constitutionalists as against bumbling, erratic behavior by the opponents of reform. Effectively, the Constitutionalists had to force the states, by democratic techniques of coercion, to emasculate themselves. To be specific, if New York had refused to join the new Union, the project was doomed; yet before New York was safely in, the reluctant state legislature had sua sponte to take the following steps: 1) agree to send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention; 2) provide maintenance for

these delegates (1 and 2 were distinct stages: New Hampshire was early in naming delegates, but did not provide for their maintenance until July); 3) set up the special ad hoc convention to decide on ratification; and 4) concede to the decision of the ad hoc convention that New York should participate. New York admittedly was a tricky state, with a strong interest in a status quo which permitted her to exploit New Jersey and Connecticut, but the same legal hurdles existed in every state. And at the risk of boring the reader, it must be reiterated that the only weapon in the Constitutionalist arsenal was an effective mobilization of public opinion.

The group which undertook this struggle was an interesting amalgam of a few dedicated nationalists with the self-interested spokesmen of various parochial bailiwicks. The Georgians, for example, wanted s strong central authority to provide military protection to their huge, underpopulated state against the Creek Confederacy; Jerseymen and Connecticuters wanted to escape from economic bondage to New York; the Virginians hoped to establish a system which would give that great state its rightful place in the councils of the republic. The dominant figures in the politics of these states therefore cooperated in the call for the Convention.[3] In other states, the thrust towards national reform was taken up by opposition groups who added the "national interest" to their weapons system; in Pennsylvania, for instance, the group fighting to revise the Constitution of 1776 came out four-square behind the Constitutionalists, and in New York, Hamilton and the Schuyler ambiance took the same tack against George Clinton.[4] There was, of course, a large element of personality in the affair: there is reason to suspect that Patrick Henry's opposition to the Convention and the Constitution was founded on his conviction that Jefferson was behind both, and a close study of local politics elsewhere would surely reveal that others supported the Constitution for the simple

(and politically quite adequate) reason that the "wrong" people were against it.

To say this is not to suggest that the Constitution rested on a foundation of impure or base motives. It is rather to argue that in politics there are no immaculate conceptions, and that in the drive for a stronger general government, motives of all sorts played a part. Few are the men who in the history of mankind have espoused a view of the "common good" or "public interest" that militated against their private status; even Plato with all his reverence for disembodied reason managed to put philosophers on top of the pile. Thus it is not surprising that a number of diversified private interests joined to push the nationalist public interest; what would have been surprising was the absence of such a pragmatic united front. And the fact remains that, however motivated, these men did demonstrate a willingness to compromise their parochial interests in behalf of an ideal which took shape before their eyes and under their ministrations.

As Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick have suggested in a perceptive essay,[5] what distinguished the leaders of the Constitutionalist caucus from their enemies was a "Continental" approach to political, economic and military issues. To the extent that they shared an institutional base of operations, it was the Continental Congress (thirty-nine of the delegates to the Federal Convention had served in Congress[6]), and this was hardly a locale which inspired respect for the state governments. Robert de Jouvenal observed French politics half a century ago and noted that a revolutionary Deputy had more in common with a non-revolutionary Deputy than he had with a revolutionary non-Deputy;[7] similarly one can surmise that membership in the Congress under the Articles of Confederation worked to establish a continental frame of reference, that a Congressman from Pennsylvania and one from South Carolina would share a universe of discourse which provided them with a conceptual common denominator vis a vis their respective state

legislatures. This was particularly true with respect to external affairs: the average state legislator was about as concerned with foreign policy then as he is today, but Congressmen were constantly forced to take the broad view of American prestige, were compelled to listen to the reports of Secretary John Jay and to the dispatches and pleas from their frustrated envoys in Britain, France and Spain.[8] From considerations such as these, a "Continental" ideology developed which seems to have demanded a revision of our domestic institutions primarily on the ground that only by envigorating our general government could we assume our rightful place in the international arena. Indeed, an argument with great force -- particularly since Washington was its incarnation -- urged that our very survival in the Hobbesian jungle of world politics depended upon a reordering and strengthening of our national socereignty.[9]

Note that I am not endorsing the "Critical Period" thesis; on the contrary, Merrill Jensen seems to me quite sound in his view that for most Americans, engaged as they were in self-sustaining agriculture, the "Critical Period" was not particularly critical.[10] In fact, the great achievement of the Constitutionalists was their ultimate success in convincing the elected representatives of a majority of the white male population that change was imperative. A small group of political leaders with a Continental vision and essentially a consciousness of the United States' international impotence, provided the matrix of the movement. To their standard rallied other leaders with their own parallel ambitions. Their great assets were 1) the presence in their caucus of the one authentic American "father figure," George Washington, whose prestige was enormous;[11] 2) the energy and talent of their leadership (in which one must include the towering intellectuals of the time, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, despite their absence abroad), and their communications "network," which was far superior to anything on the opposition side;[12] 3) the preemptive skill which made "their" issue The Issue and kept the locally oriented

opposition on the permanent defensive; and 4) the subjective consideration that these men were spokesmen of a new and compelling credo: American nationalism, that ill-defined but nonetheless potent sense of collective purpose that emerged from the American Revolution.

Despite great institutional handicaps, the Constitutionalists managed in the mid-1780's to mount an offensive which gained mementum as years went by. Their greatest problem was lethargy, and paradoxically, the number of barriers in their path may have proved an advantage in the long run. Beginning with the initial battle to get the Constitutional Convention called and delegates appointed, they could never relax, never let up the pressure. In practical terms, this meant that the local "organizations" created by the Constitutionalists were perpetually in movement building up their cadres for the next fight. (The word organization has to be used with great caution: a political organization in the United States -- as in contemporary England[13]--generally consisted of a magnate and his following, or a coalition of magnates. This did not necessarily mean that it was "undemocratic" or "aristocratic," in the Aristotelian sense of the word: while a few magnates such as the Livingtons could draft their followings, most exercised their leadership without coercion on the basis of popular endorsement. The absence of organized opposition did not imply the impossibility of competition any more than low public participation in elections necessarily indicated an undemocratic suffrage.)

The Constitutionalists got the jump on the "opposition" (a collective noun: oppositions would be more correct) at the outset with the demand for a Convention. Their opponents were caught in an old political trap: they were not being asked to approve any specific program of reform, but only to endorse a meeting to discuss and recommend needed reforms. If they took a hard line at the first stage, they

were put in the position of glorifying the status quo and of denying the need for any changes. Moreover, the Constitutionalists could go to the people with a persuasive argument for "Fair Play" -- "How can you condemn reform before you know precisely what is involved?" Since the state legislatures obviously made the final decision on any proposals that might emerge from the Convention, the Constitutionalists were merely reasonable men asking for a chance. Besides, since they did not make any concrete proposals at that stage, they were in a position to capitalize on every sort of generalized discontent with the Confederation.

Perhaps because of their poor intelligence system, perhaps because of overconfidence generated by the failure of all previous efforts to alter the Articles,[14] the opposition awoke too late to the dangers that confronted them in 1787. Not only did the Constitutionalists manage to get every state but Rhode Island (which was characterized by a political system reminiscent of the "Blues" and the "Greens" in the Byzantine Empire)[15] to appoint delegates to Philadelphia, but when the results were in, it appeared that they dominated the delegations. (Given the apathy of the opposition, this was a natural phenomenon: Who in an ideologically non-polarized political atmosphere get appointed to a special committee?: The men who supported the movement for its creation.) Even George Clinton, who seems to have been the first opposition leader to awake to the possibility of trouble, could not prevent the New York legislature from appointing Alexander Hamilton -- though he did have the foresight to send two of his henchmen to dominate the delegation. (Incidentally, much has been made of the fact that the delegates to Philadelphia were not elected by the people; some have adduced this fact as evidence of the "undemocratic" character of the

gathering. But put in the context of the time, this argument is wholly specious: the central government under the Articles was considered a creature of the component states and in all the states but Rhode Island, Connecticut and New Hampshire, members of the national Congress were chosen by the state legislature. This was not a consequence of elitism or fear of the mob; it was a logical extension of states'-rights doctrine to guarantee that the national institution did not end-run the state legislatures and make direct contact with the people.)[16]

With delegations safely named, the focus shifted to Philadelphia. While waiting for a quorum to assemble, James Madison got busy and drafted the so-called Randolph or Virginia Plan with the aid of the Virginia delegation. This was a political master-stroke. Its consequence was that once business got underway, the framework of discussion was established on Madison's terms. There was no interminable argument over agenda; instead the delegates took the Virginia Resolutions -- "Just for purposes of discussion" -- as their point of departure. And along with Madison's proposals, many of which were buried in the course of the summer, went his major premise: a new start on a Constitution rather than piecemeal amendment. This was not necessarily revolutionary -- a little exegesis could demonstrate that a new Constitution might be formulated as "amendments" to the Articles of Confederation -- but Madison's proposal that this "lump sum" amendment go into effect after approval by nine states (the Articles required unanimous state approval for amendment) was thoroughly subversive.[17]

Standard treatments of the Convention divide the delegates into "nationalists" and "states'-righters" with various improvised shadings ("moderate nationalists," etc.), but these are a posteriori categories which obfuscate more than they clarify. What is striking to one who analyzes the Convention as a

case-study in democratic politics is the lack of clear-cut ideological divisions in the Convention. Indeed, I submit that the evidence -- Madison's Notes, the correspondence of the delegates, and debates on ratification -- indicates that this was a remarkably homogeneous body on the ideological level. Yates and Lansing, Clinton's two chaperones for Hamilton, left in disgust on July 10th. (Is there anything more tedious than sitting through endless disputes on matters one deems fundamentally misconceived? It takes an iron will to spend a hot summer as an ideological agent provocateur.); Luther Martin, Maryland's bibulous narcist, left on September 4th in a huff when he discovered that others did not share his self-esteem; others went home for personal reasons. But the hard core of delegates accepted a grinding regimen throughout the attrition of a Philadelphia summer precisely because they shared the Constitutionalist goal.

There were, of course, basic differences of opinion, but these were not ideological; they were structural. If the so-called "states'-rights" group had not accepted the fundamental purposes of the Convention, they could simply have pulled out and by doing so have aborted the whole enterprise. Instead of bolting, they returned day after day to argue and to compromise. An interesting symbol of this basic homogeneity was the initial agreement on secrecy: these professional politicians did not want to become prisoners of publicity; they wanted to retain that freedom of maneuver which is only possible when men are not forced to take public stands in the preliminary stages of negotiation.[18] There was no legal means of binding the tongues of the delegates: at any stage in the game a delegate with basic principled objections to the emerging project could have taken the stump (as did Luther Martin after his exit) and denounced

the convention to the skies. Yet Madison did not even inform Thomas Jefferson in Paris of the course of the deliberations[19] and available correspondence indicates that the delegates generally observed the injunction. Secrecy is certainly uncharacteristic of any assembly suffering from strong ideological polarization. (This was noted at the time: the New York Daily Advertiser, August 14, 1787, commented that the "...profound secrecy hitherto observed by the Convention (we consider) a happy omen, as it demonstrates that the spirit of party on any great and essential point cannot have arisen to any height.")[20]

Commentators on the Constitution who have read The Federalist in lieu of reading the actual debates have credited the Fathers with the invention of a sublime concept called "Federalism."[21] Unfortunately The Federalist is probative evidence for only one proposition: that Hamilton and Madison were inspired propagandists with a genius for retrospective symmetry. Federalism, as the theory is generally defined, was an improvisation which was later promoted into a political theory. Experts on "federalism" should take to heart the advice of David Hume, who warned in his Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences that "...there is no subject in which we must proceed with more caution than in (History), lest we assign causes which never existed and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and universal principles." In any event, the final balance in the Constitution between the states and the nation must have come as a great disappointment to Madison, while Hamilton's unitary views are too well known to need elucidation.

It is indeed astonishing how those who have glibly designated James Madison the "father" of Federalism have overlooked the solid body of fact which indicates that he shared Hamilton's quest for a unitary central government. To be specific,

they have avoided examining the clear import of the Madison-Virginia Plan,[22] and have disregarded Madison's dogged inch-by-inch retreat from the bastions of centralization. The Virginia Plan envisioned a unitary national government effectively freed from and dominant over the states. The lower house of the national legislature was to be elected directly by the people of the states with membership proportional to population. The upper house was to be selected by the lower and the two chambers would elect the executive and choose the judges. The national government would be thus cut completely loose from the states.[23]

The structure of the general government was freed from state control in a truly radical fashion, but the scope of the authority of the national sovereign as Madison initially formulated it was breathtaking -- it was a formulation worthy of the Sage of Malmesbury himself. The national legislature was empowered to disallow the acts of state legislatures,[24] and the central government was vested, in addition to the powers of the nation under the Articles of Confederation, with plenary authority wherever "...the separate States are incompetent or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."[25] Finally, just to lock the door against state intrusion, the national Congress was given the power to use military force on recalcitrant states.[26] This was Madison's "model" of an ideal national government, though it later received little publicity in The Federalist.

The interesting thing was the reaction of the Convention to this militant program for a strong autonomous central government. Some delegates were startled, some abviously leery of so comprehensive a project of reform,[27] but nobody set off any fireworks and nobody walked out. Moreover, in the two weeks that followed, the Virginia Plan received substantial endorsement en principe;

the initial temper of the gathering can be deduced from the approval "without debate or dissent" on May 31st of the Sixth Resolution which granted Congress the authority to disallow state legislation "...contravening in its opinion the Articles of Union." (Indeed, an amendment was included to bar states from contravening national treaties.)[28]

The Virginia Plan may therefore be considered, in ideological terms, as the delegates" Utopia, but as the discussions continued and became more specific, many of those present began to have second thoughts. After all, they were not residents of Utopia or guardians in Plato's Republic who could simply impose a philosophical ideal on subordinate strata of the population. They were practical politicians in a democratic society, and no matter what their private dreams might be, they had to take home an acceptable package and defend it (and their own political futures) against predictable attack. On June 14th, the breaking point between dream and reality took place. Apparently realizing that under the Virginia Plan, Massachusetts, Virginia and Pennsylvania could virtually dominate the national government (and probably appreciating that to sell this program to "the folks back home" would be impossible), the delegates from the small states dug in their heels and demanded time for a consideration of alternatives. One gets a graphic sense of the inner politics from John Dickinson's reproach to Madison: "You see the consequences of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in the General Legislature and are friends to a good National Government; but we would sooner submit to a foreign power than ... be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the Legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the large States."[29]

The bare outline of the Journal entry for Tuesday, June 14th, is suggestive

to anyone with extensive experience in deliberative bodies. "It was moved by Mr. Patterson (sic, Paterson's name was one of those consistently misspelled by Madison and everybody else) seconded by Mr. Randolph that the further consideration of the report from the Committee of the whole House (endorsing the Virginia Plan) be postponed til tomorrow. and before the question for postponement was taken. It was moved by Mr. Randolph seconded by Mr. Patterson that the House adjourn."[30] The House adjourned by obvious prearrangement of the two principals: since the preceding Saturday when Brearley and Paterson of New Jersey had announced their fundamental discontent with the representational features of the Virginia Plan, the informal pressure had certainly been building up to slow down the steamroller. Doubtless there were extended arguments at the Indian Queen between Madison and Paterson, the latter insisting that events were moving rapidly towards a probably disastrous conclusion, towards a political suidice pact. Now the process of accommodation was put into action smoothly -- and wisely, given the character and strength of the doubters. Madison had the votes, but this was one of those situations where the enforcement of mechanical majoritarianism could easily have destroyed the objectives of the majority: the Constitutionalists were in quest of a qualitative as well as a quantitative concensus. This was hardly from deference to local Quaker custom; it was a political imperative if they were to attain ratification.

According to the standard script, at this point the "states'-rights" group intervened in force behind the New Jersey Plan, which has been characteristically portrayed as a reversion to the status quo under the Articles of Confederation with but minor modifications. A careful examination of the evidence indicates that only in a marginal sense is this an accurate description. It is

true that the New Jersey Plan put the states back into the institutional picture, but one could argue that to do so was a recognition of political reality rather than an affirmation of states'-rights. A serious case can be made that the advocates of the New Jersey Plan, far from being ideological addicts of states'-rights, intended to substitute for the Virginia Plan a system which would retain both strong national power and have a chance of adoption in the states. The leading spokesman for the project asserted quite clearly that his views were based more on counsels of expediency than on principle; said Paterson on June 16th: "I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governmt. as may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve."[31] This is Madison's version; in Yates' transcription, there is a crucial sentence following the remarks above: "I believe that a little practical virtue is to be preferred to the finest theoretical principles, which cannot be carried into effect."[32] In his preliminary speech on June 9th, Paterson had stated "...to the public mind we must accommodate ourselves,"[33] and in his notes for this and his later effort as well, the emphasis is the same. The structure of government under the Articles should be retained:

> "2. Because it accords with the Sentiments of the People
>
> (Proof:) 1. Coms. (Commissions from state legislatures defining the jurisdiction of the delegates)
> 2. News-papers -- Political Barometer. Jersey never would have sent Delegates under the first (Virginia) Plan --
>
> Not here to sport Opinions of my own. Wt. (What) can be done. A little practicable Virtue preferrable to Theory."[34]

This was a defense of political acumen, not of states'-rights. In fact, Paterson's notes of his speech can easily be construed as an argument for attaining the substantive objectives of the Virginia Plan by a sound political route,

i,e., pouring the new wine in the old bottles. With a shrewd eye, Paterson queried:

> "Will the Operation and Force of the (central) Govt. depend upon the mode of Representn, -- No -- it will depend upon the Quantum of Power lodged in the leg. ex. and judy. Departments ---- Give (the existing) Congress the same Powers that you intend to give the two Branches, (under the Virginia Plan) and I apprehend they will act with as much Propiety and more Energy..." [35]

In other words, the advocates of the New Jersey Plan concentrated their fire on what they held to be the political liabilities of the Virginia Plan -- which were matters of institutional structure -- rather than on the proposed scope of national authority. Indeed, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution first saw the light of day in Paterson's Sixth Resolution, the New Jersey Plan contemplated the use of military force to secure compliance with national law, and finally Paterson made clear his view that under either the Virginia or the New Jersey systems, the general government would "...act on individuals and not on states."[36] From the states'-rights viewpoint, this was heresy: the fundament of this doctrine was the proposition that any central government had as its constituents the states, not the people, and could only reach the people through the agency of the state government.

Paterson then reopened the agenda of the Convention, but he did so within a distinctly nationalist framework. Paterson's position was one of favoring a strong central government in principle, but opposing one which in fact put the big states in the saddle. (The Virginia Plan, for all its abstract merits, did very well by Virginia.) As evidence for this speculation, there is a curious and intriguing proposal among Paterson's preliminary drafts of the New Jersey Plan:

> "Whereas it is necessary in Order to form the People of the U.S. of America into a Nation, that the States should be consolidated, by which means all the Citizens thereof will become equally intitled to and will equally participate in the same Privileges and Rights....it is therefore resolved, that all the Lands contained within the Limits of each state individually, and of the U.S. generally be considered as constituting one Body or Mass, and be divided into thirteen or more integral parts.
>
> Resolved, That such Divisions or integral Parts shall be styled Districts."[37]

This makes it sound as though Paterson was prepared to accept a strong unified central government along the lines of the Virginia Plan if the existing states were eliminated. He may have gotten the idea from his New Jersy colleague Judge David Brearley, who on June 9th had commented that the only remedy to the dilemma over representation was "...that a map of the U.S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal parts."[38] According to Yates, Brearley added at this point, "...then a government on the present (Virginia Plan) system will be just."[39]

This proposition was never pushed -- it was patently unrealistic -- but one can appreciate its purpose: it would have separated the men from the boys in the large-state delegations. How attached would the Virginians have been to their reform principles if Virginia were to disappear as a component georgraphical unit (the largest) for representational purposes? Up to this point, the Virginians had been in the happy position of supporting high ideals with that inner confidence born of knowledge that the "public interest" they endorsed would nourish their private interest. Worse, they had shown little willingness to compromise. Now the delegates

from the small states announced that they were unprepared to be offered up as sacrificial offerings to a "national interest" which reflected Virginia's parochial ambition. Caustic Charles Pinckney was not far off when he remarked sardonically that "...the whole (conflict) comes to this": "Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natil. system."[40] What he rather unfairly did not add was that the Jersey delegates were not free agents who could adhere to their private convictions; they had to take back, sponsor and risk their reputations on the reforms approved by the Convention -- and in New Jersey, not in Virginia.

Paterson spoke on Saturday, and one can surmise that over the weekend there was a good deal of consultation, argument, and caucusing among the delegates. One member at least prepared a full length address: On Monday, Alexander Hamilton, previously mute, rose and delivered a six-hour oration.[41] It was a remarkably apolitical speech; the gist of his position was that both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans were inadequately centralist, and he detailed a reform program which was reminiscent of the Protectorate under the Cromwellian Instrument of Government of 1653. It has been suggested that Hamilton did this in the best political tradition to emphasize the moderate character of the Virginia Plan,[42] to give the cautious delegates something really to worry about, but this interpretation seems somehow too clever. Particularly since the sentiments Hamilton expressed happened to be completely consistent with those he privately -- and sometimes publicly -- expressed throughout his life. He wanted, to take a striking phrase from a letter to George Washington, a "strong well mounted government";[43] in essence, the Hamilton Plan contemplated an elected life monarch, virtually free of public control, on the Hobbesian ground that only in this fashion could strength and stability be achieved. The other

alternatives, he argued, would put policy-making at the mercy of the passions of the mob; only if the sovereign was beyond the reach of selfish influence would it be possible to have government in the interests of the whole community.[44]

From all accounts, this was a masterful and compelling speech, but (aside from furnishing John Lansing and Luther Martin with ammunition for later use against the Constitution) it made little impact. Hamilton was simply transmitting on a different wave-length from the rest of the delegates; the latter adjourned after his great effort, admired his rhetoric, and then returned to business.[45] It was rather as if they had taken a day off to attend the opera. Hamilton, never a particularly patient man or much of a negotiator, stayed for another ten days and then left in a considerable disgust for New York.[46] Although he came back to Philadelphia sporadically and attended the last two weeks of the Convention, Hamilton played no part in the laborious task of hammering out the Constitution. His day came later when he led the New York Constitutionalists into the savage embroglio over ratification -- an arena in which his unmatched talent for dirty political infighting may well have won the day. (In the New York Ratifying Convention, Lansing threw back into Hamilton's teeth the sentiments the latter had expressed in his June 18th oration in the Convention. However, having since retreated to the fine defensive positions immortalized in The Federalist, the Colonel flatly denied that he had ever been an enemy of the states, or had believed that conflict between states and nation was inexorable! As Madison's authoritative Notes did not appear until 1840, and there had been no press coverage, there was no way to verify his assertions, so in the words of the reporter, "...a warm personal altercation between (Lansing and Hamilton) engrossed the remainder of the day

(June 28, 1788).")[47]

On Tuesday morning, June 19th, the vacation was over. James Madison led off with a long, carefully reasoned speech analyzing the New Jersey Plan which, while intellectually vigorous in its criticisms, was quite conciliatory in mood. "The great difficulty," he observed, "lies in the affair of Representation; and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable."[48] (As events were to demonstrate, this diagnosis was correct.) When he finished, a vote was taken on whether to continue with the Virginia Plan as the nucleus for a new constitution: seven states voted "Yes," New York, New Jersey, and Delaware voted "No," and Maryland, whose position often depended on which delegates happened to be on the floor, divided.[49] Paterson, it seems, lost decisvely; yet in a fundamental sense he and his allies had achieved their purpose: from that day onward, it could never be forgotten that the state governments loomed ominously in the background and that no verbal incantations could exorcise their power. Moreover, nobody bolted the convention: Paterson and his colleagues took their defeat in stride and set to work to modify the Virginia Plan, particularly with respect to its provisions on representation in the national legislature. Indeed, they won an immediate rhetorical bonus; when Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut rose to move that the word "national" be expunged from the Third Virginia Resolution ("Resolved that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive and Judiciary"[50]), Randolph agreed and the motion passed unanimously.[51] The process of compromise had begun.

For the next two weeks, the delegates circled around the problem of legislative representation. The Connecticut delegation appears to have evolved

a possible compromise quite early in the debates, but the Virginians and particularly Madison (unaware that he would later be acclaimed as the prophet of "federalism") fought obdurately against providing for equal representation of states in the second chamber. There was a good deal of acrimony and at one point Benjamin Franklin, of all people, proposed the institution of a daily prayer; practical politicians in the gathering, however, were meditating more on the merits of a good committee than on the utility of Divine intervention. On July 2nd, the ice began to break when through a number of fortuitous events[52] -- and one that seems deliberate[53] -- the majority against equality of representation was converted into a dead tie. The Convention had reached the stage where it was "ripe" for a solution (presumably all the therapeutic speeches had been made), and the South Carolinians proposed a committee. Madison and James Wilson wanted none of it, but with only Pennsylvania dissenting, the body voted to establish a working party on the problem of representation.

The members of this committee were elected by the delegates with one from each state -- and a very interesting committee it was. Despite the fact that the Virginia Plan had held majority support up to that date, neither Madison nor Randolph was selected (Mason was the Virginian) and Baldwin of Georgia, whose shift in position had resulted in the tie, was chosen. From the composition, it was clear that this was not to be a "fighting" committee: the emphasis in membership was on what might be described as "second-level political intrepreneurs." On the basis of the discussions up to that time, only Luther Martin of Maryland could be described as a "bitter-ender." Admittedly, there is some divination involved in this sort of analysis, but one

does get a sense of the mood of the delegates from these choices -- and from the interesting fact that Benjamin Franklin, despite his age and intellectual wobbliness, was elected over the brilliant and incisive Wilson or the sharp, polemical Gouverneur Morris, to represent Pennsylvania. His passion for conciliation was more valuable at this juncture that Wilson's logical genius, or Morris' acerbic wit.

There is a common rumor that the Framers divided their time between philosophical discussions of government and reading the classics in political theory. Perhaps this is as good a time as any to note that their concerns were highly practical, that they spent little time canvassing abstractions. A number of them had some acquaintance with the history of political theory (probably gained from reading John Adams' monumental plagiarism A Defense of the Constitutions of Government,[54] the first volume of which appeared in 1786), and it was a poor rhetorician indeed who could not cite Locke, Montesquieu, or Harrington in support of a desired goal. Yet up to this point in the deliberations, no one had expounded a defense of states'-rights or the "separation of powers" on anything resembling a theoretical basis. It should be reiterated that the Madison model had no room either for the states or for the "separation of powers": effectively all governmental power was vested in the national legislature. The merits of Montesquieu did not turn up until The Federalist; though a perverse argument could be made that Madison's ideal was truly in the tradition of John Locke's Second Treatise of Government,[55] the Locke whom the American rebels treated as an honorary president was a pluralistic defender of vested rights,[56] not of parliamentary supremacy.

It would be tedious to continue a blow by blow analysis of the work of the delegates; the critical fight was over representation of the states and once

the Connecticut Compromise was adopted on July 17th, the Convention was over the hump. Madison, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris of New York (who was there representing Pennsylvania!) fought the compromise all the way in a last ditch fight for a unitary state with parliamentary supremacy. But their allies deserted them and they demonstrated after their defeat the essentially opportunist character of their objections (using "opportunist" in a non-pejorative sense, to indicate a willingness to swallow their objections and get on with the business). Moreover, once the compromise had carried (by five states to four, with one state divided), its advocates threw themselves vigorously into the job of strengthening the general government's substantive powers -- indeed, as might have been predicted from Paterson's early statements. One gains an increased respect for Madison's devotion to the art of politics when he realizes that this dogged fighter could sit down six months later and prepare essays for The Federalist in contradiction to his basic convictions about the true course the Convention should have taken.

Two tricky issues will serve to illustrate the later process of accommodation. The first was the institutional position of the Executive. Madison argued for an executive chosen by the National Legislature and on May 29th this had been adopted with a provision that after his seven year term concluded, the chief magistrate should not be eligible for reelection. In late July this was reopened and for a week the matter was argued from several different points of view. There was a good deal of desultory speechmaking, but the gist of the problem was the opposition from two sources to election by the Legislature. One group felt that the states should have a hand in the process; another small but influential circle urged direct election by the people.

There were a number of proposals: election by the people, election by state governors, by electors chosen by state legislatures, by the National Legislature (James Wilson, perhaps ironically, proposed at one point that an Electoral College be chosen by lot from the National Legislature!), and there was some resemblance to three dimensional chess in the dispute because of the presence of two other variables, length of tenure and re-eligibility. Finally, after opening, reopening, and rereopening the debate, the thorny problem was consigned to a committee for resolution.

The Brearley Committee on Postponed Matters was a superb aggregation of talent and its compromise on the Executive was a masterpiece of political improvisation. (The Electoral College, its creation, however, had little in its favor as an institution -- as the delegates well appreciated.) The point of departure for all discussion about the presidency in the Convention was that in immediate terms, the problem was non-existent; in other words, everybody present knew that under any system devised, George Washington would be President. Thus they were dealing in the future tense and to a body of working politicians the merits of the Brearley proposal were obvious: Everybody got a piece of cake. (Or to put it more academically, each viewpoint could leave the Convention and argue to its constituents that it had really won the day.) First, the state legislatures had the right to determine the mode of selection of the electors; second, the small states received a bonus in the Electoral College in the form of a guaranteed minimum (three votes) while the big states got acceptance of the principle of proportional power; third, if the state legislatures agreed (as six did in the first presidential election), the people could be involved directly in the choice of

electors; and finally, if no candidate received a majority in the College, the right of decision passed to the National Legislature with each state exercising equal strength. (In the Brearley recommendation, the election went to the Senate, but a motion from the floor substituted the House; this was accepted on the ground that the Senate already had enough authority over the executive in its treaty and appointment powers.)

This compromise was almost too good to be true, and the Framers snapped it up with little debate or controversy. No one seemed to think well of the College as an institution; indeed, what evidence there is suggests that there was an assumption that once Washington had finished his tenure as President, the electors would cease to produce majorities and the chief executive would be chosen in the House. George Mason observed casually that selection would be made in the House nineteen times in twenty and no one seriously disputed this point. The vital aspect of the Electoral College was that it got the Convention over the hurdle and protected everybody's interests. The future was left to cope with the problem of what to do with this Rube Goldberg mechanism.

In short, the Framers did not in their wisdom endow the United States with a College of Cardinals -- the Electoral College was neither an exercise in applied Platonism nor an experiment in indirect government based on elitist distrust of the masses. It was merely a jerry-rigged improvisation which has subsequently been endowed with a high theoretical content. When an elector from Oklahoma in 1960 refused to cast his vote for Nixon (naming Byrd and Goldwater instead) on the ground that the Founding Fathers intended him to exercise his great independent wisdom, he was indulging in historical fantasy.

If one were to indulge in counter-fantasy, he would be tempted to suggest that the Fathers would be startled to find the College still in operation--and perhaps even dismayed at their descendents' lack of judgment.[57]

The second issue on which some substantial practical bargaining took place was slavery. The morality of slavery was, by design, not at issue;[58] but in its other concrete aspects, slavery colored the arguments over taxation, commerce, and representation. The "Three-Fifths Compromise," that three-fifths of the slaves would be counted both for representation and for purposes of direct taxation (which was drawn from the past -- it was a formula of Madison's utilized by Congress in 1783 to establish the basis of state contributions to the Confederate treasury) had allayed some Northern fears about Southern over-representation (no one then foresaw the trivial role that direct taxation would play in later federal financial policy), but doubts still remained. The Southerners, on the other hand, were afraid that Congressional control over commerce would lead to the exclusion of slaves or to their excessive taxation as imports. Moreover, the Southerners were disturbed over "navigation acts," i.e., tariffs, or special legislation providing, for example, that exports be carried only in American ships; as a section depending upon exports, they wanted protection from the potential voracity of their commercial brethren of the Eastern states. To achieve this end, Mason and others urged that the Constitution include a proviso that navigation and commercial laws would require a two-thirds vote in Congress.

These problems came to a head in late August and, as usual, were handed to a committee in the hope that, in Gouverneur Morris' words, "...these things may form a bargain among the Northern and Southern states."[59] The Committee reported its measures of reconciliation on August 25th, and on August 29th

the package was wrapped up and delivered. What occured can best be described in George Mason's dour version (he anticipated Calhoun in his conviction that permitting navigation acts to pass by majority vote would put the South in economic bondage to the North -- it was mainly on this ground that he refused to sign the Constitution):

> "The Constitution as agreed to till a fortnight before the Convention rose was such a one as he would have set his hand and heart to....(Until that time) The 3 New England States were constantly with us in all questions...so that it was these three States with the 5 Southern ones against Pennsylvania, Jersey and Delaware. With respect to the importation of slaves, (decision-making) was left to Congress. This disturbed the two Southernmost States who knew that Congress would immediately suppress the importation of slaves. Those two States therefore struck up a bargain with the three New England States. If they would join to admit slaves for some years, the two Southern-most States would join in changing the clause which required the 2/3 of the Legislature in any vote (on navigation acts). It was done." [60]

On the floor of the Convention there was a virtual lovefeast on this happy occasion. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina attempted to overturn the committee's decision when the compromise was reported to the Convention by insisting that the South needed protection from the imperialism of the Northern states. But his Southern colleagues were not prepared to rock the boat and General C. C. Pinckney arose to spread oil on the suddenly ruffled waters; he admitted that:

> "It was in the true interest of the S (outhern) States to have no regulation of commerce; but considering the loss brought on the commerce of the Eastern States by the Revolution, their liberal conduct towards the views of South Carolina (on the regulation of the slave trade) and the interests the weak Southn. States had in being united with the strong Eastern states, he thought it proper that no fetters should be imposed on the power of making commercial regulations; and that his constituents, though prejudiced against the Eastern States, would be reconciled to this

> liberality. He had himself prejudices agst the Eastern States before he came here, but would acknowledge that he had found them as liberal and candid as any men whatever." (Italics added)[61]

Pierce Butler took the same tack, essentially arguing that he was not too happy about the possible consequences, but that a deal was a deal.[62] Many Southern leaders were later -- in the wake of the "Tariff of Abominations" -- to rue this day of reconciliation; Calhoun's Disquisition on Government was little more than an extension of the argument in the Convention against permitting a congressional majority to enact navigation acts[63]

Drawing on their vast collective political experience, utilizing every weapon in the politician's arsenal, looking constantly over their shoulders at their constituents, the delegates put together a Constitution. It was a make-shift affair; some sticky issues (for example, the qualification of voters) they ducked entirely; others they mastered with than ancient instrument of political sagacity, studied ambiguity (for example, citizenship), and some they just overlooked. (In this last category, I suspect, fell the matter of the power of the federal courts to determine the constitutionality of acts of Congress. When the judicial article was formulated (Article III of the Constitution), the legislature was still endowed with broad power under the Randolph formulation, authority which by its own terms was scarcely amenable to judicial review. In essence, courts could hardly determine when "...the separate States are incompetent or ... the harmony of the United States may be interrupted"; the National Legislature, as critics pointed out, was free to define its own jurisdiction. Later the definition of legislative authority was changed into the form we know, a series of stipulated powers, but the delegates never seriously reexamined the jurisdiction of the judiciary under this new limited formulation.[64] All arguments on the

intention of the Framers in this matter are thus deductive and a posteriori, though some obviously make more sense than others.[65])

The Framers were busy and distinguished men, anxious to get back to their families, their positions, and their constituents, not members of the French Academy devoting a lifetime to a dictionary. They were trying to do an important job, and do it in such a fashion that their handiwork would be acceptable to very diverse constituencies. No one was rhapsodic about the final document, but it was a beginning, a move in the right direction, and one which they had reason to believe the people would endorse. In addition, since they had modified the impossible amendment provisions of the Articles (the requirement of unanimity which could always be frustrated by "Rogues Island") to one demanding approval by only three-quarters of the states, they seemed confident that gaps in the fabric which experience would reveal could be plugged without undue difficulty.

So with a neat phrase introduced by Benjamin Franklin (but devised by Gouverneur Morris)[66] which made their decision sound unanimous, and an inspired benediction by the Old Doctor urging doubters to doubt their own infallibility, the Constitution was accepted and signed. Curiously, Edmund Randolph, who had played so vital a role throughout, refused to sign, as did his fellow Virginian George Mason and Eldbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. Randolph's behavior was eccentric, to say the least -- his excuses for refusing his signature have a factitious ring even at this late date; the best explanation seems to be that he was afraid that the Constitution would prove to be a liability in Virginia politics, where Patrick Henry was burning up the countryside with impassioned denunciations. Presumably, Randolph wanted to check the temper of the populace before he risked his reputation, and perhaps his job, in

a fight with both Henry and Richard Henry Lee.[67] Events lend some justification to this speculation: after much temporizing and use of the conditional subjenctive tense, Randolph endorsed ratification in Virginia and ended up getting the best of both worlds.

Madison, despite his reservations about the Constitution, was the campaign manager in ratification. His first task was to get the Congress in New York to light its own funeral pyre by approving the "amendments" to the Articles and sending them on to the state legislatures. Above all, momentum had to be maintained. The anti-Constitutionalists, now thoroughly alarmed and no novices in politics, realized that their best tactic was attrition rather than direct opposition. Thus they settled on a position expressing qualified approval but calling for a second Convention to remedy various defects (the one with the most demagogic appeal was the lack of a Bill of Rights). Madison knew that to accede to this demand would be equivalent to losing the battle, nor would he agree to conditional approval (despite wavering even by Hamilton). This was an all or nothing proposition: National Salvation or National Impotence with no intermediate positions possible. Unable to get congressional approval, he settled for second best: a unanimous resolution of Congress transmitting the Constitution to the states for whatever action they saw fit to take. The opponents then moved from New York and the Congress, where they had attempted to attach amendments and conditions, to the states for the final battle.[68]

At first the campaign for ratification went beautifully: within eight months after the delegates set their names to the document, eight states had ratified. Only in Massachusetts had the result been close (187-168). Theoretically, the ratification by one more state convention would set the new

government in motion, but in fact until Virginia and New York acceded to the new Union, the latter was a fiction. (New Hampshire was the next to ratify; Rhode Island was involved in its characteristic political convulsions (the Legislature there sent the Constitution out to the towns for decision by popular vote and it got lost among a series of local issues);[69] North Carolina's convention did not meet until July and then rejected the Constitution.) This is hardly the place for an extensive analysis of the conventions of New York and Virginia. Suffice it to say that the Constitutionalists clearly outmaneuvered their opponents, forced them into impossible political positions, and won both states narrowly. The Virginia Convention could serve as a classic study in effective floor management: Patrick Henry had to be contained, and as one reads the debates, he discerns a standard two-stage technique. Henry would give a four or five hour speech denouncing the relevant section of the Constitution on every conceivable ground (the federal district, he averred at one point, would become a haven for convicts escaping from state authority!);[70] when Henry subsided, "Mr. Lee of Westmoreland" would rise and literally poleaxe him with sardonic invective (when Henry complained about the militia power, "Lighthorse Harry" really punched below the belt: observing that while the former Governor had been sitting in Richmond during the Revolution, he had been out in the trenches with the troops and thus felt better qualified to discuss military affairs.)[71] Then the gentlemanly Constitutionalists, (Madison, Pendleton and Marshall) would pick up the matters at issue and examine them in the light of reason.

Indeed, modern Americans who tend to think of James Madison as a rather dessicated character should spend some time with this transcript. Probably Madison put on his most spectacular demonstration of nimble rhetoric in what

might be called "The Battle of the Absent Authorities." Patrick Henry in the course of one of his harangues alleged that Jefferson was known to be opposed to Virginia's approving the Constitution. This was clever: Henry hated Jefferson, but was prepared to use any weapon that came to hand. Madison's riposte was superb: First, he said that with all due respect to the great reputation of Jefferson, he was not in the country and therefore could not formulate an adequate judgment; second, no one should utilize the reputation of an outsider -- the Virginia Convention was there to think for itself; third, if there were to be recourse to outsiders, the opinions of George Washington should certainly be taken into consideration, and finally, he knew from privileged personal communications from Jefferson that in fact the latter strongly favored the Constitution.[72] To devise an assault route into this rhetorical fortress was literally impossible.

The fight was over; all that remained now was to establish the new frame of government in the spirit of its framers. And who were better qualified for this task than the Framers themselves? Thus victory for the Constitution meant simultaneous victory for the Constitutionalists; the anti-Constitutionalists either capitulated or vanished into limbo -- soon Patrick Henry would be offered a seat on the Supreme Court[73] and Luther Martin would be known as the Federalist "bull-dog."[74] And irony of ironies, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison would shortly accumulate a reputation as the formulators of what is often alleged to be our political theory, the concept of "federalism." Also, on the other side of the ledger, the arguments would soon appear over what the Framers "really meant"; while these disputes have assumed the proportions of a big scholarly business in the last century, they began almost before the ink on the Constitution was dry. One of the best early ones features Hamilton

versus Madison on the scope of presidential power, and other Framers characteristically assumed positions in this and other disputes on the basis of their political convictions.

Probably our greatest difficulty is that we know so much more about what the Framers should have meant than they did. We are intimately acquainted with the problems that their Constitution should have been designed to master; in short, we have read the mystery story backwards. If we are to get the right "feel" for their time and their circumstances, we must in Maitland's phrase, "...think ourselves back into a twilight." Obviously, no one can pretend completely to escape from the solipsistic web of his own environment, but if the effort is made, it is possible to appreciate the past roughly on its own terms. The first step in this process is to abandon the academic premise that because we can ask a question, there must be an answer.

Thus we can ask what the Framers meant when they gave Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and we emerge, reluctantly perhaps, with the reply that (Professor Crosskey to the contrary notwithstanding)[75] they may not have known what they meant, that there may not have been any semantic consensus. The Convention was not a seminar in analytic philosophy or linguistic analysis. Commerce was commerce -- and if different interpretations of the word arose, later generations could worry about the problem of definition. The delegates were in a hurry to get a new government established; when definitional arguments arose, they characteristically took refuge in ambiguity. If different men voted for the same proposition for varying reasons, that was politics (and still is); if later generations worried about this lack of precision, that was their problem.

There was a good deal of definitional pluralism with respect to the problems the delegates did discuss, but when we move to the question of

extrapolated intentions, we enter the realm of spiritualism. When men in our time, for instance, launch into elaborate talmudic exegesis to demonstrate that federal aid to parochial schools is (or is not) in accord with the intentions of the men who established the Republic and endorsed the Bill of Rights, they are engaging in historical Extra-Sensory Perception. (If one were to join this E.S.P. contingent for a minute, he might suggest that the hard-boiled politicians who wrote the Constitution and Bill of Rights would chuckle scornfully at such an invocation of authority: obviously a politicans would chart his course on the intentions of the living, not on the dead, and count the number of Catholics in his constituency.)

The Constitution, then, was not an apotheosis of "constitutionalism," a triumph of architectonic genius; it was a patch-work sewn together under the pressure of both time and events by a group of extremely talented democratic politicians. They refused to attempt the establishment of a strong, centralized sovereignty on the principle of legislative supremacy for the excellent reason that the people would not accept it. They risked their political fortune by opposing the established doctrines of state sovereignty because they were convinced that the existing system was leading to national impotence and probably foreign domination. For two years, they worked to get a convention established. For over three months, in what must have seemed to the faithful participants an endless process of give and take, they reasoned, cajoled, threatened, and bargained amongst themselves. The result was a Constitution which the people, in fact, by democratic processes, did accept, and a new and far better national government was established.

Beginning with the inspired propaganda of Hamilton, Madison and Jay, the ideological build-up got under way. The Federalist had little impact on the

ratification of the Constitution, except perhaps in New York, but this volume had enormous influence on the image of the Constitution in the minds of future generations, particularly on historians and political scientists who have an innate fondness for theoretical symmetry. Yet, while the shades of Locke and Montesquieu may have been hovering in the background, and the delegates may have been unconscious instruments of a transcendent telos, the careful observer of the day to day work of the Convention finds no over-arching principles. The "separation of powers" to him seems to be a by-product of suspicion, and "federalism" he views as a pis aller, as the farthest point the delegates felt they could go in the destruction of state power without themselves inviting repudiation.

To conclude, the Constitution was neither a victory for abstract theory nor a great practical success. Well over a half a million men had to die on the battlefields of the Civil War before certain constitutional principles could be defined -- a baleful consideration which is somehow overlooked in our customary tributes to the farsighted genius of the Framers and to the supposed American talent for "constitutionalism." The Constitution was, however, a vivid demonstration of effective democratic political action, and of the forging of a national elite which literally persuaded its countrymen to hoist themselves by their own bootstraps. American pro-consuls would be wise not to translate the Constitution into Japanese, or Swahili, or treat it as a work of semi-Divine origin, but when students of comparative politics examine the process of nation-building in countries newly freed from colonial rule, they might find the American experience instructive as a classic example of the potentialities of a democratic elite.

1. The view that the right to vote in the states was severely circumscribed by property qualifications has been thoroughly discredited in recent years. See Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760-1860 (Princeton, 1960). The contemporary position is that John Dickinson actually knew what he was talking about when he argued that there would be little opposition to vesting the right of suffrage in freeholders since "The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it." Max Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, Vol 2,, p.202 (New Haven, 1911). (Henceforth cited as Farrand)
2. The classic statement of the coup d'etat theory is, of course, Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York 1913), and this theme was echoed by Vernon L. Parrington, Merrill Jensen and others in what might be described as the "populist" historiographical tradition. For a sharp critique of this thesis see Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution (Princeton, 1956).
3. A basic volume, which, like other works by Warren, provides evidence with which one can evaluate the author's own opinions, is Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston, 1928). The best brief summary of the forces behind the movement for centralization is Chapter 1 of Warren (as it will be cited hereafter.)
4. On Pennsylvania see Robert L. Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1942) and Charles P. Smith, James Wilson (Chapel Hill, 1956), Chapter 15; for New York, which needs the same sort of microanalysis Pennsylvania has received, the best study is E. Wilder Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 1783-1789 (New York, 1932).

Footnotes (2)

5. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolutiom," 76 Political Science Quarterly, 181 (1961).

6. Warren, p. 55

7. In La Republique des Camerades (Paris, 1914).

8. See Frank Monaghan, John Jay (New York, 1935), Chapter 13.

9. "(T)he situation of the general government, if it can be called a government, is shaken to its foundation, and liable to be overturned by every blast. In a word, it is at an end; and, unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy and confusion will inevitably ensue." Washington to Jefferson, May 30, 1787, 3 Farrand 31. See also Irving Brant, James Madison, The Nationalist (New York, 1948), Chapter 25.

10. Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York, 1950). Interesting enough, Prof. Jensen virtually ignores international relations in his laudatory treatment of the government under the Articles of Confederation.

11. The story of James Madison's cultivation of Washington is told by Brant, op. cit., pp. 394-7

12. The "message center" being the Congress; nineteen members of Congress were simultaneously delegates to the Convention. One gets a sense of this coordination of effort from Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton, Youth to Maturity (New York, 1957), Chapter 22.

13. See Sir Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III 2d Ed., New York, 1957); England in the Age of the American Revolution (London, 1930)

14. The Annapolis Convention, called for the previous year, turned into a shambles: only five states sent commissioners and only three were legally represented, and the instructions to those delegates present varied widely from state to state. Clinton and others of his persuasion may have thought this disaster

would put an end to the drive for reform. See Mitchell, op.cit., pp. 362-7; Brant, op. cit., pp. 375-387.

15. See Hillman M. Bishop, Why Rhode Island Opposed the Federal Constitution (Providence, 1950) for a careful analysis of the labyrinthine political course of Rhode Island.

16. The terms "radical" and "conservative" have been bandied about a good deal in connection with the Constitution. This usage is nonsense if it is employed to distinguish between two economic "classes" -- e.g., radical debtors versus conservative creditors, radical farmers versus conservative capitalists, etc. -- because there was no polarization along this line of division, the same types of people turned up on both sides (and many were hard to place in these terms: does one treat Robert Morris as a debtor or a creditor? or James Wilson?) See Brown, op. cit., passim. The one line of division that holds up is between those deeply attached to states'-rights and those who felt that the Confederation was bankrupt. Thus curiously the most narrow-minded, parochial spokesmen of the time have earned the designation "radical" while those most willing to experiment and alter the status quo have been dubbed "conservative"! See Cecilia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith", 12 William and Mary Quarterly 3 (1955)

17. Yet, there was little objection to this crucial modification from any quarter-- there almost seems to have been a gentlemen's agreement that Rhode Island's liberum veto had to be destroyed.

18. See Mason's letter to his son, May 27, 1787, in which he endorsed secrecy as "a proper precaution to prevent mistakes and misrepresentation until the business shall have been completed, when the whole may have a very different complexion from that in which the several crude and indigested parts might in their first shape appear if submitted to the public eye." 3 Farrand 28.

Footnotes (4)

19. See Madison to Jefferson, June 6, 1787, 3 Farrand 35.

20. Cited in Warren, p. 138

21. See, e.g., Gottfried Dietze, The Federalist, A Classic on Federalism and Free Government (Baltimore, 1960); Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, (New York, 1948); and John P. Roche, "American Liberty", in M. Konvitz and C. Rossiter (Eds.) Aspects of Liberty (Ithaca, 1958)

22. "I hold it for a fundamental point, that an individual independence of the states is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty," Madison to Randolph, cited in Brant, op. cit., p. 416.

23. The Randolph Plan was presented on May 29th, see 1 Farrand 18-23; the state legislatures retained only the power to nominate candidates for the upper chamber.

24. Resolution 6 gave the National Legislature this power subject to review by the Council of Revision proposed in Resolution 8.

25. Resolution 6.

26. Resolution 6.

27. See the discussions on May 30th and 31st. "Mr. Charles Pinkney wished to know of Mr. Randolph whether he meant to abolish the State Governts. altogether . . . . Mr. Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it . . . . Genl. Pinkney expressed a doubt . . . . Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt." 1 Farrand 33-4. There were no denunciations -- though it should perhaps be added that Luther Martin had not yet arrived!

28. 1 Farrand 54. (Italics added)

29. 1 Farrand 242.

30. 1 Farrand 240.

31. 1 Farrand 250.

Footnotes (5)

32. 1 Farrand 258.

33. 1 Farrand 178.

34. 1 Farrand 274.

35. 1 Farrand 275-6.

36. "But it is said that this national government is to act on individuals and not on states; and cannot a federal government be so framed as to operate in the same way? It surely may." 1 Farrand 182-3. Also Ibid at 276.

37. 3 Farrand 613.

38. 1 Farrand 177.

39. 1 Farrand 182.

40. 1 Farrand 255.

41. J. C. Hamilton cited in 1 Farrand 293.

42. See, e.g., Mitchell, op. cit., p. 381

43. Hamilton to Washington, July 3, 1787, 3 Farrand 53.

44. A reconstruction of the Hamilton Plan is found at 3 Farrand 617-630.

45. Said William Samuel Johnson on June 21: "A gentleman from New-York, with boldness and decision, proposed a system totally different from both (Virginia and New Jersey); and though he has been praised by every body, he has been supported by none." 1 Farrand 363.

46. See his letter to Washington cited supra note 43.

47. 3 Farrand 338.

48. 1 Farrand 321.

49. Maryland's politics in this period was only a bit less intricate than Rhode Island's: the rural gentry, in much the same fashion that Namier described in England, divided up among families -- Chases, Carrolls, Pacas, Lloyds,

Tilghmans, etc. -- and engaged in what seem, to the outsider, elaborate political Morris dances. See Philip A. Crowl, Maryland During and After the Revolution (Baltimore, 1943) The Maryland General Assembly named five delegates to the Convention with the interesting proviso that "the said Deputies or such of them as shall attend . . .shall have full Power to represent this State", 3 Farrand 586. Three of the delegates were Constitutionalists (Carroll, McHenry and Jenifer), while two were opposed (Martin and Mercer) which led to an ad hoc determination of where Maryland would stand when votes were taken. The vote on equality of representation, to be described infra, was an important instance of this eccentricity.

50. This formulation was voted into the Randolph Plan on May 30, 1787, by a vote of six states to none, with one divided. 1 Farrand 30.

51. 1 Farrand 335-6. In agreeing, Randolph stipulated his disagreement with Ellsworth's rationale, but said he did not object to merely changing an "expression". Those who subject the Constitution to minute semantic analysis might do well to keep this instance in mind; if Randolph could so concede the deletion of "national", one may wonder if any word changes can be given much weight.

52. According to Luther Martin, he was alone on the floor and cast Maryland's vote for equality of representation. Shortly thereafter, Jenifer came on the floor and "Mr. King, from Massachusetts, valuing himself on Mr. Jenifer to divide the State of Maryland on this question . . . requested of the President that the question might be put again; however, the motion was too extraordinary in its nature to meet with success." Cited from "The Genuine Information...", 3 Farrand 188.

53. Namely Baldwin's vote for equality of representation which divided Georgia -- with Few absent and Pierce in New York fighting a duel, Houston voted against equality and Baldwin shifted to tie the state. Baldwin was originally from Connecticut and attended and tutored at Yale, facts which have led to much speculation about the pressures the Connecticut delegation may have brought on him to save the day (Georgia was the last state to vote) and open the way to compromise. To employ a good Russian phrase, it was certainly not an accident that Baldwin voted the way he did. See Warren, p. 262.

54. For various contemporary comments, see Warren, pp. 814-818. On the plagiarism, see Zoltan Haraszti, "The Composition of Adam's Defense," in John Adams and the Prophets of Progress (Cambridge, 1952), Chapter 9. In this connection it is interesting to check the Convention discussions for references to the authority of Locke, Montesquieu and Harrington (the theorists who have been assigned various degrees of paternal responsibility.) There are no explicit references to James Harrington, one to John Locke (Luther Martin cited Locke on the state of nature, 1 Farrand 437), and seven to Montesquieu, only one of which related to the "separation of powers" (Madison in an old speech, which he explained in a footnote was given to help a friend rather than advance his own views, cited Montesquieu on the separation of the executive and legislative branches, 2 Farrand 34.) This, of course, does not prove that Locke and Co. were without influence; it shifts the burden of proof, however, to those who assert ideological causality.

55. I share Willmore Kendall's interpretation of Locke as a supporter of parliamentary supremacy and majoritarianism; see Kendall, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule (Urbana, 1941).

Footnotes (8)

56. The American Locke is delineated best in Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence (New York, 1948).

57. See John P. Roche, "The Electoral College: A Note on American Political Mythology," Dissent, Spring, 1961, pp. 197-99. The relevant debates are found in Farrand for July 19-26, 1787, 2 Farrand 50-128, and for September 5-6, 1787, 2 Farrand 505-531.

58. See the discussion on August 22, 1787, 2 Farrand 366-375; King seems to have expressed the sense of the Convention when he said, "the subject should be considered in a political light only." Ibid at 373.

59. 2 Farrand 374. Randolph echoed his sentiment in different words.

60. Mason to Jefferson, cited in Warren, p. 584.

61. August 29, 1787, 2 Farrand 449-450.

62. 2 Farrand 451. The plainest statement of the matter was put by the three North Carolina delegates (Blount, Spaight and Williamson) in their report to Governor Caswell, September 18, 1787. After noting that "no exertions have been wanting on our part to guard and promote the particular interest of North Carolina", they went on to explain the basis of the negotiations in cold-blooded fashion: "While we were taking so much care to guard ourselves against being over reached and to form rules of Taxation that might operate in our favour, it is not to be supposed that our Northern Brethren were Inattentive to their particular Interest. A navigation Act or the power to regulate Commerce in the Hands of the National Government . . . is what the Southern States have given in Exchange for the advantages we Mentioned". They conclude by explaining that while the Constitution did deal with other matters besides taxes -- "there are other Considerations of great Magnitude involved in the system"--they would not take up valuable time with boring details! 3 Farrand 83-84.

Footnotes (9)

63. See John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government (New York, 1943), pp. 21-25, 38. Calhoun differed from Mason and others in the Convention who urged the two-thirds requirement by advocating a functional or interest veto rather than some sort of special majority, i.e., he abandoned the search for quantitative checks in favor of a qualitative solution.

64. The Committee on Detail altered the General grant of legislative power envisioned by the Virginia Plan into a series of specific grants; these were examined closely between August 16 and August 23. One day only was devoted to the Judicial Article, August 27, and since no one raised the question of judicial review of Federal statutes, no light was cast on the matter. There were a number of random comments on the power of the judiciary scattered throughout the discussions, but there was another variable which deprives them of much probative value: the proposed Council of Revision which would have joined the Executive with the judges in legislative review. Madison and Wilson, for example, favored this technique -- which had nothing in common with what we think of as judicial review except that judges were involved in the task.

65. For what it may be worth, I think that judicial review of congressional acts was logically on all fours with review of state enactments and that it was certainly consistent with the view that the Constitution could not be amended by the Congress and President, or by a two-thirds vote of Congress (overriding a veto), without the agreement of three-quarters of the states. External evidence from that time supports this view, see Charles Warren, Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court (Boston, 1925), pp. 41-128, but the debates in the Convention prove nothing.

66. Or so Madison stated, 2 Farrand 643. Wilson too may have contributed; he was close to Franklin and delivered the frail old gentleman's speeches for him.

67. See a very interesting letter, from an unknown source in Philadelphia, to Jefferson, October 11, 1787: "Randolph wishes it well, & it is thought would have signed it, but he wanted to be on a footing with a popular rival". 3 Farrand 104. Madison, writing Jefferson a full account on October 24, 1787, put the matter more delicately -- he was working hard on Randolph to win him for ratification: "(Randolph) was not inveterate in his opposition, and grounded his refusal to subscribe pretty much on his unwillingness to commit himself, so as not to be at liberty to be governed by further lights on the subject." 3 Farrand 135.

68. See Edward P. Smith, "The Movement Towards a Second Constitutional Convention in 1788," in J. F. Jameson (Ed.), Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States (Boston, 1889), pp. 46-115.

69. See Bishop, op. cit., passim.

70. See Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, (Washington, 1836), Vol. 3, pp. 436-438.

71. This should be quoted to give the full flavor: "Without vanity, I may say I have had different experience of (militia) service from that of (Henry). It was my fortune to be a soldier of my country . . . . I saw what the honorable gentleman did not see -- our men fighting . . . ." Ibid, p. 178.

72. Ibid, p. 329.

73. Washington offered him the Chief Justiceship in 1796, but he declined. Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (Boston, 1947), Vol. 1, p. 139.

74. He was a zealous prosecutor of seditions in the period 1798-1800; with Justice Samuel Chase, like himself an alleged "radical" at the time of the Constitutional Convention, Martin hunted down Jeffersonian heresies. See James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (Ithaca, 1956), pp. 342-343.

75. Professor Crosskey in his sprawling Politics and the Constitution (Chicago, 1953), 2 Vols. has developed with almost unbelievable zeal and intricacy the thesis that the Constitution was designed to establish a centralized unitary state, but that the political leadership of the Republic in its formative years betrayed this ideal and sold the pass to states'-rights. While Professor Crosskey has introduced some valuable considerations -- I am indebted to him, for example, for his expose of The Federalist -- it is impossible for me to accept his central proposition. Madison and the other delegates, with the exceptions discussed in the text supra, did want to diminish the power of the states and create a vigorous national government. But they were not fools, and were, I submit, under no illusions when they departed from Philadelphia that this end had been accomplished. The crux of my argument is that political realities forced them to water down their objectives and they settled, like the good politicians they were, for half a loaf. The basic difficulty with Crosskey's thesis is that he knows too much -- he assumes that the Framers had a perfectly clear idea of the road they were taking, with a semantic machete he cuts blandly through all the confusion on the floor of the meeting to the real meanings. Finally, despite his ornate research apparatus, there is a fundamentally non-empirical quality about Crosskey's work. Even when he seems to me accurate, I wonder if his conclusions have any relationship to the data -- in short, I am reminded of the Fifth century Persian astrologer's radical and prescient announcement that the sun, not the earth, was at the center of the universe. He was not a great scientist born ten centuries too soon -- he was a sun worshipper.

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CONSENSUS-BUILDING IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL COMMUNITY: SOME HYPOTHESES AND SOME SUPPORTING DATA[1*]

by

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A large "if," followed by an even larger "of course," pervades discussion of the problems which confront the United States. Whatever the problem, whether it be one of expanding the foreign aid program or of building an extensive network of fall-out shelters, the feasibility of various solutions invariably turns on the question of the readiness of the public to make the necessary sacrifices. If the American people are willing, and if their support can be mobilized--these are the great qualifiers which dominate discussions of the American future. And, whenever they are introduced, it is standard procedure to assert that of course the people are willing and of course they can be mobilized.

One can hardly deny the importance of the qualifiers. The public's potential for sacrifice is relevant in a number of ways, ranging from group actions supporting national policy to personal acts implementing it, from organized pressure endorsing higher taxes to individual integrity in paying them. On the other hand, there is something plaintive and unreal about the confident assertion that the public is responsive. For the fact is that the foreign aid program has never enjoyed wide support, that civil defense efforts have foundered on the rocks of public apathy, and that a similar fate has befallen most proposals designed to extend our cold war involvement through increased expenditures of time and money. Only in military and defense matters have enlarged responsibilities been shouldered, and even here new commitments have not been accepted with alacrity or celerity. In short, ever since the early months of the Korean war a substantial gap has existed between the policies which have emerged from the policy-making process and those which seem necessary to contest an aggressive and skillful enemy.[2]

Efforts to account for this gap have followed along several lines of inquiry. One, what might be called the "societal decay" hypothesis, denies the premise that the public is capable of sacrifice. Instead a parallel is discerned between the United States of today and the Roman Empire of fifteen centuries ago: both societies are posited as having selfishly succumbed to the temptations of wealth, unaware of external dangers and unconcerned about internal decay.[3] An oft-quoted observation made by George F. Kennan in the fall of 1959, shortly after the television quiz scandals and during the height of the steel strike, succinctly summarizes this approach:

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*The notes begin on page 23

> If you ask me--as a historian, let us say--whether a country in the state this country is in today, with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great urban areas being gradually disintegrated by the headlong switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning without grievous interruptions--if you ask me whether such a country has, over the long run, good chances of competing with a purposeful, serious, and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say that the answer is "no."

But castigating the public is deceptively easy. It focuses attention on the results rather than the sources of social change. To posit national deterioration is to overlook the complexity of the processes whereby the values and aspirations of the society are translated into public policy. To see the nation's potential for sacrifice dwindling down to zero is either to ignore the function of leadership or to assume that the nation's leaders have acquiesced to the process of decay--and there is no evidence that the voices criticizing American values and practices have been silent. If the role of leaders is fully recognized, it becomes readily apparent that the attitudes and capacities of the citizenry are largely shaped by elite opinion. Presumably, then, a united and vigorous leadership could foster a readiness to sacrifice and a diminution of complacency. Conceivably, to be sure, the sacrifice potential of the nation is so low that even an active and dedicated leadership could not overcome the inertia and the preference for, as Barbara Ward puts it, "easy choices, surface excitements, and the temporary stimulus of pleasure."[4] However, given present knowledge about the dynamics of social change (and being not unmindful of the American response to World War II), it is more plausible to assume that a potential for sacrifice does exist and that therefore the main problem is one of mobilization--of first nourishing and then tapping and channeling the energies and aspirations of a contented but not obdurate people.

Recognition of the leadership function underlies a second explanation of the gap between the external threat and the internal response. This might be designated the "presidential leadership" hypothesis, and it is one which has enjoyed great vogue in recent years. Stated briefly, this school of thought accepts the premise that the public is capable of sacrifice, but asserts that only strenuous efforts by a strong occupant of the White House can unleash and harness the energies of the people. James Reston, for example, finds it hard "to underestimate America's current resistance to exhortations from the preachers, professors, columnists and editorial writers of the nation," but he nevertheless perceives that the resistance can be overcome:

> The President of the United States is the one man who can get the attention of the American people. If he says the nation is in trouble, they will listen to him. If he addresses himself to their doubts and questions, they will hear him out. If he presents programs and legislation to do what he thinks is necessary for the safety of the Republic and explains and keeps explaining why these are essential, he may very well prevail.[5]

An even more concise assertion of this hypothesis has been provided by Walter Lippmann, who recently observed that

> This is a most peculiarly Presidential country. The tone and example set by the President have a tremendous effect on the quality of life in America. The President is like the conductor of a big symphony orchestra----and a new conductor can often get different results with the same score and the same musicians.[6]

But reliance on the President is also deceptively easy. If the societal decay hypothesis ignores the leadership function, then the presidential leadership hypothesis oversimplifies it. Such reasoning tends to posit social change as stemming from a single cause and, in so doing, it also fails to account for the complex processes whereby public policies come to reflect public aspirations. Surely this must be why, for example, the foreign aid program has foundered despite empha tic support by post-war presidents.[7] Presidential leadership is not, in other words, the only independent variable. It may be, and doubtless is, necessary to the mobilization of the nation's sacrifice potential, but it is not a sufficient condition of social change along these lines. Obviously the public cannot be mobilized if, say, members of Congress or leaders of the business community and the labor movement resist presidential blandishments. The various segments of the public can be as responsive to their respective leaders as to the occupant of the White House, so that presidential leadership requires a followership which is both more complex and more structured than the amorphous entity called the "American people." To extend Lippmann's analogy, orchestras are not automatically melodious in response to waves of a conductor's baton. Their members must be willing to play together and must interpret movements of the baton in the same way if harmonious music rather than incoherent noise is to fill the concert hall.

A more sophisticated conception of the role of leadership,[8] one which might be called the "consensus-building" hypothesis, constitutes still a third approach to the problem of mobilizing the public. This posits a structure of national leadership which can serve as a link between public policies and public opinion. Just as leaders from all walks of a local community's life initiate and sustain its policies, so are diverse groups of national leaders---those whose opinions are regularly transmitted across state boundaries to unknown persons[9]---assumed to perform similar functions for the continental community. The policies of the federal government are viewed as resulting mainly from the actions which national leaders take on the basis of assessments of what is needed both to cope with the course of events and to satisfy the aspirations of the public segment from which they derive their leadership. In making these assessments national leaders, or national opinion-makers as they shall henceforth be designated,[10] can be oriented to serve their particular segment of the public or they can take a larger view of their roles and conceive of themselves as also having continental responsibilities. The content of any policy adopted at the national level is thus significantly shaped by the extent to which continental or segmental orientations prevail within the leadership structure.

By the structure of leadership is meant a differentiation between opinion-makers who are active at the national and local levels. Even though dissension and disunity may characterize national opinion-makers, their ranks are regarded as structured in the sense that their activities overlap and

do so apart from those whose scope of leadership is limited to a city or a state. Thus, for example, the structure of national leadership encompasses top officials of the executive branch, members of Congress, prominent corporation executives, officers of large labor unions, education and religious leaders, publishers and commentators, high-ranking military officers, and leaders of the many voluntary associations which are organized on a national scale. Stated differently, national opinion-makers are the members of Mr. Lippmann's orchestra , while the rest of the citizenry is the audience hearing the concert.[11]

The consensus-building hypothesis derives directly from this conception of a national leadership structure. For it follows that mobilization of the nation's sacrifice potential is a function of the extent to which a consensus on the need for sacrifice can be fashioned among the diverse groups which comprise the national opinion-making public. If these various types of leaders possess, presently or potentially, a common evaluative and perceptual framework, and if they are therefore capable of similar responses to external threats (as magnified and dramatized through presidential leadership), then presumably the energies of the entire citizenry can be tapped and channeled in a manner commensurate with the requirements of a prolonged cold war. In short (and to paraphrase Gabriel Almond), "Who mobilizes the opinion-makers, mobilizes the public."[12]

I

Two versions of the consensus-building hypothesis have come to be held by students of the policy-making process. One version asserts that the structure of national leadership militates against the fashioning of meaningful consensuses within the opinion-making public. Functional autonomy and ideological heterogeneity are considered to be major structural characteristics of the opinion-making public which prohibit, or at least greatly restrict, the formation of nationwide consensuses.[13] Even a vigorous occupant of the White House is hypothesized to be incapable of coordinating diverse leadership segments which ordinarily function independently of each other and which "differ significantly among themselves with regard to both the means and ends of policy".[14] Members of the opinion-making public, in other words, are regarded as constituting a community in only the loosest sense of the term. Their orientations are segmental and not continental. They lack common values and a common framework for perceiving and interpreting events and trends abroad. Hence they cannot be expected to respond similarly, much less uniformly, to the same stimuli.

In contrast to this conception of a heterogeneous opinion-making public is a version of the consensus-building hypothesis which asserts that the national leadership structure is changing as the nation becomes increasingly complex and its parts increasingly interdependent. It is reasoned that leadership groups are therefore less and less able to function autonomously and that, indeed, they are compelled to interact frequently. This recurring interaction is hypothesized to foster understanding and the integration of perspectives, thereby dissipating the value differences which have divided the opinion-making public into so many diverse segments. In turn, these changes are presumed to encourage a sense of shared responsibility and a readiness to shoulder the burdens of cold war leadership. As a result of continuous contact and common experiences, in other words, the opinion-making public is regarded as acquiring an integrated structure and the dynamics of

thriving community. Thus it is assumed that leaders at the national level will respond similarly to external threats and, given an energetic and persuasive President, that they are capable of being coordinated and mobilized. Reasoning along this line has been most clearly articulated by W.W. Rostow, who unqualifiedly contends that the various leadership

> groups are getting to know one another. One facet of the rapid evolution of an American continental community is that leaders in special segments of national life are being brought together to consider major foreign and domestic problems. Businessmen and professors, labor leaders and churchmen, farm organization executives and foundation officials gather now as a matter of course from every part of the country on one occasion or another. As a result, there now exists as never before the physical and human possibility of thrashing out rapidly a nationwide consensus among those outside the government who can play important roles in leading the community toward agreement and action in military affairs.[15]

Obviously one of these versions of the consensus-building hypothesis must be incorrect. But which one? Do national opinion-makers have common values or do they not? Do they come from similar backgrounds and have similar sources of information, or do they lack the bases of a common frame of reference? Do they respond in similar ways to shared experiences or do they not? Is it, in short, possible to fashion a consensus among diverse national leaders and, if it is, will widespread agreement at this level produce corresponding public policies? An attempt to answer these questions--at least tentatively--occupies the remainder of this paper.

II

Research in the public opinion field is marked by a curious and striking discrepancy: despite widespread concurrence that the processes of opinion formation and circulation are sustained by the opinion-making public and only peripherally influenced by the mass public, it is the former and not the latter that has occupied the empirical spotlight. Findings descriptive of the attitudes of the mass public on a variety of political or social issues are voluminous.[16] No less extensive are the studies of how opinions circulate among the citizenry--of how newspapers are read, television absorbed, voluntary associations joined, opinions internalized, and information rerouted from mass media into face-to-face situations.[17] In contrast to the powerful, two-beamed spotlight that has played searchingly upon the attitudes and behavior patterns of the mass public, a flickering candle has barely illuminated the opinion-making public. Whereas opinion-makers are conceived to interact with one another in such a way as to set the tone and limits of public debate, the extent and manner of their interaction has not been systematically researched. Likewise, the relevance of their social backgrounds and prior experience has been stressed conceptually,[18] but not analyzed empirically. Nor have their attitudes toward major foreign policy issues been the subject of close comparative analysis.[19] Even more scarce are data on how various types of opinion-makers view their roles and the responsiveness of the mass public to their leadership efforts. Most importantly, comparative analyses of national leaders in action--studies of attutudinal and behavioral responses to common stimuli that might reveal their susceptibility to coordination and mobilization--are conspicuously missing from the literature on the opinion-making public.

To be sure, the backgrounds, attitudes, and behavior of certain segments of the opinion-making public have been subjected to empirical analysis. Lawyers, for example, have been extensively researched, as have lobbyists, businessmen, academics, and public relations specialists.[20] But such studies are isolated and unrelated to each other. They do not ask the same questions of their data and are therefore neither comparative nor comparable. They were not carried out in an effort to add empirical flesh to a larger conceptual skeleton and thus they do not have the effect of cumulating knowledge about the structure and functioning of the opinion-making public as a whole.

It is true that at the local community level the nature and operation of leadership structures have been analyzed and that these efforts have yielded valuable and cumulative data. We do know, for example, about the coordination of leadership groups in "Middletown,"[21] about the building of consensuses in "Yankee City,"[22] about the shaping of policy in "Regional City,"[23] to mention but a few of the many inquiries into the structure and functioning of diverse leadership groups.[24] But building consensus among local opinion-makers on the one hand and national leaders on the other may involve entirely different processes.[25] Certainly it would be unwarranted to assume that findings pertinent to local communities are equally valid for the nation. Rather the structure and functioning of the national opinion-making public needs to be examined directly, and, to repeat, studies of this sort are virtually nonexistent. Those that have been undertaken are mainly theoretical[26] and the few available empirical investigations are unsystematic and impressionistic, if not polemical.[27] None provide elaborate and organized data bearing upon the possibilities of coordinating autonomous groups of national leaders and building consensuses among them.

A combination of reasons probably accounts for the disproportionate empirical attention that has been paid to the mass public and to local leadership structures. One is that much of the work has been undertaken by sociologists and market researchers, whose interest in community-wide phenomena leads them, quite properly, to assume those aspects of the public opinion process which occur prior to the transmission of opinion by the mass media. Democratic value theory is doubtless another reason for the empirical neglect of the national opinion-making public. Contrary to the aforementioned premise that the mass public plays a minor role in the public opinion process, democratic theory posits it as performing the central role, as controlling and directing the opinion-making public. Consequently, investigators have been inclined to observe mainly what the "people" are thinking and doing and thence to bemoan the discovery that the "people" are neither thinking nor doing.

The inaccessibility of the opinion-making public is still another reason for the imbalance between the conceptual and the empirical attention paid to it. National leaders are few in number and dispersed all over the country. Unlike members of the mass public, they are thus difficult to reach and to sample. In addition, they are busy people who often have neither the time nor the inclination to respond adequately to interviews or questionnaires.

Even if technical difficulties could be surmounted, however, empirical investigation of the opinion-making public would still be extremely difficult. For its members are engaged in diverse pursuits and thus it is not

ordinarily possible for the researcher to examine their behavior under similar conditions or in response to common stimuli. He can ask segments of the mass public about their attitudes on a given issue and then engage in comparative analysis. But in order to make comparisons among opinion-makers, behavioral as well as attitudinal data must be gathered. If some opinion-makers are not active with respect to the issue, a survey of their attitudes would not produce useful data pertaining to their role as opinion-makers. Little wonder, then, that lawyers and businessmen and academics and other groups have been examined separately and without reference to each other.

What the social scientist needs, in other words, is for somebody to attempt to mobilize public opinion behind a point of view by calling a convention of national opinion-makers. It should be large enough to include a sample of the major types of opinion-makers: leading corporation executives; college presidents; high-ranking labor leaders; distinguished entertainers and scientists; the heads of large farm, veterans, religious, world affairs, and women's organizations; military officers; prominent publishers, reporters, and commentators; members of Congress and of the President's cabinet; and so on. But such a convention should not be so large as to prevent the opinion-makers from meeting together in one place and thereby being contemporaneously subjected to the same stimuli. Perhaps the size of a presidential nominating convention would meet these requirements while at the same time being manageable from a research point of view. Preferably the convention should be at least a day in duration so that the stimuli would take the form of a meaningful and memorable experience. To make it even more memorable, the main speeches should be delivered by the top leaders of both political parties. Imagine the impact, for example, of a Republican President and his Democratic predecessor, of a Republican Secretary of State and his Democratic counterpart, of a Republican Vice President and the defeated Democratic presidential candidate, all speaking about the same issue on the same day in front of the same microphone. Surely such a spectacle would provide opinion-makers with a stimulus that would last long enough for the social scientist to come along later and analyze responses to it. Of course, it would also be ideal if the convention was sponsored by an important agency of the federal government. In this way the social scientist would be studying those who are regarded as opinion-makers by top government officials. Even more ideally, the convention should be so structured as to focus upon an issue of great national importance, thereby ensuring that all those in attendance would be subsequently inclined to engage in measurable opinion-making activity. Finally, so as to reduce any uncertainty about the exact nature of the stimuli to which responses are subsequently made, the convention speakers of both parties should take a united and firm position on the issue, stressing that those in attendance should exercise the full limits of their opinion-making capacities on behalf of the recommended policy.

Every detail of this social scientific fantasy actually occurred on February 25, 1958. The event was called the "Conference on Foreign Aspects of U. S. National Security" and its proceedings focused upon the foreign aid program. It was held at the Hotel Statler in Washington, D. C., from nine-thirty in the morning until ten o'clock in the evening. The conferees, about 1,400, were selected by a staff in the White House and the invitations to attend the Conference were issued on White House stationery in the name of the President of the United States. Included among the conferees were

about 250 leading corporation executives, 100 college and university presidents, 20 high-ranking labor leaders, 25 distinguished entertainers, scientists, and sports stars, 400 officers of large voluntary associations, 10 admirals and generals, 100 publishers and journalists, 135 members of Congress, and 75 top officials of the executive branch. Among the Conference speakers were the Republican and Democratic leaders cited above, all of whom endorsed the foreign aid program in urgent and unqualified terms. The Conference schedule also included a "Panel on Post-Conference Education" in which the opinion-makers were urged to be active on behalf of foreign aid.[28]

Exactly three months after the Conference, 1,067 of the conferees[29] were mailed an 8-page, 71-item questionnaire soliciting information about their social backgrounds, their reactions to the Conference, and their subsequent behavior with respect to foreign aid. Of these, 61 per cent responded,[30] and what follows is a summary of those aspects of the data yielded by the 647 returned questionnaires which pertain to the consensus-building hypothesis.[31]

III

While there is insufficient evidence to claim that the conferees were a representative sample of the opinion-making public,[32] it is clear from the data that they were drawn primarily from the ranks of leaders active on the national level. This conclusion is manifest in the responses to a series of multiple-choice questionnaire items that inquired into the extent of the conferees' access to various channels of communication: two-thirds of the conferees estimated that they could "reach" about ten thousand persons if they "wanted to disseminate a new idea" and one-fifth cited a potential audience of at least one million; two-thirds reported that they participated in "the deliberations of organizations which take stands on public issues;" three-fifths indicated they had "some voice in determining the contents of a publication;" three-fifths said that every month they received at least one request to give "a lecture or talk on any subject" and more than one-third said their requests averaged at least five a month; three-fifths said they appeared on at least one television or radio program a year and nearly two-fifths cited a frequency of at least four annual appearances; one-half said they were "responsible for the writing and distribution of press releases;" one-half said that "quite often" they were asked to lend their name "to advance worthy causes;" nearly one-half estimated that they were "quite often" or "occasionally" quoted in newspapers; two-fifths reported having written at least one "article published in a magazine circulated nationally and sold at newsstands;" one-fourth reported having written at least one book; and one-fourth said they had been recipients of an honorary degree.

An even more impressive indication that the White House did succeed in convening a group of national opinion-makers is provided by this datum: an index of opinion-making potential was compiled out of the responses to ten of the foregoing items and, with possible scores ranging from 0 to 100, the conferees registered a mean score of 49.0, whereas the equivalent figure for parents or friends of students at Rutgers University who completed just this part of the questionnaire[33] was 15.9. Only 4 per cent of the conferees had an index score below this "ordinary citizen" mean and this figure is perhaps a good indication of the small proportion of conferees

who cannot properly be designated as national leaders.

As for the social backgrounds of the conferees, a profile of their major characteristics is presented in Table I. Here it can be seen that on the basis of this White House-selected sample[34] the structure of national leadership is composed primarily of middle-aged, white, Protestant, well-educated males who are located mainly on the Eastern seaboard and who have not had extensive governmental or political experience. On the other hand, the profile is much less clearcut with respect to the conferees political allegiances and their occupations, albeit businessmen were clearly the predominant group. National opinion-makers, in sum, would appear to have affiliational and experiental bases for a common frame of reference even though in important respects diversity of background also characterize their ranks.

The basis for a common frame of reference is further suggested by data pertaining to the foreign travels and the reading habits of the conferees. These point to the conclusion that opinion-makers tend to rely on the same or similar sources for information about world affairs. It would seem, for example, that first-hand contact with people and places outside of the United States is an experience widely shared by national leaders. More than four-fifths of the conferees reported that they had travelled abroad at least once since 1945 and more than one-fourth said they had been out of the country on no less than six different occasions. All in all, the conferees registered a mean of 6.1 trips abroad since World War II, a frequency which no doubt greatly exceeds the foreign travel experience of most Americans.[35] No less striking are the findings concerning the secondary sources through which world affairs are experienced by opinion-makers. Not only did almost all the respondents indicate that newspapers serve as their main source of information, but the same source was cited by three-fourths of those who listed specific media (Table II). The New York Times would seem to be, so to speak, a bible for opinion-makers.[36] Indeed, no other source received even half as many citations as the Times. Nor does this finding merely reflect the large number of conferees who came from New York City and for whom the Times is a local newspaper. Only 43 per cent of those who cited it came from the Northeast and nearly half of these came from elsewhere in the region than New York. Stated even more impressively, reliance upon the Times was reported by 46 per cent of the Far Westerners, 55 per cent of the Southerners, 60 per cent of the Mid-westerners, and 81 per cent of those from Washington, D.C., as well as by 90 per cent of the Northeasterners.

Turning now to the question of whether national leaders experience interaction with other members of the opinion-making public, substantial evidence was uncovered in support of the assertion that they are "getting to know one another." It is clear, for example, that they are physically mobile and that consequently their paths are continuously crossing. One-third of the conferees who neither lived nor worked in Washington D.C., estimated that they visit the capital at least six times a year and only 8 per cent cited a frequency of less than one annual visit. That this extensive domestic travel involves interaction with other opinion-makers as well as professional or personal business is indicated by the responses to an item which inquired into the frequency of attendance at "conferences, conventions, meetings, etc.:" three-fifths responded "frequently," one-third "occasionally," and only a fraction "very rarely."

Table I: SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFEREES (in percentages)

(n=647)

Sex

Male	- 77
Female	- 23

Age

Under 30	- 2
30 - 39	- 9
40 - 49	- 28
50 - 59	- 28
60 - 69	- 19
Over 70	- 1
Unknown	- 13

Region

Northeast	- 37
Washington, D.C.	- 32
Midwest	- 14
South	- 11
Far West	- 5
Other	1

Undergraduate Education

Did not attend college	- 9
Attended college but either did not graduate (10) or did specify graduation (14)	-24
Graduated from college	-65
Unknown	- 2

Post-Graduate Education

Did not attend graduate or professional school	-31
Attended but did not obtain a degree (16) or did not specify whether a degree was obtained (4)	-20
Attended and obtained a degree	-43
Unknown	- 6

Prior Government Experience* (Local, State, and National)

Held elective office	-16
Held appointive office	-35
Held consultative office	-47
Never held any office	-38

* Due to multiple coding the total of the subcategories exceeds 100 per cent.

Race

Negro	- 2
White	- 85
Unknown	- 13

Religion

Protestant	- 74
Jewish	- 11
Catholic	- 9
Other	- 4
Unknown	- 2

Party

Democrat	- 37
Republican	- 34
Independent	- 23
Unknown	- 6

Occupational Field*

Business	- 27
Communications	- 13
Educational Administration	- 11
Religion	- 10
Politics and Government	- 8
Law	- 8
Welfare	- 7
Teaching-Research	- 6
Housewives	- 5
World Affairs Organizations	- 5
Women's Groups	- 5
Agriculture	- 3
Veterans	- 3
Labor	- 2
Other	- 3
Unknown	- 3

Occupancy of High Post in a Voluntary Association

Associational Conferees	- 41
Nonassociational Conferees	- 56
Unknown	- 3

Prior Political Experience

Served as a delegate or alternate to a presidential nominating convention	- 9
Never served in this capacity	- 88
Unknown	- 3

Table II: RESPONSES TO AN ITEM WHICH ASKED, "ON WHAT SOURCES DO YOU RELY FOR INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN AFFAIRS" (in percentages)

A. General Sources (n=647)*

Newspapers	- 94
Magazines	- 90
Columnists or commentators	- 71
Word of mouth	- 40
Other sources	- 33
Question not answered	- 2

B. Specific Sources (n=401)*

Top Five (of 57) Newspapers Cited		Top Five (of 64) Magazines Cited		Top Five (of 58) Columnists or Commentators Cited	
New York Times	-77	Time	- 37	Walter Lippmann	- 22
Washington Post & Times Herald	-32	U.S. News & World Report	- 24	the Alsop Brothers	- 14
New York Herald Tribune	-13	Newsweek	- 20	James Reston	- 11
Wall Street Journal	- 5	The Reporter	- 16	Edward R. Murrow	- 9
Christian Science Monitor	- 9	Foreign Affairs	- 15	Marquis Childs	- 8

*Due to multiple coding the total of the subcategories does not equal 100 per cent

An indication of what kinds of occasions serve as settings for interaction is provided by the pattern of responses to still another item, one which focused on the extent to which the conferees held university trusteeships, corporation directorships, charity board memberships, and similar "top posts in organizations for which you receive no financial remuneration." Three-fourths reported occupancy of positions of this sort and more than two-fifths listed at least three such posts. Indeed, five respondents specified more than twenty, and one conferee, a business executive from Ohio, reported that he held twenty-eight unremunerated positions. Furthermore, these positions were held in a wide variety of fields, with 34, 23, 21, 20 and 15 per cent citing, respectively, educational, charitable, religious, business, and foreign policy organizations (to note only the most frequently mentioned types).

But does frequent interaction necessarily result in opinion-makers "getting to know one another?" It would seem that it does. Asked whether "you ran into any old friends at the Conference," 98 per cent of the conferees replied in the affirmative. Nearly two-thirds, in fact, said they encountered more than ten friends and one-third reported running into more than twenty-five friends. As many as one hundred friends were listed by a gregarious 4 per cent.

In short, all the findings point to the conclusion that opinion-makers do not function in isolation from each other, that instead their activities often coincide and overlap, resulting in an elaborate network of acquaintanceship

and complex patterns of interaction. Thus it is not surprising that the Conference looked, as one respondent put it, "like 'old days' in D.C."[37]

Since the communication of values from nongovernmental opinion-makers to legislative, executive, and party officials is central to the consensus-building process, it is important to note that the network of acquaintanceship and interaction also appears to embrace officialdom, albeit to a noticeably lesser extent in the case of Congressmen. More than two-thirds of the conferees said they were "personally acquainted with a national committeeman or woman of either political party" and one-third specified at least six such acquaintances. Asked if "you have ever conferred with a Secretary of State or a President of the United States," nearly one-half indicated prior contact with at least one of these top officials and one-fourth specified both of them. Presumably the number of affirmative responses would have been substantially higher if the question had also asked about prior contact with, say, assistant secretaries. As for legislative officials, one-third selected "quite often" as characteristic of the frequency with which they "correspond or confer with members of Congress," nearly one-half said "occasionally," and one-fifth responded "very rarely." In addition, one-third replied "yes" and two-thirds responded "no" to the question of whether they had "testified before a committee of Congress since 1953."

IV

Thus far the data have indicated that the backgrounds, experiences, informational sources, and interactions of national leaders provide the basis for welding them together into a community of interests. Yet, the question remains as to whether these variables are sufficiently potent to foster (or at least not inhibit) common assessments of the world scene and similar responses to the same stimuli. Attitudinal and behavioral consensus does not automatically follow from frequent interaction or shared experiences. Quite conceivably other variables, especially those tending to reflect heterogeneity such as occupation and party allegiance, may intervene to prevent agreement on such an important matter as foreign aid. Or possibly personality factors may have differentially shaped reactions to the experience of listening passively to ten speeches and three panels for twelve consecutive hours. In short, the materials for building a consensus have been uncovered, but whether one was built is yet to be determined.

Two questionnaire items, one focusing on the monetary dimensions of the foreign aid program and the other on its administration, yielded data which clearly indicate wide agreement among the conferees on this issue. While it is difficult to determine whether consensus preceded the Conference or was fashioned by it, the finding is unmistakeable that most of those in attendance supported the President's 1958 request for long-term spending authority[38] and for $3.9 billion in funds. Two-thirds responded "yes" to the proposal "that instead of legislating annually in this area, Congress should give the President long-term (say, five years) authority and funds for the foreign aid program." One-half of the conferees thought Congress should "approve as is" the entire "foreign aid request for 1958-59" and one-third felt that the appropriation should exceed the presidential request. More than four-fifths, in other words, endorsed the proposition that the United States should be extensively committed in the foreign aid field.

To be sure, the endorsement was given with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Significant party and regional differences,[39] for example, were uncovered by an index of foreign aid attitude compiled out of the relevant items. While the mean index score for all the conferees was 64.2, the equivalent figures for the Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in attendance were, respectively, 70.6, 57.4, and 67.0. Similarly, the Southerners were noticeably less enthusiastic than their colleagues, having registered a mean score of 49.8 in comparison to the scores of 57.6, 62.9, 67.8, and 69.8 tallied by the Far Westerners, Midwesterners, Washingtonians, and Northeasterners. It must be emphasized, however, that these scores represent differences in degree and not in kind. Only 10 per cent of the conferees registered scores in the lowest third of the index range and equivalent to an attitude of opposition to foreign aid.

This consensus among diverse national leaders is all the more remarkable because its content is in sharp contrast with the views of the man-in-the-street at about the same time. In March 1957 a national poll[40] revealed widespread discontent with the foreign aid program, especially its economic aspects. Indeed, as can be seen in Table III, the fact that one-third of the conferees favored an expansion of the amount requested by the President, and that less than one-tenth thought it ought to be reduced, is almost exactly contrary to the equivalent datum for the general public. Among the latter, even the differentiation between economic and military aid did not raise the number who favored increased expenditures above 5 per cent. Thus it would appear that on this central issue of public policy a wide disparity exists between the mass and opinion-making publics. Since Congress's final disposition of the President's request was more in line with the public's attitudes than with those of its leaders, this disparity raises a number of questions, examined below, about the structure of national leadership which the consensus-building hypothesis assumes. The relevance of the disparity becomes even more apparent when it is noted that foreign aid is not the only policy area toward which the mass public tends to take a more conservative stance than do opinion-makers. Similar discrepancies between the leaders and citizens of American communities have also been found with respect to civil liberty questions[41] and the issue of desegregation.[42]

The data are no less clearcut with respect to the conferees' evaluation of their common experience. While it might have been anticipated that many opinion-makers, being old and wise insofar as conferences and famous speakers are concerned, would react to an event such as the Conference with skepticism, boredom, or cynicism, this was far from the case. Both the quantified responses and the qualitative comments reveal that the occasion was enormously stimulating for a large proportion of those in attendance. Seven-eighths characterized it as a "rewarding experience" and only one-sixteenth responded that it was "unstimulating" or a "waste of time." This evaluation is substantiated by the extent to which the conferees talked about the experience upon returning home and by their readiness to do it again if asked. More than three-fifths reported having described the Conference experience to family and friends "at length," one-third did so "somewhat," and a mere 3 per cent related the events "hardly at all." To the question of whether they would attend again "if the Conference were a recurring event," 61 per cent responded "yes" and 30 per cent "probably," whereas only 7 per cent said "probably not" or "no." Furthermore, and most important from the standpoint of mobilizing and directing the energies of opinion-makers, four-fifths said they had learned something "about foreign aid and the Mutual Security Program

Table III: COMPARISON OF THE CONFEREES' AND THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN AID EXPENDITURES (in percentages)

Changes in Foreign Aid Expenditures	Responses of the Conferees	Responses of the Public (as polled by Elmo Roper and Associates*)	
		Economic Aid	Military Aid
Increased	33.6	4.0	5.0
Kept at current level	48.7	24.0	47.0
Decreased	7.1		
A little		31.0	20.0
Drastically		27.0	14.0
Reduced to zero		3.0	2.0
Don't know	3.4	11.0	11.0
Other views and question not answered	7.2		
	100.0 (n=647)	100.0	99.0

*And as reported in and adapted from H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the Policy Process: 1957," American Political Science Review, Vol. LII, (September 1958), p. 700.

at the Conference" with which they were "not previously familiar" and three-fourths estimated that they had returned "home from the Conference more determined than ever to do something for or against foreign aid."

An overall picture of the extent to which the proceedings had an impact upon the conferees is provided by the distribution of their scores on an index of "nonbehavioral effect" that was compiled out of six items such as the foregoing. Arrayed on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, one-third registered a score above 75 and two-thirds scored above 50, whereas only one-sixth were located in each of the lowest two quartiles. The mean score for all the conferees was 58.9.

Innumerable comments appended throughout the questionnaire are perhaps even more indicative of the enthusiasm which the Conference engendered. "More people seemed to be having a good time about something they believed in than is usual at such conferences," wrote one conferee, adding that "people stayed at the sessions more than usual and there was a sense of expectancy among the participants." The validity of this assessment is amply demonstrated by a sample of typical comments:

> An executive of a women's association from Virginia: "A very thrilling day that will long be remembered."
>
> An attorney from Texas: "I was favorably impressed with the manner in which the Conference was organized and the program

presented. The best and smartest I've ever seen."

A state university President: "I enjoyed it thoroughly from beginning to end!"

A minister from Ohio: "It was one of the greatest days of my life."

A director of an education association from Washington, D.C.: "One of the most stimulating days of my entire experience."

A newspaper publisher from Georgia: "Let's have some more on other pressing questions."

A professor from Pennsylvania: "It was the finest conference I have ever attended, and I would not have missed any of it. This was the comment of many people."

A business executive from Louisiana: "One of the 'best spent' days of my life."

This is not to say, of course, that all the conferees were impressed by the occasion. As indicated by the scores on the index of nonbehavioral effect, a small minority were either unaffected or disaffected by the experience. Interestingly, neither party affiliation nor foreign aid attitude were as closely related to negative reactions to the Conference as were assessments of its size.[43] A few of those in attendance were apparently frustrated by the lack of opportunity to participate actively in the proceedings. The following are typical of the comments appended by conferees who tallied scores in the lowest quartile of the nonbehavioral index:

It wasn't a "conference." No one conferred with anyone. It was a bunch of speeches, generally repeating what has been said many times before to people who have heard it. No chance for more than a handful to ask even a question, much less state an opinion.

Purpose was not truly represented in original invitation. It is a mistake to lead busy men to believe their opinion is desired and then throw them into a mass arena with one-way loud-speakers. I have no objection to being "sold" something, but this affair did not impress me favorably from an organizing standpoint. Speakers were good and subject important, but I was misled in getting me there.

The "canned" responses from the floor at the end of the afternoon session gave me the impression I was not there to be asked---but to be told. A poor psychological approach. This action all but killed my interest.

I was stimulated by the many speeches but was frustrated by the lack of plans or arrangements to ask questions or to participate in the exchange of ideas.

It bears repeating, however, that reactions such as these were dis-

tinctly in the minority and that a large proportion of those in attendance were favorably impressed with what they saw and heard. Furthermore, many conferees subsequently engaged in activity on behalf of the foreign aid program. As can be seen in Table IV, almost all of them were active at the level of face-to-face communication and nearly half publicly committed themselves on the issue. A further measure of subsequent behavior is provided by the distribution of scores on an index of post-Conference activity that was constructed out of several relevant items. Again arrayed on a scale from 0 to 100, 22 per cent of the conferees registered a score above 75, 34 per cent scored between 50 and 75, and 22 per cent were classified in each of the lowest two quartiles. The mean score for all the conferees was 53.4.

Of course, the conferees could circulate opinions about foreign aid only as widely as their access to the communications system would permit, so that the distribution of the index scores does not fully reflect the extent of their post-Conference activity. An even more accurate picture can be discerned in a comparison of the types of activity in which the conferees engaged and the types of access they possessed. The results of such a cross-tabulation reveal that in the three months between the Conference and the questionnaire the conferees did not make full use of their opinion-making potentials:

Of those who reported receipt of twenty or more lecture requests a month, 67 per cent said they had delivered a speech on foreign aid subsequent to the Conference, whereas the equivalent figures for those who reported ten, five, and one lecture requests per month were 59, 57, and 41 per cent. Of those who received less than one request each month, 19 per cent had given a talk on the subject.

Of the conferees who said they are in some way responsible for the writing and distribution of press releases, 24 per cent said they had written an article, item, report, etc., on foreign aid subsequent to the Conference. The equivalent figure for those who said they have some voice in determining the contents of a publication was 28 per cent.

Exactly one-third of the conferees classified in the communications field reported that they had written an editorial on foreign aid subsequent to the Conference.

Of the conferees who reported that they correspond or confer with members of Congress "quite often," "occasionally," and "very rarely," 62, 39, and 18 per cent said, respectively, that after the Conference they had talked or written to Congressmen about foreign aid.

Of those who said they participate in the deliberations of organizations which take stands on public issues, 29 per cent reported that subsequent to the Conference they had tried to affect the position of an organization either for or against foreign aid. Similar behavior was reported by 27 and 24 per cent of the conferees who said, respectively, that they held a variety of top posts in organizations for which they received no financial remuneration and that they were executives of voluntary associations.

Of the conferees who reported that they were quoted in the newspapers "quite often," "occasionally," and "very rarely," 47, 54, and 41 per cent said, respectively, that subsequent to the Conference they had publicly announced their attitude toward foreign aid.

Table IV: POST-CONFERENCE ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN BY THE CONFEREES (in percentages)

Since the Conference have you	Proportion of the conferees who checked "yes" or made an equivalent response*
discussed foreign aid with your colleagues or co-workers	87
discussed foreign aid with business or professional acquaintances (other than colleagues or co-workers)	80
publicly announced your own attitude toward foreign aid	49
talked or written to Congressmen about foreign aid	45
delivered a speech either for or against foreign aid	42
tried to affect the position of an organization either for or against foreign aid	27
written an article, item, report, etc., on foreign aid which has appeared in any publication	25
written an editorial either for or against foreign aid	13
	(n=647)

Proportion of the Conferees who responded "yes" to all	
eight of the above activities	3
seven " " " "	5
six " " " "	8
five " " " "	15
four " " " "	18
three " " " "	22
two " " " "	21
one " " " "	7
none " " " "	1
	100
	(n=647)

*Due to multiple coding the total of the subcategories exceeds 100 per cent

[illegible] what encouragement [illegible] Conference there had [illegible]

While this is not to say that the Conference was the only---or even the primary---source of the activities that were undertaken,[44] there is evidence that the event did move some of the conferees into action. Asked to compare their "activities with respect to foreign aid in March-April of 1958 with that of the equivalent period in 1957," 50 per cent of the conferees "guessed" they had been "more active" in 1958 and 45 per cent estimated they were "just as active as in 1957." Although undoubtedly some of the "more active" group exaggerated their activity, its size suggests that at least a few of the conferees carefully compared the two years and then indicated

greater activity in 1958 because they had been spurred into action by the Conference. Such a conslusion is impressively supported by a cross-tabulation of responses to this comparative item and the scores on the indices of nonbehavioral effect and post-Conference activity. In both cases the linkages proved to be highly significant ($P<.001$) and, in fact, the questionnaire yielded few discrepancies so wide and striking as the difference between the mean nonbehavioral score of 71.3 recorded by the "more active" conferees and the equivalent figure of 48.2 registered by those who were equally active in both years. Translating this finding into the words of a Midwestern educator, "I would probably not have given any time to circulating opinions about foreign aid, had I not felt inspired and obligated by the Conference."

In addition to stimulating activity which might not have otherwise occurred, the occasion also appears to have facilitated action on the part of some of those who were already inclined to be active. An associational executive from New York noted that the "Conference provided me with some materials and statements as well as impressions of our leaders in the foreign aid program which have enabled me to be a more persuasive advocate for the Mutual Security Program." A minister from California made the same point by noting that "my being there influenced greatly the receptivity of my speeches on behalf of the program." Similarly, a civic leader from Massachusetts commented that although the event did not stimulate her into greater activity, it did provide "useful ammunition---good quotes." As the executive director of a world affairs group put it, "When one can quote in a lecture or on TV programs from the speeches, which reveal the bipartisan nature of the Conference, one has a powerful argument in favor of foreign aid."

V

Returning to the questions posed at the outset, on the basis of the data it does seem possible to fashion a consensus among diverse groups of national leaders and then to enlist their energies in support of it. Apparently national opinion-makers do interact frequently and apparently they are getting to know one another. Their perceptions of the world scene do appear to be derived from similar frames of reference and similar sources of information. Their assessments of how the United States should respond to trends abroad do seem to rest on a common core of values. Behaviorally they do appear to react similarly to shared experiences. In short, there seems to be considerable validity to the version of the consensus-building hypothesis that posits the emergence of a continental community based on an integrated structure of national leadership.[45]

But somehow widespread agreement within the national opinion-making public has not produced corresponding public policies. The gap between what the nation does and what many believe is required to cope with revolutionary trends abroad remains wide and unbridged. A new President has called for new sacrifices, but at this writing (June 1961) the nation shows no sign of having been greatly stirred by his efforts. In particular, the foreign aid program continues to be an unwanted stepchild and to suffer annual set-backs in the policy-making process. In 1958, notwithstanding the opinion-making activity precipitated by the Conference, the foreign aid appropriation was some $644 million less than the President had requested. Nor were long range effects of the occasion evident in 1959, as $1.2 billion were lopped off the presidential request for that year. It would appear, in other words, that the mobilization of the nation's sacrifice potential will not always follow

from consensuses hammered out among national leaders.

A host of historical circumstances and methodological qualifications might be enumerated to account for the insufficiency of the consensus-building hypothesis. It could be convincingly argued, for example, that Eisenhower's emphasis on balanced budgets undermined the presidential leadership he exercised on behalf of the foreign aid program. Likewise, considerable weight attaches tothe explanation that the structure of Congress makes it unreliable and unsuitable as a mechanism for translating consensuses into policies. Certainly the power of committee chairmen who, like Otto Passman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, strenuously oppose an extension of United States commitments is a structural factor of undeniable consequence. A persuasive argument could also be developed on methodological grounds which showed that neither the Conference nor the data it yielded were adequate evidence of a consensus within the opinion-making public.

While explanations such as these may underlie the apparent discrepancy between consensus and policy, they shed little light on the consensus-building hypothesis and fail to erase the impression that not all the links in the causative chain have been identified. The difficulty with historical and methodological refutation is that it stifles speculation and inhibits maximum utilization of empirical data. To accept such explanations without further theorizing would be to neglect the opportunities which, as one observer put it, "new data exert...for the elaboration of a conceptual scheme."[46]

Further speculation about possible missing links gives rise to one set of considerations which seem to go a long way toward accounting for the gap between what the nation does and what the leadership feels it ought to be doing. Namely, a good case could be made for the notion that the sacrifice potential of the public remains untapped because a major discontinuity still exists in the national leadership structure. While a consensus has emerged among most groups of opinion-makers, one group continues to have segmental orientations and thus prevents a full mobilization of the nation's energies. The group in question consists of virtually all the members of Congress, who are, for reasons enumerated below, isolated within the national leadership structure and have yet to develop continental orientations. If a sense of continental responsibility could be developed among Congressmen---and the techniques for changing legislative orientations are more numerous than might seem to be the case[47]---then they would begin to see their roles as that of also guiding, instead of only reflecting, the needs and desires of their constituents. Such a change would remove the last obstacle to the hypothesized process whereby a unified leadership would facilitate public acceptance of policies that are commensurate with the requirements of a prolonged cold war.

This discontinuity in the leadership structure is rooted in the unique kind of ties that legislators have to the mass public. Their ties are much more direct and their contacts much more frequent than are those of other types of opinion-makers. Whereas the latter can ordinarily go for long stretches of time without being attentive to the citizenry, Congressmen must perforce devote considerable time and energy to servicing the needs and wants of their constituents. Consequently, on certain kinds of issues, legislators are moved in different ways and by different values than are other opinion-makers. The localized interests of their constituencies impose strict limits

upon the extent to which they can contribute or subscribe to continental consensuses. On the issue of higher taxes, for example, the nonlegislative opinion-maker, not having to act under the constant supervision of those who would have to shoulder the increased tax burden, can afford to champion an increase much more easily and wholeheartedly than can his Congressional colleague. A Congressman's opinion-making capacities may be national in scope, but his orientations are segmental in nature. He is part of a local consensus which may not be the same as, and may even be contrary to, the one which develops among other national opinion-makers.

This is not to say that most of these other opinion-makers are motivated by altruism and that Congressmen are moved by narrowly defined self-interests. The former are no less concerned about furthering their own or their organization's welfare. Their readiness to subscribe to consensuses which accept an extension of United States commitments may stem from a variety of considerations, perhaps none of which are altruistic. Nor is this to say that legislators are unmindful of world affairs. On the contrary, they are probably more knowledgeable about such matters than most opinion-makers. Yet, to repeat, their orientations are segmental and not continental, and thus they have a fundamentally different approach to the international scene.

These attitudinal consequences of the legislator's role have, of course, long been recognized by students of the policy-making process. Less obvious are the behavioral consequences which further reinforce the segmental orientations of Congressmen. For the discontinuity within the national leadership structure marks interaction patterns as well as attitudes. That is, at gatherings of opinion-makers Congressmen seem more conspicuous by their absence than by their presence. One hears of leaders from all walks of life meeting in all kinds of situations, from large conferences to small study groups, but one rarely associates legislators with such occasions. National opinion-makers may be "getting to know one another," to quote Rostow again, but this does not include Congressmen to any large extent. More accurately, Senators and Representatives interact with other opinion-makers in committee hearings and other formal situations, but not in the more relaxed circumstances of gatherings held on university campuses or in the banquet rooms of large hotels. The fact that the proceedings examined here were attended by 135 Congressmen, and that invitations had been extended to the remainder, stands out as an exception to the rules which govern interaction among opinion-makers.[48] Probably more typical is the record of the ten most recent meetings of the American Assembly, a non-partisan organization which specializes in bringing together all types of national opinion-makers for three-day discussions of major domestic or foreign policy issues. Six hundred twenty-three persons attended Assemblies Nine through Eighteen (1956-60) and, of these, nine (1.4 per cent) were members of Congress.

Of course, this is not to say that the Congressman, whose occupational life is founded on gregariousness, is a lonely person. He does go to gatherings and he does mingle with people in a variety of fields. Indeed, he probably travels more widely and attends more meetings than any other type of opinion-maker. Outside of his constituency, however, his contacts are mainly with members of the mass public, whereas his interaction with other opinion-makers occurs primarily within his constituency. He does mingle with businessmen and labor leaders, heads of women's groups and spokesmen for farm associations, religious leaders and university administrators---but all of these are located in his district or state and, like the Congressman, do not have

national responsibilities which lead to continental orientations. The ordinary Representative or Senator does not see the presidents of the AFL-CIO and the General Motors Corporation as often as he interacts with the heads of local unions and the branch directors of national corporations. Thus, to cite one example, it is hardly surprising that when John F. Kennedy shifted from the role of Senator to that of President-elect and sought to fill cabinet positions he

> suddenly discovered he didn't know "the right people." During his campaigning he had, of course, met practically every politician in the country. But as far as picking a cabinet was concerned, his large circle of acquaintances seemed inadequate. The strength of these remarks, made matter-of-factly and with no suggestion of regret, was subsequently borne out when Mr.Kennedy appointed men not previously known to him to several key posts in his administration.[49]

The preceding paragraph reflects an assumption that needs to be made explicit, namely, that the difference between segmental and continental orientations prevails in every occupational field and that on certain issues the attitudinal frameworks of all national opinion-makers are differentiated from those of all local opinion-makers. It seems likely, for example, that local union leaders or businessmen are inclined to be more dubious about foreign aid expenditures than are the heads of the labor movement or the automotive industry. Thus, in certain respects, the president of the AFL-CIO and the head of General Motors have more in common than does the former with local union leaders or the latter with the corporation's branch directors. If this is so, it follows that on certain issues local opinion-makers may find that their Congressmen are more sympathetic to their views than are the national opinion-makers in their field. Contrariwise, on the same issue the latter may find more sympathy among officials in the executive branch, whose orientations reflect their national responsibilities and who do attend gatherings of national leaders. In contrast to the nine Congressmen who attended the ten most recent meetings of the American Assembly, forty-one officials of the executive branch were present for the deliberations. It would seem, in other words, that whenever an issue separates the national and local opinion-making publics, two mutually exclusive communications systems come into being, one culminating in the segmentally oriented legislative branch and the other in the continentally oriented executive branch.

It seems reasonable to hypothesize that both Congressmen and other national opinion-makers are acutely aware of the distance between them and are inclined to be wary of attempts to lessen it. The nonlegislative opinion-maker is anxious to avoid the appearance of exerting pressure on the Congressmen and thus tends not to initiate or sustain interaction with him outside of committee hearings and other formal situations. Similarly, the Congressman wants neither to submit to, nor to appear susceptible to, the influence of national opinion-makers and their continental orientations. He may even view himself as having the function of protecting his constituency from national leaders who, as the Congressman sees it, want his constituents to widen their horizons at the expense of their own self-interests. Hence he is inclined to view meetings of other national opinion-makers through dubious or suspicious eyes and is disposed to be too busy to accept invitations to such occasions. Perhaps it was more than hostility to the foreign

aid program which led a Midwestern Republican to explain why he missed the Conference with the observation that "as a Senator I do not make up my mind about voting on particular measures by attending social functions obviously intended to impress or influence a legislator's vote."[50]

The differences in orientation and interaction between Congressmen and other national opinion-makers are not, of course, absolute ones. Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committees, for example, tend to be less bound by segmental approaches to foreign policy issues than are other members of Congress.[51] Their special responsibilities in the foreign affairs field foster continental orientations,[52] as does the fact that their committee work brings them into close and frequent contact with other national opinion-makers. More than most legislators, they will not only be inclined to subscribe to a nationwide consensus, but because of their policy-making roles they may also make important contributions to its growth and content. The activities of Senator J. W. Fulbright serve as a good illustration of how certain legislators can set aside their segmental orientations and move widely and decisively within the national opinion-making public.[53]

Nor is the separation of Congressmen so absolute that they remain outside of every consensus which develops within the national opinion-making public. As has been implied throughout, the extent of discontinuity is largely a function of the nature and structure of particular issues. The gap between legislators and other national opinion-makers will presumably be wider the more an issue relates to matters close to the hearts and pocketbooks of local opinion-makers and the mass public. The raising of taxes or the ordering of troops into action are the types of foreign policy issues most likely to foster the isolation of Congressmen within the national leadership structure. Some issues, however, do not arouse interest at the constituency level and on these questions Congressmen may be able to develop continental orientations.[54] Complex diplomatic negotiations exemplify the kinds of situations around which nationwide consensuses can occur without any discontinuity. In 1950-51, for example, lack of public interest in the Japanese Peace Treaty greatly facilitated its negotiation by the Executive and its ratification by the Congress. In that situation it was possible for a consensus to develop among all segments of the opinion-making public, with the result that the political process functioned smoothly and officials of both branches were able to work out a policy cooperatively.[55]

In short, issues are located on a continuum that runs from those which divide the national leadership structure to those which allow for the development of consensuses among all opinion-makers, including Congressmen. If it is assumed that issues requiring sacrifice and the extension of national commitments lie at the divisive end of the continuum, then the foregoing analysis goes a long way toward identifying the missing links in the causative chain and rendering the consensus-building hypothesis more adequate.

NOTES

1 The author is indebted to the Center of International Studies of Princeton University for its support of the project which yielded the data presented herein and which is scheduled for publication as a monograph under the tentative title of Opinion-Making and Opinion-Makers in Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support for the Foreign Aid Program.

2 A spate of books and articles have recently called attention to the existence of this gap. See, for example, the Hearings before the Subcommittee of National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, Organizing for National Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), Parts I and VII; Meg Greenfield, "The Great American Morality Play," The Reporter, June 8, 1961, pp. 13-18; Robert L. Heilbroner, The Future as History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), passim; Emmet John Hughes, America the Vincible (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1959), passim; Karl E. Meyer, The New America: Politics and Society in the Age of the Smooth Deal (New York: Basic Books, 1961).

3 An eloquent presentation of the Roman Empire analogy will be found in J. William Fulbright, "Challenge to Our Complacency," New York Times Magazine, September 14, 1958.

4 Barbara Ward, "The Challenge of the Sixties," New York Times Magazine, December 27, 1959, p. 5.

5 James Reston, "Our History Suggests a Remedy," in The National Purpose (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 112-13.

6 William Attwood, "A Visit With Walter Lippmann," Look, April 25, 1961, p. 105.

7 While Eisenhower had a more passive view of the presidency than either his predecessor or his successor, he was consistently energetic on behalf of the foreign aid program.

8 The relevance of consensus-building as a variable in national policy-making processes is cogently analyzed in Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. III (December 1959), pp. 361-82.

9 An elaborate breakdown and analysis of this definition, as well as distinctions between sixteen basic types of opinion-makers, will be found in my Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation, Chap. 5.

10 A full discussion of why this designation seems preferable to "elites," "opinion leaders," and other common terms in the leadership lexicon is provided in my Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation,(New York: Random House, 1961), Chap. 5.

11 Still another characterization of the national leadership structure is provided by Neustadt, whose important work on the presidency posits "the men who share in governing this country" as comprising "what in spirit, not geography, might well be termed the 'Washington Community.'" Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley & sons, 1960), pp. 58-9.

12 Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), p. 138.

13 Ibid., pp. 143-44.

14 Ibid., p. 144.

15 W.W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 513-4.

16 See, for example, Hadley Cantril (ed.), Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 1-1191.

17 The following sources provide good summaries and bibliographies of some of the recent work done in these areas of communications research: Richard E. Chapin, Mass Communications, A Statistical Analysis (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957); Alfred O. Hero, Mass Media and World Affairs (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959); Alfred O. Hero, Opinion Leaders in American Communities (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959); Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955); Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, Robert W. White, Opinions and Personality (New York: John Wiley & sons, 1956); and Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," American Sociological Review, Vol. 23 (June 1958), pp. 284-94.

18 See Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), and Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954).

19 A noteworthy exception is Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India (New York: John Day Co., 1958).

20 For examples of research in each of these areas, see respectively Albert P. Blaustein and Charles O. Porter, The American Lawyer: A Summary of the Legal Profession (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Lester Milbrath, "The Political Party Activity of Washington Lobbyists," Journal of Politics, Vol. 20 (May 1958), pp. 339-52; Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, and James Tobin, The American Business Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., The Academic Mind (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958); and Leila A. Sussmann, "The Personnel and Ideology of Public Relations," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12 (Winter 1948-49), pp. 697-708.

21 Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown, A Study in American Culture (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929), and Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown in Transition, A Study in Cultural Conflicts (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937).

22 W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, The Social Life of a Modern Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941).

23 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

24 For summary treatments of the studies and problems in this area, see Nelson W. Polsby, "The Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," American Sociological Review, Vol. 24 (December 1959), pp. 796-803, and Maurice R. Stein, The Eclipse of Comjunity, An Interpretation of American Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

25 For an analysis of some of the differences between local and national opinion-makers, see my Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Chap. 5.

26 For example, see Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, Vol. LII (June 1958), pp. 463-69, and Arthur Kornhauser (ed.), Problems of Power in American Democracy (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959).

27 See, for instance, Osborn Elliott, Men at the Top (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959); Floyd Hunter, Top Leadership U.S.A. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959); and C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

28 The speeches and proceedings of the Conference, as well as a listing of the names and affiliations of all the conferees and speakers, are reproduced in Foreign Aspects of U.S. National Security: Conference Report and Proceedings (Washington: Committee for International Economic Growth, 1958), pp. 1-120.

29 That is, all those in attendance other than Congressmen and officials of the Eisenhower administration.

30 Not only did a remarkably high proportion respond (a return rate of 20 per cent is generally considered a good return rate for a mailed 2-page questionnaire), but they did so diligently and discriminatingly, thereby adding further to the reliability of the findings. Four-fifths of the respondents, for example, appended written comments to questions calling for the checking off of provided alternatives. One-eighth even signed their names in spite of an explicit notation that this was not necessary in order to preserve anonymity and encourage unbiased responses. Equally impressive, three-fourths answered no fewer than 68 of the 71 questions and two-fifths answered every question.

31 It must be emphasized that the data are based on the conferees' self-reports and that therefore even the "factual" responses may have been exaggerated or otherwise distorted.

32 But the 647 respondents do appear to have been a representative sample of the 1,067 nongovernmental conferees. Of the seventy-seven variables which were tested for representativeness, in only one case (the residual category of "other occupations") was a statistically significant difference uncovered between the sample and the population.

33 This sample consisted of thirty-three males and two females who averaged 47 years in age.

34 The selection of conferees was carried out under considerable pressure of time and accomplished in three weeks. Consequently, criteria of selection were simple and not fully explicit. Five members of the White House staff served as the core of a committee which went over long lists of "prominent persons" and voluntary associations, from which were culled individuals and associational officials who might be influential and who seemed likely to have at least a remote interest in the foreign aid program. Neither the party affiliations nor the foreign aid attitudes of potential conferees were used as criteria for selection and, with few exceptions, were not even known when the invitations were issued.

35 The finding that opinion-makers commonly share the experience of foreign travel is consistent with the results of other inquiries along this line. Indeed, two of these turned up even smaller proportions of leaders who had never been abroad at all: Harold R. Isaacs, op. cit., p. 19, and Ithel de Sola Pool, Suzanne Keller, and Raymond A. Bauer, "The Influence of Foreign Travel on Political Attitudes of American Businessmen," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XX (Spring 1956), p. 161.

36 Isaacs also found that "by far the largest single number" of his sample depended on this source; in the case of his data the Times was cited by 70 per cent of the respondents (ibid., p. 21). The same newspaper was also "prominent" among the sources cited by the subjects of a survey of Midwestern opinion-makers: Kenneth P. Adler and David Bobrow, "Interest and influence in Foreign Affairs," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XX (Spring 1956), p. 93.

37 The question arises as to whether the interaction data were unduly influenced by the conferees from Washington, D.C., and their close proximity to each other. This does not seem to have been the case, however, as the linkage between the friendship and regional variables was not statistically significant.

38 At the time of the Conference the Eisenhower administration was advancing the idea that money appropriated to the Development Loan Fund could be spent more effectively if Congress made it available for periods longer than a year. A year later, however, the administration altered its position and, in effect, abandoned the fight for long-term authorizations.

39 All measures of statistical significance were based on a chi square test, with significance being attributed to differences that had no more than a 5 per cent probability of occurring by chance.

40 Conducted by Elmo Roper and Associates, and cited in H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the Policy Process: 1957," American Political Science Review, Vol. LII (September 1958), p. 700.

41 Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformism, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955), Chapter 2.

42 Melvin M. Tumin, Desegregation: Resistance and Readiness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), Chapter 10.

43 Not only were low and high scores on the nonbehavioral index closely associated with, respectively, the 24 per cent who characterized the Conference as "too large to accomplish very much" and the 66 per cent who said it was "just about the right size," but also this association invariably persisted when the party and attitude variables were held consistent. Indeed, in cross-tabulating the data no variable proved to be as persistent as did the Conference-size responses. They were also not erased when the regional variable and the scores on a scale of involvement in foreign affairs were held constant. That is, regardless of whether a conferee was a Republican or a Democrat, a Northeasterner or a Far Westerner, a friend or an enemy of foreign aid, or an "involved" or "uninvolved" follower of world events, the less he was upset by the size of the Conference the more was he likely to register a high score on the scale of nonbehavioral effect.

44 A series of cross-tabulations between the activity scores on the one hand and the other indices and the background variables on the other yielded the findings that involvement in foreign affairs was the primary source of post-Conference activity. With opinion-making potential held constant, no other variable was so directly and unmistakeably linked to the conferees' subsequent behavior as were the scores on an index of foreign affairs involvement. Stated briefly, the more a conferee was involved in foreign affairs the more of his opinion-making potential was he likely to utilize in the ensuing months. Those located in the highest quartile on the involvement scale tallied a mean activity score of 63.1, and the equivalent figures for those in the second, third, and lowest quartile were, respectively, 52.1, 42.6, and 26.7.

45 Regional affiliations were found to be the main obstacle to the building of a continental community. The differences which recurred most frequently during the inquiry were those which distinguished the Southerners, Midwesterners, and Far Westerners from leaders located in the Northeast and Washington, D.C. The former tend to be less involved in foreign affairs, less informed about them, and more conservative in their attitudes toward foreign aid than are opinion-makers from the Northeast and the Capital. Neither young and old leaders, nor men and women, nor Republicans and Democrats, nor the college educated and those with less formal training proved to be as differentiated along involvement, informational, and attitudinal lines as did these two main groupings. More often than not, in fact, differences introduced by age, sex, party, and education disappeared when examined within each region. Even some of the occupational differences were erased when each region was separately analyzed.

But the regional obstacle to a nationwide consensus may not be insurmountable. If reactions to the Conference are any indication, opinion-makers from the South and West are capable of responding to new information.

Large numbers of conferees from these regions reported having learned about foreign aid as a result of their presence at the Conference. Members of these groups also tended to be highly and favorably affected by the event. There is, in other words, good reason to believe that opinion-makers located in the South and West can, given the proper stimulus and authoritative information, be brought more fully into a national consensus about the larger aspects of the international scene.

46 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, revised edition, 1957), p. 108.

47 Two avenues of change are implicit in the ensuing discussion: one involves the assignment of more responsibility in the foreign affairs field to more members of Congress and the other involves more frequent and varied contacts between Congressmen and other national opinion-makers.

48 In a way, however, this exception also illustrates the isolated position of Congressmen in the structure of national leadership, as they received a different letter of invitation which was specially worded to avoid offense to legislative sensibilities.

49 Douglass Cater, "A New Style, A New Tempo," The Reporter (March 16, 1961), p. 28.

50 This comment was made in connection with a separate, less systematic survey of Congressional reactions to the Conference carried out by Miss Susan V. Barth, a student at Douglass College, in March, 1958.

51 In a general sense it might even be said that Senators, whose constituencies are larger and more diverse, are less segmentally oriented than Representatives.

52 Cf. James N. Rosenau, "Senate Attitudes Toward a Secretary of State," in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (eds.), Legislative Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 333-346.

53 There are, of course, limits to deviation from segmental orientations. Of Fulbright's four immediate predecessors as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, three (Tom Connally, Walter George, and Theodore Green) ended their Senate careers by deciding not to run for re-election and the fourth (Alexander Wiley) was rejected by a state convention of his party and had to win re-nomination in a primary fight. In the case of Senators Connally and George, moreover, the decision not to run was apparently based to a large extent on evidence that their constituents were sufficiently dissatisfied with their continental orientations to cause their defeat at the polls.

54 If this is the case, and if it is true that the general public is apathetic about foreign aid, then an interesting, albeit seemingly absurd, proposition logically follows, namely, that the foreign aid program can be better advanced by convincing legislators the public does not care about it than by persuading the public to care about it.

55 Cf. Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).

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POLITICS AND THE NOVEL

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It is a considerable honor for me to be invited to take part in a session of the American Political Science Association, and to have the opportunity of setting forth my notions on the subject of the political novel. Not only am I flattered that you would want to hear the views of a literary man on political matters, but I have a personal reason for being pleased at your invitation. My wife is a political scientist, in the field of constitutional law, and I can assure you that nothing that has happened to me in recent years has impressed her so much as when I informed her that I was to speak at your meeting. She has always been tolerant of my literary activities, but I believe that for the first time she felt that I indeed 'arrived.'

I do not propose today to attempt an analysis of what the political novel is, and what its relationship to the political activity it describes is, because in the first place I am not versed in the science of politics as such, and in the second place I am not at all sure that I think there is anything like a political novel, as such. There are only novels, some of which deal with political life, and anyway, it seems to me that your problem is much broader than that. For when you set out to deal with novels for the purpose of analyzing political behavior, you face the task that many other people face in the search for knowledge, which is, How can an art form, the novel, be used? How can the image of human experience that is fiction be made to serve the purpose of those who would understand that human experience for purposes of predicting and controlling it?

I stress that word control, for I think that is what you are after, and rightly so. You are, after all, political scientists, and being such you wish to treat the political behavior of human beings as phenomena, in order to determine the principles by which those phenomena function—with the idea of applying your findings, at least implicitly if not explicitly, toward the more accurate prediction and control of that behavior. I do not mean of course that you are advocates of thought control, of regimentation in the style of 1984, but simply that your study is necessarily directed toward use. Man seeks to understand himself and his environment so as to govern himself, and not to be at the mercy of instincts and needs. Man as a political creature seeks to govern himself and to control power. As social scientists you are working toward that goal.

So that the first question to be asked is, Why do you want to use novels at all? To what extent, in what way, is the novel more suited to your objectives than, say, the World Almanac, or the U. S. Supreme Court Reports, or the daily newspaper files? What does it have to offer you that you cannot find elsewhere?

The answer is, People. Life. For you know that you are dealing with human beings, not simply with statistics about human beings. No statistical table, no

matter how complete, can record the multiplicity, the variety of human experience. No chart of probability, no elucidation of previous records and key issues, no studies of precedents, no theoretical analysis can ever be sufficiently complex and all-inclusive to account for the behavior of the human being. Something is always missing, having to do with Life, and what that something is can be grasped, perhaps, if we consider the difference in approach of the political scientist and the novelist.

The key to political science, to any science, is abstraction. That may seem a funny thing to say about an academic discipline that can be so very minute and inclusive in some of its manifestations, that has room even for the species of statistician known as the County Counter. Yet abstraction it is none the less, for you deal with man as political being, which is only certain aspects of his total being. When, for example, Justice Douglas writes a dissent having to do with Searches and Seizures, you must necessarily discuss it in terms of legal precedent, of his position in previous cases before the High Court involving the Fourth Amendment, and so forth. Yet it is perfectly obvious that Justice Douglas's dissent involves a great deal more than his role as jurist, as political being, that it is a congeries of historical influence, social attitudes, psychological factors, economic factors, and so on—so that by isolating Justice Douglas's political behavior from his complex human position, you are necessarily and rightly performing an abstraction. You are seeking the general principles that govern his behavior, by attempting to isolate the relevant portions of his activity.

It is precisely here that as political scientist you part company with the novelist, or with any other artist, as opposed to scientist. For what the novelist seeks to do is not to break down human behavior into its particulars, so as to abstract the relevant general activities, but to assemble the particularities, to create not a general but a unique representation of a human being living his life. His medium is not the generalization, but the assemblage of particularities, a complex of particularities, made into a single, indivisible form.

Why does the novelist wish to do this? For a reason that ultimately is very similar to the motivation of the social scientist, or the physical scientist. He wishes to give to his experience an order and a meaning beyond that offered him by the confused phenomena of everyday life. The object of the novelist is not Life as such, but life charged with meaning, life ordered, understood.

The difference, I think, is not in the objective, but in the method, the approach. Your way is to isolate, to categorize, to abstract, in order thus to interpret and perceive the order. The novelist's way is to put together, to particularize, to make concrete, in order to do the same thing. When a great novelist creates a character he is so lifelike, so believable in his complex particularity that he seems to illustrate the behavior of all men. And the essence of this universality lies in the concrete particularity. When a novelist's characters become too general in their behavior, and not sufficiently individualistic, we say they are types, which is another way of saying that they are not real, but only abstractions of reality. A great novelist's central characters are not types, but individuals, put together in so lifelike a fashion, out of so many particularities, that they represent reality, and can therefore serve as a commentary on it. The novelist's way, therefore, is through the image, through the fusion of many elements. He deals with particulars, his art is composed of them;

he has little room for abstractions, for generalizations. He must show, not tell. He makes his commentary on human experience through his images.

This is what makes it difficult. For when as political scientists you seek to use the novel to interpret political behavior, you propose to break down the novelist's image once again, to reduce it to its parts, so as to include the parts in your own scheme for ordering and interpreting experience. You wish to select only the relevant parts of the artistic image, which is to say the parts relevant to your purposes, for your own hypothesis. The novelist, I fear, is much more arrogant than you. He goes blithely about his business, writing his novels from life itself. Quite understandably this sometimes makes the social scientist angry, and he denounces the novelist as being unsound and hard-headed because he will not avail himself of reliable data. Thus that eminent Greek political scientist and man of parts, Plato, proposed to expose the tragedians and epic poets of his day for the frauds they were, and to forbid them access into his ideal republic. Yet here we are in this room, several thousand years later, discussing the novel, and so it would appear that no one has quite managed the expulsion of the poet yet! Until that day, it is perhaps wise that you continue to try to use him, in his modern guise of novelist, despite his arrogance, for your purposes.

What I should like to suggest, as, say, a friendly emissary, if not from Parnassus, then at any rate from the Modern Language Association, is that there is a way for the novel to be used, to furnish data as it were, for those who would understand human behavior, without breaking down the artist's image into what I fear are unrewarding parts. But it is not the way of abstraction.

What I would recommend is that you train your sights, not on the parts of the novel that would seem immediately available and appropriate to the uses of your discipline, but on the image itself. I would ask, that is, that you approach the novel as a concrete, unified image of human experience, not as an assortment of parts to be sorted out and classified, and that your avenue of entry into the novel be made through its controlling artistic image, treating it as a whole, as a work of art.

For if the novel has anything to say about human experience, it is as a novel, as an image of reality, in the total action of its fiction, in which people and places, characters and events, are fused into the coherent representative image of human life through the artistic process. THE ONLY WAY TO READ A NOVEL IS AS A NOVEL--NOT AS DISGUISED BIOGRAPHY, NOT AS ILLUSTRATED POLITICAL THEORY, NOT AS A HANDBOOK FOR POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. You have to deal with the total image, the controlling design. When you have done that, then you can begin to use what you have found.

But I have been talking theories, abstractions, when I should be talking about novels. So I should like to take up a specific case, a novel that many of you are familiar with and which deals with questions of political behavior, in order to illustrate my point.

In 1945 the novelist Robert Penn Warren published All The King's Men, a novel about a man who was governor of a Southern state, and about his aide, and what the governor's career meant to him. Readers immediately recognized a number of similarities between the governor's life and his political role and that of the

late Huey Pierce Long, the "Kingfish," governor of and U. S. Senator from the State of Louisiana until his assassination in 1935. Not only was All The King's Men a very good novel, but what the author has termed its "journalistic relevance" to the career of Long also contributed to its popularity, so that the novel was a considerable success and has been read and enjoyed by hundreds of thousands of readers.

The "relevance" of All The King's Men to the study of politics has been recognized, of course. At the time of its publication the novel was strongly criticized by one eminent reviewer for its political attitude. "Warren does not ask—the question apparently has no imaginative appeal for him—," the reviewer declared, "whether American tradition does not demand that we fight men like Long with all the democratic means at our disposal in order to preserve in this country and in the world free, open, pluralistic societies in which individual rights are protected by law and in which ultimate control is vested below in the people and not above in Willie Stark."

You will note that the reviewer makes the categorical assumption that Willie Stark and Huey Long are generally one and the same. And it is quite true that there is much about Stark's career and his personality that are reminiscent of Long's. I can therefore imagine, what I am sure is true, that those who teach political science, particularly in relation to Southern politics, might very well assign All The King's Men to their students as being a book "about Long," with the idea that the novel "illustrates" what Long was like and what he meant.

Now the question is, What does All The King's Men have to tell us about Louisiana politics in the 1920s and early 1930s, and about this well-known demagogue who seemed to pose so profound a problem for the American political system? If, that is, one wishes to use this novel for political science, how does one go about it?

I suggest that it is not a simple matter, that there is not a one-for-one relationship between the novel and the man at all. As factual history, for example, it is not very reliable. Many of the key events of Willie Stark's career bear no relationship to Long's. When there is a relationship, it is often as not an oblique one. Willie was assassinated; Long was assassinated; true. But the events that brought about Willie's assassination are not those that caused Long's. Would you not be misleading your students if you told them that Willie's and Huey's careers were similar? Would you not do much better to use non-fictional accounts of Huey Long's career in Louisiana, if factual history is what you wish?

What of the general picture it gives of Louisiana political life in the 1920s and 1930s, with its relevance to the South in general? Again it seems to me that it is very difficult to separate the fictional from the factual. There are so many things in the novel that are not reliable social documentation, so many points at which the fictional world of the novel is not the real world of Southern politics in the 1920s and 1930s. There are so many factors in the novel that are there for their fictional relevance, and would be a considerable distortion if used to illustrate Southern politics.

So that it seems to me that the documentary uses of All The King's Men are highly dubious. It is not sound, reliable factual history.

Then why read it? Why deal with such treacherously innacurate material?

Because a great novelist happened to be alive and present in Louisiana in the 1930s, and he created a compelling artistic image of a time and place. That is the reason. It is the image of life, and if properly used it can convey the knowledge of what the time and place meant, in a way that the documentation could never do. But the question is, how to use it in that way? How to approach this novel so that the image it provides of human beings of a time and a place confronting the necessity and the fact of political power can best be utilized for the understanding of what that confrontation meant?

I would insist that the first thing to do, the essential thing to do, is to read it as a novel. That is to say, as a coherent, unified artistic image, a story with a plot, with characters, whose relationships to each other are those of the fictional situation, who are important because they make up a story. What is the story? What happens? What does it mean to those who take part? Those, and not whether Willie is Huey, and whether this or that episode is related to real life, and to what degree, are the first questions to be asked. Until you ask them, and answer them, anything else you attempt to do will be distorted.

The narrator of All The King's Men is the Governor's aide, Jack Burden. The story is not told objectively by the author, but through the eyes of Jack Burden. Why? What does what happens mean for Jack Burden? Jack is the scion of a distinguished old Louisiana family, an attractive young man who grows up at a place called Burden's Landing and falls in love with a neighbor named Anne Stanton, the sister of his friend Adam Stanton. There is also a man who Jack reveres, Judge IRWIN. But Jack does not marry Anne. She insists that he settle upon a career first, and that he cannot do. He goes to graduate school, almost completes a dissertation in history, then drops out, goes into newspaper work, and finally becomes the aide of a back-country politician named Willie Stark. A man of the people, Stark has been used as a third candidate in the election for governor, to divert votes from one of the other candidates, and when he discovers how he has been duped, he denounces both factions, and makes a direct appeal to the people. In a subsequent election he is chosen governor, and embarks on a reform program. He builds roads, schools, taxes the corporations, breaks up the various political machines that have dominated the state's politics at the expense of the people.

And who has been as a father to him,

Willie Stark's hold over the electorate comes not only from his reforms, but from his magnetic personality, his eloquence, his ability to dramatize issues and rally popular support. His methods are those of the demagogue; he appeals to class hatred, to the voters' love of excitement, to their desire for colorful leadership. He is ruthless in his tactics; he uses bribery, threats, innuendo, hatred; he makes a mockery of representative government. But he gets things done. He enriches himself and his cronies, but the roads and schools get built, for the first time. He is idealistic, he believes strongly in the needs and desires of the poor people; and he is also cynical, immoral, and increasingly in love with power for its own sake.

One by one Willie's more high-minded associates desert him, but Jack Burden stays on. He believes in The Boss. For Jack the Boss represents a way of action, life, reality; Willie can act, he can control power. If his means are sordid, the end he seeks, Jack believes, is good. Jack Burden is Willie's loyal aide, and is

willing to do some of Willie's dirty work for him. In a world where much is confused, ineffective, morally and spiritually askew, Willie is something real in which Jack can believe.

At a crucial time, Judge IRWIN comes out against Willie's man in an election, and Willie orders Jack to 'get something' on the Judge in order to force him to withdraw his support. Jack proceeds to do that. He digs up an old scandal in the Judge's past, and confronts his onetime friend and mentor with the evidence, hoping in secret that the Judge will be able to deny it and explain it. The Judge refuses to agree to withdraw his support; instead he takes his own life.

Meanwhile other things have happened. Willie has decided to build a public hospital, as his own memorial. It is to be the one pure and uncompromised act of his career; he refuses to allow political considerations to be involved in its construction. To head the hospital he gets the best man he can find, and that is Adam Stanton, Jack Burden's childhood friend. and Judge Stanton's son. Later Willie is forced to hedge a little on his uncompromising attitude on the hospital; he allows the contract to be let to a political contractor. But when Willie's son is badly injured in a football game, having been put into the game at Willie's insistence, Willie decides anew to have the hospital built without compromise, as the one pure thing in his life. But commitments have been made by his henchmen, and when ordered to cancel them, they tell the idealistic Dr. Adam Stanton that his sister Anne, Jack's onetime girl friend, has become Willie's mistress. Enraged, Adam Stanton shoots Willie Stark to death.

In what sense is Jack Burden 'responsible' for what has happened? He had dug up the evidence that drove the Judge to suicide. His failure to be what he should have been had driven Anne Stanton into Willie Stark's arms. He had persuaded Adam Stanton to head Willie's hospital.

Jack looks at his life, and he sees it for what it has been—a failure to face up to his moral responsibility as a human being. What he had found out about Judge IRWIN'S past was 'true', in that it had happened. But had not the Judge, as a sinful but responsible human being, done all he could to atone for his error? And had Jack not had responsibilities to the Judge, to his family? For in the debacle Jack learns that Judge IRWIN was his father. And in his blind subordination of all other considerations to Willie's career, to the good "ends" that Willie sought, had Jack not evaded his own responsibility, his duty as a human being to apply to his own actions the moral standards in which he believed? The good "ends" of Willie Stark's career did not justify evil means; in looking to Willie as God, as moral arbitrator, Jack had evaded his own responsibility as a human being. Willie's whole life, and the lives of all those around him who depended on him for moral, spiritual and material sustinence, were symbolic of a failure in individual moral responsibility. The result was tragedy and death. Chastened, humbled, Jack Burden at the end prepares, with Anne Stanton, to go back into the world, but this time with the knowledge of "the awful responsibility of time" and his own compromised position as a mortal human being, his need to judge for himself, to act on his own convictions. Thus <u>All The King's Men</u> ends.

What is the use of the image of human beings that it affords? I suggest that it is not for what it has to say in a documentary fashion about Louisiana politics, or the life of Huey Long. It is for what it has to tell us about power and

responsibility, the sources of power, the uses of it, the abuses of it, the individual's relation to it. It is for what it tells us about leadership, about what it takes to command the loyalties and devotion of men for political purposes. In what Willie Stark is to Jack Burden, and to others, is an image of the basis of political behavior and response. It tells us what men like Willie Stark mean, what the kind of life means that permits them, makes it necessary for them, to gain power. It is not in its parts, in its factual relationship to this or that incident, that it has something to tell us about man as political creature. You will not get very far by singling out any specific political incident and attempting to let that, of itself, illustrate a specific factor in the career of a man like Huey Long. The incidents, the parts, have meaning and reliability only as relating to the controlling image, the total presentation. It is not enough to study Willie Stark; you must study Jack Burden, what Willie means for him, what he does and does not do because of Willie, and why. Then, and only then, it seems to me, will you be using the novel in a way that is truly valuable, a way that will give you something that non-fictional documentation cannot give you. Only then will the life that makes up the novel, instead of being a hindrance and a distortion, become an advantage, afford you an insight into political reality that you cannot acquire elsewhere.

Thus this powerful commentary on human behavior, political and otherwise, can become available to you in reliable and useable fashion—if you will use it as a novel. In that way you will be taking full advantage of the novelist's genius in the only way that is of any use to you, any real importance, in any way noteworthy—as an artist, as a novelist. And that way is by reading the book as the novel it is.

How useful is it in telling us about men like Huey Long? I want to quote several sentences from a very stimulating little book, T. Harry Williams' Romance and Realism in Southern Politics (University of Georgia Press, 1961).

> But no matter how adept Long was in the arts of power, he could never have sustained himself or his organization merely by manipulation. He had a program. He promised something, and he delivered it. Long was the first Southern mass leader to leave aside race baiting and appeals to the Southern tradition and address himself to the social and economic problems of the present. He promised big, partly because that was his nature and partly because a big promise that took in the interests of large numbers was good strategy. ' Do not ever,' he advised, 'put one of those Mother Hubbard things out that is going to accommodate just one percent.'

Professor Williams goes on to enumerate some of Long's achievements in office. "Just as important as the material achievements," he continues, "was the impact of Huey Long on the psychology of the state. He created a new consciousness of government on the part of the masses and thereby revitalized state politics. By advancing issues that mattered and by repealing the poll tax, he stirred voter interest to a height unmatched in any other Southern state, and he left Louisiana with an enduring bifactionalism that has many of the attributes of a two-party system."

Does the image seem familiar? It is very reminiscent of the image of Willie Stark in All The King's Men. But you will not find that image in the journalism,

the non-fictional commentary of the time. It required the insight of a great artist such as Warren to see what a man like Long really was and to see the dangers in that meaning for the society he lived in. For the great writer, concerned not with the machinations of Louisiana politics, but with what being human meant in such a time and such a place, was able to see much more deeply into the wellsprings of human behavior, and to give much more meaning and order to the complex emotional experience of the day than so called "objective" observers who were busy trying to assemble parts into order when the parts were too diffuse and unrecognizable to make a coherent pattern. Now, only when passions have died down and many men who felt those passions have died as well, can the historian begin to assemble a true picture of Huey Long. But the artistic image managed to do it, for its method was not one of analyzing data, of isolating facts, but of putting together, of creating a complex emotional and physical and moral image. And I suggest that unless you read All The King's Men as a novel, its insights would have been largely denied you. Those who read All The King's Men as a factual account of Huey Long's life would only be confused; those who read it as a novel, who attempt to see what the fictional character of Willie Stark meant for the fictional character of Jack Burden and for others, can learn, not only about Huey Long, but about all men like Huey Long, about the South, about the realities of the uses of political power in this day and age. In that way All The King's Men is a political novel. It is so because it is also a great social novel, a great moral and ethical novel. It is a novel about human beings, for whom all of those considerations are relevant.

In other words, I am asking that novels first be read as literature, as the image cluster that they are, not as documents of particularities. There is no such thing as a political novel, or an economic novel, or an historical novel; there is only the novel. It can then be used for all those purposes and more, if it is read first as a novel. And the better the novel is as a novel, the more it will have to tell you, whatever your special interest may be, for the more intense and profound will be the ordering of human experience that it affords.

So that you see, I am asking you all to be literary critics. I am asking you to read works of fiction as works of fiction, not as disguised factual documents, and to give them the same respect for what they are, by reading them on their own terms, that you would give any other important commentary on the meaning of human experience, political or otherwise. Not only am I asking you to do this, I am inviting you to do it. If you will do so, then I think that the novelists of this world have a great deal to say to you, both as political scientists and as human beings.

THE CHANGING USE OF TELEVISION IN CAMPAIGN POLITICS

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The Issues

> "At 8:30 P.M., Chicago time, in the evening of September 26th, 1960, the voice and shadow of the previous show faded from the screen; in a few seconds it was followed by another voice and by a visual clip extolling the virtues of Liggett and Myers Cigarettes; fifteen seconds were then devoted to Maybelline, the mascara 'devoted exclusively to eye beauty, velvety soft and smooth.' Then a deep voice regretfully announced that the viewers who turned to this channel would tonight be denied the privilege of viewing The Andy Griffith Show -- and the screen dissolved to three men who were about to confirm a revolution in American Presidential politics."

Thus Theodore H. White, in his brilliant "The Making of the President 1960," described (p. 279) the fruition of the dream of Frank Stanton, President of CBS, and of other broadcasters as well: the first debate -- and the first broadcast debate -- between candidates for the office of the President of the United States. The "revolution" to which Mr. White referred was, as he put it, "a revolution born of the ceaseless American genius in technology; its sole agent and organizer had been the common American television set. Tonight it was to permit the simultaneous gathering of all the tribes of America to ponder their choice between two chieftains in the largest political convocation in the history of man."

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss some aspects of this "revolution" -- its origin, its implications, its significance and its future, if any. For as of now, the four face-to-face joint appearances of Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy must remain as a singular revolution indeed, with no subsequent history and no subsequent evolution or development. At midnight of Election Day 1960, the Federal law which made that revolution possible expired by its own terms. Section 315 of the Communications Act -- the equal time provisions of the law -- automatically revived. And so today, as the law stands, wherever there are more than two candidates for any office -- certainly where there are 15 as there were for the office of the Presidency of the United States in 1960, and 13 as there are for the office of Governor of New Jersey today -- this revolution in the use of broadcasting in campaign politics becomes impractical and so unwieldy as to be foreclosed in the future.

Is this good or bad, wise or unwise? Would the democratic processes be better served if somehow the same American geniuses who invented television and radio could disinvent them altogether -- at least for political purposes? Or, if disinvention is too drastic and unreal a remedy, should there be a new set of Federal controls and specifications, a new set of ground rules so that broadcasting can better serve the American voter? Is there anything the broadcasters themselves can or should prescribe to govern political use of their facilities so as to minimize the dangers of abuse and maximize the opportunities of the voters to make an informed and intelligent choice among those who aspire to serve as their political leaders?

To broadcasters -- and, I suspect, to political scientists, political candidates and indeed, to American citizens -- these are important questions. They can better be answered by reviewing just what, as far as we can tell, are the impact and influence of radio and television, what the dangers of abuse are, what the potentials -- for good or evil -- are, what was right and what was wrong with the joint appearances and other uses of broadcasting in 1960, and what the future holds or can hold.

The Role of Radio and Television in Political Campaigning -- Two Kinds of Communications

Communication is, of course, of the essence of a political campaign. Candidates must, in one way or another, communicate with the citizens whose vote they seek.

It is a curious historical footnote that two types of communications, at opposite extremes of the spectrum of means of communications, are ascribed by political observers as having proved to be among the decisive factors in the making of the President in 1960.

At one extreme was that most limited and focused of all communications -- the person-to-person telephone call. On October 19, 1960, Martin Luther King was arrested in Atlanta for participating in a "sit-in" in a department store. On October 24, King was put in the Reidsville, Ga., State Prison for a four months term. On October 25, as Theodore White describes it (pp. 322-323), John Kennedy "From his room at the /O'Hare/ Inn /at the International Airport in Chicago/, without consulting anyone,...placed a long-distance telephone call to Mrs. Martin Luther King, assured her of his interest and concern in her suffering and, if necessary, his intervention."

In one of the rare cases of documented conversion in political campaigning (a subject to which this paper will return at a later point), Theodore White describes (p. 323) what happened as a result of this communication:

> "The father of Martin Luther King,...who had come out for Nixon a few weeks earlier on religious grounds, now switched. 'Because this man,' said the Reverend Mr. King, Senior, 'was willing to wipe the tears from my daughter /in-law/'s eyes, I've got a suitcase of votes, and I'm going to take them to Mr. Kennedy and dump them in his lap.' Across the country, scores of Negro leaders, deeply Protestant but even more deeply impressed by Kennedy's action, followed suit. ...One cannot identify in the narrowness of American voting of 1960 any one particular episode or decision as being more important than any other in the final tallies; yet when one reflects that Illinois was carried by only 9,000 votes and that 250,000 Negroes are estimated to have voted for Kennedy; that Michigan was carried by 67,000 votes and that an estimated 250,000 Negroes voted for Kennedy; that South Carolina was carried by 10,000 votes and that an estimated 40,000 Negroes there voted for Kennedy, the candidates instinctive decision must be ranked among the most crucial of the last few weeks."

And so one extreme of communication -- a telephone call from one person to another -- was a decisive factor which led to the incumbent in the White House today being a man named Kennedy, rather than one named Nixon.

At the other extreme of communications, the dimensions of which will be examined at a later point in this paper, was the joint appearances of the two candidates on radio and television. Here the communication was not to one person but to over one hundred million. And the general consensus is that these broadcasts, too, were decisive -- that without them, Kennedy could not have won. Indeed, many Republicans are persuaded that these broadcasts were a mistake fatal to Nixon. And President Kennedy, after the election, stated that, "It was TV more than anything else that turned the tide" (White, p. 294).

The point here is not to form, or propose, a final judgment concerning what won for Kennedy or lost for Nixon, or to determine the precise -- or even imprecise -- influence of the broadcast appearances. Rather, it is to consider these two extremes of communications in juxtaposition, recognizing the probability that <u>without either of them</u>, Nixon would have won.

These contrasts in decisive communications serve no more, and no less, than to provide the perspective in which to consider the impact and influence of broadcasting -- to remind us that mass communication, even television, is only one means of communicating, only one means by which voters form, or (more likely) confirm, their judgments. Only if this is recognized can the use of broadcasting in politics be studied, or sensibly evaluated.

The critical threshold issues, then, are (1) the reach and penetration of the broadcasting media; and (2) once the reach is measured, what is its grasp. Here too, as we shall see, Browning's injunction is observed: the reach exceeds the grasp.

It is to these issues which we now turn.

One Measure of Radio and Television -- Their Reach

The pervasiveness of radio and television are well known in their general aspects. There are over 168,000,000 radios in use in the United States today. Almost 90 per cent of American families -- more than 40,000,000 -- have one or more television sets; they use them, on the average, more than five hours a day.

In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the political campaigns are followed by tens of millions of Americans through their radio and television sets, and that broadcast media serve as a major -- possibly the major -- source of campaign information among the mass media to most Americans.

And it may be worth noting, if only briefly and parenthetically, that this great attention which the public pays to electronic political campaigning comes about because of the enormous attention which the public pays to radio and television in general. It is, after all, the popular entertainment which motivated the initial purchase of receivers, and which keeps the public in the habit of turning to their radios and television sets for political campaigns. The tens of millions of American citizens do not suddenly begin buying the Reporter or the Saturday Review or even The New York Times during political campaigns; their circulation remains substantially the same. Rather, because it is their habit, the tens of millions of citizens turn to radio and television.

How many tens of millions?

A total of about 115,000,000 people attended, through radio and television, at least some part of at least one of the four 1960 debates. The average television audience for all four debates was 71,000,000. The typical family tuned in its television set to these debates for 54 minutes of every hour -- in sharp contrast to the high tune out during paid and set political broadcasts.

The four debates attracted television audiences averaging 20 per cent larger than the entertainment programs for which they were substituted. In contrast, the average half-hour paid political broadcast in 1960 attracted only 70 per cent of the audience of the program it replaced. But, it is to be noted, even the paid political programs averaged audiences well in excess of 20,000,000 -- a figure which might be compared with the estimate of a total of 10,000,000 people who saw Nixon in person during his extended and strenuous 50-state campaign tour in 1960.

Another quantitative measure of the reach of the broadcast media in political campaigns is the extent to which people rely -- or say they rely -- on these media for their political information and as a source of their political knowledge or impressions. Several studies indicate that the reliance is indeed heavy.

A survey conducted in Wayne County, Michigan, in 1956 by Professor Samuel Eldersveld of the University of Michigan, showed that 38 per cent of the people stated that they received most of their political information from television, 38 per cent from newspapers, and radio nine per cent. A study conducted by Elmo Roper for CBS ("Election Study II -- Concerning Issues and Candidates -- October 1960") showed that 93 per cent of the people who followed the 1960 conventions (69 per cent of respondents) did so through television, 47 per cent through newspapers, and 16 per cent through radio.

A study conducted by the University of Michigan after the 1956 election included the question, "Of all ways of following the campaign, which one would you say you got the most information from -- newspapers, radio, television or magazines?" These were the responses:

Television	48%
Newspapers	36%
Radio	6%
Magazines	6%
Combination of Media	4%

Cunningham and Walsh reported on the 1958 New York gubernatorial campaign ("Television and The Political Candidate"); its report included these findings concerning sources of political information during that campaign (p. 7):

	% Mentioning Source	% Saying Source Is Most Important
Newspaper articles	87	40
Television	77	38
Family, Friends, Associates	45	10
Radio	39	5
Magazine articles	24	3
Campaign literature	20	1
Newsreels	18	--
Personal appearances	13	3

In April 1961, a University of Michigan Survey Research Center team, whose members were the authors of "The American Voter," reported these findings on voter behavior:

Paid Attention to Campaign By:	1952	1956	1960
Watching Television	53%	74%	87%
Listening to Radio	69%	45%	42%
Reading Newspapers	79%	69%	80%
Reading Magazines	40%	31%	41%
Following All Four Media	15%	13%	11%

Got Most Information From:	1952	1956	1960
Television	31%	49%	60%
Radio	27%	11%	5%
Newspapers	22%	24%	23%
Magazines	5%	5%	4%
Combination of Media	9%	3%	3%
Did Not Follow Media	6%	8%	5%
	100%	100%	100%

These findings indicating the importance of the broadcast media, and particularly television, as a major source of political information to voters are substantially paralleled by findings relating to British voters (Trenaman and McQuail, "Television and the Political Image," Chapter V).

Another Measure of Radio and Television -- Their Impact and Influence

These several findings, then, serve to establish that the reach of the broadcast media is long indeed; they have come to serve as the major source of political information and impressions during campaign periods. But does their grasp match their reach -- to what extent, if any, do they influence and persuade or affect voting behavior?

Here we are on slippery ground which involves a probe of the minds (or deeply set emotions and instincts) of millions of men and women to discover why they vote as they do. This is an exercise in mass analysis; it concerns ethnics, history, parental relationships, the influence of peers (and the determination of who are peers), interpersonal relationships -- the whole congeries of factors whose influence has been so difficult to isolate.

These very difficulties have led some doubters to question altogether the value of the judgment of political scientists in this field. In an article for the New York Times Magazine, Russell Kirk recently questioned whether political scientists are scientific at all, and whether they can use the logical approach of the natural sciences in investigating the irrational nature -- and the morals and politics -- of mankind. "Human beings," he wrote, "are the least controllable, verifiable, law-obeying and predictable of subjects." A true knowledge of man, Mr. Kirk concluded, remains the province of "poets, theologians, political theorists, moralists, jurists, and men of imagination generally."

Thus encouraged, we laymen -- and probably each of us likes to think that we fall into one of the classes mentioned by Mr. Kirk -- are apt to make diligent use of our imagination in analyzing American voting and the effect of the media on it. Unfortunately, this method of interpreting election behavior is likely to lead into, rather than out of, chaos.

If this particular layman may be permitted to venture a judgment in this field, my guess would be that elusive and uncertain as the conclusions of the social scientists seem to be, they are the best we have -- and their very unanimity in most significant areas in this field, based not on spasmodic anecdotes but on empirical data, warrants our reliance. And indeed, while their conclusions appear to fly squarely in the face of the claims of some broadcasters -- and the charges of some critics of broadcasting -- that television can indeed mould men's minds like clay, the social scientists' conclusions seem eminently reasonable. (See Bauer and Bauer, "America, Mass Society and Mass Media," The Journal of Social Issues, Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1960.) Briefly, the conclusions of the social scientists are these: The mass media play only a relatively small part in persuading the voter to vote in a way different than all the other, deeper, influences would have led him to vote in any event.

In their classic study, "The People's Choice," Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet found that radio was the most important source of political information in the 1940 campaign. And at the time Franklin Roosevelt, whom many have called the absolute master of the medium, was running for a third term. It seemed like a persuasive combination. But, in fact, Roosevelt was unable to convert a statistically significant number of voters in the sample study. Radio and Roosevelt left the Republicans substantially where they found them. Those who originally intended to vote Republican stuck to their choice throughout the campaign. The same tenacious grasp on party and party leader was shown by the Democrats -- despite the overwhelming press support for the Republican candidate.

The authors found that political propaganda could convert -- but only a very small percentage of voters. Moreover, the people most open to conversion were the least interested in campaign propaganda. It was the interested and the decided who exposed themselves to the most propaganda through the various media.

They also found that the standard stereotype of the rational dispassionate democratic voter existed only in "textbooks on civics, in the movies, and in the minds of some political idealists."

Of the many reasons for this failure of the media to convert, perhaps the most important is that the voter tends to "discover" only that which he finds is acceptable to him. The voter selectively exposes himself only to arguments and opinions with which he agrees. Thus he reinforces predispositions and, by election time, reaches a destination that is already determined, and very likely determined prior to the conventions.

The "clinching" argument, the authors conclude, does not persuade. It has the function of merely identifying for the voter the "way of thinking and acting which he is already half-aware of wanting."

Moreover, once the media raised old opinions to the threshold of awareness, the voter sealed himself off from an objective approach to voting by erecting a wall between himself and alien notions. This wall was partially erected by simply ignoring any statement of the issues at stake. In the last 12 days of the campaign, only 54 per cent of the sample group exposed themselves to one or more of five major campaign speeches on radio; and the printed media fared even worse.

Many of these conclusions have also been found to be valid for television. In their study of the British election of 1959, for example, Trenaman and McQuail found that television -- and television alone -- significantly increased the voters' knowledge of campaign issues. But they also found that with minor exceptions "the electorate was not influenced directly in its voting or political attitudes" by the media. There exists, they found, "a definite and consistent barrier between sources of communication and movements of attitude in the political field at the General Election."

These conclusions are strongly affirmed by Joseph Klapper in his comprehensive and invaluable summary of the learning in the field of mass media influence, "The Effects of Mass Communications" (1960). Dr. Klapper writes, "in reference to persuasion, we (the social scientists) have maintained that the media are after all not so terribly powerful, and yet we have reported their impressive successes in promoting such varied phenomena as religious intolerance... and disenchantment with the Boy Scout activities." He laments the "plethora of relevant but inconclusive and at times seemingly contradictory findings."

Yet Klapper proposes that social scientists now know considerably more about communication than they thought they did. And by combining the results of research surveys and "the considered conjecture of reputable and acute thinkers" a remarkably clear picture of the effect of the media emerges.

Klapper confirms Lazarsfeld's findings that mass communications are more likely to reinforce convictions than change them; that people fail to perceive the unsympathetic; that facts are changed to suit fancy. He also concludes, as did Trenaman and McQuail, that there is a barrier between communications and the political attitudes and opinions of the electorate and notes that these "ego involved attitudes," as they have come to be called, "are particularly resistant to conversion by mass communications."

Klapper observes that there are exceptions to all these "rules," that conversion can and does occur, and that some people are, in fact, persuasible, although their number is small in comparison with those reinforced. Moreover, he notes, as Bryce did long before electronic media came into being, that a barrage of propaganda can produce a "bandwagon effect," people adopting opinions merely because they believe them to be in accord with the majority view.

Perhaps Dr. Berelson, in 1948, summed it up somewhat moodily but as accurately as possible when dealing in general terms -- that "some kinds of communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects."

And it is to be noted that mass media -- even television -- are likely to have their least effect, at least in terms of persuasion and conversion, in the fields of deeply held beliefs, among which must be numbered politics. It is precisely here that the distinction must be drawn between ideas -- such as political beliefs -- and products and merchandise. For there can be little question that television does, in the words of the industry, "move" goods. It is an enormously effective merchandising medium; it sells products.

But there is a sharp distinction between goods and beliefs. Television can, and does, persuade a viewer to buy a refrigerator or a toothpaste or an electric shaver if he is about ready to buy one and is on the verge of making a choice among products which serve the same purpose and differ from one another only in a few (though sometimes very important) characteristics. There are not, normally, deeply held beliefs among the general public between the relative merits of one cigarette and another, and so many cigarette buyers are most certainly persuadable over a period of time.

Not so with most voters and political beliefs. The trends, the influences, the directions are deep-seated and, at least to a considerable degree, fixed. Persuasion and conversion are far rarer and more difficult in this field.

Why, then, all the fuss and bother among legislators, with their incessant worries about equal time, and among politicians, with their elaborate television campaigns?

One answer is that television has an important use to candidates even if it does not convert. Torchlight parades, motor cavalcades, political rallies in Main Street and in Madison Square Garden do not convert either; but they do inspirit the faithful, raise their flagging hopes, provide them with the fervor and rationalizations to serve their cause. And paid political rallies on television serve the same purpose of reinforcement. Republicans still must reach Republicans, and Democrats, Democrats. Television rallies are a quick and effective means to serve precisely that purpose. And indeed they do -- for we know that the vast majority of those tuning in to Republican television broadcasts are Republicans, and Democrats to Democratic broadcasts.

More than this, as Dr. Berelson and Dr. Klapper have both said, in some circumstances, on some issues, television will have some influence on some people. And while quantification is a dangerous business here, we have <u>some</u> evidence that <u>some</u> people are converted to <u>some</u> extent -- or think they are.

In its study of the 1958 New York gubernatorial campaign ("Television and The Political Candidate"), Cunningham and Walsh reported that there were 56 cases of "switching" out of a total sample of 537 -- people who said that they voted for a different candidate from the one for whom, somewhere in the course of the campaign, they thought they would vote. Cross-switching was found -- but two to three times the number of voters among these 56 switched from Harriman to Rockefeller than vice versa. And a few of these switchers said they changed because of the candidates' television appearances which, it may be noted, included at least one joint appearance.

A more comprehensive indication of persuasion and possible conversion is provided by a study made by Elmo Roper and Associates for CBS News during the last campaign. In one of these surveys, which went into the field after the fourth debate and before Election Day, interviewers asked whether the interviewees had watched the candidates on television, and whether they had watched the debates. Roper reported that 44 per cent of the respondents who voted said that the debates had "influenced" their decision. About five per cent -- projecting to 3,400,000 voters -- ascribed their final voting decision to the debates alone. Of these 3,400,000 voters, 884,000 (26 per cent) voted for Nixon and 2,448,000 (72 per cent) voted for Kennedy (two per cent did not reveal their vote). The debates, according to these figures, therefore, yielded Kennedy a net gain of 1,564,000 votes -- over 13 times greater than his actual margin of about 113,000.

The Cunningham and Walsh and Roper surveys are not, of course, final and conclusive proof of persuasion or conversion by television. They indicate only that some number -- in the case of the 1960 Presidential campaign, a decisive number -- think, or say, that certain television broadcasts were the critical factor in their voting decision. Even so, taking the responses in the Roper study at their face value, the net change caused by the debates was only two per cent of the total vote.

And, in any event, the figures may well be applicable not to ordinary political broadcasting, but only to the special circumstances involved in the fact that these were debates, unique in history, and, according to all surveys, they were debates in which there was a decisive margin of superiority for one of the participants. It may be -- although the evidence surely is inconclusive -- that joint appearances in the form of debates or other kinds of face-to-face counter-arguments have a greater impact and influence, and produce a greater degree of conversion, than single, set appearances controlled by the candidate.

Television and Politics -- Abuses and Uses

There is, thus, some perspective against which to judge the potential -- of abuse and of use -- of television in campaign politics. For, thus far, it appears that we know that (1) television's reach is enormous -- through it, a candidate potentially can reach almost all Americans, and, given the proper programming and chemistry, as in the

case of the debates, he in fact can reach them and hold their attention; and (2) by a large margin, television's grasp is exceeded by its reach -- for its use to persuade or convert is limited indeed, although even if minimal and marginal, it may be a decisive factor.

With these facts, television's dangers and promises as an instrument of democratic processes can be more meaningfully judged. The dangers, it is submitted, are less real when thus judged; its potential - greater; and the techniques for its better utilization more clearly indicated.

The Dangers

There are many who have considered television a dangerous medium -- in politics as in other fields. After the second World War when television began to grow rapidly, its enormous potential alarmed intellectuals, television critics, politicians, political scientists -- and some social scientists. With the union of television and advertising, it was felt that candidates would eventually be sold like soap; that only those with pleasing television personalities would be selected as candidates; that charlatans with acting talent, backed by makeup men, ghostwriters and teleprompters, could be elected to the highest office in the land.

In The Golden Kazoo, by John G. Schneider, a fictional account of the Presidential election of 1960, candidate Henry Clay Adams achieves a dramatic reversal of his sinking fortunes with a gigantic television giveaway program in which he promises to turn over the nation's farm surplus to "The People." And CBS News Correspondent Walter Cronkite asked, in an article for the November 1952 Theatre Arts Magazine, whether we would eventually have "Government by Hooper Rating?"

Over the years, exaggerated fears of television were to some extent dispelled. Television was, as we have seen, becoming the most important source of information to the voter, yet there was an extremely high tune out of sets during paid political broadcasts. It also became apparent to politicians that there was a point beyond which candidates saturated the airwaves at their own risk. In 1952, after preempting prime evening time, Governor Stevenson received the now famous wire: "I like Ike and I love Lucy. Drop dead" (an example, it may be noted, of the reinforcement of which the social scientists write).

Psychologists warned that with political advertising there is a built-in safety valve. When people begin to feel that their freedom is being threatened by a massive political advertising campaign, they are likely to react so violently that the campaign can be a serious liability to the candidate it means to promote.

And historians might have noted that American politics have long been a matter of the hard sell. Political rallies, parades, campaign songs, buttons and other paraphernalia -- all were psychological devices designed to convince the electorate that one man's stock was

rising. In 1895 the Englishman James Bryce, in The American Commonwealth, commented that "A European, who stands amazed at the magnitude of these /political/ demonstrations, is apt to ask whether the result obtained is commensurate with the money, time, and effort given to them, /but/ as with advertising...it keeps up the 'boom,' and an American election is held to be, truly or falsely, largely a matter of booming."

But as we have seen, in any event, the very nature of television as a mass medium, provides its own protection. For mass media are not essentially instruments of persuasion or conversion in the field of ideas -- at least when controlled or manipulated to present only one side or one viewpoint.

And, in any event, television can be a probing and revealing medium. As John Crosby has noted, it "throws a merciless white light on phoniness. The candidate had better know what he is talking about.... It is not his looks that television puts under scrutiny; it is his ability." Or as Walter Cronkite observed in his article in Theatre Arts, "Television has an eerie ability to X-ray the soul. I think it can detect insincerity as quickly as a more orthodox X-ray can detect a broken bone."

A second major danger which has disturbed some observers is that -- with its great reach and its supposed influence -- television gives an enormous advantage to the candidate, and the party, with the largest purse.

Saturation can, indeed, boomerang. Viewer resentment may well be quick, and perhaps fatal. Yet, with the potential of residual -- and decisive -- conversion, there is a danger. Television's enormous costs -- over $100,000 for time alone (exclusive of program and production costs) for an evening hour on a network -- can inevitably place a premium on the long purse, with all its attendant evils and dangers.

To guard against that danger, it has been suggested that broadcasters should be compelled to give a certain number of hours of free time to candidates for office.

Aside from the fact that this ignores the enormous numbers of national and local candidates in an election year, and that television might end up being nothing else than an election medium if it were forced to grant them all free time, this provision hardly seems fair. Nobody has yet suggested that a newspaper or a magazine, in return for the second-class mailing privilege, offer the candidates free advertising space; nobody has suggested that the airlines transport candidates free -- though they are licensed to use segments of the nation's limited airspace just as television stations are licensed to use a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.

The fact is that compulsory free time is an artificial remedy for an artificially created problem. In campaigns prior to 1960, candidates had exceedingly limited access to free television time simply

because of Section 315. For under that provision, free time to any candidate meant free time to all his opponents for the same office. Faced with campaigns with a dozen or more candidates for a single office, broadcasters were, as a practical matter, remitted to the policy of not giving, but selling, time. Ironically, Section 315 is satisfied if time is offered for sale equally; the section is indifferent to the unequal ability to buy.

Prior to the 1960 campaign, this problem was somewhat ameliorated by a number of amendments to Section 315. In 1959, following the Lar Daly case, the Congress permanently amended Section 315 to exempt from the equal time requirements regularly scheduled newscasts, on-the-spot coverage of news events (such as acceptance speeches at conventions) and regularly scheduled news interview programs such as Face The Nation and Meet The Press.

And, of course, of even greater significance, on the eve of the 1960 campaign, the Congress temporarily suspended the application of Section 315 to Presidential and Vice Presidential campaigns, thus making the debates and a number of other programs possible during the campaign.

Thus, for the Presidential campaign in 1960, the danger of the long purse was minimized. For under the freedom to present the candidates provided by these several amendments, and putting aside the regularly scheduled newscasts, the CBS Radio and Television Networks devoted a total of 16½ hours to personal appearances of the Democratic and Republican candidates in 1960, at no charge to them. In addition, in 1960, 16 hours were devoted, free to the parties, to supporters of the major candidates. The monetary value of these 1960 broadcasts exceeded $2,000,000. Additional time offered by CBS to the candidates but not accepted amounted to $700,000.

The clearest and most direct protection, then against the dangers of a purchase of an election by obliterative purchase of television time is to repeal Section 315 -- thus assuring to all significant candidates free time in quantities apparently beyond their desires.

In the foregoing circumstances, it would seem apparent that the major dangers sometimes thought to inhere in political broadcasting -- the danger of the phony candidate and the danger of excessive costs -- are, in fact, not grave at all, and can be further minimized.

The Benefits

It would seem clear that the benefits to the democratic processes which television can bring, and has in a measure already brought, far outweigh the real or imagined dangers.

One of the problems in our expanding and increasingly complex democratic society is that of remoteness, of lack of citizen participation, of apathy and indifference born of the absence of any directly connecting communications between candidate and most of the voters.

Radio and television have considerably closed these gaps. They have provided a direct link between politician and public; they permitted voters to see and hear for themselves first-hand, without having to rely on the filter of a newspaper reporter whose editing, impressions and choice of words are necessarily his own.

After the 1952 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Philip Hamburger wrote in the New Yorker: "Television, covering affairs of this sort, makes the viewer a member of a community vaster than his own without demanding that he sacrifice any of his individuality. It does not require him to judge, nor does it judge him -- a nightmare envisioned by Orwell and mercifully not in prospect.... In a sense, television coverage of a national convention turns the entire nation into a huge town meeting...."

Mr. Hamburger concluded that "the proceedings themselves were irresistible, being a manifestation of the right of every delegate -- and, by extension, every citizen -- to take a direct part in the choosing of his President."

In 1952, the Saturday Review put it another way when it stated: "The vast public which is too untutored or too indifferent to apply itself with assiduity to evolving a clear conception of a candidate from his speeches as reported in the press, is now able to follow his course through political events with the least possible effort over television .... The America of 150,000,000 souls is nearer today to the era when politicians and people met face to face than in many a long decade."

The Changing Use of Television -- The Near Past and The Future

It was not, however, until the 1960 campaign, when broadcasters were able to operate under the 1959 amendments to Section 315 and its temporary suspension as far as Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates were concerned, that the real potential of television began to be realized. For the first time, the political diet in television was not the set speeches by the candidates, the carefully staged rallies, the screened and rehearsed "telethons," but rather the more meaningful beginnings toward a national dialogue and toward a systematic portrait of the nature of the candidates.

Thus, under the 1959 amendments, as we have noted, it was possible for the first time to present the candidates on the press interview broadcasts such as Face The Nation and Meet The Press. James Reston of The New York Times has described press panel broadcasts such as these as "important antidotes to one-way campaigns"; he has argued their uses to offset the candidates' reliance on what he calls "the techniques of modern salesmanship."

Programs of this nature proved effective and revealing in 1960. They will doubtless be more widely utilized in future campaigns if the requirement in the 1959 amendments that they be permitted only if part of "regularly scheduled" series do not prove too limiting -- as they well might.

A second and important new technique, developed under the temporary suspension of Section 315 (and so unavailable in the future without further Congressional action) was the informal conversations with the candidates. In Person To Person and Presidential Countdown on CBS, and in The Campaign and The Candidates on NBC, there were unrehearsed conversations, quiet and often revealing, between a newsman and the candidate, dealing less with the immediate issues than with the nature of the man, his philosophy, his background and his character.

In the excitement surrounding, and the focus on, the debates, these portraits have too often been overlooked. I believe that they proved to be an exceedingly effective use of television, affording the voter the all-too-rare opportunity of learning for himself, at first hand, what manner of men these were who sought to lead this nation. They provided some rare insights.

Third, of course, were the debates. Prior to the action of the Congress in suspending Section 315 to make these debates possible, Professor Stanley Kelley, Jr., presented, in his recent book, Political Campaigning, a persuasive case for debates among candidates as an important technique for quickening the election processes.

The campaign discussion, Professor Kelley wrote, should help voters make rational voting decisions. A rational voter must have discerned what is at stake in an election, and (he quotes from John Stuart Mill), "the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion" (italics mine).

Unfortunately, Kelley points out, the political campaign has degenerated into a kind of "adversary proceeding." Each side puts its best foot forward and distorts the efforts of the opposition. "Under such conditions the ability of the individual voter to get an accurate picture of the views and records of parties and candidates will depend ...on whether or not he is exposed to the communications of both sides."

Professor Kelley observed that argument elevates the observer (if not necessarily the participants); that debates promote rational discussion; that audiences for rival candidates are usually separate, each group seeking to reinforce its own convictions; that the political rally fosters this partisanship, celebrating unity, while the old time face-to-face arguments enabled the audience to grasp the arguments for both sides.

In the Senatorial debates between Jacob Javits and Robert Wagner in 1956, Kelley points out, "the stands of the two parties were less distorted /on the issues of civil rights and foreign policy/ than they were in the Eisenhower-Stevenson speeches." In other words the issue was joined -- as it rarely is in political campaigns -- and the result was greater clarity.

The case is summarized in a quotation from a veteran Southern politician, discussing, in 1889, the demise of the political campaign

debates: "Forty years ago constant practice had made our public speakers so skillful in debate that every question was made clear.... For the last 20 years this practical union between politician and people has not existed. Only one party is allowed to speak and the leaders of that party no longer debate, they simply declaim and denounce. Upon this crude and windy diet, the once robust and sturdy political convictions of our people have dwindled into leanness and decay."

The debates in 1960, with all their faults, thus, provided the most important changes in the use of television in campaign politics. Walter Lippmann has called the four debates "a bold innovation which is bound to be carried forward into future campaigns and could not now be abandoned." James Reston described the debates as "a great improvement over the frantic rushing about the nation, roaring at great howling mobs at airports and memorial halls." Roscoe Drummond called them "an invaluable innovation.... Even without any changes, I vote for their continuance." Marquis Childs wrote that they "added a new dimension to politics" and President Kennedy has called the debates "a significant advance in American politics."

But there were some dissenters. Among those who rejected the debates altogether were Max Ascoli of the Reporter, who wrote that "the very fact of arousing the interest of the millions further lowers the level of campaign oratory."

Another critic was the noted historian Henry Steele Commager. In an article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "Washington Would Have Lost A TV Debate," Mr. Commager called the debates "televised press conferences /which/ in future campaigns could be a disaster." Lincoln, Mr. Commager says, "was not quick in the give and take of politics.... Indeed, of our major Presidents, probably only Franklin D. Roosevelt had the wit, the resourcefulness, the self-assurance, to do well in such televised press interviews."

I disagree with both these critics. With Mr. Ascoli, first, because I believe the American voter neither wants platitudes nor is deceived by them. I believe he wants facts and conflict -- wants to be shown a demonstrable difference of opinion between the candidates -- so that he can make an intelligent choice between them. The high interest in the debates -- and the low interest in paid political speeches (in which, as Mr. Reston has noted, nobody has the chance to answer back) -- is evidence that this is true.

Fundamentally, Mr. Ascoli's quarrel seems to be with democracy itself. If "arousing the interest of the millions" can be achieved only at the expense of the intellectual, the philosopher, and other minority groups, then that is one of the prices we must pay for democracy. As Toqueville noted in 1835, "the very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority.... No obstacles exist which can impede or even retard its progress, so as to heed the complaints of those whom it crushes upon its path."

We were -- all of us -- crushed in a way. We would all prefer that the candidates sit down with us in small groups to go into the issues in detail, or even talk to us in town meetings. But this is no longer possible. Mr. Nixon estimated that on his grueling 50-state campaign he may have been seen in person by 10,000,000 people -- about one seventh of the total number of people who voted.

But more than 75,000,000 people watched the first debate -- and almost as many the last. Their interest was sustained not only throughout each debate, but throughout all four debates. Certainly the candidates aimed their remarks at what they felt was the largest common denominator of the electorate, but they nevertheless sustained the interest of the many minority groups which made up the majority.

I also disagree with Mr. Commager who, I feel, does little to support his own argument about the major Presidents' ineptitude at debate by pointing out that Mr. Lincoln, in seven stirring debates with Douglas, succeeded in educating "not only the voters of Illinois, but posterity as well." My personal feeling is that Mr. Lincoln would have been magnificent in debates -- on or off television -- and in this feeling I join President Kennedy, who wrote before the election that "the quiet dignity of Lincoln...would have been tremendously effective on TV." I also like to think that Washington, despite his methodical manner and false teeth, would have had the appeal of an Eisenhower. To believe that the people would have rejected Washington is to damn not television, but the people.

A third critic, Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review, wrote that the debates put a premium on superficiality and failed to reveal the inner nature of the candidates. He criticized the debates as running "counter to the educational process. They require that a man keep his mouth moving whether he has something to say or not. It is made to appear that the worst thing that could happen to a candidate is to be caught without an instant answer to a complex question. Thoughtful silence is made to appear a confession of ignorance." Theodore White made this same point, in "The Making of a President 1960," commenting on the "snap" replies required of the candidates.

I would agree that the format of the debates was imperfect. CBS, as well as the other networks, preferred a more traditional debating format in which the candidates would be allowed to question each other. Indeed, CBS proposed these joint appearances as only a part of a more comprehensive plan of eight hours of broadcast, the first and last (on the eve of the Election) of which would have been divided between the candidates for their own uninterrupted arguments and summaries, and the remaining six of which would have included direct debates as well as press interviews.

But the candidates themselves would not agree to these arrangements.

Time to complete arrangements was short. The important thing was to make a start, to begin the evolution of a political tradition

which I am certain will make even more significant contributions in the campaigns to come. And so the format which was used was the result of compromise; without agreement between the networks and the candidates, there could have been no joint appearances at all.

But, I do not feel that the format which was utilized required constant mouth-moving, or permitted only snap replies, or even that these are necessarily bad. As Mr. Nixon pointed out at the time, "whoever is President is going to have to make some decisions very speedily at times, so that the people at least get a chance to see how both of us react under fire." Even so, nothing in the programs or their format required that the candidates shoot from the hip or answer a particular question without deliberation.

Perhaps each candidate came to the conclusion that he was compelled to do so, but if he did so, I suspect he underestimated the American people. I do not believe that the candidates would have been censured -- indeed, they might have been the more appreciated -- by the audience had they taken the time carefully to consider an answer. While no one knows in what form the debate format will come to maturity, we may some day see candidates pausing, reflecting, and taking the time to make considered answers to questions.

Mr. Cousins also felt that the debates did not really show what manner of man the candidates were, that the "battle station atmosphere" did not lend itself to the kind of questions that should have been asked.

It is reasonable to conclude that the confrontations showed qualities of the candidates that might not have been so apparent under less demanding circumstances. And I am sure that most people thought them more revealing than carefully planned and rehearsed political speeches, where the audience reaction is carefully cued, and the speech itself a product of half a dozen skillful minds -- not necessarily including the candidate's. This manufactured image certainly may bear little relationship to the inner man.

More than that, however, as I have noted, there were a number of programs other than the joint appearances which were designed to meet the objective Mr. Cousins emphasized -- that of illuminating the kind of man the candidate was.

Conclusion

In sum, it would seem that the press interview broadcasts, the conversational self-portraits and the debates, singly, but more important, in combination, provided significant advances in the use of television in campaign politics. In 1960, to a greater extent than in any other campaign in American history, the broadcast media afforded the voter the opportunity -- only partially realized, but still the opportunity -- to know the men and the issues at first hand.

But, indeed, it was only a beginning. Much is left to be done. Section 315 must be repealed -- so that these new techniques can be continued, improved and applied, to all levels of elective offices. And broadcasters themselves must sharpen their techniques -- experiment with more direct debates, with less confining formats, and with other kinds of program types.

And too, as we feel surer of our ground, as we mature, we in broadcasting must insist on high standards in politics, just as we must in all other kinds of programming. We must devise fair but clear rules to prevent -- or force disclosure of -- rehearsed political interviews and actors who play the part of men-in-the-street questioners -- steps which CBS News has already taken. We must guard against the practice of political parties buying time simultaneously on all networks, thus depriving the public of all choice -- another step CBS News has taken. We must use all our persuasive powers to avoid the curtailment of debates during the last two weeks before Election Day -- as happened in 1960 at the insistence of one of the candidates, who wanted to control his appearances by his own design during the crucial two weeks before November 8. We must consider imposing our own limits on time which may be purchased in the final days of the campaign, so as to avoid the dangers of last minute, one-sided saturation, when it is too late to answer arguments and charges.

We broadcasters must, above all, conscientiously, and with scrupulous fairness, sharpen the tools so as to quicken the democratic processes -- using as our single touchstone not what candidate or what party the new techniques may help or hinder, but rather whether the public will be better informed and better able to make that most vital of all public decisions: the choice of its leaders.

Partly because of Section 315, television has barely begun to play the full and responsible roles, of which it is capable, in the complicated and critical process of selecting and electing political candidates. It has the duty, and surely it has earned the right to go forward, free of Section 315, to fulfill its enormous potential as an instrument of democracy in the vital business of politics.

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FREUD AS A POLITICAL THINKER

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Mr. Chairman, fellow panelists, ladies and gentlemen:

I appreciate your invitation to speak at this meeting. My work in preparing this paper led me to realize the intriguing complexities of Freud's political thought. We are all familiar with presentations of Freud in political theory which dutifully group him with Sorel and Graham Wallas as discoverers of the non-rational factors that affect politics; and we also know those presentations which summarize his social theory, his views on the origin and nature of society and culture, and then derive a view of politics as a special case of those general propositions. I believe that another approach may yield a more exact and a more comprehensive account of Freud's political thought.

I take "political" to mean that which relates to the nature and function of the state and of government. Of all that social scientists can learn from Freud, among their most important gains may be the awareness that the following of small clues can at last bring an elusive quarry within sight. David Riesman has indicated, in his essays on Freud, what can be found out by attention to slight bits of evidence, and there he did touch on political concerns. (1) I decided to try a more extensive investigation; I have gone through Freud's published writings, the several hundred letters now in print, and Jones's biography collecting references to politics regardless of their extent or intended importance.

I will say at once that the results were extremely disappointing. The references seemed to be far fewer, and much more trivial, than I had hoped. Perhaps one might make some use of Freud's attaining the title of Professor as a sign of his attitude toward government. What he wanted was what we call a clinical professorship, valuable in his earlier years because patients would see it as an endorsement by all-knowing authorities. For a long time anti-Semitic pressures denied him this rank, to which his pre-analytic and quite orthodox scientific accomplishments entitled him. He sought and received the support of leading figures at the University of Vienna, and he tried to affect the Minister of Education, whose approval was necessary. He consoled himself by reflecting that after all it was only a title, but the matter recurs insistently in his dreams. In 1902 an enthusiastic patient finally made a deal with the Minister and Freud received the title, in return for a painting the Minister would place in a state gallery. (2)

Such proceedings very likely heightened a distaste for Austria, the Austrians, and the Viennese which Freud often expressed. Yet he did not leave Vienna until the Nazi occupation, and again and again throughout his life he directly rejected proposals that he migrate, or he simply

allowed them to lapse. (3)

My examination of Freud for political evidence further yielded the following: He put in his required military service, later saw his sons go to fight for Austria, paid his income tax, and read the newspapers. At times he voted, usually Liberal with a capital L; he rejoiced at a temporary setback for the anti-Semitic Karl Lueger, who did finally become Mayor of Vienna in the late 1890's. (4)

He lectured to a seminar in jurisprudence about the use of association tests in establishing legal evidence. He prepared a small number of memoranda for use in court cases, and he wrote a statement at the government's request about the treatment of war neuroses. In the early 1930's he took part in an exchange with Einstein, under the auspices of an organ of the League of Nations, arranged to spread his views on the question "Why War?" (5)

Other bits of evidence also relate to this matter of speaking out, and of advocating specific changes. As a physician who treated serious illnesses, he was accordingly expected to know what caused them, and also was held to know what would prevent them. He was often asked for recommendations--on parental attitudes toward childhood masturbation, for instance, and on other problems, such as the sexual enlightenment of children, which would concern those in charge of schools. There certainly seems to have been considerable difficulty or resistance on his part to making such statements, and they often emerged garlanded with cautions, but they did emerge onto the public scene, and sometimes without very much protective hedging.(6)

We may feel, and Freud may want us to feel, that in these instances he is merely a physician doing his professional job, but I would recall here the passages in which Freud expresses distaste for being a physician, the assertions that he became a therapist against his will and had never properly been a doctor, and I wonder whether he is simply meeting the requirements of his profession. (7) Perhaps there are overtones of the reformer, the lawgiver, the politician in an exalted and cleaned-up sense.

Many of the political references which I have collected belong to the content of Freud's dreams, to his associations to those dreams in interpretations which he makes, and to jokes or slips which he analyzes. On this internal stage, where Freud can enact the kind of drama he wishes to have performed, he often plays a political part. (8) In one dream his dead father is said to resemble Garibaldi; the dream, however, is classed among absurd dreams, and Freud explains that absurdity affords a way of representing criticism or ridicule in a dream. In a further association Freud thinks of one of his sons whom he had determined to name Oliver, after Cromwell, one of the central heroes in his pantheon, and he comments that he was gratifying a suppressed megalomania which he could not live out in reality, gaining a substitute satisfaction as, he remarks, fathers often do with their children. (9) I would guess that this arrangement of three generations may mean: my father was no Garibaldi (because the dream was hostile); his hopes of political glory fall to me, just as my phantasms of being a Cromwell cannot be realized but can only be passed on to my son. Elsewhere Freud clearly recalled his father's hopes that he, Sigmund, would have a political career, in the glorious dawn allegedly signalled by the Bürger or middle-class ministry which held office at the end of the 1860's and did include Jews. (10)

The figure of Joseph often appears in Freud's dreams and dream analyses. Freud very carefully points out the naturalness of such appearances: Joseph was a great interpreter of dreams. Nothing is ever said directly in those analyses, however, about Joseph's other side, his political activity as a government adviser. I certainly wonder about this fragmenting of a personality who seems to have had considerable importance for Freud, particularly

as I note that Freud later in life described Napoleon as a figure who lived out a version of the Joseph legend. (11) Was Freud allowing Napoleon, the Napoleon of his inner life, to achieve what he could not externally realize, or allow himself to seek openly?

Freud's treatment of Moses also raises questions. He pointedly discusses Moses as a law-giver and a liberator, a monumental religious and political leader. It is well known, however, that Freud went to great lengths to alter the traditional picture of Moses, changing him from a Jew into an Egyptian. (12) Were some underground processes active which affected Freud's estimate of the meaning of political leadership, and thus drove him to transform the accepted Moses?

As I looked over the data which I have just summarized for you, I could not maintain that the experiment had worked out very well. My effort to detect Freud's political thought by examining his explicitly political references, however slight and incidental, had produced an uncompromising catalogue and a few questions. I began to think that I would have to rehash the familiar accounts which connect Freud's exploration of the unconscious with political processes, and to repeat the leading features of his social theory, deriving one or two political applications from them. It seemed to me, nevertheless, that there would be small point in a paper of this sort, because you can always read one or two of Freud's works on social theory--most of them are quite short, perhaps significantly so--and there are, in addition, various expository manuals which are helpful in threading your way through the Freudian labyrinth.

I began to ask myself whether Freud's political thought might not be far better concealed than I had earlier hypothesized. It might be buried within the entire context of his work, and so it might be discoverable by looking at signs other than those I had first examined, the obvious political references. In studying any written work to detect the presence of a theme, literary critics are accustomed to hunt out frequently used terms as well as images that occur at crucial points in the development of a work. I was impressed by the high frequency with which Freud uses certain terms: liberate, compromise, suppression, repression, censorship, defense. These terms all point to aspects of political behavior, although the political connotation obviously does not exhaust their significance. Many of the terms which Freud uses most often are clearly devoid of any usual political meaning: unconscious, sexuality, dream, ego, and so on. (13)

I do think, however, that the presence of frequently used terms which do suggest political processes means that Freud's political thinking very likely is embedded deep down and throughout his entire work. One may vary the familiar remark that the best way to hide something is to put it out in the open by saying that you can hide it even better by breaking it up and homogenizing it so that it really gets hidden, far inside other objects. You know it's there, you have the satisfaction of knowing it's there, but others will not know of its existence until what you have pulverized and concealed somehow produces an <u>effect</u>. You will then have triumphed, perhaps over powerful authorities who would allow you no direct satisfaction of your most cherished aims.

In my speculation I drew at this point on the hypothesis of David Bakan, who has argued that Freud indeed sought to liberate mankind, which surely looks like a political aim. I want to make clear that I am not endorsing Bakan's complex hypothesis; I am only using part of it as a hypothesis: the view that the role Freud wanted to play and did play was that of a liberator. Bakan's entire case deserves careful consideration, of which thus far it has received very little. (14)

I then built the following theory. Freud's political thought is identical with the totality of his work; Freud's political thought is his work; the object of both is liberation. Then why did Freud not become a politician? Having been born in 1856, he was an adolescent during a time of high hopes for intelligent Jewish boys; he was not driven into psychology by the closing of political opportunities in the 1880's and 1890's to which Carl Schorske has attributed the interest in the psyche strong in figures like Hofmannsthal and Schnitzler. (15) My guess is that Freud's father, a man of little formal education but probably cultivated in traditional Jewish learning, a man of modest economic stature, treasured great hopes for his son as a lawyer or statesman. It may very well have happened that Jacob Freud recognized that the son whom he so much prized could not take up the Law, with a capital L, of his ancestors, and that he then consoled himself by hoping and urging that Sigmund would follow a life devoted to a secularized concern with law, entering and achieving in the world of public affairs.

I do not think that the problem of Freud's choice of medicine as a vocation has yet been satisfactorily solved. I have already mentioned that Freud was accustomed to speak of his work as a physician in a striking way: he had not wanted to become a physician; and occasionally he remarks that his scientific and therapeutic work was a detour, a regrettably roundabout way to that satisfying concern with the great questions--the nature of civilization and society--which in his youth he had imagined he would spend his life investigating. His account of deciding to study medicine so that, as a research scientist, he could probe the mysteries of nature about which he had heard in a rhapsodic public lecture seems entirely too superficial, too much like what he would consider a memory screening something else, particularly because for a considerable period before the decision in favor of medicine he had been set on studying law. (16)

Why did Freud not live out directly his father's hopes, why did he refuse to realize in the external world that paternal suppressed megalomania we have already seen him connecting to political figures, Garibaldi and Cromwell, in a dream about his father? Freud's favorite childhood models seem to have been vastly heroic, men such as Hannibal and the Napoleonic marshal Massena. Freud's father, by contrast, presents a far different spectacle, a sort of unaggressive type once likened to Mr. Micawber, usually hopefully expecting something to turn up. (17) Freud remembered in great detail a story told him as a child when he was taking a walk with his father. In a provincial town his father had reacted to an anti-Semite's knocking off a new cap by meekly picking it up and going on his way. "This struck me as unheroic conduct on the part of the big, strong man who was holding the little boy by the hand. I contrasted this situation with another which fitted my feelings better: the scene in which Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear before the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Ever since that time Hannibal had had a place in my phantasies." (18)

I suggest that Freud could not, as an adolescent, grant his father what that father, so pitiful and deplorable in important senses for the son, very much wanted. He could not become a lawyer or a statesman, he could not build a political career. Yet the hopes of fathers figure importantly in the lives of sons, as Freud has so well taught us, and they cannot be discarded by an assertion of the son's rebellious will. Modified and disguised, they will deeply affect him. Perhaps Freud's decision to prepare

for a life of biological investigation did stem from a desire to study law--the law of nature. Darwin, a man of the most titanic accomplishment, had shown the way, and his example must have glowed with the most compelling attractiveness in the 1870's. Later in life Freud likened the effect of psychoanalysis to the impact of Darwin. This is a valid analogy, but also one which hints at the realization of a long cherished fantasy. (19)

Certainly Freud's psychoanalytic work has many points of relation to the idea of law. He was seeking the laws of mental life and denying capriciousness, for what else is determinism but the statement that everything which occurs is subject to formulated, or formulable, principles? The arbitrary and the irrational must yield before the onslaught of a man dedicated to the imposition of order.

That order, in turn, held the promise of freedom, because through understanding Freud could help his patients. They might cease being enslaved to cruelly exacting masters. What man who had wished to affect the lives of others could have dreamed of greater fulfillment than being able to restore to men their own lives? (20)

I have been hypothesizing that Freud did devote himself to law, to a version of political concern which satisfied him. Now I want to suggest a mechanism which may have propelled him along this course. Freud called attention to a tendency in patients--something also present generally in mankind--to indulge in what he named "acting out;" instead of merely recollecting memories and thoughts from the past during analytic therapy, these individuals actually lived them out. (21)

I believe that all of Freud's adult life involved an acting out of youthful fantasies which certainly were political. Freud's behavior, his thought and action, gave satisfaction to these fantasies in ways that were sometimes more concealed, and sometimes less, but always satisfaction which his entire being demanded. These fantasies fall into two main classes: first, the more usual political career prominent in the expressed hopes of Freud's father, the vision of success as a Cabinet minister, perhaps as an accomplished political intriguer and compromiser; and, second, pictures with a far more dramatic, more upsetting and revolutionary content, pictures of revenge on oppressors, representations of a new age in which men would truly be liberated, freed by a great hero from the strangling laws and covenants in which they had been ensnared.

I believe that this hypothesis not only helps to clarify Freud's choice of a profession, and the great significance both of law and of freedom in psychoanalysis, but it may also help to solve other difficulties encountered in the study of Freud as a political thinker. I am not convinced that what is sometimes called Freud's victorianism has been correctly interpreted. I believe that one may view his concern for the correctness of his manners and of his outward appearance as an expression of the first class of fantasies, the desire to win acceptance in a high and very visible public office. The two classes of fantasies came into conflict when he faced the problem of voicing rather un-Victorian ideas about manifestations of sexuality, and that conflict is evident in his hesitation and reluctance to speak out. He did not keep silent, however. Furthermore, he held that certain special and individualized circumstances might justify non-marital intercourse, and here, I believe, the second class of his fantasies, the more reformist and revolutionary, betray their activity. (22)

The hypothesis which I have been advancing can explain much of Freud's involvement in what strongly resembles true political activity--the psychoanalytic movement, particularly its embodiment in the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society and the International Psycho-Analytical Association. These

groups had regular meetings and congresses, official publications, struggles for leadership, and problems of finance and the handling of dissidents. Only a fragment of the material that has survived has yet been made public. There are suggestive signs of Freud's devotion to legal forms and appearances, a devotion frequently matched by an impatience with technicalities and a desire to get things done simply, directly, forcefully, and forcibly. I suspect that Freud's attitude toward criticism--a lofty aloofness combined with an implacably retentive memory--may grow out of his early political fantasies, on the one hand the desire of the good, law-abiding liberal to observe parliamentary forms and give everyone his due hearing, on the other a disgust with most men's opinions and a drive to push through an end to debating. I would not be surprised if Freud's relations with his pupils and associates were conditioned to an extent by his youthful desires for political success that was both legal and more than legal. He dwells on his tough ability to withstand isolation, but he also describes with obvious satisfaction the coming of disciples and the building of a movement. We may uncover one root of his behavior in the truism that a really political man needs a polis, he needs other people. (23)

Finally, I believe that Freud refused to leave Vienna because he could not allow himself the risk of forgetting the mission to which he had been called. He was bright, and his English was good; he could have won material success in England, a country he much admired; but who needed liberation there? (24) His father had hoped for his son's achievement in Austria, and Austria was a tormented land of suppressions and repressions.

Freud wanted to liberate. All of his work--investigative, therapeutic, speculative--may fruitfully be considered as based in this ambition. It is perhaps more dramatic to portray Freud as embittered and despairing, a pessimist consigning all of humanity to blind self-defeat. Yet such a picture must omit real acknowledgement of Freud's political nature, of his desire to understand and, having understood, to help men move toward increased freedom.

Notes

These notes are not intended to be exhaustive.
The following abbreviations are used:

SE: The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London, 1953--
CP: Freud, Collected Papers, 5 vols., various trs. London, 1924-50.
L: Letters of Sigmund Freud 1873-1939, tr. T. and J. Stern. London, 1961.
O: Freud, The Origins of Psycho-Analysis. Letters to Wilhelm Fliess..., tr. E. Mosbacher and J. Strachey. New York, 1954.
Jones: Ernest Jones, M.D., The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, 3 vols. New York, 1953-7.

(1) Riesman's valuable essays are in his Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), 310-387.
(2) O, 190, 191, 193, 200, 210, 245, 292, 300, 341-4; SE, 4:136-142, 168, 192-3, 271; 5:560; 6:108; 7:87, 122; 8:39; 11:146; L, 251-3; Jones, 1:340-1.
(3) On emigrating: Jones, 1:178, 293; 3:5, 175, 177-8, 218, 220. On Austria: O, 308; SE, 13:242, 14:27, 39-40, 18:149, 20:235; L, 415, 418-9; Jones, 3:230. Related topics of interest include Freud's feelings about the Germans and about being German: L, 216; SE, 4:195-6, 323, 18:247, 20:49, 72-3; his attitudes toward France, L, 185-6, 199; O, 112, 245; CP, 1:9, 12, 15; SE, 4:166; his views of the U.S., SE, 4:270, n. 2, 14:31, 17:165, 18:95, 20:52, 21:19, 49, L, 401; and estimates of old and new Russia, O, 263; SE, 5:529, 21:112-115; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, tr. W.J.H. Sprott (London, reprinted 1949), 226-32.
(4) War and military service, O, 293, n. 1; L, 231-3; SE, 5:559, 6:33-4, 13:241, 14:275ff., 17:207-215; Jones, vol. 2, generally, and 3:21-4; tax, Jones, 2:390; political activity, Jones, 1:5, 2:391; O, 124, 133; SE, 4:166; newspapers, SE, 2:65, 297; 4:168, n. 2.
(5) "Why War?", CP, 5:273-287, L, 410-11; law, SE, 2:65, 4:152, 155-6, 275, 6:101, 147-8, 254, n. 1, 9:102ff., 10:233, n. 1, 20:180ff., 21:95-6, 251-3; Jones, 3:88.
(6) L, 384; CP, 1:239; A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, tr. J. Riviere (reprinted, Garden City, 1943), 376-7 (the start of Lecture 27); SE, 9:132, 138, 204, 10:146-7, 11:149-50, 187, 12:250, 13:189-90.
(7) O, 162; SE, 2:160, 13:242, 20:72, 253-4.
(8) SE, 4:191, 208-9, 5:424, 432, 6:59, 72-5, 8:20, 22, 27, 68-9.
(9) SE, 4:427-9, 447-8; Jones, 1:24, 152, 179, 317.
(10) SE, 4:193.
(11) L, 428-30; Jones, 3:190-1; SE, 5:484, n. 2, 11:33.
(12) SE, 13:211ff.; Moses and Monotheism, tr. K. Jones (London, reprinted 1951), 11, 31, and generally.
(13) Censorship, O, 240; SE, 2:269, 282; 4:142; compromise, SE, 5:677, 9:52, 58-9; liberating, SE, 8:134, 9:90, 237; CP, 5:316.
(14) Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition (Princeton, 1958), 128-30, 136-8, 297.
(15) Carl E. Schorske, "Politics and the Psyche in fin de siècle Vienna: Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal," The American Historical Review, LXVI (1961), 930-946.
(16) L, 378-80; SE, 4: 299, 8:82, 20:8, 253-4.
(17) Jones, 1:2; SE, 4:217, n. 1; CP, 5:311-12.

(18) SE, 4:197.
(19) SE, 17:140; Gen. Introduction, 252 (end of Lecture 18).
(20) Freud twice said that there were three impossible professions: educating, healing, and governing, and that he had nevertheless become occupied with the second and interested in the first. We certainly may wonder about the third. SE 19:273; CP, 5:352.
(21) SE, 12:150-1.
(22) SE, 7:191, 8:109-10, 9:197, 10:263, 292, 296, 11:223-4, 12:160, 163-4, 169.
(23) Jones generally, and 2:411, 3:30-2, for examples; SE, 4:146, 11:226-7, 14:7 (as early as 1914 Freud was writing a history of the movement), 17:48, 18:267, 20:9, 53, 209-210, 274; L, 279, 359.
(24) Jones, 1:178, 293.

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The diffusion of political ideas and structures in the Soviet orbit

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The reception, in eastern Europe and certain areas of Asia, of political ideas and structures of Soviet origin and inspiration, is in itself not surprising. It was the almost unavoidable result of the international situation created in these areas at the end of the second world war. Certain peculiarities of the way in which the reception -- or imposition -- was effected make the story a rather poignant one. However, the student of comparative politics cannot overlook the general aspects of the problem before he proceeds to analyze the specific and peculiar circumstances. Thus we must allow for two general and related phenomena : (1) defeat in a major war usually results in the remaking of the institutions of the defeated countries inspired by the victors ; (2) there is a tendency toward what might be called anticipatory adaptation on the part of small and weak countries to the patterns of political institutions of successful major Powers.

The area under discussion, and in particular Eastern Europe, may be said to have lost the war. Should one insist that unlike, say, Rumania or Hungary, defeated ex- satellites of Germany, countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia were allies of the victorious coalition, our discussion might develop into a veritable lawyer's delight remarkably devoid of meaning to the political scientist. What are the consequences of listing the area among the losers of the war ? Victorious major Powers usually flatter themselves that the know what was wrong with the institutions of the defeated; they have no doubt about their own mandate to remake those institutions so as to produce blessed results for everyone (but primarily to the presumed interests of the victors.) The belief that war is an occasion for improving the world rather than a tragic mishap from which the world will necessarily emerge a differe t but hardly a better place, is held with particular tenacity by systems of government lacking the modesty or sophistication to allow for the limitations of human institutions, and especially by systems which look upon themselves as a product of particularly felicitous divine inspiration or else believe themselves to be directly the same way as History. An example known to all of us is the so- called amendment of the Japanese Meiji constitution after World War II under the auspices of the military occupant . Ostensibly the change was an expression of the enlightened choice of the country's law- making body. No significant use of force was necessary, though a directive of the occupying Power gave advance blessing to the use of it against those obstructing change; mere pressure -- though hardly subtle pressure -- sufficed. The main element in the situation was the view of the Japanese legislators that, to use a colloquial expression, they were licked. No such clear-cut insight into the facts of international life was present in the minds of some non- communist leaders in eastern Europe, and possibly even some communist leaders. The ambiguities of arrangements like Yalta, the intrusion of time- honored notions like that of national sovereignty, and the insistence of the major occupant that he was actually a liberator, tended to obscure the picture and raise, in some quarters, embarrasingly primitive expectations.

The study of the radiation of Soviet influence in the orbit of Russian power is complicated because the relationship between the USSR and the countries under its influence does not easily fit into tra itional categories. It is not as, say, in the case of the British empire and commonwealth, the case of physical migra-

tion to distant lands of people who considered themselves Englishmen and transplanted institutions and ideas of the Mother Country; nor is it , on the other hand, an avowed colonial relationship. The phraseology of fraternal sodruzhestvo covers the reality of a cliental situation with a layer of pretentious hypocrisy thicker than that provided by the humanitarian and civilizational claims of past western colonizers. No one is more palpably aware of the realities of power than the communist leaders, whose source of inspiration, V.I. Lenin, has reduced the definition of politics to the briefest possible phrase: kto- kogo (literally: who whom, meaning : who wields power over whom.) Yet this realization coexists in their terminology with an imagery of a solidaristic , even brotherly association of a " higher type", unknown to past human history. At the XXI Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev repeatedly insisted that the Soviet Union " does not lead or direct" the other socialist countries. " Thanks to its rich experience it merely sets an example." To quote further from Mr. Khrushchev : "Everyone knows — a familiar prefatory remark usually covering a blatant lie — everyone knows that the Soviet Union's role consists not in controlling other countries, but in its having pioneered the way to socialism for all mankind." Hence it is not power, but " confidence and prestige" that account for the special position of the USSR in the " commonwealth of socialist nations." Yet the Soviet leaders, like all major carriers of international burdens, display a characteristic ambivalence about the nature of the relationship to their clienti. It is up to the leader blushingly to disclaim a desire to lead, but the junior members of the association should insist that the claim is more than fully deserved. The amount of space given in Soviet publications to sycophantic statements by foreign communist leaders shows now pleasing these songs of praise are. Another manifestation of the "leaders' ambivalence" is the necessity to remind all and sundry that while everyone is equal in the socialist camp, the Soviet Union is ahead of everyone else, a primus inter not so pares. For quite a while Soviet leaders and Soviet scholars insisted that the so-called People's Democracies were not a type of regime different in essence from that of the Soviet Union, that they were a variant of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But now that the satellite leaders have painted themselves into a corner by identifying themselves as carriers of a proletarian dictatorship, sometime at the price of sacrificing a claim to broader nationwide leadership, the CPSU blandly proclaims that for the Soviet Union the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was no longer necessary and the regime can now claim to be " an organ expressing the will and interests of the entire people." While repeating Khrushchev's assurance that all the members of the socialist family will enter communism " more or less" simultaneously, Soviet sources make it clear that this would come about only if they will continue to follow the leadership of the USSR and permit it to exercise the coordinating functions, usually called socialist division of labor. As suggested above, this ambivalence is not uniquely communist and may be found in the attitudes of other major "ordinators." It seems to me that its cause lies in a not quite rational fear of being outdistanced by the lesser members of the association, a fear akin to the apprehensions of a father watching his growing offspring. Professor Brzezinski more charitably suggests that the drive to assert the primacy of the Soviet Union is dictated not only by considerations of tangible and intangible advantages to the latter, but also because, as he puts it, " in Soviet eyes there is no other alternative ... without such Soviet primacy, the (socialist) camp would easily become disorganized..."

The second general point suggested above is that small and weak countries, not formally in the category of defeated enemies, yet in one way or another dependent on

major victors of major wars (who either sponsor their newly won independence or contribute to their liberation or endorse their enhanced frontiers or, simply, save them from starvation), usually of their own accord seek inspiration for their constitutional structure in models provided by the victors. The difficulty some of us have in adapting this self-evident proposition to the case of reception of Soviet institutions in eastern Europe, stems from the traditional view of what was the "proper" direction of the flow of political ideas. It seemed to many that the movement of ideas from east to west, though reverently recognized as a fact of past history, had irreversibly come to an end in modern times. In view of the acknowledged cultural preponderance of the West, the location of places of higher learning where the leaders of new countries would more often than not receive their schooling in political ideas, and - last but not least - the undisputed international position of western Powers, the nineteenth century was replete with examples of the transfer, at times with limited regard for the realities of the local scene, of western inspired political forms and labels. (Even in areas under Russian influence, as, for instance the Kingdom of Poland after 1815 or Bulgaria after 1878, the constitutional forms introduced were of western style, rather than in imitation of the Russian regime. It has been suggested that when Stalin sponsored after World War II the regimes of People's Democracy in eastern Europe, he was reverting to the historical position of Alexander I as absolute tsar of Russia and constitutional monarch of Poland. If he was thus paying temporary tribute to the predominantly western traditions of the area, he certainly shifted soon thereafter to an attitude reflecting a greater realization of the undisputed position of the Soviet Union in postwar eastern Europe.)

To what extent the international position of a major victor influences the processes of shaping political institutions of small beneficiaries may be seen from acknowledgments to sources of inspiration in successive constitutional documents produced in Czechoslovakia. The Declaration of Independence issued by the provisional government of Czechoslovakia in Paris, on October 18, 1918, stated, in part:

> "We accept the American principles as laid down by President Wilson; the principles of liberated mankind - of the actual equality of nations and of governments deriving all their just power from the consent of the governed. We /.. cannot but accept these principles expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, the principles of Lincoln, and of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen ....."

That the actual provisions of the Czechoslovak constitution of the interwar period owed their inspiration also to the constitution of Old Austria was obviously nothing to mention in a particularly solemn way, if only because old Austria was a defeated and in fact a defunct country. Nor was it necessary to prattle in preambles about the Russian revolution of 1917 and its radicalizing impact, which resulted in the preventive inclusion of various social and economic provisions next to the traditional Bill of Rights in a number of post War War I constitutions. The Czechs knew who had won the war. But the Czechs always know, or believe they know, these things. If by some mishap all other documentation were to disappear, a future historian might still be able to reconstruct the fortunes of war and resulting influences in eastern Europe from a chronological arrangement of preambles and allied statements of successive Czechoslovak constitutional documents. If the passage cited above is a bow to the post World War I position of the United States and France, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945 (actually worked out in Moscow) reflects the ambiguities of Yalta and the wishful in-betweeness of Czechoslovakia prior to February 1948 by simultaneous bows towards east and west, although there is emphasis on the glorious part of the Red Army in the liberation of Czechoslovakia. In the constitution of 1948 vintage the introductory manifesto significantly points out that the Czechs and Slovaks received even their Christianity from the east (~~a claim based on a not too relevent technicality~~), ascribes the rebirth of statehood in 1918 to the inspiration of the Great October Revolution, makes vague reference to assistance received from unnamed allies but mentions by name only "the great Slav state". the USSR. A much more unequivocal description of the relationship is to be found in the preamble of the constitution of what is, since July 11, 1960, officially called the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR). Not only is the Bolshevik revolution referred to as the main source of inspiration, but there is also a pledge that the nation will continue along the path of communism "hand in hand with our great ally, the fraternal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the other friendly countries of the world socialist system of which our republic is a firm part." Thus the current international alignment of Czechoslovakia, which in the traditional framework of sovereignty is a matter of changing policies, becomes a constitutionally entrenched constant. A point stressed with pride by Czech spokesmen is that their country is the first one to follow the Soviet Union in identifying the state as socialist in its very name, thus making it only one letter removed from the source of inspiration. Elements of built-in "proletarian internationalism" are featured also in another orbit constitution of the same vintage, that of the Mongolian People"s Republic, also of July, 1960.

~~We should turn now from what, with some digressions, has been a discussion of the two generally observable phenomena:~~

Let us move now from the generally observable phenomena, the constitution-shaping by victors and the propensity of client states to imitate the institutions of major Powers, to some propositions rooted more specifically in the theory and practice of communism and of the Soviet leaders in particular. Of basic significance in this connection is the limited value of formal documents and of formal institutions of government in the thinking of the Russian leaders. This is not the time for a discussion of the extent to which this view is rooted in the hisorically Russian "a rather limited respect for legal institutions," in original Marxist views, or in their distillation through Lenin's mind. It is a fact that the Bolsheviks looked upon institutions of formal government as obe of several channels or transmission belts of the will of the party acting in its capacity as plenipotentiary general of the titular sovereign, the proletariat in power. Early Soviet constitution - making with its hasty and sloppy drafting technique already demonstrated the party's contempt for legal forms or, at the very least, the notion that they were of secondary importance as against the crucial matter of "kto-kogo", who wields power over whom. On the theoretical and pseudo - philosophical level there is in communist literature an obsessive insistence on the seondariness of form as against essence (sushchestvo). We must here resist the temptation to speculate on why this rather obvious fact of political life is repeated with such dull persistence; let us merely throw out the suggestion that it may be a case of protracted bombardment of the incorrigibly idealistic tissue of Russian thought with the rays of expediential common sense. However, the operational consequences of this theoretical point are relevant to our discussion. Any institutional arrangments required by the specific internal or international situation are permitted, as long as they do not affect, or can be later said not to hve affected, the essence, the sushchestvo, of the location of power. Thus, if unfinished business with the West called for the toleration of the monarchy in Russia in the immediate post World War II period, it was consistent with good Marxism-Leninism to tolerate it, as long as it was abolished when it was no longer useful or necessary. This flexible nature of initial arrangements in eastern Europe had its roots in the experiences of the Soviet state. The most obvious example of a lasting ostensible arrangement which does not affect the essence of power is the quasi federal structure of the Soviet Union, whose component republics enjoy the right even to secede. A more directly relevant example is the case of the so-called Far Eastern Republic (DVR). This Buffer state was set up on explicit orders from Moscow as an obtensibly indpenedent unit, with a constitutional order ostensibly different from that of Soviet Russia, and without a single party system. Official Soviet sources make no secret of the fact that the arrangement had its roots in considerations of an international nature, specifically to avoid a military clash with Japanese interventionist troops. The same sources, though silent on the constitution-making role of two naturalized Americans (who wrote the document in English), still stress the difficulties encountered by the party in its struggle against two classical extremes: the dogmatists who saw no reason why

the Soviet syste, which is good by definition, should not be introduced immediately, and the right- wing deviationists who thought of keeping the system tried in the Far Eastern Republic, of keeping it, as Lenin sneeringly said, vserioz i na dolga, seriously and lastingly. Thus what was meant to be a tactically determined short- range buffer setup was, rather un- Leninistically, viewed as a samotsel! an aim in itself. The problem of the two extremes, the dogmatists and the revisionists, has also plagued the relations between the Soviet Union and the eastern European communists. It was Stalin who criticized the Yugoslav communists for proclaiming themselves during the war a Soviet republic in a fit of absent-minded zeal; he also later quarreled with Tito for taking too seriously the slogan of separate ways to socialism. And so the pattern continues: it is a sin to overlook or disregard historial peculiarities and concrete conditions of a given society, but it is also a sin to keep on insisting on "separate ways" or national differences to the detriment of the unity of the socialist camp vis- a-vis the outside world. How to combine unity and diversity , how to stimulate the pride of lesser associates while keeping it within bounds, is a problem of increasing complexity to the USSR, they try to keep the situation in hand by insisting on general agreement on a set of fundamentals, basic laws (zakonomernosti) to which all good members of the socialist camp must subscribe. They suffer from what might be called survivals of the Komintern mentality, which reflected a situation of utter dependence of often hunted and outlawed foreign communist parties on moral and financial support from Moscow. The temptation to apply the pattern of democratic centralism to a group of nominally sovereign states is great, but as Mr. Khrushchev has found out the situation is infinitely more complicated: even puppets, once wound up, acquire a life of their own. Currently the main Soviet effort seems to be in the dirrection of bolstering the unity of the camp by involving the countries of the area in a coordinated economic endeavor, with deep and possibly irreversible consequences.

Within the framework of agreement on the common zakonomernosti and identification with the goal of going toward communism, there is still within the orbit enough room for institutional diversity. The origin of this diversity, as has been pointed out, lies in advice from the Kremlin, given during the second world war and in the early postwar period. Some more recent manifestations of this diversity, although superficially traceable to domestic considerations, can on more careful analysis be meaningfully connected with the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (more accurately, the meaning given to those decisions by the leaders of individual communist- lead countries) The institutional diversity in part reflects the degree of transformation of the socio- economic structure of individual countries. On the scale of communist values, a country like Poland, with a very low level of collectivization of agriculture, is presumably "backward" by comparison with Outer Mongolia whose leader can already claim that socialism has triumphed in his corner of the commonwealth. This "backwardness" is reflected in a less clear political structure, including a multi- party system and a legislative assembly, the Sejm, which somehow shows more real life than similar institutions elsewhere in the orbit. Yet it would be a mistake to make too much of the domestic sources of this diversity. The postulate of infusing life into the ostensible legislatures has been voiced in the last few years quite often in Soviet literature. It is possible that we have here a case of reversal of direction of the flow of ideas. It is obviously primitive to claim that there is no genuine exchange of ideas and mutuality in studying the experience of one country or another within the orbit. Unfortunately we know too little about channels of communication to form a clear picture. On the other hand, the pre- eminence of

Moscow continues to be a visible and tangible reality. The Poles may continue to boast of the reality of the life of their legislature and publish statistics showing at least quantitatively impressive results (e.g. a total of 44 plenary meetings in six terms, 931 committee meetings, 131 statutes passed and, more significantly, not one instance of the government making use of its power to legislate by decree), but they must also insist that the existence of several ostensibly different political parties does not mean that there is a traditional pattern of parliamentary coalition. There is, of course some difference between the current insistence that a multi- party system is not un- Marxist-Leninist as long as the essence of power is unaffected, and the apologetic assertions made by Polish leaders in the "Stalinist " period, 1949- 53, when the surviving non- communist partiss were referred to by Hilary Minc as " tail formations " destined to disappear and yield to conformity to the Soviet pattern. Some Polish authors even discovered that Lenin, before and after the seizure of power, admitted the possibility of the existence of more than one party (cf. Mark Waldenberg, " Z zagadnien leninowskiej idei dyktatury proletariatu", in Panstwo i Prawo, XV, 4 - 5, April- May 1960. ≠ Also, Sylwester Zawadzki, "Lenin a idea demokracji", Nowe Drogi , Warsaw, March 1960.) But again , on close scrutiny it will be found that similar suggestions were made earlier in Soviet sources.

Some of the newest constitutional documents of the orbit, especially that of Czechoslovakia and the Mongolian People's Republic, incorporate the postulates made de lege ferenda by Soviet leaders and scholars rather than features of the current Stalin constitution about to be scrapped as obsolete. The Czech constitution retains the one-man presidency of the republic, in ostensible deference to the historical prestige of the institution established by the no longer mentioned Thomas Masaryk; but Czech commentators significantly point to the example of the Chinese People's Republic and Mao Tse- tung's position as "chairman." Similar provisions may be found in the constitution of the People's Republic of Vietnam. On the other hand, the East German regime chucked the one-man presidency as soon as its holder, Wilhelm Pieck, died. Unlike the Czech sources (Professor Jan Gronsky and others) who clearly identify the retention of the presidency as a departure from Stalin's teachings about a collegial presidency as being necessarily a " higher " form, the Germans blandly stated that there was no longer room for such an institution in the DDR.

Another feature of recent constitutional documents in them orbit is the inclusion of statements and provisions of a clearly programmatic nature. This is obviously a posthumous slap in the face administered to Stalin who in his capacity as leading political scientist of the Soviet Union pointed out that a constitution was not supposed to be a program, but merely a reflection and zakreplenie (anchoring) of already achieved realities. But when the new constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic states, in its last article, that it will be abolished "once the need for the existence of the state will disappear and be replaced by a communist association of the toilers", it revives some of the spirit of the early Soviet constitutions which apologetically referred to themselves as temporary documents destined to wither away. Soviet literature, following the inspiration of N.S. Khrushchev , has already advanced the postulate of combining in the future Soviet constitution a summing up of the road traveled with a commitment to communism. The orbit documents merely anticipate what the Russians are about to do. By the same token, the recent documents reflect the Khrushchevian insistence on the gradual transformation of the organs of government into organs of social self- administration (e.g. art. 5 of the Czechoslovak constitution which states that public organizations will gradually take over some duties of the state organs.)

The development of the legal order in orbit countries is clearly echoing the situation in the Soviet Union where, after the burst of insistence on legality and the attempts of jurists to make the legal system more formalized and predictable, the party seems to have put into motion the idea of informal and comradely justice.

To sum up: the institutions of the orbit countries, the ideological arguments accompanying their introduction and abolition, and above all the entire style of public activities are powerfully influenced by the special position of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet leaders could have their way, the administration of the "commonwealth" would present no more problems than their rule over the Soviet Union, in itself a substantial area with much diversity in background and level of development. But the Russians do not quite have the same lattitude within the orbit as they have inside the USSR. They are, in a sense, victims of their success, like parents who become victims of the growth of the family. The reformulations of the nature of relations between socialist states, in the statements issued in 1957 and 1960 by gatherings of the communist parties, was meant to reestablish the authority of the Soviet Union in the orbit, more than slightly shaken by events in several countries which resulted from a too sanguine reading of the implications of Khrushchev's secret speech and of the overt decisions of the Twentieth Congress. In drastic cases, such as that of Hungary, extreme measures will be used if necessary. For less drastic occasions, the cohesion of the socialist camp is to be maintained by renewing periodically the commitment to the goal of building communism, by restressing the claim of the Soviet Union to primacy, and by invoking external danger as an argument for hanging together. The needs of students of comparative government, if not the needs of the peoples of the area, will still be satisfied in a minor way by their ability to dig up in the new Czech constitution a provision not only not copied from Soviet sources but actually not to be found in any other constitution anywhere, namely the duty of the state to care for " the conservation of nature and the preservation of the beauties of the country" (art.15.), a duty at least as noble as that of fraternal cooperation within the world socialist system.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE WEST: 1949-1952

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I. INTRODUCTION

The prevailing interpretation of recent Soviet foreign policy emphasizes Stalin's death as the great watershed event, from which is charted the shift toward a more flexible and differentiated policy, broadly known by the term "peaceful coexistence." While this emphasis properly draws attention to the new departures that characterize the more recent period, and to the dynamic character of Soviet policy, it tends to give insufficient attention to a number of significant changes in the Soviet outlook and in Soviet behavior abroad which began to be manifested before the death of Stalin. The importance of a recognition of these earlier developments is not merely the historical one of correctly dating the beginning of a trend in Soviet policy, but is of greater significance for the contribution it makes to our general understanding of the forces which shape Soviet foreign policy. The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the significant implications of these developments in Soviet policy prior to the XIX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1952.

II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

A detailed account of the changes manifested in Soviet policy toward the West in the period 1949-1952 is contained in a book-length manuscript, on which this discussion is based.* Briefly summarized, this account traces the inter-reacting effect of the increase in Western cohesion and military capabilities, stimulated by the period of militant advance in Soviet policy from 1947 to 1949, associated with the Soviet effort to redefine the outer periphery of its sphere of interest in the molten power situation following the war. After the failure of the Berlin blockade, the last and climactic act of this period of militant Communist probing in Western Europe, Soviet policy evolved through a period of experimentation toward a less overtly bellicose course of action, in an effort to create an atmosphere of relaxation of international tension. This relaxation of tension was intended to check the adverse trend in the world power position of the Soviet Union by removing the stimulus to Western cohesion and mobilization, and by encouraging divergent trends within the Western alliance. During the period of transition, Soviet policy proved ineffective in

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*The Soviet Union and the West, 1949-1952: An Interpretive Essay. Scheduled for spring publication by the Harvard University Press.

preventing the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of a West German government, as well as the signing of the Bonn and Paris Treaties in 1952 which looked toward the inclusion of a West German military contribution to the Western alliance. On the other hand, the prospect of future power gains by the Soviet Union was strengthened in this period by the development of the Soviet atomic weapon; by intensive research and development efforts on jet engine and swept-wing aircraft designs, missiles and thermonuclear warheads; by the growth of neutralism, nationalism and pacifism in the non-Communist world; and by the Communist victory in China. The latter gain, which signified a dynamic phase in the revolutionary movement in Asia at the same time as the European continent appeared to have reached a stage of provisional stabilization, led to a differentiation in Soviet policy: efforts to achieve an atmosphere of <u>détente</u> in Europe were accompanied by a period of continued militancy in Asia. The contradictory force of these policies became evident following the Communist attack in Korea, which further stimulated the mobilization of the Western powers. This reaction in turn stimulated the clear emergence of a strategy of "peaceful coexistence," articulated and sanctioned at the XIX Party Congress in October, 1952. Balancing present disadvantages in its world power position

against anticipated future gains, the XIX Congress stressed the need for a period of consolidation within the Communist orbit, and political maneuver in international politics. To check the further development of the Western alliance, now the prime Soviet requirement, the Soviet Union sought to take into its hands the levers by which it could assist in the fragmentation of that alliance. This meant the use of nationalism, the peace issue, neutralism, trade and other forms of collaboration with elements of the bourgeoisie.

III. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

The analysis summarized above, if it correctly characterizes a significant shift in the Soviet outlook before the death of Stalin, also is suggestive of some general characteristics of Soviet foreign policy.

First, an analysis along these lines tends to emphasize the interpretation of Soviet policy in terms of its largely rational responsiveness to changes in the world environment, particularly to changes in world power relationships. In so doing, it represents a departure from familiar interpretations of Soviet policy which emphasize enigmatic or occult characteristics, or the psychopathology of particular Soviet leaders. Without minimizing the difficulties involved, or the unconventional scholarship required by this subject as compared with the study of diplomatic history where the materials are relatively more open and available, this approach to Soviet ways as explicable human phenomena tends to reveal patterns of behavior which bear some relationship to what we know of human behavior elsewhere in the world.

Second, this analysis suggests that a recurrent pattern of behavior can be discerned in Soviet policy, a pattern of alternation between two marked syndromes of behavior, one essentially militant and direct, the other manipulative.

Although the Communists also recognize the presence of these dual modes of behavior and describe them by the terms "Left" and "Right," these designations have become increasingly inadequate for analytical purposes as the content of each mode has evolved during the four decades of the Soviet experience.

Thus, in the course of responding to a disadvantageous trend in its world power position in the period 1949-1952, the Soviet Union reintroduced tactical and ideological formulations that had been associated with earlier periods in Soviet policy which in the Soviet terminology had been identified as "Right-wing" periods. The first of these periods of "peaceful coexistence" came into being in 1921, in the face of critical domestic and foreign problems, and was guided by Lenin's classic statement of the ideological justification for tactical flexibility: "Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder," written in April 1920. Again, the period from the end of 1933 to the autumn of 1936 was also one in which the emergence of a Right-wing Soviet foreign policy may be observed. The central concern of the Soviet government in this period was with the rise of Nazism as a new form of German militarism. The previous militant policy, which had been in force since 1928, had left the Soviet Union diplomatically isolated and relatively weak before a potential enemy or alliance of enemies. What was necessary as a consequence was a period of intense concentration of resources

on Soviet industrial and military capabilities, meanwhile entering into collaboration with one section of the "imperialist world" against the other.

Again, following the lapse of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Soviet policy turned essentially Right-ward during its wartime collaboration with the Western allies. This period was marked by a muting of the revolutionary and sectarian aspects of the ideology, and by a commitment to the temporary support of the Western "bourgeois" governments, as a necessary requirement of the defense of the Soviet homeland. After the war, when the militant pressures of Soviet policy in the 1946-1949 period had aroused a mobilization of the West, the Soviet leaders sought once again to return to a policy which would at the same time relax the international tension and create opportunities for indirect advances among the divergencies within the Western camp. Thus, in the changes which emerged experimentally during the period 1949-1952, essentially the same circumstances prevailed as during the Right-ward shifts of 1921 and 1935 and to some extent during the wartime collaboration. In each case, an immediately adverse power relationship, combined with the anticipation of a more favorable prospect in the future, evoked a lengthened strategic time perspective, a policy of indirection, of maneuver, of expedient alliances, of manipulation of Western

differences, of "peaceful coexistence."

Despite the similarity of the Communist nomenclature, however, the Right-ward shift of the 1950's was not wholly congruent with that of the earlier periods. One reason was that the earlier Right-wing periods had left a residual effect, not only upon the Communists, but upon the Socialists of Western Europe. In striving for a broad mass base in the period 1950-52, the Communists did not repeat the 1935 effort to come to a formal agreement with the Socialist leaders; this may have reflected partly the unwillingness of the Socialist leaders to repeat the experiment after their previous disillusionment, and partly the Communist desire to avoid the ideological cost of such an agreement. The development of the Peace Movement after 1949 as a nominally detached instrumentality enabled the Party to involve broad elements of the population in selected foreign policy objectives without having to dilute the character and program of the Party itself as much as would otherwise have been required.

Another reason for the evolution of the Right-wing policy was that the strategic situation had also evolved. Although at a temporary relative disadvantage, the Soviet Union had become a leading world power, with world-wide involvements and the prospect of large-scale relative gains in the near future as a result of heavy military-technological investments and as

a result of the disintegration of the Western ties with the under-developed sections of the world. Thus the Right-wing policy of the 1950's was less a retreat than a maneuver combining a short-term defense with a long-term mode of advance. This elongated strategic perspective led inescapably to certain important ideological implications.

IV. IDEOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLICY SHIFT

Perhaps the most difficult ideological consequence of the Right-wing phase of policy for a party which flies the Marxist pennant is the adjustment required in regard to class relations. In a sense, the causal relationship runs in both directions, for a condition precedent to the emergence of a Right-wing policy has invariably been the renewal of a sense of disappointment on the part of the Soviet leadership over the unrevolutionary outlook of the proletariat of Western Europe.

Although the Communists have continued to propagate, and at times to emphasize, the Marxist theory of the pauperization of the working class, this anticipation has not been confirmed by any appreciable increase in class consciousness and readiness for political activity on the part of the workingmen of Western Europe. The repeated experience of the C.G.T. in France, for example, has shown that the ready mass support which is at hand for a strike for economic advances is not available for political strikes. In trying to respond to the Party's demands for political action, the C.G.T. leadership repeatedly jeopardized its credit with the rank and file.

Once it was appreciated that the proletariat of the advanced industrial countries were not, or at least not yet, able to provide the dynamic source of revolutionary energy, it

became apparent that some essential adjustments were required in Communist expectations.

One consequence which Stalin seems to have drawn was that no Communist Party could be expected to come to power through the ripening of the revolutionary temper of its own working class. It could hope to achieve power only through the intervention of the Red Army. This lesson was of course reinforced by the experience of the states of Eastern Europe, as Stalin bluntly reminded Tito in the correspondence preceding the rupture of their relations.

A second consequence concerns the necessity of collaborating with, rather than fighting, the bourgeoisie, or at least large segments of the bourgeoisie. When the Communist Parties are directed to put aside for the time being the objective of attaining power, and to strive instead to influence the orientation of the respective national governments in accordance with the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, they are obliged in one way or another to come to terms with the bourgeoise parties. Even in Italy and France, where the Communist Parties command a large popular vote and have a strong position in the trade unions, it has been possible for the Communists to be politically effective only to the extent that they could overcome their political isolation and enter into coalitions with

non-working-class parties.

This necessity has required in turn a muting of the class struggle, the distinctive and critical element of the Communist ideology which has enabled it to claim a link with the traditional militant working class movement and which has set it off from the "reformist" Marxist parties. How long a foreign Communist Party can maintain the élan of its cadres under this inhibition is a question that has been raised repeatedly by restive militants. A related conjecture, more often debated in the non-Communist world, raises the question whether the prolonged acceptance by the Soviet leadership of the postponement of revolutionary expectations in the capitalist countries, and the related acceptance of the possibility of capitalist states postponing or ameliorating economic crises by governmental action, may contribute to the devitalization of the ideology, or at least to the central place in it of the Marxist analysis of the dynamics of capitalism.

Another major ideological implication of the Right-wing policy bears upon the Communist attitude toward nationalism. This is closely related to the question of class relations, for the Communists have been rediscovering what the Second International learned to its sorrow at the outset of World War I, that the allegiances of the working class are still primarily

vertical rather than horizontal -- that the Marseillaise still stirs more pulses than the Internationale.

Again, the experience of the Thorez declaration of support for the Red Army in France in February 1949, which marked the furthest development of the anti-national position of the world Communist movement, quickly taught the Communists that nationalism is still a major, if not the major, political force in Europe as well as in the underdeveloped countries. Soviet policy was quick to adapt to this realization. Within a few months, the Communists had returned to the slogan of "national independence" and were seeking a "government of democratic national union." Within two years, the "united national front" had become the watchword. Within three years, Stalin had exhorted the foreign Communists to lift high "the banner of national independence and national sovereignty...if you wish to be patriots of your country, if you wish to become the leading force of the nation."

Thus at a time when the United States was committed to a supranational policy for Europe -- the economic integration of Europe as one of the objectives of the European Recovery Program, the European Defense Community as a means of adding the military contribution of West Germany to the Western alliance -- the Soviet Union was hitching its policy in Western Europe to

the dynamics of nationalism. In elevating the slogan of "national independence" to a primary position in its propaganda, the Soviet Union was endeavoring to use the force of nationalism in Western Europe as an anti-coagulant against "the pseudo-theories of cosmopolitanism, of national nihilism, which are the idelogical weapons of the U.S.A. in its struggle for world domination."*

Of course the same nationalism, when expressed within the Communist sphere -- in the Ukraine, in Yugoslavia, or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and even in the ranks of the Western European Communist Parties -- represented a mortal danger and was excoriated as "bourgeois nationalism," "national deviationism," or "homeless cosmopolitanism."

This was, however, but one of several contradictions in the use of the nationalist motivation by the Communists which required a certain dialectical dexterity. The distinction between "proletarian internationalism" -- which meant loyalty to the Soviet Union -- and "national independence" -- which meant independence from the United States -- was one which required clarification at intervals. The simultaneous encouragement by the Communists of French nationalist resistance to a new German

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*Pravda, September 29, 1951.

Wehrmacht, and of German nationalist support for German unification and (after March 1952) a German army, created certain operational difficulties. Similarly, Communist appeals to nationalist sentiments in the metropolitan powers tended to inhibit Communist support of nationalist movements in colonial territories and the Communist slogan of "revolutionary defeatism" and exhortations to mutiny among the troops of the colonial powers. Despite such difficulties as these, and the unaccustomed bedfellows gathered under the banner of national independence, the power of national feelings undoubtedly greatly strengthened whatever cause could identify itself with it, as was to be shown in the defeat of the European Defense Community project in 1954.

For those who are concerned with the question of the relative importance of the Communist ideology as a determinant of Soviet policy, it might appear that these ideological consequences of the Right-wing policy denigrate the function of the ideology as a mere instrumentality of policy, rather than as a determining factor. However, it should be borne in mind that the Marxist-Leninist mode of analysis undoubtedly plays an important role in shaping the perceptions and expectations of the Soviet leadership, and in this way may make a significant indirect contribution to the strategic calculations which

determine policy choices. If this judgment -- perhaps one can call it only an impression -- is correct, then it is to these strategic calculations that one must look for the motive force behind this policy change.

V. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICY SHIFT

The assertion that the Soviet leadership experienced in this period a change in its strategic outlook rests in large measure upon a priori reasoning, but it is not without some confirmation from an authoritiative Soviet source. A course of study of Soviet Foreign Policy prepared in 1957 at the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emphasizes a distinction between the strategic character of the period in Soviet policy from 1945 to 1949, and the period from 1950 to 1953. Indeed, the head of the Department of International Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy of the Institute took strong exception to a "periodization" of Soviet foreign policy which lumped together the period from the end of the war to 1953, on the grounds that it ignored the significance of the change which had taken place in 1949-1950.*

The curriculum of the Party's program of study of Soviet foreign policy, not surprisingly, attributed the change in the strategic situation between the period prior to 1949 and the following period to the aggressiveness of its adversaries. It

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*Assistant Professor I. F. Ivashin, "The Periodization of the History of Soviet Foreign Policy," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 7, July 1958, pp. 59-63.

divides the post-war years into three phases, in the first of which, up to 1949, "the Socialist system was being transformed into a world system." The essential features of this period, according to the Party curriculum, included:

> The radical changes in the international situation as a result of the Second World War. The struggle of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies for a democratic organization of the post-war world, against the imperialist "negotiation from strength" policy.*

The second of the three periods specified in the curriculum lasted from 1950 to 1953, and was characterized by:

> The aggravation of international tensions as a result of the aggressive actions of the imperialist states. The struggle of the U.S.S.R. and other peace-loving peoples against imperialist aggression and for the preservation and strengthening of peace.

The third period, from 1953 to 1957 (when the curriculum was prepared) was mainly identified as:

> The struggle of the Socialist camp, led by the U.S.S.R., and other peace-loving peoples for a <u>détente</u>, peaceful coexistence, and the cooperation of states with different systems, for friendship among the peoples.

Thus although the Party curriculum dates the beginning of the current Soviet emphasis upon "peaceful coexistence" at 1953 (the year in which Stalin died and a new leadership took over -- a factor not mentioned in the curriculum), it discerns a

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*Ivashin, p. 62.

significent change occurring in 1949, characterized by defensive Soviet efforts to deal with a rise in international tensions.

This view is shared by other Soviet specialists in international affairs, but is by no means unanimous. The publication of these extracts from the Party's curriculum occurred in the course of a controversy over "the periodization of the history of Soviet foreign policy" in the pages of the Soviet journal, International Affairs, during 1958. The controversy aroused a lively correspondence from readers of the journal. Some readers were even more explicit than was the Party curriculum in defining 1949 as a major turning point, as can be seen from this "periodization":

> 1945-1949: Soviet foreign policy in the period of the emergence and strengthening of the world Socialist system;
>
> 1949-onwards: the struggle of the Soviet Union to ensure stable and lasting peace in the current period.*

A summing-up of the discussion in authoritative terms by a senior member of the editorial board of the journal tends to

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*S. Yeshin, "Periodization Should be Soundly Based," International Affairs, No. 7, July 1958, p. 64.

emphasize 1953 as the "important milestone," because of "the tremendous impact of the Soviet peace policy after 1953, and the extension of the Soviet peace effort," but he finds justification for the establishment of a subdivision at the year 1949.* However, the development which he emphasizes in establishing the 1949 subdivision is that the victory of the Chinese Communists in that year "completed the process of Socialism's emergence as a world system."**

It should be added that the controversy over "periodization" is also of general significance, to the extent that it indicates an effort by Soviet scholars to recognize and characterize the successive phases of Soviet foreign policy, and particularly to grapple with the delicate problem of the inter-relationship of domestic and external factors in the determination of foreign policy.***

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*V. M. Khvostov, "A Summing Up of the Discussion Concerning the Periodization of the History of Soviet Foreign Policy," International Affairs, No. 8, August, 1958, pp. 67-71.

**Khvostov, p. 71.

***"The difficulties of periodization have been and remain in the fact that we have to take into account the laws of internal Soviet development as well as the laws governing international development, since Soviet foreign policy has always been implemented against the background of a definite international situation. That is just what we wish to show in our curriculum and concise study aid which...neither identify foreign and domestic policy nor divorce them." Ivashin, p. 60. Other articles on the subject may be found in International Affairs, No. 2, Feb. 1958, pp. 63-70; and No. 5, May 1958, pp. 71-75.

What was evident in the Soviet view, leaving aside differences concerning particular dates and the distinctive Soviet terminology, was a recognition of a well-defined separation between a preliminary postwar situation, and a later period of provisional stabilization in its relations with the West. The former period was characterized by fluidity in the power situation, as the respective spheres were being redrawn in the light of the postwar breakdown of the previous configuration, and as the Soviet Union was, with varying degrees of militancy, actively probing the outer periphery of its new sphere of control. The respective zones of primary and secondary interests having been established in Europe, at least provisionally, it became necessary in the period from 1949 on, and especially after Korea in 1950, to consolidate the political and economic condition within the new Soviet sphere, and to check the growth of Western military power by restoring an atmosphere of relaxation of international tension and by playing upon Western divergencies. Meanwhile, the dynamic phase of Communist expansion in Asia continued to encourage a militancy in that area until the exhaustion of the Chinese offensive in Korea in the spring of 1951.

In a sense, therefore, it can be said that the strategy which began to emerge in the period 1949-1952 was defensive in

character, in that it came about as a response to an adverse power relationship. It would be more accurate, however, to mark this manipulative phase of Soviet policy by its difference in time perspective rather than in its intent. Still oriented toward the achievement of a dominant power position, the more manipulative strategy was invoked to minimize the disadvantages of a present adverse situation while it made preparations for a later and more favorable concatenation of forces.

This contrast between a short-term estimate of relative weakness and a long-term expectation of relative strength is further illustrated by what is known concerning changes in Soviet military capabilities during this period. While the broader and somewhat softer political line was intended to retard or reverse the Western rearmament, to reduce the danger of war on unfavorable terms and to encourage the fragmentation of the Western alliance, the Soviet regime appears to have intensified its efforts to build up its military strength, within the limits of its economic capabilities. According to Soviet figures released in 1960, total Soviet military manpower was increased from a postwar low point of 2.87 million in 1948-49 to double that figure by 1955.* Figures for intermediate years

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*Speech by Nikita S. Khrushchev, Pravda, January 15, 1960.

are not given, but it appears possible that the peak may have been reached during the 1952-53 period. The intensive concentration of resources in this period upon research and development on jet and swept-wing fighter aircraft, upon guided missiles and upon small thermonuclear warheads, is evidenced by the increasing appearance of these Soviet military capabilities by the middle 'fifties. Pending the maturing missile capabilities then in the research and development stage, the Soviet leadership was obliged to rely upon the effectiveness of its foreign policy to prevent a general war during the interim period of danger. The absence of provocation, and the resulting international atmosphere of <u>détente</u> tended to remove the stimulus to the Western military effort which earlier Soviet policies had provided. Meanwhile, the encouragement of neutralism, the Peace Movement and anti-colonial agitation served to weaken the structure of American strategic air bases abroad (which had been growing rapidly since 1948-49), as well as the cohesion of the Western alliance and the general military capabilities of the "colonial" powers. The deep-seated Franco-German hostility was fanned to delay West Germany's integration into the Western defense system. In broad terms, the Soviet Union sought to use both political and economic instrumentalities during this period to effect a denial of areas vital to the economy or strategic

position of Western Europe, and to create a more favorable orientation of European industrial areas away from the United States and hopefully toward the Soviet economic complex.

The harvest of this policy was not to be gathered until after 1957, when Stalin's successors, emboldened by Soviet missile and space achievements, would begin to claim that the balance of power had begun to shift in the Soviet favor. Under those circumstances, the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" would begin to reveal its offensive potentialities. It is important to realize, however, that the foundation for this later stage of Soviet policy was laid in the period 1949-1952, when the Soviet leadership concerted its resources, political actions and ideological doctrines to reverse an unfavorable trend in its world power position.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN POLICY

There is an old folk tale about a husband and wife who were granted three wishes by a creature with magic powers and an ironic sense of humor, with the result that the wishes were realized in such a way as to leave the unfortunate couple much worse off than before. This appears to have been the situation in which the Western powers found themselves as a result of the events described in this essay.

It seems fair to say that the Western powers were reasonably successful, between 1947 and 1949, in their efforts to repair the imbalance of power and prevent the further expansion of Soviet military power in Europe at least. The expectation which lay behind this effort was that it might bring about a change in Soviet ways, and as we have seen, it did. In a sense, therefore, the Soviet shift to a less directly militant policy represented the fulfillment of a desired Western objective.

Behind this objective, of course, was the further expectation that if the Soviet leaders could be persuaded over a long period of time that the prospects for a further expansion by force were not inviting, the long-term effects of a prolonged "peaceful coexistence" policy might moderate the essential purposes of the Soviet regime in a beneficial direction. This latter proposition is not, or at least not yet, subject to

verification. Partly this is because the time involved is still relatively short, and the data on changes in the Soviet system are not readily available. Chiefly however it is because the essential condition of the expectation has not been realized: Soviet interests have been more effectively advanced than frustrated on the changed terrain of the struggle.

Whereas the Soviet Union was induced to adapt its thinking to a longer time perspective, and to put its emphasis upon long-term political and economic penetration rather than upon the direct use of force, the Western powers continued for the most part to address their efforts to a short-term and predominantly military challenge.

What the Soviet leaders call the "internal contradictions" of the non-Communist world have indeed developed, not to the point of war, as Stalin had prophesied, but certainly to the point of reducing the effectiveness and the capabilities of the Western alliance, in large measure because the Western attention was still riveted upon an image of the problem which was no longer adequate. The conflicts between the Western powers over the rearmament of Germany in the following period, the steady drain of France's vitality, political stability and military capabilities in debilitating colonial struggles, the subordination of fundamental economic and political requirements within

the alliance to military goals which were in any case not realized -- these were all genuine dilemmas inherent in the Western situation. They were also, however, evidence of the absence of any large conception of the political and economic forces at work in the world, and of the absence of a sense of direction toward a conception of the world that went beyond a defense of the past.

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THE THAI BUREAUCRACY

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(Panel 19. The Role of the Bureaucracy in Emerging States)

The Approach

The Thai bureaucracy is a tantalizing subject for an impressionistic case study, for there is much here which appears unique, and even more which is subtle and obscure.

Thailand is one of the "developing countries," but its conscious and deliberate developmental efforts began in the late 19th century rather than the post-World War II era; its bureaucratic evolution traces back into a semi-historic era of pre-Khmer patriarchal monarchy and runs down more than four sanguine centuries during which an impressively rational socio-governmental system emerged and then gradually disappeared under the detritus of a traditionalism which the most powerful oriental despot in Southeast Asia could not penetrate. In the last years of the 19th century, in the face of imperialistic pressures from France and Britain, the monarch radically reformed the bureaucratic system, initiated developments in transportation, trade, communications, and agriculture, and opened full the already-present Pandora's box of Westernism. All of this laid a foundation for overthrow of the monarchy in the depression of the 1930's and its replacement with a relatively benign and limited authoritarianism sustained by a passive, "neutral" civil bureaucracy.

The problems of getting data about this bureaucracy and describing it are substantial. Putting a description in useful comparative terms is no less difficult. Yet to some extent the characteristics of the Thai system can be stated in general terms, or put into categories which also apply elsewhere. The categories used here are both arbitrary and rather obvious, and possibly productive of some semantic quibbles. It is hoped that they do not amount to a prescriptive application of broad and vastly abstract labels to the entire system without recourse to supporting data. They simply seek to order the data -- impressionistic as some of it is -- attempt to add or extend relevance through the ordering, and to do this in a fashion which may facilitate comparison and perhaps hypothesizing about such things as similarities and differences between the Thai and other systems.

The Thai civil bureaucracy -- using the term "bureaucracy" rather casually -- is an entity or a system within which certain common structural, functional, and valuational characteristics are found. As such it is engaged in what might be regarded as broad "processes:" the procurement of resources

including personnel; the allocation of resources, including the ordering of personal relations into an organizational system; the motivation of participants in the system; and the implanting of knowledge, skills and values in those participants.

In the course of its existence and action the Thai bureaucracy, like other similar systems, is engaged in sustaining certain social values apart from the specific goals which are the formal substantive objectives of its organizational components. These values tend to be reflected in the manner of resource procurement, allocation, and utilization.

As a "system," the Thai bureaucracy is related to its environment in complex ways; it interacts with its setting. Some of this interaction is reflected or expressed in the behavior of participants within the system and in the operation of the "processes" mentioned previously. Other facets of it are expressed in the manner in which substantive and administrative goals are assigned to organizational components within the system. And another aspect of the broad relationships between the system and its setting consists of the patterns of organization-clientele interactions which occur as the system functions.

In a nutshell, knowledge of these aspects of the Thai bureaucracy will enable one to describe it, to compare it with other systems, and to examine and compare system-setting interrelations. The trouble is simply that not even in a land of coconuts are the shells sufficiently large. "Hard" data on fundamental aspects of the system do not exist; manageable premises about essential motives and values are likely at best to be dignified generalizations derived from unsystematic and undetached empiricism. This speaker certainly makes no claim to omniscience, but asserts only that accuracy is his intent, and that one of the most basic characteristics of the Thai system is the operation of the "exceptions principle:" there are significant exceptions to any and every general statement about its features and operations -- caveat emptor! Finally, in the interests of brevity, this presentation will focus upon what might broadly be called the "personnel" facets of the system, with no systematic treatment of the procurement, allocation and application of other material resources.

Personnel Resource Procurement

The civil bureaucracy consists of somewhat more than 200,000 regular or "classified" officials, plus about 53,000 "village officials" with quasi-official status, about 7,000 regular municipal officials, and an unnumbered army of statusless "employees" engaged in menial work under the jurisdiction of individual ministries or departments. Our attention here is limited to the official group who are the core of the bureaucracy.

This civil officialdom comprises about .9 per cent of the total population of the nation. Forty per cent of the group consists of teachers, and another 20 per cent is composed of police. For a unitary state in which the

public service has for generations past been the major avenue to material achievement the Thai civil service seems not unduly large, nor does it impose an insufferable burden upon the financial resources of the state.

In narrow terms the personnel system of the bureaucracy is characterized by almost complete careerism with two hierarchical intake levels -- the fourth or bottom class and the third class. Clerks and other non-college trained personnel move into the system at the fourth class level, where they tend to stay, for this class contains more than 80 per cent of all the civil officials. The intake level for college-trained personnel is the third class, containing 8 per cent of the total. Fourth class personnel can and do move into the third class to a limited extent on the basis of seniority and acceptability; but practically all of the second, first, and special class positions which make up the top five or six per cent of the system are filled by seniority-based advancement from the third class.

Upward movement occurs along myriad rapidly converging channels -- the third class of the civil service is more than 20 times as large as the top, or special class, and there are only two classes between them. Interdepartmental mobility is not common, and interministerial movement is practically non-existent.

Intake selection is based upon a combination of factors: citizenship; "suitability" in the sense of freedom from criminal, moral, or subversive taint; educational attainment; and an elaborate competitive examination process.

Intake selection tends to be competitive, although the scope of competition is limited by the varying but usually restricted publicity given to forthcoming examinations, which are scheduled and administered by individual ministries or departments within them. To some extent this is a consequence of a persistently large supply of position-seekers.

The examination procedure is standardized by an elaborate set of rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission whose representatives may participate in the selection process. In practice, selection is a "line" function performed by a legally prescribed committee headed by a departmental or ministry (or provincial government) level official. The examination system itself traces back to the era of the reorganization of the Ministry of Interior in the 1890's, when formalized training for provincial and local government was reinforced by an examination system which quickly became focused upon the knowledge which had been acquired by provincial government trainees.

The intake examination system sheds interesting light upon the orientation and some of the values of the bureaucracy. The written portion of the fourth class examination encompasses 13 hours and 45 minutes of allotted time, 80 per cent of which is devoted to a "theoretical section" covering knowledge of Thai history and geography, civil service and constitutional law, other pertinent administrative legislation, culture and morals, official conduct, the Thai language, and English. The practical section of the examination deals with correspondence, reports, filing, typing, and longhand writing. Successful candidates on the written examination are examined orally over their "general knowledge, intelligence, personality and aptitudes."

The examinations are largely subjective and place their greatest stress upon general knowledge acquired at the secondary school level, legalisms pertaining to the civil service, and the prescribed patterns of appropriate conduct toward superiors, subordinates and the people which have been formalized during several centuries of exhortation. In five years, 1954 through 1958, 651 fourth class examinations were held, 21,000 applicants competing, of whom about 7,900 or about 38 per cent passed. (These statistics appear not to include the examination of fourth class teacher candidates, fourth class teachers amounting to more than 40 per cent of the total civil service.)

The third class intake examination (which to a small extent is also a promotional examination for movement from fourth to third class) follows a similar pattern, although a higher level and broader range of knowledge is of course required. This examination takes about 20 hours, of which three are devoted to specific subjects related to the work of the organization making the selection. It should be noted, however, that several of the civil departments of the government have developed special examinations in which greater stress is placed upon substantive knowledge relevant to the work of the organization.

From 1954 through 1958, 85 third class examinations were given to 12,148 applicants, of whom 16 per cent (1902 persons) passed. Average annual intake into official third class positions thus amounted to no more than 380 persons per year, or 2.3 per cent of the total number of regular positions in this class, which was 16,600 in 1957. Fourth class intake for the five year period could not have much exceeded eight per cent of the total number of fourth class positions exclusive of teachers (96,000 in 1957), or an average of less than two per cent per year, according to the available statistics.

The significance of these intake figures exceeds their precision. In a broad sense the Thai civil service career system, with its two intake levels, has been geared to an educational system which was itself largely developed to meet the burgeoning needs of the bureaucracy beginning with the reforms of the late 19th century, and which has acquired social value as the key means to upward movement in the Thai social system.

Educational standards for persons entering the King's service were first established in the 1880's; a Royal Pages' School for higher government training was created in 1902, expanded in 1914 into a "Civil Service School," and elevated to become Chulalongkorn University in 1917. A law school was established in 1897 which evolved into Thammasat University by 1934. In 1957 there were in Thailand about 10,000 undergraduate students in these and other college level institutions besides the police and military academies, and baccalaureat degree recipients were significantly outrunning the absorptive capacity of the civil bureaucracy which had more than any other factor spurred the development of the higher educational system.

By the late 1950's the long-standing symbiosis of the bureaucracy and the educatinnal system was weakening as enrollment trends in higher education continued upward. In the short run this has produced some grumbling and dissatisfaction among undergraduate students, notably at Thammasat University, which became the chosen instrument for civil service career preparation following

the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. In the longer run it presages fundamental shifts in a tradition-sanctioned arrangement whereby the cardinal value of the typical college degree lies in its utility as the foundation for a secure and prestigeous career in the civil service.

The Ordering of Personal Relations in the Civil Bureaucracy

As in all systems, the procurement of personnel and the ordering of personal relations are only separable in the abstract. In the Thai system intake is intimately linked with a stark and encompassing hierarchical system. Once "in," the official can be removed only for cause or superannuation; there is no reduction-in-force procedure in the Thai bureaucracy, and resignation is by permission only. Once "in," it is up to the official to survive and advance in accordance with his karma, his prowess, his personal values and those of the system.

In bare outline, the hierarchy is built on the bones of a "class" system made up of five basic levels, running upward from fourth to special class, plus a rank system under which every regular official has his own achieved and legitimated "class" status in the system. The rank classification of officials goes back at least as far as the Khmerization of Thai government and society in the 15th century A.D., and the antecedants of the position classification system are also traditional. Each position is fitted into the class system.

Within the four classes are a series of 14 grades. Thus the fourth class has four grades, the third class has two, and the remaining classes have three each. Each officially established (and numbered) position in the system has a designated grade, which amounts to a salary ceiling for that position, presumably reflecting the level of the duties and responsibilities of the post. Within a given jurisdiction such as a department, movement of an official from one numbered position to another as he establishes personal rank eligibility is not particularly difficult, and there seems to be something of a numbers game in this. Class promotion, or the movement of an official from one broad class to another, is another matter.

For each grade within each class there is a base salary plus a series of three incremental pay rates, or "salary steps" (except for the top grade of the special class, which has only two). An official moves along in the service by obtaining annual "salary promotions," which gradually kick him up through the grades of his designated class, and eventually make him a possible candidate for a class promotion.

The official, with his class rank, must of course occupy a position, with its "grade". Personal eligibility to advance in salary is conditional upon the existence of room for upward salary movement in a given position, or the formalistic shuffling of positions to create such latitude. The ease with which such adjustments are made suggests that the "functional" classification of positions by grade ceilings within the class system has a strongly ritualistic aspect. Adjustment of the assignments of individual officials to specifically numbered

positions is, at any rate, a convenient substitute for a Western ritual called "reclassification."

This particular kind of flexibility is, however, limited to movement within an individual class. All positions are allocated to the five classes by law and rule, essentially on a hierarchical rather than functional basis, and there is no "reclassification" of a position on the basis of changes in functional content. New sections or divisions may be created, and new posts as section or division chief, and these will then be filled on the basis of standardized upward movement in the hierarchy. But the individual official does not advance by exploiting the potentialities of his position and thereby changing its content and level. His access to advancement is a function of his rank.

To advance from third to second class the official must commonly (though not always) move to a supervisory position of section chief or equated post; to move up to first class he must achieve division chief status or the equivalent; to attain the ultimate goal of a special class appointment (less than one half of one per cent of the civil service consists of special class officials) he must usually become a division director, departmental director general or deputy director general, or something comparable.

In general terms, access to higher rank is to a considerable degree an immediate function of salary status at the lower rank. "Salary promotions," awarded annually at the discretion for all practical purposes of one's supervisor, are thus the means of access to higher rank.

For example, there are eight pay levels within the third civilian service class, the top level equaling the bottom pay level of the second class. At a more or less "normal" rate of progression of one step per year, it might take an official as much as eight years to reach the top of his class (depending upon his entry pay level, which in turn depended upon his pre-service educational attainments above the third class minimum). To be eligible for "class promotion" an official must have served at least one or three years at the third class, again depending upon his educational background. But he must also have been recommended for promotion at the departmental level, and have passed a qualifying examination administered in his department or ministry, and there must be an available position. In practice preference for promotion -- again with exceptions -- goes to those third class officials within a step or two of the top of the salary scale for the class. This is even more generally the practice at the second class. At the first class level the arrangement is explicitly recognized in an order stating that an official must have achieved the seventh step of the first class pay scale before he is eligible for nomination to the special class. Of course, high salary status within a class is a prerequisite to promotion -- not a guarantee.

An official may receive a "salary promotion" of none, one, or even two or more steps per year. There is no formal performance rating system and there is no effective system of appeals from the decisions of superiors concerning pay increases. There is no work measurement, no performance budgeting and no "O&M." The criterion of merit is the subjective assessment of one's supervisor and possibly his superior.

Thus are personal relations within the system ordered by elaborate and rigorous formalisms of personal and positional rank. The able and ambitious official advances by pleasing his superiors. (There is little lateral movement from one organizational component, such as a department, to another.) The others find order, security, and an ascribed-achieved status whose destruction would require flagrant efforts.

Functional differentiation of duties and responsibilities is to a remarkable degree subordinated to hierarchical differentiation. A section chief is a section chief, whether the work be filing or technical research. And third class "officials of section" are essentially just that; in the system for ordering personal relations status is more rank-derived than functionally-derived.

Under such an arrangement substantive accomplishment is always tending to succumb to entropy. "Effective performance" derives its prime meaning from the judgments of superiors, and established status affords an intrinsic security to participants in the system. There are no Admiral Rickovers in Thailand, nor is "Stankhanovite" a term which has been translated into Thai. And yet an impressive amount of work does get done.

The static ordering of personal relations among participants in the system by rigorous ranking of positions and officials tends to serve as a substitute for some dynamic facets of supervision. However, supervision does play a vital role in maintaining the social subsystems comprising the Thai bureaucracy.

The good supervisor is wise and paternal, and his relations to subordinates are those of the senior member of a social group. He is the "father." His status is derived from hierarchical position, yet his role is not essentially limited to bureaucratic actions, but tends more toward the familial. He may order or reprimand, but he also protects his people. "Walk behind the supervisor and the dog will not bite you." On the other side of the coin, the supervisor is supposed to be regarded as the legitimate link between his subordinates and the balance of the organization, and the ethics of the system call for the scrupulous formal observance of "channels."

In the development of Western-style supervisory training programs in the Institute of Public Administration at Bangkok instructors consistently encountered a surprising interest of Thai supervisors in employee counseling and in human relations approaches to motivation and management. The explanation of this phenomenon would appear to lie in the intensely social character of supervision in the Thai system rather than in any widespread concern with these techniques and concepts as means to increased productivity.

The systematic pursuit of a high level of productivity is not a dominant concern of typical supervisors in the Thai system. The significance of productivity as a motive in the system is subtle and variable, and in any event different from the case of Western Weberian bureaucracy. Substantive output is of course not ignored. Coins are minted, trains run, water is controlled, accounts are kept, and payday is never late. The routines work, and from time to time -- though not very often -- episodic changes may be made in a pattern

of activity. These seldom if ever initiate within the organization directly engaged in the immediate activity. Supervision rather makes minimal adjustments to cope with inescapable changes. It helps link components of the organization, carries communications, sees to the routines and regulations, and applies sanctions. Supervision is heavily oriented toward enforcement of a formal-informal code of conduct effective upon officials, such code not being highly "productive-functional" in its content. In short, supervision is more nearly concerned with the maintenance of a reasonably stable social sub-system than with a productive segment of a production-oriented enterprise.

The latitude of supervisory power is limited in various ways. The expectations of the subordinate members of the social group tend to be effective. And the formal rank system, while it gives the supervisor his chief sanction in a share of control over salary promotions, also produces a degree of feudalism in supervisory-subordinate relationships. The subordinate has his legitimated rank and status. He has the obligation of deference and expressed respect for the boss; he has duties or assignments which may properly expected of him (they may range from little or nothing to a rather sizeable amount of work depending upon highly particular circumstances); he has actual or potential extra-bureaucratic service obligations toward his superior; and relative uncooperativeness may produce no salary promotion. But harsh discrimination against a particular subordinate, or treatment which substantially violates the mores of the organizational system, will not be tolerated. A supervisor, for example, cannot prey upon the person of an attractive subordinate, or take financial advantage. And a subordinate can decline to perform duties which he feels are incompatible with his legitimated status. Thus one of my former students, after receiving his American M.A., upon his return to Thailand simply refused to work in his assigned position and sat in the office reading newspapers for upwards of three months until a more appropriate slot was found for an official of his established rank.

Finally, supervisory authority is limited by the existence of infinite numbers of extra-organizational social channels within the organizational system. Lateral functional relations are uncommon beyond the confines of a particular small work unit, but lateral and upward social relations form a tangle of links between many parts of the system. Family connections have important effects within the bureaucracy, as do school associations, friendships with high ranking officials or the personal aides to high ranking officials, and so forth. Thus for some the force of hierarchism is mitigated by the power of connections, and it sometimes almost seems that the whole system is shot through with connections. These failing, there is in extremis recourse to the anonymous letter which can be sent to top officials, perhaps producing an inquiry or investigation to check or harrass lower level supervisors. Thus supervisors, too, must walk with care if the dogs are not to bite.

Beyond -- and above and below and around -- the intricate mixture of formalism and informalism by which supervision in its fashion helps to order personal relations within the system there are the laws and rules and regulations. They are considerable in volume, and are promulgated in a semi-systematic fashion. They are not maintained in administrative manual systems and they do not seem to serve as pervasive, standardized instant premises for decision-making in a manner directly comparable to Western bureaucracy.

Generalizations are difficult. The civil service rules and regulations defining status, pay, allowances, retirement, and similar matters are as well-worn with use as a scholar's chair; they have a fundamental effect upon the ordering of personal relations. And they accrue, in part as a consequence of a system given to generalized legalistic forms and particularistic decisions to meet specific cases not appropriately covered by what exists. The application of various laws and regulations tends in accordance with tradition to be selective and particular; so that while of necessity relations are ordered by rule and regulation, so also rule and regulation are not uncommonly applied or not applied in accordance with other ordering forces.

Motivation of Participants

Thus we have come to the matter of motivation. Here system-environment relationships are of great importance, even though they can be described only in qualitative terms.

The Thai social system, somewhat like the Thai bureaucracy, is hierarchical, but its stratum sensitivity has traditionally been offset by a vital virtue -- its relative openness. Mobility, upward and downward, has long been tolerated and accepted within it. The Thai society is largely agrarian with a sophisticated and heavily traditional culture. Through the years and decades of this century and part of the last the bureaucracy has been to ambitious and self-seeking Thais what free enterprise, the industrial revolution, and the West have been to North Americans -- and more, for bureaucratic careers have meant not only power and relative wealth but a sharing in the charismatic splendor of a majestic monarch whose symbolic significance, though dulled, persists even today.

The promise of access to the bureaucracy has motivated untold hours of drudging but ungrudging efforts at rote learning. Within the system many motivational forces have their play, and the data by which to trace them are most obscure, but it seems safe to generalize to this extent: no other immediate force appears to have the persistent and permeating effectiveness of rank and hierarchism, including the authority of superiors.

The range of this authority in some ways far exceeds that common to our Western bureaucracies and takes on different objectives. It is not constitutionalized by elaborate formal internal restraints, nor by other than fragmentary and informal external processes of control.

There are certain necessary qualifications, the most important of which include, in addition to those already mentioned, the sheer consequences of scale and inertia. The size and routine of larger organizations tend to regularize and limit the workings of authority within them, although not so much at the level of the social group. For example, emphasis upon rule and regulation tends to restrain some facets of hierarchical authority. These afford a basis for subtle and sometimes devious upward sanctions, and some of the rules -- but which ones? -- seem to have an intrinsic consensual efficacy. This is a very tricky realm, more susceptible of illustration than generalization. Thus, all rules to the contrary notwithstanding, a Thai police official may be quite promiscuous and

even somewhat predatory, but should he be convicted of conceiving an illegitimate child of a hostile mother he will be discharged from the service. Again, in ways somewhat suggestive of but substantively different from the American system, certain rules of fiduciary honesty are enforced quite stringently while other forms of substantive dishonesty go unchallenged.

Authority is not "fully bureaucratized" in the Western sense of the phrase; subordinates are likely to be subject to their superior in relationships not limited to official business -- ranging from serving drinks at his parties and playing fountain to his Narcissus to furnishing extra-official intelligence and "making money for him" through non-official talents or connections. Within broad and little-traced bounds, the working of hierarchical motivation is quite specific, and variable.

There is one essential restraint whose importance is matched only by its intangibility: a high but of course unmeasurable degree of tolerance and permissiveness which permeates the society and in very real ways moderates the exercise of authority. Here again, however, it is the superior official who tolerates, rather than any formalized aspect of the system itself, and constraint and forebearing are more common than regularized.

All of this, of course, tends to produce an exquisitely personalized administrative system, in which the formalities are at best the parameters of action, and in which the parameters themselves are never fully fixed over time and space. Thus the social status and social connections of subordinates may affect the character of motivational forces effectively imposed upon them within the system.

"Discipline" in the somber formal sense of the technical bureaucratic term does indeed exist. Four thousand six hundred and two civil officials exclusive of teachers were discharged, dismissed, or expelled from the civil service between 1954 and 1959, or almost one per cent per year -- a figure not strikingly different from what one finds in the United States Civil Service. But they were the victims of a far more subtle system than ours whose rules tend to have literal -- and general -- applicability; and one the inexorability of whose hierarchical authority is attested by the fact that of the 4,602, only 263 appealed -- nine of them successfully.

In a sweeping summary, the prime systematic force motivating participants in the system is a form of hierarchical authority which at best is only quasi-bureaucratic. And this authority is only to a limited and varying degree geared to the persistent and efficient pursuit of substantive organizational purposes; which raises the question "Why?" for there is no innate incompatibility between hierarchism and effective purposive organization, as any 19th century Prussian bureaucrat would testify.

The Implanting of Skills, Knowledge and Values Upon Participants in the System

Substantive organizational achievement is clearly not the arrogating value of the Thai bureaucracy; any effort to explain why not must range beyond quantitative data, into empiricism and speculation. Yet from almost any perspective this question and its ramifications are basic.

At a very shallow level we note that the use has long been made of deliberate and conscious devices for implanting skills, knowledge, and certain operational values upon its participants. In-service training is perhaps a new phrase -- but a very old idea -- in the Thai system.

In the 19th century and earlier, "mahatlek," or royal pages were at an early age assigned from ranking families to serve the king, observe the conduct of his court, and thus train for assignment to an oriental quasi-administrative class. Traditionally, too, sons of officials at lower levels became apprentices in the King's service. The needs of the burgeoning bureaucracy of the late 19th century caused King Chulalongkorn to issue an edict "Warning Sons of Officials to Work in Government Offices," and thus help meet needs for trained staff.

In the late 19th century came an expansion of technical skill and knowledge training to meet the needs of railway, telegraph and postal operations, projects involving surveying and engineering skills, and revised systems of justice, financial administration, and paperwork.

A far-reaching reorganization of the basic system of provincial government before the turn of the 20th century made use of complex and rational "management training" to help produce district officers and other provincial officials who would be both technically competent and appropriately motivated. Pre-service, threshhold, and in-service training were combined in an effort which involved elaborate indoctrination and which made a large and lasting contribution to the traditions of provincial government in Thailand. Much of the indoctrination was exhortatory, but exhortation was reinforced by example and inspection.

Provincial officials were instructed to be faithful, industrious, and courteous in implementing the three basic purposes of the King's service: maintaining domestic peace, increasing prosperity, and safeguarding the nation's independence. Courtesy, sympathy, and kindness to inferiors, including both subordinates and the people, was stressed. (One is tempted to expound a "plantation model" by which to characterize relationships between such a bureaucratic system and its "clients.")

Yet it would seem that the bureaucrats themselves -- generally and abstractly -- are among the prime clients of the system. There is certainly a strong traditional basis for a high degree of internal circularity in the input-output relations of the system.

Until the Chakri reformation of the late 19th century Thai government was based upon the kin muang principle, kin muang meaning quite literally "eat the place." Officials were not paid; their functions, or their status, entitled

them to fees and shares of the products of the populace. They were the king's men, and they "ate the country." With the establishment of salaries during the reign of King Chulalongkorn this practice abated, but the innate value-idea that the bureaucracy existed in considerable measure for its participants was never really killed.

Of course, merely to isolate and articulate this integral value element of the system is to distort it, for it is at most a facet of complex and implicit network of values. But I would suggest that this value has long been sustained not only within the bureaucracy itself but in the society at large. Kin muang was for centuries a very real part of the established natural order, and great and growing change has by no means obliterated the main streams of Thai traditionalism. For that matter, the essential social and valuational underpinnings of the Thai bureaucracy long antedate productivity theory, and are involved with a fatalistic Buddhist rather than militant Protestant ethic. As for centuries past, "the rice is in the field, the fish are in the stream," a man's state is the product of his karma, "efficiency" is an alien term, causality is difficult even to contemplate, and while the world and personal existence are surely desirable the ultimate goal is the personal transcending of materiality and conscious existence. Vast, intricate, smooth-working productive administrative mechanisms as such have no aesthetic or romantic appeal, given such a value orientation, and Thai literature has to this point produced no organizational sagas known to me.

Specific processes and purposive organizational systems can and do exist; planes fly, malaria is controlled, and "injections" work wonders; but (to an admittedly lessening degree) these things are shallow incidental surface flotsam overlying a deeper true reality. The values do not uphold productivity as an intrinsic good. They do help explain an almost elemental passivity among the populace, while they promote a high tolerance within the system for the edicts and orders imposed from the top of the government, where the value complex is in some ways somewhat different.

In short, the most basic values effective within the bureaucratic system come quite directly out of its social context -- and these values need little or no nurturing through in-service training. Professor James Mosel has most aptly labelled the result "pseudomorphism;" the bureaucratic structure bears much similarity to Western ones, but its valuational and functional content is considerably different, and the system sustains its established basic values.

Hierarchicalism is imposed by the system and reinforced by the social setting. The legalisms and formalisms typical of bureaucracy in a manner of speaking also apply; they contribute to the inertial maintenance and stabilization of the system, but they have a contingency alien to Western systems. And in the broadest of terms, the system does not emphatically impose bureaucratic productivity values upon its participants. Skill training and knowledge training have long abounded; practically every department has its official library, and vast quantities of data are ingested in preparation for entrance and promotion examinations. But the pertinence of skills, understandings, and ingested data is not related in any simple functional fashion to the achievement of substantive organizational goals. Rather here is a partially "inverted" bureaucracy, a system

in which a considerable portion of the outputs tend to be directed to the internal participants rather than to purposive goals and external clients, which poses a considerable challenge to Western-style executive development programs.

System-Setting Relations: Two General Aspects

Of course, the preceeding statements have been heroic simplifications which tend to overstate the case, overemphasizing the distinction between Thai and Weberian bureaucracy. In all systems, participants must be induced. But in the Thai system it appears that the relationship between inducements and organizational goal orientations differs sufficiently in degree from a Weberian model to amount to a difference in type.

This raises interesting and basic questions: how are substantive organizational goals set, and to what extent and in what circumstances do they tend to be implemented? Obviously the system must do more than feed upon itself, or it would long ago have run out of sustinence.

In the briefest and broadest of terms, substantive goals are imposed from "the top," from the political reaches of the governmental system which are essentially external to the bureaucratic system, an arrangement which is acutely compatible with tradition as well as with the hierarchical character of the bureaucratic system.

The meanings which are given to such goals within the system seem to vary considerably. Where persistent and systematic pressure is applied from the top, highly complex activities can be made to take place on a continuing basis -- an example being the management of the nation's currency and the maintenance of its balance of payments position through a competent central bank which is technically outside the bounds of the civil service.

Again, where the product is relatively measurable, and failure to produce is likely to have a direct and inescapable consequences of an undesirable sort, cutput is obtained and in quality it is likely to be satisfactory or even superior. But efficiency of productive processes is another matter. In recent years a splendid dam, a key element of a complex water control system, was constructed under the jurisdiction of the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, in a not-unreasonable amount of time. Over a five year period, for every laborer on this job, there was on the average about one clerk.

Further, in some fields of substantive activity there is much "going through the motions," with small achievement of a programmatic type. Here it seems that the relevance of the substantive purpose presumably being pursued is small, or in other words that the goal is not particularly compatible with the basic values of the participants in the system and the society. Some examples include programs established largely in accommodation to Western pressures despite small self-evident pertinence or utility in the Thai value system. Witness social welfare, or comprehensive economic planning.

In short, substantive purposes are to varying degree pursued and attained. Such purposes are to an infinitely small degree generated within the system; "efficiency" is an incidental concern in their pursuit; and the extent to which purpose is likely to be achieved appears to vary with its evident relation to basic social values represented in the Thai social system and shared in by participants in the bureaucracy. At top governmental levels where purposes are generated, control over implementation is generally quite limited; in theory hierarchism takes care of this, and in practice the top level of the government has a span of attention far short of its asserted span of concern. To these features the system rather nicely accommodates itself.

In all of this there has been little attention given to "the public," or the citizenry who are on the receiving end of those outputs of the system which are produced. What of the public?

The answer is at this stage in the endless evolution of Thailand quite simple: there is no "public," in the sense of politically important forces in society strong enough to "counterbalance and control the political machine," to use Wittfogel's words. The people of Thailand are apolitical by tradition. At the localest of levels, in the villages, there is a very real degree of "social" rather than "political" democracy, buttressed by the limited effectiveness of the bureaucratic system in exerting much control over the populace. Perhaps it is in this realm of system-environmental relationships that the great changes of the emerging future will occur, for new portents loom, but the future is obscure.

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS IN ARGENTINA

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The oft-quoted testamentary remarks of Bolívar, his final despair, still afford us an excellent sentimental bench mark for a discussion of contemporary Argentina. "There is no good faith in America," said Bolívar, "neither among men or among nations. Treaties are paper, constitutions books, elections battles, liberty anarchy, and life a torment." Bolívar went on to advise that "The only thing one can do in America is emigrate." These words and especially the sour parting admonition to move away are quite conventional in today's Argentina. Their academic reflection is found in a preoccupation with explaining why a country of such material promise, human richness, urban exaggeration, and past progress should now find itself stagnant, a prey to "tropical" politics in the upper reaches of society and to apathy and irresponsibility below.

The taxi-driver explanation is a condemnation of corrupt governments, and more often than not a slurring of one or another of Argentina's numerous immigrant groups -- Italians or Spanish Galicians or Jews or what-not. Economists lament the fiscal illiteracy of the Perón regime, and most of them usually add complaints about Argentina's dependency on foreign markets, the mentality of landowners and industrialists, and the lack of productivity and morale of labor. Historians like to start with the 1930 intervention of the military in political affairs, and then grimly trace the downward path of the juggernaut through intervening Conservative oligarchies, military dictatorships, the Perón adventure, and on to the present day via the interregnum of the Liberating Revolution of 1955 to 1958. Recently interpretations less concerned with symptomatology have begun to be heard, attempting to relate social disorganization to the more profound facts of national character, values, and social structure. The following quotation is typical of this new search:[1]

> "Argentina today can be described as an economic enigma -- a basically resourceful country that has undergone a period of economic stagnation during a decade of almost unprecedented economic expansion throughout most of the world, a country making a serious but largely unsuccessful attempt to take the road of steady economic growth * * *
>
> "Of course, economic factors play an important role in determining whether or not economic development occurs. . .But Argentina's experience between 1945 and 1955 and its failure to recover, despite basically sound economic measures taken since then, suggest that something of more vital importance lies behind the troubles besetting the nation's economy * * *
>
> "An analysis of the Argentine 'national character,' based on a study of the value orientation profile of the Argentine society, will demonstrate that some cultural traits of the bulk of the population are inimical to the emergence of social relationships which would enable individuals to act concertedly in the pursuit of common goals and interests. This

1. Tomás Roberto Fillol, Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine Case, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1961, pp. 1 - 3 passim. For another recent publication underscoring the concept of "dilemma," see also Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Argentine Paradox," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 334, March 1961, pp. 103-112.

> feature, i.e., the fact that Argentines are a 'conglomeration' of people rather than an organic 'community,' together with the fact that those same cultural traits also constitute a powerful barrier to the appearance of 'Western-capitalistic-like' economic initiative in the bulk of the society's members, is and has been in the past a fundamental impediment retarding the nation's economic growth. Of course, it would be unrealistic to assume that one element alone is the cause of Argentina's economic stagnation. . . [but] the basically passive, apathetic value-orientation profile of the Argentine society must be regarded as the critical factor limiting the possibilities of steady, long-run economic development."

Values and social structure underlie all social science disciplines; at this deepest level of generality, let us accept several still undemonstrated statements as working hypotheses descriptive of the Argentine way of looking at the world. This article concerns itself with institutional and not value factors, but assumptions concerning the latter help us to define the limits of probable and perhaps even possible institutional change. These working premises are put in terms of those dilemmas, paradoxes, or contradictions with which so much of the recent literature on Argentina has been concerned.

1. A contradiction affecting the entire society is the clash between the levelling effects of mass communications and a very high degree of urban concentration and the opposing failure of the political mechanism to escape the corset of an extraordinarily narrow definition of interests. The almost universal view in Argentina is that no public measure can be good for almost everybody, that the benefit of one group is the automatic detriment of all others. Life is an inelastic pie, and a bigger piece for fulano means necessarily a smaller piece for sutano. Political discussion in Argentina, for example, takes it as axiomatic that increased freedom of action for lower economic groups in the peronista period implied a necessarily restricted freedom for others, and that with the fall of Perón nothing could have been more natural than a return to restriction of freedom for those below and a regrowth of freedom for those above. Such static views in the presence of the goads of radio, television, airplanes, and great cities must lead either to the purgatory of stultification or the hell of authoritarian direction.

2. Another inconsistency flows from the failure to adjust a fairly advanced degree of industrialization to responsible entrepreneurial attitudes and to an appreciation of the possibilities inherent in mass consumption. The impediment is once again the inability to see the society as in some respects total and interdependent. The power of industrialization, then, is employed to maintain a degree of social inequality preventing the growth of healthy markets and thus inhibiting the further economic development of the country. The results can again be measured against the poles of paralyzing frustration and rude force, rather than in terms of possible choice among positive policy alternatives.[2]

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2. Easily available sources for a study of the Argentine economy are United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina, 1957; the periodical statistical bulletins of the Argentine Central Bank; Ricardo M. Ortiz, Historia Económica de la Argentina, Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1955; and Leopoldo Portnoy, La Realidad Argentina en el Siglo XX: II Análisis Crítico de la Economía, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961.

3. At the personal level the paradox describes the high degree of specialization, of functional articulation, demanded of the individual in Argentina's relatively developed economic situation and the opposing failure of the citizen to be guided by a system of impersonal loyalties toward all the others operating within the system of mutual dependency. The narrowness of the loyalty horizons weakens social institutions and invites autocratic personalism, whether for change or the mere continuance of the status quo.

Why these localistic, sub-national views archetypical of the traditional society should manage to persist in a context of industrial urbanization must be the subject of speculation elsewhere. But their survival serves to afford a first explanation of the malfunction of social institutions, as measured by the criteria of the developed world. But because a working adjustment does exist, the Argentine situation does not fit neatly into the categories of social order as they have been derived from the major currents of European experience. The "paradoxes" of which we have been speaking are paradoxical only in terms of theoretical views of the elements necessary to social progress from folk to traditional to modern society; they are not paradoxical in the sense that they are incoherent or mutually incompatible in terms of the experiences of daily life. That the results are policy confusion, an ultimate halt to economic growth, and the politics of force is, of course, exactly fitting to the situation.

The Articulation of the Political Mechanism. The most striking characteristic of Argentine politics is its simplicity. This lack of complication, this failure to achieve a high level of articulation of the functions of the state, is also in perfect consonance with the set of traditional values still pertaining. While the structure of the economic institution has managed a fairly high degree of modernization despite the continued rooting of certain functions in an older order, the political institution has remained much more intimately related both to pre-national structures as well as functions. Charisma, the charm factor of personalism, remains the only certain way of gaining mass support for political movements; if the manifest leaders do not possess charisma, then they must rely on the play of naked force to maintain authority. Recent history supports this statement unequivocally. The military dictatorship of 1930-31 of General José E. Uriburu, although based on a fair degree of popular support to begin with, ended as a mere military adventure. Succeeding Conservative governments depended on simple electoral fraud to give their governance a semblance of democratic legitimacy, but their authority stemmed from a combination of economic and military power.[3] The return of the military to direct government occurred in 1943, once again made possible and -- to military eyes -- seemingly "necessary" by the utter simplicity of the patterns of power distribution and the shrunken universe of political discourse recognized as pertinent. The emergence of Perón and his attractiveness to certain parts of the public -- a political magnetism not seen in the country since the days of Radical Yrigoyen (1916-22 and 1927-30) -- added other dimensions of power, but still the fall of Peronism was essentially a response to changes in the views of certain leaders and not to the complex, sweeping movements which one attributes to truly national politics. The succeeding Provisional Government of

3. It is not necessary to list the standard works on recent Argentine political developments. Specialists already know them, and any non-specialist can find them easily enough. I might mention only a very recent work of merit, Alfredo Galletti, La Realidad Argentina en el Siglo XX: I La Política y los Partidos, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961. Otherwise, see Fillol, op cit, and the appropriate works of A. P. Whitaker, G. I. Blanksten, J. J. Johnson, J. J. Kennedy, R. Alexander et al.

President Aramburu (1955 to 1958) made no pretense of being other than a temporary military government, even though it earned widespread praise and support among middle and upper class groups. The present administration of Arturo Frondizi has once again been unable to bank on the mechanisms of a plural society recognizing differing degrees and levels of approval and disapproval, instead being forced to play about among all too evident power centers to maintain an at times most precarious existence. For the past thirty-one years, Argentine governments have shown either the hard surface of military rule or the mottled aspect of Machiavellian balancing, bargaining, and intriguing.

Perhaps nowhere is this disconcerting political absoluteness -- another way of saying simplicity -- made so evident as in the manner in which political parties themselves see their functions. Instead of viewing themselves as the guardians of a part of the truth and as holding a limited responsibility for the nation's destinies, parties are used either as the vessels of universal truth or as simple mechanisms with which to gain power. Even the quasi-official historian of the Radical Party, the most professional of all Argentine parties, permits himself these words:[4]

> ". . .we are not just a political party. . .we are a force of national and continental history which consists in imparting constitutionality to Independence. . .in giving to the Nation through its people firm bases for its authentic development, which conceives of the Republic as a moral idea. . ."

This Messianic view of politics leaves no room for a legitimate opposition; the erection of an ideological structure on moral grounds viewed as universal condemns dissenting voices to heresy, and not to mere human error. The dismaying inclusiveness of this view of Radicalism is really no less than the bald statement made by General Rawson the day after he led the military to overt power in 1943: "Now there are no political parties, but only Argentines." In his turn Perón employed his newly erected party structure as a direct arm of government, as in totalitarian situations. And even though the succeeding military interregnum actually encouraged a limited play of party politics, official proclamations deplored such activities, clearly implying a belief in the innately evil nature of parties.[5]

> ". . .And finally, we appeal to all the inhabitants of the Republic to postpone all tendentious and partisan interest to the higher interests of the collectivity. Let republican austerity be the guide of our conduct and let solidarity in the common effort permit the prompt gaining of those ends for which our people long."

And now the incumbent, Arturo Frondizi, the first civilian honestly elected to the presidency since 1927, demonstrates the same implied disdain for party politics by his constantly reiterated statement that he is the "President of twenty

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4. From Gabriel del Mazo, El Radicalismo: Ensayo sobre su historia y doctrina, 2nd ed., Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1951, as quoted in Galletti, op cit, p. 40.

5. Message prepared by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu on assuming the Provisional Presidency of the Nation after the deposition of General Eduardo Lonardi in 1955, as quoted in Galletti, op cit, p. 209.

million Argentines," and not the exponent of a self-consistent and necessarily only partially valid set of views supported by a continuing, responsible, and extended party organization.

The directness of the manner in which political power is applied is also evident within the government itself. The strong executive pattern is a constant, the judiciary being relatively weak and without prestige, and the legislature never at any time having been able to exercise the deciding voice in the setting of public policy. Fundamental decisions are made within the executive establishment itself, where pressures continue to focus and where the true deliberative function occurs. Although there are rudimentary interest groups established outside the formal organization of government, pressure groups of importance extend their heads directly into the governmental structure itself. The military, the single most important source and avenue of pressure, of course represents other groups and ideologies as well as merely its own professional interests. As a consequence all aspiring interests attempt to exercise influence over the armed establishment; even far leftists sometimes wistfully speak of the possibility of talking some disgruntled level of the army over to their point of view. The Church, agrarian interests, industrial groups, and the labor unions all bring their plaints and their points of view to bear directly on the executive, at best using the legislature as a sounding board and the courts, when possible, as some kind of interim source of juridical legitimacy.

The workings of the mechanism are transparent, the channels of access clear, and the results plain to all through the activities of the media of mass communications and the pronouncements of the interested parties themselves. But this simplicity of articulation does not make the executive omnipotent. Executive decisions, however they may have been reached and with what concessions, may be in themselves the decisive political acts of the state, but they are limited in their scope and effectiveness by the very simplicity of the structure. In short, the Argentine government is intrinsically weak,[6] a debility stemming from several fundamental causes:

First, the political institution is simplified, as we have been pointing out, so that not only are decisions a response to the crudest of pressures, but there can be no subtlety or refinement in the application of political measures throughout the society.

Second, the state is not established as the ultimate secular authority in Argentina. There are other competing institutions demanding men's loyalties which permit a high degree of protection from the dictates of the state. Although the Church immediately springs to mind, the matter is much more complicated. A failure to recognize the supremacy of the state in the mediation of secular dispute leaves many areas of life, such as the family, outside the reach of governmental deter-

6. The fact that President Frondizi made a direct and profound about-face in policy shortly after his election is rather a measure of weakness than strength, not only because the change was in partial response to alien pressures but also because his own followers were powerless to stop him. If the Radical Intransigents had not the power to prevent the change, then it follows that they have not the strength to support their own president, and that he has little bargaining power with which to face his ideological opponents.

mination. Class status also plays a fundamental part in the varying application of the law, as does simple economic position. The impunity enjoyed by the far-right scions of upper class families for their racist demonstrations, shootings, bombings, and burnings are undeniable evidence of this statement.

And third, the combination of a simplified structure and a lack of acceptance of a broad social area as legitimate to political action reduces the amount of anticipated obedience any Argentine government can expect, increasing the need for direct police and military enforcement of the law, or else permitting a highly effective degree of laissez-passer in such daily events of life as parking a car or painting political slogans on walls. This executive dependency on the police and the weakness of the legislature were well exemplified in mid-1961 when the police peppered the Congress building with small-arms fire in a protest concerning equipment and pay, incidentally at the time Congress was considering charges of police torture. Their punishment was a salary increase.

Simplicity, party weakness, the immediacy of action of pressure groups, and an exaggerated dependence on direct sanction within a severely limited sphere all describe aspects of traditional Mediterranean political thought and practise, and especially of syndicalism. An innate distrust of the state coupled with the direct representation of economic and occupational interest in the government are destructive of party strength, erode pluralism, deny the sweeping grandeur possible to enlightened political action in its broadest senses, and lead easily to such subsidiary ideologies as Fascism and Falangism, whose very symbols of course celebrate the tenuous tying together of vertical organizations. The denial of lateral identifications, the insistence on hierarchy, and a creole version of the Führerprinzip combine in Argentina to the detriment of decided and imaginative governmental action.

Peronism and Limitations on the Leadership Role. The Argentine leader cannot create a modern set of national values by signing a decree or speaking from a balcony. He can extend the effectiveness of his government by chipping at the power of rival institutions only through the exercise of great skill and effort. Unless he whips together a mass movement striving for frank and complete revolutionary change -- an unlikely event at least for the immediate future -- then he is restricted to the employment of two types of authority: he can derive his power from the existing play of intra- and inter-institutional forces, or else he can attempt to amend this situation by gaining external power through the mobilization of mass public opinion. In matters of program, as distinguished from the question of the configuration of his support, he is restricted to the path of administering the movement of the tides of the status quo or to a mild reformism. In explaining his actions to himself and others, however, he can indulge in the strongest of ideological statement from center-left to right in tone, or else be a simple eclectic. But no matter what his power basis, the profundity or the superficiality of his program, or the style of his explanations, the non-revolutionary leader cannot escape the limitation that he is leading a people of traditional values flexing the muscles of a substantially developed economy.[7]

7. Little attention is being paid in this analysis to the political left. The reason is that we are not considering the possibility of social revolution, rather limiting ourselves to the possibilities inherent to non-revolutionary governments. The Argentine left has but the scantest of chances to mount a fullblown revolution, and has practically closed off for itself the possibility

These hindrances apply to Perón as well as to his successors. The problem of categorization here becomes acute, for if the foregoing analysis is correct, then the Peronist government was not effectively totalitarian, whatever other unhappy things it may have been. A totalitarian state employs the political institution to work its will directly upon the citizen without the interference of intervening buffer institutions or of the restraints of a rule of law or a less than universal ideological justification. These institutional conditions simply did not prevail in Argentina between 1946 and 1955, although the lack of juridical and ideological constraint did exist and still does.

Even if we use secondary descriptive criteria of totalitarianism derived specifically from the European Fascist examples, the Argentine experience diverges in significant points. Specifically:

The middle-class base for German and Italian Fascism is contrasted in Argentina with the mass lower class backing for Peronism, with significant middle class groups also involved and, as shall be seen later, even persons of upper class extraction made themselves available for leadership positions.

The relatively high degree of technology necessary for police state control, eminently true of Nazi Germany, could not be said to describe Argentina; even Italian Fascism lost some of its effectiveness by an institutional "leakiness" caused by technological deficiencies.

Charisma was of great importance in the three systems, but in Argentina the full measure of organizational consequences did not flow therefrom, especially in the internal administrative operation of the government.

A mystical ideology of nationalism was also true of the three governments, but Argentine justicialismo was almost an after-thought, an intellectual appendage to justify the "leadership principle." Argentine nationalism was largely restricted to attacks on foreign countries in speech and press, and to mystical glorification of the nation, but devoted itself little to the task of assuring the relative position of the state as the supreme social institution.

Militarism was of course an important component of Peronism as of German and Italian Fascism, for Perón assumed power primarily as the result of his

for sound parliamentary action. Leftist leaders are no less the captives of their culture than their political opponents. They have delivered themselves up to endless bickering, conspiratorial practises, unreal policies, and short-lived coalitions entered upon through wishful thinking instead of through a real concord of belief and interest. Fidelismo has also served to accentuate romantic dreams and to underscore the extra-national nature of the left in a country crying for a degree of healthy national integration. The dissolution of the left Socialists and Radicals, Communists, Trotskyists and other left splinters was also hastened by the actions of President Frondizi, who succeeded in persuading many of them that he would be a left-leaning president, only to present them after his inauguration with much conservatism and a caricature of their own economic determinism. The left has little real hope of gaining the support of the former peronistas and their middle class leadership by and large has made itself inefficacious in normal politics by a denial of elementary respect for the principles of Liberal political procedures, their only hope for a sound and productive political survival. And, of course, let us not forget the power and determination of their political opponents in their containment.

military position and previous actions of the armed forces. But, of course, both Hitler and Mussolini assumed power in some measure despite the military, and employed their armed might for war, a purpose alien to the ideas of Perón despite brave words about Argentine hegemony in the Southern part of the continent.

A controlled economy -- the total identification between economic and political interests and the growing indistinguishability of controlling personnel in Italy and Germany -- was not matched in Argentina. Despite governmental interventionism at the highest level of Argentina's history, the Argentines did not succeed in surpassing the degree of control reached in Chile and Mexico, and perhaps even in Uruguay. Although Peronism did recruit some new millionaires from its own ranks, it is difficult to say whether the results were substantially different from this same kind of political insurance as practised in other Latin American countries. In any event, Peronism contributed to building a new class of industrialists, but stopped far short of dispossessing pre-existing wealthy groups or instituting total mobilization of the economy for national ends. The motivation for the economic measures of Peronism rested in nationalism as in the Mexican case, in statism as throughout Latin America, in anticapitalism as an almost universal article of faith among both conservatives and leftists in Latin America, and probably only in a very minor degree on any self-conscious ideological principles concerning the economic role in a Fascist society.

Racism was entirely incidental to Peronism, even more marginal than it was to Italian Fascism.

Because Peronism went outside the preexisting power structure to build popular support among lower class groups herded into captive trade unions, some observers have attempted to save the totalitarian category by labelling the movement as "Fascism of the Left." S. M. Lipset, for example, writes:[8]

"[Another]. . .type of social movement which has often been described as fascist is Peronism. . .Unlike right-wing antidemocratic tendencies based on the more well-to-do and traditionalist strata and those tendencies I prefer to call "true" fascism -- centrist authoritarianism, based on the liberal middle classes, primarily the self-employed -- Peronism, much like Marxist parties, has been oriented toward the poorer classes, primarily urban workers but also the more impoverished rural population.* * *

"The phenomenon known as Peronism -- anticapitalist populist nationalism which appeals to the lower strata in alignment with the army -- is, of course, not unique to the Argentine. In Brazil, Getulio Vargas developed the same theme a decade earlier, was also identified with fascism, and continued to retain the support of the workers after he left power. . . If Peronism is considered a variant of fascism, then it is a fascism of the left because it is based on the social strata who would otherwise turn to socialism or Communism as an outlet for their frustrations."

Several very serious quarrels can be picked with this statement, the most

8. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, New York: Doubleday, 1960, pp. 170-73 passim.

important being the loose and interchangeable use of "fascist," "authoritarian," and "totalitarian." All fascisms and totalitarianisms are of course authoritarian, but not all authoritarianisms are totalitarianisms and fascisms. Peronism employed the ideology and the public style of fascism, but performed no revolutionary functions in a class or structural sense, governed internally by juggling already existing power centers in a fashion typical of states in immediately pre-national situations, and above all was unable to establish the unquestioned supremacy of the state. The regime even toppled in traditional semi-developed Latin American style, victim of a coup d'etat led by a military vanguard and supported by an important and significant body of public sentiment.

Peronism did succeed in setting class against class more sharply than in any other period of Argentine history. It clearly counterposed liberty and authority and opted for the latter; it also in more hidden fashion opposed honesty to dishonesty, and also chose the latter in all senses. Reason, too, was made to cede to demagoguery. Peronism did not change the relative position of Argentina's social classes, although it did squeeze them together and temporarily reduce social distance in psychological as well as economic senses. The regime did not change the land tenure system or the prevailing patterns of the distribution of great wealth. Although the style and ideology of leadership changed, the recruitment patterns changed only slightly, and the sources of succeeding opposition leaders were unaffected after all is said and done. Not even the prevailing distribution of opposition parties was effectively destroyed, for they all returned to their usual sickly bloom within a year after the fall of the dictator. These "accomplishments" of Peronism do not describe the workings of a totalitarian fascism.

Peronism responded to several basic needs in Argentine political life, and succeeded in betraying all of them. Any reasonably modern society must somehow recognize and make provision for the desire of large groups of citizens to participate in the civil experience; Argentina also urgently needs some kind of national, integrated identity, and a means for the routine settlement of secular dispute. Perón gained outside support by promising to meet these desires and by devising a poor man's fascist ideology to explain his actions. But through inefficacy, a failure to understand why he really gained mass support, and his ultimate reliance on traditional sources of power, he perverted what might have been positive in his policies and left his country with the twisting legacy of a lower class infected with fascist political beliefs. And by denying even the traditionally thin Liberalism to which middle and upper groups had become accustomed, his kind of authoritarianism guaranteed the hatred even of wavering Argentine democrats.

> "The Argentine political tragedy resides in the fact that the political integration of the popular classes was initiated under the sign of totalitarianism which succeeded in providing, in its fashion, a certain experience of political and social participation in the immediate and personal aspects of the life of the worker, nullifying at the same time the political organization and the basic rights which constitute the irreplaceable pillars of any genuine democracy. The immense task to be carried out consists in gaining this same experience, but relating it in an indissoluble manner to the theory and practise of democracy and freedom."[9]

9. Gino Germani, Política e Massa, Minas Gerais: Estudos Sociais e Políticas da Faculdade de Direito No. 13, 1960, p. 189.

Peronism, if this analysis be correct, boils itself down to an early and bumbling type of Nasserist authoritarianism, a self-conscious attempt by dissident members of the elite and near-elite to employ their power toward the end of creating politically nationalist, economically statist industrial societies, but in Argentina not really prepared to use their power to break traditional molds in favor of their ideological view of modernism, as appears to be the determination of the government of Nasser. Perón indubitably failed because his government did not understand the magnitude of its task, his ideological manipulation of the lower economic groups in the last analysis being no more than a cynical political ploy.

The importance of Peronism should not be underestimated, however. The effects were profound precisely in those two areas least strongly inhibited by institutionalized power -- ideology and style. Unable as Perón was to change the basic contradictions in the structure of social values, economic practises, and mass vs traditional politics, his ideological prods and his simulacrum of populism have left these problems inflamed, a continuing source of infection and pain. Not only did the dispossessed become aware of their status and taste some of the fruits of an artificial participation, but now even the integrated middle and upper groups are willing to admit to the possible alienation of some of their fellow citizens.

Dismantling the work of the Perón administration in an organizational and immediate policy sense was not an inordinately difficult task, and certainly nothing to compare with what would have been a transition from totalitarianism to limited democracy. Despite the damage he wreaked on the nation's economy, there is good reason to believe that many of the difficulties would have existed even without the maldirected interventionism of the Perón era.[10] The constitution of 1949 was calmly repealed, elections organized, and by early 1958 the government was legally reconstituted in regular fashion. Ideological confusion hinders leadership in gaining popular support, but since both policy horizons and public power remain limited, the play of politics continues to deal with problems manipulatively and superficially. The great difference between the Perón and the post-Perón period lies in the present greater freedom of speculation, the enlarged area of liberties. Although large numbers of blue collar workers continue to deny themselves the possibility of effective organization by clinging to their Peronism, and although antidemocratic forces continue to gain strength in many significant sectors of the society, the mere existence of even a little libertarian elbow room opens the range of political possibilities. Stable continued growth toward a more significant and truly institutionalized degree of mature democracy is still far from assured, however.

The manifest political leaders: 1947, 1954, 1956, 1960. The preceding analysis of the area of action within which recent Argentine governments have acted cannot be validated only by an examination of the antecedents and occupational histories of political leaders. Even deep social psychological analysis would be inadequate, of course, for we should still be unable to relate personal intention to political product without prolonged research into many other aspects of political life. Sharp differences between Peronist and post-Peronist leaders, however, should lead us to suspect that perhaps the emphasis this paper is putting on ideological and stylistic

10. This view is common among many Argentine economists. See, for example, Leopoldo Portnoy, op cit., especially Chs. 2 and 3.

differences and problem area and institutional likenesses is not well taken. Were Peronism the truly revolutionary government which a totalitarian fascism implies, we should expect young leaders, strong differences in educational background from their predecessors and successors, markedly dissimilar family antecedents, and extraordinary personal histories to support the hypothesis. In short, we should suspect that persons who reject an existing order strongly enough to attempt to change it by totalitarian means must demonstrate areas of great marginality; we should be able to infer resentments, unsatisfied desires, and great ambitions.

The task of determining who are the political leaders in Argentina is not a subtle process, even though the precautionary measure is being taken here of speaking only of manifest political leadership. Greater caution still might be exercised by drawing a theoretical distinction between leaders and the exercisers of power. But in Argentina manifest leadership is real leadership and also involves the power to make political decisions. Given the nature of the state and the strength of competing institutions, of course, many persons not formal members of the political institution obviously weigh heavily in the taking of such determinations as whether or not meat shall be marketed internationally through the agency of a governmental monopoly, or whether private universities should be allowed to grant degrees. This study does not concern itself with the "power elite" as a whole, but only with that part of it which acts in formal governmental positions. As will be seen from an examination of some of the most obvious social characteristics of these persons, there is little reason to suppose that their extra-political colleagues are substantially dissimilar.

I have selected for examination persons occupying key governmental positions during four periods. The positions chosen were President and Vice-President of the Nation, Cabinet Ministers and Secretaries, Justices of the Supreme Court, members of the governing committees (mesas directivas) of the two houses of the legislature, governors (whether locally elected or appointed by the national executive) of the Provinces of Buenos Aires, Mendoza, Córdoba, and Santa Fé, selected members of the board of the Central Bank, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the federal Chief of Police. The periods selected were all for the month of July in the years 1947 (after the initial shaking down of the first Perón government, which took office in 1946), 1954 (one year before the fall of Perón to see the changes that may have occurred as his regime progressed), 1956 (in the midst of the rule of the Liberating Revolution), and 1960 (after 25 months of constitutional civil rule). There were 41 cases filled for 1947, 46 for 1954, 40 for 1956 when there was no Congress, and 41 for 1960; ten of the Peronist regime figures were the same in 1954 and 1947, although occupying different positions in all but two cases.[11]

Age distribution shows what is to be expected: the 1947 Peronist leaders were the youngest (median age 48 years and ten months), increasing to 50 years and nine months in 1954. The Provisional Government, tapping persons who in many cases had been prominent before the advent of Peronism, had leading members of a median age of 53 years and four months, while the present administration in 1960 was still a little older, 54 years and three months.[12] These ages are relatively

11. I owe thanks to the personnel of the morgues of the newspapers La Nación and Clarín for their assistance. Other sources of data were were the Argentine Who's Who and Blue Book.

12. The average ages, in contrast to the medians expressed above, are somewhat different because of the skewing effect caused by a few quite old leaders in their seventies, of course not counterbalanced by very young persons. The averages for the four periods respectively are 51 years three months, 49 years six months, 56 years one month, and 58 years one month. The median gives a more realistic impression in this case.

advanced for Latin America, but of course to be expected in Argentina, where life expectancy among city dwellers is high and the tradition of maturity among political leaders of long establishment. We find essentially what we expect, of course, the Perón group being only a little younger and representing both in the military and civilian spheres persons who lacked the final step to cap their careers. Perón was a member of the so-called "Colonel's Clique," as will be remembered, a group which as its very name indicates was waiting to be invested with the insignia of general rank. But no true generational conflict reveals itself from these figures.

Birthplace holds only one surprise. In 1947 about two-thirds of the leading government personnel were born in the provinces, the remainder in Buenos Aires; in 1954 the division is about equal. The same more or less 50-50 split occurred in the Provisional Government, and in 1960 the government returned to a two-thirds preponderance in favor of the provinces. The 1960 increase in the number of persons born in the provinces appointed or elected to high position is a natural corollary of the return to civilian government and the ascendency of a national political party owing favors to constituents throughout the land. The 1947 experience probably answers to the same considerations, for at that time Peronism was in the first blush of its pseudo-populism and appealing strongly for support to provincials. Probably the most significant aspect of these figures is that only two persons of the total of 168 were foreign-born, one in Italy (from whence about half of Argentina's recent migrants come), and one from Spain (providing about a third of the immigrants). The following chart indicates how impressive was mass migration to Argentina in purely quantitative terms.

Native and Foreign-Born Males Over 20 Years of Age in Buenos Aires and Selected Provinces -- 1869-1947 in absolute numbers

Years	City of Buenos Aires		Provinces of Bs. As., Sta. Fé, Córdoba, E. Ríos, La Pampa, Mendoza	
	Native	Foreign	Native	Foreign
1869	12,000	48,000	———	----
1895	42,000	174,000	287,000	309,000
1914	119,000	404,000	557,000	752,000
1947	614,000	433,000	2,115,000	747,000

Source: Gino Germani, with the cooperation of Jorge Graciarena and Miguel Murmis, "La asimilación de los inmigrantes en la Argentina y el fenómeno del regreso de la inmigración reciente," Depto. de Sociología de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, pub. int. No. 14, mimeographed, p. 29. Ultimate source: national censuses.

The relative similarity of ages and the astonishing failure of persons to emerge from the great numbers of the foreign born to assume high political office are preliminary indicators of a similarity of style throughout the four periods suggesting the stubborn narrowness of the terms of political availability in Argentina. This striking likeness holds throughout the succeeding analysis. Unfortunately the data on social extraction of the leaders are insufficient to permit us to speak with surety about their mobility paths. This lack is lamentable, especially because of the possibility that many of the Peronists were sons of immigrants seeking the political or the politico-military path to assure a social status equal to the economic positions of their fathers. What information can be trusted on the social position of parents indicates that during the Perón period at least half the leaders were from middle, upper middle, or upper class parents. A very few were from modest surroundings. A reasonable guess would place those

concerning whom we do not have full information also in the middle and upper groups, whether at the provincial or national levels, particularly because of their occupations and educational levels, as will be seen immediately below.

The 1956 group appears more heavily weighted in favor of persons of traditional upper and upper middle class origins, with perhaps a slight tendency to spread downward once again in 1960. Certainly the thesis cannot be entertained that Peronist leadership was of humble origins; there can be no question but that the heavily preponderant source of Argentine leadership during the four periods was from among the children of middle and upper class parents, more or less evenly divided between provincial and Buenos Aires families.

This conclusion is strengthened by a glance at the occupational and educational histories of the leaders. In 1947 some 81 per cent had graduated either from a university or from one or another national military academy; in 1954 the figure was 83.5 per cent; the Liberating Revolutionary period saw 95 per cent in these categories, and in 1960 the figure went to a round 100 per cent.

Educational Records of Argentine Leaders in Selected Years

	1947		1954		1956		1960	
Type of Training	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
University	59	24	70	32	60	24	83	34
Military/Naval/Air	22	9	13.5	6	35	14	17	7
Secondary	5	2	6.5	3	2.5	1	--	--
Primary	5	2	2.5	1	--	--	--	--
Not ascertained With Surety	10	4	6.5	3	2.5	1	--	--

The ability to be graduated from a university or one of the military academies is an almost certain indicator in Argentina of parents in economically comfortable or at least socially prestigious circumstances. The census of the University of Buenos Aires carried out in October 1958 indicates that only 5.4 per cent of the students had fathers in blue collar occupations, and that only 8.3 per cent of their grandfathers were in similarly humble occupations.[13] Ten per cent of the parents were college graduates themselves. Because the census included all students, of course, and because the drop-out rate in some branches of the university is well past 80 per cent, it may reasonably be supposed that the persons who succeed in graduating demonstrate in even more marked degree the function of the university in ratifying preexisting socioeconomic status.

An examination of the principal occupations of the leaders reveals conclusions parallel to those concerning education: the heavy preponderance of persons with higher education during Peronism climbing steadily to the absolute of 1960 accompanies a similarly growing number of professionals and career military officers. These two categories (professionals and military) accounted for 70.2 per cent of the leaders in 1947, 80.5 per cent in 1954, and 95 per cent both in 1956 and 1960. The objective breakdown is as in the following chart:

13. Universidad de Buenos Aires, Censo Universitario, 1959, pp. 111-114.

Principal Occupations of Argentine Leaders in Selected Years

Occupation	1947	1954	1956	1960
Lawyer	15	12	12	21
Career military officer	9	7	14	5
Physician	4	8	4	2
Manufacturer	3	--	--	1
Dentist	1	1	--	--
Agronomist	1	--	--	--
Professor	1	2	3	3
Accountant; Economist	1	3	1	2
Rancher	1	--	--	--
White collar employee	1	3	--	--
Labor Organizer	1	1	--	--
Professional Politician	--	1	1	--
Journalist	--	--	--	1
Engineer	--	3	4	6
Diplomat	--	1	--	--
Secondary Teacher	--	1	--	--
Career Police Officer	--	1	--	--
Not Ascertained With Surety	3	2	1	--

The commanding position of lawyers is to be expected, as is the varying number of military men, naturally reaching its peak with the military government of President Aramburu. The greater occupational spread under Peronism is once again in response to his function as a partial innovator and the builder of a new political party, while the later shrinking to a more restricted and standard occupational distribution reflects the return to normalcy and more complete traditionalism. Because the chart is restricted to principal occupations, those persons who may be physicians as well as large landowners, for example, or who denominate themselves as "lawyers, professors, and diplomats," reveal themselves only once. Multiple occupations are much more important in the 1956 period than in any of the others, as is to be expected, and of course there are many more persons owning estates than appears. The criterion of "principal occupation" for non-professional politicians was essentially that from which the individual's primary prestige derives and to which he devotes most of his time; in the case of the professional politicians, their principal source of income during periods when they were out of office was allowed to govern. Only one person on the list earned his income directly from party sources. Thus President Frondizi, a professional politician of course, was listed as a lawyer because it was through the exercise of this profession that he earned a living before taking office.

The career paths of the professionals and the military are almost exactly the same for the four periods, except for the accidents of history which caused some to interrupt their careers at one time, others at another. In almost every case professionals have dedicated themselves to teaching, some beginning at the secondary level but most initiating their academic careers as assistants to distinguished professors. Some have worked in the provinces at the beginning of their careers, even some persons born in Buenos Aires, but virtually all have reached the pinnacle of their professional careers in some kind of intimate association with the capital. Extensive travel is common to almost all; few have studied formally abroad, but international conferences see these persons in steady attendance. Some have gained international repute in their professional fields, and at least half have authored

books. Without exception the civilians who participated in the 1956 and 1960 governments had to suspend their public activities during Peronism; they withdrew or were discharged from their university and governmental positions and a few went into exile, although most of them continued to pursue their professional careers privately. Civilians who served in the Perón governments also found themselves cast out of formal political office, if not in worse condition, when the wheel turned.

The military line divides itself in two: those who pursued relatively normal careers throughout the Peronist period and thus were in a position to mobilize troops, airplanes, and ships when the moment for the overthrow came, and those who went into retirement, in almost every case immediately following or within a year of the ill-fated "Menéndez Revolt" of 1951. Once again we find great consistency: overseas missions and positions as military or naval attache usually serve as the first really marked opening into high prestige status, with subsidiary careers developing as professors in the various training academies, troop or ship commands, and so forth into the ministerial level or the "interventorship" of a province. The major difference between Peronist and post-Peronist military officers is that most of the former took their last steps upward during the course of the Perón regime, while those of the latter who continued on active duty through the Perón period had their "careers made," as they also say in Spanish, by the time of the revolution. Those who retired in 1951 and 1952 and then returned to important position enjoyed almost immediate promotion, of course, and many were granted reinstatement with seniority as of the date of their retirement.

The relatively small number of persons in the Peronist governments who did not follow these normal life paths sprang from many diverse origins, owing their ascent to their own ambitions and attitudes as well as to the need of the government to support its "black populism" with individuals to fit the style of the ideology and to serve as living demonstration of the identification of the lower groups with the exalted sphere of government. These persons define the very limited extent to which the Weberian definition of the charismatic corporate group implanted itself within the administrative machine itself.[14]

> "The corporate group which is subject to charismatic authority is based on an emotional form of communal relationship. The administrative staff of a charismatic leader does not consist of 'officials'; at least its members are not technically trained. It is not chosen on the basis of social privilege nor from the point of view of domestic or personal dependency. It is rather chosen in terms of the charismatic qualities of its members. The prophet has his disciples; the war lord his selected henchmen; the leader, generally, his followers. There is no such thing as 'appointment' or 'dismissal,' no career, no promotion. There is only a 'call' at the instance of the leader... There is no hierarchy. . .There is no such thing as a definite sphere of authority and of competence, and no appropriation of official powers on the basis of social privileges. . ."

How little the Peronist leadership group really responds to this definition of the charismatic corporate type is evident, except for the reduced number of special cases. The growing normalization of the bureaucracy is apparent even in

14. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, tr. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Glencoe: The Free Press, p. 360.

the course of the decline of Perón, and of course comes to full bloom in 1960. The rules of the career game were preserved in their essence throughout the thirteen years of Argentine history we have been examining. The leaders continued to adjust themselves to the appreciation of the attributes of prestige common to Argentina; those who rose into the political hierarchy on the wings of the Peronist appeal used their positions to advance their careers as university professors, to travel, to complete the prestige image. The institutions conquered them, willing as they were; they themselves changed the institutions very little, and certainly not enough in the case of the Peronists to guarantee their own survival -- obviously.

The Presidents and Their Alter-Egos. No word has yet been said about famed Eva Perón whose presence and ideology imparted so much of the tone to her husband's administration until her death in 1952. She does not enter into our statistics, for she held no formal position fitting our definition of "manifest" leadership. Her attempt to present herself as a vice-presidential candidate in 1951 failed before the pressure of many within the Perón camp as well as without, but plainly she was a person of power and a key figure in the leadership constellation of the regime. Had she appeared in the statistics, her presence would have changed the averages: she was young, dying at the age of 33; she had little formal education; her occupation was that of entertainer. Her personal history is in sharp contrast with that of her husband, whose military career followed quite normal Argentine lines. Perón was born in 1895 in a small town in the Province of Buenos Aires. Some doubt concerns his origins, but at least his father was well enough placed to see his son graduated from the National Military College in 1913. After the military coup of 1930 his star began to shine brightly. In that year he became the private secretary of the Minister of War, a post he held for five years, and also was appointed professor of military history in the Superior War College, a chair he occupied until 1936. In that year he was appointed military attaché in Chile. After a few intermediate incidents, he was sent to Italy from 1939 to 1941, where he bettered his professional knowledge of mountain fighting and sought to observe some political lessons. Returned to Argentina, he was given troop commands in Mendoza, nestled in the skirts of the Andes. With the military revolt of 1943 he assumed important political posts and then, with imposing difficulties here and there along the way, swept into the presidency in the elections of 1946, winner by a solid majority.

The partnership was plain: as his primary task the President kept the institutional store, while his wife took a populist ideology to the lower class and funneled power back to the government. Rarely indeed are we privileged to watch a contradiction work itself out to the last resolving chord, as in the fall of Perón. With Church, military, landowners, and large parts of the middle class ranked against him at the end, he had clearly to choose between the ideology he had espoused and the institutional loyalties to which he had remained tied. He could have attempted to distribute arms to the trade unions, a step which would have unleashed the class war his ideology propelled and his measures were too ill-designed to make unecessary. Instead he chose to continue juggling among the clusters of formal power, and of course guaranteed his downfall.

In a strange fashion the two succeeding administrations we have been examining also were headed by presidents who made use of extremely important leaders to round out what we may call the personalities of their governments. General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, Provisional President from 1955 to 1958, was seconded by Admiral Isaac F.

Rojas as Vice-President, both differing in styles and certain political policies. The two men had distinguished careers, acting as attachés overseas and as professors and directors of academies, as well as having important commands entrusted to them. They both also remained on active duty throughout the Perón period, and thus took important parts in the rebellion. President Aramburu dedicated himself to a restructuring of constitutional rule and insisted on holding two elections, the second of which returned the presidential election to a person not favored by the provisional rulers. Vice-President Rojas is what is called in Argentina a "gorilla." Although the term is a relative one, changing with the times, it refers primarily to a person who believes in the forcible institution of Liberalism, who is extremely anti-Peronist, and is willing to see the military enforce political measures on the nation if need be. Although Aramburu also qualifies as a "gorilla," of course, his position was much more moderate than that of Rojas. In the interaction of the Provisional Government, Aramburu represented the center moderates and certain sectors of the democratic left, while Rojas appealed more to the traditionally Liberal right.

The same Janus-like appearance characterized the Frondizi administration in 1960, when the President was backstopped by a Minister of Economy (also called the Prime Minister in jest) who earlier had been a most severe critic of Mr. Frondizi. The President, born in Corrientes in 1908 of immigrant parents who had achieved a comfortable position in the provinces, was graduated from the School of Law of the University of Buenos Aires in 1929. He then embarked on an active life as lecturer, practising attorney, editor and publisher, and politician. He was a national deputy for the capital from 1946 to 1952 and ran for the vice-presidency in 1951. He was elected President of the Nation in 1958 against the desires of the Provisional Government with a reputation as something of a left-leaning intellectual, anti-clerical, and so forth. For a series of reasons still mysterious to many, Frondizi soon after his inauguration adopted a series of conservative economic and social policies. To guarantee his integrity in this change, he had to appoint an electoral opponent, Alvaro C. Alsogaray, an outspoken and indubitably honest exponent of a purist's version of economic Liberalism. Mr. Alsogaray, born in 1913 in the Province of Santa Fé, first went through military training and on completion studied engineering at the University of Córdoba. He taught in military schools, addressed himself to private undertakings, was President of the Argentine Merchant Air Fleet from 1949 to 1950, and then retired from public life until his reappearance as Subsecretary of the Ministry of Commerce in 1955; he was also Minister of Industries from 1955 to 1956. Appointed Minister of Economy by Frondizi and given a guaranteed free hand, his function was not only to redirect the economy along <u>laissez-faire</u> lines but also by his presence and his conviction and his known personality to inspire faith in the new political look.

In all three cases we find the same -- the unsolved problems below, the immense weight of institutional continuity and essential governmental weakness pressing from above, and the necessity to explain actions of one kind with ideologies of another. These three immutable guides to Argentine political life help to explain the continuity of the three regimes and to condition our views of future possibilities

* * * * *

To attempt to discriminate among several types of authoritarianism is no mere intellectual game. In both professional and lay spheres there has been too much lazy satisfaction with simply dividing the world into good democracies and

bad dictatorships, with the added modern fillip of welcoming some dictatorships because we like them or because we say nothing else is possible to certain lands other than one kind of dictatorship or another. But of course there are few things so important to developing nations as the kind of authoritarianism they have, or to put it in perhaps less loaded words, the kind of a-democratic situation under which they must live. Certainly to confuse a fascist totalitarianism with a Nasserist or Peronist dictatorship has important consequences: it is a muddling of our thinking, to begin with; we make it difficult to judge events as they are occurring in Asia and Africa; and we confuse our ethical ability to judge good and bad, assuming we wish to permit ourselves a judgment. We also trammel our analyses of the leadership function, for what determines policy is not only the interplay of leaders and followers, but also the power of the governmental institution being employed.

There are degrees and degrees of constraint. An authoritarian government which is the least authoritarian it can manage to be is what we should favor if we like democratic solutions. Peronism was by conviction totalitarian, by practise a kind of caudillistic police state, by social philosophy cheaply paternalistic, and by economic doctrine a kind of semi-state monopolistic pre-capitalism. The successor governments have been less authoritarian than they could have been, and not so libertarian as they should have been.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF GERMAN UNIVERSITIES TO POLITICAL THEORY

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I understand "political theory" in a cosmopolitan (or, better, "cosmopolitical") sense. Even if there have been periods in which national or other parochial theories existed, the present is none such. A global corpus of political theory exists today, and theories not somehow related to that body are of little interest and probably not political. The question, therefore, that I have been asked to answer, is this: What have German universities contributed to this corpus of political theory?

"Germany" has been a short-lived national state (1871-1945). Universities in Germany, with very few exceptions, were founded long before the national German state, which they have outlived. Virtually all contributions to political theory that have come from Germany have come from the universities. The most significant contributions have come from university professors. Some others were made by men whose university education or affiliation was more important for them, and is more important for gaining an understanding of them, than their political involvement. In this respect as in others, the contribution of the German universities differs markedly from that of universities in England and the United States, the two other countries considered by this panel.

Part I will consider some major contributions. Part II will try to isolate some of their distinctive features. Part III, finally, will attempt to evaluate the peculiarities of the contribution of the German universities to political theory.

I.

> ...Intellectually oriented politicians like Friedrich Naumann and Theodor Barth were at one time members of the Liberal Association, while political professors, like Max Weber, Hugo Preuss, and Theodor Mommsen had contacts with it....
> ...During the period of fluidity that marked the German revolution, the organizational structure of the parties and the political structure of the state opened momentarily and permitted a decisive intervention by these democratic professors and publicists. Theodor Wolff, the editor of the Berlin Daily, and the sociologist Alfred Weber took the initiative in the founding of the German Democratic Party, and they were soon joined in this attempt at a new departure in liberal politics by Naumann, Preuss, and Weber. This group also provided the democratic framework of the Weimar Republic: Preuss

> wrote the basic draft of the constitution, Max Weber participated decisively in its elaboration, and Naumann supplied its underlying theory with his notion of a "people's state"....[1]

The Weimar Republic was Germany's first experiment with constitutional democracy, though it was not the first in Germany. Professorial theorists were identified with its founding. It failed. But the theories of some of its founders made weighty contributions to political theory, contributions often of greater influence outside than inside Germany.

In this instance, the contributions to political theory of men connected with, or essentially "formed" by, German universities, followed a pattern frequently repeated in Germany. Theorizing was motivated by, or culminated in, advocacy of policies designed to solve some immediate problem. Such advocacy was usually not remarkably successful in German politics, but the theories themselves were often of remarkably pervasive influence on the main stream of political theory. Hegel, Hegelianism, and its children, both legitimate and otherwise, followed a somewhat similar course, as did the political theory of German Romanticism. Both Hegelianism and Romanticism have been called rationalizations of the status quo, ideologies rather than Utopias, in Mannheim's terms. If they were, then their brief practical influence in Germany may have been due to changes in the status quo, and their profound theoretical influence abroad, e.g., in England, to their "objective" profundity, a by-product that impressed university professors of other countries where academic political theory enjoyed much less (if any) respect among politicians. These less respected non-Germans may also have been impressed by the prestige that their German colleagues did enjoy. The contributors to the Weimar Constitution, far from justifying the status quo, tried to construct a constitutional Utopia, whose early failure was not foreseen by non-German contributors to, or students of, political theory, who may have been impressed partly because they envied the Weber Brothers and others their opportunity and partly again by the by-product of produndity, amplified by this very application of the theories.

By contrast with the practically less successful theories in German politics, the practically more successful ones were virtually unknown outside Germany. As a result, they made a negligible contribution to the corpus of political theory. This was true, for example, of Robert von Mohl and Karl Rotteck, southwestern theorists of constitutionalism. Political reformers like vom Stein did not contribute to political theory, they drew upon it, in this case through Stein's friend Rehberg at Goettingen, who had been influenced by the prototypical non-German non-academic contributor, Edmund Burke.

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[1]Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. 463 and 464. See also R. Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789-1815. London, Allen, 1936; Otto Butz, Modern German Political Theory. New York, Doubleday & Co., 1955.

In our own century, the major impact of the contribution of German universities has been to analytical rather than normative theory. The names of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim come to mind before all others. On the conceptual side, too, the influence was stronger outside than inside Germany. It was and continues particularly strong in the United States. The fact that even this kind of political theory had to be "brought back home" by Americans cannot be explained adequately, I think, in terms only of the Nazi destruction of free academic inquiry. Nor can the academic popularity of these theories in this country be accounted for by way of the influential teaching of distinguished graduates of Heidelberg and other German universities in the United States - though this factor should not be discounted in the year in which this Association is for the first time electing to its Presidency a political theorist who is a product of Heidelberg. This, too, is a contribution, but I was warned not to discuss it.

II.

Is there anything distinctive about the contribution of the German universities to the corpus of political theory? In the context of this comparison between Germany, England, and the United States, three features seem to me to stand out: the greater relative importance of academic as distinguished from non-academic political theory; the greater effort to be scientific, objective, or value-free (though this is perhaps no longer greater than in the United States, since the American social sciences have come under the heavy influence of German academic theory); and the greater compartmentalization to which German theory has subjected the reality it dealt with.

The greater importance of academic political theory has already been mentioned. It and the highest respect enjoyed by university professors in Germany are mutually related to one another. Today, German politicians rely heavily upon academic counsel, as did their forerunners of the German national state. They make much use of theoretical justifications of academic origin for their policies. Indeed, many top German politicians are professors or lower academic ranks with pretensions to competence in what we would regard as political theory, in the broad sense of the term. One might perhaps be able to deomonstrate that similarly competent individuals play similarly important political roles in the two English-speaking countries. Names like Atlee, Gaitskell, Fulbright, Morse (perhaps even Kennedy) might be cited. The big difference lies in their diffidence in advancing their academic theoretical competence as a claim to political fame or public favor. In Germany it is and has been the other way around, partly no doubt because of what the establishment of the German national state owed to academic political theorists. For different sets of reasons, the founding of neither the modern British state (if that was ever founded), nor the United States owed anything to theory coming from the universities.

The fact that academic political theory has been so much more influential in Germany than in the other two countries could easily lead us to expect it to be more partisan than its English and American equivalents. At least in the present century and on the surface, this has not been true. On the contrary, German academic theorists have usually made special efforts to get at "objective reality" and, when they believed themselves to have succeeded in this, it made them especially proud. Also - and more important for our

purposes - this claim to scientific objectivity, when it appeared credible, lent an added authority to their contribution to the cosmopolitan corpus of theory. In Germany itself, where faith in the power of "knowledge" has generally been stronger than in the English-speaking countries, this presumed objectivity enhanced the influence of academic theories and theorists. The relative skepticism of Britons and Americans may have kept academic theorists in England and, until recently at least, in the United States, from both asserting great objectivity and exerting great influence. A connection may exist between this difference and the relative failure (until American social sciences came under German influence) of English-speaking theorists to compartmentalize reality.

German political theorists have usually tried to compartmentalize not only the reality that they subjected to analysis or prescription, but also their own lives. Political science, or social science, or state science, or legal science, or cultural science, or economic science, was pursued in one compartment of the scientist's existence; politics, when it was pursued, in another. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the assumption usually was that each of these two compartments (and others, like family life) was water-tight and air-tight, segregated, and mutually irrelevant. This assumption was recently subjected to rigorous criticism by Alfred Weber and others. Nevertheless, it served as the cornerstone of the basis for the claim to scientific objectivity about politics. Compartmentalization of the theorist's life contributed to the tendency to break political reality down into a number of unrelated compartments, like the state, the legal order, the society, the economy, the community, the (untranslatable) Kultur, and others. Something else contributed to this tendency: the corporatist origins of the ancient and usually honorable profession of university professors, and its persistently corporatist institutions and habits of thought and action, in an environment that has been more corporatist than those of the professorial professions in either the United Kingdom or the United States.[2]

The Romantic theorist Josef Goerres distinguished three and only three estates: Wehrstand, Lehrstand, Nährstand (defence, teaching and nutrition estate), and at least one reputable contemporary German political theorist, Otto von der Gablentz, used these same corporatist concepts in discussing the possibility of political science. A corporatist way of looking at things encourages the already latent tendency to regard the goals and functions, the personnel and processes of the various estates as separated from one another, not only conceptually, but also in fact. Since they are not in fact separated from one another, this view leads to distortions in theory. "This may be true in theory but does not apply in practice" is a common saying denounced by Immanuel Kant with special reference to political theory, in 1793.[3] His

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[2]For corporatism and its effects on academic intellectuals, see my Government by Constitution, chs. 18, 20, and passim.

[3]Carl J. Friedrich, ed., The Philosophy of Kant. New York, Modern Library, 1949. P. 412.

denunciation has often been disregarded by his followers at German universities because of their compartmentalization of politics, their claims to scientific objectivity, and their desire for influence upon German political practice.

III.

There is no need to reaffirm here that contributions out of German universities have greatly enriched political theory: it would be hard to picture its present corpus without these contributions. The worthiest among them, in my judgment, were made by theorists whose vision looked ahead to the ultimate establishment of the cosmopolis. This kind of vision which, in ages before our own, may have been confined to recognition of universals in the nature or the condition of man, is the common element of all worthy contributions to political theory. The peculiar strength of the contribution made by German universities I would attribute to the distinctive features, beyond this common vision, that characterize it. Each of these three distinctive features by itself, or any combination of them, would be likely to have negative effects, judged by the standards of constitutional democracy, when directly effective in politics. However, when added to the mainstream of political theory, the distorting qualities of the German academic current have been corrected, so as to let it provide enrichment to the ecumenical mixture. This has been particularly true in the English and American refineries, to which national universities added a type of fuel that was neither more highly regarded than non-academic political theory, nor designed to be very objective, nor - if I may use the metaphor a final time - processed through a series of separate cracking chambers.

In the world of today and tomorrow, it makes less and less sense to speak of the specific contributions to political theory of national universities. The heavy indebtedness of political theory in this country to teachers who are themselves products of German universities illustrates this as well as anything could, with the possible exception of the return, after the Nazi hiatus, to these German universities of what may, before 1933, have been German political theory, now enriched and better balanced by its, and its bearers', exposure to the world.

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1960 AND THE PROBLEM OF DEVIATING ELECTIONS

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In voting research, as in any branch of inquiry, knowledge is moved ahead as much by seeing new problems as by solving old ones. The contemporary voting studies have disposed of many questions about the behavior of electorates whose answers could only be guessed a few years ago. Yet this cumulation of findings has brought to the fore a number of "second-generation" questions that could be stated only in terms of the theoretical framework evolving out of current work. This has especially been true as interest has extended from the population of voters to a population of elections; concepts that could explain a good deal about individual choice inevitably spawned additional questions about elections as total social or political events. I will state such a "new" question or problem and will suggest from historical evidence a preliminary answer, although a firm answer surely waits for evidence that is not at hand.

The problem is briefly characterized as follows. By measuring a limited set of political orientations (among which party loyalty is pre-eminently important) we are able to say with increasing confidence what the behavior of the American electorate would be in any given election if the vote were to express only the influence of these basic dispositions. But the election returns reflect, too, the public's reaction to more recent and transitory influences (think for the moment of candidate personality) that deflect the vote from what it would have been had these short-term factors not intruded on the nation's decision. Therefore, any national election can be thought of as an interplay of basic dispositions and short-run influences. Yet the freedom of these "disturbing" influences to modify the effects of long-term dispositions is not yet well understood. Their capacity to do so is not of trivial importance; there have been few presidential elections in a hundred years that we could not imagine having gone to the loser, had the right combination of short-term factors appeared in time. And yet each election is not a fresh toss of the coin; like

all good prejudices, the electorate's basic dispositions have a tremendous capacity to keep people behaving in accustomed ways.

I

Of all the continuities in the life of the American voter the most important is his sense of party loyalty. Despite the grip that political independence has on our civics texts, party identifications are extraordinarily widespread in the electorate. Most Americans freely call themselves Democrats or Republicans when asked, and most of those who say they are Independent at first, concede some degree of party loyalty under the gentlest urging. If we think of the electorate as spread out along a dimension extending from strong Democrat through Independent to strong Republican, less than a tenth of the American public sees itself at the point of full independence.

In view of the fact that very few Americans have any deep interest in politics, it is a mild paradox that party loyalties should be so widespread. Part of the answer is that these identifications perform an exceedingly useful evaluative function when the electorate discharges its responsibilities in a democratic state. To the average citizen the affairs of government are a remote and complex world. Yet we require the citizen to make judgments about that world. At the very least, he has got to decide periodically how he will vote, what choice he will make between candidates offering different programs and very different versions of contemporary political events. In this dilemma, having the party symbol stamped on certain candidates, certain issue positions, certain interpretations of political reality is a matter of great psychological convenience.

Because of this evaluative function party identification is not to be thought of as a simple disposition to vote out of habit for one party or the other. To be sure, there is some totally unadorned persistence voting in this country. But for most voters the tie between party identification and behavior involves subtle processes of perceptual adjustment by which the individual assembles an image of current politics consistent with his partisan allegiance. With normal luck, the partisan voter will carry to the polls attitudes toward the newer elements of politics that support well his long-standing bias.

This perceptual process is probably seen in its most melodramatic form in partisan response to the personal qualities of the presidential candidates. For the millions of Americans identified with a particular party, the candidate bearing the party symbol inevitably becomes more of a lion, his opponent more of a wolf. Although I would not argue the point, it seems to me that any really open-minded observer would have found Grover Cleveland a more estimable man than James G. Blaine

in the campaign of 1884. Yet we can be sure that the public's actual response to these new presidential personalities was colored almost totally by its prior partisan loyalties, as the smallness of the vote swing from 1880 to 1884 suggests.

Therefore, the capacity of party identification to color perceptions holds the key to understanding why the unfolding of new events, the emergence of new issues, the appearance of new political figures fails to produce wider swings of party fortune. To a remarkable extent these swings are damped by processes of selective perception. Because the public so easily finds in new elements of politics the old partisan vices and virtues, in our electoral history, as in so much else, plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

And yet the nation's response to a changing political world is not wholly governed by fixed party loyalties. Some elements of political reality not agreeing with these loyalties will get through the partisan screen raised in the individual voter. A war, a sharp recession, a rash of scandal will leave their mark on all shades of partisans, though the mark will not be deep enough to change the votes of more than some. What is more, other identifications will at times lead the voter to perceive political objects in a way that contradicts his partisan bias. As they become relevant to politics, identifications of a racial or national or religious or class nature may counter the perceptual effects of long-term partisan loyalties in substantial portions of the electorate.

To underscore the significance of this interplay for the actual vote decision I will introduce a classification of outcomes, which I take from a recent report of the Survey Research Center's work.[1] Let us call an election in which short-run factors either benefit the party that is in the majority (in the sense of party identification) or benefit the minority party so little that it is not elected to office a "maintaining" election. And let us call an election in which these short-run influences aid the minority party substantially enough to bring it to power a "deviating" election.[2] With this distinction in view it is clear that the freedom of

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[1]See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 531-538.

[2]By definition, "maintaining" and "deviating" elections exhaust the set of elections in which the nation's basic party loyalties remain unchanged. The American Voter denotes elections producing a shift of underlying party loyalties as "realigning" elections, a category closely allied to V.O.Key's "critical" election. As an extension of this typology we have more recently proposed that "maintaining" elections be further classified according to whether the majority party is kept in office or returned to office and that the second of these be called "reinstating" elections. See Philip E. Converse, Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," American Political Science Review, 55 (June 1961), 269-280.

short-term factors to modify the effects of basic dispositions is directly related to the likelihood that the minority party will come to power, and the problem of the paper can be restated in these terms. The question I am asking is this: assuming a given distribution of party loyalties in the electorate, what is the probability that short-term forces will give a majority of votes to the minority party, that is, what is the probability that a "deviating" election will occur?

II

To give this question definite meaning for the current political scene I will set forth some empirical materials from the 1960 election and the two presidential elections preceding it. Repeated measurements of the nation's underlying partisan loyalties from 1952 to 1960 show that party identification has been remarkably constant for at least eight years and has favored the Democratic Party throughout this entire period, despite the Republican successes of the Eisenhower era. As the entries of Table 1 make clear, among those who have some degree of identification with one party or the other the Democratic advantage has been something like three to two.

It would be wrong to interpret this advantage as the vote division we would "expect" to find if short-run influences did not favor one party more than the other. As a matter of fact, Democratic identifiers differ as a group from Republican identifiers in critical respects that make the "expected" division of the vote much closer to an equal share. The nub of this difference is the greater psychological involvement of the average Republican in politics. Although our measurements of involvement are less satisfying than our measurements of basic partisan commitment, it is clear that someone identifying with the Republican Party is likely to be more deeply involved in political matters emotionally than is someone identifying with the Democratic Party.[1]

This difference depresses the "expected" Democratic share of the vote in two ways. In the first place, the lower involvement of Democrats means that they are somewhat less likely to vote than are Republicans, a fact that cuts substantially into their majority in party identification. Beyond this, the lower involvement of Democrats means that they are more likely than Republicans to defect to the other party in casting their votes. In any election, including one in which short-term electoral tides are not running in either direction, some people

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[1] For detective work on this difference and its consequences, see Angus Campbell, "The Case of the Missing Democrats," New Republic, 133, July 2, 1956, pp. 12-15. For a discussion of the conception and measurement of involvement, see The American Voter, pp. 101-107.

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Table 1.

Distribution of Party Identification,
1952 to 1960

	Oct. 1952	Sept. 1953	Oct. 1954	April 1956	Oct. 1956	Nov. 1957	Oct. 1958	Oct. 1960
Strong Republican	13%	15%	13%	14%	15%	10%	13%	14%
Weak Republican	14	15	14	18	14	16	16	13
Independent Republican	7	6	6	6	8	6	4	7
Independent	5	4	7	3	9	8	8	8
Independent Democrat	10	8	9	6	7	7	7	8
Weak Democrat	25	23	25	24	23	26	24	25
Strong Democrat	22	22	22	19	21	21	23	21
Apolitical, Don't know	4	7	4	10	3	6	5	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	1614	1023	1139	1731	1772	1488	1269	3021

will vote against their party because they have been buttonholed by the precinct committeeman or because they have gotten into a violent argument with their wife's family or for some other individual, idiosyncratic reason. The lesser emotional involvement of Democrats in politics means that they are more liable than Republicans to this sort of defection.

Therefore, if we return to the idea of the electorate distributed along a dimension of party identification, it is not true that Democrats and Republicans equally far out from the point of full independence could be expected to give their parties equal support if the electoral tides were not running more one way than the other; effective electoral strength is not symmetric about the point of independence on the party identification scale. But symmetry can be restored to expected behavior if we complicate our conception by thinking of the electorate as distributed over a two-dimensional space, in which the second dimension is psychological involvement in politics. The hypothesis that persons of equal partisan commitment and equal involvement in politics could be expected to give equal support to their parties apparently fits the empirical facts tolerably well.

When the Democrats' advantage in party loyalty is adjusted to take account of their relative disadvantage in psychological involvement in politics, the party's "expected" share of the vote is reduced from 60 percent to about 54 percent. In the South its majority is nearly two-to-one, although outside the South the party's expected share of the vote is just less than half. Over the country as a whole, in an election that expressed the nation's long-term partisan loyalties, the Democrats would poll a majority in the neighborhood of 53 or 54 percent of the two-party vote.[1]

That they have not in three successive presidential elections is due to strong short-run influences working for the Republicans. In the Eisenhower years the Republican Party profited from the immense personal popularity of its presidential candidate and from the well-developed sense in the country that Republican leadership would better assure the peace. In addition, in the first Eisenhower victory, the Republicans benefited handsomely from the feeling of many voters that the time had come to sweep a corrupt administration from office. These influences combined to overcome the Democratic advantage and give the Republican Party wide majorities in the vote for President.

The short-term forces of 1960 were of different content and much less strongly Republican in their total impact. To begin with, the campaign brought two fresh presidential figures to the fore. That the public liked Mr. Kennedy more than it had Mr. Stevenson four years earlier

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[1] A brief statement of the methods leading to this estimate appears in Philip E. Converse et al., op. cit., at p. 274.


is hardly news; but this is of course an important reason for the Democratic recovery between 1956 and 1960. The really surprising aspect of the 1960 campaign, one that faces a struggle to survive in the popular histories, is how favorable an impression Mr. Nixon made on the public. Indeed, Nixon's personal impact is clearly one of the reasons why the Republicans almost overcame the Democratic advantage a third successive time, although some of Mr. Nixon's favorable image was a side-effect of the religious issue, as will be noted presently.

A comparison of public response to the personal qualities of the candidates in 1956 and 1960 is given in Figure 1. Regrettably, some statistical operations stand between the entries of this figure and the sort of original data that could be presented without comment. The horizontal dimension shows five party identification groups from our national samples of 1956 and 1960. The vertical dimension shows the evaluations of the presidential candidates formed by these groups, their evaluations being measured in terms of references to personal qualities given in response to free-answer questions about the candidates. Of course, within any of these groups there is a range of opinion about the personal attributes of any candidate. This range is not shown; the distribution of opinion about a particular candidate in a particular group is represented solely by its mean, which is expressed in standard units so that the several groups can be compared. The higher a mean score, the more favorable is the group's assessment of a Republican candidate—or the more unfavorable its assessment of a Democratic candidate. If the mean is greater than zero, the assessment, on balance, is pro-Republican; if less than zero, pro-Democratic.

When the entries showing the response to particular candidates are connected, the resulting curves are spectacular testimony to the way party identification colors the electorate's view of the candidates. Whether we are speaking of Eisenhower or Nixon, reactions are uniformly more favorable as we move across the party identification scale from Strong Democrats to Strong Republicans. And reactions both to Stevenson and to Kennedy are uniformly less favorable as we move across the same party identification groups. Apparently the strengths and weaknesses of these men were judged a good deal according to established party loyalties as one pair of candidates followed the other onto the national proscenium.

Yet they were not judged entirely according to fixed party loyalties. It is clear from Figure 1 that some candidates were seen more favorably than others across the whole party identification scale. Consider the difference between Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Stevenson. The fact that at each degree of party identification public reaction to Kennedy is more pro-Democratic than reaction to Stevenson cannot be accounted for in terms of party allegiance, and this substantial warming of feeling toward

PUBLIC EVALUATION OF PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, 1956 AND 1960, BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION



the Democratic candidate between 1956 and 1960 (d_2 in the figure) is a principal reason for the return of the Democrats to power in national government. The very mild decrease in popular esteem for the Republican candidate (d_1) contributed to the same end, but the really noteworthy aspect of the comparison of Republican candidates in the two years is how close Nixon (again, with an assist from the religious issue) came to matching the great surplus of positive feeling for Eisenhower. His success in this may come as a particular surprise to Democratic intellectuals whose image of Nixon, unlike the country's at large, is deeply colored by memories of his early political career.

What accounts for variations in public reaction to the candidates that party loyalty cannot explain? Undoubtedly this question is to be answered partly in terms of "objective" qualities of the candidates themselves. In 1960 Mr. Nixon had been Vice President of the United States for eight years, under a President who left the business of government in the hands of subordinates to a remarkable degree. The claim that Nixon had had unprecedented training at the bench was more than campaign oratory, and a great many Democrats knew that it was. On the other side, Kennedy presented the electorate with personal qualities--youth, confidence, energy in word and act--that are universally approved in this country. In both cases, the "real" qualities of the candidates raised the probability that they would be favorably seen by the American voter, whatever his partisan bias.

But perceptions of the candidates also can be influenced by pre-disposing factors other than party loyalty, a point that it vividly underscored by examining the views of the candidates formed by different religious groups in 1960. Indeed, one of the most interesting demonstrations of the importance of religion in the Kennedy-Nixon election can be made by comparing what Catholics and Protestants came to think of the personal qualifications of the men running for President. Two points should be mentioned before this comparison is shown. First, the content of what is being compared is entirely non-religious; the references to the candidates that enter these tabulations do not touch their church affiliations at all. Of course a great many references were made to these affiliations by our respondents in 1960. None is included here. Second, the comparison is made within party identification groups so that it will not be influenced by the marked relation of church preference and party loyalty in American society. In particular, the view of the candidates formed by Catholics and Protestants will be compared separately for Weak Democrats and for Independents.

That religious identification raised a perceptual screen for millions of Americans in 1960 is evident from the entries of Table 2. The table divides the Weak Democrats of our 1960 sample according to whether they were Catholic or Protestant and, if Protestant, according to how frequently they said they go to church.

Table 2.

Evaluations of Nixon's Personal Qualities
by Catholic and Protestant Weak Democrats,
1960

Evaluations of Nixon	Catholics	Protestants who attend church: Seldom or Never	Often	Regularly
Favorable	18%	33%	49%	65%
Neutral	52	51	36	26
Unfavorable	30	16	15	9
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 3.

Evaluations of Candidates' Personal Qualities
by Catholic and Protestant Independents, 1960

	Independent Catholics		Independent Protestants who attend church regularly	
	Evaluation of Nixon	Evaluation of Kennedy	Evaluation of Nixon	Evaluation of Kennedy
Favorable	31%	75%	70%	36%
Neutral	49	24	27	37
Unfavorable	20	1	3	27
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%

For each of these religious groups the columns of the table give the proportion favorable, neutral, and unfavorable toward Nixon's personal qualifications. Everyone in this table is a confessed Democrat. Yet only the Catholics perceived Nixon more negatively than positively. They are by no means strongly hostile; the largest number of them are neutral toward Nixon the man. It is more the Protestants whose perceptions seem colored by religious identification. There is a surplus of positive feeling for Nixon in all these groups of Protestant Democrats, and this surplus rises to very generous proportions indeed among those attending church regularly. The march of figures across these columns indicates that Mr. Nixon's personal stature for many Protestants was strongly derivative of their reluctance to see a Catholic in the White House.

It would be seriously misleading if Table 2 created the impression that religious identification colored perception only among Protestants in 1960. Its entries actually are partial evidence for the interesting and more general finding that religious identification, whether Protestant or Catholic, led primarily to positive perceptual distortion in the Kennedy-Nixon campaign. Because Table 2 is limited to perceptions of Nixon, it shows this positive distortion only among Protestants. But the symmetric quality of the perceptual processes at work among Protestants and Catholics in 1960 can be strikingly illustrated by the evaluations of the candidates formed by Independent voters of differing religious identifications. As seen in Table 3, Independents were remarkably free of negative perception. Catholic Independents saw Nixon more favorably than unfavorably, and at the "opposite" end of the religious scale, Protestant Independents who attend church regularly were more positive than negative toward Kennedy. But the evidence here of selective favorable perception is overwhelming. Catholic Independents saw the Catholic candidate in an exceedingly favorable light, and Protestant Independents were very nearly as unreserved in praise of the Protestant candidate.

Therefore, the short-run influences deflecting the vote in 1960 differed markedly from the forces moving the electorate toward the Republicans in the Eisenhower years. The flow of national politics threw up new faces and new issues from those the public had been asked to appraise four and eight years before. And the appraisal of these things was marked by a religious influence that can also be regarded as a short-run factor, despite the similar causal position of partisan and religious identifications in forming the political attitudes of 1960. Unlike party loyalties, religious commitments become highly charged politically only at times. If it were otherwise (and if two parties continued to dominate our politics) we would expect religious and partisan identifications to become much more closely aligned than they now are in the United States.

How distinct the forces acting on the electorate in 1960

were from those of the Eisenhower campaigns is underscored by the minimal overlap of Eisenhower Democrats and Nixon Democrats. Of the persons who identified with the Democratic Party over the four-year life of our 1956-60 panel and who voted in both years, fully one-third voted Republican at least once, that is either for Eisenhower or for Nixon. But less than one-tenth voted Republican twice, that is both for Eisenhower and for Nixon, a proportion not very much greater than the percentage we would expect to have done so if defecting to Eisenhower and defecting to Nixon were completely uncorrelated acts. This remarkable fact strongly contradicts the hypothesis that a substantial stratum of traditional Democrats, particularly in the South, are developing a habitual Republican orientation at the presidential level. If true, the hypothesis would require the proportion of Democrats supporting the Republican candidate in both years to be fairly large relative to the proportion supporting in at least one of the years. The actual number of repeaters suggests a very opposite view of what drew millions of traditional Democrats to the Republican candidates for President in 1956 and 1960.

III

The ebb and flow of short-term forces in our politics lead back to my central problem. What is the freedom of these forces to modify the influence of basic dispositions? Our measurement of partisan dispositions in the current era indicates that the Republicans could expect about 46 or 47 percent of the vote if the nation expressed only its fixed party loyalties at the polls. Yet as a minority party the Republicans won popular majorities in 1952 and 1956 and a near-majority in 1960. How likely were these events in view of the country's underlying partisan hue? Given the distribution of party identification found in the United States today, what is the probability of a deviating election?

Putting the question this way inevitably implies some sort of probability model, which I should like to make explicit in terms of an idealized conception of the electoral process. In this conception, I will think of our electoral politics as repeatedly sampling a universe of short-term forces. At each election a sample of such forces is drawn and the two-party division of the vote deflected according to the strength and partisan direction of the forces that have fallen in the sample.[1] The sum of the forces in the samples drawn in 1956 and 1960 favored the

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[1] It is of course true that successive samples are not drawn entirely independently, since some short-run influences carry over from one election to the next, as Eisenhower's appeal carried over from 1952 to 1956. The lack of full independence does not bias the estimates we will obtain below, although it has the interesting consequence at a conceptual level of making the conditional probability of a deviating election, given the immediate electoral past, somewhat different from the unconditional probabilities we seek.


Republicans, although not all the terms in this sum were pro-Republican, especially in the latter year. Each of the samples that might possibly be drawn would deflect the two-party division of the vote by some given amount in a given direction; over all the possible samples that might be drawn these deflections define a sampling distribution. We would naturally take the mean of this distribution to be zero, and if the distribution's values are to be translated into percentages of the two-party vote, we would associate this mean with the division of the vote expected from party identification. To do anything else would be to assume that over all possible configurations of short-term factors the electoral process will be kinder to one party than it is to the other.[1] The more difficult problem, the one that holds the key to the probability of a deviating election, is to reach a reasonable estimate of the variance of this sampling distribution.

The connection between the variance of such a distribution and the probability of a deviating election may be clarified by the use of a simple figure. Figure 2 shows three such idealized distributions, drawn over a scale representing the Republican percentage of the two-party vote for President. Each distribution has the same mean--46 percent, in accord with our empirical estimate of the expected Republican vote in the present era. And each distribution has the form of a normal probability function.[2] These three hypothetical distributions differ only in the size of their variances: the variance of A is of intermediate size, relatively speaking, whereas the variance of B is small and of C, large. As is true for any continuous probability function, the probabilities

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[1]Some may think such an assumption warranted. In view of the maintenance of effective two-party competition since the Civil War, can we not say that the electoral process has been unexpectedly generous to the minority party? Two points should be made in this connection. First, certain respects in which a majority party suffers are already reflected in our computation of an expected division of the vote from the distribution of party identification. In particular, the historical forces that award a party a majority of long-term identifications usually attract to it a number of people who are only marginally interested in politics and relatively unlikely to vote. The wave of new recruits to the Democratic Party during the Great Depression and Roosevelt New Deal undoubtedly included many people of this type who are today less likely to vote. Our method of computing expected strength at the polls has already applied this penalty to the Democrats. Second, because our attention here is fixed on deviating elections I have by definition excluded those rare elections, important historically for the two-party balance, in which the underlying distribution of party identifications is changed, as it was not in the Eisenhower or Kennedy elections.

[2]The assumption of normality is not gratuitous here but is well supported by the historical evidence to be examined below.


B
A
C
30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
Present "Expected" Division
Point of Equal Division
Republican Percentage of Major Party Vote

associated with these distributions are interpreted by areas under the curves. Thus, for a given distribution the probability of the Republican Party winning a majority of votes is represented by the area under the curve that is to the right of the point of equal division. Because of the differences in the variances the size of this area and, with it, the probability of the Republicans winning are very different for the three distributions. In the case of distribution A roughly a third of the total area under the curve lies to the right of fifty percent; in the case of B, about a tenth; of C, not much less than half. Interpreting these areas as probabilities, we would say that the chance of a deviating election under A is about .3; under B, about .1; under C, almost .5. Therefore, the meaning of the four percent difference between the expected Republican share of the vote and an equal share would be grossly different according to which of these distributions has the cloeset fit with the real world. Undoubtedly B and C are extremes. The electoral process does not give the minority party a trivial chance of winning; neither does it treat each election as a toss of a fair coin. Reality lies somewhere between.

Just where is a matter on which the historical record is by no means moot. To be sure, we will not reach exact estimates; here, as is so often true, significant measurement is harassed by the niggardliness with which history has furnished cases of an event involving a whole political system, as the choice of an American President does. Nevertheless, evidence from the historical competition of our parties helps fix an upper bound to the variance of our theoretical distribution and, hence, to the probability of a deviating election occurring, given the present distribution of partisan loyalties.

Seen in terms of our model, past deviations of the vote about some central value are deflections of the party division by successive samples of short-term forces. The central value we would use for any given election if past measurements of basic dispositions were available would of course be the division of the vote expected on the basis of the distribution of party loyalties at that time. With these measurements impossible to recover, a conservative alternative is to take the mean value of the party division in the period, say, from the 1890's to the present and to attribute <u>all</u> the variation of the vote about this central value to the work of short-run factors. This procedure is a conservative one because it tends to inflate the variance estimate we seek and, with it, our estimate of the probability of a deviating election. Accordingly, I have used the variance of the empirical distribution of the vote in the eighteen presidential elections from 1892 to 1960 as an estimate of the variance of our theoretical distribution.[1] When this is done, the sampling

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[1]The choice of 1892 as a starting-point was prompted by the fact that the variability and cyclical pattern of party competition after that time have differed a good deal from what they were in the first generation following the Civil War. Because the variance of the party division since 1892 has been greater, this choice is again a conservative one.

distribution turns out to be not too unlike distribution A in Figure 2, and the resulting estimate of the probability of a deviating election, given our present division of party loyalties, is about .27. Hence, under the assumptions of the model there is a chance of something less than three in ten that a minority party, faced at any given election with an "expected" deficit of about four percent, can poll a majority of votes. If the expected deficit were less than this, the probability would rise; if more, the probability would fall. By expressing the functional relation between the probability of a deviating election and the expected disadvantage of a weaker party the model allows us to say for any size deficit what the probability is that the minority party can attract a majority of votes for President.

Of course, a popular majority is not the same as a majority of Electors, and if a deviating election is to be defined as one in which the minority party captures the White House, we need to consider the Electoral College. I will be frank to say that the relation between popular and electoral votes introduces some additional uncertainty into our problem. A close examination of this relation in the modern period of party competition shows that it has been somewhat variable.[1] On the other hand, this examination gives little support to the idea that the Democrats have to win more than a popular majority to capture the Presidency, despite the familiar lore on this point. If anything, the reverse is true, although the points of discrimination in the popular and electoral vote are very close. I think a fair judgment of the historical evidence would be that the variability of the relation between popular and electoral votes gives our estimate of the probability of a deviating election a limited additional degree of error without biasing the estimate either for or against the Republicans.

IV

If my argument runs true, the probability of a deviating election bears out the importance of basic partisan dispositions for a predictive theory of elections. At the state or local level party loyalties are so frequently all-important in deciding whether a Democrat or Republican will win that they can hardly be overlooked. But at the national level, particularly in presidential elections, party allegiance is sometimes felt to be a limited tool of analysis. I think that this conclusion is reached fairly often by those who have to make the strategic decisions of our national campaigns. Their feeling is, in our language, that everything depends on the sample of short-term forces drawn in a particular

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[1] My comments on the Electoral College are based on an examination of the regression of the electoral vote on the popular vote from 1892 to 1960. The findings for this whole period are virtually unchanged if we ignore all extreme values and consider only the five elections in which the party division of the popular vote has been closest to fifty percent: 1892, 1896, 1916, 1948, and 1960.

election and that nothing of real value is to be learned by measuring the electorate's long-term dispositions. From this it is only a short additional step to the idea that party allegiance is a purely nominal attachment of slight motivational significance to the voter, at least in choosing a President.

Of course it is easy enough to dispel the idea that party identification is of slight significance for individual behavior. But voting in presidential elections is not entirely determined by party allegiance. And so long as it is not, the question of how likely the electorate is to give a majority of votes to the minority party requires an answer. If the likelihood proved high, party identification would lose a good deal of its importance for the explanation of the total election outcome, even though it continued to be a variable of great power for the explanation of individual voting choice. Therefore, the probability of a deviating election I have given is implicitly a judgment about an analytic framework to explain the national election decision, a judgment confirming the importance of party identification in the causal forces carrying one candidate to the White House, the other to private life.

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RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS AT THE LOWER LEVELS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY APPARATUSES

Since the mid-1950's the Soviet leadership and Nikita Khrushchev personally have showered considerable attention on the lower reaches of the Soviet system where it makes direct contact with the populace -- a sphere much neglected in Stalin's later years. As a corollary, developments at the local level have been many and diverse. The new Party program -- with its concern for socialist democracy, the withering of the state, and administrative perfection -- while disingenuous, both reflects and will further stimulate experimentation with local administration, party control, and popular participation. Several considerations have occasioned the often agonizing re-appraisal of the effectiveness of Soviet rule at the lower levels. The growing complexity of Soviet industrial society has, to use the Marxian terminology, increasingly contradicted the rigid, top-heavy bureaucracy. The relative demise of terror and the secret police have both required and permitted the elaboration of new techniques of rule by the Party leadership. The achievement of ambitious, even revolutionary, programs has necessitated the rejuvenation of administration and the mobilization of the masses. Finally, the new departures at the local level reflect the Khrushchev touch, his style of leadership and his means of generating and expanding his personal power. Central Committee decrees on improving the work of local soviets (January 1957), on the handling of workers' complaints, on propaganda and agitation and on the organization of new mass organizations like the Voluntary Friends of the People and Comrades Courts; the wholesale adoption of new republic statutes on local soviets, their standing committees, and executive organs; gigantic administrative restructuring; and the outpouring of books, pamphlets, and journals on local government and administration all attest to the activity in this realm which in the last two years has reached campaign proportions.

Rather than cataloguing these complex local innovations, this paper will attempt to put them in some perspective by focusing on significant trends that have emerged, the motivations that lie behind them, and the potential difficulties inherent in them. These include: the consolidation and generalization of territorial units and administrative structures; the pronounced shift toward the territorial principle of administrative organization and the concomitant efforts at a cautious administrative decentralization while retaining and even strengthening central controls; the changing roles and structure of the lower Party apparatus; and efforts to derive the benefits of popular participation without relinquishing power to the people. For analytical purposes these four areas have been rather arbitrarily delimited. However, it should be noted that developments in all four are interdependent. For example, the movement toward the territorial basis of state administration and administrative decentralization is connected with the enhanced position of the Party apparatus; and recent indications of a retreat in these trends are related to difficulties in Party control. Similarly, the growth of popular participation,

such as public criticism of local bureaucrats and voluntary mass organizations, are intertwined with the reduction of highly centralized, vertically structured command channels and with the increased authority of lower Party cadres.

Bureaucracy in Flux

Much to the harassment of the writers of Soviet texts on administrative law, one of the most pronounced facets of Soviet administrative practice is the constant restructuring of the administrative apparatus. In addition to the continuous minor shake-ups, there are periodic large-scale upheavals based on one ruling principle or another. These momentary panaceas -- whether it be the functional, industrial-branch or territorial principle of organization; centralized or decentralized management; or collegial versus one man administration -- do, of course, have validity for bureaucratic illness at any particular point in time. But, over the long haul, as the bureaucracy oscillates between various organizational alternatives, one is impressed by the seemingly institutionalized instability of the bureaucratic structure. Constant flux appears to be a part of the pathology of the Soviet bureaucracy.

This can be explained in terms of practical results. It breaks up interlocking family groups and protection societies which short circuit central command and communications channels. It permits the promotion of fresh blood and ideas into administrative ranks. The exigencies of controlling and coordinating a rapidly industrializing and increasingly more complex society undoubtedly also account for this phenomenon.

The constant tinkering with the bureaucracy is also intimately linked to the official ideology. The discrepancy between ideology and reality is often great. Since the ideology is sacrosanct and is only slowly modified over considerable periods of time, it is necessary to lay the blame for the disparity on reality, i.e. on individuals and especially on bureaucratic mistakes and excesses. Administrative reorganization results. Moreover, Marxism-Leninism is steeped in the 19th Century rationalist belief that man can scientifically order society. Hence, bureaucratic shortcomings and societal irrationalities are frequently met not by gradual, piece-meal reforms, but by sweeping reorganizations.

Territorial Form of Administrative Organization

In recent years a territorial, instead of an industrial branch form of organization has been increasingly employed in Soviet administration. This is most poignantly illustrated by the 1957 reorganization of industrial management which placed the daily management of the great bulk of industry into the hands of regional economic councils. The same tendency is also manifested in the reconstituted management of local industry under local soviets. In the non-industrial realm also steps have been taken to make local departments of, say public education and public health, more responsible to the local soviet executive committee than to their respective ministries for day-to-day management. Finally, even in the Party the abolition of special Central Committee inspectors and political departments, the formation of the Bureau for the RSFSR, and the increased freedom of republic central committees have reinforced the basic territorial structure of the apparatus.[1] Industrial branch and functional elements, of course, do exist in the apparatus: in the Central Committee Secretariat, in Gosplan, and in the regional Party and governmental structures. But, these industrial branch and functional elements are now more fully incorporated in a territorial pattern of organization.

Most schematic descriptions of the Soviet system by Western commentators, especially in the early 1950's, emphasized the division of the state into severaly highly centralized vertical structures -- Party, police, state bureaucracy, and armed forces. The significant divisions and the possible points of friction were thus seen to be primarily horizontal between these various vertical structures. Although containing considerable validity in regard to the secret police and the military, this description even during the late Stalin period was so oversimplified that its utility was questionable. It ignored the frequent interchange of personnel between the Party and governmental apparatuses at all echelons. It failed to account for the penetration of all vertical structures by the Party (and police). Moreover, it discounted the highly variegated structure of the governmental bureaucracy by justaposing it, as a whole, over and against the Party.

A main thesis of this paper is that in view of the developments in the Party and administration during the last five years, there is now greater validity, or at least greater utility for purposes of research, to visualize diagramatically the major divisions in the Soviet Union as horizontal and the major tensions as vertical between the territorial-administrative layers of the hierarchical state pyramid. The restructuring of industrial management and local soviets, the altered role of the Party apparatus, and the efforts to mobilize the masses through the various techniques of popular participation can more easily be approached on the working hypothesis that the main direction of post-Stalin administrative changes has been to consolidate the territorial-administrative unit as the basis of administration. The potentialities of conflict between higher and lower territorial units also serve to explain many of the confusing peregrinations in administrative organization and Party functions during the last several years, and account for the partial deflection of the thrust of initial reforms.

Sovnarkhoz-local Soviet Relationship

Before discussing other features of administrative reorganization, it should be noted that a major anomaly exists in the territorial form of organization at the oblast level. The overwhelming majority of regional economic councils coincide with oblast boundaries. However, the sovnarkhoz is not under the jurisdiction of the oblast soviet, but is responsible to republic organs. This tangential relationship between the sovnarkhoz and the oblast soviet has apparently been the source of some conflict.[2]

Under the old ministerial system, the local soviet frequently had little control over the enterprises, municipal services or even housing on its territory since they were often owned by the several centralized ministries operating in a locality. The powerful ministries paid little head to such things as city codes and regional planning. A major benefit, which was supposed to flow from the industrial reorganization, was the improvement in the economic base and the capabilities of local soviets to fulfill the needs of their populations. A sizeable volume of local industry, municipal services and housing was transferred to local soviets; and it was emphasized that since the sovnarkhoz was located close at hand, coordination between it and the oblast and city soviets would be facilitated. In some areas apparently a satisfactory relationship has been arranged. In others, it has not.

In some instances the division of industry between the sovnarkhoz and the local soviets resulted in divided management of mutually interdependent enterprises and caused endless bickering. Despite original plans, in many cities

and oblasts the sovnarkhoz and its trusts and enterprises own more housing and municipal services than the soviets, and frequently manage them without consulting the latter. Several soviet officials have complained publicly that local soviets are slighted in favor of the sovnarkhoz in the planning of new industrial and municipal construction. In Kemerovo Oblast 80% of the capital investment in municipal services in 1959 was funnelled through the sovnarkhoz.

The city of Magnitogorsk provides perhaps an extreme example of conflict between a sovnarkhoz (Chelyabinsk) and the city soviet. In Magnitogorsk most of the housing, plumbing, electricity, water supply, sewerage and transportation are owned by the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine of the Chelyabinsk Sovnarkhoz. The Combine manages these public services as it sees fit, complains a city official in Izvestia. If electricity is needed by the Combine, city lights may suddenly go off. The streetcar schedule is established for the convenience of Combine employees only. The sovnarkhoz has firmly resisted attempts by the city soviet to wrest from its hands these municipal services.[3]

Moreover, local industry under the soviets as a rule fares less well in the allocation of materials than its sovnarkhoz brethern. Apparently, oblast party secretaries, who might provide the necessary coordination between local soviets and sovnarkhozy, are more concerned with the performance of the critical sovnarkhoz. Obviously, the local soviet is at a disadvantage in any power struggle with the strategically-placed sovnarkhoz. Reports of transfers of local industry to the sovnarkhozy and continued concentration of municipal services in the hands of many economic councils suggest that the local soviets are not gaining in this jurisdictional struggle.

Administrative Consolidation and Decentralization

A significant part of the efforts at administrative decentralization has been the enlistment of lower officials in the drive to consolidate administrative organs and to reduce staff personnel. Consolidation has taken several forms, including sweeping mergers of administrative-territorial units, and the merger of specialized staffs and departments at all administrative levels. For example, in conjunction with the 1957 industrial reorganization, republic ministries, adminstrations, trusts, combines and enterprises under both sovnarkhozy and local soviets were amalgamated with a vengence.[4]

Territorial-Administrative Mergers

Between the mid-1930's and the late 1940's there was a constant splintering and increase of territorial units. The year 1954 witnessed a radical reversal of this trend with the abolition of over 23,000 rural (sel'sky) soviets, as sel'soviets were merged to keep abreast of collective farm amalgamations. As the following table shows, every territorial-administrative category of consequence, except cities and workers' settlements, has demonstrated a marked decline since 1954.[5]

Type of Soviet	1954	1957	1961	% Change 1954-1961
Autonomous Oblast	9	9	9	0
Okrug	10	10	10	0
Krai	6	6	7	+15
Oblast	129	121	107	-17
City	1,515	1,632	1,685	+11
Borough	498	432	332	-33
Raion	4,367	4,149	3,447	-21
Workers Settlement	2,426	2,559	3,000 (approx.)	+24
Rural	73,729	50,214	41,500 (approx.)	-44

To stimulate and oversee this shake-down of the administrative-territorial structure, the regime has begun to rely more heavily on regional authorities. Prior to 1957, authority for making alterations in administrative boundaries, except for the very lowest levels, was strictly held by all-union officials. In 1957 decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee empowered the union republics to alter, abolish, or change the status of all territorial units except the oblast.[6] Boundary changes must be "reported" to the all-union Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Undoubtedly central authorities still retain a veto and even initiatory power, but republic officers now have greater scope to carry out, in a more rational manner, the sustained drive to consolidate the territorial-administrative structure.

Similar authority has trickled down only slightly below the republic level. Oblasts, krais, and autonomous republics may bestow the status of a rural or settlement soviet on a populated area, authorize the transferral of their administrative seats and redraw their boundaries. At least in the Ukraine, oblast soviets in 1958 were also elevating workers' settlements into towns of raion subordination.[7]

Each of the last seven years has witnessed at least moderate amalgamations. However, 1959 was noted for a particularly heavy attrition rate. In that year some 6 oblast, 457 raion, 37 borough, and 5,141 rural soviets were liquidated reflecting, at least in part, the effects of the moderate decentralization in the handling of this consolidation. Between July 1, 1959 and July 1, 1960 the average population of a raion jumped from 36,200 to 39,200.

Discussions in the journals indicate that further consolidations can be expected, and provide some clues about the course these may take. N. G. Starovoitov, head of the Department for Questions of the Work of Soviets of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, at a conference on "The Soviets in the Period of the Extended Construction of Communism" at the Central Committee's Higher Party School last spring, proposed the abolition in the "near future" of raions in small and moderately-sized oblasts.[8] In their stead, he suggested enlarging the rural soviets to embrace an average of 5,000-6,000 people and 2-3 collective or state farms, and transferring to them the functions of present raion soviets. In rural population centers, he would establish non-staff public bodies.

There have also been indications of further oblast mergers and/or the grouping of oblasts under a more embracing administrative umbrella so that they will more nearly coincide with natural economic regions. The 101 sovnarkhozy (four less than 1957) are far more than originally anticipated during the early planning stages of the industrial reorganization and create difficulties for coordination and control. Such a large number of sovnarkhozy was dictated by the need to make them parallel the existing governmental and party structures. They are thus under the thumb of corresponding oblast party secretaries and jurisdictional wrangling among oblast secretaries is avoided. As problems of coordination have been exacerbated by manifestations of "localism", several devices have been instituted to ameloriate the difficulties: ad hoc committees of neighboring sovnarkhozy to coordinate their activities, territorial divisions within the RSFSR Gosplan, and the all-republic economic councils (established in mid-1960 in the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan), and strict control over investment and supply by union and republic authorities.[9] However, these are primarily palliatives. Moreover, since they entail more centralized direction of the economy, they undercut the stated purposes of the reorganization. In addition, the coincidence of both territorial and functional branch departments in RSFSR Gosplan, and the all-republic sovnarkhoz frequently causes confusion.

Several authors have proposed a rather drastic solution to this dilemna. They have urged the merger of oblasts, thus permitting the consolidation of corresponding sovnarkhozy without running afoul of jurisdictional struggles between oblast party secretaries. In early 1961 such an experiment actually took place in northern Kazakhstan, though primarily in connection with agricultural difficulties. Five oblasts were combined into the newly-formed Tselinny Krai. One sovnarkhoz was formed for the Krai.[10]

Experimentation with Raion Government, 1956-59

A review of the experimentation with raion government in the late 1950's will illustrate efforts at a more flexible approach to administrative consolidation of staff units.[11]

To cut administrative overhead and rationalize the self-strangulating bureaucracy, and to simplify the raion administration and bring it more directly under the supervision of the raion soviet executive committee (raiispolkom) and raion party committee (raikom), local officials were encouraged to experiment with the raion government. This, of course, was a controlled experiment. Central authorities undoubtedly provided the stimulus and general guidelines for local action.

Several pilot projects for raion reform were launched in 1956. In the Smolensk Raion, Altai Krai, the following changes in the raion governmental structure were made: the department of public education was replaced by two raiispolkom inspectors for teacher training; the department of public health was abolished and its functions transferred to the raion hospital; the departments of automotive transport and roads, rural and kolkhoz construction, and municipal services were combined to form the department of local economy; the department of trade was eliminated and its functions passed to the raion consumers' union; the raion Komsomol took over the committee for physical culture and sports; the raiplan and the inspectorate of the Central Statistical Administration were merged; and several other minor changes were made. The alterations made in the government of the Kuldig Raion, Latvia followed the same general pattern with these variations: the department of culture and the raion house of culture were merged; and neither the department of trade, nor the committee on physical culture and sports were abolished. In the Lunensky Raion, Penza Oblast, 9 of 15 departments and offices were abolished; but, unlike the Smolensk and Kuldig Raions, the department of public education was retained. There were also variations in the ability of raions to make their alterations stick. For example, the raiplan and the inspectorate of the Central Statistical Administration were again split in the Smolensk but not Kuldig raion.

Besides a reduction of personnel, a major effect of these alterations was to concentrate more administrative functions within the raiispolkom itself, thus again strengthening the territorial basis of administration. The replacement of departments by inspectorates directly attached to the raiispolkom, the marked tendency for raiispolkom deputy chairmen to head up the newly consolidated departments, and the devolution of the functions of some defunct departments on raion institutions directly under raiispolkom supervision (like the House of Culture and public organizations such as non-staff departments) will enable the raiispolkom and raikom staffs to regulate more closely raion activities. The major exception is the enhanced position of the raion department of finance which, standing somewhat aloof from raion officials, serves as a major control and inspection arm of higher authorities.

As might be expected, the affected ministries looked askance at this decimation of their local organs. The republic ministries of public health and public education, for example, attempted to sabotage hatchet-wielding local authorities whenever possible. The reformist-minded Chairman of the Altai Krai Soviet Executive Committee in 1958 complained: ". . . the RSFSR Ministry of Public Health to date has expressed dissatisfaction with the reconstruction and does not meet us half way on the decision of several important questions."[12] A raiispolkom chairman in 1956 observed that "oblast and central organs would not listen to the voice of the raion and even dampened raion initiative."[13] Ministries, obviously aroused by the interference of political cadres into their professional domains, asserted that instead of abolishing raion departments, they should be strengthened by capable people. As the Chief of the Moldavian Statistical Administration wrote, ". . . it is incorrect to be concerned only with the reduction of posts as are the comrades of Tumanovo Raion."[14] In some cases, the stronger ministries, like Finance, were able to beat back attacks.

It appears that in 1956 the leadership, despairing of meaningful reform of raion departments by the ministries themselves, attempted to by-pass them by charging local party officials with the task of trimming raion administrative staffs. It was probably felt also that this would instill new flexibility into the ossified local ministerial structures by encouraging local pecularities to be taken into account. Only partial successes were achieved. Personnel economies were frequently reduced by the outright restoration of departments or their recreation as a staff unit under a different title. Bureaucrats, reorganized out of a job, often popped up again in another post. In part this was due to the resistence of the ministries. In part it was the result of careless and irresponsible slicing by local party officials who let political motives dominate over professional considerations. Perhaps the major reason, however, stems from the design of the Soviet bureaucratic structure, above all else, to brake the growth of local bureaucracy, check on its activities, and ensure local response to higher authorities. Given the many overlapping controls in Soviet administration, there are a number of organizations involved in any major changes in raion government: the raikom and obkom, whose nomenklatura are directly affected; the oblast departments and republic ministries, whose lower organs are being lopped off; the Ministry of Finance, whose highly centralized Staff Administration must pass on any staff and wage alterations; and the oblast executive committee and republic council of ministers which must give final approval. Ironically, these criss-crossing controls built into the system to ensure that local administration does not get out of hand, also act to retard the reverse process of reform when that reform is conducted in a manner which calls on local initiative and takes varying local conditions into account.

It is also because of these rigidities of the administration that the raion reorganization was not conducted in a more flexible and variegated manner. While some local experimentation with raion government has occurred (and is still taking place), and while there are varying organizational patterns among different republics and oblasts, nevertheless within an oblast or republic a stereotyped format is usually imposed on raion government. In Altai Krai, for example, on September 1, 1956, after six months of experimentation, all raions of the Krai were reorganized along a single pattern. In part this reflects the attitude of higher officials like V. Latsis, Chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, who in late 1956 wrote, "changes in the structure of the [raion] apparatus should proceed in a single way."[15] But fear that local organs may get out of hand is only part of the answer. Uniform governmental structures within an oblast or republic are also required because when local officials have been called on to clean house, they find themselves so frustrated by the rigidities of the system that the only recourse has been to order the abolition of this or that department or the reduction of a certain percentage of employees across the board.

Not only do oblasts and republics establish the departments which shall be organized in a raion, but departmental tables of organization are also rigidly set. This frequently leads to absurd situations where two raions may have the same number of staff although one is twice the size of the other. A recent article by the head of the Staff Administration of the RSFSR Ministry of Finance reveals the rigidity of staff and wage control. The article sets out in great detail the population criteria on which the number of staff posts are allocated for small towns. . Any deviation from these centrally set standards needs the approval of the republic and the Staff Administration.[16] It is a well-known fact that the Staff Administration is loathe to make exceptions.

There appear to be several motivations behind the consolidation and generalization of administration. It is usually justified as part of the drive to cut administrative overhead and to utilize more effectively the talents of the best administrators. Secondly businesses in capitalist countries have long since learned, although bigness brings difficulties of administration, it also brings benefits of greater resources with which to operate. Third, reversing the trend prevalent in the two decades previous to 1950 of increasing specialization of staff, it is hoped that administrative parochialism will be alleviated. Finally, and perhaps most important, reducing the number of administrative units is designed to facilitate central control and coordination under the new territorial form of administration by reducing the number of subunits under central supervision.

Decentralization

Inextricably intertwined with administrative consolidation and restructuring on a territorial basis, as we have seen in part, has been an endeavor to readjust administrative relationships to permit greater flexibility and resourcefulness by lower administrative echelons while retaining, and hopefully making even more effective, central control. This cautious decentralization has not been prompted by popular demand but by the leadership's belief that some redistribution of functions within the unitary Soviet state is required for continued economic growth and societal development. By removing from Moscow the squabbling central ministries and by attempting to push to lower levels some of the day-by-day management of the economy, the leadership sought to achieve a clearer, broader and longer-ranged perspective and hence exercise more effective leadership. Moscow has sought to make the economy responsive to its will through several key centralized control mechanisms, such as the Ministry of Finance, Gosplan, the Procuracy, the Commission of Soviet Control (now State Control) and, of course, the Party. These levers extend into the bowels of society and cut across the prevailing territorial organizations. With the exception of the Party -- whose role will be discussed at length later -- these are planning, coordinating, and inspection agencies which, in theory, are to provide central direction but not to subvert lower territorial-administrative units. In practice this division of functions is more tenuous.

The almost unbelievable centralization of decision-making, with the accompanying red tape, buck-passing and delays, during the later Stalin period made some devolution of authority mandatory if Soviet administration was not to sink below a morass of red tape. The following illustration may drive home the point. Izvestia, in mid-1958, complained that for a village school to add .3 of a hectare to its grounds five official decisions had to be taken by the kolkhoz board, the general meeting of the kolkhoz, the rural soviet, the raiispolkom, and the oblispolkom.[17]

What is the nature and extent of the devolution of administrative authority? To provide a definitive answer would require an analysis of the entire range of administrative functions. However, several observations and examples may give a flavor of this trend. First, it should be reiterated that there is no intention of making lower administrative bodies in any way independent. A recent Soviet monograph on the direction of lower soviets by all-union and republic bodies makes this clear:

> Higher organs establish the legal basis and framework of action of lower organs. . .
> . . . A local soviet, in making a decision on the basis of and in execution of laws and ukazy, has the right to detail and concretize norms of given acts only to a degree that does not alter the substantive content of these norms.[18]

Secondly, it appears that the major portion of the decentralized administrative discretion has come to rest at the republic and to a considerably lesser degree at the oblast level. For example, Republics have been granted greater discretion, within the gross income and expenditure limits of their budgets, to establish the budgets of subordinate soviets; they issue statutes on local soviets and mass organizations and they form and abolish local soviets except at the oblast level. Some additional authority for decision-making has found its way to still lower levels. Local administrators have been encouraged, with mixed results, to play a greater role in planning production, especially in agriculture. Within the framework of all-union laws on educational reform, the industrial reorganization, the MTS reform, etc., republic and lower soviets have some leeway to take local conditions into account when executing these programs. As previously discussed, local authorities, with central guidance, have also experimented with administrative reforms at the lower levels.

Basically, however, more important than actual moves to decentralize decision-making is the attempt to stimulate local officials to assume more responsibility and show more initiative in the execution of central plans. This is a major point hammered on by Khrushchev during his barnstorming trips around the countryside. Local officials have been repeatedly told that vigorous leadership will bring promotion and that bureaucrats will be weeded out. The people are urged to criticize local authorities for lack of vigor and sloppy management. Finally, a number of administrative devices are used to stimulate the local official to greater efforts in fulfilling state directives. For example, a sizeable proportion of the budgetary income of a local soviet derives from deductions from national taxes. Since these deductions are fixed on a percentage and not an absolute basis, local officials are behooved to see that national revenues are fully collected. Local soviets, including rural soviets, also may retain for their own use at least a portion of above-plan revenue.

Yet another aspect of decentralization has been the freer and fuller discussion at all administrative levels of national problems and projects of reform. It is apparent that much of this debate is stimulated from the top and controlled within the framework laid down by central authorities. Nevertheless, it is evident that such really profound changes as the abolition of the MTS and the educational reform of 1958 were proceeded by months of debate among officials at all levels. The rights of factory managers, the relationship between the sovnarkhozy and Gosplan, projects for alterations in the kolkhoz

system such as kolkhoz unions and the transformation of kolkhozy into sovkhozy have also been topics for serious discussion throughout the administrative hierarchy. Khrushchev has attempted to tap opinions at all levels on a number of thorny problems; and also to give local officials a vicarious sense of participation in decision-making. The limits of discussion have been stretched by largely withdrawing these issues, at least temporarily, from the realm of ideology and thereby casting them in a non-political, technical framework. Nevertheless, the problems are real and have important ramifications for the whole system. Final decisions on major reforms are made in the Party Presidium, but they are now made on the basis of a better knowledge of local attitudes, and frequently after local authorities have done some experimentation with various alternatives.

Despite the determined drive to push decision-making down the administrative ladder, it tenaciously creeps upward again. This derives in part from the structure of the local bureaucracy which is arranged to provide inconclusiveness of authority so that all significant disputes will be called to the attention of higher authorities. Moreover, since Party and governmental authorities at each territorial unit -- republic, oblast, city, raion -- are ultimately responsible for all happenings within their geographic area, they often feel compelled to intervene at lower levels and to review a great many activities which should be handled by subordinate bodies. The lower one descends the scale of soviets, the more they are restricted from dealing independently with local affairs, until at the bottom level most decisions of the rural soviet executive committee conclude with the phrase "ask the raiispolkom to affirm the present decision." In this milieu, published laws and instructions about decentralization are not always a reliable guide to administrative practice. Complaints in the press make it clear that higher administrators frequently act in an arbitrary and high handed manner toward their subordinates. For example, an oblast soviet executive committee may decree that the above-plan revenues of a particular raion be used elsewhere in the oblast even though the raion is legally entitled to spend these funds itself.[19]

As might be expected, Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance, as the two main levers of central direction over the economy, frequently encroach upon the rights of territorial bodies. It is with good reason that as the movement toward territorial administration gathered momentum, the vehemence of the criticism directed at Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance grew. Perhaps the most devasting attack levelled against the Ministry of Finance by local authorities was published in Izvestia in mid-1958 about the bureaucratic snarls in Rostov Oblast.

> The Finance Department occupies a special place in the oblast link. It, before all else, is subordinated to the ministry rather than to the ispolkom of the oblast Soviet, whose department it is. The Ministry of Finance has centralized everything down to the last detail, infringing on the rights not only of other departments and administrations but also above all on the rights of its "own" department.[20]

While the Ministry of Finance is the devil for local soviets, Gosplan is the bête noire for sovnarkhoz officers who claim that it has hamstrung their operations.

Despite these criticisms of central control, there are no indications that they have been lessened. On the contrary, if anything, they have been increased.

The creation of all-republic economic councils in the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; the reorganization in mid - 1961 of the Commission of Soviet Control into the union-republic Commission of State Control after press complaints about its laxity and ineffectiveness; and the revamping of the organs of agricultural management, all point to increasing central supervision and consequently encroachment on the rights of territorial-administrative organs.

The retarding, and in some instances reversal, of decentralization are related to the pitfalls inherent in the new forms of administration. Despite Moscow's admonitions, the staffs of the sovnarkhozy have shown the same propensity to proliferate and become more specialized and complex as did the old ministries. Moreover, as territorial units become larger, the bureaucracy is further removed from the populace. The major danger in the territorial organization, however, is "localism," a term which covers a wide variety of sins but generally connotes the adoption of a localist point of view contradicting national interests. It may entail a cavalier attitude toward the delivery of products to another region, the diversion of investment funds from items of national importance to those of more local consequence, attempts to make an area as self sufficient as possible and thus violate plans for specialization, or any number of machinations to mislead central authorities about the true state of affairs in an area. In sum, "localism" contains the seeds of local autarky which might disrupt central plans and policies.

The Party is perhaps the main lever of central control throughout the country. In contrast to the other arms of central control, such as Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance, its responsibilities are general and so broad as to embrace all local activities. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the success or failure of the post-Stalin system of administration rests or falls on the ability of the Party to synthesize local activities into the national plan. Consequently, it is necessary to look in some detail at the Party's role at the local level during the post-Stalin period.

Party Functions

During the Stalin period the Party had been only one string in the old dictator's bow of societal controls. At times it appeared to be eclipsed by the Secret Police. Under Khrushchev the Party achieved a clear supremacy over its rivals and took on a number of burdensome tasks. This, of course, was to a considerable degree the result of Khrushchev's successful bid for power. Khrushchev, as First Secretary of the Central Committee after crowding out Malenkov in the spring of 1953, found his power base deeply rooted in the Party apparatus. Quite naturally he vigorously fought to extend Party prerogatives and thus enhance his own position and also build a strong command to govern society. The secret police were discredited by the Beria affair in mid-1953 and shorn of their independent powers. The Party in the fall of 1953 was directly charged with jacking up seriously lagging agricultural production. In 1957 its control over industry was firmly consolidated by the industrial reorganization. Party control of the military was reaffirmed after the ouster of Marshall Zhukov in the fall of 1957. The decentralization movement and the shift to the territorial form of organization in the government and Party also meant that party secretaries at all echelons would have greater authority and influence over their bailiwicks. Finally, mass mobilization was largely entrusted to the care of the Party apparatus which was

responsible for guiding the mass organizations that mushroomed after the mid-1950's.

Thus, by October 1957 the Party apparatus was firmly in charge and bearing the operational brunt of implementing the leadership's policies. However, it appears that the enormous burdens placed on the Party apparat have in some instances overtaxed its capacities and some retrenchment has occurred since 1957. Moreover, when Khrushchev replaced Bulganin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in early 1958, it followed that his personal power position had been broadened and was no longer exclusively tied to the Party cadre. Khrushchev's ability and willingness to utilize other organs besides the Party to manage the country was symbolized by the transfer of several members of the Party Secretariat to the Governmental apparatus in May, 1960. After May 1960, the majority of the Party Presidium was no longer drawn from the Central Committee Secretariat. Today the Party remains strong, but it no longer retains the prominence it did in the fall of 1957. A review of local developments illustrates the reasons for this partial retreat.

Since the first years of the Soviet Union, the communist theory of state has carefully delineated between the government and party hierarchies. At the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 the following maxim was laid down:

> "...The Party must carry out its decisions through the soviet organs within the frame of the Soviet Constitution. The Party should endeavor to guide the activity of the soviets, not to supplant them.[21]

The two parts to this formula -- party control and direction, and the retention of independent party and state administrations -- retain their validity in Party doctrine today. The soviets, to use Lenin's term, are "transmission belts" of Party policy; but the Party must always retain its own unique personality and independent existence, from which vantage point it can criticize, cajole, and correct the state administration. To become involved in day-by-day management of governmental affairs would dilute the critical faculty and revolutionary elan which enable the Party to navigate its counterpart governmental organs on the charted course and to put current events in their proper perspective. Too close an identification of local party officials with local administration might damage the cohesiveness and discipline of the centrally responsive party. It might also divert attention from educational and mass-organizational activities. On the other hand, "the Party is not separate from the soviet state apparatus."[22] The Party is not only the ultimate source of power but it should also serve as a ubiquitous super-ministry of coordination. This finely drawn distinction between the government and Party roles, which is logically strained even in textbook discussions, is even more difficult to uphold in the practical course of events.

Depending on the temper of the times, party supervision of the government is criticized by the leadership for being either too lax, due to negligence or concentration on intra-party work; or for usurping the legitimate functions of the administration and its cognate: collusion of party and government officials. During the four and one half decades of Soviet history, the pendulum of party supervision has swung back and forth several times. In the late 1940's Bolshevik undertook a lengthy campaign to separate Party and governmental affairs which had become hopelessly intertwined during the war years when the party apparatus

had assumed command at all levels. This drive culminated in Malenkov's report to the 19th Party Congress in which he lectured against mixing Party and government responsibilities.[23]

With the rise of Khrushchev the emphasis again shifted to direct action by party organizations in administration, especially in agriculture. At the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev railled against party officials who "draw an absurd distinction between Party political work and economic activity.[24]

The Party and agriculture. --Khrushchev's exhortation for a more activist Party attitude toward administrative work had concrete reflection in the Party's altered role in agriculture. In late 1953 the First Secretary had charged the raion party apparatus with direct administrative responsibilities, and had shoved aside the raion soviet executive committee. The raion department of agriculture was abolished and a raion party secretary with a group of instructors, each responsible for one or two kolkhozy, were assigned to each Machine Tractor Station.[25] Daily management of agriculture at the grass roots passed into the hands of the local party cadre.

By early 1956 suggestions were aired behind the scenes for a fresh reorganization by those who believed that direct Party supervision of agriculture was unwise and violated Party canons about usurping governmental functions. At the 20th Party Congress, however, Khrushchev summarily rejected these proposals.[26] A straw in the wind some months later was a Central Committee decree in January 1957 on improving the work of the soviets which remonstrated against party units that usurped the work of the soviets. In December 1957 Partiinaya Zhizn' suddenly announced that during the fall instructor groups for MTS zones had been abolished and the raion party apparatus extensively restructured.[27] This set the stage for Khrushchev's announcement in January 1958 that the MTS was being discarded. In this same speech in Minsk on January 22, 1958 Khrushchev came around full circle when he proposed that the raion soviet executive committee again be equipped to take over the daily management of agriculture by, as it later developed, the establishment of inspectorates of the raiispolkom.

The significance of Khrushchev's reversal in December 1957 -- and it should be remembered that by now he had consolidated his position and eliminated his Presidium opponents -- extends beyond agriculture since it illustrates the difficulties of Party control and the ambiguous relationship between Party and government apparatuses. The withdrawal of the raikom from direct agricultural administration had several motivations. On the positive side, the agricultural outlook by late 1957 had substantially brightened after the 1957 bumper harvest. The mobilization of thousands of communists to head collective farms had improved the quality and reliability of kolkhoz chairmen and increased the number with party affiliations. By intensive recruiting and commandeering communists from the cities for work on the collectives, the primary party organizations of the kolkhozy had been strengthened by 230,000 members and their forces had been concentrated by kolkhoz amalgamations. In 1957, " with few exceptions," all farms had primary party organizations. Thus, the need for irregular party controls was lessened.

The overriding consideration, however, was the harmful effects of direct Party administration. MTS party secretaries and instructors were unduly interfering in the management of the kolkhozy and usurping the prerogatives of

kolkhoz chairmen and primary party organizations. The article announcing the liquidation of the MTS zones commented, "as an organizational form of the party apparatus [they] were good for a certain period of time and under certain conditions... Their tendencies to interfere directly in the operative activity of kolkhozy and the MTS had begun to fetter the initiative and the autonomy of the primary party organizations and the managing cadres of kolkhozy."[28]

Moreover, it was found that by assuming direct supervision of agriculture, the local party cadre were no longer able to maintain that detached critical attitude toward management demanded by "partiinost"; nor serve as arbitrators of local disagreements.

> "We recently analyzed in the office of the raion committee the problem of the relations between the director and the secretary of the party organization of the MTS. They seriously argued with one another and it was not simple to decide who was right and who was wrong. The instructor, Comrade Popov, dealing with the party organization of this MTS asked to speak. Expressing his reasoned opinion, he assisted the raion committee in finding the correct solution to the problem. You may ask: what is unusual about this? But you see, earlier in the office of the raion committee, as a rule, there spoke out the secretary of the raion committee for the MTS, and it was he who evaluated all that was going on, not the instructor. Now, however, the instructor feels himself really not left to one side."[29]

The situation outlined in the above quotation carried with it the seeds of a more serious problem which, as we shall see, became painfully apparent in early 1961: the temptation for local party personnel to over-identify with kolkhozy and thus short circuit their response with the center.

The withdrawal of the MTS zone party groups was only part of a comprehensive restructuring of the raikom apparatus aimed at cutting its swollen staff, reducing the overlap of party and government organs, and placing the raikom apparatus on a foundation from which it is less likely continually to take over the tasks of state administration. The raikom apparatus prior to 1957 was a dehydrated replica of the oblast party structure with departments of propaganda and agitation, organization and several others. In late 1957, after experiments in Latvia and Tadzhikistan, with some exceptions, all departments in the raikom were eliminated.[30] The apparatus was transformed into 2 or 3 secretaries and the rest instructors, each responsible for several primary party organizations in a wide variety of organizations. Previously, specialized departmental instructors had been in charge of one phase of the work of all primary party organizations in the raion.

Departmentless party committees have also appeared in some smaller cities. Larger cities and oblasts retain departments, but in many cases their numbers have been reduced by mergers and the Party leadership has encouraged republic and oblast officials to take the initiative in proposing alterations in local party apparatuses.

The reorganization of the raikom fits neatly into the broader pattern of consolidation and administrative generalization pervading the entirety of the Soviet Union's bureaucratic structures. However, it should be underscored that a major reason for replacing raikom departments by instructors, each res-

ponsible for a wide range of primary party organizations, was to inhibit the tendency of party organs to duplicate and replace the raion government.

The relationship of the local party apparatus to agricultural management after 1958 is more obscure. Certainly the raikom continued to play an important, if less direct, role in agricultural management. However, it is quite possible that in late 1958 and 1959 the local party cadre made another bid to increase their power in this sphere through the vehicle of the proposed kolkhoz unions. There was widespread discussion in the press at this time about establishing kolkhoz unions in each raion to administer agriculture and rural construction. Although the motives of those proposing this scheme were undoubtedly mixed, it seems not unreasonable to speculate that a number of local party professionals saw in this scheme a means of achieving closer supervision of the kolkhozy and their growing indivisible funds under the facade of grass-roots democracy. Kolkhoz unions would greatly diminish the role of the governmental apparatus and especially the Ministry of Agriculture which had temporarily regained some stature after the December 1957 reform. The raikom would have a leading role in the kolkhoz union.

If this indeed was the motivation of local party cadres they were disappointed at the December 1959 Central Committee Plenum. Although the pre-plenum discussion and the first sessions indicated that the kolkhoz union plan would be adopted, counter-forces prevailed and Khrushchev announced that the plan should be further discussed. This outcome can perhaps be interpreted as a victory at that juncture for more professionalism and less political intervention in agriculture. At any rate it was a victory for the Ministry of Agriculture whose head, Matskevich, had strongly opposed the plan.

The bad harvest of 1960 piled on the poor showing of 1959 resulted in fireworks at the January 1961 Plenum. An obviously angry Khrushchev castigated rural officials, including a number of raion and oblast party secretaries. Not only did he charge them with mismanagement and incompetence; but also with the serious matter of report falsification. The Ministry of Agriculture was shorn of most of its powers and turned into an educational and scientific organ. Its former chief was sent to the boondocks as chairman of the new Tselinny Krai Executive Committee. The gathering of statistics was placed in the hands of the Central Statistical Administration. Planning was entrusted to Gosplan. A new national cooperative with republic, oblast, and raion units was formed to handle kolkhoz supply. Raion agricultural inspectorates were abolished and model farms to propagandize agricultural techniques were established in each raion. Most important, a centralized State Committee for Agricultural Procurement was formed to contract for purchases from the collective farms.[31]

One thing is clear from this drastic overhaul of agricultural management: Khrushchev said a plague on both your houses to the Ministry of Agriculture and the local party cadre. It is also clear that planning, statistical reports and procurement will be in the hands of centralized state agencies. By splitting functions of agricultural management among several centralized state agencies, Khrushchev perhaps hopes to make it more difficult for local officials to hoodwink the state. This reorganization quite obviously, is a reversal of the trend toward consolidation, generalization and decentralization of administrative organs.

There is now no clear delineation of primary responsibility for agriculture.

As a Stalingrad agronomist recently asked, "just who will direct agriculture." Certainly the local party organization will be responsible to provide general supervision. But it would appear that the leadership will direct agriculture primarily through the new State Committee for Agricultural Procurement, headed by Presidium member Nikolai Ignatov who has handled agricultural matters for the leadership for the last four years. The State Committee has powers over and above procurement. Its procurement inspectors, each of whom is assigned 3 to 7 kolkhozy or sovkhozy, participate in planning farm production, check on the implementation of plans, and report cases of plan violations. They are empowered to limit or stop loans and cash advances to farms which do not meet their obligations. Two final characteristics of procurement inspectors are especially worthy of note. Their wages are tied to the level of procurements, hence putting pressure on them to meet steeply increased procurement goals. Secondly, local procurement inspectors are not also responsible to the raion soviet executive committee as are most other ministerial personnel at the raion level. In sum, the key lever over agriculture is the State Committee for Procurement, and it has been so structured that it will be somewhat insulated from localist pressures.

This, at least temporary, retreat from decentralization and territorial administrative organization must be placed in the context of Party failings. The revelations of enormous fraud among territorial party secretaries at the January 1961 Plenum and subsequent zonal meetings; and the dismissal of party officials in agricultural areas, which in late 1959 and the first half of 1960 reached bloodless purge proportions, demonstrate the almost complete failure of Party discipline in the rural areas. Local party officials, shouldered with responsibility for meeting overly ambitious agricultural goals took refuge in falsifications of all kinds. The monolithic Party structure displayed severe cracks and Khrushchev was forced to devise new control mechanisms for implementing his policies.

The Party and industry. --As previously noted, the 1957 industrial reorganization was in part designed to allow oblast, krai, and smaller republic party secretaries a greater voice in the management of the most important industry. Similarly, the revamping of local industry by putting it more firmly under the jurisdiction of local soviets provided party secretaries at all local levels greater opportunities for influencing the local economy. The lower Party apparatus was not only charged with assisting the sovnarkhoz meet production goals, but also ensuring that national interests were at all times taken into consideration in daily local decision-making.

Judging by production results, the sovnarkhozy have been rather successful. Industrial goals for the Seven Year Plan, although somewhat lower than previous plans, have been overfulfilled by a respectful margin. Nevertheless, the sovnarkhoz system has not been without its troubles. The former industrial ministries were charged with "parochialism" on an industrial branch basis. The sovnarkhoz difficulties are lumped under the rubric "localism." In either case, the Russian saying, "one's own shirt is nearer one's body," is applicable. Localism, although a thorny problem, at least to date has not become impossible. It has, however, occasioned in the last two years some reversals in administrative practice toward centralized control which run counter to the stated purposes of the reorganization, i.e. to bring management closer to production.

Never have the sovnarkhozy had absolute jurisdiction over their bailiwicks.

As noted earlier, Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance from the very beginning exercised strong central controls over the sovnarkhozy -- much to the frustration of the sovnarkhoz officials and oblast party secretaries. Throughout 1957 and into the spring of 1958 there was much talk of expanding the rights of the sovnarkhozy when the new system had shaken down. Even today lip service is given to further decentralization. In actual fact, the reorganization never decentralized as much as was originally suggested and recent innovations have, on the whole, been in the opposite direction -- primarily because of the ubiquitous and hydra-headed localism. All-republic sovnarkhozy now oversee and coordinate the activities of the sovnarkhozy in the RSFSR, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Rather stringent restrictions have been placed on the use of investment funds by sovnarkhozy; and in the spring of 1961 Khrushchev cryptically indicated that even further central direction of investment would be imposed to stop wasteful dispersion of investment funds.[32] Supply and sales of a wide variety of important commodities have been retained by central authorities; and efforts to rationalize the inefficient and duplicative supply organizations have been frustrated by the reluctance of authorities to transfer these functions to the sovnarkhozy.

The gradual attrition of sovnarkhoz rights has resulted from a complex set of factors, but shortcomings in the Party apparatus bear their share of blame. As early as May 1958 a Central Committee resolution condemned regional industrial officials for localism in the use of capital investment funds and, significantly, took a verbal slap at responsible provincial party authorities who failed to prevent such abuses.[33] Pravda in September 1958 enlarged on the charge: "Unfortunately, there are Party workers who not infrequently promote antistate practices. Not having themselves delved into the heart of the matter, they begin to support the incorrect proposals of managerial officials and in some cases even force such officials to carry out work not included in the plan in order to suit local interests."[34] Rather ominously, during the recent denunciations of fraud in agriculture, it has been noted that industry too is not free from fradulent practices.[35]

Thus in agriculture, but also in industry to a lesser extent, the Party has run into difficulties and Khrushchev has had to devise supplementary means to administer the economy. While official doctrine sees no conflict between national and local interests, which must coincide by definition in socialist democracy, this unity of interests is perhaps more difficult for a local party secretary to define. This is particularly true when he is given fuller and more direct responsibilities for the economy in his territory. Since the first secretary is the most powerful person in any territorial unit, if he should evade central directives and take refuge from overwhelming production goals in fraud, the consequences are most serious. If the first secretary is corrupted, then most probably it will be discovered that a number of other key officials in the area are associated with him in a mutual protection society. The recent revelations of thorough corruption in Tadzhikistan are a poignant confirmation of this generalization.[36]

To counteract these harmful tendencies, the regime has gradually been reinstituting more centralized levers of state control. In addition to the new controls over agriculture and industry already mentioned, in July 1961 the Soviet Control Commission was transformed into a State Control Commission indicating a heightened role for state control and inspection after the recent exposures of fraud. Finally, the legal codes are being rushed into the battle.

A May 1958 law provides criminal sanctions for repeated violations of inter-regional deliveries. Recently, officials have been given stiff sentences for falsification of reports.[37]

New Party line. --The thrust of this argument is not that the Party has been discredited and reduced to the secondary position it sometimes held during the Stalin era. The new Party Program literally shrieks about the great tasks of the Party in the building of communism. But the Party role is now being redefined so that in the future it will be less directly involved in administration, though, of course, the party cadre will always bear ultimate responsibility for their jurisdictions. The Party is now increasingly relying on more indirect measures of control such as: appointments of key officials through the nomenklatura system, the party educational program, propaganda and agitation, mobilization of mass organizations through party groups, and reliance on primary party organizations in enterprises and institutions as conduits of information at the grass roots. These measures, it is hoped, will make the Party a more reliable instrument for the leadership.

Along with the redefinition of Party functions, efforts have been renewed to revamp the Party structure to fit its modified roles. Developments have proceeded primarly along two lines: trimming the paid staff, and efforts to stimulate party activists. In mid-1959 the chief of the Central Committee Department of Party Organs wrote that "in recent years" the apparatus of republic central committees and oblast party committees had been cut by 40 percent.[38] In December 1957, in connection with the revision of the raikom, a reduction of 20 percent was ordered in the raion party apparatus. The Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee has recently written that in the Capital the number of staff personnel in the city party apparatus remains at the 1941 level even though the number of communists has increased from 229,000 to 630,000; and that only 7.5 percent of the secretaries of the city's primary party organizations are paid. Although such statistics are sticky, some headway against party bureaucracy has probably been made.

On the other hand, ways have been sought to enlist more effectively the Party masses in support of the cadre. In mid-1959 party control commissions were established in primary party organizations to give more form and regularity to party supervision of the state administration. Non staff instructors have been more widely utilized. Many primary party organizations have developed rather elaborate structures with their own bureaus, committees and groups. Even a number of collective farm brigades boast their own party groups with the rights of primary party organizations. The regulations in the New Party Statutes about the turnover of party committee members and the limitation on terms of party offices, while containing loopholes and in fact marking no basic departure from current practice of high turnover in lower party organs, nevertheless demonstrate the leadership's concern to involve a greater volume of people in the Party's work.

Fraud and the System

In view of the recent disclosures of fraud, it is useful to put these occurrences into some perspective. The Soviet press blames these embarrassing transgressions on remnants of the bourgeois private property mentality and the lack of proper ideological orientation and party discipline, i.e. fundamentally on the shortcomings of individuals. Rarely, if ever, does the system, the administrative process, come in for its share of blame. There is no public dis-

cussion of the milieu which permits and even encourages these anti-state actions.

As many Western studies of the Soviet administration have shown, extra-legal and illegal activities have always been rife in Soviet management. Tolkachi and blat have become household words. To a considerable extend, in the high pressure scarce supply Soviet economy a successful manager has been forced on occasion to rely on techniques which are deplored -- particularly when his income and career are so closely tied to achieving oftentimes Herculean plans. The regime has known about these evasions in general; and, as a rule of thumb, if a manager produces, nothing will be said about his minor transgressions. Informal, sub rosa procedures have become a bureaucratic way of life.

Given the venerable history of these managerial manipulations and the fact that they have probably been a necessary lubricant for the economy, why does the leadership now look on them with such a jaundiced eye? It seems probable that evasions have increased, especially in agriculture, since 1958. The cautious decentralization, the greater reliance on the territorial principle of organization and the reduction of central control channels(e.g. the MTS) and the curtailed role of the secret police have afforded greater opportunities for illegalities. In agriculture, overly ambitious production goals, and pressures for local officials to pledge impossibly high deliveries resulted in machinations by local officials to cover their inevitable failures. Finally, a distinction should be made between actions by officials which may be technically illegal, but of utility for the system if indulged in moderately(e.g. moderate hoarding of scarce materials and exceeding the wage fund); and those actions which are strictly contrary to the state's best interests such as falsification of reports. From the viewpoint of the individual Soviet administrator, this distinction may frequently be blurred. Operating in a system rife with necessary minor evasions of established regulations, the Soviet administrator may pile deception on deception and thus gradually sink deeper into the murky waters of outright fraud. Particularly disturbing to the leadership must be the involvement of the lower party apparatus in these deceptions.

The extent of the purge of agricultural officials, both Party and government, evidence the regime's belief that fraud has now reached dangerous proportions; and its determination to stamp it out. Given the nature of the Soviet economic structure, however, the leadership must be careful not to overdo its vigilence. To eliminate all evasions of standard procedures might well be a crippling blow for the economy.

Popular Participation

Still another salient feature of local government is the renewed stress on socialist democracy and popular participation.[39] Local soviets, largely moribund under Stalin, have been activated, their membership enlarged, and their standing commissions broadened. Public organizations of all sizes and varieties -- street and block committees, voluntary friends of the people, non staff departments, comrades courts, workers militia, pensioners councils, women's soviets, parents councils and many others -- have been organized to the point of congestion. Khrushchev has played the man of the people, barnstorming through the countryside. Draft projects of the industrial reorganization, the Seven Year Plan, the MTS reform and other ambitious plans have been discussed at the grass roots to give them public sanctity.

Typically, the campaign for popular participation rests on an ideological foundation. Khrushchev, on several occasions, has proclaimed that the state is already withering away because of the increased role of voluntary organizations in the management of sports, law enforcement and general administration. While the new Party program backs off somewhat from such an advanced position, it nonetheless makes clear that popular participation and increased use of voluntary organizations is a necessary condition for the state's demise. The official doctrine now emphasizes the dual nature of local soviets: as organs of state administration, and as bodies of public self government. This implies that strengthening the public aspect of local soviets is a means of transforming them into organs suitable for the new communist society.

Behind these esoteric ideological formulations lie a number of very practical reasons for the increased tempo of popular participation. A revolutionary totalitarian society seeks to mobilize politically the entire citizenry for the accomplishment of the regime's goals. With a lessening of outright state imposed coercions in the form of terror and repressive legal codes, popular participation has shouldered a greater burden in regimenting and propelling society. Moreover, the relative decline of harsh repression has probably created an atmosphere in which popular participation can be more successfully cultivated. Through a complex maze of overlapping public organizations, an attempt has been made to weave each individual into the fabric of collective society so as to mobilize him for service to the state, and to observe and mold his character. Socialist morality and public order have been judged especially suitable areas for public action. A number of devices, such as comrades' courts, workers' militia, and voluntary friends of the people, have been employed to generate social pressure against offenders of the public order and Soviet mores. Popular participation may help to foster public support for the regime and its policies and permit the leadership to make closer contact with the masses in order to implement its policies and to read the public mood, while at the same time keeping effective governmental powers beyond the people's reach.

More specifically, heightened popular participation is an accompaniment to administrative consolidation and decentralization. Voluntary public bodies have assum some local administrative functions and thereby facilitated the reduction of the bureaucracy. By encouraging criticism of local officials, higher authorities have instituted another check on their subordinates. Public criticism of a local bureaucrat diverts mass antagonisms away from the top leadership by focusing it on lower officials and also provides the regime with valuable information about the state of affairs in the localities. This function has assumed more importance as some administrative authority has been decentralized. Finally, since mass organizations are under control of local party organizations, ... popular participation helps to extend party control by acting as "transmission belts" of party policy.

Popular participation is not without its limits and liabilities. Its effectiveness as a check on the bureaucracy may be reduced through manipulation of criticism by local officials. Press complaints attest to the arbitrary actions of public organizations, especially in the field of public order and morality. On occasion public criticism has threatened to go beyond the bounds of local affairs and reach the ideological underpinnings of the regime. Professional administrators have been dismayed by the disrupting interference of public organizations into realms which require a considerable degree of knowledge and sophistication. Finally, popular participation over a period of years could have an eroding effect on the centralist dynamic of Soviet state if local administrators feel greater pressures to respond to popular desires. These desires may not always coincide with the leadership's plans. On the other hand, too blatant manipulation of popular participation can and does result in cynicism about socialist democracy.

Socialist democracy is still basically manipulative. While this may go without saying, it is useful, in view of the upsurge in popular participation, to see if what has been said for years is still going. Local soviets and public bodies are in both theory and practice tightly controlled by the party group which the party statues stipulate must be formed in all such organizations. Each party group, in turn, is responsible to a cadre instructor of the relevant territorial party committee. Elections in the USSR are still formalistic rituals in which each citizen publicly reaffirms his devotion to the Soviet system by casting his affirmative ballot for the single party-picked candidate on the ticket. Public criticism of a local bureaucrat does not entail the right of organized opposition based on the popular mandate. In Soviet democratic theory -- as, it may be noted, in classical democratic theory of the Rousseau variety -- the people are homogenized into individual particles suspended, as it were, in "non-antagonistic" classes. Interest groups of a sort there are. But these are not tied in with popular participation, and the politics they play are exclusively bureaucratic in-fighting.

The highly stylized and often artificial nature of popular participation largely results from the fact that it is not the well-spring of the Soviet political system and must be organized and stimulated from the top. The Soviet Union has, in essence, taken over the form of a radical democratic system and robbed it of its substance. Socialist democracy is not the fundamental capstone of the political system. Its importance should not be lightly dismissed, however, for it is a technique, and an increasingly important technique, of party rule.

FOOTNOTES

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10. "Tselinny Krai," Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya, No. 2(February), 1961, pp. 98-99.
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15. V. Latsis, "Several Sides of Soviet Democracy," Partiinaya Zhizn', No. 23 (December), 1956, p. 24.
16. "Answers to Readers Questions," Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya, No. 6 (June), 1961, pp. 98-99.
17. Izvestia, June 4, 1958, p. 4.
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21. Julian Towster, Political Power In the U.S.S.R.: 1917-1947(Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 178, quoting the stenographic report of the Eight Party Congress.
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26. Current Soviet Policies II, p. 58.
27. "The Rural Raion Party Committee and Its Apparatus," Partiinaya Zhizn' No. 23(December), 1957, pp. 3-8.
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29. "How the Raikom Begins to Work After the Reconstruction of its Apparatus," Partiinaya Zhizn', No. 2(January), 1958, pp 40-41.
30. Partiinaya Zhizn', No. 23, 1957, p. 4. In the republics of Belorussia and Armenia, and the oblasts of Ryazan, Stalingrad, Kirov, Voronezh and several others, the departments of propaganda and agitation and organization were retained. Even here, however, the great bulk of the staff became instructors reporting to the chief of the organization department.
31. Pravda, February 21, 1961.
32. Pravda, June 25, 1961.
33. Pravda, May 19, 1958.
34. Pravda, September 1, 1958.
35. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, March 4, 1961.
36. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, April 21, 1961.
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38. V. Churaev, "Development of Inter-Party Democracy in the CPSU," Problemy mira i sotsializma, No. 6(June), 1959, p. 25.
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ORGANIZED LABOR AND POLITICS

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In describing the American trade unions as an active element in political campaigns, the focus must inevitably concentrate on the mechanical aspects of organized labor's electioneering. This close-up of the operational details too often shuts out the larger, more basic, and more enduring work of the trade unions in shaping the contours of American politics; namely, the development of political attitudes and habits among American wage earners and their families.

Fundamentally, the trade unions -- as a political force -- are a contributory factor to shaping the cultural pattern (programmatic stance and voting habits) of the wage earner. The enduring impact of the union lies in its ability to influence the thinking of its members and their families. This prime work of labor-in-politics is conducted in a total social milieu that surrounds the trade union member. The union affects this environment and is, in turn, affected by the surroundings. Because of this circumstance, effective political action by trade unions is far less a mechanical operation than an ideologic influence, whose force is built up over long periods of continuous activity and education rather than in the last few weeks or days preceding an election.

The election itself is the pay-off, the culmination of the multiple influences affecting the behavior of the trade union member. These influences are nationality, church, personal associations, family tradition, geography and -- also -- trade union affiliation, not to mention press, radio, TV, canvassing. The activity of the union in and around election time is the effort to cash in on the prevailing mood of its members, as shaped by all these impacts.

The union in politics is not a bloc vote. The labor organization can not "deliver" its members at the polls. At its best, the union in politics is an ideologic and organizational influence, whose effectiveness varies directly with its ability to merge with or oppose the

various other influences in the wage-earning community.

In this respect, American labor in politics is unlike its typical European counterparts, where the wage-earning population is more apt to enjoy a homogeneity of viewpoint, less torn by multiple cultures, less fluid in economic movement, less attached to traditional governing parties. The relative homogeneity, class consciousness, and inner group loyalty of the European trade unionist tends to produce class parties, closely identified with trade unions, co-ops, and cultural organizations. The class party tends to be the community in Europe. In the United States, the union-in-politics is NOT the laboring community but only one ingredient in that ambience.

The methodology of the trade union in politics flows from this overall circumstance.

The long-range political view of American labor is not a third party, a labor party. Instead, the present perspective is for a continuing non-partisan policy, endorsement of friends and opposition to enemies. Within this strategic framework, the unions hope to become increasingly effective through the education and organization of their membership into a permanent political organization.

This perspective, however, does not exclude the possibility of ultimate affiliation directly with one of the major parties. Nor does it exclude the possibility of the organization of a new party. But either such eventuality would turn less on labor's inner desire than on the alignment of forces on the political scene. In the last couple of decades, it has been increasingly difficult for trade unions to find Republicans to back. Should this trend continue, there might be a definite change in labor's attitude toward party affiliation. Unions would no longer simply find themselves a virtual part of the Democratic Party's electoral machinery. Instead, they might even merge into a party fusion, officially urging members to join, enroll in, and work in the primaries of the Democratic Party, as well as to vote for given Democratic candidates.

Should both parties turn anti-labor, a highly unlikely development in the forseeable future, then labor might give thought to a third party, although even here the tendency would be to think more of a liberal fusion party rather than a straight class party.

This perspective, cast against the background of labor's being one determinant in the behavior of the political trade unionist, further shapes labor's methodology.

The major divisions of the trade union effort in politics are: 1) education; 2) registration; 3) fund raising; 4) electioneering; 5) district organization.

The educational push revolves around specific issues. In federal and state elections, where a legislative post is involved, a candidate can be rated with relative ease in terms of his stand on various issues. This is not quite so easy in local elections, where the post is more administrative or householding rather than legislative. To prepare the ground for measurement by issues, the educational effort of labor is directed at popularizing certain stands.

This kind of a campaign can be conducted in two ways: as a general broadside piece of propaganda and agitation or as a pin-pointed drive to enact a piece of legislation. In the former type, the union may use its press, its meetings, its educational departments, and its public influence to acquaint the membership and the public with some issue, such as medical care for the aged or the need for a federal national scholarship program. By the latter method, the union tries to involve its membership directly in support of a specific bill, usually intended for early passage. Through the membership, the union involves the community. Often both types of education are used simultaneously to reinforce one another.

This kind of political education is not exactly the same as the less florid, more restricted work of the registered legislative representatives of the unions. Their work is more a matter of quiet persuasion, horse trading, prodding, wire-pulling, research, or education of a legislator. But it is not work that cuts deep into the union rank-and-file. It is when that rank-and-file is brought in as another dimension to legislative work -- with letters to Congressmen, with delegation visits to the homes and offices of Representatives, with petitions and telegrams and back home rallies -- it is then that the legislative work takes on a profound educational aspect and becomes the base of labor's political pyramid.

This emphasis on the legislative issue orients the trade unionist programmatically, rather than partisanly. The individual member sees government and politics as an instrument for the effectuating of programs rather than the wielding of power as an end in itself. The trade unionist is being prepared to respond as a citizen to ideas, platforms, programs, and issues rather than to names, faces, and parties. To the extent that the latter -- name, face or party -- do count, they do so because they stand for certain concepts of governmental action.

Registration is the second phase of labor's political work. For several years, trade unions have given this almost top priority in their organizational efforts along political lines. The general theory behind this program is that for labor a big vote is a good vote, and a big registration means a big vote.

In their registration drives unions have worked along three lines:

First, a mechanical card check to find out which union members are registered and which are not. This is followed up by a variety of devices to get the unregistered to register -- bus loads to registration points, post card mailings, prizes run as raffles on registration numbers, home visits, and so on.

Many local unions have standing committees making a year-round check to see to it that every old or new member is registered. They send reminders to those who have lost their good standing as voters. The AFL-CIO's COPE has been giving prizes and plaques to local unions that report 100% registration.

A second method of stimulating membership registration is agitational or educational. This is a general rather than a pinpointed drive; appeals are made through all the media. Sometimes the unions do this together with other elements in the community; often, the work place is used as a spot to talk over the benefits of registration.

Each of these methods works best under somewhat different circumstances. The first, the mechanical method, is specifically suited to a local with a small membership or a local with a large membership living in a concentrated industrial-dwelling compact. In a small local, the simple clerical task of checking on each member is easily accomplished. Similarly, where a local has a large body of members who live near where they work, the job of checking on registration is relatively easy. The mechanical type of check becomes much more difficult in a great metropolitan area like New York. A large local with forty thousand members, one third of whom come and go each year, would have to check registration files containing millions of names in tens of thousands of precincts (Election Districts). The cost alone of conducting such a check would be prohibitive. The necessary follow-up with visits to homes becomes nearly impossible. Therefore, in the case of large local unions in metropolitan areas, the usual methods are heavy agitation and a movement in the direction of district organization, to be discussed at a later point.

The third aspect of the registration drive is work for election law reforms making it easier for working people, especially blue collar workers, to register. The first step in this direction is personal permanent registration. The second step is to try to set up a system of registration where you work, or where you shop, or in your own home. Thirdly, the time of registration should be set at hours suitable for factory people. In some areas, labor favors literacy tests in foreign languages, especially in Spanish, since many American citizens who speak Spanish as a mother tongue are literate in their

own language and are acquainted with the affairs of the nation.

During the years that labor has been conducting heavy registration drives, two questions have arisen as to the effectiveness of registration itself, sans political education.

First question: does increased registration necessarily mean an increased total vote? This is questionable, especially where people have been induced to register by strictly mechanical operations. Many of these people have no interest in voting, resent being dragooned, turn their back on politics, and never show on Election Day -- sometimes, just for spite.

Second question: is a big vote a good vote? This is also questionable, since it assumes that workers vote more or less as a class responding to class pressures. Such a generalization applies with some percentage of accuracy to those workers who are conscious members of unions, have a measure of understanding as to their economic and political role, and have been subject to talk, discussion, ideas. But this generalization does not necessarily apply, indeed in some cases it applies in reverse, to that portion of the working class that does not like the union to which they belong, that is negative about both economic and political action and that has little or no understanding of its citizenship role. Such a lumpenproletariat (somewhat modified) can be dragged down to register and may even be driven to vote but can hardly be counted on as reliable elements in labor's battalions.

Increasingly, therefore, sophisticated labor leadership gears its registration drive to issues. It urges people to get out and vote -- for something. Registration is not just ordered, it is motivated. This tends to make a greater vote follow greater registration, and -- by the same motive -- makes the larger vote a more liberal vote.

Labor's third activity in politics is fund raising. This is also the most controversial of all labor's activities. Any candidate who has received a penny from organized labor is charged with having been bought by labor's millions, although financially, labor does not do well in campaigns. In Federal campaigns, trade unions are restricted by law in their contribution to and expenditures on behalf of candidates. No regular union dues money may be used and so the unions, usually through independent committees, must appeal for "voluntary" dollars.

The unions ask for a dollar a member, but they consider themselves to be doing nicely if they come up with 20 cents from each. Because this money comes in as a trickle, it is conserved, cared for, and limited

in use to one specific purpose: direct campaign efforts for a named candidate.

If labor's political efforts were limited financially to the money that comes in on the voluntary dollar drives, the trade unions would be a thin reed for any candidate, party or program to lean on. The unions must depend upon other finances.

Regular union dues are used politically, although they are not used for a public appeal to back a specific candidate.

Dues may be and are used to educate members on an issue of public concern. They may be used for a legislative drive. They may also be used to urge registration and to organize machinery to get out the vote.

In other words, labor's basic machinery for political action may be organized with dues money. Treasury funds are stopped at the point where the union would use such funds to name a candidate and to urge people to vote for that candidate.

In a discussion of the areas in which dues money may and have been used there are twilight zones. There is, first of all, the question of the use of the union newspaper and other regular union publications that are financed through union funds. Shall they have the right to urge a vote for a given candidate for Federal office? To deny a union such a right and to deny a corporation such a right would not only mean a ban on endorsement in the labor press but a ban on endorsement in the American press, since newspapers are -- after all -- owned in most instances by corporations. Apparently then, union publications have the right.

In deeper and darker twilight lies the question of whether a union may, at a union meeting, in a hall rented or bought out of union funds, endorse a candidate. The union seems to have this right under the general theory that a union, like any other organization, has a right to communicate with <u>its own members</u> about matters of common interest.

Unions evidently do have the right to endorse candidates. If they do, then as democratic institutions they must also have two concomitant rights -- the right to discuss with their membership in advance whom to endorse, and the right to report back to the membership on why that candidate was backed.

In still darker twilight is the question of whether a union may use radio in communicating with its membership. The radio is the most effective and cheapest way, if not the only way, of contacting the

membership in an area where there is a huge concentration of workers of one union. The right of the union to speak to its membership via the air waves seems to have been conceded by the courts. The problem, however, is the "spill over".

In general then, unions may use union funds in conversing with, educating, organizing, and motivating its own membership -- right up to and including the open backing of a candidate. The union funds are stopped when the union wishes to influence the public at large.

These generalizations apply only to Federal campaigns. In state and local campaigns there are few prohibitions. Since there is no need for reporting under the various political regulations, less is known about the subject. However, any study would reveal a pattern checkered beyond design, because of the variety of relations between labor and local and state politics.

As a generalization, however, it may be said that labor devotes a relatively tiny portion of its funds to political activities. Three per cent of union funds would be a high annual expenditure rate. One per cent is more likely and that, on even years, rather than annually.

The recent Supreme Court decision in the Georgia Railway Labor case will unquestionably tend to alter the methods of the railway unions. Its impact on other unions is highly moot at the moment. This decision restricts a union from using a portion of a member's dues for a political purpose inimical to the will of the individual member. In the event that such money has been spent, the member may claim and shall receive back that portion of his dues paid for this purpose.

Two questions arise from this decision: first, its enforceability; second, its applicability.

As to its enforceability, I have real doubts as a practicing labor politico. Let me assume a union that devotes 1 per cent of its dues to politics. Let me assume a member who objects to the use of his money for one item out of a twenty item program of the union. This member should have returned to him out of his annual dues one twentieth of one per cent of his dues. If he pays dues of fifty dollars a year (rather high) he should have returned to him a sum of two and one half cents, hardly worth the fare, the postage, or the shoe leather.

As to its applicability, it appears that the Court held as it did in the Railway case because the railway unions come under a special piece of legislation: the Railway Labor Act. Apparently the Court felt that

the legislative history of this Act, which granted the unions a "union shop" clause, implied a ban on the use of union dues money for political purposes running contrary to the will of the individual member.

The fourth division of labor's political work is the actual election program, divided into primary and regular elections. Taking the two separately, labor is stronger in the general election than in the primary. (This, of course, does not apply to those states where the primary is, in effect, the real election.) Unions are relatively weaker in the nominating process because they are not directly affiliated with a party. Hence, the labor unions find it difficult to urge their members to join any one party, to enroll, and to get into the primary. In addition, participation in the primaries is habitually low in most of the urban areas of the East and North: to build a primary machine labor would not only have to affiliate with some one party but would have to change the voting habits of the entire electorate.

In the nominating process, labor counts on its weight in political collective bargaining. The union leadership may meet with party leadership to influence or show preference. In some cases, labor's voice is decisive; in others, labor's voice is ignored; and in still other cases the union view is taken into consideration.

In the general election, the labor movement works in four ways, depending upon local custom, type of leadership, party relationships, etc. Unions may work individually, as national or local units strictly on their own. They may work as part of a tightly coordinated campaign of the labor movement in the area. They may work through party or candidate headquarters, supplying manpower and brainpower. Or they may work as part of a coalition in a broad liberal front.

Campaign techniques vary widely. There are union meetings, sponsored by the local union or the central labor body; outdoor meetings in crowded labor areas or in front of the factory gates; literature distribution in shop areas; canvassing at homes; motorcades; get-out-the-vote drives with car drivers assigned to pick up individual workers; use of union publications; introduction of candidates to key men in the union, or walking them and hand-shaking them through plants; lunch hour talks in work places; radio; TV; posters; and picnics. The actual technique of rousing the voter is hardly original or creative. It is the application of traditional methods of campaigning.

There is, however, an inherent weakness in all of labor's political work. The trade union's authority runs from the worker in the shop to the representative in the shop or to the representative who services the shop. The political authority runs from the voter to his neighbor-

hood leader, whether he operates through patronage or through program. The union is structured to operate through the point where people work. The election is structured to operate through the point where people live. Hence, the trade union movement, in its original industrial mold, is not ideally equipped to do political work.

A few experienced political unions have been aware of this for years. Thus in New York City, a number of traditionally progressive and political unions operate through the Liberal Party and its district clubs, with the clubs providing district organization. Active trade unionists are urged to and often do join these clubs. Through them they act in the neighborhood to reinforce the general message of the union in the work and market place.

Although New York's Liberal Party is an established and legally recognized third party, it operates partly in the same non-partisan fashion as the labor movement. The Liberal Party may endorse and run on its party line both Democrats and Republicans who meet its standards. In other instances it runs independent candidates.

The pattern of district organization is now the new direction in which the trade unions are moving. There are four states -- all southern, incidentally, -- where the trade unions have set up district organizations, centralized in a state organization. These district organizations parallel the party organization of the political parties, except that they do not constitute a party.

This year, a northern state is going to move in the same direction with a state-wide staff and state-wide backing from the unions.

It is likely that, in the coming years, more and more states will copy this design of organization. Labor will then shift its organizational base from the work place to the community, while using the work place as a point of education, agitation, recruitment of manpower, and raising of funds.

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THE MOVEMENTS OF PROTEST AND REVOLUTION AGAINST WESTERN SOCIETIES

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> Since (the French Revolution) has made the impression of striving more for a renovation of mankind than merely for a reform of France, it has kindled a passion such as even the most violent political revolutions have heretofore not been able to produce. It started a proselytizing campaign and brought propaganda into the world. In this way, it eventually assumed a religious character which astonished the contemporaries. Even more, it became itself a kind of religion, an imperfect religion, to be sure ... but one which nonetheless has flooded the world with its fighters, its apostles and its martyrs ...
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville,
> L'ancien régime et la révolution

> In view of the fact that with the spread of education and of communications, consciousness of suffering and impatience, too, spread visibly and at an accelerating pace ...
>
> Jacob Burckhardt,
> Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen (1868)

> We are living in the fifth act of the French Revolution.
>
> Felix Somary,
> Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben (1955)

The modern movements of protest and revolution against traditional Western society can be seen as part of a world-wide revolutionary process that

has gone on for almost 200 years, exploding first in one place and then in another, interrupted at times by periods of quiet and restoration, gaining momentum, at first slowly and then rapidly, and now encompassing the entire globe. Its main characteristics are: a passionate desire for change, with little regard for the needs of conservation and consolidation, and impatient of slow, gradual, change; a kind of evangelical moral fervor for the poor, in earthly goods or in spirit; the twin phenomena of protest against the existing intra-national and international stratification, in the form of socialism and nationalism, respectively, both movements hostile to each other at times and cooperating at others. Hatred for private property and for the frankly acquisitive pursuits of men is characteristic of socialism and often of nationalism, too. Everything receives a particular flavor through the alienation of the intellectuals, from whose ranks the political leaders of modern times usually come, from their societies.

I.

THE WESTERN MOVEMENTS

The progressive bias.

Modern bias is strongly in favor of change and it often favors quick and violent change over slow and non-violent evolution. "Progress" is always, "revolution" usually, a laudatory term. Even changes which involve no physical violence are called revolutions to give them added prestige; one speaks of the urban, the scientific, the industrial, revolution, of revolutions in style or taste.

This is a relatively new phenomenon. Throughout most of human history, heavy opprobrium was attached to any deviation from the traditional order of

things. To be cupidus rerum novarum was a serious accusation in ancient Rome. The middle ages held to the concept of a closed world. As late as in the mid-fifteenth century, the humanist Lorenzo Valla still considered "the physician who tries out new and experimental medicines on the sick rather than the time-tested ones to be contemptible", like "the sailor who prefers to hold an uncharted course to one upon which others safely sail their ships and cargoes." Only forty years later, Columbus started on his voyage into uncharted sea.

With some interludes of consolidation and restoration, the world has been changing since with increasing velocity, and public opinion has come to identify change with life, conservation with stagnation and death.

But the question of conservation versus innovation need not be a matter of weltanschauung, of principle and ideology. Civilisation needs conservation just as the cultivated soil needs it, as a protection against the return of the jungle and against corrosion; there are many historical examples of regression, of the loss of achievements already gained. But in quiet times and, in particular, in times in which living conditions have been steadily improving, people take for granted what they have and do not consider the possibility that it could be in jeopardy.

Equally, civilisation needs innovation if it is to fulfill human aspirations. And in modern, industrialized, societies, the end, or the mere slowing down, of economic progress would mean a major calamity because a large part of the people depend, directly or indirectly, on the investment sector of the economy. Whether, in any particular case, we should, or should not, embark on innovation, could be decided on an appraisal of the merits of the case, i.e., on the chances and probable costs, material and otherwise, of

the innovation. There is no basis for any generalized statement about the optimal relation of conservation and innovation, and no likelihood that the same formula will apply in all places and at all times.

There is also the question, not of great immediate importance but possibly crucial in the long run, how long this constant change at a necessarily accelerating pace could be maintained without creating unmanageable conditions through the progressive interference with the balance of nature, and without reaching the limits either of the natural resources within reach or of the possibilities of human adjustment to perpetually changing conditions. Previous speculations about the limits of technology, or the limits of mankind, have proved highly premature but that does not mean that such limits will not eventually make themselves felt.

However that may be, it is interesting to notice that the attitude towards "progress" which is a question of ideology in political and social matters has been thoroughly de-ideologized in areas in which great advances towards rationality have been made, as, e.g., in medicine. There was a time when the application, or non-application, of surgery was a matter of principle. Physicians foreswore the use of the knife in the Hippocratic Oath; surgery was practiced by another, not always fully respected, profession. Today the determination of medical treatment is no longer a matter of ideology; physicians are not divided into conservatives, always advocating conservative treatment, and liberals, always in favor of radical treatment. It is universally recognized that surgery is indicated in some cases and contraindicated in others. There is still a place for temperamental differences between doctors but it is a marginal one. Perhaps there will some time be a day when the question of conservation and innovation in public affairs will

be equally free from ideology - or prejudice - and nobody will profess himself in favor or against innovation as a matter of principle.

The evangelical fervor.

The Western world has in the last 200 years been the scene of a kind of messianic, albeit secular, fervor. It has found expression in many documents and manifestoes, as, e.g., in the American Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and others down to the so-called Atlantic Charter and more recent documents. The moral climate that these declarations indicate has led to an improvement in the living conditions of countless common people beyond the boldest hopes of the reformers of earlier generations. But it has also had some other consequences. "Moral fervor", as Michael Polanyi put it, "in our lifetime has outreached itself by its inordinate aspirations and has heaped on mankind the disasters that have befallen us."[1)]

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1) Beyond Nihilism. Cambridge University Press, 1960. P. 1.

The moral demands "outreached" themselves and became "inordinate" when self-criticism, or criticism of one's own government and society, and the attempt at a sympathetic understanding of an opponent's point of view, were carried to the point where people can see only the mote in the eye of their own society and never the beam in the eye of its enemies. It is the kind of attitude which Bernard Shaw must have had in mind when he let the tailor Androcles, just about to be thrown into the circus, express his compassion with the poor lions. But while such attitudes make sense in the faithful Christian who is confidently looking forward to eternal life, they are more difficult to understand in their contemporary, secularized, version.

The overreaching of moral demands is shown by the fact that no allowance is made by the moralist critics for the pursuit of national interest, including mere self-preservation. The U.S. is requested, in her dealings with other nations, to follow what is said to be "the right", with complete disregard for the consequences which such a course would have for American interest in a world in which not everybody is motivated by such exclusive dedication. Yet, self-preservation and the pursuit of one's interest are common to all living creatures who can neglect them only at their peril. Morality sets definite limits to the degree to which, and to the ways in which, interests may be pursued, and it sets up obligations to others. But a morality which plainly condemns the consideration of interest as such is not compatible with survival.[1)]

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1) Cp. in this context the following statement by Reinhold Niebuhr: "A valid moral outlook must be based upon honest regard for the facts in the human situation, and must not construct norms which are impossible to achieve in view of the persistence and the power of man's self-concern, and more particularly of his collective self-concern. It is obviously wrong for either the individual or the group to pursue its interests consistently without regard for the interest of other individuals or groups who are bound to it in the bundle of life. It is also wrong to claim a larger measure of disinterestedness than is possible for either individuals or groups. But it is possible for both individuals and groups to relate concern for the other with interest and concern for the self ...

"It is interesting that a valid psychiatry has come to the same conclusions with respect to the individual as those at which a valid political science has arrived in regard to communities ..." (The Structure of Empires and Nations. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. P. 30.)

It should be added, however, that the neglect of considerations of national interest, characteristic of liberal attitudes to international problems in the U.S. is not always due to exaggerated moral demands but sometimes merely to the fact that the possibility of a national catastrophe is not realised. The long period of unearned security which the American people have enjoyed because of their geographical remoteness from other centers of power, the balance of power in Eurasia, and the role of sea power - facts which have either disappeared or been downgraded in recent years -

have made the people take security for granted; this feeling, together with anti-European resentment and the complacency produced by American successes, had created an atmosphere in which "power politics" was looked upon as something wicked, and the concept of national interest as a fraud.

How moral aspirations can outreach themselves can be seen, e.g., in the attitude of extreme liberalism to crime and the criminal. The law-breaker has from time immemorial been fair game for human sadism; people openly and unashamedly enjoyed watching wilfully produced human agony at public executions. The fact that the victims were criminals, hence, supposedly, "got their just deserts", quieted whatever stirrings of conscience the spectators might otherwise have felt. In the last two centuries, the more conspicuous expressions of sadism have gradually been taken out of law and law enforcement - a development for which every humane person will feel grateful.

But the process has been carried farther to the point where the law-breaker appears to be fully exonerated as a victim of circumstance - "more sinned against than sinning" - and society is seen as responsible. The judges, the government, the upper classes, even the victim himself,[1] appear as the real culprits, and the plea of conditioning by circumstance is never entered on their behalf.

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1) Shortly after the first World War, a novel, by the German writer Leonard Frank, was published under the title: Not the Slayer but the Slain One is Guilty.

The position is logically untenable. If all behavior is determined to the exclusion of all culpability and responsibility, not only the law-breaker but society, too, cannot be called to account, and exhortation or condemnation make no sense whatever. If, on the other hand, there is sense

in attaching blame to society for its acts of commission or ommission, the same ought to apply to the lawbreaker, too. The fact that, in this modern view, the lawbreaker is treated on the assumption of complete determinism while society is treated on the assumption of freedom of choice, merely reflects the will to condemn society.

As Polanyi has suggested, the moral fervor may have its origin in the ethics of the Gospel (and of prophetic Judaism). The moral prescriptions of the Gospel, the demand to offer the other cheek, with total self-abnegation, can hardly be practiced for any length of time except by people who live under at least partially sheltered conditions - as in monastic orders - so that the harsher necessities of life are performed by others less burdened by scruples or subject to a different code.

It has therefore been suggested that the prescriptions of the Gospels were never meant to govern the daily lives of continuing communities but that they constituted an Interimsethik, a set of moral rules for the waiting time, before the final consummation of history and the coming of the Kingdom of God which was then thought to be imminent.

However that may be, the Church interposed herself between man and the text of the Gospels. It was the function of the Roman Church to direct the messianic expectation away from daily life, into an afterlife or a very distant future, and so to preserve a realistic attitude to the world around us. In this way the Church arrived at a synthesis of hope and realism, of the Don Quixote and the Sancho Panza in us - albeit a synthesis heavily weighted towards immobilism. The compromise became untenable once the possibility of secular improvement had been demonstrated.

The decline of the Churches and of any kind of supranaturalism seems

to have led to a revival of messianism in its original form: the expectation of a consummation of history, in the immediate future, that will establish the realm of justice and happiness for all men of "good will".[1)]

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1) For the messianic social beliefs cp.: J. L. Talmon, The Origin of Totalitarian Democracy. 1st ed., 1951. New York: Praeger.
Utopianism and Politics. London: Conservative Political Center, 1957.
Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium. London: Secker and Warburg, 1957.

While this, presumably, is the origin of the immense moral fervor for the "disinherited of the earth" in our time, it is an open question in each individual case to what degree fervor is due to genuine moral passions that have been carried to extreme, even suicidal, conclusions, and to what degree it is due to envy of, or spite for, the establishment in one's own society. Both motivations may, in fact, operate in the same person although only the first, idealistic, one is likely to appear in a man's conscious self-interpretation. The fact that moral fervor for the oppressed may sometimes be fed by unconscious hatred of the establishment may explain the frequent indifference of the moral critic towards oppression and injustice, however severe, when it is practiced by the enemies of his society.

But despite their self-damaging implications, these attitudes, whatever their origin, would still not constitute any real danger to the vital interests of Western societies were it not for the peculiar present constellation of forces. One school of thought in the messianic tradition, of particular determination and ruthlessness, has in our time succeeded in establishing complete power over the Eurasian heartland (to use Sir Halford Mackinder's excellent expression). Its leaders believe dogmatically in a modern version of Manichaeism according to which their

own side represents both the morally good and the wave of the future while our way of life is both irredeemably evil and irreversibly decaying; and they believe that our downfall is not only preordained by inexorable laws of history but that it is actually their historical mission to be our executioners. It is for this reason that the moral passions of Western liberals have often become, in effect though probably not in conscious intent, an aid to an adversary who frankly rejects the very values for the minor infractions of which they are daily castigating Western society.

At the same time when Nebuchadnezzar threatened the existence of the Jewish kingdom, the prophet Jeremiah urged the people not to resist but to accept servitude to Babylon as a divine punishment for their sins. Like him - and other ancient prophets - many contemporary doctrinaire-liberals profess to believe that our peril is due to our sins and would disappear if we would practice strict morality in all our actions. But while the assumption of a relation between sin and misfortune makes sense for the ancient Hebrews who believed that God punishes His people for their misconduct, it is less understandable in modern liberal atheists or agnostics who do not think that the moral law determines the course of events. But beliefs can endure long after the rationale for holding them has withered away.

In one important point, however, there is a striking difference between Jeremiah and his contemporary successors: Jeremiah was fully aware of what was in store for the people at the hand of their Babylonian masters but many of his contemporary followers tell us that Nebuchadnezzar does not really exist but is merely an hallucination of the State Department.

The struggle against the "establishment", domestic and international.

The protest against the status quo appears as protest against the pecking order of our society, and the promotion of the demands of the lower strata at the expense of the higher ones. As has been emphasized before, protest that does not come from the lower orders themselves may be due either to identification with, and compassion for, them, or to hatred of the higher ones.

The demands for justice for all men have grown ever stronger in the Western world since the 18th century. Justice, at first interpreted as equality of opportunity, is more and more becoming to mean equality of station; and, as Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw, "the hatred that men bear to privilege increases in proportion as privileges become fewer and less considerable, so that democratic passions would seem to burn more fiercely just when they have least fuel" because in a world in which there are no great differences, the still existing inequalities are all the more unacceptable.[1] Thus, the anti-colonial passions in Asia and Africa have become

1) Democracy in America, Vol. II, Book 4, Chapter III.

more inflamed at the very time that more than nine-tenths of the Western colonial empires have become emancipated.

Nationalism, on the other hand, creates a feeling of solidarity along ethnic rather than class lines. It was at times welded to the political and social revolt as in the French Revolution, while at other times the two movements have been bitterly opposed to each other. Nationalism has been universalist as well as parochial, integrative as well as divisive. It was the former when it strove towards the unity of groups conceived as "nations"

that had hitherto been divided into smaller traditional, mostly dynastic, political units as, e.g., the unification of Italy and Germany; it was disintegrative and divisive when it broke up traditional multinational structures such as the Habsburg monarchy, or pursued its national aspirations without regard for the aspirations, or indeed the very existence, of other nations. In the latter aspect of nationalism, naive egotism, an attitude which in individuals or groups precedes moral development, has been elevated to a sacred duty and the innocent selfishness of the primitive has thus been transformed into an evil of civilisation, viz. the use of morality for immoral ends.

Not infrequently, nationalism has begun as an integrative force and has shown the latter characteristics only after it had realized some of its fundamental aspirations; this was, e.g., the case of the German development from the nationalism of the Liberals of 1848 over the militaristic nationalism of the Treitschke generation which still paid at least lip service to Christianity, to the paroxysmal nationalism of a Hitler who knew no law except "the interest of the German people."[1)]

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1) It is unmistakable, however, that the germs of the later barbarism existed from the beginning. Sir Iewis Namier, e.g., said about Mazzini whom he called "a man outstanding for spiritual integrity" and "a sincere lover of liberty": "... the moral fervor, purity of purpose and religious sincerity which pervade his writings - words of faith and action rather than of thought - were apt to conceal from contemporaries how deficient his teachings were in substance correlated to every-day reality, and what dangerous germs they contained. National self-glorification and claims to moral superiority were of their core: which entails a measure of depreciation of other peoples, and is not conducive to international comity." (Avenues of History. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952. P. 29.)

The Austrian poet Franz Grillparzer, a somewhat older contemporary of Mazzini, said around 1848 that the development went "from humanitarianism over nationalism into bestialism".

Nationalism has therefore been called a demonic force. There are examples of a nation turning away from nationalism in disillusionment after it has led the nation into disaster (as happened in France and, more recently, in Germany); but there are no examples of a successful appeasement of nationalism.

Nationalism sometimes sponsors the aspirations of groups at the lower level of the pyramid of power or wealth, and sometimes the aspirations of groups which are relatively high up on an international scale. In the latter case, it has a double face: it is a rebellion against those who occupy the top positions but it is at the same time oppressive towards the lower echelons. That was, e.g., the case of nationalism in industrially advanced countries like modern Germany and Japan; they struggled against the "have" nations - above all England and the U.S. - who they claimed had appropriated the best things on earth at a time when the "younger" nations had not yet appeared on the scene. There was either a demand for colonies as in Germany and Italy, or an attempt to conquer adjacent territories populated by less advanced peoples - the Ukraina, parts of China - with a view to colonising them and enslaving the inhabitants. This aspect gives nationalism its peculiar ambiguous character, at once "revolutionary" and "counter-revolutionary".

But where nationalism took hold of a poor and undeveloped people as, e.g., in Latin America at the present time, the national and the social revolution may run parallel for some time as is demonstrated, e.g., by the Cuban revolution, or by some of Mao-Tse-Tung's revisions of orthodox Marxist doctrine, allowing, i.a., for a temporary coalition with the "national bourgeoise" and thereby putting the "struggle against imperialism",

i.e., the international revolution, ahead of the domestic class struggle.

Whether an individual is more attracted by socialism - which under present conditions means Marxist socialism and, most probably, Communism - or by nationalism, seems to depend on many circumstances, historical, situational, personal. Among them is also the response of the personality to Marxism's and nationalism's basic attitudes towards life, their implicit weltanschauung: the latter is expressed most clearly in their respective doctrines regarding determinism and freedom.

Marxism is strongly determinist and sees the world move along inexorable laws of history. Men may accelerate or smooth the course of events by correct action, or may delay it and make it harsher by error and futile resistance but they cannot change necessity. Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt.

Nationalism, on the other hand, is indeterminist; the future belongs to him who seizes it. Different temperaments are attracted or repelled by these two philosophies.

The anti-capitalist bias.

The impact of the socialist idea has been cataclysmic. Its strength is probably due, in the main, to a combination of an egalitarian moral fervor with a particular, superficially persuasive, interpretation of the non-egalitarian realities, viz. the doctrine that the business man acting under the profit motive is a social parasite who fulfills no social function but has merely, through the possession of the means of production, interposed himself between the worker and his tools, and so been able to extract a heavy tribute from the "toilers" - not unlike the medieval robber barons who extracted river tolls from travelling merchants. This interpretation seems

convincing to all but the very few who have either personal experience or theoretical training in economic matters.

This means that the problem of economic rationality, i.e., the problem of an optimal employment of scarce resources, is little understood. The problem is difficult enough if only one goal is pursued - in which case we usually speak of a question of strategy rather than of economics - but it receives a new dimension of complexity if there is a multiplicity of goals each of which can be pursued only at the expense of some others as is the case, e.g., in the promotion of general welfare.

It is the justification of a market, or capitalist, economy that it creates a field in which all players are constantly rewarded by an extension, or punished by a contraction, of their operating range, according to the results of their management in terms of consumers' preferences.

It cannot be taken for granted that consumers' preferences should always be the ultimate determinant of action; in fact, virtually everybody agrees that there must be at least some exceptions from the sovereign and irresponsible rule of the consumer (as, e.g., in the control of the traffic in narcotics, or in building and zoning regulations). Furthermore, even if consumers' preferences are accepted as the ultimate frame of reference, it cannot be taken for granted that a market economy is necessarily the only possible, or the best, solution of the problem of economic rationality. The capitalist system can therefore become subject of legitimate criticism on either of these two grounds: for catering to desires which, in the view of the critic, are not worth indulging in, or because its function of selecting the most economic among the possible alternatives of action might be achieved better by some other mechanism.

But capitalism has only extremely rarely been attacked on any such ground. It has been attacked for more than a century not by people who wished to substitute their solution of the problem of economic rationality for the solution of the market but by people who are unaware of the very existence of the problem. For them the only economic problems are technological; one produces what is needed, it is as simple as that, and except for the engineer's task, the job of management, as Lenin put it, "can be reduced ... to simple operations of registration, filing and checking."[1)]

1) State and Revolution. Coll. Works, XXI.

Unaware of the problem of economic rationality, the Marxists did not understand what hit them (and everyone else) when socialized industries, supposedly freed from the burden of having to produce "surplus value" for the capitalists, did not have that surplus value available for distribution among the wage earners as one had to expect according to the theory. Nor did they later understand how the "exploited" worker in privately owned industry can receive higher wages than his "liberated" opposite number in socialist countries. Even today observers report that leading men in Eastern Germany, looking at the prosperity of Western Germany and West Berlin, do not consider the possibility that something might be wrong with their economic system: the system, they are satisfied, is superior to capitalism and it must be due to accidental factors such as bottlenecks if the people have not yet reaped the benefits of socialism.[1)] Just the same,

1) There is evidence, however, that some economists in Communist countries have become aware of the problem in recent years. Their insight has been acted upon in Yugoslavia through decentralisation and the establishment of a market of sorts. There have also been stirrings in this direction among

economists in the Soviet Union and particularly in Poland. But they are still viewed with suspicion by the Communist party who fears the impact of any undermining of the labor theory of value. See Gregory Grossman, Value and Plan. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1960.

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they are eager to get rid of capitalist Berlin and thereby of the case that visibly contradicts their theories.

It is this inability on the part of most people including, in particular, most intellectuals, to understand the nature of the economic problem that gives the socialist ideology its virtually irresistible appeal. The arguments which the defender of a market economy can put forward are simply beyond the understanding of those who have neither theoretical instruction nor practical experience in economic matters. They are in any case suspect of being self-serving if they are advanced by people with vested interests in the preservation of capitalism; and if advanced by others who are conspicuously lacking in such interests, they can be equally discounted as coming from "lackeys" of capitalism.

The problem of economic rationality is often not understood even by men of very high intelligence. We are accustomed to speak of intelligence as though it were a unitary quality which, as much or as little as there is, can be applied with equal success to all areas of reality. Psychometrics, with their I.Q. measurements, have contributed to this conception.

Yet there is much evidence that an individual can operate on a high intellectual level in one area of reality and on a very low one in another. Theoretical intelligence capable of understanding how things are - in itself buta name for a whole group of abilities, each related to a particular area or aspect of reality - is different from economic intelligence that is quick in realizing how available things could be put to best advantage; from

political or military intelligence that grasps the value of everything for a struggle for power; from social intelligence that knows how to make friends and influence people; or from the erotic intelligence of a Casanova.

Several types of higher intelligence are rarely found together in the same person. Lenin was one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest, revolutionary strategists of all times. He sensed like nobody else the points of weakness in existing societies, and invented strategies of how to establish footholds of power, how to enlarge them, and how to win and keep total power. Even his closest collaborators did not fully understand him for a long time. But the same Lenin was unable to grasp the problem of an optimal allocation of resources to competing goals, and the dependence of human welfare on a solution of this problem; he thought economic management was a matter of accounting and statistics.

Andrew Carnegie, an economic genius of the first magnitude, had no understanding for matters of power or ideology. When he set up the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he wondered what role the Foundation could play once it would have succeeded in abolishing wars. He told his trustees that it would then be their task to decide on what ills the Foundation should focus next.

In the mid-1930's when civilized men were appalled at the prospect of another war, and one that would involve the bombing of civilians, to boot, a prominent English mathematician pointed out that, of course, one would not actually drop any bombs, though in dealing with Hitler it might be necessary to behave for a while as though one would; it did not seem to have occurred to this outstanding man that one cannot bluff a determined adversary while at the same time putting one's cards on the table.

The failure to understand the problem of rational allocation of resources and its crucial importance for human welfare may also be seen in another light, viz. as the consequence of utopian thinking. Human values are in some degree contradictory, i.e., one can often realize one value only at the expense of another; liberty and equality or, more generally, individual expression and social order, economic progress and security, income and leisure, are examples of such dichotomies. Decision involves a choice in favor of one value against another or, rather, the determination of an optimal point beyond which any further approach towards the realization of one value would cost too dearly in terms of the other. Because of these contradictions among the things which men hold dear, complete human fulfillment is not possible.

The utopian mind, however, does not accept this kind of reasoning. The utopian refuses to believe that there could be any inherent limits to human fulfillment; the very suggestion, he suspects, is a ruse to protect special privilege. In the good society, all men can be completely fulfilled in their individual aspirations and society can yet be harmonious, without conflict; as Marx had put it: the free development of each is the prerequisite of the free development of all.

It is a kind of preordained harmony; the skeptics, of course, think that this is merely another way of saying that one can have one's cake and eat it, too.

If one believes that all human aspirations are in natural harmony with each other and with the interests of society, and of the whole of mankind - a harmony only so far disturbed and impeded by the "class structure" - one will, of course, not believe that decisions involve choices between

irreconcilable values; for if one believed the latter, one would not have accepted the former.

But if the problem of rational allocation is not understood, the system of private enterprise appears to have no raison d'ëtre but to be merely a form of privilege, at once immoral and inexpedient.

This belief, somewhat weakened in the West but holding full sway everywhere else, that government operation of the economy is both morally indicated and practically sensible while business management is both evil and stupid, appears to be the main reason for the fundamental goodwill enjoyed by the Soviet Union, and the widespread distrust of the United States. It is for this reason, I submit, that over so large a part of the world, a light view is taken of Communist aggressive moves while the West is severely castigated for even moderate acts of self-assertion: for Communism stands in the minds of countless people for something fundamentally "progressive" while the West stands for an obsolete system of privilege. Without such fundamental aversion, it would be difficult to understand why a large section of world opinion condemns as aggressiveness in the West what it hails as strength in the East, and ridicules as weakness in the West what it applauds as manifestation of peaceful intentions in the East.

To the enormous amount of goodwill which the Soviet Union has enjoyed as the land of socialism must also be attributed the paralysis of American foreign policy at the end of the second World War, when the Soviet Union established her stranglehold over Eastern Central Europe, at a time when the balance of physical strength greatly favored the United States and effective resistance would have been possible at small risk. But a vigorous

policy towards the Soviet Union would have been vetoed by a substantial part of Western public opinion.

The alienation of the intellectuals.

The intellectuals of the West, as a rule, are not fully identified with their societies. They stand aloof and while they may feel enthusiastic about some "ideal" society they are often indifferent or hostile to their society as it actually is.[1)]

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1) A characteristic example for the attitude of many Western intellectuals: In a psychological study of scientists, the author, a noted psychologist, points out that "scientists are very good citizens" and states: "The scientists involved in espionage have been very few, indeed, and misguided as they may have been, they have acted on principle and not for personal gain." (Anne Roe, The Making of a Scientist. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1952. P. 240.) Thus, the author is not sure whether she condemns espionage against the United States at all ("misguided as they may have been ...") and, in any case, does not take a grave view of the matter as long as it was done for ideological reasons and not for monetary gain. It would be rash to conclude, however, that intellectuals of liberal persuasion advocate a general tolerance for all ideologies as was done by John Stuart Mill; as a rule, they make no allowances for ideologies of the Right. But the ideologies of the left are regarded as "idealistic" and action based on them is excused or only mildly rebuked, whatever its consequences. No question is asked whether these ideologies may not also be fed from emotional sources not necessarily praiseworthy such as, e.g., lust for power or intellectual conceit.

To some degree, this has been so in all societies in which intellectuals have enjoyed the freedom of expression. Since the days of the Sophists, they have been in the habit of questioning and challenging the values and the assumptions that were taken for granted in their societies. Some intellectuals, on the other hand, have followed the example of that dissident Sophist, Socrates, who used his intellectual powers not only to challenge current beliefs but also to give to the essential values of his civilisation a new, presumably better, foundation.

Intellect tends to question and thereby to undermine dogma and tradition.[1] The act of understanding, said the historian of science, Charles Coulston Gillispie, is an act of alienation.[2] Psychoanalytic theory suggests a kind of primary antagonism of the ego against the id, i.e., of the rational, goal-directed, part in us against the impulsive and automatic parts. Alienation is an aspect of emancipation. It is the hostility of Geist to life of which there has been so much talk in German philosophy.

1) Cp. the following remark by Frank H. Knight: "... the 'liberation of the mind' seems to have released a tendency to acute discontent, criticism, fault-finding that was there all along but held in check by the harsh discipline of pre-liberal culture - or possibly new conditions have caused it to develop with astonishing speed as a culture trait." Frank H. Knight, Intelligence and Democratic Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. P. 144.

2) The Edge of Objectivity. Princeton, University Press, 1960. P. 84.

In principle this is unavoidable. It is rooted in the very nature of freedom because freedom is destructive as well as creative; the very viability of a free society depends on whether or not the society can take advantage of the creative energies unleashed by freedom while keeping its destructive aspects within limits.

But this does not explain the degree of the estrangement or the bitterness with which many Western intellectuals look upon their society which has provided them with a degree of personal security and with opportunities of development not enjoyed at any other time or place. Is this a reaction to freedom which, for the inner-directed vital like air, is deeply frustrating to the other-directed who need guidance? Is it the very consequence of the emancipation from drudgery and of the newly won

leisure which makes people ask beyond life's necessities or luxuries for a meaning in life while they are yet not able to find it for themselves? Is it the constant increase in possible fulfillments and the simple fact that in such situations aspirations always grow a little faster than fulfillments? Or the attitude of those who have been conditioned in their childhood to expect immediate fulfillment of every wish, have accordingly failed to acquire any tolerance towards frustration, and who go to pieces, bundles of despair and fury, whenever they meet with even the slightest frustration as is, after all, not forever avoidable? Somewhere along these lines an explanation must be sought for phenomena like the "angry young men", for the bitter hatred of their society on the part of members of a generation which, perhaps as the first in history, "never ate their bread with tears."

It must be added, however, that the destructive criticism of Western societies comes only very rarely from those intellectuals who have special training or experience in the areas which are particularly relevant for socio-political problems; i.e., they come rarely from historians, economists, political scientists, professional diplomats, etc.

This, obviously, does not mean that historians, economists, or political scientists are miraculously free from the disintegrative potentialities of the intellect; but it suggests that in the field in which one has sound knowledge and with which one is in constant contact, such potentialities are likely to manifest themselves mostly in the form of creative destruction, as a restructuring of the field[1] with creative

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1) The expression is taken from M. Wertheimer, Productive Thinking. New York: Harper Brothers, 1945.

value. But without such knowledge the destructiveness of the intellect has full sway.

What then appears as antagonism of the intellectual to his society must therefore be attributed not only to the alienation inherent in the life of the intellect but also to the naive and arrogant confidence of individuals with higher education in their competence not only in matters within the areas of their training and experience but on any subject of public interest - a pretension to which taxi drivers or plumbers are far less prone.

The fact that the intellectuals of the type of Protagoras are the perpetual debunkers of their society would not change the balance of forces in the world if all societies were equally exposed to such pressures. But if this is not the case, if some societies are shielded against the consequences of intellectual scepticism and debunking as, e.g., is largely the case in present totalitarian societies, the pressures which intellectuals exert where they are in a position to do so, may have the effect of influencing the balance of power in favor of those societies in which they are not - in favor of monolithic Sparta, against free Athens.

II.

THE ANTI-COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The setting of the stage.

"Western culture", said C. C. Gillispie, "is set off from those of Asia, Africa and the world of Antiquity by two fundamental factors. From one of these it emerged: its religious chrysalis was Christianity, investing history with the promise of fulfillment of a sort. The other it produced: the most dynamic, distinctive and influential creation of the

Western world is a progressive science of nature. Only there, in the technical realm, indeed, does the favorite Western idea hold any demonstrable meaning."[1])

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1) L.c., p. 8.

These two characteristics contain the germs of the history of contact between Western culture and other cultures. The achievements in the rational analysis and control of man's environment gave Western culture an easy superiority over other peoples, provoking them, at first, to futile resistance or to surrender - both exemplified in Caesar's story of the two Aedui brothers, Divitiacus and Dumnorix - and later stimulating identifications, envy and emulation. The moral and metaphysical beliefs of the West in an ultimate historical consummation, seen in modern times in the picture of continuous progress, on the other hand, manifested itself at first in missionary activities, both by religious and non-religious bodies, to bring to alien cultures the message of Western creeds; soon there were also men who espoused the cause of the natives against Western rulers. To the leaders of non-Western peoples, finally, Western moral beliefs gave the spiritual weapons with which to ask for a redress of their grievances.

Two types of group antagonism.

Group antagonisms take different forms according to whether they are directed against more advanced, or against less advanced, groups. "Advancement", in this context, should be understood as advancement in terms of alloplastic adjustment, i.e. in terms of man's ability to control his environment and to find suitable means for advancing his ends in relation to his environment. It does not mean a higher degree of autoplastic adjustment (as the ability to bear frustration and suffering with equanimity, or

the wisdom of an Epicurus, a Buddha or a Confucius) nor does it mean moral superiority. Least of all, of course, can it be taken as superiority in ultimate human values, or superiority before God - matters about which this writer has no knowledge.

Advancement, in the above sense, of greater control of the environment implies a lengthening of the road from impulse to action, i.e. a larger measure of self-control, in significant areas of human behavior. Under conditions of relatively fair competition, it is reflected by a person's place in the social hierarchies of power, wealth, income and status. The relative advancement of a group in social interaction with other groups is manifested, i.a., by the proportional participation of the group in the occupational hierarchy, inasmuch as occupations are open to them. A group is more advanced if fewer of its members are engaged in unskilled or semi-skilled labor than would correspond to their number, and if it has more than its proportional share in leading occupations - administration, spiritual leadership, science, education, arts. The Jews, e.g., were a more advanced group in medieval Europe or, in modern times, in Central and Eastern Europe and in Arab lands; so were the Greeks and the Armenians in the Turkish Empire, the Jainas in India, the French in Algeria; so are whites in general as compared to Negroes in Africa, America or Arabia; so is, on the whole, the whole West in the global community of men.

The antagonism which the more advanced group feels towards the less advanced one - as, e.g., American Southerners towards Negroes - is quite different from the antagonism of the less advanced group towards the more advanced one - as, e.g., of African Negroes towards white settlers, or

Algerian Moslems towards European settlers.

The less advanced group is not resented as such by their more advanced neighbors; rather, it is welcome to perform menial labor and in some cases has been imported for that very purpose. As long as their members "know their place", there is no opposition against them in the more advanced group and many people of the latter group may even have a personal affection of sorts for them. It is only if the members of the less advanced group step beyond the limits either of the general rules of conduct prevailing in the society, or of the social conventions regulating their social position, that they arouse resentment and, in the cases in which the less advanced group is also believed to be closer to savagery and to an unbridled expression of sexuality, fear and horror.

A group that is more advanced than their environment provokes a different kind of antagonism. Its members usually behave with arrogance, and even if they should not do so, the simple fact of their superiority, difficult to hide, is felt as an insult. One then watches them carefully for any signs of weakness, for any flaws, and once they are found as needs they will, these flaws are seized upon by the less advanced group and exploited to the full. Anti-American sentiment, and anti-Western sentiment in general, belong to this category; it is remarkable how closely current accusations against the West resemble accusations against the Jews which run through the history of Antisemitism.

While outbreaks of violence against backward groups rarely go beyond actions that should "teach them a lesson" so that they may assume again the humble station to which the more advanced group would like to confine them, the hostility against a more advanced group has no built-in limitations

and may go all the way to effect their physical elimination.

These easily observable differences have been obfuscated by catch-phrases such as "minority groups" (as though the relative place of groups in the pecking order were determined by their quantitative strength) or by pseudo-scientific investigations of prejudice in which the outcome of the research was implicit in the design of the experiments. Antisemitism and anti-Negro sentiment in the U.S. have, e.g., been grouped together as sentiments or prejudices against "minority groups", although they differ radically in motivation and goal. Antisemitism has never been willing to tolerate the Jews, if they only behaved deferentially towards Gentiles and took their meals in the kitchen; and anti-Negro sentiment has never aimed at eliminating the Negroes from the land through expulsion or harsher measures. The analogy to Antisemitism can be found not in the anti-Negro sentiment of whites but rather in the violent forms of anti-white sentiment among black Muslims.

Both responses to the phenomenon of difference in development are natural and therefore in some measure unavoidable. They represent a conflict of interest which only time can heal - through elimination of the developmental difference - and which, in the meantime, charity can do much to mitigate. To ideologize this conflict by seeing it in Manichean terms as a struggle between good and evil can only inflame it and may make it insoluble except for such solutions as unmitigated violence can provide.

Conditions of revolution.

Thus, in the contact between groups at different levels of development, the more advanced group is motivated by a fear of being pulled down from levels already reached, while the less advanced group reacts to a blow to

their pride.

But it does not react on any large scale unless and until the people have advanced far enough and narrowed the gap between themselves and the more advanced group sufficiently to be able to compare themselves with them.

There is still a further step from resentment to action. For a long time the enormous superiority of Western power discouraged any thought of resistance until, in the second World War, Western prestige was severely damaged through the defeats which Western powers had suffered at the hand of Germany and Japan. A revolutionary situation existed once the sense of grievance was ignited by the hope of success.

Revolutions do not seem to break out where men are most downtrodden but rather where conditions have begun to improve.[1] As long as the

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1) Cp., e.g., the following statements by contemporary scholars: "... it is not the backward countries which need revolutions. Being backward, Spain had not yet developed those internal strains which made France, with all its enlightenment, a social volcano." (H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Spanish Enlightenment. Historical Essays. London: Macmillan, 1957. P. 271.)

"Paradoxically as it may seem, colonial nationalism is far less the response to oppression than to the widening horizons opened up by progressive colonial governments." (Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. P. 45.)

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prevailing conditions, no matter how bad, are stable they are taken for granted and men adjust to them as one adjusts to the climate, to incurable disease, or to death. But once the possibility of improvement has been realized, conditions never improve fast enough to keep pace with rising aspirations.

This is closely analogous to a well-known psychiatric phenomenon and may be a manifestation of the same biological truth: the danger of

suicide in severe depressions is great not at the height of the depression but rather at the time when the depression has begun to lift.

But the tremendous momentum which the anti-colonial revolution has gained in recent years is due, above all, to extraneous circumstances: viz. to the fact that the Soviet Union, with all her might, has been backing up and encouraging the most radical anti-Western groups anywhere on earth. Under these conditions a premium has been placed on the most radical revolutionary action.

So far this refers to events in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But the revolution may yet spill over U.S. boundaries, and revolutions of American Negroes, Chinese in Hawaii or Mexicans in the Southeast are not out of question if the Western position further disintegrates.

In a recent article on the social life of baboons[1] the authors, two

1) S. L. Washburn and I. De Vore, The Social Life of Baboons. Scientific American, Vol. 204, No. 6, June 1961, p. 70.

biologists, stated: "In troops where the rank order is clearly defined, fighting is rare" and "fighting" (sc. over a female) "may take place if the dominance order is not clearly established among the males." One may say that fighting between humans, individuals and groups, may break out if power relationships are unclear, or liable to different interpretations. As long as power relationships are unambiguous, and so interpreted by all, there is likely to be peace, and the existing power distribution is the basis for the legal order; when the pecking order is not universally recognized, either because power relationships have changed and human thinking has not kept up with the change, or because different people

interpret them differently, fighting may break out until a new pecking order has been established and recognized which then ushers in a new legal order.

III.

THE PREDICAMENT OF THE WEST

The American response.

The anti-colonial revolution has assumed, or tends to assume, an anti-American stance, except in those countries or groups who feel themselves under pressure from the Soviet bloc or from a country or group that enjoys Communist support, and who look to the U.S. for help.

This development should have surprised no-one; the United States has been on top of the world politically and economically for quite some time, and revolutions are attempts to overthrow the existing order of things. It came as a surprise to many, however, partly because they thought of revolutions as strictly national affairs and did not consider that they might be part of a concerted international action; and partly because it was widely assumed that revolutions are reactions to oppression and injustice, and the record of the United States as a neighbor and as a member of the international community, although not entirely spotless, compared very favorably with that of any other nation. Many a nation owes much to American generosity. It was overlooked, however, that there are reasons other than oppression and injustice in the ordinary sense, as these words are understood in the West, why people may feel bitter against those more fortunately placed, and that they will feel little difficulty in interpreting their resentment and their aspirations, whatever they may be, as manifestations of a demand for justice.

There is tragic irony in the present situation in which the American people find themselves at the receiving end of a world-wide populist revolution, as Americans have seen themselves for generations as the avant garde of such movements against oligarchy-ridden Europe. This country has for a long time, and still quite recently, been a leader of the populist and nationalist revolutions all over the world, busily undermining traditional political structures and the balance of power anywhere on earth in the name of the principle of self-determination[1] - all in the expectation that the emancipation would appease

1) One fairly recent example: When the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, recognized their defeat in October, 1918, and appealed to President Wilson to mediate an armistice and peace on the basis of his fourteen points, the President requested, as a prerequisite of his mediation, from Germany, that "the power of the king of Prussia" be curtailed, and in the case of Austria-Hungary he took the position that it was up to the various national groups of the Monarchy to decide what concessions to their aspirations by the central government would be satisfactory to them. He thus gave carte blanche to the nationalist movements in the Monarchy. In this way, Wilson enforced the overthrow of the Hohenzollern monarchy and the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian State. This led, in the first case, to the establishment of the unpopular Weimar republic, soon to be overthrown by the disastrous Hitler movement; and, in the second case, to the creation of a power vacuum in Central Europe, soon to suck in, at first, German, and then, Russian, power.

rather than appetize the colonial peoples and that they would behave with the moderation shown by the American colonists in the late 18th century, and with the same emphasis on prosperity rather than on military power - assumptions for which there was no basis whatsoever.

There are many Americans even today who believe that the anti-American turn of the nationalist and populist revolutions in the "underdeveloped" countries was not a necessary phenomenon but merely the consequence of political mistakes which might have been avoided; perhaps, the U. S. had

"supported" dictators who were later overthrown, or had failed to put pressure on friendly governments in favor of land reform, or had failed to help one-crop countries out of their precarious situation by using American financial strength for a stabilization of world market prices of this commodity, etc. We had permitted ourselves, so it has been said, to be lined up on the wrong side, against the "aspirations of the common people", in the role of the Holy Alliance. If, so the argument runs, Americans could only fearlessly take up again the banner of the populist revolution, all would be well. One wise observer commented on this more than ten years ago: "A people with the highest standard of living in the world tries desperately to remain the leader of the Left."[1] The unsolved

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1) F. Somary, From Portsmouth to Korea. The Balance Sheet of American Foreign Policy. Unpublished memorandum, 1950. Published German translation: Neue Schweizer Rundschau, December 29, 1950.

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contradictions between the needs of self-preservation which urged conserving, as far as possible, the essentials of the old international order of Western dominance, on the one hand, and the ideological bias in favor of revolution, on the other, was, and I submit still is, at the bottom of the ineffectiveness of American foreign policy.

There are four possible reactions to revolution on the part of those who feel threatened by it. It is the conservative response to try to stem the revolutionary tide. The Bonapartist (or fascist) solution consists in the setting up of a counter-revolutionary totalitarianism which steals some of the revolutionary thunder and uses the same terror methods as the revolution. There is the me-too policy of trying to join the revolution and to march with its legions, preferably in its spearhead. Finally,

one may attempt to placate the revolutionary forces by inaugurating reforms, in the hope of thus weakening the revolutionary elan. These are, of course, marginal types (Idealtypen) of political behavior and in practice a policy may lie somewhere in between these sharply defined categories, and show characteristics of more than one.

The conservative answer is historically represented most brilliantly by Clemens von Metternich; in our days, Winston Churchill tried it within the narrow limits of his power. It is widely asserted today, particularly in this country and in Britain, that such a policy would in the present world be doomed to failure. This may well be so but it is questionable to what degree this assessment is based on a dispassionate analysis of the forces involved, and to what degree on the progressive bias which is part of the protest attitude itself. There are anti-revolutionary forces everywhere in the world, and the current revolution, like every other revolution, cannot go on forever; a point must be reached where people can no longer adjust sufficiently fast to the constantly accelerating pace of events. One can hardly state a priori that a policy of digging in, defending crucial positions, and waiting for the next swing of the pendulum to occur, is necessarily doomed to failure. But it runs strongly against the progressive stream of Western thinking.

The Bonapartist solution is quite alien to American traditions. But a policy of trying to stay ahead of the revolution has been repeatedly followed by the U.S. although the pressures of national interest have made its consistent application impossible. The advocates of this policy believe that if the U. S. sides with Arabs against England, France, and Israel, with Algerian Moslems against France, with Indonesia against the

Netherlands, or with African nationalists against Portugal, the African and Asian nationalists will appreciate these American attitudes and will in some way show their appreciation; to the very least, according to this theory, they will be less hostile than they would otherwise have been. Others, however, believe that this is an unwarranted extrapolation of political experience in a democracy from the domestic to the international scene. Only under conditions in which physical violence is effectively excluded, as is the case within a well established legal order, so these critics think, is the accumulation of good will the royal road to power and influence, while in international relations, particularly in the present conditions of extreme lawlessness in which nearly every nation faces grave perils, good will is of limited value. They believe, furthermore, that for Asian, African and Latin American intellectuals, the U.S. is the arch-imperialist power, not because of what it does but because of what it <u>is</u>, viz. the world's richest capitalist nation; that manifestations of benevolence are not likely to alter the course of unfriendly nations except adversely by convincing them that the U. S. is already in so desperate straits that it can be abused with impunity; but that unfriendly nations may nevertheless at any moment change over to the Western side if they feel threatened by Communist powers and <u>if</u> they believe that the U.S. can render them effective assistance.

The last answer to the challenge of revolution, finally, that of reformism, has been the main U. S. policy all during the crisis; support for a liberal policy of reform everywhere has been further emphasized by the present Administration.

It is the basic idea of this American policy to try to convince the world that the American "Revolution" rather than the French and Russian Revolutions holds the message for their present aspirations; and to win a major part of the people of "underdeveloped" countries for a program of meliorism, financed by the U. S., in preference over revolution - a repetition of the Roosevelt New Deal on a world scale. Success or failure of this policy is still hidden in the future but it is clear that it is undertaken under conditions far less auspicious than those under which the New Deal was launched. A rich man of moderate temperament like Franklin Roosevelt was acceptable to the lower income groups of America as their leader but that does not mean that rich and moderately tempered America will be acceptable as leader to the descamisados and African hut dwellers or to the students in Bogota and Rangoon, particularly while the Soviet world offers its full support for more radical alternatives. The U. S. can only offer help towards an improvement of living conditions, which must needs be slow, at the price of domestic tranquillity, while the more radical alternative promises, in addition to the immediate confiscation and distribution of accumulated consumers' goods - including durable consumers' goods such as luxurious homes or beaches - the excitement of revolution, with ample opportunities for the squaring of old accounts and for sadistic gratifications. While the embourgeoisement of the poor is more satisfactory in the long run, the expropriation of the rich suggests itself to human impatience as so much quicker and easier. It is the ancient cry: panem et circenses.

Strength and weakness in the Western position.

The weaknesses of the Western position are patently obvious; they

appear to be rooted in the following facts:

1) The contact of the poor with the rich, together with the progressive breakdown of caste barriers, has brought about constant comparison, by the poor, of their condition with that of the rich, and with it a sense of suffering, resentment and envy. These sentiments can hardly be appeased by the prospect of slow improvement because, for a great part of the road at least, impatience increases as actual differences diminish and the goal is closer in sight.

2) Under these circumstances, utopian ideas seem entirely plausible to all but a few. Their plausibility rests in the failure of most people to understand the economic problem of rational choice, and in the naive belief that all problems can be easily solved once the authorities have set themselves to them. Furthermore, a democratic party is in a poor position to compete with a totalitarian movement because the democratic party cannot make utopian promises with impunity, while a totalitarian movement is under no such restraint; it does not have to worry about redeeming its promises because on the day of their maturing it has long achieved unchallengeable power.

3) Finally, there is, for Americans, the inner difficulty that the current revolutions strive for goals that Americans have traditionally upheld such as, e.g., the right of self-determination of all nations, large or small, i.e., of all groups whose leaders declare them to be nations. Many of the declarations of nationalist leaders today might have been bodily lifted from speeches of American leaders in the past.

In particular, the following beliefs which are widely held in this country, tend to weaken it in the present struggle:

a) The egalitarian illusion, i.e. the assumption that all branches of the human family have been equipped with equal genetic endowment, and that actual differences of performance can therefore be due only to differences in opportunity; lack of achievement of some is therefore the responsibility of the more successful ones.

b) The democratic illusion, i.e. the belief that self-government is always workable and indeed the best possible government, regardless of the level of education and information; and that there is something sacred about the principle, "one man, one vote", or its present international application: "one sovereign unit, one vote".

c) The materialist prejudice, i.e. the belief that people are always motivated by economic interest, and by a correct evaluation of their economic interest, to boot. A revolution in, say, Asia, must therefore be due to a clamor for land reform denied by the American-supported government, or similar conditions; facts at variance with this theory simply cannot be true.

d) The sentimentalist illusion, i.e. the belief that relations between nations are governed not by the demands of self-interest as interpreted by them but by emotions such as likes or dislikes for another people, or admiration or disparagement for its domestic achievements.

e) The rationalist and moralist illusions, i.e. the belief that the establishment of law need not have a basis in a community existing in the minds of men and in physical power, but that law can be based on an appeal to conscience alone, and that the social contract can create an effective community.

f) Finally, the distorted view of revolution that sees revolution as always being made by those at the bottom of the social pyramid and caused by oppression and injustice of the regime in power. The very fact of the revolution appears then as prima facie evidence for the injustice of the regime;[1] and it is felt that injust rule must eventually lead to revolution.

1) How unreal this assumption is will be seen when we translate it from the vertical, intranational, to the horizontal context, i.e., from the civil to international war: who would entertain the notion that the fact that one nation has taken up arms against another is sufficient evidence for the justice of its cause?

The fact that a substantial part of articulate public opinion holds some, or all, of these propositions to be true greatly interferes with a realistic evaluation of the situation.

But there is also one point of strength for the West in its competition with Communism for the allegiance of the remainder of mankind: While the West in the present climate of opinion appears to be outclassed in the propaganda battle - as was the Habsburg Monarchy in its final struggle for survival in the midst of revolutionary forces, and for similar reasons - there is also one strong card in the Western hand, and much will depend on whether it will be played with skill (as it has hardly been so far). The strength of the Soviets consists in the fact that the socialist idea which they incarnate has an enormous appeal to the intellectuals and, to a lesser degree, to the poor; but it is their weakness that the socialist reality is quite unattractive. No amount of argument and of good deeds is likely to convince liberal opinion in this country or abroad, or the masses in backward lands who have become aware of the possibility

of a better life, that a capitalist country could do any right except by retreating and surrendering; but neither persuasion nor good deeds are necessary to convince, say, the East Germans.

Among men as well as in animal and plant life, favorable living conditions bring about a proliferation of life, and whatever people may think ideologically, the direction of their migrations indicates the differences of living conditions. And where migration has been possible at all, as in Berlin and Hongkong, it has been going from socialism to "capitalism".

It is the Western system, not the Soviet and the various other government-operated systems, that has actually worked better for the satisfaction of human needs and of the aspirations of people in their private lives. The strength of socialism lies in the plausibility of its arguments and promises; the strength of the West lies in its actual deliveries. But the latter take a long time before they tell their story; long not only because much experience must have accumulated before much inference can be drawn from it but also because few people will revise satisfactory theories on account of inconvenient facts; most people will not notice such facts or will explain them away in some fashion. Also, governments unfriendly to the West can easily suppress such facts. It therefore takes at least the coming of age of another generation before there is any chance that widely accepted theories might be revised.

The crucial problem in the struggle.

The fundamental fact in the struggle between a pluralist society and a totalitarian system is the permanent reversibility of every victory of the former, and the irreversibility of a victory of the latter. Whenever

an attempt by totalitarians at seizing power has failed, the totalitarian movement, or the totalitarian countries that back it up, remain in a position to repeat that attempt tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, and forever after; whenever totalitarians have seized power in a country, the result is irreversible (except for outside intervention which overthrew Mussolini and Hitler) because Communists destroy after seizure of power every focus of possible resistance, setting up, as Lenin put it, a government that nobody will ever overthrow; and this has been greatly facilitated in more recent times by modern technology which has made possible an effective monopoly of the tools of coercion and communications such as has not existed for a long time, and perhaps has never existed to quite that degree.[1)]

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1) In the 18th and 19th centuries, the main weapon of regular armies was the rifle; and rifles could be owned and operated by civilians, too. They could be hidden in backyards or smuggled across frontiers. Hence, the advantage of a governmental force over rebellious citizens was narrowed down to the advantages of superior training and discipline; these were real, but not necessarily decisive, advantages and men of courage had a chance against regular security forces. This was therefore the age of minute men and of barricades, and the age of expanding democracy; it was in this period that the word was coined that one could do everything with bayonets except sitting on them. But tanks and bombing planes cannot be hidden under the floor, nor operated without a large visible organisation. Present technology therefore favors absolute State power.

These ground rules put Western societies at a grave disadvantage. Nevertheless, they need not necessarily lead to catastrophe as long as the likelihood of a totalitarian take-over is small as, e.g., of the order of magnitude of one chance in twenty, because the time that would have to pass until a totalitarian take-over becomes probable is sufficiently long that unforeseen events may upset all calculations. But if the totalitarian chance

is fairly good, perhaps one chance out of three, totalitarian victory becomes very probable within a relatively brief period of time.

Victory, by Communism or movements allied to Communism, all over the "underdeveloped" world appears therefore very likely unless the West is able to effect a change in the ground rules and to make a Communist take-over a reversible event.

It may be that Communism, though with its prestige greatly increased, may yet have less easy sailing in many countries than it had in Russia, China and Cuba, as the middle classes, the peasants and unionized labor may be less naive as to what is going to happen. But within the reach of Soviet power, effective resistance against a Communist regime already established is nevertheless an inauspicious enterprise as events in Eastern Germany and Hungary have shown.

It may be different in countries which are not within easy reach of the Red Army, including its air transport, and which lie in the shadow of Western sea power. The latter has recently been shown as of little effectiveness in the case of a left-handed support for a small force of invading exiles but it may yet be effective in enforcing a hands-off policy against a foreign, Hungary-style, intervention to crush a local uprising. In this way, perhaps, Alfred Thayer Mahan's concept of the influence of sea power upon history may not yet be entirely obsolete. It may be one of the present-day possibilities of sea power, and therefore one of the chances of the "world island" (Mackinder) which so largely depends on sea power for its survival, to keep revolutionary results reversible within a certain radius from its power center, and thereby to give trial and error a chance to work itself out.

From this point of view, the establishment of Communist States distant from the Soviet center of power contains, in addition to all too obvious dangers for the West, some possibilities for it, too. If conditions are reversible, Communist propaganda might be defeated in a certain area by the only effective argument there is, viz. by a demonstration of Communism in action.

We may therefore question whether it is in the best interest of the United States to continue the policy of containment and to try its utmost to deny Communism access to Latin America and Africa. This policy is straining American resources to the utmost; it greatly antagonizes many people in these countries, as people do not like being told by others what they should do in their own best interest, which they prefer to judge for themselves; and it has not been conspicuous for its success of late. One may wonder whether it would not be preferable for the U. S. to take more of a back seat and, with the exception of the strategically most sensitive spots, to allow events to take their course. Under such circumstances, one must assume that Communist governments will be set up in some countries in these Continents (as they probably will be anyhow); but it is also likely that some other countries will pursue a vigorous anti-Communist course and will look to the United States for help. The U. S. would then not be in the thankless role of a proponent of an unpopular policy and an easy prey for blackmail, but would be in the strong position of a power whose help is eagerly sought. In this way, a kind of equilibrium may be established in these Continents which, though fraught with dangers for the West, may yet be one that can be lived with, and which could be upheld with less strain than is incumbent upon the present attempt of holding an

umbrella over these Continents and all their people, the willing, the disinterested and the hostile alike. As time passes, Communism may find itself in these transoceanic outposts confronted with difficulties similar to those it faces in Eastern Europe, albeit without the possibility of easy military intervention.

The obstacle against the adoption of such a policy may well lie less in its undeniable perils but in the reluctance of the American people to part with universalist moral schemes and to have recourse to the despised strategies of "power politics".

KANT, LIBERALISM, AND WAR

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"War" has different meanings: armed conflict between or within states; active hostility or contention though it fall short of violence; military operations as a science or art, a profession or activity. We shall concentrate on the second of these meanings with lesser attention to the first and the third.

Many liberals of the nineteenth century, and their predecessors of the middle eighteenth, thought the natural condition of men to be one of harmony. Dissension and strife do not inhere in man and society; they arise instead from mistaken belief, inadequate knowledge, and defective governance. With the evils defined, the remedies become clear: educate men and their governors, strip away political abuses. This is one theme in the history of liberal thought. Urged by humane philosophers and supported by pacifistic economists, its appeal in Western society is immense and enduring.

There is in liberal thought another theme as well. It is often obscured and sometimes denied the honorific in question, thought it goes back to the earliest philosophers who can fairly be called liberal. Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Kant made no easy assumptions about the rationality and goodness of man. Among men in nature and states in a world of states, they found not harmony and peace but hostility and war to be the natural condition.

The two liberal traditions are partly contradictory. Kant is often improperly placed in the first of them, which helps to account for many of the misinterpretations of his political philosophy. His essay Eternal Peace is seen as one of a succession of peace plans going back to Dante and Dubois in the early 14th century, encompassing the French monk Crucé and the abbé St. Pierre, and culminating in the League and the United Nations. Some emphasize the plan, that is, international organization; others the importance of its being based on republican or democratic governments. In his guise as a philosopher urging the the peaceful proclivities of democracy, Kant has even infiltrated the State Department. Giving full credit to the analysis of Kant, George V. Allen, an assistant secretary, once said: "The United Nations, with all its virtues, has not yet been able to achieve freedom from fear. The reason is easy to understand. Its second most powerful member is not a democracy."[1].

Some have accepted such an interpretation not to applaud Kant's commanding vision and high moral purpose but rather to decry his political naiveté and simple-minded optimism. Kant's supposed conviction that a Europe of republics would be peaceful, Crane Brinton finds to be a pathetic fragment of the Enlightenment.[2]. The statement exposes one of the problems of interpretation. Kant is a child of the Enlightenment; he is also the father of a critical philosophy that goes beyond it. Sometimes he writes as though peace were inevitably coming; at other times, as though Realpolitik were the mode of the present and the future. One who cannot ignore the latter aspect may label it a Germanic aberration, as does Gooch in his work on Germany and the French Revolution.[3]. While he may be seen as a backsliding liberal, he may also be considered a theorist of power politics who hid his Machiavellian ideas by

hanging 'round them the fashionable garments of liberalism. Since he explained and in a sense accepted the practice of power politics in the relations of states, since he wrote of nature's plan and man's predetermined destiny, this interpretation too becomes plausible, the more so if Kant's Rechtsstaat is taken to be a thinly disguised despotism with the sovereign supposedly limited by law but actually free of any human constraint.[4]

It is little trouble to collate passages that would support in turn each of the preceding interpretations of Kant, but the whole man would thereby elude us. There is a unity in his thought that is hard to grasp. His manner of thinking is foreign to social-science fashions, his mode of analysis rigorous and yet subtle, his style difficult but clear, his writing crabbed and still, as Goethe said, sometimes slyly ironic and even eloquent.

"A true political philosophy...cannot advance a step without first paying homage to the principles of morals...."[5] It is incumbent upon us to take Kant at his word and begin by briefly discussing his moral philosophy. Kant was neither an empiricist nor an idealist. Empiricism he criticizes as leading to "merely contingent" knowledge; idealism as exceeding the bounds of reason. Man is a member of two worlds: the phenomenal and the noumenal. In the first, he is a creature of the senses, of impulse and desire. Utility or happiness as a standard of morals or legislation is mere caprice, for the object of action is taken from the realm of contingency. There can be no certainty, nor universality of agreement. If your happiness is not mine, a government that presumes to tell either of us what objects we should seek and how we should seek them exceeds the bounds of permissible legislation. It undertakes to do what all men could not possibly have assented to[6]. This is the kernel of all liberalism, rigorously defined. It is expressed, for example, by Lord Acton in his argument that liberty is the only end of government that can be generally pursued without producing tyranny. In Kant's words: "No one may force anyone to be happy according to his manner of imagining the well-being of other men; instead, everyone may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him as long as he does not infringe on the freedom of others to pursue a similar purpose, when such freedom may coexist with the freedom of every other man according to a possible and general law."[7]. Where others have grounded the injunction more pragmatically, Kant roots the limitation in a profound analysis of the nature of reason.

By his possession of reason, man is distinguished from all mere animals. Man's reasoning abilities are, however, circumscribed. He can know that noumena, things-in-themselves, exist; he cannot know their content. The imperative, which is the basis of morality and of legislation, is then necessarily without content. "Act according to a Maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a Universal Law."[8]. My act is proper if everyone could, without contradiction and conflict, claim the right to act similarly. Men would always act in accordance with the catagorical imperative if they were wholly creatures of reason. They are not. From the sensual nature of man conflict and violence arise. The contradiction between his condition and his potential give the right to compel

others to enter with him into a civil society in which his rights are secured and with them the possibility of moral behavior.[9] The criterion of legislation is abstract in order that it may be, within the limits of reason, of general validity. The purpose of legislation is negative: to "hinder hindrances" to freedom so that each may enjoy his antecedently existing rights unmolested.

Each man is an end in himself. The rights of one man before the law are the same as the rights of another. Kant is sharply critical of all practice contrary to the dictum. In the state of nature men have possessions; in the civil state their possessions are secured to them by law and become property. Men have equal rights to property but in varying amounts depending on their situation and abilities. There can, by right be no nobility of birth but only gradations of rank according to merit. Great inequalities of wealth may, however, limit or even destroy equality of opportunity, as Kant himself remarks. The remedy, negative and typically liberal, is to arrange the laws so as to lessen the perpetuation of family lands by inheritance.[10] To take another example and one that will incline our analysis toward the problem of war, Kant steadfastly opposed the impressment of subjects into military service. The practice was widespread. Karl Alexander, nephew of Frederick the Great, sold his regiments to England for the American War. At the bidding of his English mistress, he finally sold his principality to Prussia for cash and retired to England. In England impressment of sailors was regarded as an undeniable perogative of the crown, and the brutal and inefficient practice not eliminated until it was made unnecessary by the Continuous Service Scheme adopted in 1853.[11] In the face of such practices, Kant writes: "A State is not to be regarded as a property or patrimony like the soil on which it may be settled. It is a society of men, over which no one but itself has the right to rule... and to incorporate it as a graft in another State is to destroy its existence as a moral person; it is to reduce it to a thing, and thereby to contradict the idea of the original compact without which a right over a people is inconceivable." Subjects are not, like the vegetables the farmer uproots and carts off to the market, objects that the ruler can dispose of according to his whim. In many states the ruler does so treat them. Where war does not require of the ruler the least sacrifice of his pleasures he may "resolve for war from insignificant reasons, as if it were but a hunting expedition; and, as regards its propriety, he may leave the justification of it without concern to the diplomatic body, who are always too ready to give their services for that purpose."[12]

The practices of governments contradict the principles of right. How are the required limitations to be secured? The answer has two parts: first, the institutions that are appropriate, and then how they may come to exist. Only in a republic can it be hoped that the principles of right will prevail. In such a state the executive is made up of one or a few; separated from it is an assembly representing the self-dependent citizens, men of property, profession, or craft. The executive presents its proposed legislation, the assembly chants its ayes and nays. The question put to it is not, for example, is a 10% tax on bread supportable as compared to a tax of 5%. The question, in the manner of Rousseau, is simply this: Does the proposed law accord with the general will?

Is it one that everyone, though he would have preferred the lower tax, could conceivably have agreed to? If it is such, then the idea of the original contract is preserved. Still, what if the assembly says "nay" and the executive refuses to listen? Kant's philosophy, including his political philosophy, moves forward by resolving a series of antinomies or tensions. The enjoyment, as distinct from the possession, of rights depends on the state. However imperfect the state may be, it is greatly preferable to anarchy. On such grounds as these, revolution is absolutely enjoined. Yet one may, as Kant did, view with sympathy revolutions that according to the principles of right would stand condemned. There is no contradiction. He writes, one might say, sometimes noumenally and sometimes phenomenally, or, more accurately, with both aspects of human affairs clearly in his mind. Careful analysis and the clear specification of standards square easily in Kant's philosophy with caution, flexibility, and moderation in the judgment of human behavior.

The other institutional arrangement that is essential to proper governance is freedom of expression. Sapere Aude! Kant takes as the motto of the Enlightenment, and one of the most frequently quoted of his statements is that "the liberty of the press is the sole palladium of the rights of the people."[13] One hears a distinct reverberation from the Philosophes' Shield of Evidence or an echo, to take a German formulation, of Schlözer's dictum that statistics and despotism cannot coexist. In his own and his subjects' interest, the ruler ought to permit the widest freedom of expression; but again, if he does not, there is nothing that can rightfully be done about it.

At such points as these some have concluded that Kant's political theory is a defense of despotism coupled with a hope that the despot will rule by law. He does, it is true, reflect the widespread ideas of his time. But they were ideas shared by many who were liberals as well as by others. Only a government secure in its power, Hegel once wrote, can permit the conscientious objector to live by his scruples. Across the North Sea one finds Lord Hardinge, Secretary at War in Wellington's Cabinet, describing the army as "a protection rather than any detriment to Liberty. We permitted a licentiousness which under any other constitution might be fatal to the public peace. Meetings were held and language was used which no other empire would permit and which nothing but the confidence of the Crown in the Standing Army would justify even our Government in permitting." Neither Hegel nor Hardinge were liberals, but they reflect the idea that Kant emphasizes: A government that while limited is strong in its sphere can permit a freedom to its subjects that would otherwise endanger the state. Thus Kant, with obvious reference to Frederick the Great, applauds the strength of the Prussian state upon which the individual's liberty depends.[14]

So long at least as the state "runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States," it must be powerful externally as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. The republican form is preferable, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; but despotisms are stonger — and no one would expect or wish to bring the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength.[15] Standing armies are dangerous, arms races themselves being a cause of war, but in the absence of an outside agency

affording protection, each state must look to the effectiveness of its army.[16] A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies or to maintain itself as a commonwealth."[17] Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war.

Kant's concern with the strength and thus the safety of the state is part of his perception of the necessities of power politics. Among states in the world, as among individuals in the state of nature, there is constantly either violence or the threat of violence. States, like "lawless savages," are with each other "naturally in a nonjuridical condition."[18] There is no law above them; there is no judge among them; there is no legal process by which states can pursue their rights. They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. A treaty of peace can end only a particular war; pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as unjust; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."[19] More surely than those who extract and emphasis merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "War," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "is not fatalistically inevitable."[20]

Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.[21] He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or diplomatically composed codes have not, nor could have, the slightest legal force, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint...."[22] His intention clearly is that the "oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

This is the culminating problem of Kant's philosophy. Men need the protection of law before they have any chance of leading the moral life to which their reason commands them. The civil state is not sufficient. Peace among, as well as within, states is essential to the development of uniquely human capacities. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."[23] This is the form of the imperative that is most appropriate here. The constant hostility of states and the pressures of recurring war make its fulfillment impossible. How can the problem be solved?

As is well known, Kant proclaims the <u>Rechtsstaat</u>, or republic, as preeminently the peaceful form of the state. In a republic the unambiguous test of right is applied to every piece of legislation, and every act of the executive will in turn follow the universally established law.[24] Such a state could not undertake an aggressive war, for its sole purpose, a purpose guaranteed by its structure, is to further the moral life of its subjects by

enacting and administering positive, general law.[25] There may be reasons for a republic to fight, but they are not internally generated. Kant records, as had Hume, the couplet from Pope's Essay on Man:

> For Forms of Government let fools contest;
> Whate'er is best administered is best.

And just as with Hume he cites the thought in order to disagree with it. The point for both of them is that as the context of action varies, similar causes have different effects. Notice what Kant has done. With no comforting illusions about man, he seeks in the state, and among states as will be seen in a moment, the structure that will turn men's "unsocial sociability," their conflict and violence, toward a constructive result.[26]

How are the appropriate structures to come into being, nationally and in the world at large? Kant sees in history, indeed in the very horrors of war, "a deep-seated, maybe far-seeing, attempt on the part of supreme wisdom, if not to found, yet to prepare the way for a rule of law governing the freedom of states, and thus bring about their unity in a system established on a moral basis."[27] Aha! one may say, an overriding determinism, an uncritical teleology, an Hegelian world-spirit marching with benign purpose, a sterile optimism. Kant succumbs to none of these. He is neither determinist, uncritical nor rosy-faced with hope. A universal plan of nature, unknowable in detail but dimly discernible in outline, must be assumed; it cannot be known. He is moving at the outermost rim of reason to establish the necessity of an act of faith and its compatibility with his own critical philosophy. We can discern in nature "a design to bring forth concord out of the discord of men...." This must be so if Kant's moral theory is correct, for only in concord can man follow the categorical imperative. But, he warns "human reason, when dealing with the relation of effects to their causes, must keep within the limits of possible experience; and to speak of Providence as knowable by us in this relation would be putting on Icarian wings with presumptuous rashness in order to approach the mystery of His unfathomable purposes."[28] His argument, both of limits and of possibilities, is established in the Pure Reason and elaborated in the Practical Reason. Along with its relation to moral philosophy, his reasoning is great with political implications.

The activities of bees and beavers, guided by instinct, produce regular patterns and predictable results. Citizens of a purely rational world, on the other hand, would act according to a preconcerted plan. Because men behave in neither of these ways, "no regular systematic history of mankind" appears to be possible. But if we take progress not as a final cause but as a postulate of the practical reason "the cheerless gloom of chance" is illumined by "the guiding light of reason."[29] In the economic world of Adam Smith, men scratch and claw, each seeking his profit. The result is the greater good of all. If we look at the world and see discrete events, we are overwhelmed by the chaos: each event without cause and all events without meaning. But if we look at the aggregate of events with a proper organizing principle in our minds, we may see in the chaos, order; in the welter of events, a plan of nature. Newton, as Darwin said, did not explain why there is a gravitational

force but that there is such a force. The cause, as Kant would put it, located in the bodies, is inaccessible to our reason; but the rules by which it operates can be discerned.[30] And so it is that out of the "universal violence" of the state of nature and "the necessity arising therefrom" comes the resolution of a people "to subject themselves to national law...."[31] The juridical union itself is "a condition of /legal/ equality...determined by the action and reaction of free wills limiting one another...."[32] And "even if a people were not compelled by internal discord to submit to the coercion of public laws, war as an external influence would effect his. For, according to the arrangement of nature already indicated, every people finds another pressing upon it in its neighborhood and it must form itself internally into a State in order to be equipped as a power so as to defend itself."[33] Men and states seek their ends little knowing that they are by their actions producing a result that may have been no part of their intentions. Smith's invisible hand is at work in the realm of politics. The "planless aggregate" of human actions can be represented as "constituting a system," though the demonstrations of Kant in the realm of the political are necessarily vaguer, crasser, and less certain than are those of Smith.[34]

There is a sense of progress but not a naive optimism, for as we advance Kant sees that the dangers and difficulties also grow. The practical reason pronounces its irresistible veto: "There shall be no war."[35] Yet without war in the past, men now would be feeble types sheltering in caves and feeding on nuts and berries. The development as conceived by Kant is dialectic. "By the expenditure of all the resources of the commonwealth in military preparations against each other, by the devastations occasioned by war, and still more by the necessity of holding themselves continually in readiness for it, the full development of the capacities of mankind are undoubtedly retarded in their progress; but, on the other hand, the very evils which thus arise, compel men to find out means against them. A law of equilibrium is thus discovered for the regulation of the really wholesome antagonism of continguous States as it springs up out of their freedom; and a united power, giving emphasis to this law, is constituted, whereby there is introduced a universal condition of public security among the nations."[36] Kant mentions, by way of suggestion, some of the ways in which peace may come out of war. The strength of a state is directly related to its general prosperity and well-being, and these in turn to the amount of liberty enjoyed by its subjects. "If the citizen is hindered in seeking his prosperity in any way suitable to himself that is consistent with the liberty of others, the activity of business is checked generally; and thereby the powers of the whole State are again weakened." Since states are in close competition, the sovereign, to avoid weakening his state, must grant a greater liberty to his subjects. Meanwhile the growing intensity of the competition among states leads them to spend larger amounts of money, even in time of peace, in military preparation. Prices rise, the national debt mounts, and finally the states are so weakened by this competition and by actual war that the sovereign is forced to give in peacefully to the people and place in their hands the power to choose between war and peace.[37] The attempt to win in the competition of states leads the sovereign to make some concessions; the impossibility of winning leads to the final concession, at which point, presumably, the republican form becomes the pattern of government throughout the world.

The manner of approach is immensely impressive. Its execution is accomplished with modesty, perception, and political sensibility. This is not to say that the vision is without flaw, the plan without blemish. Kant, if read from one point of view, can be taken as a study in the futility of the unsoundly based "ought." This was clear in his analysis of the individual in a state of nature whore, he argued, the moral obligations, the "oughts" that apply to every rational being, cannot possibility be fulfilled. Prior to the establishment of a pacific federation, the "oughts" in international law turn out to mean as little as those applied to man in the state of nature. When the state of nature gives way to the civil state, the "oughts" applied to moral man take on a practical meaning. Those that apply to states can be taken seriously only if the enviroment of the state is similarly improved. For he says: "Every people, for the sake of its own security, thus may and ought to demand from any other that it shall enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil constitution, in which the right of each shall be secured."[38]. The civil state is necessary for two reasons, because men are imperfect and because even good men may fall into dispute and require a legally established mediator. The universal law-state would seem to be necessary for a similar pair of reasons.

Despite a number of statements such as the one just quoted, Kant will not accept the "legal state of Society" on a grand scale, the world constitution "similar to the civil constitution," as a solution to the problem. Every time he uses such phrases he quickly adds qualifications that materially change their meaning. His "universal International State, or Union of Nations," turns out to be "a voluntary combination of different States that would be dissoluble at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble."[39]. In such a voluntary organization, Kant says, the settlement of disputes among states can be conducted according to a civil process instead of by war. And yet he has also said in the clearest terms that against the evils of war and the general insecurity of states "there is no possible remedy but a system of international right founded upon public laws conjoined with power, to which every State must submit, -- according to the analogy of the civil or political right of individuals in any one State."[40]. The seeming contradiction calls for some explanation.

Why does Kant, after having constructed an argument internally consistent, turn to the conclusion that not government but a voluntary organization is the solution to the problem of war? He gives two reasons. The first is partly a logical proposition resting on his definition of terms. States already have a legal constitution; it would be illogical to place them under another. Individuals in a condition of nature have a right to compel others to join with them to form a state. The right of a state to demand that other states submit to the rule of law is not comparably strong. As a matter of right, no state can interfere with the internal arrangements of another. Kant, in contrast to Mazzini and Woodrow Wilson, is a non-interventionist liberal.[41]. One suspects that his second reason for shying away from a world state is more important. He fears that such a state, once achieved, would be a greater evil than the wars it is designed to eliminate. It could so easily become a terrible despotism, stifle liberty, kill initiative, and in the end lapse into anarchy.[42].

. States in the world are like individuals in the state of nature. They are neither perfectly good nor are they controlled by law. Consequently conflict and violence among them are inevitable. This statement does not lead Kant to the conclusion that a world state is the answer. Distrusting that solution, he casts about for another. The other possibility open to him is that all states so improve that they will act according to maxims that could be universally followed without conflict. While he fears the former solution, he is too cautious and critical to place his faith entirely in the latter. Instead he attempts to combine them. It is the aim of his political philosophy to establish the hope that states may improve enough and learn enough from the suffering and devastation of war to make possible a rule of law among them that is not backed by power but is voluntarily observed. The first factor is the internal improvement of states; the second, the external rule of law. But the second, being voluntary, is dependent on the perfection with which the first is realized. The "power" to enforce the law is derived not from external sanction but from internal perfection.

Can one sensibly expect all states gradually to conform to a pattern that once universally established would provide the basis for perpetual peace? At one point Kant says: "Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and then will your object, the benefit of perpetual peace, be added unto you."[43]. This is a strange injunction to come from Kant, for he has pointed out, as we have several times noted, that it is only in the civil state that man has the possibility of living the moral life. The civil state made changes in man's behavior possible; it was not the other way around. And this is also the view that Kant takes of the relation between the internal and external affairs of states. In the 7th Proposition of his "Principle of the Political Order," for example, he avers that without the proper ordering of the external relations of states, the internal establishment of the perfect civil constitution is impossible.

For the moment, however, let us assume that, without profound change in their external relations, all states have become republics. Kant's conclusion is that at this point perpetual peace is established, at least approximately. The international rule of law is realized, for the law is voluntarily agreed upon and voluntarily obeyed. This whole system of voluntary universal law rests upon an equilibrium of forces that is the culmination of world history.[44].

To show that the equilibrium, once realized, is bound to collapse, one need only refer to Kant's own analysis. He points out that in a state of nature, where each state must define its rights and prosecute them with its own power, no one country can be secure against any other. "Lesion of a less powerful country many be involved merely in the condition of a more powerful neighbor prior to any action at all; and in the State of Nature an attack under such circumstances would be warrantable." This is a logical justification of the right of preventive war. From it Kant derives the principle of the balance of power.[44]. How, one may ask, does the final equilibrium of the voluntary federation among states differ from the equilibrium sometimes attained by balance-of-power politics, an equilibrium that Kant has properly labelled precarious? It should be clear by now that it differs not at all. Kant ridicules the balance of power by comparing it with "the house described by

Swift, which was built by an architect so perfectly in accordance with all the laws of equilibrium that when a sparrow lighted upon it it immediately fell." Yet the same doubt would seem to apply to Kant's hope for a pacific world secured "not by the weakening of all the separate powers of the States, but by an equilibrium which is brought forth and guaranteed through their rivalry with each other."[45] It is, in Kant's impeccable logic, necessary to supersede the state of nature among states and establish the rule of law. It is, by the same logic, impossible for a voluntary international federation effectively to guarantee the peace. If equilibrium depends on spontaneous agreement or if equilibrium depends on a balance of forces, the federation of Kant is either way doomed to be as transitory and shifting as the equilibrium of balance-of-power politics. Just as the house designed by a Laputian would collapse under the weight of a sparrow so Kant's structure falls to the ground whenever one major state chooses to forsake the international federation and flaunt its universal law.

The difficulty is made all the clearer by noting how, in a republic, the general will pronounces on the question of war and peace. The unambiguous test of right is again applied to a proposed act of the executive. The question is, as with domestic legislation, abstractly put. The answer to it must be a simple yes or no. Since the point is important and generally overlooked, I quote the relevant passage. "If, for example, a proportioned war-tax were imposed on all the subjects, they are not entitled ... to say that it is unjust because somehow, according to their opinion, the war was unnecessary. For they are not entitled to judge of this; whereas, because it is at least always possible that the war was inevitable and the tax indispensable, it must be regarded as rightful in the judgment of the subject."[46]

Kant has held out a hope for perpetual peace, which upon closer scrutiny seems to disappear. Has he deluded himself with a false optimism, which has then been transferred to many of his interpreters? To answer the question we have to complete the circle and return to a consideration of his moral philosophy.

It is, Kant writes in the Practical Reason, "absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which" an act was purely moral. However, "whether this or that takes place is not at all the question; but that reason of itself, independent on /sic/ all experience, ordains what ought to take place, that accordingly actions of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example, the feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds everything on experience, are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by reason..."[47] A moral act may never have been performed; yet moral behavior is a "necessary" or "practical" goal of mankind. When Kant uses such adjectives he means that the action described is the only action in accordance with man's noumenal nature, that its performance is a duty. Kant demonstrates that the categorical imperative exists and that to follow it is not impossible; he does not imply that men will live according to it. From the moral duty, inherent in man's noumenal nature, arise other of Kant's postulates. He accords to man in the form of practical reason, or will, what he has denied to him in the form of pure reason. If we are ever to fulfil the moral law, we must assume the existence of progress, an immortal soul, a God.[48]

Kant approaches the problem of war in similar fashion. Perpetual peace is a particular reading of the postulate of progress, for if a condition of peace is not possible, then the prospect of one day realizing the ideal of moral behavior disappears. It is a partial and erroneous reading of Kant that leads to the conclusion that he thought the realization of "necessary" or "practical" goals something that would occur in anyone's lifetime. Kant's analysis makes the conclusion that a universal rule of law can be achieved almost incomprehensible, but even this conclusion makes sense in his way of thinking; for to say that we can only "comprehend the incomprehensibility" of something is simply to face up to the inherent limitations of reason.[49]

The conclusion that follows from considering Kant's political philosophy in the context of his moral philosophy is borne out by many of his more purely political statements. In the Philosophy of Law, after one of his many iterations of the proposition that only in a universal state can man find security, he raises the argument that if the state is extended over too large an area it becomes physically incapable of protecting its members. "Hence," he says, "the Perpetual Peace, which is the ultimate end of all the Right of Nations, becomes in fact an impracticable idea. The political principles, however, which aim at such an end, and which enjoin the formation of such unions among the States as may promote a continuous approximation to a Perpetual Peace are not impracticable ...."[50] As he had demonstrated the possibility of moral behavior, so he must establish the possibility of perpetual peace. The second is the precondition of the first, and nothing that is impossible can be imperatively commanded. Peace is possible. This Kant has sought to prove. Its achievement remains an improbability. "Now, as a matter of fact, the morally practical Reason utters within us its irrevocable Veto: 'There shall be no War.' . . . Hence the question no longer is as to whether Perpetual Peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must act on the supposition of its being real . . . And although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not deceive ourselves in adopting the maxim of action that will guide us in working incessantly for it; for it is a duty to do this."[51]

Kant shares the major tenets of liberalism: the source of the individual's rights lies outside of the state; his freedom may be limited only when its exercise interferes with the rights of others; such limitation must be by known general laws before which all men stand equal; men's capacities are greater than is shown by their present accomplishments; and, finally, their potential will unfold in time with education being one of the important means of progress. But Kant sees in combination what others have often separated — the defects, or as he says, the evil of men and the possibility of their living good lives, the strength of the state and the liberty of its subjects, progress amidst ever greater difficulties, the approach to peace as wars become fiercer and more frequent. He has, as many liberals do not, an appreciation of politics as struggle, an idea of possible equilibrium not as simple and automatic harmony but always as something perilously achieved out of conflict.

Let the philosophers scribble as they will, writes Kant at the beginning of "Eternal Peace." There is no danger, for rulers will not listen. This has been taken as criticism of states and condemnation of their rulers. But to the philosopher's advice rulers cannot listen, as Kant well knew. He was not engaged in the puerile task of telling men of affairs to stop behaving badly. Nor could he have been, for the dependence of behavior upon condition is one of his major theses. Taken as a King's Mirror, Kant's "Eternal Peace" is lost in futility. But so to take it requires a very unKantian interpretation. In describing what the states and the world will have to do and to become if moral behavior is to be possible, Kant makes understandable and in a sense excuses the failures of men and their rulers to achieve moral rectitude.

Many liberals of Kant's time and after have looked upon war as annoyance or aberration, as social disease or political malady, as something, one might say, that lies outside of history. Kant, in contrast, at once condemns war and demonstrates that its occurence is expected rather than accidental. In the end we are left not with a confident foretelling of "the end of wars and the reign of international law"[52]. but with a deeper appreciation of the causes of war and the immense difficulty of doing anything about them.

FOOTNOTES

1. George V. Allen, "Perpetual Peace Through World-Wide Federation," The Department of State Bulletin, XX (June 19, 1949), 801-802.

2. Crane Brinton, A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799 (New York, 1934), p. 261.

3. G. P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution (London, 1920), p. 271.

4. For a recent example, see the lead review of The Times Literary Supplement, January 23, 1959.

5. Kant, Eternal Peace and other International Essays, tr. W. Hastie (Boston, 1914), p. 118. This book contains: pp. 1-25, "The Natural Principle of the Political Order Considered in Connection with the Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitan History"; pp. 27-54, "The Principles of Political Right Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in Natural Law"; pp. 55-66, "The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law"; pp. 67-168, "Eternal Peace, A Philosophical Essay."

6. See Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, esp. sec. 2; and in general Critical Examination of Practical Reason. Both are in Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, tr., Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics (London, 1909), 6th ed. For the political parts of the argument, see "Principles of Political Right."

7. Acton, "Nationality," The History of Freedom and Other Essays (London, 1907), pp. 270-300; Kant, "Theory and Practice: Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory But Does Not Apply to Practice," tr. Carl J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Kant (New York, 1949), p. 416.

8. The Philosophy of Law, tr. W. Hastie (Edinburgh, 1887), p. 34.

9. Ibid., pp. 77-78, 157.

10. "Principles of Political Right," pp. 34-39.

11. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution, p.12; Christopher Lloyd, The Nation and the Navy (London, 1954), pp. 131, 209.

12. "Eternal Peace," pp. 70, 78; Philosophy of Law, p. 217.

13. "What is Enlightenment?" tr. Friedrich, Philosophy of Kant; "Principles of Political Right," p. 50.

14. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York, 1937), pp. 167-168; "What is Enlightenment?" p. 139.

15. "Eternal Peace," p. 108.

16. Ibid., p. 71. In a way that long remains typical of liberals, Kant, in effect, critizes the army that has nobility as officers and rabble for its soldiers. He would prefer not the nation-in-arms but an army of citizen-soldiers periodically and voluntarily rehearsing their military duties.

17. Ibid., pp. 98-99; "Principles of Political Right," pp. 42-43.

18. Philosophy of Law, p. 214; cf. pp. 223-224: "Further, it may be said that the expression 'an unjust enemy in the state of Nature' is pleonastic; for the state of Nature is itself a state of injustice."

19. "Eternal Peace," p. 83; cf. p. 76.

20. Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress. cf. Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment, tr. James C. Meredith (Oxford, 1928), p. 96. Referring to "a system of all states that are in danger of acting injuriously to one another" Kant says: "In its absence, and with the obstacles that ambition, love of power, and avarice, especially on the part of those who hold the reins of authority, put in the way even of the possibility of such a scheme, war is inevitable."

21. Philosophy of Law, pp. 219-225; "Eternal Peace," pp. 69-75.

22. "Eternal Peace," p. 83.

23. Metaphysic of Morals, p. 47.

24. Philosophy of Law, pp. 210-211.

25. "Principle of Progress," p. 64: Each republic "unable to injure any other by violence, must maintain itself by right alone; and it may hope on real grounds that the others being constituted like itself will then come, on occasions of need, to its aid."

26. "That politics may be reduced to a science," Hume's Political Discourses (London, n.d.), pp. 229-243.

27. Teleological Judgement, p. 96

28. "Eternal Peace," p. 91

29. "Principle of the Political Order," pp. 3-5.

30. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (London, 1928), p. 455.

31. "Principle of the Political Order," pp. 15-17; "Principle of Progress," p. 62.

32. "Principles of Political Right," pp. 34-35.

33. "Eternal Peace," p. 95.

34. "Principle of the Political Order," p. 22.

35. Philosophy of Law, p. 230.

36. "Principle of the Political Order," p. 17; cf. p. 23: "Applying the same method of study everywhere, both to the internal civil constitutions and laws of the States, and to their external relations to each other, we see how in both relations the good they contained served for a certain period to elevate and glorify particular nations, and with themselves, their arts and sciences, — until the defects attaching to their institutions came in time to cause their overthrow."

37. Ibid., p. 20; "Principle of Progress," p. 63.

38. "Eternal Peace," p. 81.

39. Philosophy of Law, p. 225.

40. "Principle of Progress," p. 65. cf. "Eternal Peace," pp. 122-123; and Philosophy of Law, pp. 163-164, where Kant emphasizes that the federation must have the function of determining according to law, wherever there is a significant conflict, which interpretation of right should prevail.

41. "Eternal Peace," p. 81; and see above, n. 9. For differences among liberals on this question, see Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York, 1959), ch. 4.

42. "Principle of Progress," pp. 62-63; "Eternal Peace," pp. 97-98.

43. "Eternal Peace," p. 114.

44. Philosophy of Law, p. 218, where in addition to what is quoted above, he writes: "This international relation is the foundation of the Right of Equilibrium, or of the 'balance of Power,' among all states that are in active contiguity to each other."

45. "Principle of Progress," p. 65; "Eternal Peace," p. 98.

46. "Principles of Political Right," p. 41n.

47. Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 23-24.

48. We must, for example, "postulate the existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum...." Practical Reason, p. 221.

49. Metaphysic of Morals, p. 84. This is a difficult problem. To put peace in the infinite future would be to demonstrate its impossibility. Kant must therefore think of sequences in the phenomenal world that are not infinite but do continue without end. This abstruse statement of the problem may help to make clear the philosophic context of Kant's political thought. For this resolution of the problem, I am indebted to S. Körner's superb little book, Kant (Penguin, 1955), pp. 163-174.

50. Philosophy of Law, p. 224; cf. "Principle of the Political Order," p. 13.

51. Philosophy of Law, pp. 229-230.

52. Edwin D. Mead's introduction to the book cited above, n. 5.

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THE ENGLISH PLURALISTS RECONSIDERED

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The writings of the English pluralists are not to-day much read. When I was an undergraduate, in the incredibly remote period before the rise of Hitler, Maitland, Figgis and the early Laski were still names to be reckoned with. Their contribution to the education of the political scientists of that generation was substantial, and has been substantially acknowledged. The group theory of politics, which has had so long and fruitful a career in this country, owes much of its initial inspiration to the insights provided, among other, by these English scholars. But even though much of the substance of their work has stood the test of time, its form and above all its vocabulary are calculated to jar on the ears of most contemporary readers. The present fashion among political scientists is to speak of such things as political authority and the decision-making process, leaving the concepts of state and sovereignty to be dealt with very sparingly, if at all, by anyone who is not a professional jurist. The English pluralists, in direct contrast, regarded the problem of sovereignty as the central issue of modern political thought. In their attempts to solve this problem, moreover, some of the more influential members of the group, most notably Laski, used the word "sovereign" in ways which were so loose and illogical that they themselves were ultimately forced to admit that their position was really untenable. Though the issue was largely verbal, this was a defeat which cast a certain disrepute over the whole movement, a disrepute from which it has yet to recover.

After such an introduction, the reader is no doubt braced to withstand a more or less impassioned defense of the English pluralists as one of those all too frequently rediscovered schools of political thought which have been unaccountably and unjustly neglected by the political science fraternity and which, if we will but lend them our attention once again, will reward us with fresh and invaluable approaches to the problem of politics in an age of moral and nuclear fission. Such is not my intention. It is true that, on rereading a number of these writings after an interval of some twenty-five years, I find their merits rather more substantial, their faults rather more venial, than they had seemed in recollection. But this is a small matter. On balance I would say that this is one case, at least, where the normal processes of professional acceptance and rejection have worked, as they are supposed to work, in the interests of intellectual justice. Through the efforts, largely, of the many able scholars who have used the group-theory approach to the problems of politics, the more valuable insights of the English pluralists have long since been fully incorporated in the work of American political scientists, and considerably refined and improved in the process. Those aspects of their writings, such as the theory of the "sovereign group", which have not been thus incorporated have been rejected with good reason. This, then, is a mine which has been long and faithfully worked. Where so much gold has already been separated from the attendant dross, it is doubtful that there can be much pay-dirt left for the encouragement of future prospectors.

Why do I then feel justified in asking you to join me in a reconsideration of the English pluralists? Quite simply, because I suspect that, in spite of the long and generally successful refining process to which it has been subjected, the gold we have taken from that source still bears a small but disturbing residue of the original dross. This is not an easy point to prove. American political scientists of to-day are in many ways far more sophisticated than were the Laskis and Figgises of fifty years ago. At their best they are easily capable of avoiding the logical flaws and fallacies that once were the undoing of their predecessors. And yet, in my recent rereading of those same predecessors, particularly Laski's Grammar of Politics, I have been repeatedly struck not so much by its outmodedness as by its contemporary quality. His vocabulary is peculiar, especially in its loose and irresponsible use of the word "sovereign". He is also capable, in his analyses of the political behavior of trade unions and other non-capitalist groups, of a naive and explicit rationalism which often smacks more of the 18th than of the 20th century. But when he descends from generalities to specifics, and spells out his ideas on how a constitutional democracy does and ought to operate, he suddenly becomes quite commonplace. Apart from his special commitment against capitalism, his treatment of the relationship between parliament, political parties and pressure groups, and his emphasis on free negotiation as the essence of any truly democratic decision-making process, are remarkably similar to the standard contemporary analysis of constitutional as contrasted with totalitarian government. This should, I think, provide us food for thought. Laski and others of the English pluralists explicitly base their conclusions on assumptions regarding the nature of man and society which few contemporary theorists would dare to make. Their positive conclusions nevertheless are very much the same. Does this mean that the pluralists reached right conclusions on the basis of wrong premises? Or is it possible that the conclusions of contemporary political scientists are still being tacitly based on premises which, although no longer respectable enough to be made explicit, have been more or less unconsciously taken over from their pluralist mentors?

Before trying to answer this question it is necessary to return to the English pluralists and ask more specifically what they themselves were trying to do. We already know that their particular concern was to attack "the myth of the state" and the traditional concepts of sovereignty. Why did this task seem to them to be so crucially important? What light does this preoccupation throw on their basic assumptions with regard to the problem of politics?

In considering these matters we must turn in the first instance not to conditions of 19th-century England itself but, rather surprisingly, to the peculiar problems and experiences of the then recently created German Empire. Germany was not, to be sure, the only available source of pluralist inspiration. France had its own pluralistic tradition in the anarcho-syndicalism of Proudhon and the juristic theories of Duguit. This tradition was not without influence in England, particularly among the guild socialists, who constituted the extremist wing of the pluralist movement. But pluralism proper was inspired primarily by the ideas of a single man, the German legal historian, Gierke. Maitland, the most scholarly of the English pluralists, was an enthusiastic admirer of the German scholar, and was mainly responsible for introducing his ideas to the British academic community. But the problems Gierke was trying to solve were characteristically German rather than English problems. We must therefore turn

to the history of 19th-century Germany for an explanation of some of the more distinctive features of the subsequent English movement.

The main peculiarity of German political thought at this time was its tendency to place extreme emphasis on the concepts of state and sovereignty. This was a reflection not of strength but of weakness. Although Bismarck's policy of blood and iron had succeeded in uniting the German nation under the leadership of Prussia, the authority of the new imperial system was somewhat precarious. Loyalties traditionally owed to the old-established local dynasties were still a force to be reckoned with, for all the rising power of German nationalism. The imperial constitution left the member principalities so many rights that responsible jurists found it hard to decide whether the empire was a federal state or a confederation of states, a Bundesstaat or a Staatenbund. The nation was rent, moreover, by social and ideological cleavages which stood in the way of any rapid consolidation of new loyalties. Catholics, long accustomed to obeying local rulers who for generations had been the official defenders of their own faith, found it hard to render the same sort of allegiance to a protestant emperor. There was also the problem of Marxism, which at that time was more strongly entrenched in Germany than in any other country, and which was committed, at least in theory, to the rejection of nationalism and to the denial of the legitimacy of any bourgeois state. Bismarck's vigorous but unsuccessful attempt in the first decades of the empire to promote national unity by suppressing both the catholics and the socialists did nothing to ease the situation. In their commitment to the imperial experiment, therefore, the more ardent nationalists were forced to counter separatist tendencies by placing unusual emphasis on the legal and moral sanctity of the imperial sovereign. Hegel's old principle that the state is the "Gang Gottes im Welt" took on new meaning in these circumstances, and was widely propagated. Extreme exaltation of the concept of sovereignty seemed to offer the only way of counteracting the weaknesses of an authority which, unlike the governments of older European states, could not as yet rely on any long-established habits of political allegiance.

Gierke's work was a reaction against this particular line of thought. Although he agreed that sovereignty was a distinctive characteristic of state authority, his inclination was to play down the uniqueness of the state, and to emphasize the likenesses between it and other social groups. His position was that the function of regulating inter-personal relationships, the function in other words of generating law, was inherent in the very nature of group life. Insofar as men join together for the accomplishment of common purposes, they necessarily create and enforce common rules of action. This is true of any social group, whether it be as broadly comprehensive as a state or as narrowly specialized as a glee club. Under the principles of Roman law, long since adopted in Germany, this fact is obscured by the doctrine that the only groups known to the law are corporations, supposedly "fictitious persons" which owe their existence to an act of incorporation by the sovereign state itself. But Gierke believed that, in the period prior to their reception of the Roman law, the Germans had developed a much sounder and more realistic approach to the problems of group life. Corporate rights at that time had been recognized as coming into existence not at the arbitrary pleasure of the sovereign, but as a necessary consequence of the spontaneous sociability of men. Social groups, like individuals, were seen as natural rather than as artificial persons. Although both types of persons were subject to authoritative regulation by the state, both also had

natural rights which the state was bound to respect. This, to Gierke's way of thinking, was a far more realistic and a far more desirable way of looking at things than the Roman habit of considering the state as the one and only social group with an inherent capacity for self-regulation. His long and distinguished career as a legal historial was devoted to the task of recovering the old deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, and persuading his countrymen to revive it.

Though specifically addressed to a German audience, Gierke's work soon achieved substantial influence in the English-speaking world. This was due primarily to the efforts of Maitland. He too was an eminent legal historian, who knew and greatly admired the writings of his slightly older German contemporary, and believed that they deserved to be better known in the British academic world. True, the problems Gierke was attacking might not be quite so urgent in England as in Germany. In the common-law conception of the trust, for example, the English possessed a legal instrument which was far more flexible than the Roman (and common-law) theory of incorporation, and provided a relatively satisfactory means of meeting the legal needs of private associations. And with their well-rooted traditions of political authority, the English had had relatively little need to throw excessive weight on the concepts of state and sovereignty. Maitland believed, however, that these were differences of degree, not of kind. The Austinian concept of sovereignty had given an uncompromisingly absolutist cast to the prevailing legal and political theories of parliamentary sovereignty. Through the influence of Bosanquet and other idealists, some Englishmen had gone even further, and accepted the neo-Hegelian identification of the state as the sole authoritative exponent of moral values. Under these circumstances, Maitland felt that the corrective views of Gierke were sorely needed. Believing that any realistic approach to the problems of modern politics called for a greatly enhanced awareness of the importance of private assocations, he adopted and transmitted to English readers the essence of Gierke's thought. In so doing he became the founding father of English pluralism.

Of the men who followed Maitland's lead, Figgis and Laski were the ones who contributed most extensively to the pluralist movement. Figgis is the less ambitious and the more clear-headed of the two. Primarily a moralist and Christian churchman, he devoted most of his attention to the problem of church-state relations. Bismarck's campaign against the German catholics, and the drastic anti-clerical legislation of the Third French Republic, were the most disquieting examples of the extremes to which modern governments, in the name of national sovereignty, had already been willing to go in their impairment of religious freedom. Although the situation in England was less immediately threatening, Figgis thought he could detect a growing inclination to demand that the decisions of church authorities, even in such essentially religious matters as the definition of Christian matrimony, be reversed by an appeal to the authority of parliaments and law courts. Feeling that this was quite unacceptable, he used the arguments of Gierke and Maitland as the basis for his defense of the church position. Although the church, in its relations which the nonchurch community, is subject like any other individual or group to civil regulation, it is also, again like any other individual or group, an organic entity with a life and conscience of its own. This gives it an inherent right to define its own purposes and to impose its own standards on those who choose to remain within the fold. Any government which ignores these elementary facts of group life is violating the integrity of private associations in the name of a grossly

exaggerated and erroneous concept of sovereignty.

Laski's application of pluralist principles is considerably broader in scope. His four substantial volumes, beginning the The Problem of Sovereignty (1917) and ending with A Grammar of Politics (1925), constitute the only really extensive series of writing in the rather limited corpus of English pluralism. Inspired by a confident faith in the future of democratic socialism, his ambition, at this early stage of his career, was to meet the needs of a wholly new age by producing a comprehensive new summa of political though. In so doing he relied heavily on the principles of Maitland and Figgis, but applied them to a much wider range of problems. It is true that, in his hostility to the traditional concept of sovereignty, he stated his views in language which, by its daring novelty and hopeless imprecision, made his position seem at first glance to be a good deal more radical, and less acceptable, than that of his predecessors. It is in Laski, rather than in Figgis or Maitland, that one most often encounters those emphatic statements about the "sovereign group" and "contingent revolution", which did so much to discredit the whole pluralist movement. I suspect that, even though he explicitly rejected their conclusions, he was so struck by the dashing style of the guild socialists, with their echoes of the eloquence of Proudhon and the French anarcho-syndicalists, that he could not always resist the temptation to emulate their verbal fireworks, with consequent damage to the clarity of what he was really trying to say. For the substance of his theory of politics, when you come right down to it, is not appreciably different from that of his pluralist predecessors. Like them he thought that the sovereign state had acquired too strong a hold over the imagination of his contemporaries, and hoped to redress the balance by emphasizing the moral and political responsibilities of other associations. But he was also like them in recognizing that a state cannot get along without some finally authoritative decision-making process.

As I see it, therefore, the basic position of the English pluralists can be briefly but not unfairly summarized in terms which will not seem wholly unfamiliar to people acquainted with the writings of American group theorists. Politics in a proper constitutional democracy is a game in which all who so wish are invited to compete as fully and freely as possible. This is the essential difference, indeed, between democracy and totalitarianism. But games need rules to define the permissible strategies of competition, and to permit a clearcut decision as to who has rightfully won. The democratic state is a neutral empire which enforces the rules of the game, as laid down by the law and usages of the constitution. It is also an impartial executive, which rewards the rightful winner, in the interval between matches, by carrying out the political decisions for which the winning team has fought. For the proper performance of its functions, both as empire and as executive, the state is vested with sovereign authority, and may apply coercive measures against anyone who tries to step out of line. By preference it ought not, however, to be an active contestant in the game itself. Its function is to supervise, and to validate the outcome of, a never-ending series of contests and negotiations between rival pressure groups. Such is the nature of the decision-making process in any well-ordered constitutional democracy.

It would be absurd to suppose that many contemporary scholars would subscribe to this brief summary as a true and adequate statement of their theory of constitutional government. I believe it comes reasonably close, however, to the position explicitly or implicitly adopted by the English pluralists. And though it may do less than justice to the democratic theorists of our own day, it

has even now, to a modern ear, a rather familiar sound.

This is disquieting. For the fact is that the assumptions on which the English pluralists based their work, assumptions which at best were never fully realistic, are becoming daily more incompatible with the realities of contemporary politics. Englishmen of the pluralist generation were worried about the dangers of excessive authority. Contemplating a political system so deeply entrenched and so widely accepted that few would think of challenging its decisions, they sought, in the interests of social justice, to weaken its hold on the minds of men, and to encourage a wider diffusion of political responsibilities. Granted their assumptions, this makes some sense. But the most spectacular feature of contemporary politics is the unprecedentedly rapid and widespread disintegration of political authority. Colonial regimes are collapsing in droves, leaving behind them native governments whose authority is, in most cases, either precarious or non-existent. Vast areas of Europe and Asia are held down by communist regimes that must all rely, in large though varying measure, on coercion rather than consent. In the non-communist world, large and, as it would seem, growing numbers of people are transferring their allegiance to communist movements which believe, in principle, in the illegitimacy of all non-communist governments. Pretorianism, once a Latin-American specialty, is turning up everywhere, and even in France the army can no longer be relied upon to obey its legitimate rulers. All this is a far cry indeed from the bye-gone days of English pluralism.

And so I conclude by raising once again the question with which I started: have we really got rid of all the dross in the gold we have so long been using? I suppose most of us realize by now that the survival of constitutional democracy is going to depend, for a long and unpredictable future, on the development of effective leadership, and on an increasingly widespread and enlightened sense of the values and responsibilities of democratic citizenship. We can no longer afford, if we ever could, to rely on a decision-making process that asks the government to stand idly by while pressure groups fight it out between themselves, expecting the spontaneous generation of public goods through the balancing of private interests. I strongly suspect that many of our group-theory studies, in their preoccupation with the highly visible manoeuvers of the smaller groups, have tended to make us neglect the broader problems and possibilities of democratic politics. If so, our theories are still mixed with dross, and require still further distilling.

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION —

IN THE COURTS AND THEREAFTER

By Rowland Watts

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THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION --
IN THE COURTS AND THEREAFTER

By Rowland Watts*

The American Civil Liberties Union recognizes, as all of us should, that the role of private upholders of the Constitution has assumed major importance in the United States. A recent report by the American Jewish Congress indicates that 54 out of 120 written decisions of the Court during its last term (October Term, 1960) had to do with civil liberties matters. This analysis was in support of the AJC's contention that the Court had assumed, within the last 25 years, a significantly different role, that is, in support of individual rights as against property rights under the Constitution. Our own account of the Supreme Court decisions within the last Term arive at slightly different figures. The significant fact, however, we both agree upon -- that close to 50% of the cases on which the Court rendered a written opinion were based upon questions of individual rights.

These questions traditionally in the ACLU classification were in the areas of due process, free speech and association, equality, and labor v. business competing concerns (closely akin to both free speech and due process).

The ACLU was founded in 1920 as an outgrowth of a committee devoted to the defense of the rights of conscientious objectors during World War I, and was immediately precipitated into Attorney-General Palmer's raids and deportation of persons he considered radical aliens in the early 1920's. In 1929 it was stabilized by incorporation as a non-profit membership association under New York

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* Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union; author of Illegal Forced Labor in the United States (a part of the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor to the United Nations' Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor) and of The Draftee and Internal Security; member of the Bars of the State of Maryland, numerous lower federal jurisdictions, and the Supreme Court of the United States.

State laws. It has always been non-partisan, non-political and devoted exclusively to the defense of civil liberties as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the various states. It, therefore, has not looked into the political motivations of anyone who it has defended.

ACLU's Annual Reports used to publish a balance sheet of U. S. Supreme Court decisions on the basis of their being favorable or unfavorable to our concept of constitutionally-guaranteed civil liberties. A few years ago we abandoned this practice in the recognition that rarely does a particular decision fall unequivocally on the civil liberties credit or debit side. More often than not, the questions that are decided are far too complex to give a plus or minus balance.

The ACLU Legal Role

The ACLU traditionally has appeared in key cases as amicus curiae. We are not a general legal defense agency and have felt that we could be most effective by highlighting civil liberties issues on the appellate level, once the facts have been established by evidence in the trial courts. This approach has certain obvious disadvantages in that we cannot control the method of production of evidence and thus the establishment of an adequate appeal record in the trial courts; yet, we have felt that such an approach makes it possible to establish our single integrity to civil liberties as a useful contribution to the court's consideration of the question before it.

We have not sought test cases, although some of them have come our way. We have not kept an accurate account up to this time of appeals to us for help, but roughly we receive an average of 500 such appeals from prisoners, inmates of mental institutions, and others who feel that they are deprived of their rights, during any one year. Of this number we take into court roughly one percent of those who are incarcerated. In this connection once should glance through the "Memorandum

Decisions" of the U. S. Supreme Court, because these decisions for the most part indicate the rejection of over a thousand applications in forma pauperis for Supreme Court review. Professor Hart of Harvard in the October 1960 Harvard Law Review made a mathematical calculation that the Supreme Court could consider each of these cases for less than five minutes. This calculation was vigorously repudiated by Mr. Justice Douglas, but the fact remains that the percentage of in forma pauperis petitions that are granted review is not significantly above the percentage of those that the ACLU determines to undertake.

We have now begun to keep a numerical record of persons who appeal to us by mail. These are mostly from persons who are confined to institutions, criminal or mental. As of August 31, 1961 we had 168 such cases under various stages of active consideration. The method of such consideration will be set forth in greater detail below, but it certainly consists of far more than five minutes, and usually far more than five hours, of research and review. We attempt to carefully consider all possible civil liberties issues involved in every case that is presented to us, as we are very conscious of the fact that our office has become, when we turn down a case, the graveyard of hope for the one who sought our aid. We know, of course, that the ultimate graveyard is those 1000-odd "Memorandum Decisions" of the United States Supreme Court denying review. But many of those who appeal to us have neither the heart nor the ability to pursue their cases on their own to this ultimate determination. (A few realistically accept our conclusion that there is no legal basis for the contentions they are making. We thus perform an incidental benefit to the United States Supreme Court by relieving it of the necessity of reviewing a number of other "unmeritorious" petitions each year.)

The ACLU Before the U. S. Supreme Court

The ACLU appears before the United States Supreme Court either directly or

as amicus curiae. If it appears directly it supplies counsel and assumes full responsibility, including financial, for the case. If it appears amicus it files a brief, and occasionally argues, in support of the civil liberties issues involved. During the October 1960 Term of Court we considered appearance in 40 cases in which the Court ultimately rendered a written opinion. We actually appeared in 11 of such cases. What are the criteria we use in determining whether or not to make such an appearance?

On direct appearance the first criterion is whether or not we have assumed responsibility for the case in a lower court. If we have, we must obviously continue such appearance where there is any possibility of establishing the civil liberties proposition for which we have contended. We provided such representation in four cases during the last Term.

In the first of these, Wilkinson v. United States (5 Led 2d 633), we suffered a resounding defeat when the Court upheld absolutely, in a 5-4 decision, a contempt of Congress conviction for refusal to answer on First Amendment grounds a question propounded by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. This decision was presaged by the Barenblatt decision (also an ACLU case) of the preceding Term, where the Court held that the "persuasive gloss of legislative history" had eliminated the vagueness that may have existed in the House Committee's mandate to investigate "un-American propaganda activities" and that on balancing individual First Amendment rights of free speech and association against the interests of national security, such individual rights must yield.

In the second case, Reck v. Pate (6 Led 2d 948), a case handled by our Illinois Division attorneys, a significant victory was achieved where the Court, in a 7-2 decision, reversed an Illinois murder conviction where the first confession was obtained from the 19-year old accused after four days of incommunicado interrogation.

The third case of direct support was Torcaso v. Watkins (6 Led 2d 982), a case which the ACLU handled jointly with the American Jewish Congress. Here a unanimous Court invalidated the Maryland constitutional requirement that all public officials (here a Notary Public) must, as a condition to holding their office, state a "belief in the existence of God."

The most important decision rendered by the Supreme Court among those cases in which we supplied direct representation was that of Monroe v. Pate (5 Led 2d 492), a case also handled by our Illinois Division. In this case, the Court in an 8-1 decision upheld the right to bring a civil suit for damages under the Federal Civil Rights Law against policemen who engage in an illegal search and seizure, even though the city of Chicago, by whom they were employed, could not be so sued.

Our direct participation before the Supreme Court extended beyond these cases where written decisions were rendered, in that we supported five further petitions for Supreme Court review. In three of these the petition for certiorari was denied.

In the other cases in which the ACLU did not give direct support the reasons therefore were threefold. Primarily and overwhelmingly, such direct support was not requested of us, as the appellants had adequate representation, either through their own attorneys or through other organizations such as the NAACP. Secondly, in a few cases we reluctantly had to deny support because of limitations on our financial resources. And finally, in a few cases we believed that the civil liberties issue involved was relatively minor. In both of these last two situations the appellants were ably represented by court-appointed counsel.

The ACLU appeared amicus curiae in 7 cases in which opinions were rendered. The results were as follows&

Of the four cases in which the Supreme Court considered the validity of state Sunday-closing or "blue" laws, the ACLU appeared in Gallagher v. Crown Kosher

Supermarket (6 Led 2d 536), along with our Massachusetts affiliate, and in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown Incorporated v. McGinley (6 Led 2d 551), with our Greater Philadelphia affiliate. In these cases the Supreme Court, in multitudinous concurring and dissenting opinions, upheld the validity of the Sunday-closing laws as a proper exercise of the states' police powers regardless of their undoubted religious origin.

In a case closely related to both the desegregation issue and the question of malapportionment of state legislatures, the Court in a unanimous decision held that the gerrymandering of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama with the result of eliminating virtually all of the Negro voters therefrom, was violative of the United States Constitution, even though a state ordinarily has absolute right to determine its own political subdivision.

In the series of cases testing the validity of the Connecticut law prohibiting the dessimination of information concerning birth control, in which the ACLU appeared with its Connecticut affiliate, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the affirmation by the Connecticut Supreme Court that the law was constitutional. A five-Justice majority held that there was no "justiciable issue" before it because in the 75 years that the law had been on the Connecticut statute books, there had been only one prosecution under it, and that the records showed that contraceptives were openly and widely sold throughout the state. In effect, the majority considered the law a dead letter. (Based on this decision, the Planned Parenthood Association immediately announced its intention to open up clinics in Connecticut, so it is possible that a "justiciable issue" will come eventually before the Supreme Court.)

In the motion picture censorship case of Times Film Company v. Chicago (5 Led 2d 403), the ACLU with its Illinois affiliate also appeared amicus. In this case the appellant sought a license from the Chicago movie censor to show the

motion picture "Don Juan", but refused to submit the film for review. Here the Court, unlike the lower court, held that there was "a justiciable issue" and that the Chicago ordinance was not void on its face, in that under proper standards motion picture censorship is valid. A four-Justice minority strongly dissented.

The final case in which the ACLU, with its Ohio affiliate, appeared amicus was the most important decision in the area of civil liberties rendered by the Court. And this decision was based exclusively on the arguments advanced by us in our amicus appearance. This case of Matt v. Ohio (6 Led 2d 1081) was originally conceived of and presented to the Court as a challenge of the validity of the Ohio obscenity law which made mere possession of obscene literature, without knowledge of its content or without intent to distribute it, a criminal offense. The Court did not reach this issue, however, but decided the case on the additional argument raised by us amicus that despite the long-standing contrary opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, holding that evidence unlawfully obtained was admissable in state criminal prosecutions without violating the federal Constitution, a state conviction based on evidence so obtained denied the accused of due process. The Court upheld our contention and ruled for the first time that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against using evidence obtained illegal search and seizure applied likewise to the states.

The Criteria for Amicus Appearance

It is not the purpose of this paper to present a full scale review of all of the cases involving civil liberties which the Supreme Court considered. Two important decisions are worth review, however, as they illustrate one of the reasons that we do not appear even though we consider the case of great importance.

The first of these is International Association of Machinists v. Street (6 Led 2d 1141). This case involved a provision of the Railway Labor Act

authorizing union shop agreements. A group of dissident Georgia members sought to enjoin the collection of dues from them on the basis that a portion of such dues were used for political purposes with which they disagreed, in violation of their constitutional rights. Six members of the Court held that no constitutional rights had been violated because there was other relief available to the objectors, such as an injunctive action to prevent the use of a proportional share of their dues for such purposes. The dissenting opinions were a surprise. Mr. Justice Black held that the statute so interpreted did in fact violate First Amendment rights and Mr. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented, finding that, regardless of any other remedy that may theoretically be available, there was no denial of First Amendment rights in requiring the payment of dues even for such purposes.

The other case was Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy (6 Led 2d 1230). In this case the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the denial of admission to a naval installation on security grounds, without a hearing or statement of allegations against her, of a short-order cook employee of the commissary concessionaire. It held that there was no violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The ACLU carefully considered participation in these cases and, incidentally, believes that the Court's decisions in them are serious blows to civil liberties. Yet we did not appear because, after very careful review of the petitions and briefs of the parties involved, we believed that there was nothing additional that we could contribute to the consideration of the cases by the Court. This illustrates our concern that we do not appear amicus on a mere "me-too" basis. We have reason to believe that the Court does consider our amicus briefs, as dramatically illustrated in the Matt v. Ohio case discussed above, and as shown in other decisions where our arguments have been substantially adopted without specific reference to us. We do not wish to have whatever impact we may make diluted by merely reiterating,

albeit it with variations, the main theme of the principal briefs.

We also have a very high regard for the responsibilities of a person or organization seeking to appear amicus curiae. We believe that such appearance genuinely should be as "a friend of the court". We do not seek to appear if we do not consider that we can make a substantial contribution to the Court's consideration of the civil liberties questions before it.

This approach raises some serious practical and organizational problems. The simple, practical problem grows out of a peculiar rule of the Court that an amicus brief should be submitted at the time of the submission of the brief of the side amicus supports and should not be duplicative of the argument raised in the principal brief. As lawyers rarely file until the approximate date they are due, it is often difficult for amicus to know what to include and what to leave out in order to avoid duplication and in order to supply the proper civil liberties emphasis. We have been only partially successful in resolving this problem in a case that will come before the Court in the October 1961 Term. This case, Hoyt v. Florida (No. 31), challenges discriminatory exclusion of women from the Florida jury in a murder prosecution. To our chagrin, we discovered that our amicus brief says substantially the same thing that is said in the principal brief. We hope, however, that we have made a partial contribution to the Court's consideration by going more extensively into the history of the development of the right of women to sit on juries.

The Amicus

The organizational problems in reaching a decision to appear or not to appear are sometimes more difficult of resolution. There was a time -- not too long ago -- when an amicus appearance, often in the form of a "laymen's" massive

petition to the Court, clearly constituted a pressure, an essentially lobbying activity, in derogation of the democratic concept of immunity of the judicial process from such attempted political intervention.

The Court rejected such efforts and virtually eliminated the privilege of amicus appearances. This almost complete prohibition of amicus appearance was finally -- and fortunately -- modified to permit lawyers' briefs, as distinguished from layman petitions, by consent of the parties or on a motion granted by the Court.

There are a few "landmark" cases where an organization devoted to "eternal vigilance" in the full defense of civil liberties finds it extremely difficult not to appear, despite the fact that it can make no significant further contribution to the argument. One such case potentially was the group of 1954 School Desegregation cases. What more could we contribute to the principal NAACP presentations? We solved this problem in this particular case by joining with other like-minded organizations in presenting a brief we believe to have been helpful.

In other situations, the solution has not been so salutary. The decision not to appear because we have nothing more to add always leaves us open, from both our supporters and critics, to the question: "Where were you?" We think that in each such case we were on the side of civil liberties, of which non-lobbying activities in the courts is an important part. Defense of the Constitution sometimes requires, "The Court is in session; silence in the Court."

Other Legal Action

This recital of ACLU action before the Supreme Court and consideration of cases submitted to us by persons confined by no means exhaust the area of ACLU

legal action. Even before the Supreme Court, in our prior recital, we overlooked the fact that our Southern California affiliate appeared amicus in support of the case of Konitsberg v. State Bar of California (6 Led 2d 105) in which we again asserted that the denial of admission to the practice of law based exclusively on a refusal to answer a question pertaining to one's prior political associations was violative of the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, disagreed with us. It is entirely possible that other cases taken to the Supreme Court by our affiliates alone have been overlooked in this paper.

Outside of the Supreme Court, however, the ACLU and its affiliates appear in many cases before they reach such ultimate determination.

Such appearances begin in consultation with a person who appeals to us or with his lawyers. They progress through our lawyers' providing free legal advice, consultation with public officials, administrative proceedings, trial representation, and appellate review. Because our national office and our affiliates operate with minimum staff (many of our affiliates have no staff whatsoever), it has not been possible for us up to this time to maintain an accurate statistical record of all of the cases we participate and assist in. In the interest of political science we hope that this situation will be corrected if we can devise a method of maintaining a national docket with the minimum of volunteer effort.

As far as the national office of the ACLU is concerned, it has daily many calls, both by telephone and in person, from individuals who feel their civil liberties rights have been infringed. Within the area of our physical capacity, we attempt a full consideration to all such calls.

This means that we, insofar as we succeed in this intention, are absolutely dependent upon the assistance of volunteers. We have been fortunate in having each summer several senior law students who have fully volunteered their complete time to

us. We have been doubly fortunate in the fact that we have several persons of more mature experience who volunteer for us two full days a week. We have in non-affiliate areas, state correspondents who contribute their efforts, and throughout the country we have between seven and eight hundred volunteer cooperating attorneys who contribute incalculably to our work. Without this volunteer system, no organization can possibly hope to begin to cope with the scope and quanity of civil liberties problems that are presented to us.

The Affiliate System

The American Civil Liberties Union operates through a national organization and through thirty affiliates organized in 27 states. The state-wide affiliates function through 75 chapters, and, in the case of the Southern California affiliate, it functions through ten local branches. The affiliates are essentially responsible for the legal work in their respective areas, and they are bound in principle to the policy positions adopted by the national board. They do, however, have a considerable degree of autonomy in legal matters, and can deviate from national policy if the affiliate board disagrees on basic civil liberties grounds with the national's policy position. A few years ago, in a case best left unidentified, a state affiliate appeared amicus on one side of the issue, while the national office appeared amicus on the opposing side. (The position of the national was upheld by the Court.)

Our state correspondents do not have authority without express permission to act on behalf of the ACLU, but they are invaluable in advising us of cases with which we should be concerned in their areas. The seven to eight hundred cooperating attorneys are essentially on a stand-by basis, and have the right to refuse or accept any case for whatever reason. Most of them are extremely courageous in

acting on our behalf, despite strong local pressures. When they do so act, they serve without fee, although we reimburse them for their actual out-of-pocket expenses.

Through this affiliate and volunteer cooperative system, the ACLU has been able to multiply many times the effectiveness of its professional staff.

After the Court Decision -- and Conclusion

The title of this paper would have more appropriately stated that our role outside of the courts included both "before" and "after". Our work does not begin ordinarily with a test case or a case brought directly to us by the persons involved.

Our work begins with the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States and similar provisions of the various state constitutions. The ACLU has attempted through the years to define such rights as we understand them, to promote them in the courts where necessary, but -- more importantly -- to promote them in the understanding of the people through the educational process. In this connection we carry on many efforts to induce the legislatures as representatives of the people to adopt laws which we consider will promote civil liberties, and to refrain from adopting laws which we consider detrimental to civil liberties. We also, through our publications and publicity program, try to clarify the civil liberties issues involved in current affairs.

We do not try to highlight such issues in the public press or through a publicity campaign around a particular case, because we believe that we have a responsibility to the Court to let it decide, once the issue has reached the litigative stage, the constitutional issue on its merits and not through public

pressure. There are many who disagree with us on this approach, and this is a matter for further consideration in a further paper.

If the final decision of the ultimate judicial authority is against the position we represent, it does not mean that we abandon our position. It does mean, however, that if there is a possibility on non-constitutional grounds to secure revision of the pertinent statutory law, we work in this direction. If not, we bide our time until another case will give the Court an opportunity to further reconsider and possibly reverse itself on the matter. This was done in the course of a year in the Jehovah's flag-salute cases, in the course of almost 60 years in the desegregation cases and in only slightly lesser time in the Fourth Amendment cases as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio above.

The American Civil Liberties Union is not patient with even a temporary denial of civil liberties. It does believe, however, that the only way we can permanently achieve personal freedom within a democracy is to work within the framework of our constitutional government and within the judicial system, without political pressure.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SPACE

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Prepared for delivery at the 1961 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Mo., Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 6 - 9, 1961

* * *

> "Space is open to us now; and our eagerness to share its meaning is not governed by the efforts of others. We go into space because whatever mankind must undertake, freemen must fully share."
>
> President Kennedy
> State of the Union Message
> May 25, 1961

I

EMERGING ROLE OF SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Space exploration is bringing a new dimension to international affairs. In so doing, it is also providing a new instrumentality, knowledge, that will be more and more persuasive in the battle for men's minds. Early ventures into space are already influencing world opinion and international policy. As the pace and extent of exploration of the solar system increases, the manner in which knowledge derived from space is put to use could well become an important political factor in the struggle between the Free Nations and the Communist bloc.

U.S. Policy

The United States is conducting its space experiments in the open. We are sharing our discoveries with the world scientific community. We are cooperating with a growing number of nations in a variety of projects to increase knowledge of the earth's environment and of the universe.

The concept of wide dissemination of knowledge is characteristic of democracy and of science. Moreover, in today's interlinked world such a policy must eventually prove as sound a one in the practical sense as it is morally. In its very essence, science is international; its sources and its reach are as widespread as human intelligence and human needs for its benefits. No way has yet been devised to padlock the dynamism of science and technology permanently. Thus, a closed-door policy on purely scientific knowledge is in the long run much more apt to exclude valuable contributions from outside than to pen worthwhile discoveries inside. Such a policy could result, at some crucial point, in a surplus of yesterday's hardware and a scarcity of tomorrow's ideas.

The United States stands to gain contributions from gifted minds in scores of countries through its mutual-aid space programs and interchange of ideas with scientists and scientific organizations of other nations.

These considerations, based on long American practice as well as on recognition of the character of modern science, guided the 85th Congress when it charted the mission of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958.

In setting forth NASA objectives, Congress also bore in mind a then-current, highly successful example of research cooperation on a global scale -- the International Geophysical Year, an 18-month period (1957-1958) during which 60,000 scientists of 66 nations participated in the most intensive study ever undertaken of the make-up of the earth and its environment.

II

NASA ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

Statutory International Cooperation

Public Law 85-568, which established the civilian national space program, stipulated that this country's space activities "should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." This aim was further spelled out to include: "Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in peaceful applications of the results thereof." The Act also specified the widest practicable dissemination of information on civilian space activities and their results.

Background and Accomplishments

At its birth on October 1, 1958, NASA absorbed the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) which for 43 years had been at the forefront of aviation research and which had also played an important role in early U.S. space research. To the 8,000 NACA scientists, engineers, and technical and administrative personnel utilizing five field centers, other excellent groups were added. Among these were the staff members of the Naval Research Laboratory Vanguard group which joined NASA in November 1958, and the approximately 2,400 people of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, operated under NASA contract by the California Institute of Technology since December 3, 1958. On July 1 of last year, more than 5,000 staff members of the Development Operations Division, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, Huntsville, Alabama, were added. Today, NASA's

total employee strength -- excluding The Jet Propulsion Laboratory -- is approximately 17,400, and by this time next year the agency plans on a strength of about 21,400.

NASA now has an all-around space research and development capacity and a budget for Fiscal Year 1962 of $1,671,750,000.

Space Sciences Program Highlights

NASA's space science program, which is carried out with satellites, space probes, and sounding rockets, consists of studies of the earth and its environment -- geophysics -- and of the sun, stars, and universe -- astronomy.

In geophysics, research is focused on the atmosphere and ionosphere and on energetic particles. These are atomic particles moving at very high speeds, thus possessing great amounts of energy. They include the particles forming the Great Radiation Regions surrounding the earth, cosmic rays, and the particles involved in auroras.

Since January 31, 1958 -- and as of this writing -- the United States has successfully launched 46 earth satellites, two solar satellites, and two deep space probes. The most recent is Explorer XII, which is making simultaneous measurements of many aspects of the space environment between altitudes of about 200 and 50,000 miles. All have provided important new scientific knowledge which has brought space into sharper focus and has contributed to the technology needed for more advanced spacecraft to come. The flights of these experiments have been traced by tracking stations abroad as well as by those located in the United States. Foreign scientists have participated to varying degrees in most of the experiments.

Some of the scientific findings are:

...Discovery of two intense radiation zones trapped around the earth -- the Van Allen Belts. It has also been discovered that radiation from the sun significantly affects our weather.

...Determination that the earth is slightly pear-shaped with the stem at the North Pole. Other measurements by means of U.S. satellites have resulted in more accurate mapping of island and continent masses on earth.

...New data regarding the makeup of the fields of magnetism in space. For example, Explorer X, a 78-pound NASA satellite, transmitted highly meaningful information on solar-terrestrial relationships -- such as magnetic fields and solar winds. Explorer X's data indicate that part of the interplanetary magnetic field near the earth may be an extension of the sun's magnetic field which has been carried earthward by solar winds.

...Discovery that sunlight exerts pressure on objects in space. This pressure is shifting the orbit of the grapefruit-sized Vanguard I satellite about a mile per year and has affected the orbit of the 100-foot-diameter Echo I satellite at a rate 300 times greater.

Among NASA's most successful experiments to date have been the Pioneer series of space probes. Pioneer V, for example -- launched into solar orbit on March 11 last year -- was tracked into space to a distance of 22.5 million miles, still the greatest distance any man-made object has been tracked. Pioneer V sent back scientific data on conditions in space until communication contact was lost on June 26, 1960. This space probe transmitted new and valuable information about cosmic rays, the earth's magnetic field, solar "storms," and evidence of the existence of a large "ring current" circulating around the earth at altitudes from about 30,000 to 60,000 miles.

In addition, NASA's family of sounding rockets -- which reach altitudes of from 150 to 4,000 miles -- have been accumulating quantities of data on atmosphere composition and pressure, upper atmosphere winds, cloud cover, the makeup of the ionosphere, etc. During the coming 12 months NASA will be launching more than 300 sounding rockets from sites in this country, and will cooperate with other nations in sounding-rocket launchings abroad.

Advanced launch vehicles, such as the Agena and the Centaur, will soon be available to NASA. They will have greatly improved load-carrying capabilities. Detailed plans have been made and work has begun on an Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO), based on use of the Agena launch vehicle. OGO will be one of NASA's first standardized satellites, with a stock-model structure, basic power supply, attitude control, telemetry, and a command system. Its compartments will accommodate 50 different geophysical experiments on a single mission. The observatory itself will be about six feet long by three feet square. The two solar "paddles" which collect energy from the sun will each be about six feet square. The satellite will weight 1,000 pounds, including 150 pounds of scientific experiments.

NASA has well-advanced plans for unmanned, then manned, exploration of the moon. A lunar spacecraft -- known as Ranger -- has been designed to carry an instrument package built ruggedly enough to survive a crash landing on the moon, after which the instruments will record and radio to earth data on the makeup of the lunar surface.

Following Ranger will come Surveyor, a spacecraft designed to make a so-called "soft landing" on the moon. More delicate scientific instruments than those in Ranger can thus be employed.

Under NASA development also is Mariner, an instrument-packed spacecraft that will skirt Venus and Mars. Later, perhaps, Mariner spacecraft will be dispatched on missions approaching more remote planets in the solar system. Mariner will be equipped with devices to measure planetary atmospheres, surface temperatures, rotation rates, magnetic fields, and surrounding radiation regions. Centaur vehicles will launch the Mariner series.

Manned Spaceflight

The historic flights of American Astronauts Alan Shepard and Virgil Grissom on May 5 and July 21, respectively, were too recent and too minutely reported for details to be repeated here. These missions were advanced steps in Project Mercury, the first phase in the United States program for manned spaceflight. The main goal of Project Mercury is to determine man's capabilities under the alien conditions of acceleration and weightlessness with which future voyagers to the moon and planets will have to cope.

Shepard and Grissom were not sent on their brief space trips merely to bolster the prestige of the United States. Theirs were research flights, planned and made to test the combination of man-and-Mercury systems and to learn to what extent trained human ability could manage Mercury-capsule control during actual flight in space.

The results proved gratifying. Despite the mishap and loss of the capsule after the second Mercury flight reached its successful sea landing, NASA is convinced that the planned schedule for orbiting one of the astronauts late this year, or early in 1962, can be met.

As the world noted, the suborbital Mercury flights were conducted openly. During the flights and after, there was a continuous flow of information to the press and to scientists. This was in strong contrast to the

flights of Soviet Cosmonauts Gagarin and Titov which were launched in secret and, so far, have yielded to the world only sketchy information.

The first Mercury manned orbital mission will circle the earth three times to test pilot and capsule for about four and one-half hours. A prime purpose is to study how weightlessness will affect a human being during such a long period. The Mercury capsule will return to earth in a manner similar to the technique used in suborbital flights. NASA plans to send several manned Mercury capsules on as many as 18 orbits each during the next two years.

Mercury tests and those for the next generation of manned spacecraft -- Project Apollo -- will probably overlap. The Apollo spacecraft will be several times larger than the Mercury capsule. It will provide living and working quarters roomy enough to accommodate three men who will be able to move around without space suits in what NASA scientists call a "shirt-sleeves environment." The Apollo spacecraft will be carried aloft by the Saturn booster, an eight-cluster rocket with a thrust of 1,500,000 pounds, compared to the Atlas with 360,000 pounds of thrust and the Redstone with only 78,000 pounds. The Redstone was used for the Shepard and Grissom flights. The Atlas will be the booster for Mercury orbital flights.

The Apollo-Saturn combination will first be used for an earth satellite, an orbiting space laboratory in which the three-man team can perform a great variety of scientific experiments while training for sustained spaceflight. Next will come voyages deep into space toward the moon and, in time, a three-man voyage around the moon and return to earth.

An actual moon landing may be feasible late in this decade. NASA's F-1 liquid-fuel rocket for the booster is now completed and is being tested. This engine, developing 1.5-million pounds of thrust, will be clustered into a super booster -- the Nova -- to power moon expeditions. The design for Nova and for the Apollo spacecraft are under active study.

III

SATELLITE APPLICATIONS

Space itself, when instrumented by man, will feed back large returns to the world economy. Early dividends from NASA experiments are already within reach in the fields of weather and communications satellites.

Project Echo

In 1960, NASA's Echo I passive communications satellite appealed to the world's imagination. The hugh aluminized plastic sphere has been seen sparkling like a moving star by people in practically every country. Echo proved that it is possible to communicate between distant areas on the earth by reflecting radio signals from a satellite. Private companies have shown great interest in the Echo concept, and in "repeater" satellites -- which the Government is developing -- that can receive and store messages at one point over the earth's surface and re-transmit them to ground receiving stations thousands of miles apart. Satellite communications will make world-wide telephone and television service realities, and will relieve the overload on present global communications systems. This enhanced communication could well be a bond drawing people of the world closer together.

Gen. David Sarnoff, chairman of the Radio Corporation of America, predicts: "Ten years hence there will be TV stations in virtually every nation on the earth. An audience of a billion might then be watching the same program at the same time. The instrument which will give television's second epoch this distinctive global character is satellite relay transmission."

According to Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, chairman of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, satellites can increase present world communications capacity by a factor of 10,000.

Project TIROS

NASA is developing meteorological satellites to provide worldwide observation of atmospheric elements -- the data meteorologists must have to understand atmospheric processes and to predict the weather. TIROS I, launched April 1, 1960, was the first step toward an operational meteorological satellite system. The highly successful satellite, orbiting at altitudes averaging 450 miles, transmitted 22,952 television pictures of the earth's cloud patterns. This afforded meteorologists unprecedented opportunities to relate the earth's cloud cover to weather observations from the ground.

Within 60 hours after the first TIROS was in orbit, its reports were being applied to day-to-day weather forecasting. In Hawaii, TIROS pictures helped trace the monsoons. Data on storms in the Indian Ocean were used by Australian meteorologists.

TIROS II, launched last November, reported important information about the atmosphere and the radiation of solar heat back from the earth into space.

NASA is receiving excellent cloud pictures and infrared data from the weather satellite TIROS III, launched July 12. Orbited to coincide with the hurricane season, the satellite has been gathering information on the origin, development, and movement of these massive tropical storms. The Weather Bureau has employed TIROS III pictures to help analyze and track Storm Eliza in the Pacific and Hurricane Anna in the Atlantic.

Japanese weathermen have made good use of TIROS III data supplied by the U. S. Weather Bureau. According to the chief of Japan's weather bureau, the information was valuable in plotting tropical storms. He stated that weather satellites would open a new era in forecasting typhoons, from which Japan has suffered so heavily in the past.

NASA used TIROS III for weather support of Astronaut Grissom's July 21 Mercury suborbital flight. Twice a day as the satellite passed over the Caribbean, one of its two TV cameras was triggered to report weather conditions in the area of the flight.

According to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, "An improvement of only 10 percent in accuracy (of weather forecasting) could result in savings totaling hundreds of millions of dollars annually to farmers, builders, airlines, shipping, the tourist trade, and many other enterprises."

IV

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

NASA's international activities began shortly after the agency was organized. In November 1958, an Office of International Programs was established to plan programs and oversee their accomplishment.

International Satellite Projects

In March 1959, the United States pledged that it would support projects for orbiting individual experiments or complete satellite payloads, of mutual interest, prepared by scientists of other nations. Subsequently, NASA has repeated its readiness to make available launching vehicles, spacecraft, technical guidance, and laboratory support for valid scientific experiments or payloads developed by scientists abroad. Launching vehicles provided by NASA may be one of several types, including Scout, a versatile solid-propellant, four-stage rocket capable of earth-orbiting payloads of from 50 to 150 pounds.

The first satellites under this program are being prepared by the United Kingdom and Canada. The U.K. satellite will carry devices to study electron temperatures and concentrations in the ionosphere, and instruments to determine electron densities in the vicinity of the satellite, to measure solar radiation and correlate it with ionospheric phenomena, and to observe primary cosmic rays and study their interactions with the earth's magnetic field. The payload will weigh about 170 pounds; a Scout vehicle will launch it.

Experiments were selected by scientists of the United Kingdom in consultation with NASA scientists. U.K. scientists are building the experiments. They will also be responsible for data analysis. NASA will design, fabricate, and test the prototype and flight models.

Work on a second U.S.-U.K. satellite began recently.

The Canadian project centers around a "Topside Sounder" satellite, which will be employed to study the upper ionosphere by radio-echo sounding -- a technique, similar to radar, used for years to study the lower portions of the ionosphere. The nature of the ionosphere makes it impossible to obtain information about its upper reaches from the ground because radar pulses penetrate the region and continue on into space instead of reflecting back to earth. The Topside Sounder will be the first attempt to apply radio-echo sounding of the ionosphere's top surface from above. The satellite (which has been christened "Alouette" by Canada) is being funded and built by Canada. The United States will supply the Thor-Agena launching vehicle.

The first U.K.-U.S. satellite and the Canada-U.S. Alouette will both be launched by NASA early in 1962.

Several other governments have expressed interest in cooperative satellite projects.

NASA's design and test requirements for such projects call for the closest relationships between scientists of the participating nations. For example, in the satellite program with the United Kingdom, a joint U.S.-British working group meets regularly to resolve technical problems. A similar group of U.S. and Canadian scientists serves the Alouette Topside Sounder program.

International Sounding Rocket Program

Cooperative space research is by no means limited to expensive satellite projects. Much valuable information about the earth's atmospheric envolope and its near-space environment has been gained from experiments carried aloft by relatively cheap and uncomplicated sounding rockets.

NASA is cooperating with a number of nations which are conducting scientific investigations with sounding rockets. And discussions now in progress may lead to additional projects of this nature.

Typical of such programs is the joint NASA-Italian Space Committee sounding-rocket effort. In this program rockets are used to release glowing clouds of sodium vapor at altitudes of 50 to 120 miles to measure winds and temperatures at the fringes of the atmosphere. The information obtained not only has basic scientific value but contributes as well to better understanding of basic weather phenomena.

In January and April this year, there were sodium-vapor rocket launchings from Sardinia. More are planned for the near future. During the April series, coordinated launchings were made from NASA's Wallops Island Station and the information obtained is being compared.

The Italian Space Committee purchased the rockets and built the Sardinian launching site. It conducts the launchings there, provides the instruments to gather the data, and reduces it to usable form. NASA contributed the rocket launcher, the payloads, and technical advice throughout.

Sweden and Norway also have active sounding rocket programs in which NASA is cooperating and sharing in the scientific results. Sweden recently successfully launched the first rocket in this program. The activities of Sweden are directed toward learning more about night-glowing clouds at high altitudes, while Norway plans to study phenomena of the ionosphere above northern regions.

Australia's Woomera Range is the site of a unique three-nation effort, with Australians firing British Skylark rockets carrying NASA experiments to survey sources of ultraviolet radiation in Southern Hemisphere skies.

In other joint programs under consideration, NASA may contribute the rockets and the cooperating nations the payloads, or vice versa. The method of cooperation is flexible and total costs need not be great. For this reason, sounding rocket programs will probably continue to have a large role in cooperative space activities.

Guidelines

In formulating and carrying out cooperative satellite and sounding rocket projects, NASA observes these guidelines:

1. To insure that promise does not exceed fulfillment, NASA defines proposed international projects through informal technical discussion before entering into cooperative agreements. This procedure also makes certain that projects proposed have valid scientific content so that support, related to NASA's own programs, can be provided.

2. Proposals must be specific and reflect mutual interests and capabilities. Ideally, they are for experiments or other projects that NASA itself would carry out if the project were not to be done jointly.

3. Because many individual and agency interests are involved in space research abroad (as in this country), the importance of adequate, sustained support for costly programs requires that international projects be sponsored or supported centrally by the cooperating governments.

4. Early in the program, the role of United States financing in NASA's international programs had to be faced. It was decided that both political and scientific objectives would best be served if cooperative programs were carried out without exchange of funds between nations. Therefore, each nation funds the portion of a given cooperative program that represents commitments of its own personnel or material.

5. Scientific results of cooperative enterprises are made available to the scientific community, consistent with the interests of the prime experimenters in publishing the results of their own work.

Ground-Based Support

The most useful contribution to space research within the present capabilities of scientists abroad may for some time lie in supporting research conducted from the ground. A program of this type was arranged in connection with Project Echo. The first receipt of a transatlantic transmission from the U.S., employing Echo as a reflector, was reported by the French National Telecommunications Establishment. The first transatlantic voice message via the satellite was received in England. Surprisingly, representatives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences organized a visual tracking program and supplied a number of observations to the United States.

NASA organized a more extensive program jointly with the U.S. Weather Bureau in connection with TIROS II. Foreign weather services were invited to conduct local meteorological observations, synchronized with passes of the satellite, and to analyze and compare the data. Although TIROS II instrumentation difficulties restricted the program, an organizational precedent was established which was implemented this summar during a special nine weeks of international participation in the TIROS III satellite experiment.

NASA and the U.S. Weather Bureau planned the program to permit global meteorological observations by more than 100 weather services in synchronization with passes of TIROS III. It constitutes an important forward step toward developing an operational worldwide meteorological satellite system. In addition to this program, the Weather Bureau immediately transmits the results of its analyses of the TIROS photographs over international weather communications networks.

NASA and the Weather Bureau are also sponsoring an International Meteorological Satellite Workshop, November 13-22. Meteorologists from more than 100 foreign weather services have been invited to participate in lectures, laboratory sessions, and in visits to the TIROS satellite data receiving station at Wallops Island and to the Weather Bureau's Meteorological Satellite Laboratory.

Participation in Future Communications Satellite Experiments

Representatives of NASA, the British General Post Office, and the French Center for Communications have signed agreements for participation in NASA's coming Rebound and Relay satellite experiments. (Rebound is an advanced "passive" communications satellite of the Echo type. Relay is an "active" or "repeater" communications satellite noted earlier in this paper.) The British and French organizations have agreed to construct ground terminals at their own expense for receiving and transmitting telephone, telegraph, and television signals via the satellites.

Overseas Facilities

NASA operates, or has made arrangements to use, tracking and/or communications stations in 19 foreign countries.

Of 27 overseas facilities, nearly two-thirds are operated wholly or in part by local staffs. In several cases, governments of cooperating countries are footing the entire operating costs of their units in the NASA global network. To increase this kind of participation, NASA has instituted a training program for foreign tracking and communications station technicians.

Jodrell Bank, a giant British radio telescope facility of the University of Manchester, assists NASA in space experiments, under contract. The telescope maintained contact with Pioneer V until it was 22.5 million miles from earth. Jodrell Bank was the only tracking facility in the free world capable of receiving signals from Pioneer V's five-watt transmitter beyond about 10 million miles. It has been used to track all NASA satellites and space probes. Operation of Jodrell Bank has created wide interest abroad in the possibility of establishing advanced radio telescope programs -- particularly in France, Italy, Japan, and Germany. NASA is furnishing interested foreign agencies with design suggestions for building new radio-telescope tracking facilities.

Technical Training

Scientific groups entering space research may need technical advice and experience. A post-doctoral program, funded by NASA and administered by the National Academy of Sciences, makes it possible for foreign as well as U.S. scientists to pursue space-connected projects in this country. In another program, NASA is offering laboratory support and training for extended periods to qualified scientists sponsored by their governments.

International University Program

NASA has established a new International University Program for gifted graduate students from a number of countries. They will study and conduct research in the space sciences at U.S. universities. Pilot programs have been arranged at the State University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Colorado, and Columbia University. Ten to 20 students will start their projects during the 1961-62 academic year. All major U.S. universities engaged in space sciences will be invited to participate in the full program, beginning with the 1962-63 academic year and involving more than 100 foreign students.

Data and Information Exchange

Scientific data from NASA space research is circulated internationally through:

1) Dispatch of preliminary technical information to COSPAR shortly after rockets and satellites are launched.

2) Regular transmittal of satellite orbit and observation data through the international SPACEWARN system.

3) Publication of preliminary scientific results and the deposit of results in the World Data Centers established during the International Geophysical Year.

4) Agreements with experimenters abroad to provide the results required.

5) Publication for world use, of telemetry calibrations where useful.

6) Exchanges of scientific personnel in support of cooperative activities.

Cooperation with International Organizations

NASA maintains close and effective liaison, either directly or through appropriate agencies, with international organizations to assure adequate consideration of United States interests and effective support for peaceful international cooperation. These organizations include the United Nations, COSPAR, NATO, and the regional organizations emerging for cooperative space efforts in Europe and Latin America.

Roles of COSPAR and the United Nations

In all NASA cooperative programs, prime experimenters are provided opportunities to publish their data. The data is made freely available through the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) and the World Data Centers. As an organism of the scientific community, COSPAR serves to: focus the objectives of international space research programs, provide a forum for research coordination, and supply a mechanism for exchange of the information resulting.

On a governmental level, the principal forum for international cooperation in space activities is the United Nations. In 1959, an Ad Hoc Committee of the UN recommended that the UN consider: first, how it might facilitate international cooperation in space and second, what legal problems should be given attention. The legal problems that have been suggested relate to defining the limits and use of national air space, liability for damages, claims upon celestial bodies, and the like.

Opinions differ as to whether these questions are urgent. In any case, by July 1959 the Ad Hoc Committee noted that "countries throughout the world (have) proceeded on the premise of permissibility of the launching and flight of space vehicles which were launched (during the IGY), regardless of what territory they 'passed over' during the course of their flight through outer space." The Committee concluded, "that, with this practice, there may have been initiated the recognition or establishment of a generally accepted rule to the effect that, in principle, outer space, on conditions of equality, is freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with existing or future international law or agreements."

More than 50 earth satellites have now been placed in orbit, repeatedly passing over the territory of every nation on earth. No permission was sought in advance; none was expressly given by any state.

On the extremely important question of reserving space for peaceful purposes, the United States has proposed that all nations agree to ban weapons of mass destruction from orbiting satellites. However, consideration of the entire question of space by the UN has been delayed for more than a year by differences between the East and West in organizing a permanent committee for the purpose. The issue remains deadlocked.

Through IGY and COSPAR, scientists made the first effective proposals for satellite projects and created a most important precedent. The UN, on the other hand, has so far been frustrated in its efforts to contribute to international cooperation in space activities.

V

CONCLUSION

The foregoing should clearly demonstrate the substantive nature of the United States-NASA program which is stimulating the development of space research in nearly two dozen countries throughout the world, by:

1) Providing opportunities to foreign scientists to have their own experiments flown in our rockets and satellites.

2) Enlisting the talents and skills of scientists abroad in ground-based programs directly related to U.S. orbiting experiments (especially in the highly promising fields of communications and meteorological research by satellite).

3) Enabling foreign scientists and technicians to share in the operation of most U.S. global satellite tracking stations.

4) Opening up valuable training opportunities to foreign scientists in U.S. centers and universities for work directly connected with space research projects and operations.

This type of "hard" program is essential to international cooperation in space research. For, in this most advanced of technologies, technicians must carefully evaluate all proposals and provide for implementation of the feasible and useful ones through intimate associations, in order to meet the stringent requirements of systems compatibility.

Happily, the countries of Europe, stimulated by these opportunities and the broad technological and scientific challenges and obligations of space research, are now planning to organize substantive cooperative programs of their own. The United States welcomes these new centers of cooperation and will assist to the best of its ability in any sound scientific enterprises they may plan and in which they desire us to take part. This also holds true for Latin American and Pacific nations.

And what of the future?

NASA will continue to make available opportunities for joint projects, research, and training. New and promising international developments will follow from our communications and weather satellite programs, which are already in progress. Thus, the United States is making international cooperation in space a living fact. For the welfare of mankind, all practitioners of space research should do the same.

It is highly regrettable that opportunities for truly international cooperation in space research are hampered by the prevailing world political situation. The Soviet Union talks of the "advisability of international coordination of the efforts of all states and nations..." and suggests that "...it is natural and inevitable that the Soviet Union should rightly play the leading part in the international efforts in space research." Nevertheless, the USSR has increasingly subjected space activities to political opportunism, even attacking the completely open TIROS meteorological satellite program, although the USSR and other nations have been invited to share in TIROS cloud-cover data. Indeed, the USSR was invited to participate in the program.

In spite of the present state of affairs, NASA will continue its efforts to extend international cooperation to all nations, including the USSR. President Kennedy has pledged that "we are going to continue to attempt to engage the Soviet Union in a common (space) activity."

Science is one human activity that should be independent of political boundaries. Response to NASA's program of joint space research has proven that, if given the chance, men and women of different nations and varying social and political beliefs can collaborate scientifically with enthusiasm and with growing understanding.

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DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: A NEW FOCUS FOR RESEARCH

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In succession, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy have called for a massive effort on the part of the American people to assist the less developed countries of the world. Several billion dollars are spent on these efforts each year. As the scope of technical assistance and economic aid broadened, academic disciplines found new areas for research. First in line was development economics, symbolizing the age of planning and the dominance of economists in public policy. The sociologists and social workers embraced something they called community development, although they were not quite sure what the term meant. The educationists and the political scientists, true to their traditions, were among the last to react, but in the last few years development education, development politics, and, finally, development administration have become popular terms.

The Meaning of Development Administration. Like the sociologists, the public administrationists have not been quite sure of the meaning of their new term. Some have confused it with administrative development, or the changes and growth that take place in public administration in any country. Others have taken on the philosophy of the White Man's Burden, and believe development administration to refer to the problems of public administration in the less developed countries of the world. A variation of the same theme looks upon development administration as designating those changes in an administrative system that are necessary for modernization of a backward country. Some administrationists, feeling insecure and inadequate against the onslought of the economists, have seen development administration as referring to the administration of economic development programs. Others have countered by pointing out that there is social and political development to consider, also, and have suggested that the term therefore applies to all internal and domestic services of government. The foreign and defense policy critic has then suggested that in this modern world perhaps the greatest development need of all lies in the area of international relations and armaments. And who is to dispute him!

Most of these would-be definitions have at least one element in common: they are describing an action-oriented, goal-oriented administrative system. More precisely, in Lasswell's terminology they are pointing to programmatic values, not those of expediency. There is something special about these programmatic values that makes them developmental. It is the forward look rather than the lament for the good old days. Development has many aspects: the increase in per capita income, the improvement of health standards, the decrease of illiteracy, or the strengthening of democratic institutions. No two persons will agree exactly as to what elements go to make up development. Nor need we strike out for a master plan of development to which all men of good will can subscribe. The important thing for the study of development administration is that in some authoritative manner, development goals--singly, or in pairs, or in large bundles--be set forth for a government, be it international, national, state, or local. If there are no development goals, there is no development administration. The lack of development goals prevails more frequently than is commonly admitted.

Development administration is the means of selecting and accomplishing progressive political, economic, and social objectives that are authoritatively determined in one manner or another. The focus is on a single kind of value. There are many other kinds of values that compete for men's allegiances both of an expediency and programmatic nature. From a development administration point of view, expediency values can be unrelated to development objectives, inconsistent with them, or supportive of them. Similarly, other programmatic values will be unrelated, inconsistent, or supportive of particular development objectives. Development administration must not be based upon an assumption of a unity or a polarity of values, but rather an effort must be made to seek out the relation of one value to another.

Countries vary widely in their achievements of today and in their hopes for tomorrow, and hence they approach development from different perspectives. One of the most unfortunate aspects of such terms as the less developed or the underdeveloped countries is that they imply that a large group of countries have similar characteristics. The discovery of similarities is inversely related to the strength of the microscope used. While few students in the classroom taking a matching test would fail to group the United States and the United Kingdom if the alternatives were Bolivia and the Congo, the development administrationist would be sadly mistaken if he believed that development policy and technique should be or are the same in the latter two. Some countries have virtually no development orientation. Some seek to slow down change (e.g., following periods of violent revolution), some to reach a stable rate of change, and others to accelerate the rate. Since each nation of the world starts from a different development base, the possible combination of circumstances is infinite in number.

There are also wide differences in group and individual support for development within each country. Which groups and leaders seek what development goals? More pertinently, what is the role of the bureaucracy (especially in comparison to the role of other parts of the government or society) in the original formulation and later modification and refinement of development values? Many different patterns can be found, from near unanimous agreement on objectives to almost complete lack of agreement. Variations in the role of the bureaucracy are equally great. After identifying patterns, the student of development administration is concerned with which patterns under what conditions seem to lead most fully to the achievement of development objectives.

As an academic area of enquiry, development administration is thus an aspect of public administration that is centrally concerned with one of the many values men seek and which varies in the strength and kind of allegiance it commands country to country, group to group, and person to person. The social scientist's task is to go beyond identification and classification of differences, however. Unless certain similarities can be found, the basis for generalization will not be established. There is both a need to be sensitive to the many differences and at the same time to be aware of broad similarities so as to make cross-cultural generalizations possible. The task is not easy.

The essence of the development process is ordered change of a certain kind. Development administration can fruitfully be related to the study of innovation in administration, the study of social change, and the study of creativity. Several of the social sciences have already made substantial contributions to these areas. Reciprocally, the student of innovation,

social change, or creativity will find much in development administration that will interest him, but development administration itself is illustrative of only one kind of innovation, change, or creativity.

Foci of Research in Public Administration. The meaning of development administration for research scholars in public administration becomes more evident upon review of the foci of the research in public administration over the last several decades. Much of the attention of scholars has been on how to turn the rascals out, or, if they are out, how to keep them that way. This focus has been especially common among specialists in personnel administration and state and local government, and particularly typified much of the research at the turn of the century and again in the 1930s, when examination of corruption and boss rule was so popular. Reform is a continuing theme in administration in the United States, and organizations such as the National Municipal League help to keep it alive and vital. The approach of many Americans toward administration in less developed countries is one of turning out the rascals.

The positive side of the coin of reform is an insistence upon the discovery of good principles of public administration and on administrative reorganization. Perhaps the greatest emphasis on this aspect of research came from the 1920s through the 1940s. It is far from dead. Indeed, as this is being written, the State of Michigan is marshalling its talent in public administration and related fields in order to prepare for a constitutional convention, where, hopefully, "the best practice" in public administration will be discerned and reflected in the suggestions prepared for electorate consideration. Be it a constitutional convention, a charter commission, a Presidential task force, or a technical assistance program abroad, scholars in public administration still expend a good share of their research energies on how the principles of public administration can best be incorporated into particular administrative reorganizations.

The old efficiency and economy school of thought is not yet dead, and it has had periods of ascendancy, especially in the first two decades of the century and in the 1930s. Overlapping with the notions of turning the rascals out and following good principles of public administration, the efficiency and economy school has always defined good principles as those that lead to the most efficiency and economy. Many of the representatives abroad of the United Nations Office of Public Administration, the Public Administration Division of the International Cooperation Administration, and of public administration programs of American universities have sought to vest the less developed countries with concepts of efficiency and economy and practices consistent therewith.

Scholars in public administration have been amazingly devoted to description, often for description's sake alone. The universities rightly jealously guard their claim to knowledge for knowledge's sake. Description, knowledge, understanding,--these are basic to academic objectives. In the last decade many fine descriptions of public administration in the less developed countries have come forth, adding substantially to our store of knowledge.

The rise of behavioral science has affected research in public administration as well as research in other aspects of the social sciences. This new emphasis accounts for an extensive literature in the human relations aspects of public administration. The behavioral scientists have also been model-conscious, as the sessions in comparative administration that are a major

part of this conference so amply illustrate. A number of research studies in human relations in administration have been forthcoming from university technical assistance programs overseas. A series of models of administrative systems, particularly relevant to some of the less developed countries, have come from the experience of such scholars as Fred Riggs in Thailand and the Philippines and John Dorsey in Viet Nam.

An exceedingly small portion of research in public administration has been devoted to particular services of government, such as agriculture, education, or social security. Administrative problems of these services have been occasional thesis topics, but have not been the center of scholars' attention over the years. There are a few exceptions. The interest of John Gaus in the USDA has been one. Some interest in social security in the 1930s, some interest in education, especially the independent school district controversy, and some interest in natural resources have inspired a few books and monographs. Overseas, very little interest has been shown in particular functional ministries by the public administration experts attached to technical assistance projects.

As a process, development administration offers the opportunity of further exploration and study to scholars following any one of the six most common foci for research in public administration. From the most basic to the most applied, the interests in public administration scholarship can be channelled toward development administration. Models can be built, descriptions completed, reforms explored, principles tested, efficiency and economy pursued. All such research can be highly useful to the practitioner and scholar in development administration as well as to the scholar whose main interest lies elsewhere.

However, there is an important difference between development administration as a process, and development administration as a focus of research in its own right. The difference is one of a policy orientation, a particular kind of policy orientation, as contrasted to just another fertile field for collecting research data. Public administration both in its practice and in its scholarship has been distinguished by the fact that it has had almost no relationship to substantive policy. Practitioners and scholars have been primarily concerned with personnel, budgeting, and organization and management. The problem that has interested them is how to make these tools more effective, in a narrow sense. The test of effectiveness has been largely an internal one: how much control is exercised and how much efficiency and economy is enforced by the personnel, budget, and O and M agencies. Public administration has not been a part of the policy sciences in the broadest sense of the latter term. Public administration has glorified the means and forgotten the ends.

While it is to be hoped that development administration as a process can serve as a fertile field for research for scholars with many different kinds of interest, there is a need for a group of scholars to adopt development administration as a separate focus for research. As a part of the policy sciences, the end-object of such research would be to relate different administrative roles, practices, organizational arrangements, and procedures to the maximizing of development objectives. Interest in personnel, budgeting, and O and M would be confined to a study of the manner in which these aspects of administration contribute to or negate development. In research terms, the ultimate dependent variables would be the development goals themselves.

If this be the focus of a part of the research in public administration, new vistas present themselves even in the much-studied administrative system of the United States. Little is known about public administration's relationship to the development of the United States, past, present, and future. To assume, as some have done, that the relationship is clear and that the same patterns that were used in the United States are applicable abroad is exceedingly dangerous in both respects. A new approach toward personnel administration, budgeting, and organization and methods is called for, an approach that seeks to establish a relationship between such activities and the development ends of government. It may be that some of the time-worn principles and clichés will not stand the test of relevance to promoting such goals, in which case a problem of priority of values presents itself.

An assumption behind development administration is that man is at least partly a rational human being, and that he can select among a variety of goals those to which he wishes to give priority. It is further assumed that he can then select means that will help him maximize the possibility of attaining these goals. But it is not assumed that every country in the less developed category is committed partially or completely to a course of development. Values are to be discerned, not postulated.[1] It may be, as Willard Hanna has suggested, that in Indonesia the quality of leadership that attracts attention is still the force of personality, not hard, grinding nation-building efforts. Yet no one can seriously deny that development is one of the more important values sought by human beings the world around in the 1960s. Scholars in public administration can do much to facilitate its achievement by adopting development administration as a focus of research.

Some Limitations of Existing Models or Frameworks. A new focus for research does not necessarily require new theoretical models, although it will require new applications of the models, and will suggest new areas for theory-building. There are many models extant in comparative public administration, from Max Weber to the several contributions of Fred Riggs. A number of them are rather broad, general, and inclusive.

One of the limitations of most of the existing models lies in their handling of social change. Two main methods have been adopted. One has been to limit the handling of change to that possible within the concept of a self-sustaining system or equilibrium theory.[2] Such treatment of change limits a model's applicability to development administration. In essence, development administration has two aspects: a kind of moving goal that is never reached and administration or stimulation of continual change toward it. A much less conservative treatment of change is called for than is possible under self-sustaining system or equilibrium theories. Major development efforts specifically try to upset self-sustaining systems and equilibriums.

A second way in which social change has been handled is to think of development as particularly connected with the less developed countries and to label these countries as transitional societies and presumably the change as transitional change. The teleological problem that the term transitional introduces is of vast proportions. Presumably these countries are going from one kind of society, labelled traditional, to another kind, labelled industrial. The situation smacks of the most complete sort of determinism. Nor does it help to broaden the alternatives by suggesting that there may be two or three kinds of industrial society. The term transitional is basically at fault. Models making use of the idea of transitional change are not designed for the study of continual change. They are not based on

the idea of rational behavior that involves choices among alternatives. Presumably, the most advanced industrial societies cannot change at all. While it is obvious that rigidities have crept into American society, it would be dangerous and self-suicidal to suggest that rapid change is not for us and is confined to the "transitional" societies. The problem of the United States is exactly how to institutionalize a rapidly-increasing rate of orderly, progressive change.

Another difficulty of applying some of the more advanced theoretical models in comparative administration to development administration research is that in some cases they involve a definition of rationality that makes rationality virtually meaningless from an operational standpoint. The problem in development administration is how to get results, not how to conform to a predetermined set of criteria of rationality. In terms of the development administration process, what is rational is the means that get the results desired. As Blau has clearly said, "To administer a social organization according to purely technical criteria of rationality is irrational, because it ignores the nonrational aspects of social conduct."[3] Merton has made the same point in different language by arguing that bureaucratization involves rationality of procedure within limited contexts.[4] Is corruption irrational? Most interpreters of Weber would argue the affirmative. However, looking at the American development experience, it is patent that corruption played an important facilitative role. Similarly, corruption of favoritism has played an important facilitative role in Indian, Mexican, and Brazilian development in recent years. It is of course possible to construct a theoretical system of human behavior that has its own assumptions about rationality. However, such a system is likely to be so far from reality that it cannot serve as an effective means of measuring or understanding reality, and it certainly would provide no guides to action. The problem of ethics in the public service is a real one, but there are no simple answers based upon an abstract rationality.

In addition to rationality, most theories of bureaucracy concentrate on the importance of a neutralized, professionalized civil service as an essential element of modern bureaucracy. Apter suggests that a disinterested or neutral public service is a recognized norm.[5] Merton argues for universalistic recruitment patterns.[6] Here is a clear case of mutually contradictory criteria being incorporated into theories of bureaucracy. Professionalization and neutralization are basically incompatible concepts today. Historically, both ideas became popular in the late nineteenth century. Professionalization seemed to imply a kind of objectivity in social policy as opposed to the spoils or family-influenced decision. The city mangger of Newburgh, New York, has discovered something that the model builders in comparative administration have not, namely, that the products of the professional schools in the United States are far from neutral. We need not indorse his welfare policy but we must heed his conclusion that from here on in he will not hire any graduate social workers for his city because they are prejudiced and obstruct the policy he wishes to implement. If public administrationists were not so isolated from the professions that provide personnel for the line agencies, they would long since have discovered that professionalization is to an important extent a process of indoctrination. The professional schools of the university are at the center, and have direct liaison with the practitioners, professional societies, and clientel groups. Their object is in part to maximize the services of the profession and this means in public administration terms to extend the public service involved. Governments

trying to push development find ready allies in the professions, but they do not find neutral civil servants.[7]

Another point of concern of theories of bureaucracy has been the extent to which hierarchy and discretion are characteristics of modern bureaucracy.[8] Actually, hierarchy and discretion are to a considerable extent contradictory. From a development administration standpoint, the important thing is not the argument over the proper balance between initiative and obedience that is supposed to characterize modern bureaucracy, but rather which gets the job done the best under the particular development circumstances that prevail. Sometimes more hierarchical control will be necessary, sometimes more delegation. It depends in part on whether the superior has a greater or lesser devotion to development objectives than his subordinates.

The variables or nets that have been put forth as important for comparative administration have on occasion been exceedingly extensive. One of the most inclusive was that developed by the Subcommittee on Comparative Public Administration of the American Political Science Association in 1953.[9] Fred Riggs in many of his writings has been encyclopedic.[10] Almond and Coleman suggest a wide range of variables.[11] Undoubtedly the subject with which we are confronted is complex and the variables many, but the practical research problem is to seek simplicity so that limited studies can be made in two or more countries without lifetimes of research. There must be a selection of a limited number of variables at a modest theoretical level. Some of the extensive nets permit of such selection, while some models include many variables in a manner that makes their separation for research purposes difficult. As a whole, most authors seem to favor simpler research and experimentation. For example, Presthus argues for middle-range theory.[12] Heady and Siffin see a need for experimentation with the various models at an operational level.[13]

In summary, the models that are frequently used in comparative public administration are limited in their usefulness for development administration by the fact that they lack a focus on change, are not goal-oriented, take inadequate account of the pluralism of alternatives in the world, and characterize modern bureaucracy in very inaccurate ways. In addition, some of them have been overly all-inclusive in their dimensions and at such an abstract level that they have not been operational.[14]

A Suggested Typology. Actually, the most productive work in development administration research is likely to be carried out through the use of rather modest additions to our systems of classification and through typologies, rather than through extensive and all-inclusive models. Whether it be low-level or middle-level theory or simple classification or typology, this kind of undertaking is essential if we are to bridge the gap between development problems and technical assistance on the one hand, and empirical research and involved conceptual schemes on the other. Broad yet rather simple classifications and typologies are compatible to a limited extent with the use of more complicated models, and hence a researcher can adopt as extensive a theoretical framework as his research allows and requires.

Since development administration is distinctive in regard to its objectives, a series of types of administrative systems, based upon the predominant value or goal being sought, may prove very useful. A sketch of one such typology that could be developed follows as an illustration.

Development as a goal can be pursued either by government or by the private sector or by both. In terms of the government's role in development, one of four situations can obtain. The objective can be a great increase in the rate of growth in the economic, political, and social spheres. In such a case we can speak of a production-oriented government. The major goal of such a government is a great expansion in the capacity of the society to provide goods and services in the broadest sense of these terms. Mainland China and India are current examples of governments primarily committed to production.

Other governments are more committed to maintaining a relatively stable rate of growth. They are primarily consumption-oriented. The role of government in such instances is the provider of goods and services, and the goal is the maximization of consumption. Two distinct sub-types appear. Some consumption-oriented governments primarily emphasize various physical services of government, such as the provision of streets and highways, the building of airports, or the redevelopment of the business districts of cities. By their nature, such services help add to the capital of a country at the same time they provide a service to its citizens. The physical service sub-type is much closer to the production-oriented government than the social-service government. In the latter case, the emphasis is on services directly to the people themselves, such as education, social welfare, or public health. The importance of distinguishing between the physical services and social services sub-types lies in the fact that different kinds of administrators and clientel groups with different kinds of values are attached to each general area.[15] Current examples of consumption-oriented governments are many of the state governments in the United States.

A special kind of value in development is characteristic of the defense-oriented government. Change is encouraged to the extent that it provides additional strength against real or imagined external threats. Most of the major powers of the world have followed in this path in greater or lesser degree.

There are governments that are not committed in any substantial way to growth in the economic, political or social spheres. Such governments tend to be law and order-oriented. Emphasis is upon control of the population and making sure that no one gets out of line. Roles in such a society are givens that should not be changed. Change is looked upon as inherently bad. Growth may even be feared. The major value in such a society is power. Most of the colonial governments were of the law and order type predominantly, and several of the least progressive Latin American governments are current examples.

Finally, there are societies in which economic, political, and social development is beside the point, where other values hold the center of the stage and growth is considered neither good or bad. Two or three sub-types are present in these non-development-oriented societies. There is the government that is primarily concerned with the balancing of interests and forces within society. There is the government that is primarily concerned with spoils. And there may be governments primarily concerned with efficiency and economy, although such governments are probably not of a distinctive sub-type; efficiency and economy may be merely residual or purely secondary values. Most efficiency and economy governments are probably primarily balancers of interests.

Since the world is pluralistic, very seldom does a single value monopolize the attention of a government. Consequently, to the extent that a typology such as that suggested here were used, it would rest upon ideal-types since most governments and societies embrace a combination of goals. However, the typology would be useful in helping to discern major tendencies and the consequences flowing therefrom. It is apparent that some governments emphasize one value more than other governments do. What is the meaning of this fact for public administration? This is a question that, up to now, has for the most part gone unraised and unanswered. If it were answered, the administrative consequences of changing major values would be more evident.

The role of government may not accurately indicate the attitude of society as a whole toward development. The role of government may be small or large in the development of a country. The suggested typology allows for this situation. In public administration the principal concern is with the role of the public bureaucracy. For example, if the role of government is primarily confined to a balancer of interests and the private sector is rather completely committed to rapid development, it would be representative of one type. As soon as the government begins to assist the private sector in development, a new value and role are introduced and such a government would be representative of a different type or combination of types.

One of the difficulties of any typology is that of operationalizing it. Can indices be found that will indicate when a government is pursuing one or another of the goals? The major expenditures of a government would reflect its emphasis upon production, consumption (both sub-types), defense, and law and order. Distinguishing the non-development-oriented governments be they of the spoils, balancing, or efficiency and economy sub-types would be more difficult. However, the allocation of government expenditures together with public statements of the government of the day and its political opposition, if any, would give at least some objective basis for classification.

The typology suggested is simple. It is based upon empirically verifiable differences. The number of variables that can be examined with it can be as few or as many as the researcher would like. It is fundamentally a useful tool in making rather simple generalizations or in constructing middle-range theory, although there is no a priori reason why it could not also be built upon for more advanced theory in the future. In basic structure it is not complex. Compared to the all-encompassing models that Fred Riggs has given us, it is a mere outline. While models such as those of Riggs are valuable in furthering theory development in comparative administration, they are not very useful for the more practical and precise requirements of development administration.

The suggested typology presents two types of governments that concentrate on programmatic values, those that are production and consumption-oriented. The other three are primarily concerned with expediency values. Thus in the broad values represented in it, the typology would seem to be reasonable.

The typology moves away from the easy and false dichotomy between traditional and industrial societies. It recognizes that there may be several major kinds of objectives that underlie governments of either the so-called traditional and industrial societies. Rather than positing certain values for a society, the present typology simply classifies governments on the

basis of the major values actually held. It can therefore be put to greater operational use, especially in regard to administrative characteristics of development-minded governments. As a consequence of classifying governments according to their principal goals, the typology pushes the researcher in the direction of closely relating administration and the ends of government. No longer would the science of the means assume administrative self-sufficiency or retreat into statements about the bureaucracy's inherent neutrality. Neutrality and self-sufficiency become items to test empirically.

Such a typology avoids the pitfall of assuming that only one type of bureaucracy exists and that it is somehow associated with industrial society. Morroe Berger got into this difficulty in studying Egypt.[16] Actually, it is possible that bureaucratic characteristics vary with the major goals and values of a government, even over rather short periods of time. Whether they do or not is an empirical question, but in the selection of a classification, typology, or model, it would be wise to allow for empirical investigation of such an item. The whole sub-field of development administration is based upon the assumption that there are at least some unique or different qualities to public administration in a production-oriented government. Productive research in development administration would not be possible with a model that is based upon an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of Weber, such as Berger used.

Closely related to the assumption that there is one kind of bureaucracy is the equally dangerous assumption that there is one kind of bureaucracy that will maximize development everywhere and under any conditions. Much of the technical assistance in public administration has been based, at least implicitly, upon this assumption. Bureaucratic structures and procedures associated with production-oriented governments may have certain similarities compared to other bureaucracies, but they may have important ranges of differences as well. Again, this becomes an empirical question.

Applying the Typology. An example of the usefulness of the typology occurs in the much-maligned and blighted field of personnel administration. If the assumption is sound that administrative characteristics vary with the major goals of governments, it would follow that differences in public employees should be present in each of the major kinds of government. For instance, the type of employee that a production-oriented government finds most useful should be different from the type of employee that a law and order-oriented government prizes. It is more accurate to speak of the main types or the mixture or balance of types, since any government with hundreds of thousands or millions of employees will in all likelihood have some employees of each major type.

A classification of the roles of public employees is required for enquiry into such an area. Concentrating on the administrative, professional, and technical employees, at least five major roles can be discerned: innovation, leadership, administrative processes or routine, specialized or technical expertise, and political or administrative liaison. It may be assumed that in all probability at least some of each of these roles is performed in any large bureaucracy. It would greatly add to theory-building to know if and to what extent the balance of roles performed varies in governments with different major purposes. From a practical standpoint, it would help the practitioner who wants to recruit and hire employees to have some knowledge of the balance of roles in different kinds of government. He would no longer have to pretend to go through the blind man's bluff game of simply

hiring the "best" person, on some psuedo-objective basis. Professional and personal criteria would be supplemented by criteria as to role. The technical assistance expert would be able to advise host governments more effectively if the major purpose of the host government could be related to the types of employees necessary to perform a particular balance of roles.

As a preliminary proposition, it would seem likely that the production-oriented government would have a far greater proportion of innovation and leadership roles than the law and order government. To return to the city of Newburgh, it would seem that Newburgh does not want leaders or innovators, but would like persons skilled in administrative routine and political liaison. However, the production-oriented government could not afford to have only leaders or innovators in its ranks; some kind of mixture of other roles in varying proportions at various levels would seem necessary for effective accomplishment of its objectives.

Once data such as these are obtained, the possible extensions of research would be infinite. A next step might be the examination of the career patterns of those who best epitomize each role in an attempt to discover if there are any similarities. Experiments could be conducted in an effort to see if predictions could be made as to which persons would be best in each of these roles at the time of college entry or later at the time of recruitment. Education and training for the public service could be related to the roles performed in each of the major types of governments. New methods of training could be extended to those expected to perform certain kinds of roles in order to maximize their potential contributions. These are all possibilities, but they are based on the same foundation that development administration is based: that research needs to be focussed on the characteristics of administrative systems of each type of government, classifying the governments according to major goals.

The typology suggested in these pages is a mere skeleton of a series of types each of which could be greatly elaborated in detail. The logic of development administration as a focus for research leads in such a direction. While no government is committed to only one goal, the construction of such ideal types can assist us in understanding real governments. In the last analysis, the value of ideal types, as well as more extensive hypothetical models, lies in their ability to help us understand public administration in the real world.[17] Since major goals are an integral and important part of the real world, the typology here suggested may help in furthering understanding of live public administration.

Pursuing research in development administration based upon a typology of governments according to major goals does not solve all or any great number of theoretical problems. However, the solution of such problems need not be awaited before useful research is undertaken. And explorative research should contribute substantially to theoretical construction.

Footnotes

1. William J. Siffin, ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University, Department of Government, 1957), pp. 15-16.

2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957) is one attempt to make use of equilibrium theory on a rather broad basis.

3. Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 58.

4. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), p. 165.

5. David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 190.

6. Merton, op. cit., pp. 151-2.

7. Of course neutrality can refer to individual favoritism, also, but in most writings on bureaucracy it seems to refer more broadly to public policy.

8. See Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 49.

9. See its "Final Report" (September 1953, mimeo), Annexes I and III.

10. See his "Agraria and Industria" in William J. Siffin, ed., op. cit., pp. 23-110.

11. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), Chapters 1 and 7.

12. Robert Vance Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," 19 Public Administration Review (1959), p. 26.

13. Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration," 3 Administrative Science Quarterly (1959), p. 510; and William J. Siffin, ed., op. cit., p. 15.

14. A specific review of the several models available is beyond the scope of this paper. For such reviews see Heady, op.cit.; Presthus, op. cit.; Alfred Diamont, "Comparative Politics and Comparative Administration," 5 Administrative Science Quarterly (1960), pp. 87-112; and Edward W. Weidner, "The Search for Priorities in Comparative Public Administration" (Bloomington: Indiana University, Occasional Paper Series, 1961).

15. See, for example, Edward W. Weidner, Intergovernmental Relations as Seen by Public Officials (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), Chapters 2-4.

16. For an analysis of this point see Heady, op. cit., p. 523.

17. Riggs, op. cit., p. 98; Presthus, op. cit., p. 28.

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THE SUPREME COURT CANNOT BE NEUTRAL

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Professor Herbert Wechsler of the Columbia University Law School delivered the Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School in April, 1959. The lecture was published in the Harvard Law Review the following November. Within fifteen months at least half a dozen articles dealing with his argument appeared in law reviews. [1] All except one [2] of those I have seen were critical either of his approach or of his critique of particular decisions of the Supreme Court. A single essay which can so quickly lead to so many, and such diverse, discussions merits more than passing examination. Nor is it the number of comments which is of primary interest and importance. The fact is that Professor Wechsler raises, more effectively than other recent scholarly critics of the Court, questions which go to the foundations of the American system of judicial review and therefore the American conception of government in which the appeal by all except the lunatic or fanatic fringe is to law and to the reason of the law.

The discussion, of which Professor Wechsler's paper is a leading example, indicates the continuing concern for the prestige of the Supreme Court and its part in sustaining the rule of law. Most of us realize, though this realization is not so often put in words, that there is but a narrow gulf between our form of politically organized society and that in which a mob, or a small group, or a dictator makes the law. But the gulf is deep, if not wide, and the gap between the one and the other can be preserved only through a respect for continuity, tradition, reason, and the processes of constitutional government. In the age-old controversy between law as either the will of the strong or the interest of those controlling the key segments of the economy, and law as justice supported by reason, the theory and the practice of the American Supreme Court is central. Our way of dealing with a problem at least as old as the dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus and Glaucon is not that of Plato nor, for that matter, of Aristotle or the Romans (whose law-making and governing abilities exceeded their capacity for philosophizing about politics), or of the political and legal philosophers of the Middle age, though we are indebted to all of them. More immediately our system combines elements found in the 17th and 18th centuries into a new amalgam. It is one in which, for the first time, a court of law was effectively, though slowly and not without the opposition of some of our foremost statesmen, elevated to a position of responsibility and authority for giving a rational justification for the growth of the law of the Constitution.

We are concerned with more than an isolated episode, for the subject of this discussion is one group of attempts in man's eternal quest to give support through reasoned opinions to a government in which the rational element in man is respected and dignified. Only the courts, except when ruling per curiam, are required to give reasons for their decisions. The courts, therefore, have a peculiar responsibility in explaining and justifying the interpretations of the oldest of written national constitutions, interpretations made necessary by that "unknown and expanding future" of which Justice Matthews wrote (Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530-31; 1884).

Of recent years the critics of the Supreme Court have been those who saw it as a defender of subversives (though the most recent decisions under the Smith Act of 1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950 may have very nearly ended this source of criticism), those opposed to its rulings concerning the rights and status of Negroes, and those scholarly critics who charge it with intellectual and professional inadequacy. Professor Wechsler's critique is in this last category, though he may wish to alter my phrasing.

I do not agree with much of what I believe to be the central doctrine of Professor Wechsler's paper, but I have very considerable respect for his attitude, his procedure, and his statement. I applaud unreservedly his choice of an approach which transcends the immediate and the trivial and which raises questions bearing on some fundamental principles of constitutional government. As I read it, his paper raises, directly or by implication, questions involving the relative roles of process and of substance, of majority rule and minority rights, the extent to which reliance can be placed upon reason in the affairs of organized society, politics as the "art of the possible," as well as the value and the philosophical quality of the reasons given by the justices for their decisions. Of course, he doesn't pronounce judgment on all of these fundamental questions of political and legal philosophy, nor shall I attempt to do so. My point is that here is no circumscribed discussion of a minor point of constitutional interpretation.

In Mr. Wechsler's paper, after a preliminary and perhaps unnecessary consideration of Judge Learned Hand's recent expression of doubt whether review of legislation by the Supreme Court is required by the Constitution, a discussion too much based upon the wording of the Constitution (a mistake not made by Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall), he concludes that Marbury v. Madison was not in error. Of course, the words of the Constitution do not require a federal court to review legislation. Hamilton said that in so many words in the 81st Federalist, and Marshall adds to his opinion in Marbury, almost as an afterthought, that the words of the basic law lend support to the principle "supposed to be essential to all written constitutions." As Charles Beard pointed out in an article [3] published in 1912, the year before his more famous Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, an article based upon sounder and more complete research than the book, the assumptions and the explicit statements of leaders of the Federal Convention and of numerous leaders of the ratifying conventions make it clear that judicial review of some degree was taken for granted. Surely this is an essential corollary of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, drafted by men who wrote the

Constitution, and of the words used by James Madison (whom, in spite of Mr. Crosskey, I continue to regard as the chief author of the Constitution) in the first Congress when he introduced the bill which became the first ten amendments.

But Mr. Wechsler does not challenge the legitimacy of judicial review; he only engages in a preliminary excursion on that often discussed topic. His argument is rather that in many recent cases the Supreme Court has not discharged that responsibility in a way that is greatly to its credit. It has failed to base its decisions on what he chooses to call "neutral principles". Aside from the use of "neutral" in the title it first appears on page 9, and, if my count is correct, "neutral" or its noun, "neutrality," appear in the text fifteen times, the last usage being on the final page (35). After a survey of his discussion I shall give a more careful attention to his choice of words. Here I shall remark only that Mr. Wechsler never defines "neutral."

There are, Professor Wechsler points out, situations, possible controversies, where the Constitution has clearly vested authority to decide in other agencies of government. He also points to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in deciding whether to grant certiorari. The standards are defined in "neutral terms" (p. 9) and he believes that "only the maintenance and improvement of such standards and, of course, their faithful application" can protect the Court against the imputation of a bias in favor of claims of one kind or another. With some other professional critics, he agrees, though he limits this comment to a sentence or two, that "necessary as it is that the Court's docket be confined to manageable size," it follows that the governing statutes should "be revised to play a larger part in the delineation of the causes that make rightful call upon the time and energy of the Supreme Court." (p. 10)

Mr. Wechsler is frankly seeking "criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of reason." (p. 11) Such criteria are, he makes it clear, "the antithesis of willfulness or will." Those whose criterion is "whether its result in the immediate decision seems to hinder or advance the interests or values they support" are in another camp, and that camp appears to exalt fiat at the expense of reason. For this position "implies that the courts are free to function as a naked power organ" for here the judgment turns on "the immediate result." The use of the adjectives here used, "immediate" modifying result, and "naked" when describing the court as a "power organ" momentarily takes us a very long way, indeed into a different realm of discourse, from characterizations of the Court's opinions as inadequate or unsatisfactory. The charms of dichotomy and antithesis seem to have led Professor Wechsler into the beguiling but misleading realm of excessive exaggeration. Would anyone defend the contrary proposition?

He is on firm ground when he points to the inconsistencies in the views about the powers of the national government as illustrated not by decisions of the Court but by changing attitudes, north and south, about such matters as the tariff, the Bank, and the purchase of Louisiana. The South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification does not reflect the same view toward national legislation as that state's stand on the fugitive slave law. Such examples

can be multiplied, but they are almost beside the point. Somewhat closer to the central issue is his passing reference to former Justice Curtis' opinion, published in 1862, that President Lincoln could not free the slaves in "the rebellious states." This is contrasted with Curtis' dissenting opinion in Dred Scott. But surely Curtis was consistent when he supported the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories and questioned the authority of the President, or Congress, to free the slaves in a state. Lincoln, you recall, signed the Emancipation Proclamation, as Commander in Chief, since he believed, and had repeatedly said, that neither Congress nor the President could free slaves in existing states, nor did he ever admit that the states of the so-called Confederacy had left the Union.

After a few other examples of the too, too human proclivity to favor or oppose depending upon our support or rejection of the results of decisions he indicates his impatience "of the ad hoc in politics, with principle reduced to a manipulative tool," and then asks "are you not ready to agree that something else is called for from the courts." The answer has to be yes, though it is not so certain that the ad hoc is all that we get or should get in politics, that "principle" is there "reduced to a manipulative tool."

But let us turn to Professor Wechsler's conception of the nature of the judicial process, so far as constitutional adjudication is involved. It must be "genuinely principled, resting on analysis and reasons transcending the immediate result that is achieved." The courts, while deciding only the case immediately before them should rest those decisions on "grounds of adequate neutrality and generality." But then, in the next paragraph, we read that it is a commonplace "that courts in constitutional determinations face issues that are inescapably 'political' -- ... in that they involve a choice among competing values or desires, a choice reflected in the legislative or executive action in question, which the court must either condemn or condone." This means that what is crucial "is not the nature of the question but the nature of the answer." The courts must give a reasoned answer and it is their "special duty" (p. 16) to "judge by neutral principles." There is "a vital difference between legislative freedom to appraise the gains and losses in projected measures and the kind of principled appraisal, in respect of values that can reasonably be asserted to have constitutional dimension, that alone is in the province of the courts." Though some of his critics have accused Mr. Wechsler of saying that value judgments are left out by his insistence upon principles of neutrality, it is evident that he does not, at least in these statements, find that the one excludes the other. And in the next two or three pages (17-19) he agrees that growth and value judgments are involved in adjudicating claims under the clauses of the Bill of Rights. In their interpretation room must be left for "adaptation and adjustment if and when competing values, also having constitutional dimension, enter on the scene." I do not see how any scholar could disagree with this, but can such "adaptation and adjustment" be carried on by means of "neutral" principles? That question is never answered.

Possibly the key statement of the paper is the first sentence of the paragraph on pages 19-20. "The virtue or demerit of a judgment turns, therefore, entirely (italics supplied) on the reasons that support it and their adequacy to

maintain any choice of values it decrees, or, it is vital that we add, to maintain the rejection of a claim that any given choice should be decreed." That's quite a statement if it means what the words used ordinarily mean. Are the sanctions of time and the relation of decision to changing circumstances or to changing social values unimportant, or are all included in a very broad meaning of "reasons"? Certainly all of us could think of examples of carefully reasoned and generally accepted decisions which were later found to be seriously lacking.

He agrees that his generalities call for application to concrete problems or cases. His first example, one generally passed over by his critics, is Burstyn v. Wilson (343 U.S. 495; 1952). There, you recall, the Court unanimously reversed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals which had sustained a New York statute permitting censorship of motion pictures that are "sacreligious." The Court, by Mr. Justice Clark, agreed that the guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press applied to motion pictures. As I understand, Professor Wechsler does not object to the ruling in the Burstyn case, where the decision turned on the vagueness of the word "sacreligious," but rather to the five succeeding cases in which lower court decisions sustaining various grounds for censoring films were reversed per curiam. Here, he says, "the subtlety and difficulty of the problem, the need and opportunity for clarifying explanation" call for analysis and exposition of the grounds on which the Supreme Court was reversing the lower courts. The blunt and unexplained per curiam rulings failed to give needed explanations of the Court's reasoning. I entirely agree.

On January 23, 1961, well over a year after Mr. Wechsler's paper appeared, the Supreme Court decided Times Film Corporation v. Chicago (365 U.S. 43) sustaining a Chicago ordinance requiring submission of all motion pictures for examination before a public showing. The petitioner contended that the ordinance providing prior restraint violated freedom of expression and as such, was contrary to the guarantees of the First, through the Fourteenth, Amendment.

Mr. Justice Clark spoke for the majority, as he had for the unanimous Court in Burstyn. He admits to no disagreement with the ruling in the earlier case and restates the doctrine that the guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press apply to the showing of motion pictures. He finds a sentence or two in Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Near v. Minnesota (283 U.S. 697; 1931) to the effect that not all prior restraint is prohibited, and quotes from Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion in Chaplinsky v. N. H. (315 U.S. 568, 572; 1942) where it is said that certain classes of speech can be prevented and punished (the "lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words"), although it would appear that prior restraint was not involved in that case. Mr. Justice Clark is careful to say that the case before them did not involve "a specific standard," such question remaining to be considered in later decisions, and that the decision applies only to the "broadside attack" on prior censorship of moving pictures.

I do not know whether Mr. Wechsler regards this opinion as genuinely principled and based on neutral principles. I find it defective, as did four members of the Court. But then I am also critical of both dissenting opinions, that of Justice Douglas, with which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black

concur, (another of the absolute interpretations of the First Amendment: all prior restraint is forbidden), and the long series of quotations and comments put together by the Chief Justice, with which Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan concur. As so often happens, the majority and minority disagree about the scope of the decision. Justice Clark insists that it is restricted to the broadside attack; the dissenters view it as the beginning of a general process of prior restraint upon the expression of opinion. Much that appears in the Chief Justice's anthology seems beside the immediate point, but he is, or appears to be, on firm ground, when indicating the difficulties and delays in appealing from adverse rulings by local censors and he gives examples of such rulings which have little relation to the protection of morals. If the Court should follow the Burstyn example of extending the Times Publishing Company case through per curiam rulings, it will deserve a full measure of criticism.

Following the brief consideration of Burstyn and its per curiam extension, Mr. Wechsler turns to what "may be called the progeny of the school segregation cases." In fact, some are ancestors not progeny. He first points out that, to the time of his writing, the Court had written on the constitutional issue posed by integration but once (in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; 1954). Following that decision, which of course deals with segregation in the public schools, the Court extended its ruling to other public facilities: transportation, parks, golf courses, bath houses, beaches, which differ from public schools in one extremely important respect: no one is required to use them or a private substitute. All of these rulings, though involving hotly, even bitterly, contested questions of social relationships, were per curiam. The only "principled" decisions were those of the lower courts which the Supreme Court sustained.

There follows an interesting diversion referring to the cases of the decades in which, before 1937, the Court confined the legislative powers of Congress. I shall reserve this discussion for later consideration and turn to "the decisions that," he says, "provide the hardest test of my belief in principled adjudication, those, in which the Court in recent years has vindicated claims that deprivations based on race deny the equality before the law that the fourteenth amendment guarantees." These are the white primary, restrictive covenants, and the segregated schools cases. It is his criticism of the opinions (or the per curiam rulings) in these cases which have led to most of the law review answers to his article. His position on the merits of the decisions in these cases is somewhat equivocal, but his preliminary statement is clear: he believes "that the decisions....have the best chance of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our society of any that I know in recent years." Whether "recent" goes back to 1937 I do not know. If it does, I disagree, but that is of incidental interest, for what Mr. Wechsler is asking is "how far they rest on neutral principles and are entitled to approval in the only terms I acknowledge to be relevant to a decision of the courts." It is hard to put off a rejoinder to "only terms....relevant to a decision of the courts," but I shall resist temptation and postpone.

The primary and covenant cases, we are told, "present two different aspect of a single problem that it is a state alone that is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment to deny equal protection of the laws, as only a state or

the United States is precluded by the fifteenth amendment from denying or abridging on the ground of race or color the right of citizens of the United States to vote." I believe the distinction is sharper and clearer than Mr. Wechsler indicates. I shall not take your time to trace the process and summarize the series of decisions by which the Court came to Smith v. Allwright (321 U.S. 649; 1944). The opinion of Mr. Justice Reed for the Court (only Mr. Justice Roberts dissented) is not one of the timeless masterpieces of judicial reasoning, but I find no difficulty in agreeing when he says that, though the privilege of membership in a party is not the concern of a state, "when, as here, that privilege is also the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action of the party the action of the state." The majority of the Court did not see, what should have been evident for many years, that primaries had become inseparable parts of the exercise of the right of suffrage, until after the judicial revolution of 1937. Smith v. Allwright is not concerned with a constitutional term of vague and shifting meaning, as are the restrictive covenant cases. It is based upon a definite and affirmative injunction relating to a fundamental process of representative government, not to "party organization," as Mr. Wechsler somewhat misleadingly says on page 29, but, as he indicates in the previous line, to the franchise. Whether we use the nineteenth and twentieth century word, "democracy," or "republic," which is favored by those vastly disparate commentators, James Madison and Robert Welch, elections are agreed-upon essentials.

"The case of the restrictive covenant presents" for Mr. Wechsler, an "even harder problem." I would use different phrasing, since, for me, Smith v. Allwright is no more than acceptance of what should long before have been evident, but I agree that Shelley v. Kraemer (334 U.S. 1; 1948) and its companions present a question that has not yet been adequately resolved or explained. It is not clear how far the ruling carries us. Are all private contracts which are enforced in the courts subject to the rule? The authors of the fourteenth amendment intended to secure the Negroes' right to ownership of real property; does it follow that enforcement by the courts of private agreements relating to land becomes the action of the state and therefore a violation of the amendment? With Mr. Wechsler I think that we need more than a series of per curiam rulings or denials of certiorari (as in the second Girard College case, Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 357 U.S. 570: 1958) in issues related to this range of problems. The rule in this Shelley's case requires more explication than it has received.

Professor Wechsler is a brave man. That he demonstrated when he questioned the school segregation cases. He is not a candidate for elective office in Alabama or Mississippi, or in any number of constituencies in the East, Mid West, or Far West where feeling against the Court's decision varies from the openly bitter to the secret but decided. And it has become almost a point of faith and dogma in academic circles that in Brown v. Topeka the Court struck a tremendous blow for the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, and the fourteenth amendment, not to mention our position in a world in which a majority of the people are not white.

What Mr. Wechsler questions is not the intent of the fourteenth amendment,

though, as I understand, he agrees that integration in education was not explicitly intended by all, and "many thought the contrary," for the "words are general and leave room for expanding content as time passes and conditions change." Nor are his doubts addressed to enforcement of the decision, nor to the possibility that the question should have been left for Congress to deal with. "The problem inheres strictly in the opinion, an opinion which is often read with less fidelity by those who praise it than by those by whom it is condemned." He points out that the Court did not declare that the amendment forbids "all racial lines in legislation, though subsequent per curiam decisions may...now go that far." The Court said that the separate-but-equal formula has "no place" in public education. Segregated schools are "inherently unequal," and the effect upon colored children is so harmful as to retard their educational and mental development. Was there, he asks, sufficient evidence to sustain this finding? Did the Court assume that the Negro children would be "happily accepted and regarded by the whites?" Does not segregation also have benefits of security and the absence of hostility? So far as concerns the relatively short-term situation, possibly fifteen to twenty-five years, his questions seem to me pertinent, though not easy to answer. But when he asks if the choice does not "involve an inquiry into the motives of the legislature, which is generally foreclosed to the courts?" I have difficulty in following him. Perhaps I misinterpret, but he gives me the impression of finding some validity in the Plessy separate-but-equal theory that if "enforced segregation stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority," it is solely because its members choose "to put that construction upon it" (p. 33). I had supposed that theory was a sociological judgment which was and is absurd on its face, one that is anything but neutral. And when he asks if "enforced separation of the sexes discriminates against females?," I suspect him of misplaced irony. Surely neither the words nor the social climate of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment are to be imported into the nineteenth.

I believe that the decision in Brown v. Topeka was, sooner or later, inevitable, though I find the opinion inadequate. I have difficulty, however, with Mr. Wechsler's reasoning when, on the next to last page of his paper (p. 34), and in the paragraph following the one from which I have just quoted, he says, "For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state enforced segregation is not one of discrimination at all. [Surely the words as here used carry a special meaning.] Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be involved." His examples are not convincing. In the next paragraph he says that "if freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant. Is this not the heart of the issue involved, a conflict in human claims of high dimension, not unlike many others that involve the highest freedoms....Given a situation where the state must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail? I should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the opinion. To write it is for me the challenge of the school-segregation cases."

His use of "neutral principles" in this paragraph (the fifteenth use of "neutral") leaves me in the air. The fourteenth amendment was enacted to protect rights of a racial minority. So much, at least, is clear. Is the principle of minority rights a "neutral" principle? If so, which minority is protected by them? Are there not distinctions to be made, and an order of values or rights to be defended?

And in the last paragraph before his graceful conclusion, he offers "no comfort" for any one "who claims legitimacy in defiance of the courts." Why? Because "This is the ultimate negation of all neutral principles, to take the benefits accorded by the constitutional system...while denying it allegiance when a special burden is imposed. That certainly is the antithesis of law." The antithesis of law, yes, an indefensible theory of political obligation, yes, but of neutral principles? Then what is the meaning of "neutral"? Does it mean no more than well established and generally accepted?

Let me make the observation, out of an excess of caution, that Professor Wechsler was not defying the Court when he questioned some of its actions and certain of its opinions. When reason, not force or disobedience or invective, is the instrument employed, criticism is in one of our oldest and most valuable traditions. Paradoxically, the Court has, over the long haul, been strengthened by criticism. Had the Court been above hostile criticism, too sacred to be questioned, had it been removed from the expression of partisan feelings, had condemnation of its decisions been tantamount to treason, it would never have become so influential, nor could it have made so impressive a contribution to the preservation of government under constitutional law.

With most of Mr. Wechsler's objections to the cases and the per curiam rulings I am in agreement. The per curiam disposition of thorny and often involved issues in the wake of Burstyn and Brown, the implications of Shelley, the reasoning in the school-segregation case - all seem to me to be less than we are entitled to expect from our highest court. But Mr. Wechsler has done more than criticize or question. He has advanced a proposal; he has offered a standard by which to measure the validity of opinions. That standard he chooses to call "neutral" principles. Because he has done so, he has provoked, or stimulated, a number of thoughtful and interesting answers. Had he been more conventional in his criticism, had he, for example, announced that these decisions are not of the quality written by Marshall and Holmes, his paper would probably have been greeted with no more than shrugs of the shoulders and general agreement. Chief Justice Warren is no Marshall, and Mr. Justice Clark is not the equal of Holmes.

Having said this, I go on to my central point of disagreement with Mr. Wechsler. In his use of the term "neutral" principles he is, to quote a neatly and moderately worded phrase from a New Yorker of twenty years ago (this is from a "Talk of the Town" column and sounds like the work of E. B. White) "confused, misguided and wrong." "Neutral," the word he repeatedly uses without ever defining it, simply won't do. The dictionary, the history of the Supreme Court, the nature of the questions that Court decides - all are against him.

Webster, to begin there, defines neutral as "not engaged on either side... neither one thing nor the other, also middling, indifferent." The nearest synonym is probably "impartial," though Roget leads off with "in the middle of the road, on the fence." Neutrality, according to Webster, is "the condition of being uninvolved in contests or controversies between others."

Since Professor Wechsler is discussing constitutional adjudication he is not dealing with law suits between John Black and James White over a claim for damages arising from a motor accident, or over the interpretation of an ordinary private contract. In such actions at law the judge should, of course, be neutral, or, as I should prefer, impartial. But if Black v. White involves a constitutional issue, as have many cases with comparable titles, and as did all of the cases Mr. Wechsler discusses, particularly if it be one where the construction of a constitutional clause of unsettled meaning is before the Court and the issue is one on which there is no clear consensus in the country, how can the Court arrive at a decision which can properly be said to be neutral?

I am not merely quibbling over the meaning of a word. For what is at issue here is the role and the responsibility of the Supreme Court in American polity. I think that Mr. Wechsler is seeking something that isn't there and can't be found: a principle or rule or standard which can be applied in solving cases where the Court must be non-neutral, when it must decide although there is no agreed-upon doctrine or principle to follow; therefore it must necessarily take sides in a debated and debatable issue of public concern.

The two justices most frequently cited by Mr. Wechsler are Marshall and Holmes. Was Marshall neutral? Everyone knows that he was not. He was a partisan from his youth during the Revolution to the day of his death in 1835. He was a nationalist, a powerful advocate for an enlarged role for the judiciary, and, in the words of Beveridge, a "supreme conservative." His most famous, and most influential, decisions support this characterization. Consider, first, Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch 137; 1803). There his finding that the Court had no jurisdiction was prefaced by a lengthy censure of the newly elected administration of Jefferson and Madison. His statement of the theory of judicial review is not that of Madison or Jefferson, but is straight out of Hamilton's 78th Federalist. His interpretation of the jurisdiction clause of Article III of the Constitution is debatable; his interpretation of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (written by authors of the Constitution) farfetched. Neutral? No. Was he neutral in Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch 87; 1810) and its numerous successors? I think not. Did he even make clear whether that decision was based on "general principles" of society and government or on the contract clause? He did not, probably because he was stretching that clause beyond the intent of its authors. Was he neutral when dealing with the relative powers of state and national governments? Certainly Jefferson, Madison, John Taylor and scores of others did not think so.

Holmes may seem to some to be the perfect example of a great justice who was, in constitutional issues, neutral, though I doubt the appropriateness of the term, largely because he often expressed a theory of the role of the judiciary which allowed greater discretion to the legislative branch. Certainly

he was not a partisan in terms of undeviating adherence to the platform or the tenets of a political party. But was he neutral on questions involving freedom of speech and of the press? The great Abrams dissent (250 U.S. 616; 1919) doesn't read like a neutral discourse to me, unless we assume as an ultimate, unquestionable, and, in that somewhat special sense, "neutral" standard of validity, the Enlightenment faith that from the free exchange of views the truth will emerge triumphant. Was he neutral on questions of federalism? He favored experiments carried on in the insulated chambers afforded by the states - provided no national interest was at stake. Then the old soldier who had almost died for the Union spoke in no uncertain tones. You recall his opinion for the Court in Missouri v. Holland (252 U.S. 416; 1920). There all that was involved was the validity of a Congressional statute giving effect to a treaty with Canada for the protection of migratory birds, a subject probably not contemplated as falling within the national legislative power by Madison and his colleagues during those hot months in the summer of 1787. But Holmes pulls out all the stops in that opinion: "when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience, and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago."

Chief Justice Marshall had used similar words in a far more bitterly contested issue, the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States. In McCulloch (4 Wheaton 316; 1819): "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding....a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Marshall and Holmes were magnificent in their use of words and phrases and in the formulation of reasoned opinions. But surely the final judgment on their place in American law and history is not their expertise in the use of "neutral" logic. They were, to put it bluntly, on the side of the future, in part because they helped to shape that future.

When the Court has forgotten, or been opposed to, this attitude toward adaptation to the changing needs of the nation, it has, more often than not, failed to live up to the obligations of its great role. Consider the cases Professor Wechsler refers to in his relatively long preface to his suprisingly brief discussion of the segregation cases. On page 23 he says that "The phase of our modern constitutional development that I conceive we can most confidently deem successful inheres in the broad reading of the commerce, taxing, and related powers of the Congress..." He then asks "Why is it that the Court failed so completely in the effort to contain the scope of national authority and that one reads decisions like Hammer v. Dagenhart, or Carter Coal, or the invalidation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act with eyes that disbelieve?" His immediate answer is, to me, excellent: "the simple facts of life and the consensus they have generated on the powers that a modern nation needs." But were they unneutral? Were they thought to be so by most members of the American Bar

Association? And if Professor Wechsler believes, as I do, that the reversals of 1937-38 resulted in a sounder conception of the powers of Congress, is this conclusion based upon a neutral philosophy, as he indicates, or upon an unprovable set of value judgments? Indeed, it appears to me that the interpretation of the commerce and tax clauses followed with very rare exceptions for two decades embodies judgments with which many lawyers disagree, judgments on at least three great subjects: the relation of nation and state, the relation of the judiciary and Congress, and the scope and functions of government in the circumstances of the 20th century.

I find myself alligned with those of Mr. Wechsler's critics who say that his approach offers no guide when the Court is facing new, undecided issues of constitutionality, or when its function is bringing the meaning of the Constitution into harmony with either changed circumstances or an emerging but not clearly accepted set of values. I think, however, the critics who say he applauds only the decisions in which the Court abdicates its supervisory function are not completely fair, though I confess that he gives that impression.

Mr. Wechsler appears to believe that the Court has taken on too much work and therefore has too little time for consideration, discussion, and the maturing of judgment (see his reference to a docket of "manageable size" on page 10). I do not know whether the unfortunate extension of interpretation by per curiam rulings is a result of a too great burden of work. It may be due to an inability to formulate reasoned opinions upon which agreement can be secured. Yet the burden of cases cannot account for several of the least adequate opinions. Consider the number of times the issue of censorship has been before the court and the length of the three opinions in the recent Times Publishing Co. case. Brown v. Board of Education was twice argued and was extensively briefed and researched. Professor Wechsler suggests no neutral principles which would have improved that opinion. Attempts by several learned critics to rewrite the opinion are not impressive. I do not exclude from that statement the absolutistic version of the nature of fourteenth amendment equality by Professor Black of the Yale Law School and the six page draft opinion by Professor Pollak, also of the Yale Law School, who agrees with Mr. Wechsler that neutrality is essential to acceptable judgments (otherwise "they deserve to be jettisoned"), but Professor Pollak's examples of valid decisions display a clear and present philosophy of the variety fairly accurately designated as libertarian. That is a defensible philosophy; it is not neutral.

I see no alternative to basing the school segregation opinion upon a reading of the change of attitude, which had for decades been taking place in this country, toward the place of public education, as well as toward the relations of races. To designate such a reading of history and of a national consensus as neutral seems to me not only to misuse a perfectly good word but, more serious, to introduce a misleading theory of constitutional interpretation. There is evidence for both changes, though only some of it is employed in the Brown opinion.[4] That opinion should have been in the grand manner of a Marshall or a Holmes. It is not. Instead it is a pedestrian effort not worthy even of the line of cases beginning with Gaines in 1938 and extending through the Oklahoma and Texas University cases in 1948 and 1950 (305 U.S. 337; 1938;

332 U.S. 631; 1948; 339 U.S. 629; 1950; 339 U.S. 637; 1950). It is no more than barely indicative of the great changes in this country and in the world of the relations between the white and colored races. The Court was following a modification in national sentiment, though it is at least equally clear that there is something less than complete agreement on this ancient and vexing problem. The unanimity of the decisions in the Oklahoma, Texas and Brown cases is, however, pertinent to an understanding of the growing dissatisfaction with Plessy, especially if we recall that in the Gaines case in 1938 there were two dissenters, and those two (McReynolds and Butler) were the remaining members of the four old guard conservatives who had been primarily responsible for so many of the unfortunate decisions of 1935-36, and the preceeding years.

Professor Wechsler has very little to say about civil liberties cases other than a particular group relating to the rights of Negroes. To be sure, he approves of some older decisions and dissenting opinions, such as the Holmes opinion in Abrams. He finds unsatisfactory the majority opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 U.S. 234; 1957) which, in his view, rests "at bottom" on the principle of power separation among the branches of a state government, a question not previously thought to be a federal question. I read that opinion a little differently, though, once again, I concur in a finding of weak draftsmanship, and I think that the opinion of the four members of the Court should have contained the statement expressed in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence that the Constitution does not enjoin separation of powers upon states. I do not entirely share his apparent satisfaction with Uphaus v. Wyman (360 U.S. 72; 1959).

My point, however, is not whether Sweezy or Uphaus were correctly decided. My question is rather how does his standard of neutrality apply to the difficult and unresolved issues of civil liberties? Since the Court adopted a latitudinarian philosophy concerning the scope of economic regulation the most interesting and important cases have involved civil rather than economic rights. A principle of neutrality, or some synonym therefor, can be said to apply to the many and varied cases in this area only if it, the principle, be equivalent to well established and accepted rules. What then of the numerous new issues, the open questions, which the Court must decide? Must decide is perhaps too sweeping a term, for there are times when the Court should not intervene. One such was, in my view, Dred Scott. By 1857 it should have been clear that the Court could not, as many hoped, settle the burning issue of slavery in the territories. The Court should have followed the precedent of Strader v. Graham (10 Howard 82; 1850), as indeed the majority originally intended. I also think that the Court should have intervened in Korematsu v. U.S. (323 U.S. 214; 1944). That "abomination" is Professor Wechsler's word. To me it is the worst precedent on the record, though I recognize the danger inherent in such intervention. To intervene or not to intervene, that is a question more often decided on the basis of philosophy and judgment than by established rules and precedents. Yet these precedents are, of course, necessary parts of the equation to which the Court must find a solution.

I find myself coming back, when I try to state my position, to the insight of that amazing visitor to this country in good King Andrew's day -

Alexis de Tocqueville. He was here for just over a year in 1831-32; the first volume of his great book appeared in 1835, the year of Marshall's death. Yet he saw, far more clearly than the more learned Bryce who had the advantage of observing an additional half century of the practice of judicial review, that the courts in America exercised "immense political influence." How he could see this so clearly so early I do not know. But his perception of the role of American courts when exercising the function of judicial review was and is valid. Their task is that of statesmanship. To be sure, they do not propose or enact statues, but they do interpret, apply, and either justify in terms of constitutionality, or reject for reasons of unconstitutionality, the laws coming from the legislatures, both state and national. The performance of that task calls for a very high order of judgment on issues which are essential political. It also calls for the employment of extraordinary powers of rhetoric and logic, to use the late Reed Powell's phrase, though the meaning Powell gave the term, the "common sense of the Supreme Court," does not go far enough.

Wasn't it Disraeli who said that "with words we govern men"? The ultimate test of the validity of constitutional decisions is their relation to a trinity: the language of the Constitution, changes of circumstance, and modifications in the national climate of opinion. But Mr. Wechsler is altogether correct in asking that the Court of today give us better examples of reasoned exposition or "principled analysis" than it has sometimes done. This is of particular importance when the Court is dealing with open or unresolved issues requiring the exercise of learning and wisdom, as well as a gift of rational exposition worthy of the majesty of the cause and the most supreme of courts.

We part company (though I am not certain that the breach is a wide one) over his choice of words. "Neutral" and "neutrality" seem to me singularly ill-suited to describe the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication. Perhaps Professor Henkin is correct in saying that Mr. Wechsler is only calling for a "return to doctrine," [5] that his paper reflects a long over-due reaction from the once popular tendency to "stress that judges were fallible mortals with prejudices, who talked 'principle' that was really a rationalization for achieving prejudged results; or, at least, that judges tended to find in the Constitution the notions they brought to it about the proper role of government and the rights of the individual." Certainly much of the older and cruder realism was over-done and some of it obscured the nature of the judicial process. I agree that we should have greater respect for what Mr. Wechsler calls "principled analysis" and that the quality of analysis in some recent opinions is regrettably poor. However, though there are references to the fact that in constitutional cases the courts "face issues that are inescapably political....in that they involve a choice among competing values or desires..." (p. 15) and to "room for adaptation and adjustment," he does not make clear how these relate to the statement quoted earlier that "the virtue or demerit of a judgment turns, therefore, entirely on the reasons that support it..." (pp. 19-20). I doubt if he means to divorce reason from experience and circumstance. There is, nevertheless, a thread of argument running through the paper which can be read as supporting that unfortunate separation. Just as law cannot long survive on either reason or precedent alone, so a government according to law cannot escape transformation into rule by fiat or by force if its legal

guardians are seduced into dependence upon pure reason, or, for that matter, any of the abstract absolutes which are false replacements for sanity and wisdom.

What appears to be a failure to attain unity in Professor Wechsler's thesis may be, in part, due to the difficult, and somewhat paradoxical, character of the Court's role. It must use the words, phrases and concepts of doctrine to reconcile the fixed words of the Constitution with "the various crises of human affairs;" it "must consider what this country has become in deciding what" the Constitution means. The Court is not elected and it is not a poll-taker's mirror, but it has the responsibility of representing and reflecting the sense of the country and its value judgments. If it does not reflect accurately and articulate persuasively the felt needs and values of its constituency, the cause of a government of laws is weakened. Far more than in Lincoln's time this country is the last, best hope of constitutional government. To the success of such polity the Court has repeatedly contributed out of all proportion to its power. In some instances the Court has failed, but a yard-stick called neutrality helps to identify neither the rare failures nor the many achievements.

Footnotes

1. Among these articles are the following: Louis H. Pollak, "Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: a Reply to Professor Wechsler," 108 Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review, no. 1, pp. 1-34 (Nov., 1959); Richard A. Givens, "The Impartial Constitutional Principles Supporting Brown v. Board of Education," 6 Howard Law Journal, no. 2, pp. 179-185 (June, 1960); Charles L. Black, Jr., "The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions," 69 Yale Law Journal, pp. 421-430 (1960); A. Mueller and M. L. Schwartz, "The Principle of Neutral Principles," 7 Univ. of California at Los Angeles Law Review, no. 4, pp. 571-88 (July, 1960); A. S. Miller and R. F. Howell, "The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication," 27 Univ. of Chicago Law Review, pp. 661-95 (Summer, 1960).

2. See Louis Henkin, "Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy," 109 Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review, no. 5, pp. 637-62 at 652 ff. (March, 1961).

3. "The Supreme Court - Usurper or Grantee?" 27 Political Science Quarterly, 1 (1912).

4. See, for example, Robert J. Harris, The Quest for Equality (1960), a book published after Professor Wechsler's article appeared.

5. Op.cit., Louis Henkin, note 2 at pp. 652-53.

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GUERRILLA WARFARE AND SUBVERSION AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL CHANGE

by

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss subversive activities concentrating upon guerrilla warfare as an instrument of political change. Although "subversion" may employ many techniques, the paper will deal only with those of overt and violent character. The discussion will follow this order of topics: (1) socio-psychological conditions for emergence; (2) analysis of organizational structures; (3) conditions for success; (4) operational strategy and tactics; (5) impact of activities upon the "enemy" and upon the organization's membership; and (6) conclusions pertaining to research on organizational behavior of groups using violence in problem-solving.[1]

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[1]Research for this paper was done under the auspices of the Studies in International Conflict and Integration at Stanford University. The findings are based on cross-cultural investigation of Chinese, Polish, Yugoslavian, Greek, French and Italian underground and

Conditions for Emergence

Seventeen years ago eight men from an underground unit were engaged in street fighting. They found themselves in the basement of a burning house. The house was not only burning, it was bombed and rubble blocked the way out; it was dark and smoky, and the men desperately struggled alongside the walls, searching for an opening. At that moment a small group of men shouting in a different language stumbled into the basement. The exchange of shouting acted as a catalyst--both groups opened fire.

When it was all over and the flashlight beams picked out the dead and the dying men, one of the survivors pointed to a dead officer of the enemy saying, "I killed her." Then he proceeded to tell us that it was his mother-in-law whom he had killed. It was a symbolic killing. Sometime later he asked to be relieved from duty because he said he "already" had won peace. This incident compelled an examination of my own motivation for fighting in the underground movement. I had four years of it and even today I am not exactly certain why I fought. The more insight I have into my own personality dynamics, the more complicated this answer seems to be. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern and classify certain elements which lead an individual to attempt to solve problems by using violence.

An analytical scrutiny of factors affecting the motivation of an individual should be the starting point of an inquiry into the dynamics of mass organizations engaged in violence. The reason is the speculation of a correlation between individual and group aggression.[2] It

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guerrilla activities in the period from 1939 to 1945 (Chinese, 1946-49).

The writer had four years of combat service in an underground movement during World War II.

Neither the sponsoring project nor The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford are responsible for the views expressed here.

[2]Bjorn Christiansen, Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959), pp. 23-75; L. W. Doob and R. R. Sears, "Factors Determining Substitute Behavior and the Overt Expression of Aggression," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 34 (1939), pp. 293-313; E. Glover, "War and Pacifism: Some Individual (Unconscious) Factors," Character and Personality, Vol. 4 (1936), pp. 305-318.

has also been suggested that international tensions are related and often based on interpersonal tensions.[3]

The following sets of conditions perceived by individuals are considered to be the prerequisites for the emergence of groups engaged in exercising violence.[4] These conditions can be broadly classified as:

Physiological	--	(deprivation or the threat of it)
Sociological	--	(loss of status or the danger of losing it)
Psychological	--	(perceived threat to survival among the most prominent)[5]
Political	--	(inability to pursue group objectives through the formally recognized channels)

Although these factors by no means encompass the variables involved, they seem, nevertheless, to be present prior to the emergence of all sub-systems of subversive organizations. They set the stage for intra-societal warfare (activities directed against the indigenous power elite

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[3]Doctor Harry Stack Sullivan was prominent proponent of the thesis. See also Roger E. Watson, Leon Pritzker and Peter Madison, "Hostility in Neurotics and Normals," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 50 (1955), pp. 36-40; Leonard Goodstein, "Inter-relationships Among Several Measures of Anxiety and Hostility," Journal of Consulting Psychology, Vol. 18 (1954), pp. 35-39; Bertram H. Raven and Jan Rietsema, "The Effects of Varied Clarity of Group Goal and Group Path upon the Individual and his Relation to his Group," Human Relations, Vol. 10 (1957), pp. 29-45.

[4]John Paul Scott, Aggression (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 102; Georg Simmel, Conflict. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff. The Web of Group-Affiliation. Translated by Reinhard Bendix (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 15-16, 30; N. E. Miller, R. Sears, O. Mowrer, L. Doob and J. Dollard, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," Psychological Review, Vol. 48 (1941), pp. 337-342; F. Alexander, "Peace Aims," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 13 (1943), pp. 571-581.

[5]T. H. Pear (ed.), Psychological Factors of Peace and War (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), passim; A. H. Maslow, "Deprivation, Threat and Frustration," Psychological Review, Vol. 48 (1941), pp. 346-366; Robert E. Osggod, "Observations on the Clinical Approach to International Tensions," Social Problems, Vol. 2 (1955), pp. 176-180; A. H. Maslow, "A Comparative Approach to the Problem of Destructiveness," Psychiatry, Vol. 5 (1942), pp. 517-522.

within a given nation state) as well as against the inter-societal warfare (the enemy's occupational forces). These socio-psychological factors might or might not be articulated, but they will be manifested by signs of anxiety and frustration (hoarding of gold and food, the increased consumption of alcohol, etc.).

It appears that a particular sequence of behavioral processes takes place before a group structures itself toward a systematic exercise of violence.

First, the transformation of anxiety and frustration into meaningful operational symbols must take place. "The unique difficulty of Homo sapiens is that he is capable of experiencing nuances of feeling and of attaching this feeling to symbols."[6] Man tends to pinpoint the object against which he can relieve his feelings of frustration.[7] This is part of an integrative process within the threatened group.[8] The first sign of this process taking place is

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[6]Elton B. McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression," Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3 (1959), p. 196.

[7]Sam I. Stein, "The Major Cause of Warfare--Emotional Incompetency; The Emotional or Psychogenic Factor of Behavioral Control," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol. 112 (1950), pp. 66-74; Dowin Cartwright and Ronald Lippit, "Group Dynamics and the Individual," International Journal of Group Psychotherapy, Vol. 7 (1957), pp. 86-102; Talcott Parsons, "Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World," Psychiatry, Vol. 10 (1947), pp. 167-181; L. B. Hill, "The Use of Hostility as Defense," Psychoanalitical Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1938), pp. 254-264; Reiwald P., "Zur Psychologie der Massen-aggression" (Towards a Psychology of of Mass Aggression), Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen, Vol. 4 (1945), pp. 102-109; Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1951), pp. 10-11.

[8]Lewis A. Coser, The Function of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 87-110; Robert C. North, Howard E. and Di na A. Zinnes, "The Integrative Functions of Conflict," Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 355-374; Muzafer Sherif, "Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 63 (1958), pp. 349-356; Morton Deutsch, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Co-operation and Competition upon Group Process," Human Relations, Vol. 2 (1949), pp. 199-232, also 129-152;

conscious delineation of the terms "we" and "they." The more inclusive the category of "we" and the more limited the scope of "they," the easier it is for men to separate and classify the symbols of identification. People tend to be intensely "for" or "against" identifying their frustrations with symbols as simple as the national flag, the enemy's uniform, or "the government."

Undergrounds and guerrilla movements are not, however, organized by frustrated mobs, but by leaders. These men are usually the most dissatisfied and those with natural aptitudes to take initiative in manipulation and allocation of symbols. They begin to operate within the segment of society which feels most oppressed by the status quo. For example, among the workers in Tsarist Russia in 1917 or the peasants in China in 1946-49.

The most important function of the leaders with regard to establishing an organization using violence is to provide an aegis for the release of aggression. Because of the environmental conditioning and social mores, most men appear hesitant to engage in violence unless there is a moral justification for it. We know from experience that any movement--regardless of its size--attempts to acquire a monopoly on the symbols of legality. "Legal" and "duly constituted" prime ministers and presidents appear under these circumstances, particularly abroad. Governments-in-exile seem to be indispensable in any long range movement of magnitude. Their importance lies not in the qualifications and the competence of the personnel, but rather in the service they perform as a formal source of "dispensation" for acts of violence. Nobody wants to be a "murderer." It It is nicer to be a "hero." Shooting one's way in and out of a bank, and leaving several dead guards behind, is murder when committed for self-gain. But the same action performed on behalf of patriotic symbols makes a man a hero. He may even win a medal for it (provided, of course, that no one in the underground's leadership is a major investor in the bank--as happened once in China). The leaders place themselves in the position of supplying "moral dispensation." With a rationalization provided, the

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W. C. Allee, Cooperation among Animals, with Human Implications (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951), passim; The Nature of Conflict. Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions, by the International Sociological Association in collaboration with Jessie Bernard, T. H. Pear, Raymond Aron and Robert C. Angell (Paris: UNESCO, 1957), pp. 135-136.

propensity of man to use violence can be exercised with less inner conflict.[9] The leaders help to transform frustration into open aggression by legalizing violence.

When these providers of a moral excuse appear on the scene they build a network of communication, initiate interaction, assign responsibilities, and define awards. Later, they also prescribe sanctions. Their emergence is the inception of organization. At the initial stage of their appearance the leaders have to keep operational ideals broad enough to accommodate the highly diversified latent aspirations of the membership and to secure an influx of the rank and file.

The speed with which an organization can be created is not primarily related to the intensity of formally claimed allegiance to the ideals of the organization. It is the perceived threat by the membership which is related to the rate of organizational growth. This is well illustrated by the great contribution of French Jews to the impetus for the creation of the French underground movement.[10]

Moreover, "the more intense the perception of threat, the less salient is the group's perception of its own capability relative to that of the enemy."[11] Here lies an explanation of the fact that even a hopelessly numerically overwhelmed and terrorized country is able to continue underground fighting (for example, Poland in the nineteenth century).

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[9]E. Frankel, "One Thousand Murderers," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 29 (1939), pp. 672-688; William Vogel, Robert W. Baker and Richard S. Lazarus, "The Role of Motivation in Psychological Stress," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 56 (1958), pp. 105-112; Hans Seyle and Claude Fortier, "Adaptive Reaction to Stress," Psychosomatic Medicine, Vol. 12 (1950), pp. 149-157.

[10]David Knout, Contribution a l'histoire de la résistance juive en France, 1940-1944 (Contribution to the history of the Jewish resistance in France, 1940-1944) (Paris: C.D.J.C. Editions du Centre, 1947), pp. 85, 88.

[11]The observation contributed by Professor Robert C. North of Stanford University. See also Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of War," in James N. Roseman, International Politics and Foreign Policy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), passim.

Organizational Structure

When we speak of an underground we speak of a social organization. As with any social organization, there is a division of labor within it. Thus "an underground," regardless of its cultural setting and the values for which it stands, has seven basic structural elements--each performing a different function. These elements are:

1. Headquarters where the locus of formal power is crystallized; often it is abroad
2. Intelligence
3. Communication
4. Propaganda
5. Cadres in reserve and training
6. Logistics
7. Fighting arms: guerrilla and sabotage units.

With reference to the fighting arms, a general distinction should be made between guerrilla and sabotage units. Guerrillas, as a rule, do not disband after each action. Sabotage units generally do disband and their activities are mainly carried out in a manner avoiding direct contact with the enemy.

The problem which leaders aiming at the establishment of an underground organization have to face first is the degree of centralization which they will have to superimpose upon the structure. The issue is that of control versus security. The more highly structured the organizational framework, the more easily it is controlled by the elite; but when penetrated by the enemy such an organization can collapse very easily. On the other hand, the more loosely tied the structure, the more difficult it is for the enemy to penetrate it--but the leaders of such an organization have a weaker grip on it.

It is desirable to remember that an underground movement--no matter how well it appears to be centralized--is a highly pluralistic "society within a society" with fierce, and quite often parochial, loyalties and local Robin Hoods competing with each other. Quite often local units identify their own interests with those of society and distort the purpose of the latter when convenient to themselves. Transformations from a Robin Hood into a Jesse James are quite common. These competing interests within a movement result in a struggle for political leadership. Generally, this struggle within the organization starts even before the organization is capable of initiating well-coordinated action against the enemy.

There is always a correlation between the clarity of the pattern of the organizational structure and the ability of the organization to take coordinated action. Without centralization of authority there cannot be an effective underground. Ultimately, however, the structural pattern of the organization will be designed by the elite in power.

The French, Polish and Italian experiences from World War II indicate that the backgrounds of leaders affect the character of the structure of the organization they establish. When a military man emerges from the competition as leader, the organizational framework appears relatively centralized, highly structured and closely knit.[12] When the leaders are politicians, the organization seems rather loose and decentralized. In both instances, however, there is a tendency to exaggerate the magnitude of the operation, the number of men under command, and their capabilities.

Whether the general character of an organization is to be centralized or decentralized, very careful attention has first to be paid to the ethnic composition of the country. This consideration is as important in intra-societal warfare as it is in fighting against occupational forces. It has been empirically verified that ethnic groups will tend to cluster within the organizational framework. For example, Poles in French guerrilla units, Jewish partisans in Poland, Germans on the side of the French resistance, and Italians serving under Tito during World War II--all fought in separate units.[13] Although the

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[12]Luigi Longo, Un popolo alla macchia (The marked people) (Verona: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1947), pp. 197, 205; Stanford University, Hoover Institution and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, A Collection of Materials on the Resistance Movement in France, 1940-1944. Box 1-7 (Ts W. W. II Underground. France C 697-Vault), passim; Poland. Komisja Historyczna Polskiego Sztabu Głównego w Londynie, Polskie Siły Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Światowej. Tom III, Armia Krajowa (The Home Army) (Londyn: Instytut Historyczny im. Generała Sikorskiego, 1950-1951), pp. 97-114; contra "The Strategy of Underground Warfare," translated and digested by the Military Review, from an article by Captain Sven Blindheim in Militaer Orientering, Norway, December 15, 1950, Military Review, Vol. 31 (1951), pp. 77-79.

[13]Jewish partizants, see Joseph Tenenbaum, Underground. The Story of a People (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 385-460; Italians in the French underground, see Angelo Tasca, In Francia nella bufera (In France during a hurricane) (Parma: Casa Editrice Guanda, 1953), passim; Italians in Tito's forces, see J. C. G. Reader, "Guerrilla Warfare," The Army Quarterly (1956), pp. 245-251.

goal-value orientation may cut across ethnic groups, there seems to exist a distrust of minorities when the system is in strife. Therefore, the territorial structuring of the organization should show great sensitivity to the ethnic composition.

Generally speaking, the framework of the structure is hinged either on natural topographical features of the territory, or it follows the character and occupation of the population. The latter is very important, since when joining an organization men intuitively follow their previous conditioning and experiences. It is of the utmost importance from the standpoint of effectiveness to utilize manpower in its natural setting. This writer saw guerrilla peasants used on one occasion for street fighting in a large city. Otherwise, very brave men, they cringed at a single shot of rifle fire echoing in the tunnels of the streets. They had no sense of direction, and felt lost. These feelings were shared by city-dwelling sabotage units who found themselves in the country, to the point that a whole unit was lost on one occasion in a wooded area the size of a couple of city blocks. Parenthetically, it might be mentioned that a requirement for an ideal guerrilla type might be that of an ideal cavalry-man, of whom the American General Phil Sheridan said ought to be a bachelor and "properly reckless."

It is of paramount importance to recognize that the membership of all underground organizations is composed solely of volunteers; hence, problems of discipline and sanctions have to be handled with great sensitivity and tact. However, when security is involved, procedures must be extremely ruthless--even if it means fratricide. One interesting feature concerning membership appeared in cross-cultural studies: whatever the ideological objectives of the movement, the upper socio-economic strata supplied very few of the rank-and-file guerrillas; rich peasants were relatively absent, also.[14] The process of recruitment of experts is quite interesting. They are apt to be less discriminating about leadership and its ideological objectives as long as there is an opportunity for them to perform.[15]

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[14]For an example see Enciclopedia Italiana, 1938-1948, p. 687.

[15]K. Riezler, "On the Psychology of Modern Revolution," Social Research, Vol. 10 (1943), pp. 320-336.

It is necessary to make a definite distinction between recruitment of manpower for intra-societal warfare and recruitment of manpower for fighting against occupational forces arriving from a different culture. When organizing a structure designed to fight occupational forces it is mandatory that all sources of personnel data be destroyed prior to the arrival of the enemy. This is to prevent the enemy from identifying potential sources of manpower and equipment.

The size of guerrilla units will depend upon the terrain and the units' assignments. To execute selected officials, ambush small patrols or police posts, or to wreck local economy and transportation--small units of from 10 to 30 men are desirable. But when destroying enemy troops or "holding" an area (to "hold" in this instance means to terrorize, for guerrilla units which attempt to "hold" an area in the conventional sense of the word invite their own immediate destruction), larger units have to be created numbering as many as 600-800 men. One point should be clear--the size of the guerrilla unit is directly related to the frequency of its actions. The larger the unit, the less frequent the engagement. The magnitude of the outcome of a single action of a large unit may be greater, however, the frequency of undertakings will be less than for small units.

Guerrillas, as a general rule, seem to maintain army--specifically infantry--organization, with the smallest unit being a section of from four to six men, and the tactical unit comprising a platoon of ten to thirty men, or a company with eighty to one hundred men.

Past experience indicates that it is useless to speculate as to the time needed for setting up an underground organization with guerrilla units because there are too many variables involved for such a speculation to be meaningful. However, it is possible to do so when a projective study is done of a particular reference group. In the case of the Polish experience during World War II, systematically coordinated guerrilla units began to operate two years from the date of the German invasion.

Prerequisites for Success

By "success" is meant the seizure of power for the purpose of formally pursuing the goal-values and objectives of the organization.

Behavioral scientists interested in the processes of mechanics of revolutionary movements basically agree on several points concerning "success." Their agreement concerns, first, the sequence of stages of development of such organizations. Here are the phases as seen by Gettys:[16]

1. The feeling of general unrest and excitement of individuals.
2. The manifestation of the unrest in terms of group behavior.
3. Formulation of issues (and, according to this writer, symbols).
4. Formation of organizational structure.
5. The climax of the process usually is revolution.

On the last point, we might add that practitioners of some eminence, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, concur.

Lenin and Mao also emphasized the weakness of the "enemy" and his inability to defend himself as the crucial factor of the achievement of success by a revolutionary movement in its final stage of organization.

On the basis of these stated phases of development, any behavioral scientist could speculate on the probabilities of success of an underground movement with the tools of his own specialization. Considering each phase of the development of the movement, structural-functional prerequisites for success could be established. Depending upon the degree of the reduction in depth in analyzing the phenomena--and the training and specialization of the scientist--one could go as far as the fields of neurology, chemistry and genetics in searching for causal relationships.

In considering the prerequisites for success of underground movements attention must be drawn to the scope and depth of inquiry possible in a paper of this length. Therefore, consideration will be limited here to three selected topics which have the most direct bearing upon the success of underground movements from the standpoint of a

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[16]Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," Social Forces, Vol. 28 (1950), pp. 270-279; Louis Gottschalk, "Causes of Revolution," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 50 (1944), pp. 1-8; Feliks Gross, Seizure of Political Power (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), pp. 33-63.

political scientist. They are as important in intra-societal as in inter-societal underground warfare:

1. Motivational factors
2. Support of the indigenous population
3. Sources of supplies abroad.

Men "behave" as they are motivated; therefore, motivational factors should be considered first in any attempt to define the conditions for success of an underground movement. They are of particular importance in studying the success of guerrilla and sabotage units--these units being most exposed to physical destruction, or the direct threat of it.

In an underground movement all men are, as already stated, volunteers. They participate because they want to. There is no legal machinery enforcing their membership. It can be assumed, then, that the personal rewards resulting from joining the movement must be greater than the anticipated consequences of discovery. In the case of guerrilla and sabotage units, those caught with weapons can usually expect immediate death--whether they participate in intra- or inter-societal warfare. However, consequences notwithstanding, men join the units. During the civil war in Greece, 1946-49, guerrilla losses were, on an average, about 1,500 casualties per month--yet voluntary recruitment was at the rate of 2,000 per month.[17]

According to Professor Daniel Katz who was kind enough to allow the use of his views on the motivational patterns of social organization as a base for this analysis, motivational patterns securing the success of any social organization can fall into several categories.[18]

First, are those motivations related to the "integration of internalized patterns with legitimacy." As previously discussed under the section Conditions for Emergence, the rationalization for legitimacy provides formalization of the structure, and also the authority and moral dispensation for the exercise of violence.

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[17]J. C. Murray, Colonel, "The Anti-Bandit War," Marine Corps Gazette (January, 1954), Part 1, p. 20.

[18]Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, 1960-61.

Second, are those motivational patterns which concern rewards. These are of two types: (1) those provided by the system itself, and (2) those related to individual merits. The former are inherent in the status of a fighter. The latter is related to rewards for individual merits, including rank, medals, praise in front of fellow combatants, etc.

Third, are those motivational patterns allowing for internalization, which means an unconscious adoption of standards and values of the group. These, in turn, allow for playing a role, self-expression and identification with the group. This last factor is of utmost importance whenever teamwork is required, particularly in guerrilla and sabotage units.

Ego satisfaction, promotion of one's own values, participation in perceived policy, sharing in activity, and feeling of utilization of one's talents within the organization--all these contribute to the process of internalization (Katz).

Among the specific factors instigating direct aggression by guerrilla and sabotage units, threat seems to play a major role. The intensity of perceived threat might be stimulated at the same time by "the need to resolve a situation filled with an anxiety of continuous anticipation; the risk of physical injury resulting from a tempestuous act may be preferred to the dread of waiting for the unknown to happen."[19] As a logical outgrowth of this statement, the following proposition is submitted here: The more intense the anticipation of terror applied by the opposition suppressing an underground, the more intensive will be the desire of the membership for violent action. Ultimately, the interaction between the two camps is limited to the exchange of violence. In fact, it is possible to reach the point of diminishing return in the application of terror and counter-terror--and that threshold is usually reached sooner by the opponent of the movement, as will be explained later. Anyway, in such a situation the claims of success will reflect the feelings of the participants rather than actual political, strategic, or tactical gains. These phenomena are common in the behavior of guerrilla units.

The incentives of a material nature are virtually absent in underground movements. A penalty of swift death

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[19]McNeil, Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3 (1960), p. 202.

follows the taking of booty or stealing during action. Salaries are not paid except to those who, so to speak, work "full time" in the underground--such as members of guerrilla units and members of the staff. The author, in four years of service in an underground, had financial dealings only in one direction--the paying of monthly dues. Some guerrillas, as he recalls, were paid the stupendous sum of six to nine dollars a month! It should be mentioned, in this connection, that there is a well established custom in most guerrilla units--no matter what the ideals for which they fight, or the culture in which they operate: the automatic pistol, the most precious weapon of the guerrilla, goes to the man who seizes it from the enemy in direct combat. This, and sometimes shoes, go to the victor.

A skillful leader who knows the cultural values of the group will use them most aptly to elicit the appropriate motivational response. For example, Fidel Castro's beard helped him considerably to be identified with Christ by the humble folk. Cubans associated Castro with Christ's suffering--his willingness to die for the cause, and his concern for the "little" people. Castro, as Christ did, is able to articulate the grievances of poor people. This is the manner in which the image can grow and catalyze the response. Castro has done very well in this respect. At least one observer from Cuba reported crowds dancing in the streets singing "Eisenhower ha-ha-ha! Fidel Castro your papa!" The example of identification is a classic one. Even feelings of guilt can be harnessed to serve revolutionary process. According to the same reporter, there was a slogan used by Castro which went like this: "If you did not do anything courageous before, you can do it now."

To conclude the discussion of motivational patterns, it can be said that personality dynamics, cultural values, the perceived threat and opportunities to exercise "flight-or-fight" behavior--all these factors bear upon the motivational output and; ultimately, upon the application of violence in problem solving. Under some conditions an underground movement--particularly the guerrilla units--may indeed serve as a cathartic device to relieve individual and mass frustrations.

A discussion of the motivational patterns of underground movements would not be complete without an assessment of the ability of the leadership to manipulate such patterns.

Here the Chinese experiences indicate the highest degree of sophistication in utilization of the behavioral sciences.[20]

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[20]A particular example from the period of intra-societal Chinese warfare may illustrate the point: When the Chinese People's Army was engaged in the military struggle with the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang's soldiers--when captured by the People's Army--had excellent treatment. After the initial shock of battle had worn away, the captured men were invited to participate in "bitterness-revealing" meetings where the prisoners freely mingled with the soldiers of the People's Army. The utmost sympathy and understanding was extended to the captured men. Since members of both groups were mainly from the peasantry, the voicing of common grievances against landlords, money lenders and foreigners took place. After several of these "bitterness-revealing" meetings the bonds between the groups were evident and an identity of interests and symbols was established. At this point the prisoners were offered three strong alternatives: (1) they could join the People's Army; (2) they had permission to go home--wherever it was; or (3) they could go back and join the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

Initially, the officers in Chiang's army were most pleased to see the men whom they thought captured by the enemy, returning happily to their own units. In a short time, however, a mass defection from these units followed. We can imagine such a man returning to his detachment. His fellow soldiers ask eagerly, "How did they treat you?"

"Oh, very well," he says. "They gave me the choice of joining them, returning to my old unit, or going home."

"Going home?" they query.

"Sure," he answers.

The next day half the unit would be gone.

In the case of captured officers the procedure was similar. They had to undergo indoctrination, and then were offered the three choices. The reaction the Communists desired was the choice by the officer of going home, particularly if his area was still controlled by Chiang's forces. The reason behind this was an expectation that Chiang's administration would not trust these men and would assign some secret forces to watch them, and in this way withdraw trained personnel from following those directly engaged in Communist activities. These two examples illustrate the point that the Chinese, in manipulating individual and group behavior for political purposes, reveal a degree of finesse unknown in democracies of the West. Both examples cited by Anna Louise Strong, The Chinese Conquer China (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1949), pp. 210, 213.

The support of the indigenous population is an indispensable factor for the success of an underground movement. This can be stated in the form of a proposition: The broader the population base of an underground movement, the longer the span of its life--and the greater the probability of its success. It is technically possible to create and maintain for a very short time a guerrilla unit operating in the midst of a population which is hostile to it, but even under the most favourable conditions of climate and terrain, its life span will be very short. A great practitioner of guerrilla warfare, T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, maintained that about two percent of the population is sufficient to organize a revolution, as long as the rest of the population remains sympathetic. Whether this numerical ratio would apply in all cultural settings is questionable, but the validity of the thesis is beyond dispute.

There is no more effective weapon for combating sabotage and guerrilla activities than marshalling attitudes of the local population against them. The inability to do this implies selfishness or inaptitude of political leadership. This has been proven again and again by some of the colonial powers in their dealings with movements demanding social justice and political self-assertion. These powers not only have driven the movements underground, but by applying terror directly against them have fanned the intensity of the movements and stimulated them to counter-violence.

Finally, the third factor guaranteeing the success of an underground movement is a source of support abroad.

The location of governments-in-exile abroad not only provide security for the symbols of "legalism" so important to the membership as a motivational factor, but it also gives the leadership an opportunity to plan and train the cadres and specialists in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility. Approximately 345 special couriers, instructors and various specialists trained in England, were dropped from the Allied planes into Poland during World War II. Their skills were indispensable to the movement.

From abroad the leadership can seek and integrate information about the enemy from a broader range of sources. This is essential for planning effective strategy, and experience has shown that coordination of actions and command decisions within a country can be done more efficiently and more easily from abroad than from local headquarters operating under enemy surveillance.

One disadvantage of leadership from abroad is the difficulty in maintaining control from a distance. During World War II governments-in-exile and the commanders of underground forces within the occupied countries experienced disagreements and, occasionally, local commanders countermanded orders from headquarters. As an illustration, in June 1944, the French general responsible for activities of the French underground issued an order directing the limiting of guerrilla actions. He justified this order by explaining the impossiblity of delivering adequate supplies to the guerrilla units. A week later the central coordinating body of the underground located in occupied France contradicted the general's order, issuing instructions of its own for the intensification of guerrilla fighting.[21]

Nevertheless, the advantages of having the policy-making body abroad more than offsets the difficulty of control, especially because of the opportunities to secure money and equipment--two elements indispensable for the success of the movement.

Although local underground movements can obtain money by issuing bonds, asking for voluntary contributions, imposing taxes, or even robbing banks--these means are really half-measures. In a well developed, systematically operated underground movement employing guerrilla units, a stable source of funds is needed. Friendly governments with an immediate identity of purpose have to be approached by the elite in exile, particularly the elite which has some claim to legality in representing the suppressed population at home. Such a claim gives some assurance of ability to make reimbursements or to grant concessions in the event of a victory.

More than money is needed to keep the underground apparatus in working order. The centers in exile are primarily responsible for the supplying of arms and other equipment necessary for underground warfare.

To maintain their position of power, governments-in-exile must provide supplies to their countrymen. The struggle for power and control being incessant within the movements, the elite abroad who are not responsive at least to the physical demands of the fighting membership

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[21]Hoover Institution and Library, A Collection of Materials on the Resistance Movement in France, Folder 10, no. 4, p. 7.

are apt to find they represent no one. To prevent this from happening, the elite abroad frequently makes commitments to foreign governments which scarcely can be in keeping with the aspirations of the membership of the underground they represent.

Delivery of weapons into the hands of guerrilla and sabotage units can be a more difficult problem than securing money--a further reason for dependence on other nations. To sustain consistent efforts on the part of these specialists in violence, weapons, ammunition and medicine must be supplied regularly.[22] During March and May, 1944, the Soviet Air Force made more than 900 flights each month delivering supplies to guerrilla and sabotage units deep behind German lines.[23] Allied drops of supplies to Duropean undergrounds during World War II amounted to hundreds of thousands of pounds. Deliveries on such a scale require systematic and detailed planning based on a thorough knowledge of technical capabilities of the supply system.[24] It would be most difficult to organize these deliveries in a country in strife.

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[22]William C. Wilkinson, Lieutenant Colonel, "Problems of a Guerrilla Leader," Military Review, Vol. 32 (1952), p. 27.

[23]"Atomic War and Partisants," translated and digested by the Military Review from an article by a former Soviet officer in "Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung" Germany, 1956, Military Review, Vol. 37 (1957), p. 106.

[24]The United States soldier, under combat conditions, uses 37 pounds of supplies per day, including:

6 pounds of equipment
5 pounds of fuel and oil
20 pounds of ammunition
6 pounds of miscellaneous supplies--from bubble gum to toilet paper

If guerrillas used supplies on a comparable scale, 25,000 men would use one million pounds per day. This amount of supplies would require 400 two and one-half ton trucks for transport. Murray, Marine Corps Gazette (April, 1954), Part 4, p. 58. Obviously, guerrillas are denied this kind of comfort. Yet, indispensable equipment can weigh thousands of tons. The French underground alone, during World War II, received 300,000 rifles and machine pistols, and someone had to arrange for their purchase and delivery. Account made by Ferdinand Otto Miksche, Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 148, note 1.

In conclusion, the presence of authorized centers abroad representing underground movements are indispensable for the maintenance of symbols of legality, providing overall strategy, collecting money, training specialists and controlling logistics--particularly for the benefit of units engaged in direct action. This is valid, whether the conflict is inter- or intra-societal.

Operational Strategy and Tactics

No other form of warfare demands such a precise assessment of capabilities in strategic planning as does guerrilla activity, and in no other form of warfare is this principle so often broken. The usual order of procedure for committing the conventional ground forces to action is: strategy, tactics, and weapon requirements. But with guerrillas the procedure is practically reversed: upon the availability of weapons and the tactical possibilities rests the consideration of strategy. The number of variables bearing upon the choice of strategy can be classified and refined to a point requiring the use of a computer for collation and correlation. However, in this paper they are assembled in six major categories:

1. Strength of the group (ratio of membership to available weapons)
2. Attitude of the indigenous people
3. Strength of the enemy
4. Terrain and climate
5. Coordination, when possible, with the conventional forces of an ally.
6. Length of time between inception of the organization and the anticipated outbreak of the revolution.

Upon the assessment of these categories by the leadership, three major decisions have to be made. First, should the strategy be based upon activities covering the whole territory, or upon activities in limited areas only? Second, under which conditions will action occur, under whose orders, and coordinated by whom? The third decision concerns the priority of strategic objectives.

Whether warfare is directed against an unpopular regime or against occupying forces, the priority of assigned objectives for underground activity immediately reflects the strategic posture taken by the elite of the movement.

Basically, there are four strategic objectives of an underground: (1) to undermine the strength of the enemy, (2) to enhance the solidarity of the in-group, (3) to prepare for a general uprising, and (4) to gain control of the territory by revolution. Each of these objectives calls for different kinds of activities by guerrillas and for the assignment of different types of operational targets. The objectives can be pursued at the same time, in the stated sequence, or in any order of priority most suitable to the demand of the moment.

In connection with strategic planning, utmost attention must be given to the cultural values of the groups in conflict because often these values--as much as the capabilities--affect the choice of strategy. Poles, for example, have a natural propensity to engage in premature and politically unprepared uprisings. This should illustrate the point that cultural values (folkways, habits, mores and symbols) should be given the closest attention as factors possibly influencing strategy.

Tactics, now, require some attention. This writer would formulate tactical principles for guerrilla operations in the following manner:

Do

1. Be on the offensive.
2. Show the enemy by all possible means, "We don't like you and we are everywhere."
3. Act only by surprise.
4. Preserve mobility; an old Chinese tactical rule says, "Move while attacking, attack while moving."[25]
5. Imagination is the means to success. Soviet partisans captured a German general, carrying him out of his headquarters rolled in a rug.
6. Coordinate actions with overall strategy.
7. Take care that food, shelter, camouflage and the enemy are as near each other as possible.
8. Establish supply bases in the area of operations far in advance.

Under all circumstances avoid:

1. Antagonizing the local population
2. Undertaking positional warfare.
3. Camping in valleys.

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[25]Han Wu-ti 140 B. C.

The tactical assignments of guerrilla units may vary considerably: They can be used to disrupt communications and transportation, to gather intelligence, for killing or kidnapping enemy elite and collaborators, to protect downed pilots of an ally, to protect the indigenous population against banditry, to protect local industry and natural resources from exploitation by the enemy, and, when possible, from the enemy's troops.

If out of historical empirical data concerning the tactical employment of guerrillas one compressed sentence concerning tactical doctrine could be drawn, it should be this: If, during a guerrilla attack, the enemy has a chance to reload his weapons, the action should be considered unsuccessful and be abandoned.

In terms of group behavior, guerrilla units do not represent the noblest human motivations in action. Quite often the unit is a sewer of personal frustrations which have nothing to do with patriotism. The local commander manipulates guerrillas either by providing operational incentives geared to local issues, or keeps the ideological objectives so broadly defined that they can encompass the latent content of all the guerrillas' aspirations. "Social justice" for a peasant guerrilla craving for land of his own will have one connotation, while the same term will be interpreted quite differently by an idealistically inspired student of sociology who shivers in the rain together with the peasant while waiting in the forest to blast the car of an enemy official.

Preserving discipline of such units is often a problem because of the voluntary nature of the service. This is a subject which requires further study. The Chinese Communists tightened the discipline in proportion to the size of the unit, which seems logical.[26] Also their small units had what appeared to be the largest degree of participation of the membership in policy-making on the tactical level of any underground studied by the author.

One concluding observation concerning strategy and tactics might be useful. Guerrilla fighting is probably the most vicious form of human warfare. Under situations of particular stress, guerrillas kill not only their prisoners, but even their own wounded. The latter practice

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[26]Robert B. Rigg, Red China's Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Telegraph Press, 1951), p. 226.

is not used by any conventional forces in the front line. The intensity of feelings involved and the sacrifices incurred are peculiar to guerrilla fighting. What is the reward? Is it worthwhile? The assessment of the impact of the guerrillas and of underground activities upon the enemy may answer these questions.

Impact of Guerrilla Activities upon the Enemy

How effective are undergrounds in their employment of violence as a means for changing the status quo? Since 1945 the form of government and/or political elite changed in eight countries--through the application of planned violence (China, Israel, Egypt, Vietnam, Turkey, Iraq, Cuba, and Laos).

There are active underground movements in at least eleven countries at this time--Algeria, South Africa, Argentina, China, Spain, South Korea, Kenya, Portugal, Venezuela, Guatemala and Malaya. There are also "dormant" undergrounds (in terms of aspirations and traditional ways of fulfilling them) in at least ten countries of Eastern and Central Europe within the direct sphere of Soviet influence.[27]

In this writer's opinion, the effectiveness of guerrilla violence does not lie in the strategic and tactical capabilities expressed in the number of enemy killed or equipment captured. True, they inflict losses upon the enemy, engage his garrisons, and in the case of internal strife they, in addition, embarrass the regime. In the light of comparative statistics guerrillas never win a battle large enough to decide the outcome in a struggle for power. Inevitably, the balance of losses in manpower is never in favor of the guerrillas because the enemy usually directs his reprisals against the local population. Population losses should be included in the count of guerrilla losses for the reason that this same population is the only source of manpower and the main source of physical and moral support for the guerrillas. The leaders are reluctant to include the population in the balance sheets of their losses and gains. Yet the problem of losses in the population should not be disregarded. There were many occasions during World War II when a guerrilla unit killed, let us say, eight to ten enemy

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[27] J. K. Zawodny, "Unexplored Realms of Underground Strife," The American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 2-5.

soldiers or policemen. Enemy security forces then would herd the people of the nearest village into their homes and burn them--men, women, and children. In one instance 700 peasants were killed in this manner. The point here is not to belittle the tactical effectiveness of guerrilla activities, but to illustrate the consequences not always included in evaluating their success!

When coordinated with conventional forces, guerrillas can be devastating. One the night of June 19, 1944 Soviet guerrilla and sabotage units broke German lines of communication and supply routes at more than 9,000 points. Then the Soviet offensive smashed through the area.[28]

Guerrilla activities can drain enemy manpower and resources.[29] All of these guerrilla achievements, however, do not adequately explain the guerrillas' contribution to success in changing the political status quo. It is not their tactical actions which are of paramount importance. THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION OF GUERRILLAS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER LIES IN CATALYZING AND INTENSIFYING COUNTER-TERROR EXERCISED BY THE ENEMY, WHICH FURTHER ALIENATES HIM FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION.

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[28]Frank A. Gleason, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, "Unconventional Forces--the Commander's Untapped Resources," Military Review, Vol. 39 (1959), p. 26; Larry L. Wolff, First Lieutenant, "The Soviet Partisan Movement," Military Review, Vol. 35 (1955), p. 46.

[29]For example, thirty thousand Algerian patriots, only a fraction of them employing guerrilla warfare, tied approximately 400,000 French soldiers in Algeria for a period of several years. During the Korean conflict, at one time, three United Nations divisions had to be employed in anti-guerrilla action. In the summer of 1942 on the Soviet front, German forces employed 144 battalions of SS troops and 15 field divisions solely for the purpose of pursuing guerrillas.

Guerrillas can control a section of territory, particularly during the night, so effectively that the enemy does not venture out of his fortified lodgings. To illustrate, the Swiss Minister who was sent during World War II on business into the Vichy region, to secure personal safety, equipped himself with two passes--one from the German general in that part of the territory, and another from the French colonel who commanded the local guerrilla units.

The enemy, whether in intra- or inter-societal warfare, does not reveal political acumen or sophistication by driving the opponent underground. Following the pattern of all regimes in power and on the defensive, the enemy will relegate the responsibility for dealing with the underground either to military forces or security agencies. These groups deal with the guerrillas by using the only methods available to them--those involving force. Because the guerrillas themselves are too elusive, the counter-violence falls on the lifeline of the guerrillas and their source of manpower--the local population. Reprisals begin.

This is what the underground's political leaders expect. There is no better way to alienate the regime from the population than to incite him to apply terror. Guerrillas serve this purpose eminently.

Any counter-terror of the enemy brings new recruits, escaping from reprisals or wishing revenge, to the ranks of the underground. In this way the movement perpetuates itself. The ebb and flow of membership in sabotage and guerrilla units is not related to the number of tactical victories of these units, to their losses, nor even to the prospects for success. The rate of recruitment is positively correlated with the intensity of terror applied by the enemy in suppressing the movement.

Tactical capability for physical destruction is not the primary contribution of guerrillas in accomplishing political change, but rather the importance lies in the ability of the guerrillas to induce the regime to counter-activities of violence and terror which alienate it from the population. This is of particular significance in intra-societal warfare. It is in this instance that guerrillas exercise the greatest impact upon the regime, and it is in this respect that the enemy first reaches the point of diminishing return from the application of terror. The more terror he applies, the more underground fighters he will produce.[30]

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[30]Italy. Presidenza del Consiglio. Ufficio Storico per la Guerra di Liberazione. Atti del Comando Generale Corpo della Liberta dalla sua costituzione all insurrezione nazionale, giugno 1944-aprile 1945 (The actions of the General Command of the Voluntary Corps of Liberation from its establishment to the national insurrection, June 1944-April 1945), doc. 15, p. 29; Leo Valiani, Tutte le strade conducono a Roma (All roads lead to Rome) (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1947), p. 171; Komisja Historyczna Polskiego Sztabu Głównego w Londynie, Armia Krajowa (Home Army), p. 433; Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, Secret Army (London: Victor Gollancz, 1951), p. 150.

Impact upon the Membership

Mass participation in overtly organized violence has profound effects upon the leaders, the rank and file of underground and guerrilla units, and upon the operational values of the society. Some of these effects are of particular interest to the political scientist.

The elite of undergrounds are in a most unique position as power-wielders. The requirements of secrecy enable them to maintain a monopoly of control without the responsibility of accounting to the public or the members of the underground. This situation is conducive to bitter political infighting, particularly in intra-societal strife. It is much easier for an unscrupulous elite to deal with political opposition competing for power in conditions of clandestine strife than within the peaceful conditions of the democratic process. During World War II there were several instances of denunciations to the common enemy in order to remove political competitors in the underground.

A cross-cultural inquiry appears to indicate that "politicians" and the "military" each have particular characteristics affecting the process of the formation and structure of an underground organization. The "politicians" seem to be prone to use their power for settling old accounts with political enemies. The "military" men act initially in an unreflective and rather spontaneous fashion. They tend to organize fighting units, search for "soft spots" of the enemy, and engage in direct fighting. Intuitively, the military elite appear to perceive the infighting of the politicians, and are consequently reluctant to relinquish leadership to those with political backgrounds.

The task of acquiring a position of power is always easier for those military leaders who are directly engaged in guerrilla activities. They do not need, as political leaders do, to be anonymous for security reasons. To the contrary, they build around themselves an atmosphere of heroism, sacrifice and success. These elements help the populace to identify with them. Nothing captures popular imagination so well as does successful violence.

Guerrilla units have an extremely high rate of resilience. A unit of conventional forces which suffers more than 50 per cent in losses would scarcely be able to function effectively. This is not the case with guerrillas. Even without immediate replacements, a guerrilla unit is still able to undertake action, or merely by its presence in an area, gives the impression of being able to do so.

There is one distinct difference between undergrounds organized by Communists and those of other political shadings. Communists in all cultural settings make a conscious effort to obtain the sympathy and support of intellectuals. The Chinese Communists were most flexible in changing the symbols and verbalization of objectives in order to gain support of intellectuals, and to appear as their spokesmen. This is not necessarily the case with non-Communist movements. Regardless of the political setting, the propostion of guerrillas with higher education is relatively small.

In spite of the hardships suffered by all members of a movement during the struggle for ultimate victory, there are a large number of individuals who--even with victory--do not find the satisfaction they expect. The elite and their allies anticipate this and are watchful of the time when they are compelled to state with precision their political and social programs. As a rule, they try to disarm the underground--particularly the guerrilla units--before a program is announced. Underground fighters sense this, and are usually reluctant to yield their weapons until their political aspirations are satisfied.

Allied Forces in Italy had considerable difficulty in retrieving arms from Italian partisans. In many instances Allied Forces began disarming Italian guerrillas at the moment of their arrival in an area. There were cases where the men who did not surrender the arms with which they had "fought Nazis" had to be jailed. Italian partisans felt profound discontent when many of their demands were not satisfied and they complained that the Allies treated German prisoners with more consideration than they accorded former Italian partisans. Although the underground was disbanded in Poland after World War II, it strove to retain its network of command and its weapons. In China the Communist guerrillas were not disbanded, but generally absorbed into the armed forces of the Chinese People's Republic. This practice was also followed to some degree in liberated France and Italy in the Second World War. Long after the war was over there were some active guerrilla units in the Soviet Union.

In view of the feelings and attitudes of the guerrillas in giving up their weapons prior to fulfillment of their expectations an instruction in a current U. S. Army manual dealing with unconventional warfare sounds a bit naive:

> As friendly conventional forces move into the areas of the guerrilla operations, the ability of guerrilla forces to support military operation gradually ceases. At this time the guerrilla organization should be demobilized without delay.[31]

It is to be hoped that this part of the instructions will be amended, unless, of course, we want to have behind our lines a reservoir of bitter and disappointed guerrillas. The disarmament of such units by an ally is a political decision, not a tactical one, and should be handled on the level of high command and not by company or battalion commanders.

Undergrounds, and particularly guerrilla units, are frustration groups and when threatened they may turn their weapons on the source of the threat--any source.

Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide satisfaction to all the members of an underground movement, a successful revolution will breed immediately a core of dissatisfied men who form the nucleus of another movement. The natural course of such a movement, reinforced by the previous conditioning experience of the members, will be to rely on violence again.

The existence of an underground is evidence of the breakdown of social order, and when this occurs there is considerable alteration of the operational values of the society. What was a crime before the struggle can become exemplary behavior during the strife. Stealing or destroying any property that may be of use to the enemy, or slowing production not only becomes respectable, but also a moral obligation. The modification of values affects the process of socialization of the generation growing up while the underground activities are in progress. Violence becomes a part of conditioning and an acceptable means of problem-solving for generations to come. This psychological post-revolutionary effect persists in societies which have a propensity to verbalize their political objectives in terms of "principles." This is in contrast with the precision of the target-values supplied by the Communists. For example, during the Chinese civil war the Communist

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[31]U. S. Department of the Army. Headquarters. Department of the Army Field Manual. Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 131.

party was able to assess the grievances of every social stratum and appeal to specific groups in terms of their own problems. American leadership has been chronically unable to achieve this in cross-cultural relations. Grievances traversing all social strata of Communist China were employed successfully. For example, the Communists promoted vehemently the status of women, stressing specific areas of problems and desirable remedies--the freedom of choosing a mate, equal political participation, and the right to own land.

Conclusion

Underground organizations engaging in violence to promote their political aims are symptoms of despair--despair which can be rooted in many motivational causes.

There is a tendency nowadays to explain all political phenomena, particularly in the realm of international politics, in terms of the struggle between "Communists" and "non-Communists." We forget that behind human actions are human needs crying for satisfaction.

Insights into human motivations, capabilities, and needs in a given cultural setting can provide the key to understanding the behavior of underground and guerrilla groups. The imposition of stereotyped labels on groups in violent strife is pointless.

Such groups usually are conscious of great social responsibility. They act "on behalf" of symbols and they "stand for" symbols. Their feelings are strong and they are willing to die for the cause. Human feelings cannot be divided into "Communist" and "non-Communist" categories; nor do people die for "facts." They fight and die because of their perceptions of the facts and the feelings they have about them.

Subversive activities using violence may occur throughout the spectrum of conflict--before the formal declaration of war, during war, and even after the war--when the conventional forces of the defeated cease to exist. The persistence of this existence is due to unaccommodated needs and objectives. These are almost always the catalysts of further violence. It is unlikely that nuclear war would eliminate post-war underground activity.

The governments of the Soviet Union and China recognize the importance of human aspirations, feelings and needs in the formation of the mass clandestine movements

geared to the seizure of political power. Special research institutions employing social scientists collate data on this subject and feed it to those governments for policy-making purposes.

It was Mao Tse-tung who said, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Man holds the rifle and he can point it in many directions. Judging from the sophistication of Chinese and Soviet official doctrines and pronouncements about guerrilla and subversive warfare, they are fully aware of the importance of motivations and socio-political objectives of the MAN behind the rifle. Their social scientists interpret this kind of warfare in terms of scientific inquiry into human behavior. We, on the other hand, seem to be consistently preoccupied with tactics, strategy and hardware and leave the problem of guerrillas to military men.

The tendency of our political leaders to bequeath our military men with the problem of combating guerrillas and resistance movements is an evasion of the basic question. Leadership with vision should ask: "Why are the guerrillas there?" "Why did the underground emerge in the first place?" American soldiers have every right to defend themselves when attacked, and to secure stable conditions behind their own lines. But guerrilla and sabotage warfare are primarily problems in political behavior, not tactical problems. This thesis is particularly important when the organization of an underground is being considered.[32]

We are going to see an ever-increasing utilization of violent subversive activities as an instrument of acquiring political influence. This type of mass warfare can employ people of both sexes and all ages. It is a mass "weapon." It is relatively cheap to use, materially; hence it will be the future weapon of technically underdeveloped countries.

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[32]Grace A. de Laguna, "Culture and Rationality," American Anthropologist, Vol. 51 (1949), pp. 379-391; C. R. Strother, "Methods of Modifying Behavior," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 1 (1945), pp. 46-52; T. Reik, "Aggression from Anxiety," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 22 (1941), pp. 7-16.

An honest and dispassionate assessment of the aspirations, both latent and claimed, of the MAN behind the guerrilla's rifle or saboteur's gun should be considered by those who make policy. Matching and overmatching guerrillas rifle-for-rifle will not do. The mind controls the gun. In the context of the guerrilla's mind lies the means to achieve his cooperation or his defeat.[33]

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[33]It is suggested that a research institute under academic auspices be established, for the sole purpose of analyzing political and organizational behavior of guerrilla and subversive organizations. The focus should be on selected cultural groups in frustration and under stress. Data could be tabulated and stored in a manner permitting efficient access. Such an institute should be staffed by an interdisciplinary team of social scientists. The range of investigation could be limited to the following problems bearing upon subversive behavior:

1. Integration of the available body of theories and empirically validated hypotheses in the social sciences bearing upon behavior of underground and guerrilla units.
2. Development of methodology for discerning the sources of tensions in other cultures from a distance.
3. Study of cross-cultural symbols for group identification.
4. Psychological barriers to communication in task-sharing groups.
5. Group dynamics under the stress and escalation of conflict.
6. Decision-making under stress and its correlation with typology of leadership.
7. Personality dynamics and political behavior in conflict situations.
8. Controlling factors in human motivation with regard to cooperation.
9. Manipulative techniques of small group behavior under stress.
10. The integrative process of group behavior under stress.
11. Small group model building for the purpose of testing hypothetical situations.

Already there is a considerably body of the research done in some of these areas. What is needed now is a systematic and sustained effort in collation of the data in order to fill the gaps in knowledge and to draw conclusions concerning human behavior under specific conditions of intra- or inter-societal strife.

The findings would not only expand the body of knowledge of political behavior, but would also serve as empirically certified data for policy-making in relation to unconventional warfare.

This idea is respectfully submitted to our Government and to my academic colleagues for consideration. Upon our ability to deal with, channel, and manipulate guerrilla and "subversive" movements may depend our national survival.